Indefinite Detention Affirmative – ADI

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Indefinite Detention AFF
Indefinite Detention Affirmative – ADI
Indefinite Detention Affirmative – ADI ............................................................................................................................ 1
***1AC .......................................................................................................................................................................... 3
Advantage 1: Terrorism ................................................................................................................................................................ 4
Advantage 2: Leadership .............................................................................................................................................................. 7
Plan .............................................................................................................................................................................................19
Solvency ......................................................................................................................................................................................20
***Solvency ................................................................................................................................................................. 23
Ext – Congressional Action Solves/ A2: Executive Restraint ......................................................................................................24
Ext – Legitimacy ..........................................................................................................................................................................26
Ext – Key to Terrorism ................................................................................................................................................................27
Ext – Conviction Rate ..................................................................................................................................................................28
AT – Courts Inexperienced..........................................................................................................................................................29
AT – Light Sentences ...................................................................................................................................................................30
AT – Can’t Detain Suspects .........................................................................................................................................................31
AT – Miranda Problems ..............................................................................................................................................................32
AT – Wartime ..............................................................................................................................................................................33
AT – Prisoner Escape ..................................................................................................................................................................34
AT – National Security ................................................................................................................................................................35
*** Terrorism Advantage.............................................................................................................................................. 36
UQ: Nuclear Terrorism Inevitable...............................................................................................................................................37
Internal Link: Motivation ............................................................................................................................................................38
Internal Link: Distrust .................................................................................................................................................................39
Internal Link: Cooperation ..........................................................................................................................................................40
Impact: Nuclear Terror – Retaliation ..........................................................................................................................................41
*** Leadership Advantage ............................................................................................................................................ 42
UQ: Heg Sustainable ...................................................................................................................................................................43
Internal Link: Human Rights Cred ...............................................................................................................................................46
Internal Link: Soft Power ............................................................................................................................................................48
Internal Link: Allies .....................................................................................................................................................................50
Impact: Credibility – Heg ............................................................................................................................................................51
Impact: Soft Power – Laundry List ..............................................................................................................................................52
Indefinite Detention Negative – ADI.............................................................................................................................. 53
***A2: Solvency ........................................................................................................................................................... 54
Congress Fails – Executive Power Key ........................................................................................................................................55
Civilian Courts Fail—Laundry List ...............................................................................................................................................56
Civilian Courts Fail—Erodes Legal Systsem ................................................................................................................................57
Civilian Court Fails—Can’t Prosecute .........................................................................................................................................58
Civilian Courts Bad—Terorism ....................................................................................................................................................59
***A2: Terrorism Advantage ........................................................................................................................................ 61
A2: Link—Detention Doesn’t Drive Recruitment .......................................................................................................................62
A2: Link—Detention Key to Terrorism........................................................................................................................................64
A2: Impact—No Terrorism..........................................................................................................................................................66
A2: Impact—No Nuclear Terror ..................................................................................................................................................67
A2: Impact—No Lashout.............................................................................................................................................................69
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Indefinite Detention AFF
***A2: Leadership Advantage ....................................................................................................................................... 70
A2: Human Rights Cred—Plan Insufficient .................................................................................................................................71
A2: Human Rights Cred—Doesn’t Solve .....................................................................................................................................72
A2: Soft Power—Alt Cause: Wiretapping ...................................................................................................................................73
A2: Soft Power—Fails .................................................................................................................................................................74
A2: Soft Power—Doesn’t Solve Heg ...........................................................................................................................................75
A2: Russian Collapse—No Impact...............................................................................................................................................76
A2: Russian Relations—No Solvency ..........................................................................................................................................77
A2: Russian Relations—No Impact .............................................................................................................................................79
A2: Alliances—No Impact ...........................................................................................................................................................80
A2: Heg—No Impact ...................................................................................................................................................................81
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Indefinite Detention AFF
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Advantage 1: Terrorism
Indefinite detention leads to terrorism – multiple warrants
First, motivation – comparative studies prove that indefinite detention increases the motivation for
terrorism and the likelihood of an attack.
Roberts, Associate Professor of Philosophy at East Carolina University, ‘11
[Rodney, “Utilitarianism and the Morality of Indefinite Detention”, Criminal Justice Ethics, Vol. 30, No. 1, RSR]
Finally, ‘‘ there
is no evidence that¶ preventive detention works . Comparative studies of terrorism stretching back more
than 20 years have¶ concluded that draconian measures*¶ such as prolonged detention without¶ trial*are not proven to
reduce violence, and can actually be counterproductive .’’¶ 30 Since it may contribute¶ to the ‘‘underlying factors [that]
are¶ fueling the spread of the jihadist movement,’’ namely, ‘‘injustice and fear of¶ Western domination, leading to anger,¶
humiliation, and a sense of powerlessness,’’ there is a sense in which¶ indefinite detention can be selfdefeating*it may
increase the likelihood of future attacks .31
Second, distrust – indefinite detention generates resentment that kills effective community
cooperation within counter terrorism efforts.
Hathaway, et al, ‘13
[Oona (Gerard C. and Bernice Latrobe Smith Professor of International Law, Yale Law School); Samuel Adelsberg (J.D.
candidate at Yale Law School); Spencer Amdur (J.D. candidate at Yale Law School); Freya Pitts (J.D. candidate at Yale Law
School); Philip Levitz (J.D. from Yale Law School); and Sirine Shebaya (J.D. from Yale Law School), “The Power To Detain:
Detention of Terrorism Suspects After 9/11”, The Yale Journal of International Law, Vol. 38, 2013, RSR]
Legitimacy of the trial process is important not only to the individuals ¶ charged but also to the fight against terrorism. As several successful
habeas ¶ corpus petitions have demonstrated, insufficient procedural protections create a ¶ real danger of erroneous imprisonment
for extend periods. 249¶ Such efforts can generate resentment and distrust of the United States that undermine the ¶
effectiveness of counterterrorism efforts.¶ Indeed, evidence suggests that populations are more likely to cooperate in
policing when they believe they ¶ have been treated fairly.250 The understanding that a more legitimate detention ¶
regime will be a more effective one is reflected in recent statements from the ¶ Department of Defense and the White
Third, signaling – use of indefinite detention and military commissions hinders effective intelligence
gathering and extraditions internationally – recent history proves.
Hathaway, et al, ‘13
[Oona (Gerard C. and Bernice Latrobe Smith Professor of International Law, Yale Law School); Samuel Adelsberg (J.D.
candidate at Yale Law School); Spencer Amdur (J.D. candidate at Yale Law School); Freya Pitts (J.D. candidate at Yale Law
School); Philip Levitz (J.D. from Yale Law School); and Sirine Shebaya (J.D. from Yale Law School), “The Power To Detain:
Detention of Terrorism Suspects After 9/11”, The Yale Journal of International Law, Vol. 38, 2013, RSR]
Many key U.S. allies have been unwilling to cooperate in cases involving ¶ law-of-war detention or prosecution but have
cooperated in criminal prosecutions. In fact, many U.S. extradition treaties, including those with allies ¶ such as India and
Germany, forbid extradition when the defendant will not be ¶ tried in a criminal court.252 This issue has played out in practice several
times. ¶ An al-Shabaab operative was extradited from the Netherlands only after ¶ assurances from the United States that
he would be prosecuted in criminal ¶ court.253 Two similar cases arose in 2007.254 In perhaps the most striking ¶ example,
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five terrorism suspects—including Abu Hamza al-Masr, who is ¶ accused of providing material support to al-Qaeda by
trying to set up a training ¶ camp in Oregon and of organizing support for the Taliban in Afghanistan—¶ were extradited to the United States by the
United Kingdom in October ¶ 2012.255 The extradition was made on the express condition that they would be ¶ tried in civilian federal criminal courts rather than in the
military ¶ commissions.256 And, indeed,
both the European Court of Human Rights and ¶ the British courts allowed the extradition
to proceed a¶ ctions offered by the U.S. federal criminal justice system and finding they ¶ fully met all relevant
standards.257 An insistence on using military commissions ¶ may thus hinder extradition and other kinds of international
prosecutorial ¶ cooperation, such as the sharing of testimony and evidence.
The risk of a nuclear terrorist attack is high – top UN officials concede.
Sturdee, AFP, 7-1
[Simon, “UN atomic agency sounds warning on 'nuclear terrorism'”, Fox News, 7-1-13,, RSR]
head of the UN atomic agency warned Monday against complacency in preventing "nuclear terrorism",
saying progress in recent years should not lull the world into a false sense of security .¶ "Much has been achieved in the past decade," Yukiya
Amano of the International Atomic Energy Agency told a gathering in Vienna of some 1,200 delegates from around 110 states including 35 ministers to review progress on
the issue.¶ "Many countries have taken effective measures to prevent theft, sabotage, unauthorised access, illegal transfer, or other malicious acts involving nuclear or
other radioactive material. Security has been improved at many facilities containing such material."¶ Partly as a result, he said, "there has not been a terrorist attack
involving nuclear or other radioactive material."¶ "But this must not lull us into a false sense of security. If
sabotage occurs at a nuclear facility,
a 'dirty bomb' is detonated in a major city, or
the consequences could be devastating .¶ "Nuclear terrorism" comprises three main risks: an atomic bomb, a "dirty
bomb" -- conventional explosion spreading radioactive material -- and an attack on a nuclear plant.¶ The first, using weapons-grade uranium or plutonium, is generally
seen as "low probability, high consequence" -- very difficult to pull off but for a determined group of extremists, not impossible.¶ There
are hundreds of
tonnes of weapons-usable plutonium and uranium -- a grapefruit-sized amount is enough for a crude nuclear weapon
that would fit in a van -- around the world.¶ A "dirty bomb" -- a "radiological dispersal device" or RDD -- is much easier but would be hugely less lethal.
But it might still cause mass panic.¶ "If the Boston marathon bombing (in April this year) had been an RDD, the trauma would be lasting a whole lot longer," Sharon
Squassoni from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) told AFP.¶ Last year
alone, the IAEA recorded 17 cases of illegal
possession and attempts to sell nuclear materials and 24 incidents of theft or loss. And it says this is the "tip of the
iceberg" .¶ Many cases have involved former parts of the Soviet Union, for example Chechnya, Georgia and Moldova -- where in 2011 several people were arrested
trying to sell weapons-grade uranium -- but not only.¶ Nuclear materials that could be used in a "dirty bomb" are also used in hospitals,
factories and university campuses and are therefore seen as easy to steal.¶
An attack breaks the nuclear taboo – leads to nuclear war.
Bin ‘9 (5-22-09 About the Authors Prof. Li Bin is a leading Chinese expert on arms control and is currently the director of
Arms Control Program at the Institute of International Studies, Tsinghua University. He received his Bachelor and Master
Degrees in Physics from Peking University before joining China Academy of Engineering Physics (CAEP) to pursue a
doctorate in the technical aspects of arms control. He served as a part-time assistant on arms control for the Committee of
Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND).Upon graduation Dr. Li entered the Institute of Applied
Physics and Computational Mathematics (IAPCM) as a research fellow and joined the COSTIND technical group supporting
Chinese negotiation team on Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). He attended the final round of CTBT negotiations as
a technical advisor to the Chinese negotiating team. Nie Hongyi is an officer in the People’s Liberation Army with an MA
from China’s National Defense University and a Ph.D. in International Studies from Tsinghua University, which he
completed in 2009 under Prof. Li Bin. )
The nuclear taboo is a kind of international norm and this type of norm is supported by the promotion of the norm
through international social exchange. But at present the increased threat of nuclear terrorism has lowered people’s
confidence that nuclear weapons will not be used. China and the United States have a broad common interest in
combating nuclear terrorism. Using technical and institutional measures to break the foundation of nuclear terrorism
and lessen the possibility of a nuclear terrorist attack can not only weaken the danger of nuclear terrorism itself but
also strengthen people’s confidence in the nuclear taboo , and in this way preserve an international environment
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beneficial to both China and the United States. In this way even if there is crisis in China-U.S. relations caused by conflict,
the nuclear taboo can also help both countries reduce suspicions about the nuclear weapons problem, avoid
miscalculation and thereby reduce the danger of a nuclear war .
That causes extinction via retal.
Ayson 10 (Robert, Professor of Strategic Studies, Director of Strategic Studies: New Zealand, Senior Research Associate
with Oxford’s Centre for International Studies. “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects. Studies in
Conflict and Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July 2010, pages 571-593)
But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack,
and especially an
act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear
weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted
during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties.
These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to
depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United
States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors
or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some
possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how
might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the
fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks ,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for
nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the
debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it
detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of
the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41
Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a
terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally
countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its
program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if
the act of
nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China,
and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders
not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United
States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting
each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist
attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to
consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington’s
early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own
soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China . For example,
in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be
expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense
environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China
might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the
temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response.
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Advantage 2: Leadership
We’ll isolate three internal links:
First, Human rights credibility---now is key to set the global standard for human rights protection
Suzanne Nossel 12 is executive director of Amnesty International USA, "Time for a Reset on Human Rights," 11-7-12,,1, DOA: 7-22-13, Y2K
In 2008, Barack Obama's election thrilled many human rights activists . For eight years under George W. Bush, the U.S.
government had used torture, held hundreds in long-term detention without trial , and committed abuses at wartime prisons such as Iraq's Abu Ghraib. Rights
advocates hoped -- and, based on many of Obama's election-season remarks, reasonably expected -- that the unlawful renditions, secret prisons, and unfair trials would give way to a new American commitment the
Although Obama faced truculent political opposition in his first term, his weak record on human
rights cannot be explained away by economic exigencies or even congressional defiance. Obama now openly
Constitution and international law.
the concept of
a global "war on terror" as grounds to override
human rights norms and reinterpret the Constitution. Osama
Bin Laden's killing was not only the chief talking point of his campaign but a synecdoche for his approach to the terrorist threat, one in which the administration writes its own rules. Although preventing attacks on
If the president's legacy is
to include reclaiming U.S. human rights credibility, he needs to face up to his troubling record, and fix it. The Obama
U.S. soil represents an important human rights victory, this should not overshadow the worrisome direction of U.S. human rights policy and its long-term consequences.
administration has led in some areas of human rights policy; examples include advancing gay and lesbian rights,
bolstering U.N. human rights mechanisms, and promoting Internet freedom . But where human rights norms are
pitted against counterterrorism tactics, it has fallen down . Blocked by Congress, Obama broke his first-term promise to close Guantánamo. Four years later, that
failure barely seems to register as a disappointment; 167 men languish in the prison, including 55 who are cleared for release but have not been transferred. Recent weeks have revealed details of an Orwellian
"disposition matrix" -- a kill list of top terrorist targets that keeps getting longer. The administration claims the authority to kill those named, anytime and anywhere, based on secret information and unreviewable
judgments. The administration has declared any man killed by a drone to be an enemy terrorist, and defends such killings regardless of resulting civilian casualties. With the U.S. withdrawing from Afghanistan, these
extraordinary powers are detached from any major battlefield or conventional war. The administration is now backed into claiming that a war exists because it has convinced itself it cannot function without a broad
license to kill. Short of al Qaeda suing for peace, this war may never end. The administration's reshaping of the concept of war risks undoing over 100 years of evolution of the laws of war, and the protections those
The next four years will define whether this rewriting of the rules becomes a bipartisan "new normal" in the
United States, and implicit permission for the rest of the world to sidestep human rights . Absent swift progress to close
laws have delivered.
