Theory of War: Research Paper Prompt
The central task of the research paper assignment is for you to apply the course’s theoretical
principles to real-world cases.
There are multiple ways you can link course ideas and empirical cases. If you are interested in a
particular region, such as the Middle East, your starting point may be identifying your paper’s
empirical focus (perhaps the Iran-Iraq War). In contrast, you may be attracted to a substantive
focus first (such as the degree to which technology constrains strategy). Regardless of your
starting point, you will have to pin down both parts of the paper early in the project—both your
empirical and theoretical interests.
In the following pages we lay out one approach to the research paper, as well as information
regarding the assignment timeline and submission details.
1) Select empirical focus
As mentioned, you could start the research and writing process in many ways. One method is
first selecting your empirical focus, the historical case study you are seeking to understand.
Appendix A at the end of this prompt includes a starter list of “war cases,” including:
 World War I (& specific campaigns)
 The Vietnam War
 World War II (& specific campaigns)
 The 1991 Gulf War
You might choose to focus on one of these war events. Or, your regional or substantive interests,
or notes from Addington, might lead you to focus on another.
2) Narrow in on research question
(A) Topic: Once you have established your empirical focus, you can start thinking in terms of a
theoretical topic. Scanning the syllabus, you can see potential topics:
 Purpose of war
 Types of strategy
 Violence in war
 Victory
 Constraints on strategy
 Etc.
(B) Research question: After this initial consideration, reframe the topic of interest so that it
reads as a research question. This is a key step in developing the research paper. Were you to
think about the research paper only in terms of “writing about your topic,” you could easily fall
into the trap of writing a descriptive paper—describing the historical event rather than applying
theoretical material to critically analyze the event.
For instance, you might be interested in the topic of “technology.” One interesting research
question would then be: “Is technology the reason why the U.S. won the 1991 Gulf War?”
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Formulating a clear question will focus your research and writing. It will also be attractive to the
reader, who will have a clear sense of the question your paper sets out to answer or on which it
will provide insight.
(C) Engaging course theories: Once you have the research question, consider our course
readings—how would different scholars reply to and think about that question?
Your research paper can engage these theories/logics in different ways. It could:
 Explain the outcome of your empirical case using a theory
 Evaluate a theory using your empirical case: is the theory consistent with the events in
your case (hence the case supports and strengthens the theory), or is the theory at odds
with the events (hence the case contradicts and weakens the theory)
 Qualify/constrain a theory, by showing that it operates only under particular
circumstances (in one case but not another, due to circumstances), or
 Compare how well two theories explain war dynamics in your case, and then decide
which better explains the case.
Again, there are multiple ways to execute the paper, and meetings with us can help you decide
which path to go down. In addition, as you start diving into the empirical material, you will
likely adapt the research question and paper’s organization.
3) Apply theory to empirical material
At this point, you have your empirical focus and research question, and you have determined
which course theories/logics are related to that topic. Now it is time to dig into the evidence to
carry out your paper’s task—explaining the outcome of the case, or supporting, critiquing,
qualifying, or comparing theories with the help of evidence from your historical case(s).
Consult with us to determine good starting points for research and evidence collection on your
case. Appendix A provides suggested starter readings on possible war events. But in general,
sources for information might include:
 Peer-reviewed journals. In political science, international relations, and military history,
a list of prominent peer-reviewed journals includes:
International Security
War in History
International Organization
Journal of Strategic Studies
Journal of Conflict Resolution
International Studies Quarterly
Journal of Peace Research
Security Studies
Journal of Military History
Armed Forces & Society
For instance, you visit http://library.gwu.edu/, click the ArticlesPlus tab, and conduct an
advanced search for keyword “World War I” and publication “International Security.”
 University-Press books. University presses publish the best scholarly book-length
manuscripts. When you turn to a book’s copyright page and see that the manuscript has
been published by Cambridge, Oxford, Princeton, Harvard, Columbia, or Cornell
University Press, for example, that is a signal that the research is of a very high quality.