Guantánamo, the men now held will likely die there of old age decades from now, since no future president is
likely to renew Obama's ill-fated pledge to close the facility.
And even if the Guantánamo detainees are transferred to a U.S. prison, bringing indefinite detention
onshore, it is hard to fathom the practice will not be used again to deal with future threats. The bipartisan affirmation of drone use will make those weapons routine for the United States and any other government
with a kill list of its own.
AND- US is key to global human rights protection---indefinite detention undermines US credibility.
William F. Schulz 9 is Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress, "The Future of Human Rights: Restoring America’s
Leadership,", DOA: 7-23-13, y2k
What has been far more problematic over the last few years than random disparities between domestic and international interpretations of human rights law has been a
fundamental disparagement of the authority of the international community itself. Such depreciation started early: in 2000 Condoleezza Rice,
then foreign policy advisor to candidate George W. Bush, wrote in Foreign Affairs magazine, “Foreign policy in a Republican administration…will proceed from the firm ground of the national interest, not from the
interests of an illusory international community [emphasis added].” Over the past seven years the U.S. has repeatedly demonstrated its contempt for that allegedly chimerical community by doing such things as
“unsigning” the Rome statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC); declaring the Geneva Conventions inapplicable to prisoners at Guantanamo Bay and other so-called “unlawful combatants;” ignoring UN
findings and resolutions in the run-up to the Iraq War; or refusing to stand for election to the UN Human Rights Council.
The consequences have been devastating for the
reputations both of the U.S . , which has seen its favorability ratings drop precipitously around the world,5 and ,
of human rights themselves . The U.S. has long prided itself on being a champion of human rights and with
much good reason. We would have had no Universal Declaration of Human Rights had it not been for Eleanor and Franklin Roosevelt; the U.S. pushed hard for the civil rights provisions of the Helsinki
Accords, thereby contributing to the eventual liberation of Eastern Europe; the U.S. judicial system with its wide array of due process protections has been a model emulated by newly emerging countries around the
world; U.S. diplomats have frequently intervened on behalf of political dissidents; the Kosovo War was spearheaded by an American commitment to prevent ethnic cleansing; and the annual State Department
human rights reports have long been an invaluable resource to the cause of human rights. The current U.S. administration’s commitment to battling HIV/AIDS in Africa and its outspokenness on Darfur are consistent
with this tradition. But
for the most powerful nation in the world, long looked to as a model of human rights virtue, to
undermine the international system itself — the very framework upon which human rights are predicated — is to
cause immeasurable damage
to the struggle for liberty. Backtracking on our commitments to international treaties and norms in the name of defending human rights is not just ironic. One
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of the consequences of the Iraq War with its latter-day human rights rationale and of the “War on Terror” with its oft-stated goals of defending freedom and the rule of law is that human rights themselves have come
human rights to be conflated with, fairly or not, in the words of the critic David
Rieff, “the official ideology of American empire,”6 only exacerbates the customary suspicion in which human rights
have been held by some in the developing world who see them as a guise for the imposition of Western values.
The truth is that if human rights and the U.S.’s pursuit of them are discredited , American interests are put in peril.
to be identified with America’s worldwide ambitions. For
Reserving the option to torture prisoners, denying them habeas corpus, sending them into “black site” prisons—
all this makes it harder to defend America against the charge of hypocrisy; t he claim that we are carrying out a war in defense of the rule of law by
abandoning that very rule.
Such a charge hands fodder for recruitment to our adversaries and makes the world less safe for Americans.
No country can claim protection for its own citizens overseas (be they soldiers taken as prisoners, nationals charged with crimes, or corporations faced with
extortion) if it fails to respect international norms at home. Global relations are based in good part on reciprocity . Nor can
the U.S. offer effective objection to the human rights violations of others if it is guilty of those same violations
itself or has shunned cooperation with international allies . No nation, no matter how powerful, can successfully
pursue improvements in human rights around the world independent of the international community. Unilateral sanctions
imposed upon a country to protest human rights abuses will inevitably fail if they lack the support of others
Credibility key to foster foreign cooperation and hegemony
John Ikenberry 4 Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton, “Liberal Realism: The Foundations of a
Democratic Foreign Policy”, The National Interest, Fall
The Bush Administration's disregard for legitimacy has had devastating consequences for America's standing in the world, particularly
among Europeans. The country that for decades was seen to be at the forefront of progressive change is now regarded as a threat to the
international system. During the heyday of American legitimacy amid the Cold War, it would have been unthinkable for a German chancellor to rescue his bid for re-election by insisting that Berlin stand
up to Washington. Not only did Gerhard Schroder do so in 2002, but candidates in other countries--Spain, Brazil and South Korea--have thrived by distancing themselves from the United States. In a world of
degraded American legitimacy, other countries are more reluctant to cooperate with the United States. Over the longer term-and in a thousand different ways--countries will take steps to separate themselves from the United States, to resist its leadership
and to organize their regions of the world in opposition to Washington. From the perspective of liberal realism, legitimacy is an intrinsic aspect of
power. To care about legitimacy is not to cede American power to the UN or any other party. Instead, it is to exercise American
power in a manner that continues to attract the support of others. Successive American presidents have found ways to do so because they realized that to legitimate
American power was to turn coercion and domination into authority and consent. In Jean-Jacques Rousseau's famous formulation from The Social Contract: "The strongest is never strong enough to be always
master, unless he transforms strength into right and obedience into duty."
Human rights protection prevents extinction
Annas et al 2 Edward R. Utley Prof. and Chair Health Law @ Boston U. School of Public Health and Prof. SocioMedical
Sciences and Community Science @ Boston U. School of Medicine and Prof. Law @ Boston U. School of Law [George, Lori
Andrews, (Distinguished Prof. Law @ Chicago-Kent College of Law and Dir. Institute for Science, Law, and Technology @
Illinois Institute Tech), and Rosario M. Isasa, (Health Law and Biotethics Fellow @ Health Law Dept. of Boston U. School of
Public Health), American Journal of Law & Medicine, “THE GENETICS REVOLUTION: CONFLICTS, CHALLENGES AND
CONUNDRA: ARTICLE: Protecting the Endangered Human: Toward an International Treaty Prohibiting Cloning and
Inheritable Alterations”, 28 Am. J. L. and Med. 151, L/N]
The development of the atomic bomb not only presented to the world for the first time the prospect of total annihilation , but also, paradoxically,
led to a renewed emphasis on the "nuclear family," complete with its personal bomb shelter. The conclusion of World War II (with the dropping of the only two atomic bombs ever used in
war) led to the recognition that world wars were now suicidal to the entire species and to the formation of the United
Nations with the primary goal of preventing such wars . n2 Prevention , of course, must be based on the recognition that all
humans are fundamentally the same , rather than on an emphasis on our differences. In the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis, the closest
the world has ever come to nuclear war , President John F. Kennedy, in an address to the former Soviet Union, underscored the necessity for
recognizing similarities for our survival:
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L]et us not be blind to our differences, but let us also direct attention to our common interests and the means by
which those differences can be resolved . . . . For, in the final analysis, our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this
small planet . We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children's future. And we are all mortal. n3
That we are all fundamentally the same, all human, all with the same dignity and rights, is at the core of the most important document to come out of World War II, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and
The recognition of universal human rights, based on human dignity and
equality as well as the principle of nondiscrimination, is fundamental to the development of a species consciousness . As Daniel Lev
the two treaties that followed it (together known as the "International Bill of Rights"). n4
of Human Rights Watch/Asia said in 1993, shortly before the Vienna Human Rights Conference:
Whatever else may separate them, human beings belong to a single biological species, the simplest and most
fundamental commonality before which the significance of human differences quickly fades. . . . We are all capable, in exactly the same
ways, of feeling pain, hunger, [*153] and a hundred kinds of deprivation. Consequently, people nowhere routinely concede that those with enough power to do so ought to be able to kill, torture, imprison, and
generally abuse others. . . .
The idea of universal human rights shares the recognition of one common humanity, and provides
solution to deal with its miseries . n5
Membership in the human species is central to the meaning and enforcement of human rights, and respect for
basic human rights is essential for the survival of the human species . The development of the concept of "crimes against humanity" was a milestone for
universalizing human rights in that it recognized that there were certain actions, such as slavery and genocide, that implicated the welfare of the entire species and therefore merited universal condemnation. n6
Nuclear weapons were immediately seen as a technology that required international control, as extreme genetic manipulations like cloning and inheritable genetic alterations have come to be seen today. In fact,
cloning and inheritable genetic alterations can be seen as crimes against humanity of a unique sort: they are techniques that can alter the essence of humanity itself (and thus threaten to change the foundation of
human rights) by taking human evolution into our own hands and directing it toward the development of a new species, sometimes termed the "posthuman." n7 It may be that species-altering techniques, like
cloning and inheritable genetic modifications, could provide benefits to the human species in extraordinary circumstances. For example, asexual genetic replication could potentially save humans from extinction if all
humans were rendered sterile by some catastrophic event. But no such necessity currently exists or is on the horizon.
Second, Soft Power---US detention policy damages Soft Power—specifically, Rule of Law deficit fuels
authoritarian crackdowns in Russia---destroys US-Russia engagement.
Sarah E. Mendelson 9 is director, Human Rights and Security Initiative, CSIS. "U.S.-Russian Relations and the Democracy
and Rule of Law Deficit", DOA: 7-23-13, y2k
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, every U.S. administration has considered Russia’s political trajectory
a national security concern .1 Based on campaign statements and President Barack Obama’s early personnel choices, this perspective likely
will affect policy toward Russia in some way for the foreseeable future. 2 While the Obama
plans to
cooperate with Moscow on a number of issues , it will find that Russia’s current deficit in the areas of democracy and the rule of
law complicate the relationship and may , in some cases, undermine attempts at engagement . The organizers of the Century Foundation
Russia Working Group have labeled this policy problem “coping with creeping authoritarianism.” Results
from nearly a dozen large, random
sample surveys in Russia since 2001 that examine the views and experiences of literally thousands of Russians, combined
with other research and newspaper reporting, all suggest the current democracy and rule of law deficit is rather stark .3 The
deficit does not diminish the importance of Russia in international affairs, nor is it meant to suggest the situation is unique to Russia.
The internal
conditions of many states have negative international security implications . As Europeans repeatedly pointed out during the administration
of George W. Bush, U.S. departures
from the rule of law made the United States increasingly problematic as a global partner ,
whether through the use of force in Iraq or the manner in which the United States pursued and handled terrorist suspects . In fact,
coping with authoritarian trends in Russia (and elsewhere) will involve changes in U.S. policies that have , on the surface,
nothing to do with Russia . Bush administration counterterrorism policies that authorized torture, indefinite detention of terrorist
suspects, and the rendering of detainees to secret prisons and Guantánamo have
had numerous negative unintended consequences for
national security , including serving as a recruitment tool for al Qaeda and insurgents in Iraq.4 Less often recognized,
policies also have
undercut whatever leverage the U nited S tates had,
as well as
limited the effectiveness of
American decision-makers , to push back on authoritarian policies adopted by, among others, the Putin administration .
At its worst,
American departures from the rule of law may have enabled abuse inside Russia . These departures certainly left
human rights defenders isolated .5 Repairing the damage to U.S. soft power and reversing the departure from
human rights norms that characterized the Bush administration’s counterterrorism policies will provide the Obama
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administration strategic and moral authority and improve the ability of the United States to work with allies . It also
can have positive consequences for Obama’s Russia policy . The changes that need to be made in U.S. counterterrorism policies,
however politically sensitive, are somewhat more straightforward than the adjustments that must be made to respond to the complex issues concerning Russia.
The Obama administration must determine how best to engage Russian leaders and the population on issues of
importance to the United States, given Russia’s poor governance structures, the stark drop in oil prices, Russia’s
continued aspirations for great power status, and the rather serious resentment by Russians concerning American
dominance and prior policies. The policy puzzle, therefore, is how to do all this without, at the same time, sacrificing our values and undercutting (yet
again) U.S. soft power.
AND- Now is key---bolstering democratic reform in Russia prevents violent revolution
Freeland and Gutterman 12 – Chrystia Freeland and Steve Gutterman, writers for Reuters, January 17, 2012, “Russia
faces violent revolution if it doesn’t embrace democracy, billionaire Putin challenger declares”,
MOSCOW — Mikhail Prokhorov, a super-rich tycoon challenging Vladimir Putin for Russia’s presidency in March, said his country faced the danger of violent
revolution if it did not break conservative resistance and move quickly to democracy. Prokhorov, a billionaire bachelor long seen more as
playboy than politician, told The Freeland File on Russians had shaken off a post-Soviet apathy and were now “just crazy about politics.” He denied accusations he was a Kremlin tool, let into the race to
split the opposition and lend democratic legitimacy to a vote Putin seems almost certain to win. Putin is seeking to return to the Kremlin and rule until at least 2018, but protests against alleged fraud in a December 4
What worked before does not work now. Look in the
streets. People are not happy,” Prokhorov, 46, said in the interview beneath the windowed dome that soars above his spacious office on a central Moscow boulevard close to the Kremlin.
“It is time to change,” said Prokhorov, ranked by Forbes magazine as Russia’s third-richest person, with an $18-billion metals-to-banking empire that includes the New Jersey Nets basketball team in
the United States. “Stability at any price is no longer acceptable for Russians .” But Prokhorov made clear he considers revolution equally unacceptable for a country
parliamentary vote have exposed growing discontent with the system he has dominated for 12 years. “
with grim memories of a century of hardship, war and upheaval starting with Vladimir Lenin’s 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, instead calling for “very fast evolution.” “I am against any revolution, because I know the
history of Russia. Every time we have revolution, it was a very bloody period,” he said. The son of a Soviet sports official, Prokhorov has a basketball player’s 204-cm (6-foot-8) frame, a narrow face and a head of
Public political consciousness is on
the rise after years of apathy. The Soviet mentality is fading as a generation of Russians who “don’t know who Lenin was” grows up, he said. The country was finally
ripe for change. “We now have all the pieces in place to move very fast to being a real democracy,” Prokhorov said. But he
suggested there was a mounting battle in the ruling elite between liberals like himself and conservatives “ready to pay any price” to maintain the status quo. Russia, he said, could face a bloody
revolution if opponents of reform prevail. “If there are no changes in Russia, from day to day this risk will increase,”
short-cut hair graying around the edges. In a dark suit and blue shirt that looked modest for a Russian tycoon, he sat straight and spoke in English.
Prokhorov said. “Because 15, 20 percent of the population, the most active ones living in the big cities, want to live in a democratic country.”
That causes miscalculation and nuclear war
Pry 99 (Peter Vincent, Former US Intelligence Operative, War Scare: U.S.-Russia on the Nuclear Brink, netlibrary)
Russian internal troubles—such as a leadership crisis, coup, or civil war—could aggravate Russia’s fears of foreign
aggression and lead to a miscalculation of U.S. intentions and to nuclear overreaction. While this may sound like a
complicated and improbable chain of events, Russia’s story in the 1990s is one long series of domestic crises that
have all too often been the source of nuclear close calls. The war scares of August 1991 and October 1993 arose out of coup attempts. The civil war in Chechnya caused a
leadership crisis in Moscow, which contributed to the nuclear false alarm during Norway’s launch of a meteorological rocket in January 1995. Nuclear war arising from Russian domestic crises is a threat the West did
The Russian military’s continued fixation on surprise-attack scenarios into the 1990s,
combined with Russia’s deepening internal problems, has created a situation in which the U nited S tates might find
itself the victim of a preemptive strike for no other reason than a war scare born of Russian domestic troubles. At least in
not face, or at least faced to a much lesser extent, during the Cold War.
nuclear confrontations of the 1950s–1970s—during the Berlin crisis, Cuban missile crisis, and 1973 Middle East war—both sides knew they were on the nuclear brink. There was opportunity to avoid conflict through
negotiation or deescalation. The nuclear war scares of the 1980s and 1990s have been one-sided Russian affairs, with the West ignorant that it was in grave peril.
Independently, US-Russian relations prevent extinction and collapse of hegemony
Allison & Blackwill 11 Allison Graham is Director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs @ Harvard’s
Kennedy School—AND—Robert Blackwill is Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow for U.S. Foreign Policy @ CFR, “10 reasons why
Russia still matters,” Politico,, DOA: 7-23-13, y2k
That central point is that Russia matters a great deal to a U.S. government seeking to defend and advance its national interests. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s decision
to return next year as president makes it all the more critical for Washington to manage its relationship with Russia through coherent, realistic policies.
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Russia is a dangerous, difficult, often disappointing state to do business with. We should not overlook its many human rights and legal failures. Nonetheless,
Russia is a player whose choices affect our vital interests in nuclear security and energy. It is key to supplying 100,000 U.S. troops fighting in Afghanistan
No one denies that
and preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.
Ten realities require U.S. policymakers to advance our nation’s interests by engaging and working with Moscow.
Russia remains the only nation that can erase the United States from the map in 30 minutes. As every president since John F. Kennedy has recognized,
Russia’s cooperation is critical to averting nuclear war.
Second, Russia is our most consequential partner in preventing nuclear terrorism . Through a combination of more than $11 billion in U.S. aid, provided
through the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program, and impressive Russian professionalism, two decades after the collapse of the “evil empire,” not one nuclear weapon has been found loose.
Third, Russia
plays an essential role in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile-delivery systems. As
Washington seeks to stop Iran’s drive toward nuclear weapons , Russian choices to sell or withhold sensitive
technologies are the difference between failure and the possibility of success.
Fourth, Russian support in sharing intelligence and cooperating in operations remains essential to the U.S. war to
destroy Al Qaeda
and combat other transnational terrorist groups.
Fifth, Russia provides a vital supply line to 100,000 U.S. troops fighting in Afghanistan. As U.S. relations with Pakistan have deteriorated, the Russian lifeline has grown ever more important and now accounts for half all daily deliveries.
Sixth, Russia is the world’s largest oil producer and second largest gas producer. Over the past decade, Russia has added more oil and gas exports to world energy markets than any other nation. Most major energy transport routes from Eurasia start in Russia
or cross its nine time zones. As citizens of a country that imports two of every three of the 20 million barrels of oil that fuel U.S. cars daily, Americans feel Russia’s impact at our gas pumps.
Seventh, Moscow is an important player in today’s international system. It is no accident that Russia is one of the
five veto-wielding, permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, as well as a member of the G-8 and G-20. A
Moscow more closely aligned with U.S. goals would be significant in the balance of power to shape an environment
in which China can emerge as a global power without overturning the existing order.
Eighth, Russia is the largest country on Earth by land area, abutting China on the East, Poland in the West and the United States across the Arctic. This territory provides transit
corridors for supplies to global markets whose stability is vital to the U.S. economy.
Ninth, Russia’s brainpower is reflected in the fact that it has won more Nobel Prizes for science than all of Asia, places first in most math competitions and
dominates the world chess masters list. The only way U.S. astronauts can now travel to and from the International Space Station is to hitch a ride on Russian
rockets. The co-founder of the most advanced digital company in the world, Google, is Russian-born Sergei Brin.
Russia’s potential as a spoiler is difficult to exaggerate . Consider what a Russian president intent on frustrating U.S.
international objectives could do — from stopping the supply flow to Afghanistan to selling S-300 air defense missiles
to Tehran to joining China in preventing U.N. Security Council resolutions.
So next time you hear a policymaker dismissing Russia with rhetoric about “who cares ?” ask them to identify nations
that matter more to U.S. success, or failure, in advancing our national interests.
US heg is sustainable, but soft power is key---solves every existential challenge
Lagon 11 Mark P. Lagon is the International Relations and Security Chair at Georgetown University's Master of Science in
Foreign Service Program and adjunct senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. He is the former US Ambassador-atLarge to Combat Trafficking in Persons at the US Department of State. “The Value of Values: Soft Power Under Obama,”
2011,, DOA: 7-16-13, y2k
Despite large economic challenges, two protracted military expeditions, and the rise of China, India, Brazil, and other new players
on the international scene, the United States still has an unrivaled ability to confront terrorism , nuclear proliferation , financial
instability , pandemic disease , mass atrocity , or tyranny. Although far from omnipotent, the United States is still, as former Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright called it, “ the indispensible nation .” Soft power is crucial to sustaining and best leveraging this role as catalyst. That President
Obama should have excluded it from his vision of America’s foreign policy assets—particularly in the key cases of Iran, Russia, and Egypt—suggests that he feels the country has so
declined, not only in real power but in the power of example , that it lacks the moral authority to project soft
power. In the 1970s, many also considered the US in decline as it grappled with counterinsurgency in faraway lands, a
crisis due to economic stagnation, and reliance on foreign oil. Like Obama, Henry Kissinger tried to manage decline in what he saw as a multipolar world, dressing
up prescriptions for policy as descriptions of immutable reality. In the 1980s, however, soft power played a crucial part in a turnaround for US
foreign policy . Applying it, President Reagan sought to transcend a nuclear balance of terror with defensive technologies,
pushed allies in the Cold War (e.g., El Salvador, Chile, Taiwan, South Korea, and the Philippines) to liberalize for their own good, backed labor movements
opposed to Communists in Poland and Central America, and called for the Berlin Wall to be torn down—over Foggy Bottom
This symbolism not only boosted the perception and the reality of US influence, but also hastened the demise of the
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USSR and the Warsaw Pact.? For Barack Obama, this was the path not taken. Even the Arab Spring has not cured his acute allergy to soft power. His May 20, 2011, speech on the Middle East and
Northern Africa came four months after the Jasmine Revolution emerged. His emphasis on 1967 borders as the basis for Israeli-Palestinian peace managed to eclipse even his broad words (vice deeds) on democracy
in the Middle East. Further, those words failed to explain his deeds in continuing to support some Arab autocracies (e.g., Bahrain’s, backed by Saudi forces) even as he gives tardy rhetorical support for popular forces
To use soft power without hard power is to be Sweden. To use hard power without soft power is to
be China. Even France, with its long commitment to realpolitik, has overtaken the United States as proponent and
implementer of humanitarian intervention in Libya and Ivory Coast. When the American president has no problem
with France combining hard and soft power better than the United States, something is seriously amiss.
casting aside other ones.?
Third---indefinite detention undermines international coop and alliances
Martin Scheinin 12 is Professor of International Law and Former UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and CounterTerrorism, "Should Human Rights Take a Back Seat in Wartime?" 1-11-12,, DOA: 723-13, Y2K
CLC: As a world leader and active promoter of universal human rights, the practice of indefinite detention without charge would seem to
clash with U.S. ideals. Could you comment on this contradiction? MS: One of the main lessons learned in the international fight against terrorism is that counter-terrorism professionals have
gradually come to learn and admit that human rights violations are not an acceptable shortcut in an effective fight against terrorism. Such measures tend to backfire in multiple ways. They result in legal problems by
hampering prosecution, trial and punishment. The use of torture is a clear example here. They also tend to alienate the communities with which authorities should be working in order to detect and prevent
terrorism. And they add to causes of terrorism, both by perpetuating "root causes" that involve the alienation of communities and by providing "triggering causes" through which bitter individuals make the morally
The NDAA is just one more step in the wrong direction, by aggravating the
counterproductive effects of human rights violating measures put in place in the name of countering terrorism. CLC:
inexcusable decision to turn to methods of terrorism.
Does the NDAA afford the U.S. a practical advantage in the fight against terrorism? Or might the law undermine its global credibility? MS: It is hard to see any practical advantage gained through the NDAA. It is just
another form of what I call symbolic legislation, enacted because the legislators want to be seen as being "tough" or as "doing something." The law is written as just affirming existing powers and practices and hence
, it nevertheless hampers effective counter-terrorism work,
including criminal investigation and prosecution, as well as international counter-terrorism cooperation , markedly in the issue of closing the Guantanamo Bay detention facility. Hence, it
carries the risk of distancing the United States from its closest allies and the international community generally . And of
course these kinds of legal provisions are always open for bad faith copying by repressive governments that will use
them for their own political purposes. CLC: Do you think the U.S. adoption of the indefinite detention provisions sets a precedent for other countries to do so? MS: Of course,
these kinds of legal provisions are always open for bad faith copying by repressive governments that will use them
for their own political purposes. Nevertheless, one of the conclusions I drew at the end of my six-year tenure as United Nations Special Rapporteur on human rights and counter-terrorism
was that such copying of bad laws is less frequent than expected. It is much more common that countries are willing to learn from each other
not providing any meaningful new tools in the combat of terrorism. By constraining the choices by the executive
about what really works in the fight against terrorism , and for my part I did my best to identify and promote such best practice. There are a lot of
good models showing how laws can at the same time comply with human rights and produce real results in the
fight against terrorism. I don't think countries genuinely concerned about terrorism will be tempted to follow the
NDAA approach. But repressive governments may do so for their own political purposes.
Alliances prevent nuclear war---key to burden sharing
Douglas Ross 99 is professor of political science at Simon Fraser University, Winter 1998/1999, Canada’s functional
isolationism and the future of weapons of mass destruction, International Journal, p. lexis
Thus, an easily accessible tax base has long been available for spending much more on international security than recent governments have been willing to
contemplate. ? Negotiating the landmines ban, discouraging trade in small arms, promoting the United Nations arms register are all worthwhile, popular activities
that polish the national ? self-image. But
they should all be supplements to, not substitutes for, a proportionately equitable
commitment of resources to the management and ? prevention of international conflict – and thus the
containment of the WMD threat . Future American governments will not ‘police the ? world’ alone. For almost fifty years the
Soviet threat compelled disproportionate military expenditures and sacrifice by the United States. That world is gone. Only by ? enmeshing the
capabilities of the United States and other leading powers in a co-operative security management regime where the
burdens are widely shared does the world community have any plausible hope of avoiding warfare involving
nuclear or other WMD .
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Alliance is key to hegemony
Joseph S. Nye 13 Jr. is a professor at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, “American power in the 21st century will
be defined by the ‘rise of the rest’” 6-28-13,, DOA: 7-23-13, y2k
In the last century, the United States rose from the status of second-tier power to being the world’s sole
superpower. Some worry that the United States will be eclipsed in this century by China, but that is not the
problem. There is never just one possible outcome. Instead, there are always a range of possibilities, particularly regarding political
change in China. Aside from the political uncertainties, China’s size and high rate of economic growth will almost certainly increase its strength in relation to the
United States. But even when China becomes the world’s largest economy , it will lag decades behind the United States in
per-capita income, which is a better measure of an economy’s sophistication. Moreover, given our energy resources, the U.S. economy will be less
vulnerable than the Chinese economy to external shocks. Growth will bring China closer to the United States in power resources, but as Singapore’s former prime minister Lee Kwan Yew has
noted, that does not necessarily mean that China will surpass the United States as the world’s most powerful country. Even if China suffers no major domestic political
setbacks, projections based on growth in gross domestic product alone ignore U.S. military and “soft power”
advantages as well as China’s geopolitical disadvantages in the Asian balance of power. The U.S. culture of openness and innovation will keep this
country central in an information age in which networks supplement, if not fully replace, hierarchical power. The
United States is well positioned to benefit from such networks and alliances if our leaders follow smart
strategies . In structural terms, it matters that the two entities with per-capita income and sophisticated economies similar
to that of the United States — Europe and Japan — are both allied with the United States. In terms of balances-ofpower resources, that makes a large difference for the net position of American power , but only if U.S. leaders
maintain the alliances and institutional cooperation. In addition, in a more positive sum view of power with, rather than over, other countries, Europe and Japan
provide the largest pools of resources for dealing with common transnational problems. On the question of absolute — rather than relative — American decline, the United States faces serious domestic problems
in debt, secondary education and political gridlock. But these issues are only part of the picture. Of the many possible futures, stronger cases can be made for the positive over the negative. Among the negative
But barring such
mistaken strategies, there are, over a longer term, solutions to the major problems that preoccupy us. Of course, for political or other reasons,
such solutions may remain forever out of reach. But it is important to distinguish between situations that have no solutions and those that, at least in principle, can be solved. Decline is a
misleading metaphor and, fortunately, President Obama has rejected the suggested strategy of “managing decline.” As a leader in research and development, higher education and
futures, the most plausible is one in which the United States overreacts to terrorist attacks by turning inward and closing itself off to the strength it obtains from openness.
there is a reasonable probability that the United States
is likely to remain more powerful than any single state in the coming decades. We do not live in a “post-American world,” but neither do we live any longer
entrepreneurial activity, the United States is not in absolute decline, as happened in ancient Rome. In relative terms,
in the “American era” of the late 20th century. In terms of primacy, the United States will be “first” but not “sole.” No one has a crystal ball, but the National Intelligence Council (which I once chaired) may be
correct in its 2012 projection that although the unipolar moment is over, the United States probably will remain first among equals among the other great powers in 2030 because of the multifaceted nature of its
The power resources of many states and non-state actors will rise in the coming years. U.S.
presidents will face an increasing number of issues in which obtaining our preferred outcomes will require power
with others as much as power over others. Our leaders’ capacity to maintain alliances and create networks will be an
power and legacies of its leadership.
important dimension of our hard and soft power.