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

Dissertations. Dissertations are good sources for evidence on cases that may not be
researched thoroughly in existing scholarly work. While you will likely find an
abundance of journal articles and books devoted to studying grand strategy in WWII, you
may find less on more recent or marginal events. You can go to http://library.gwu.edu/,
click on the left sidebar link “Most Popular Databases,” select “ProQuest” (All
Databases), and filter by “Dissertations & Theses.”
Other. Other sources for evidence might include declassified government documents,
war memoirs, International Crisis Group reports, or quantitative data on variables of
interest (such as World Bank data on domestic economies).
4) Make inferences, draw conclusions
The goal of the research paper is for you to apply theoretical course material to real world events
that beg deconstruction and analysis. Your paper will not be able to definitively judge whether
Clausewitz provides a one hundred percent, true-to-life, account of strategy in war. However, as
a result of your analysis, you should be able to show whether and how one or a set of course
theories illuminate the empirical case(s) on which you have focused.
Make sure your paper goes beyond merely describing events – it should focus on an
argument or an inference. This will usually mean answering a question of why rather then merely
a question of what, and this will normally require that you advance a finding that cannot simply
be observed as a fact about the event. For example, “the United States used stealth technology in
the 1991 Gulf War” is a factual observation that merely describes a facet of the war. “The United
States won the war because it used stealth technology,” by contrast, is an argument based on
inference – to establish its validity requires you to reason beyond the observable facts (i.e. which
aircraft technology the U.S. used) to an analytical conclusion about why the war came out the
way it did. Your paper will need to do the latter. Similarly, if your paper asks “is Clausewitz’s
theory or Sun Tsu’s theory more consistent with the outcome of the 1991 Gulf War?” then you
will have to do more than simply report facts about the war, and you will have to do more than
just describe the two theories. You will have to make an argument about which theory better
accounts for the facts and why. Of course your paper may consider different questions and make
different arguments than these examples. But whatever question you choose and whatever
answer you reach for it, be sure that your paper makes inferences and draws conclusions to
sustain an argument, rather than merely describing factual events.
5) Details
(A) Fine print: The paper should be at least 15 pages and follow these conventions:
 Double-spaced
 1” margins
 Times, 12pt font
 Header containing student last name and page number
There is no upper limit on length, but good English style demonstrates economy; length per se is
not a virtue, and excessive verbiage will not be rewarded!
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(B) Citation: Chose either Chicago, APA, or MLA citation style and follow it consistently. Visit
https://owl.english.purdue.edu/owl/section/2/ for detailed information on citation style.
Intentional or unintentional plagiarism is not acceptable and we will follow GWU’s academic
integrity violations procedure should we discover any instances.
(C) Assignment timeline:
Part
Outline
Description
Schedule an office hours meeting with
Dot the week before or after spring break.
Bring a 1-page document describing your:
-- empirical focus
-- topic; research question
-- initial identification of theories
connected to your research question
Submission
Email Dot
dasmith@gwu.edu
a copy of your 1pager on the day of
the office hours
meeting
Evaluation
Not graded
Late Policy
No consequence, but
it is assumed this
meeting will be
extremely beneficial
to your paper’s
development.
Draft 1
Complete 15-page draft. You should
approach this as if it were the final draft,
pushing as far as you can to execute the
full research paper.
Two hard copies
delivered at the
start of class on
April 9
30% of final
term paper
grade
Final
Draft
15-page final paper reflecting significant
revisions that respond to our comments
on the first draft.
Two hard copies
delivered to ESIA
605E by 5 pm on
April 22
70% of final
term paper
grade
Draft will be graded
on merit and then
incur 1/3 grade
deduction for each
day late.
Final will be graded
on merit and then
incur 1/3 grade
deduction for each
day late.
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Appendix A: Suggested Paper Topics and Starter Readings
Grand Strategy in World War I
 Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray, Military Effectiveness, Vol. I (Boston: Allen and
Unwin, 1988), pp. 31-115, 190-228, 249-350
 Paul Kennedy, Grand Strategies in War and Peace (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1991), pp.