China but, rather, the “rise of the rest.”
Simply put, the problem of American power in the 21st century is not one of a poorly specified “decline” or being eclipsed by
The paradox of American power is that even the largest country will not be able to achieve
the outcomes it wants without the help of others.
Hegemony solves extinction---every other alternative fails---retrenchment fosters transitional conflicts
Bradley A. Thayer 6 is an associate professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, Missouri State
University, “In Defense of Primacy,” November/December 2006, Issue 86, National Interest, p.32, EBSCOHost, Accessed
Date: 5-7-13 y2k
A grand strategy based on American primacy means ensuring the U nited S tates stays the world's number one power --the
diplomatic, economic and military leader.
Those arguing against primacy claim that the U nited S tates should retrench, either because the
U nited S tates lacks the power to maintain its primacy and should withdraw from its global commitments, or because the maintenance of primacy will lead the United
of "imperial overstretch." In the previous issue of The National Interest, Christopher Layne warned of these dangers of primacy and called for retrenchment.(FN1)¶ Those
arguing for a grand strategy of retrenchment are a diverse lot. They include isolationists , who want no foreign military commitments; selective engagers , who
States into the trap
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want U.S. military commitments to centers of economic might;
and offshore balancers , who want a modified form of selective engagement that would have the United States abandon its landpower
presence abroad in favor of relying on airpower and seapower to defend its interests.¶
But retrenchment, in any of its guises, must be avoided . If the United States adopted
it would be a profound strategic mistake that would lead to far greater instability and war in the world, imperil
American security and deny the United States and its allies the benefits of primacy.¶ There are two critical issues in any discussion of America's grand strategy: Can America remain the dominant state?
such a strategy,
Should it strive to do this? America can remain dominant due to its prodigious military, economic and soft power capabilities. The totality of that equation of power answers the first issue. The United States has
overwhelming military capabilities and wealth in comparison to other states or likely potential alliances. Barring some disaster or tremendous folly, that will remain the case for the foreseeable future. With few
Proponents of retrenchment focus
fail to realize what is good about American primacy. The price and risks of primacy are reported in
exceptions, even those who advocate retrenchment acknowledge this.¶ So the debate revolves around the desirability of maintaining American primacy.
a great deal on the costs of U.S. action--but they
newspapers every day; the benefits that stem from it are not.¶
A GRAND strategy of ensuring American primacy takes as its starting point the protection of the U.S.
ensuring that critical resources like oil flow around the world, that the global
trade and monetary regimes flourish and that Washington's worldwide network of allies is reassured and protected.
Allies are a great asset to the United States, in part because they shoulder some of its burdens. Thus, it is no surprise to see NATO in Afghanistan or the Australians in
homeland and American global interests. These interests include
East Timor.¶ In contrast, a strategy based on retrenchment will not be able to achieve these fundamental objectives of the United States. Indeed,
retrenchment will make the U nited
S tates less secure than the present grand strategy of primacy. This is because threats will exist no matter what role America chooses to
play in international politics . Washington cannot call a "time out",
it cannot hide from threats. Whether they are
terrorists , rogue states or rising powers , history shows that threats must be confronted . Simply by declaring that the United States is
going home", thus abandoning its commitments or making unconvincing half-pledges to defend its interests and allies, does not
mean that others will respect American wishes to retreat . To make such a declaration implies weakness and emboldens
aggression . In the anarchic world of the animal kingdom, predators prefer to eat the weak rather than confront the strong. The
same is true of the anarchic world of international politics. If there is no diplomatic solution to the threats that confront the United States, then the conventional and strategic military power of the United States is
what protects the country from such threats.¶ And
when enemies must be confronted, a strategy based on primacy focuses on engaging
enemies overseas , away from American soil. Indeed, a key tenet of the Bush Doctrine is to attack terrorists far from America's shores and not to wait while they use bases in other countries to plan
and train for attacks against the United States itself.
balancing .¶
This requires a physical, on-the-ground presence that cannot be achieved by offshore
Indeed, as Barry Posen has noted, U.S.
primacy is secured because America, at present, commands the "global commons "--the
allowing the U nited S tates to project its power
oceans, the world's airspace and outer space--
far from its borders,
while denying those common avenues
to its enemies. As a consequence, the costs of power projection for the United States and its allies are reduced, and the robustness of the
and strategic deterrent capabilities is increased .(FN2) This is not an advantage that should be relinquished lightly.¶
United States'
A remarkable fact about international politics today--
a world where American primacy is clearly and unambiguously on display--is that countries want to align
with the U nited
S tates. Of course, this is not out of any sense of altruism, in most cases, but because doing so allows them to use the power of the United States for their own
purposes--their own protection, or to gain greater influence.¶ Of 192 countries, 84 are allied with America --their
security is tied to the U nited S tates through treaties and other informal arrangements--and they include almost all of the major economic
and military
powers. That is a ratio of almost 17 to one
(85 to five), and a big change from the Cold War when the ratio was about 1.8 to one of states aligned with the United
U.S. primacy--and the bandwagoning effect--has also given
S tates to shape the behavior of states and international
States versus the Soviet Union. Never before in its history has this country, or any country, had so many allies.¶
us extensive influence
in international politics,
allowing the U nited
institutions. Such influence comes in many forms, one of which is America's ability to create coalitions of like-minded states to free
Kosovo , stabilize Afghanistan, invade Iraq or to stop proliferation
through the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).
Doing so allows the
U nited S tates to operate with allies outside of the UN, where it can be stymied by opponents. American-led wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq stand in contrast to
the UN's inability to save the people of Darfur or even to conduct any military campaign to realize the goals of its charter. The quiet effectiveness of the PSI in dismantling Libya's WMD programs and unraveling the A.
Q. Khan proliferation network are in sharp relief to the typically toothless attempts by the UN to halt proliferation.¶ You can count with one hand countries opposed to the United States. They are the "Gang of
Five": China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea and Venezuela. Of course, countries like India, for example, do not agree with all policy choices made by the United States, such as toward Iran, but New Delhi is friendly to
China is clearly the most important of these states because it is a
and refrains from openly challenging U.S. power . China
Washington.¶ Only the "Gang of Five" may be expected to consistently resist the agenda and actions of the United States.¶
rising great power. But even Beijing is intimidated
by the United States
proclaims that it will, if necessary, resort to other mechanisms of challenging the United States, including asymmetric strategies such as targeting communication and intelligence satellites upon which the United
States depends. But
China may not be confident those strategies would work, and so it is likely to refrain from testing the United
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States directly for the foreseeable future because China's power benefits, as we shall see, from the international order U.S. primacy
creates.¶ The other states are far weaker than China. For three of the "Gang of Five" cases--Venezuela, Iran, Cuba--it is an anti-U.S. regime that is the source of the problem; the country itself is not
intrinsically anti-American. Indeed, a change of regime in Caracas, Tehran or Havana could very well reorient relations.¶ THROUGHOUT HISTORY, peace and stability have
been great benefits of an era where there was a dominant power--Rome, Britain or the United States today. Scholars and statesmen have long recognized the
irenic effect of power on the anarchic world of international politics.¶ Everything we think of when we consider the current
international order-- free trade , a robust monetary regime , increasing respect for human rights , growing democratization --is directly
linked to U.S. power. Retrenchment proponents seem to think that the current system can be maintained without
the current amount of U.S. power behind it. In that they are dead wrong and need to be reminded of one of history's most significant lessons: Appalling things
happen when international orders collapse . The Dark Ages followed Rome's collapse. Hitler succeeded the order
established at Versailles.
Without U.S. power, the liberal order created by the United States will end
know what you've got (until you lose it)."¶
just as assuredly. As country and western great Ral Donner sang: "
You don't
Consequently, it is important to note what those good things are. In addition to ensuring the security of the United States and its allies,
primacy within the international system causes many positive outcomes for Washington and the world. The first has been a more peaceful world .
U.S. leadership reduced friction among many states that were historical antagonists, most notably France and West Germany. Today,
American primacy helps keep a number of complicated relationships aligned-- between Greece and Turkey, Israel and
During the Cold War,
Egypt, South Korea and Japan, India and Pakistan, Indonesia and Australia . This is not to say it fulfills Woodrow Wilson's vision of ending all war.
Wars still occur where Washington's interests are not seriously threatened, such as in Darfur, but a Pax Americana does
reduce war's likelihood , particularly war's worst form : great power wars.¶ Second, American power gives the United States the
ability to spread democracy and other elements of its ideology of liberalism. Doing so is a source of much good for the countries concerned as well as the United States because,
as John Owen noted on these pages in the Spring 2006 issue, liberal democracies are more likely to align with the U nited S tates and be
sympathetic to the American worldview.(FN3) So, spreading democracy helps maintain U.S. primacy. In addition, once states are governed
democratically, the likelihood of any type of conflict is significantly reduced. This is not because democracies do not have clashing interests. Indeed
they do. Rather, it is because they are more open, more transparent and more likely to want to resolve things amicably in
concurrence with U.S. leadership. And so, in general, democratic states are good for their citizens as well as for advancing the interests of the United States.¶ Critics have faulted the
Bush Administration for attempting to spread democracy in the Middle East, labeling such an effort a modern form of tilting at windmills. It is the obligation of Bush's critics to explain why democracy is good enough
for Western states but not for the rest, and, one gathers from the argument, should not even be attempted.¶ Of course, whether democracy in the Middle East will have a peaceful or stabilizing influence on
America's interests in the short run is open to question. Perhaps democratic Arab states would be more opposed to Israel, but nonetheless, their people would be better off.
The U nited S tates has
brought democracy to Afghanistan, where 8.5 million Afghans, 40 percent of them women, voted in a critical October 2004 election, even though remnant Taliban forces threatened
them. The first free elections were held in Iraq in January 2005. It was the military power of the United States that put Iraq on the path to democracy. Washington
fostered democratic governments in Europe, Latin America, Asia and the Caucasus. Now even the Middle East is
increasingly democratic. They may not yet look like Western-style democracies, but democratic progress has been made in Algeria, Morocco, Lebanon, Iraq, Kuwait, the
Palestinian Authority and Egypt. By all accounts, the march of democracy has been impressive.¶ Third, along with the growth in the number of democratic states around the
world has been the growth of the global economy . With its allies, the U nited S tates has labored to create an economically
liberal worldwide network characterized by free trade and commerce, respect for international property rights,
and mobility of capital and labor markets . The economic stability and prosperity that stems from this economic order is
a global public good from which all states benefit, particularly the poorest states in the Third World. The United States created this network not out of altruism but for
the benefit and the economic well-being of America. This economic order forces American industries to be competitive, maximizes efficiencies
and growth, and benefits defense as well because the size of the economy makes the defense burden manageable.
Economic spin-offs foster the development of military technology, helping to ensure military prowess.¶ Perhaps the greatest testament to the benefits of the economic network comes from Deepak Lal, a former
Indian foreign service diplomat and researcher at the World Bank, who started his career confident in the socialist ideology of post-independence India. Abandoning the positions of his youth, Lal now recognizes that
the only way to bring relief to desperately poor countries of the Third World is through the adoption of free
market economic policies and globalization, which are facilitated through American primacy .(FN4) As a witness to the failed
alternative economic systems, Lal is one of the strongest academic proponents of American primacy due to the economic prosperity it provides.¶ Fourth and finally, the United States, in seeking primacy, has been
willing to use its power not only to advance its interests but to promote the welfare of people all over the globe.
The U nited S tates is the earth's leading source of positive
externalities for the world. The U.S. military has participated in over fifty operations since the end of the Cold War--and most of
those missions have been humanitarian in nature . Indeed, the U.S. military is the earth's "911 force "--it serves, de facto, as the
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world's police, the global paramedic and the planet's fire department. Whenever there is a natural disaster,
earthquake, flood, drought, volcanic eruption, typhoon or tsunami, the U nited S tates assists the countries in need.
the day after Christmas in 2004, a tremendous earthquake and tsunami occurred in the Indian Ocean near Sumatra, killing some 300,000 people. The United States was the first to respond with aid. Washington
followed up with a large contribution of aid and deployed the U.S. military to South and Southeast Asia for many months to help with the aftermath of the disaster. About 20,000 U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen and
Only the U.S. military could
have accomplished this Herculean effort . No other force possesses the communications capabilities or global logistical
marines responded by providing water, food, medical aid, disease treatment and prevention as well as forensic assistance to help identify the bodies of those killed.
reach of the U.S. military. In fact, UN peacekeeping operations depend on the United States to supply UN forces.¶ American generosity has done more to
help the United States fight the War on Terror than almost any other measure. Before the tsunami, 80 percent of Indonesian public opinion was opposed to the United
States; after it, 80 percent had a favorable opinion of America. Two years after the disaster, and in poll after poll, Indonesians still have overwhelmingly positive views of the United States. In October 2005, an
enormous earthquake struck Kashmir, killing about 74,000 people and leaving three million homeless. The U.S. military responded immediately, diverting helicopters fighting the War on Terror in nearby Afghanistan
to bring relief as soon as possible. To help those in need, the United States also provided financial aid to Pakistan; and, as one might expect from those witnessing the munificence of the United States, it left a lasting
impression about America. For the first time since 9/11, polls of Pakistani opinion have found that more people are favorable toward the United States than unfavorable, while support for Al-Qaeda dropped to its
lowest level. Whether in Indonesia or Kashmir, the money was well-spent because it helped people in the wake of disasters, but it also had a real impact on the War on Terror. When people in the Muslim world
witness the U.S. military conducting a humanitarian mission, there is a clearly positive impact on Muslim opinion of the United States. As the War on Terror is a war of ideas and opinion as much as military action, for
the United States humanitarian missions are the equivalent of a blitzkrieg.¶
THERE IS no other state, group of states or international organization that can
provide these global benefits . None even comes close. The U nited N ations cannot because it is riven with conflicts and
major cleavages that divide the international body time and again on matters great and trivial . Thus it lacks the ability to speak with
one voice on salient issues and to act as a unified force once a decision is reached. The EU has similar problems . Does anyone expect Russia or China to
take up these responsibilities? They may have the desire, but they do not have the capabilities. Let's face it: for the time being,
American primacy remains humanity's only practical hope of solving the world's ills.¶ While the benefits of American primacy
are considerable, no country can ever escape from the iron law of Economics 101 --there is no free lunch. American primacy is
no exception.
Leadership requires that the U nited S tates incur costs and run risks not borne by other countries. These costs can be stark
and brutal, and they have to be faced directly by proponents of primacy. It means that some Americans will die in the service of their country. These are the costs, and they are significant. Americans should be
conscious of them and use them in their contemplation of the value of primacy. Additionally, the costs of primacy must impose upon American policy-makers a sharp focus and prudence concerning how they wield
scholars who are proclaiming that the sky is falling, primacy is doomed and America must retrench have to
confront the reality of U.S. power. The world is a long way from seeing the end of American primacy, and it is in
American power. Equally, all Americans should be aware of the benefits that flow from primacy and that they enjoy.¶ While primacy's advantages and costs must be weighed objectively and solemnly,
America's interest--and the world's--to have it last as long as possible .¶
No impact turns---hegemonic decline emboldens rising power and challengers---US intervention is
inevitable, only a question of effectiveness.
Stuart Gottlieb 12 is an Adjunct Professor of International Affairs and Public Policy at Columbia University's School of
International and Public Affairs, where he is also an affiliate of the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies. He worked
as a foreign policy adviser and speechwriter to two senior Democratic senators and has worked on presidential campaigns
for both Democratic and Republican candidates. “What if U.S. stops policing the world?” September 19, 2012,, Accessed Date: 4-19-13 y2k
But the question is not whether promises to bring home troops and reduce military spending can be sold in an election year -- the question is what
impact would retrenchment have on future U.S. and global security. If history is any guide, the answer is troubling : Over
the past century, each of America's attempts to reduce its role in the world was met by rising global threats , eventually
requiring a major U.S. re-engagement.
This is not to argue that the U.S. should sustain its muscular post-9/11 global posture or continue its land
war in Afghanistan. It is to urge caution against a growing belief that scaling back American power in the world will be without risks or costs. History shows that
in the aftermath of America's major wars of the 20th century -- World War I, World War II and Vietnam -- the American
public and powerful leaders in Washington demanded strict new limits in foreign policy. After World War I, that meant rejecting
participation in the League of Nations and receding into isolation. After World War II, it meant embarking on one of the largest voluntary military demobilizations
in world history. And after Vietnam, it meant placing new restrictions on a president's ability to conduct overseas operations.
But in each case , hopes
were soon dashed by global challengers who took advantage of America's effort to draw back from the world stage --
Germany and Japan in the 1930s, the Soviet Union in the immediate post-World War II period and the Soviet Union
again after Vietnam. In each case, the United States was forced back into a paramount global leadership role -- in World War
II, the Cold War and the military build-up and proxy wars of the 1980s. Similar effects have also followed the withdrawal of U.S. troops from
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global hot spots , as in Somalia in 1993. America's need to extricate itself from that calamitous humanitarian mission, in which 18 U.S. soldiers were killed,
was clear. But the
withdrawal came at a huge strategic cost: It emboldened the narrative of the emerging al Qaeda
network that America was a "paper tiger ," setting the stage for the escalating terrorist attacks of the 1990s and September
11, 2001. The Afghan war: When friends are enemies U.S. steps up Mideast military presence Military option for Pres. Obama in Libya Obama's desire to
withdraw from costly and unpopular foreign conflicts and refocus on domestic issues is understandable. And he is by no means an isolationist, as his intensified
war on al Qaeda can attest. But Obama's assertion
that his recalibration of U.S. foreign policy -- centered on withdrawing U.S.
troops from Mideast wars and leaning more on allies and the United Nations -- has awakened "a new confidence in our leadership" is
without foundation . Like Great Britain in the 19th century, America since the turn of the 20th century has been the
world's pivotal global power . Fair or not, in moments when America seemed unsure of its role in the world, the world
noticed and reacted . There is no reason to believe now is different. Indeed, in many ways looming opportunists are more
obvious today than the 1930s, 1970s and 1990s. These include al Qaeda and other Islamist movements spinning U.S. troop withdrawals
from Iraq and Afghanistan as strategic defeats; an emboldened Iran on the cusp of attaining nuclear weapons; and a rising China flexing its
muscles in the South China Sea. To his credit, Romney has strongly warned against a world with more limited American leadership. He has also
promised to reverse Obama's defense cuts and offer his own increases. But while Obama's approach may be shortsighted, Romney's would face an uphill battle
against fiscal and popular sentiment. These issues must certainly be raised in the upcoming presidential debates. Whoever wins in November will confront not
robust U.S.
leadership in the world remains vital to their security and prosperity and convince the world it remains unwavering. History shows that doing
just an increasingly dangerous world, but also an increasingly isolationist public. The great challenge will be to convince the American people that
otherwise only raises the stakes down the line.
Even if they win their offense, legitimacy smooths the transition---key to global stability
Kevin Fujimoto 12, Lt. Colonel, U.S. Army, January 11, 2012, “Preserving U.S. National Security Interests Through a Liberal
World Construct,” online:
The emergence of peer competitors, not terrorism, presents the greatest long-term threat to our national security. Over the past decade, while the
United States concentrated its geopolitical focus on fighting two land wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, China has quietly begun implementing a strategy to emerge as the
dominant imperial power within Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean . Within the next 2 decades, China will likely replace the United States as the Asia-Pacific regional
hegemonic power, if not replace us as the global superpower.1 Although China presents its rise as peaceful and non-hegemonic, its construction of naval bases in neighboring countries and military expansion in the
region contradict that argument.
With a credible threat to its leading position in a unipolar global order , the U nited S tates should adopt a
grand strategy of “investment,” building legitimacy and capacity in the very institutions that will protect our interests in a
liberal global construct of the future when we are no longer the dominant imperial power . Similar to the Clinton era's grand strategy of
investment supports a world order predicated upon a system of basic rules and principles
, however, it differs in that the United States
should concentrate on the institutions (i.e., United Nations, World Trade Organization, ASEAN, alliances, etc.) that support a world order, as opposed to expanding democracy as a system of governance for other
China is already executing a strategy of expansion
sovereign nations. Despite its claims of a benevolent expansion,
similar to that of Imperial Japan's Manchukuo policy during the
1930s.3 This three-part strategy involves: “(i) (providing) significant investments in economic infrastructure for extracting natural resources; (ii) (conducting) military interventions (to) protect economic interests; and,
(iii) . . . (annexing) via installation of puppet governments.”4 China has already solidified its control over neighboring North Korea and Burma, and has similarly begun more ambitious engagements in Africa and
Central Asia where it seeks to expand its frontier.5 Noted political scientist Samuel P. Huntington provides further analysis of the motives behind China's imperial aspirations. He contends that “China (has) historically
conceived itself as encompassing a “‘Sinic Zone'. . . (with) two goals: to become the champion of Chinese culture . . . and to resume its historical position, which it lost in the nineteenth century, as the hegemonic
power in East Asia.”6 Furthermore, China holds one quarter of the world's population, and rapid economic growth will increase its demand for natural resources from outside its borders as its people seek a standard
The rise of peer competitors has historically resulted in regional instability and one should compare “the
emergence of China to the rise of. . . Germany as the dominant power in Europe in the late nineteenth century.”7 Furthermore, the rise of another peer competitor on the level of the Soviet
Union of the Cold War ultimately threatens U.S. global influence , challenging its concepts of human rights, liberalism, and democracy; as well as its ability to co-opt other nations to accept
them.8 This decline in influence, while initially limited to the Asia-Pacific region, threatens to result in significant conflict if it ultimately leads to a
paradigm shift in the ideas and principles that govern the existing world order . A grand strategy of investment to address the threat of China
requires investing in institutions, addressing ungoverned states, and building legitimacy through multilateralism. The United States must build capacity in
the existing institutions and alliances accepted globally as legitimate representative bodies of the world's governments. For true legitimacy, the United States must support these institutions,
of living comparable to that of Western civilization.
not only when convenient, in order to avoid the appearance of unilateralism, which would ultimately undermine the very organizations upon whom it will rely when it is no longer the global hegemon. The United
States must also address ungoverned states, not only as breeding grounds for terrorism, but as conflicts that threaten to spread into regional instability, thereby drawing in superpowers with competing interests.
Huntington proposes that the greatest source of conflict will come from what he defines as one “core” nation's involvement in a conflict between another core nation and a minor state within its immediate sphere of
the United States, as a global
power, must apply all elements of its national power now to address the problem of weak and failing states, which threaten to k,l as the
influence.9 For example, regional instability in South Asia10 threatens to involve combatants from the United States, India, China, and the surrounding nations. Appropriately,
principal catalysts of future global conflicts. 11 Admittedly, the application of American power in the internal affairs of a sovereign nation raises issues. Experts have posed the
question of whether the United States should act as the world's enforcer of stability, imposing its concepts of human rights on other states. In response to this concern, The International Commission on Intervention
and State Sovereignty authored a study titled, The Responsibility to Protect,12 calling for revisions to the understanding of sovereignty within the United Nations (UN) charter. This commission places the
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responsibility to protect peoples of sovereign nations on both the state itself and, more importantly, on the international community.13 If approved, this revision will establish a precedent whereby the United States
has not only the authority and responsibility to act within the internal affairs of a repressive government, but does so with global legitimacy if done under the auspices of a UN mandate.
Any effort to
legitimize and support a liberal world construct requires the United States to adopt a multilateral doctrine which avoids the
precepts of the previous administration: “preemptive war, democratization, and U.S. primacy of unilateralism ,”14 which have resulted in the alienation of
former allies worldwide . Predominantly Muslim nations, whose citizens had previously looked to the United States as an example of representative governance, viewed the Iraq invasion as the
seminal dividing action between the Western and the Islamic world. Appropriately, any future American interventions into the internal affairs of another sovereign nation must first seek to establish consensus by
gaining the approval of a body representing global opinion,
and must reject military unilateralism as a threat to that governing body's legitimacy . Despite the
long-standing U.S. tradition of a liberal foreign policy since the start of the Cold War, the famous liberal leviathan, John Ikenberry, argues that “
the post-9/11 doctrine of national security
strategy . . . has been based on . . . American global dominance, the preventative use of force, coalitions of the willing, and the struggle between
liberty and evil .”15 American foreign policy has misguidedly focused on spreading democracy, as opposed to building a liberal international order based on universally accepted principles that actually
Wilsonian idealists “support liberal democracy, but reject the possibility of democratizing peoples . . .”16 and reject military primacy
set the conditions for individual nation states to select their own system of governance. Anne-Marie Slaughter, the former Dean of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, argues that
in favor of supporting a rules-based system of order . Investment in a liberal world order would also set the conditions for
the United States to garner support from noncommitted regional powers (i.e., Russia, India, Japan, etc.), or “ swing civilizations,” in
countering China's increasing hegemonic influence .17 These states reside within close proximity to the Indian Ocean, which will likely emerge as the geopolitical
focus of the American foreign policy during the 21st century, and appropriately
have the ability to offset China's imperial dominance
in the region.18 Critics of a liberal
world construct argue that idealism is not necessary, based on the assumption that nations that trade together will not go to war with each other.19 In response, foreign affairs columnist Thomas L. Friedman rebukes
their arguments, acknowledging the predicate of commercial interdependence as a factor only in the decision to go to war, and argues that
while globalization is creating a new
international order, differences between civilizations still create friction that may overcome all other factors and lead to
conflict .20 Detractors also warn that as China grows in power, it will no longer observe “the basic rules and principles of a liberal international order,” which largely result from Western concepts of foreign
relations. Ikenberry addresses this risk, citing that China's leaders already recognize that they will gain more authority within the existing liberal order, as opposed to contesting it. China's leaders “want the protection
Even if China
executes a peaceful rise and the United States overestimates a Sinic threat to its national security interest, the emergence of a new imperial power will challenge
American leadership in the Indian Ocean and Asia-Pacific region. That being said, it is more likely that China, as evidenced by its military and economic expansion, will displace the United
States as the regional hegemonic power. Recognizing this threat now, the United States must prepare for the eventual transition and immediately begin building
the legitimacy and support of a system of rules that will protect its interests later when we are no longer the world's only
and rights that come from the international order's . . . defense of sovereignty,”21 from which they have benefitted during their recent history of economic growth and international expansion.
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The United States Congress should pass legislation that creates a requirement that the executive begin
prosecution of terrorism suspects in federal district courts within 18 months of detention.
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Congressional action solves – creates a credible regime that moderates the risk of our
counterterrorism operations.
Prieto 9 (Daniel, Council on Foreign Relations, “War About Terror: Civil Liberties and National Security After 9/11”,
February 2009,, RSR)
It is true that U.S. citizens hold the president ultimately accountable for national security, but it is ¶ also true that when
the president shares the burden
of accountability with others, tough decisions and ¶ controversial policies gain credibility and legitimacy and become
more sustainable. U.S. policy is ¶ strongest and most effective when it enjoys the broad support of Congress and the
public. It is likely ¶ that many post-9/11 counterterrorism programs could have been strengthened by greater cooperation
between the executive and legislative branches and by enabling legislation from the outset, not as ¶ a legal requirement,
but as a prudential matter. Broader consultation, both within the administration ¶ and with Congress, and greater
independent oversight of counterterrorism programs could have ¶ moderated the risk of overreach and errors in the
realms of both detention and surveillance.