31-42, 105-24, 124-44
 Michael Geyer, “German Strategy in the Age of Machine Warfare,” in Peter Paret, ed.,
Makers of Modern Strategy (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1986), pp. 527-54, 594-7
The 1918 Campaign in the West
 Martin Samuels, Command or Control? Command, Training and Tactics in the British and
German Armies, 1888-1918 (London: Cass, 1995), esp. pp. 230-69
 Paddy Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Western Front (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1994)
 Shelford Bidwell and Dominick Graham, Firepower: British Army Weapons and Theories of
War, 1904-45 (Boston and London: George Allen and Unwin, 1985), pp. 61-146
Grand Strategy in World War II
 Paul Kennedy, Grand Strategies in War and Peace (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1991), pp.
43-70, 105-24, 124-44
 Michael Geyer, “German Strategy in the Age of Machine Warfare,” in Peter Paret, ed.,
Makers of Modern Strategy (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1986), pp. 554-597
 Maurice Matloff, “Allied Strategy in Europe, 1939-1945,” in Paret, Makers of Modern
Strategy, pp. 677-702
 D. Clayton James, “American and Japanese Strategies in the Pacific War,” in Paret, Makers
of Modern Strategy, pp. 703-32
 J. R. M. Butler, et al., Grand Strategy (London, H. M. Stationery Off., 1956), selections
 Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942
[--1943-1944] (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Dept. of the Army,
1953-59), selections
The Normandy Campaign, 1944
 L.F. Ellis, Victory in the West, Volume I: The Battle of Normandy (London: Her Majesty's
Stationery Office, 1962), selections
 Martin Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military
History, 1961), selections
 Carlo D’Este, Decision in Normandy (New York: Harper Perennial, 1991 ed. of 1983 orig.),
selections
 Max Hastings, Overlord (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984)
The Pacific Campaign, 1941-5
 Ronald H. Spector, Eagle Against the Sun: the American War with Japan (New York: Free
Press, 1985), selections
 Dan Van der Vat, The Pacific Campaign: World War II, the U.S.-Japanese Naval War, 19411945 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991)
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
Gerhard Weinberg, A World at Arms (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1994), pp. 310-48,
391-4, 632-56, 842-93
Grand Strategy in the Vietnam War
 Guenter Lewy, America in Vietnam (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1978), pp. 3-222
 Andrew Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1986),
pp. 3-26, 258-75
 Robert J. McMahon, Major Problems in the History of the Vietnam War (Lexington, MA:
Heath, 1990), pp. 98-107, 108-116, 281-93, 294-300, 332-347
 Douglas Pike, “Conduct of the Vietnam War: Strategic Factors, 1965-68,” and Allen E.
Goodman, “The Dual-Track Strategy of Vietnamization and Negotiation,” in John Schlight,
ed., The Second Indochina War: Proceedings of a Symposium held at Airlie, Virginia, 7-9
November 1984 (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 1986), pp. 99119 and 143-65, respectively
The Invasion of Cambodia, 1970
 Jeffrey J. Clarke, Advice and Support : the Final Years, 1965-1973 (Washington, D.C.:
Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 1988), pp. 418-25
 Andrew Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1986),
pp. 3-26, 258-75
 William Shawcross, Sideshow (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979)
Operation ROLLING THUNDER, 1965-8
 Robert Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press,
1996), pp. 174-210
 Mark Clodfelter, The Limits of Airpower: The American Bombing of North Vietnam (New
York: Free Press, 1989), pp. 39-146
 William Momyer, Air Power in Three Wars (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Air Force,
1978), pp. 13-34
 Guenter Lewy, America in Vietnam (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1978), pp. 374-406,
416-7
Grand Strategy in the 1991 Gulf War
 Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, The Gulf Conflict, 1990-1991: Diplomacy and War
in the New World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993)
 Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor, The Generals' War (Boston: Little, Brown, 1995), pp.
4-101, 153-8, 178-202, 427-32, 443-77
Operation DESERT STORM, 1991
 Eliot A. Cohen, Director, Gulf War Air Power Survey (Washington, D.C.: U.S. G.P.O., 1993),
Summary Report
 Robert H. Scales, Jr., et al., Certain Victory: The United States Army in the Gulf War
(Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, 1993), pp. 103-316
 Stephen Biddle, “Victory Misunderstood: What the Gulf War Tells Us About the Future of
Conflict,” International Security, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Fall 1996), pp. 139-179
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