The United States should try suspects in federal district courts and transfer individuals to US facilities
PHR 11 (Physicians for Human Rights, "Punishment Before Justice: Indefinite Detention in the US,"
The United States government must support trials in Article III courts for individuals detained at ¶ Guantánamo Bay and
coordinate the various branches of government to ensure that civilian trials ¶ for detainees are a policy priority.¶ As both
recent and historic prosecutions of terrorist suspects demonstrate, United States ¶ federal district courts are well-equipped to secure
convictions for terrorist activities, thus ¶ furthering the government’s interest in and obligation to protect the country, its citizens and ¶ military personnel
from terrorism while meeting its obligation to do so in a timely manner ¶ that comports with national and international legal standards of justice. ¶ Federal
prosecutors have secured convictions against 400 individuals charged with acts of ¶ terrorism in federal courts since the attacks of
September 11, 2001, alone. The recent trial ¶ of Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, a Tanzanian citizen who received a life sentence for his involvement in a conspiracy
relating to the 1998 bombings of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, ¶ reaffirms that our legal system is fully capable of, and is a legitimate
forum for, trying ¶ individuals charged with acts of terrorism. Beginning civilian trials for others currently detained at
Guantánamo will end their indefinite detention and provide justice for victims. In ¶ order to facilitate civilian
prosecutions for terrorism suspects, the United States Congress ¶ should end bans on funding transfers of individuals
from Guantánamo Bay to facilities in ¶ the United States.
Federal courts are more legitimate than military trials – international credibility
Hathaway and Adelsberg et al 13 (Oona, Samuel, Spencer Amdur, Philireya Pitts, and Sirine Shebaya, "The Power to
Detain Detention of Terrorism Suspects After 9/11," Yale Journal of International Law, Vol. 38: Issue 123,
Federal courts are also generally considered more legitimate than military ¶ commissions. The stringent procedural
protections reduce the risk of error and ¶ generate trust and legitimacy.245 The federal courts, for example, provide more ¶ robust
hearsay protections than the commissions. In addition, jurors are ordinary citizens, not U.S. military personnel. Indeed, some of
the weakest ¶ procedural protections in the military commission system have been ¶ successfully challenged as
unconstitutional.247 Congress and the Executive ¶ have responded to these legal challenges—and to criticism of the
commissions ¶ from around the globe—by significantly strengthening the commissions' procedural protections. Yet the
remaining gaps—along with what many regard ¶ as a tainted history—continue to raise doubts about the fairness and legitimacy ¶ of the
commissions. The current commissions, moreover, have been active for ¶ only a short period—too brief a period for doubts to be
confirmed or put to ¶ rest.248 Federal criminal procedure, on the other hand, is well-established and ¶ widely regarded as
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Federal courts can utilize national security information without privacy concerns - CIPA
Hathaway and Adelsberg et al 13 (Oona, Samuel, Spencer Amdur, Philireya Pitts, and Sirine Shebaya, "The Power to
Detain Detention of Terrorism Suspects After 9/11," Yale Journal of International Law, Vol. 38: Issue 123,
Opponents of federal criminal law prosecution and detention of suspected terrorists often point to two evidentiary
concerns: (1) the inability to utilize sensitive national security information for fear of exposure, and (2) adherence to the
Federal Rules of Evidence, which makes it impossible for the ¶ government to present probative evidence in terrorism
cases.289 Once again, ¶ these challenges can be met within the criminal justice system. Release of Sensitive National Security Information ¶
Critics of terrorism prosecution in criminal court worry that exposure of ¶ probative evidence in a trial will imperil ongoing
investigations or sources. ¶ However, the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) offers a decisive ¶ answer to this
concern. It allows sensitive national security information to be ¶ used in a federal criminal trial without being publicly
released.290 Under ¶ CIPA’s detailed procedural framework, classified evidence need not be ¶ disclosed to the defense
during discovery unless the court finds, based on an in ¶ camera review, that it is relevant under traditional evidentiary
standards, and even ¶ relevant evidence may be withheld through a non-disclosure order (for ¶ which the government may face some
sanctions). All of the relevant ¶ proceedings are conducted without the defendant present and in secure facilities to ensure
maximum protection for classified information. Moreover, classified ¶ evidence that is released may use substitutions to
minimize security risks.
Federal prosecution can be used to end indefinite detention, gather intel, and convict terrorist
suspects – successful al-Awlaki mission proves
Finn 13 (Peter, 4/8, The Washington Post, "A template emerges for prosecuting terror suspects,"
Aboard the USS Boxer, somewhere in the Indian Ocean, Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame was sitting across from a team of interrogators, talking and talking. In secure
meeting rooms in Washington, senior officials in the Obama administration were wringing their hands over what to do with him.¶ Some
in the administration
desperately wanted to prosecute Warsame — a key facilitator between al-Qaida franchises — in federal court. To do
that, though, they needed a “clean team” of FBI agents to come in and read the Somali his rights, perhaps jeopardizing his
willingness to keep talking. The quandary was particularly acute because Warsame had intelligence on Anwar al-Awlaki, a
U.S. citizen and a senior leader in al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).¶ “There was a fair amount of debate because some of the intel guys didn’t want
to stop the interrogation,” said a former administration official who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss internal government deliberations.
“Others were getting antsy because they thought the longer you hold the guy and don’t Mirandize him, the worse off you
are” if prosecutors try him in federal court.¶ In late June 2011, after two months of interrogation, the president’s national security advisers made the call.
A team of FBI agents gave Warsame a Miranda warning, advising him of his right to remain silent and his right to counsel.
“Then there was a kind of hold-your-breath moment,” the former official said.¶ Warsame waived his rights and continued to talk.¶ In that
instant, the Obama administration may have preserved its ability to use the federal courts to prosecute high-value
terrorists captured overseas.¶ Warsame was detained in April 2011, the same month that Attorney General Eric Holder abandoned a criminal civilian trial in
New York for Khalid Sheik Mohammed, the self-proclaimed mastermind of the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks. Holder sent the case back to a military commission at Guantanamo
Bay. On
Capitol Hill, Republicans and Democrats were insisting that all terrorists captured overseas be sent to the military
detention center in Cuba.¶ But inside the administration, senior lawyers calculated that Warsame could be interrogated
for actionable intelligence while preparations were under way to bring him to federal court in New York for prosecution.
For an administration that is determined not to add to the detainee population at Guantanamo, the handling of the Somali’s case has become
something of a template for other terrorism suspects captured overseas.¶ Detainees are first held under the laws of war
and questioned by an interagency team of interrogators, including military, intelligence and law enforcement personnel, without being advised
of their rights. At some point, the interrogation is halted and — in the parlance of prosecutors — a “clean break” is established before a fresh team
of only FBI agents informs the prisoner of his right to counsel. Shortly afterward, the suspect is put on a plane and flown to a
federal district, most often New York, for trial.¶ According to the Justice Department, federal prosecutors since the Sept.
11 attacks have secured 67 convictions of terrorists captured overseas; a significant number have also been cooperative,
providing information to authorities. In the same period, there have been only seven convictions in the military
commissions at Guantanamo Bay. Two of those have been overturned on appeal.¶ Moreover, in military commissions, unlike federal courts,
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there is serious doubt about the viability of two of the charges most commonly used against terrorists — material
support and conspiracy — as law-of-war charges in cases in which suspects cannot be tied to a specific act of violence. ¶
Last month, federal prosecutors unsealed court documents that show that Warsame, who pleaded guilty to nine terrorism charges in
December 2011, has continued to cooperate with authorities in the U.S., almost certainly with the expectation that his cooperation will lead
the government to petition the judge to sentence him to less than life in prison. It could be a while before any sentencing takes place; prosecutors may use him as a
witness in other prosecutions.
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Ext – Congressional Action Solves/ A2: Executive Restraint
Collaboration with Congress is key to efficacy + legitimacy of counter terrorism operations
Prieto 9 (Daniel, Council on Foreign Relations, “War About Terror: Civil Liberties and National Security After 9/11”,
February 2009,, RSR)
Within the Bush administration, policy development and decision-making on a number of critical ¶ counterterrorism programs took
place within a very small circle. For example, at the direction of the ¶ White House, the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel did
not solicit input from the State ¶ Department as it developed the controversial August 2002 opinion on enhanced interrogation techniques.136In
another example, NSA lawyers were not given access to the OLC’s legal memoranda on ¶ the NSA’s activities related to the Terrorist Surveillance Program. Getting
counterterrorism policies ¶ right after 9/11 was hampered by the administration’s strategy of self-reliance at a time when
presidential actions and counterterrorism policy could have been strengthened by a more meaningful involvement of
Congress. Greater transparency and a more sustained effort to work with Congress ¶ could have helped mitigate the
controversies that have undermined and hampered U.S. counterterrorism policies, provide a more solid legal basis for
counterterrorism efforts, and defend against criticisms regarding the legitimacy of many new policies .
Congressional action is uniquely key – Court action risks illegitimacy and backlash.
Wald 5 (Patricia, Chief Judge for the US Court of Appeals, “War The Supreme Court Goes to War”, Terrorism, The Laws Of
War, And The Constitution: Debating The Enemy, 2005, RSR)
The laws of war, as interpreted by the Hamdi plurality, were a¶ key element of the decision, but they have no applicability beyond¶ the
battlefield or occupied territory and are not readily adaptable to¶ the war on terrorism. The Geneva Conventions and progeny are¶
badly in need of revision if they are to meet the realities of terrorist¶ wars. But equally deficient is our own domestic law concerning who,¶
under what conditions, with what procedures, and for how long battlefield¶ captives can be held. The Supreme Court
entered the arena¶ because it had to; individual liberties guaranteed by our Constitution¶ and laws to citizens (and, to some degree, to aliens) were in
jeopardy. The Court has momentarily finished the opening round, but the legal¶ battles are still being waged. Before there are repetitions of the¶
Afghanistan and Iraq wars, there needs to be a thoughtful debate on¶ and legislative resolution of interrogation procedures and rights,¶
detention limits on who and how long non-POWs can be held, and¶ what, if any, rights adhere to targets of covert actions. It is long past¶ time for
Congress to become engaged—even though there are skeptics¶ in the civil liberties community about what Congress may do.¶ Congress is the branch
of government directly responsible, along with¶ the executive, to the citizenry for the reconciliation of wartime security¶
and civil liberties, and Congress must fully accept this moment¶ of responsibility.33 Otherwise, there are bound to be much
deeper¶ interventions by the Court in this troubled area of the law. Once in¶ the water, the Court may not be able to hug
the shoreline much¶ longer; instead, it will be carried irretrievably by the current out to¶ the “boundless sea.”¶ 33.
Courts can’t solve – further action risks counterproductive backlash to ending detention.
Wald 5 (Patricia, Chief Judge for the US Court of Appeals, “War The Supreme Court Goes to War”, Terrorism, The Laws Of
War, And The Constitution: Debating The Enemy, 2005, RSR)
As to civilian courts, alleged obstructionist tactics and the due¶ process problem of nondisclosable evidence and unavailable witnesses¶ present real problems to their
extensive use, as the ongoing¶ Moussaoui trial indicates too well.26 And the open question, discussed¶ earlier, of what the foreign detainee can claim in a habeas
hearing—¶ for example, international law violations or torture contentions—further¶ conflates the issue. Both the Rasul decision and the Hamdi plurality¶
opinion seem
to focus exclusively on the situation of a detainee¶ protesting his complete innocence of any involvement in
an armed¶ conflict. More nuanced challenges to the legality of detention on¶ other grounds may well require more guidance
from the Court. But¶ the variety of scenarios in which these challenges will rise would have¶ made detailed protocols not
only impossible but probably counterproductive .¶ The Court signaled the path and a few markers—that is¶ all it could or
likely should have done.
Arizona Debate Institute
Indefinite Detention AFF
Congressional leadership is key – courts lack legitimacy due to outdated rules to base their decisions
Wald 5 (Patricia, Chief Judge for the US Court of Appeals, “War The Supreme Court Goes to War”, Terrorism, The Laws Of
War, And The Constitution: Debating The Enemy, 2005, RSR)
Yet, the value of detainees as a source of information remains¶ high in the view of a substantial part of the intelligence
community,¶ and its dilution by legal restraints is likely to be vigorously opposed¶ or circumscribed. The justices are worldly men and women and
not¶ oblivious to such concerns. The Rasul case does not touch the problem¶ of whether detainees from foreign countries
can be kept for intelligence¶ purposes even if U.S. citizens can’t. It seems plain after Rasul¶ and Hamdi that Congress
should tackle the problem directly and¶ openly rather than asking the Court to determine it on the basis of¶ old rules
established for old problems in old kinds of war.
Arizona Debate Institute
Indefinite Detention AFF
Ext – Legitimacy
Detention policy is globally perceived – extending procedural fairness is crucial to prevent sympathy
for terrorism. (Also in the coop extension for the terror advantage)
Welsh, J.D. from the University of Utah, ‘11
[David, “Procedural Justice Post-9/11: The Effects of Procedurally Unfair Treatment of Detainees on Perceptions of Global
Legitimacy”, University of New Hampshire Law Review, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2011, RSR]
It is also critical to extend procedural justice judgments beyond ¶ the individual detainee to the perspective of a worldwide
audience. ¶ While it is easy to overlook how an alleged terrorist feels about the ¶ degree of procedural fairness he or she is receiving, the perceptions of
governments, human rights organizations, political groups (including terrorist organizations), and millions of individuals (particularly
those who closely identify with that individual’s race, religion, ¶ or nationality) cannot be ignored. Individuals become upset when ¶ they
observe unfairness, and such observations motivate them to ¶ help victims of this unfairness.87 Thus, it would be a mistake
to ¶ think that procedural injustice against a single individual will affect ¶ the perceptions of that individual alone.88
Additionally, efforts to ¶ hide procedural injustices, such as the abuse of detainees by U.S. ¶ soldiers,89 have only backfired by creating
sympathy for the types of ¶ individuals that the United States seeks to dehumanize.90 In the next ¶ section, I identify six rules of
procedural justice, evaluate the current ¶ detention regime based on these rules, and make recommendations ¶ about how these rules could be implemented in a DTC
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Indefinite Detention AFF
Ext – Key to Terrorism
Federal prosecution encourages effective intel gathering
Finn 13 (Peter, 4/8, The Washington Post, "A template emerges for prosecuting terror suspects,"
Current and former administration officials say criminal prosecution does not preclude intelligence gathering. David Kris, the
former head of the Justice Department’s national security division, said suspects talk for all kinds of reasons, but “one of
the things the government can do in the criminal justice system, by offering somewhat shorter sentences in exchange for
valuable cooperation, is to balance and re-balance over time the sometimes competing national security values of disrupting and
incapacitating a particular target and gathering intelligence from that target that may help disrupt and incapacitate others.”
Federal courts can prosecute terrorists who can’t be tried under the MCA
Hathaway and Adelsberg et al 13 (Oona, Samuel, Spencer Amdur, Philireya Pitts, and Sirine Shebaya, "The Power to
Detain Detention of Terrorism Suspects After 9/11," Yale Journal of International Law, Vol. 38: Issue 123,
In some cases, prosecution in federal court is the only available option for ¶ prosecuting an accused terrorist. Federal
antiterrorism statutes are extensive ¶ and provide statutory authority to prosecute individuals who are part of or ¶ supporting
terrorist groups without direct ties to forces associated with alQaeda or the Taliban (and therefore outside the scope of
the 2001 AUMF or the ¶ NDAA),233 and independently operating terrorists who are inspired by, but are ¶ not part of or
associated with, al-Qaeda or the Taliban.234 These statutes also ¶ reach persons or citizens who, because they are
apprehended in the United ¶ States, cannot be tried under the MCA. The following sections discuss the ¶ contours and limit¶ ism context. ¶
Even where detention under the law of war is available, the criminal ¶ justice system offers some key advantages for the detention and prosecution of ¶ suspected
terrorists. We thus aim here to offer a correction to the recent trend ¶ toward favoring law-of-war detention over criminal prosecution and detention. ¶ In the vast
majority of cases, criminal
prosecution and detention is the most effective and legitimate way to address the terrorist threat.
Arizona Debate Institute
Indefinite Detention AFF
Ext – Conviction Rate
Federal conviction rates high – military court prosecutions fail
Hathaway and Adelsberg et al 13 (Oona, Samuel, Spencer Amdur, Philireya Pitts, and Sirine Shebaya, "The Power to
Detain Detention of Terrorism Suspects After 9/11," Yale Journal of International Law, Vol. 38: Issue 123,
As already noted, conviction
rates in terrorism trials have been close to ninety percent since 2001, and those rates have
remained steady in the face of large increases in the number of prosecutions. The military commissions, by contrast,
have—as of this writing—convicted seven people since 2001, five of whom pled guilty. Charges have been dropped against
several defendants, and other defendants have been charged but not tried. The commission procedures have been
challenged at every stage, and it is unclear what final form they will ultimately take. Even their substantive jurisdiction remains
unsettled. In October 2012, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit overturned Salim Hamdan's military commission conviction for
providing material support to terrorism. The Court held that the Military Commissions Act of 2006, which made material support
for terrorism a war crime that could be prosecuted in the commissions, was not retroactively applicable to Hamdan's conduct prior to
enactment of the statute. Moreover, the Court explained that material support for terrorism was not a recognized war crime under international law. As a
result, his conviction for material support for terrorism in the commission could not stand. It is uncertain how this will affect other trials of detainees, but this decision
clearly illustrates the unsettled nature of the commissions.
Arizona Debate Institute
Indefinite Detention AFF
AT – Courts Inexperienced
Federal district courts more qualified than military trial system
Hathaway and Adelsberg et al 13 (Oona, Samuel, Spencer Amdur, Philireya Pitts, and Sirine Shebaya, "The Power to
Detain Detention of Terrorism Suspects After 9/11," Yale Journal of International Law, Vol. 38: Issue 123,
Post-conviction detention of terrorists after prosecution in federal court ¶ provides predictability that is currently absent
in the military commission ¶ system. Federal district courts have years of experience trying complex cases ¶ and
convicting dangerous criminals, including international terrorists, and the ¶ rules are well established and understood. The current
military commission ¶ system, on the other hand, is a comparatively untested adjudicatory regime.
Federal courts more effective than military commissions – empirically proven
HRF No Date (Human Rights First, "Trying Terror Suspects in Federal Courts,"
Federal civilian criminal courts have convicted nearly 500 individuals on terrorism-related ¶ charges since 9/11.1¶
Military commissions have convicted only seven.¶ 2¶ Federal court ¶ convictions include convictions resulting from investigations of
terrorist acts and of criminal acts by ¶ those with an identified link to international terrorism. General Colin Powell has said, “Our
civilian ¶ courts have been throwing people in jail religiously. They have been very effective in putting terrorists ¶ in jail, whereas the
military commissions and the activities of Guantanamo have not gotten up to speed ¶ to do that kind of thing.
Arizona Debate Institute
Indefinite Detention AFF
AT – Light Sentences
Federal courts empirically impose stiff terrorism penalties
HRF No Date (Human Rights First, "Trying Terror Suspects in Federal Courts,"
Federal courts have repeatedly imposed stiff sentences on those convicted of terrorism-related ¶ charges. The Sentencing
Guidelines, §3A1.4, provides for increased sentencing for defendants ¶ convicted of a crime that “involved, or was intended
to promote, a federal crime of terrorism.” US¶ courts have imposed severe sentences on those convicted of terrorism-related charges.
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Indefinite Detention AFF
AT – Can’t Detain Suspects
Federal district courts still have the ability to hold suspects while the USFG is gathering evidence of a
terrorism charge. Prosecutors have several strategies available that military commissions don’t:
A) Material Support Prosecution statutes can be used to detain suspects
Hathaway and Adelsberg et al 13 (Oona, Samuel, Spencer Amdur, Philireya Pitts, and Sirine Shebaya, "The Power to
Detain Detention of Terrorism Suspects After 9/11," Yale Journal of International Law, Vol. 38: Issue 123,
Targeted prosecution under material support laws may in some cases ¶ provide a useful supplement to direct prosecution of terrorist activities. Where
¶ an
individual has not yet engaged in an act of terrorism but has participated in ¶ preparation or other support for an act of
terrorism,264 the individual may be ¶ detained and prosecuted under material support laws.265 These laws do not ¶ require
prosecutors to prove that the individual has directly engaged in an act of ¶ terrorism. They therefore can be used, and
have been used, to prosecute and ¶ detain those suspected of planning or contributing to terrorist acts.266 Material ¶ support
prosecutions have been brought, for example, “against individuals who enrolled in terrorist training camps, who acted as
messengers for terrorist leaders, who intended to act as doctors to terrorist groups, or who raised money to support terrorist
organizations.” While excessive use of material support prosecution against individuals who do not have direct ties to terrorist organizations is both controversial
and problematic, carefully targeted material support prosecution can be a useful prosecutorial tool.
B) Non terrorism statutes can be used to detain and prosecute suspects
Hathaway and Adelsberg et al 13 (Oona, Samuel, Spencer Amdur, Philireya Pitts, and Sirine Shebaya, "The Power to
Detain Detention of Terrorism Suspects After 9/11," Yale Journal of International Law, Vol. 38: Issue 123,
Another criminal law detention tool is the use of non-terrorism statutes to ¶ incapacitate terrorism suspects. In a method
broadly applied in other areas of ¶ the law, prosecutors can arrest the suspect on an alternative, readily provable ¶ charge that does
not, on its face, require any allegation that the ¶ linked 267 to terrorism. This “preventive charging” also allows law
enforcement ¶ to arrest suspects at an early stage without risking disclosure of sensitive ¶ information.268 Statutes that have
been invoked for this purpose include those ¶ criminalizing identity theft, wire fraud, and making misrepresentations to ¶
federal investigators.269 For example, the 9/11 Commission noted in its report ¶ that as many as fifteen of the nineteen
September 11 hijackers were vulnerable ¶ to criminal charges based on their fraudulent travel documents.270¶ Many of these
alternative charges carry high maximum sentences—thirty ¶ years for bank fraud,271 twenty-five for passport fraud,272 and fifteen for
¶ identity theft.273 Cumulatively, these alternative charges can be made either in ¶ addition to or instead of charges of
terrorist acts. They present a viable alternative for incapacitating terrorism suspects who cannot be prosecuted directly
for terrorism. In practice, this approach has worked. Conspiracy charges led to four life imprisonments and one thirty-three
year sentence in the 2007 Fort Dix plot. Perjury, obstruction, and false statement charges added up to a ten-year
sentence in United States v. Sabri Benkahla. While some non-terrorism prosecutions result in shorter sentences, the alternative – long-term military
detention without trial – faces all the problems outlined above.
Arizona Debate Institute
Indefinite Detention AFF
AT – Miranda Problems
Miranda rights don’t impede prosecution or intel gathering
Hathaway and Adelsberg et al 13 (Oona, Samuel, Spencer Amdur, Philireya Pitts, and Sirine Shebaya, "The Power to
Detain Detention of Terrorism Suspects After 9/11," Yale Journal of International Law, Vol. 38: Issue 123,
A second criticism that is often raised in discussions of criminal law detention for suspected terrorists is the feasibility of
providing Miranda warnings prior to arrest. This criticism of the criminal law model has particular resonance if the
suspected terrorist is captured abroad. Critics also claim that applying Miranda warnings can be an obstacle to gathering
intelligence. In practice, providing Miranda warnings has yet to be a real impediment to intelligence collection in the
terrorism context. John Brennan recently confronted and unequivocally rejected these concerns: “Claims that Miranda
warnings undermine intelligence collection ignore decades of experience to the contrary. Yes, some terrorism suspects
have refused to provide information in the criminal justice system, but so have many individuals held in military custody,
from Afghanistan to Guantanamo, where Miranda warnings were not given. What is undeniable is that many individuals in the
criminal justice system have provided a great deal of information and intelligence – even after being given their Miranda
warnings. The real danger is failing to give a Miranda warning in those circumstances where it’s appropriate , which could
well determine whether a terrorist is convicted and spends the rest of his life behind bars, or is set free.” In fact, it is unclear whether the
reading of Miranda rights has any meaningful effect on the gathering of intelligence or the prosecution of terrorists.
According to one study, approximately eighty three percent of suspects who were advised of their Miranda rights waived those
rights. This empirical finding supports the conclusion reached by FBI Director Robert Mueller in October 2010: “I do not believe that if you look at the number of recent
cases we’ve had, Miranda has not stood in the way of getting extensive intelligence.”
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Indefinite Detention AFF
AT – Wartime
The right to a timely trial is valid during wartime
Zayas 5 (Alfred de, "Human rights and indefinite detention," Vol. 87: Issue 857,, March)
Article 9, paragraph 3 of the ICCPR stipulates: “Anyone arrested or ¶ detained on a criminal charge shall be brought
promptly before a judge or other ¶ officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial ¶
within a reasonable time or to release. It shall not be the general rule that persons ¶ awaiting trial shall be detained in custody, but release may be subject
to guarantees to appear for trial.” Prolonged pre-trial detention without bail is thus incompatible with Article 9 and requires
specific justification and periodic review.9¶ In the context of the so-called war on terror, it is important to recall ¶ that the
ICCPR applies both in times of peace and in times of armed conflict. In ¶ its General Comment No. 31 of 29 March 2004, the Human Rights
Committee ¶ clarified: “The Covenant applies also in situations of armed conflict to which ¶ the rules of international
humanitarian law are applicable. While, in respect of ¶ certain Covenant rights, more specific rules of international humanitarian law ¶ may be especially
relevant for the purposes of the interpretation of the Covenant ¶ rights, both spheres of law are complementary, not mutually exclusive.”
Arizona Debate Institute
Indefinite Detention AFF
AT – Prisoner Escape
300+ prisoners convicted of terrorism are housed in federal facilities – no escapes
HRF No Date (Human Rights First, "Trying Terror Suspects in Federal Courts,"
Federal prisons hold more than 300 individuals convicted of terrorism-related offenses. None ¶ has ever escaped. 6¶ Of the 7
GTMO convicted detainees, only 3 remain in prison.¶ 7¶ The ¶ American Correctional Association said, “Corrections and law-enforcement professionals
in the United ¶ States are second to none. We want to assure all Americans that the public will be safe from harm and ¶
that the terrorists will be properly and effectively detained -- whether in Cuba or in a single facility or ¶ multiple facilities across the United
Arizona Debate Institute
Indefinite Detention AFF
AT – National Security
Federal courts can utilize national security information without privacy concerns - CIPA
Hathaway and Adelsberg et al 13 (Oona, Samuel, Spencer Amdur, Philireya Pitts, and Sirine Shebaya, "The Power to
Detain Detention of Terrorism Suspects After 9/11," Yale Journal of International Law, Vol. 38: Issue 123,
Opponents of federal criminal law prosecution and detention of suspected terrorists often point to two evidentiary
concerns: (1) the inability to utilize sensitive national security information for fear of exposure, and (2) adherence to the
Federal Rules of Evidence, which makes it impossible for the ¶ government to present probative evidence in terrorism
cases.289 Once again, ¶ these challenges can be met within the criminal justice system. Release of Sensitive National Security Information ¶
Critics of terrorism prosecution in criminal court worry that exposure of ¶ probative evidence in a trial will imperil ongoing
investigations or sources. ¶ However, the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) offers a decisive ¶ answer to this
concern. It allows sensitive national security information to be ¶ used in a federal criminal trial without being publicly
released.290 Under ¶ CIPA’s detailed procedural framework, classified evidence need not be ¶ disclosed to the defense
during discovery unless the court finds, based on an in ¶ camera review, that it is relevant under traditional evidentiary
standards, and even ¶ relevant evidence may be withheld through a non-disclosure order (for ¶ which the government may face some
sanctions). All of the relevant ¶ proceedings are conducted without the defendant present and in secure facilities to ensure
maximum protection for classified information. Moreover, classified ¶ evidence that is released may use substitutions to
minimize security risks.
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Indefinite Detention AFF
*** Terrorism Advantage
Arizona Debate Institute
Indefinite Detention AFF
UQ: Nuclear Terrorism Inevitable
Terrorists can get nuclear weapons – numerous studies confirm.
Bunn et al, ‘11
[The U.S.-Russia Joint Threat Assessment on Nuclear Terrorism, Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and
International Affairs. Matthew Bunn. Associate Professor of Public Policy at Harvard Kennedy School and Co-Principal
Investigator of Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.
Colonel Yuri Morozov Senior fellow at the U.S.A and Canada Studies Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Rolf
Mowatt-Larssen. Senior fellow at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, director of
Intelligence and Counterintelligence at the U.S. Department of Energy. Simon Saradzhyan. Fellow at Harvard University’s
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. William Tobey. Senior fellow at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for
Science and International Affairs, deputy administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation at the U.S. National Nuclear
Security Administration, 2006–2009. Colonel General Viktor I. Yesin (retired Russian Armed Forces). Senior fellow at the
U.S.A and Canada Studies Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences and advisor to commander of the Strategic Missile
Forces of Russia, chief of staff of the Strategic Missile Forces, 1994–1996. Major General Pavel S. Zolotarev (retired Russian
Armed Forces). Deputy director of the U.S.A and Canada Studies Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences and head of
the Information and Analysis Center of the Russian Ministry of Defense, 1993–1997, deputy chief of staff of the Defense
Council of Russia, 1997–1998.]
Nuclear terrorism is a real and urgent threat. Urgent actions are required to reduce the risk. The risk is driven by the rise of terrorists who
seek to inflict unlimited damage, many of whom have sought justification for their plans in radical interpretations of
Islam; by the spread of information about the decades-old technology of nuclear weapons; by the increased availability
of weapons-usable nuclear materials; and by globalization, which makes it easier to move people, technologies, and
materials across the world. • Making a crude nuclear bomb would not be easy, but is potentially within the capabilities of a technically
sophisticated terrorist group, as numerous government studies have confirmed. Detonating a stolen nuclear weapon would likely be difficult for
terrorists to accomplish, if the weapon was equipped with modern technical safeguards (such as the electronic locks known as Permissive Action Links, or PALs). Terrorists could,
however, cut open a stolen nuclear weapon and make use of its nuclear material for a bomb of their own. • The nuclear
material for a bomb is small and difficult to detect, making it a major challenge to stop nuclear smuggling, or to recover
nuclear material after it has been stolen.
Arizona Debate Institute
Indefinite Detention AFF
Internal Link: Motivation
Government management is key – detention energizes supporters for terrorist organizations.
Tyler, et al, ‘10
[Tom (Macklin Fleming Professor of Law and Professor of Psychology at Yale Law School); Stephen Schulhofer (Robert B.
McKay Professor of Law at New York University School of Law); and Aziz Z. Huq (Assistant Professor of Law and Herbert and
Marjorie Fried Teaching Scholar at the University of Chicago School of Law), “Legitimacy and Deterrence Effects in¶
Counterterrorism Policing: A Study of Muslim¶ Americans”, Law and Society Review, RSR]
A countervailing view in the terrorism literature, however,¶ warns of the potential of intrusive measures to stimulate terrorist¶
and ideological estrangement in the targeted communities (Donohue 2008) or
to prompt law-abiding individuals to¶ withhold
cooperation out of fear that suspicions, if reported, will¶ trigger overreaction and unjust treatment of innocents (as can¶ occur with ordinary crime; see Sherman
1993). A recent study of¶ Britain’s antiterror campaign in Northern Ireland (LaFree et al.¶ 2009) provides empirical
confirmation of this risk. These authors¶ identified six highly visible British interventions aimed at reducing¶ terrorist violence in Northern Ireland from the 1970s
on, and they¶ assessed whether each intervention diminished subsequent attacks¶ or instead increased the frequency or intensity of terrorism. One of¶ the six measures,
a highly intrusive military maneuver, did have a¶ deterrence effect. But two others had no statistically significant¶ impact, suggesting that
any deterrence gains
were overwhelmed¶ by backlash effects . More tellingly, two of the intrusive new deterrence-based policies resulted in significant increasesin violence¶
(also see Lum, Kennedy, et al. 2006). LaFree
et al. (2009) hypothesize that erroneous arrests and the¶ adoption of internment without trial
contributed to this backlash ¶ effect by undermining the legitimacy of British antiterrorism¶ efforts. Several studies
conducted in Iraq have also found that¶ perceived injustice on the part of U.S. forces is a strong predictor of¶ support for
resistance among Iraqis (Fischer et al. 2008; Harb et al.¶ 2006). As LaFree and Ackerman observe: ‘‘To the extent that government-based
counterterrorism strategies outrage participants or¶ energize a base of potential supporters, such strategies may¶
increase the likelihood of further terrorist strikes ’’ (2009:15).¶ Because of this, government management of terrorist threats
may¶ be as important as terrorism itself in determining future levels of¶ violence (Kilcullen 2009; McCauley 2006; Sharp 1973).
Most recent empirical data proves our claim – violating physical integrity rights leads to terrorism.
Piazza and Walsh, ‘10
[James (Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at Penn State) and James (Professor, Department of
Political Science, University of North Carolina), “Physical Integrity Rights and Terrorism”, Symposium: Terrorism and Human
Rights, July 2010, RSR]
However, recent research
provides evidence contradicting¶ the conventional wisdom that protecting human rights invites¶
more terrorism. In a recent article, we suggested that states¶ that violate the overall physical integrity rights of their¶ citizens—
the rights to not be physically mistreated by state¶ agents—are actually more frequently targeted by terrorists ¶ than those characterized
by a fuller respect for such rights¶ (Walsh and Piazza 2010). This finding corresponds with the¶ historical record of governments
that have pursued counterterrorism strategies that seriously compromised physical integrity rights—for example, Britain in
Northern Ireland in the¶ early 1970s, France in Algeria in the 1950s, Israel in Lebanon¶ in the 1980s, and U.S. rendition
policy regarding U.S.–¶ European counterterrorism cooperation—and found that these¶ policies hampered
counterterrorism while increasing terrorist activity. Reversing independent and dependent variables ¶ in another study,
we also determined the relationship between¶ human and civil rights protections and terrorism to be more¶ complex
than the conventional wisdom allows. Rather than¶ reacting to terrorist threats in a uniform manner, we found¶ that states experiencing terrorist attacks
are slightly more¶ likely to engage in extrajudicial killings and disappearances,¶ but they do not respond by restricting many other rights,¶ including the right not to be
tortured or rights to freedom of¶ speech and association (Piazza and Walsh 2009).
Arizona Debate Institute
Indefinite Detention AFF
Internal Link: Distrust
Empirical studies prove our distrust claim - procedural fairness is the biggest internal link to
counterterrorism cooperation with Muslim American communities.
Tyler, et al, ‘10
[Tom (Macklin Fleming Professor of Law and Professor of Psychology at Yale Law School); Stephen Schulhofer (Robert B.
McKay Professor of Law at New York University School of Law); and Aziz Z. Huq (Assistant Professor of Law and Herbert and
Marjorie Fried Teaching Scholar at the University of Chicago School of Law), “Legitimacy and Deterrence Effects in¶
Counterterrorism Policing: A Study of Muslim¶ Americans”, Law and Society Review, RSR]
Our principal findings are as follows. We
find a robust correlation between perceptions of procedural justice and both perceived
legitimacy and willingness to cooperate among Muslim¶ American communities in the context of antiterrorism policing.
We find little evidence that evaluations of either the severity of terrorist¶ threats or of police effectiveness play a significant role
in determining willingness to cooperate. We further find that religiosity,¶ cultural differences, and political background have at best
weak¶ connections with cooperation. These results suggest the importance of procedural justice considerations in the
design of antiterrorism policing strategies concerning Muslim Americans within the¶ United States.
Cooperation is crucial to preventing new attacks.
Tyler, et al, ‘10
[Tom (Macklin Fleming Professor of Law and Professor of Psychology at Yale Law School); Stephen Schulhofer (Robert B.
McKay Professor of Law at New York University School of Law); and Aziz Z. Huq (Assistant Professor of Law and Herbert and
Marjorie Fried Teaching Scholar at the University of Chicago School of Law), “Legitimacy and Deterrence Effects in¶
Counterterrorism Policing: A Study of Muslim¶ Americans”, Law and Society Review, RSR]
The cooperation of local communities is important to any¶ account of policing against terrorism. In comparison to
nonideological crime of the type police generally address, terrorism is a¶ relatively dispersed and infrequent phenomenon. Accurate
and¶ timely information to separate genuine threats from background¶ noise therefore has special value (Posner 2007). The
September¶ 2001 attackers, for example, came into the sphere of indigenous¶ Muslim American communities (National
Commission on Terrorist¶ Attacks Upon the United States 2004:216–17).
Arizona Debate Institute
Indefinite Detention AFF
Internal Link: Cooperation
Detention policy is globally perceived – extending procedural fairness is crucial to prevent sympathy
for terrorism.
Welsh, J.D. from the University of Utah, ‘11
[David, “Procedural Justice Post-9/11: The Effects of Procedurally Unfair Treatment of Detainees on Perceptions of Global
Legitimacy”, University of New Hampshire Law Review, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2011, RSR]
It is also critical to extend procedural justice judgments beyond ¶ the individual detainee to the perspective of a worldwide
audience. ¶ While it is easy to overlook how an alleged terrorist feels about the ¶ degree of procedural fairness he or she is receiving, the perceptions of
governments, human rights organizations, political groups (including terrorist organizations), and millions of individuals (particularly
those who closely identify with that individual’s race, religion, ¶ or nationality) cannot be ignored. Individuals become upset when ¶ they
observe unfairness, and such observations motivate them to ¶ help victims of this unfairness.87 Thus, it would be a mistake
to ¶ think that procedural injustice against a single individual will affect ¶ the perceptions of that individual alone.88
Additionally, efforts to ¶ hide procedural injustices, such as the abuse of detainees by U.S. ¶ soldiers,89 have only backfired by creating
sympathy for the types of ¶ individuals that the United States seeks to dehumanize.90 In the next ¶ section, I identify six rules of
procedural justice, evaluate the current ¶ detention regime based on these rules, and make recommendations ¶ about how these rules could be implemented in a DTC
International cooperation is crucial to quell the threat of terrorism.
Cordesman, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at CSIS, ‘10
[Anthony, “The True Lessons of Yemen ¶ and Detroit:¶ How the US Must Expand and Redefine ¶ International Cooperation in
Fighting ¶ Terrorism”, CSIS, 2010, RSR]
The second answer is to put even more emphasis on international cooperation in ¶ counterterrorism. Our first line of
defense lies in the capabilities and actions of other states –¶ particularly our friends and allies in Muslim states and states with large Muslim
populations. ¶ Defeating terrorism locally -- before it can establish major sanctuaries, create international ¶ networks,
escalate to insurgency, take control of governments – is critical to any broad success . ¶ The US must continue to work
with other states, and strengthen formal international efforts in ¶ counterterrorism – in spite of their limits – but that much more is required.
Informal efforts will be ¶ as important. One has only to consider what would have happened if we had not steadily improved¶
counterterrorism cooperation and support from countries like Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia to ¶ realize how much
more often the US would be under direct threat; how much more often our other ¶ allies would be attacked, and how
many of our global economic and strategic interests would face ¶ far more serious threats.
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Indefinite Detention AFF
Impact: Nuclear Terror – Retaliation
The outcry for retaliation would be strong + terrorists could disguise the attack to provoke retal –
leads to extinction.
Hellman ‘8
[Martin E. Hellman* * Martin E. Hellman is a member of the National Academy of Engineering and Professor Emeritus at
Stanford University. His current project applies risk analysis to nuclear deterrence, “How likely is a failure of nuclear
deterrence?”, RSR]
Nuclear proliferation and the specter of nuclear terrorism are creating additional possibilities for triggering a nuclear
war. If an American (or Russian) city were devastated by an act of nuclear terrorism, the public outcry for immediate, decisive
action would be even stronger than Kennedy had to deal with when the Cuban missiles first became known to the
American public. While the action would likely not be directed against Russia, it might be threatening to Russia (e.g., on
its borders) or one of its allies and precipitate a crisis that resulted in a full-scale nuclear war. Terrorists with an
apocalyptic mindset might even attempt to catalyze a full-scale nuclear war by disguising their act to look like an attack by the
U.S. or Russia.
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Indefinite Detention AFF
*** Leadership Advantage
Arizona Debate Institute
Indefinite Detention AFF
UQ: Heg Sustainable
Heg sustainable – military and economy checks any risk of decline
Gallarotti 13 – Giulio M. Gallarotti is Professor @ the Wesleyan University, “US Presidents Find Industrial-Military
Complex Difficult to Tame,” interviewed by Kourosh Ziabari, 1-25-13,, Accessed Date: 515-13 y2k
One can cite hundreds of statistics showing changes in a plethora of indicators (from literacy to income gaps) that suggest that
the US is slipping relatively to other advanced nations. Yet there are also hundreds of statistics that suggest an increase in
standing . Putting all these variables together and trying to clearly ascertain relative power levels is impossible. The interesting and
unfortunate thing about ascertaining power is that power can only be clearly ascertained when it is fully activated, otherwise we cannot know precisely how powerful nations are.
In material terms,
the US is now the most dominate nation ( relatively ) that the world has ever known. Beyond the size of its economy
the global economic and cultural impact it has had on the world,
its global military presence has achieved a reach no other nation
or civilization in the past
has ever acquired , with over 700 military bases in over 100 countries. Note that at the height of the Roman Empire, Rome had only 37 foreign military installations
to police its vast territory. Similarly, the British had only 36 naval bases at the height of its imperial stretch in 1898. Yet with all this material power, the US is often frustrated in getting what it
wants, even in contests with much weaker nations (Vietnam, Iran, North Korea, Cuba, etc). So is the US as powerful as most people think? Perhaps it is and perhaps it is not. The US has not fully activated its power
since World War II, so we do not know.
Has a greater countervailing coalition formed against the US in recent years? Some would be quick to say yes: citing the prevalence of
terrorists, anti-capitalist demonstrations, rogue nations, and leftist regimes. In terms of civil society, perhaps the countervailing response is greater, as
terrorism and anti-capitalist movements have become more prevalent. But in terms of nation states , one would have to say the countervailing coalitions against the
US are weaker today than they were in the past. The Cold War itself presented the US with is greatest menace in terms of countervailing coalitions. The Cold War is now over. There are in fact a number
of leftist regimes even in the US’ hemisphere that are taking a hostile stance against the US, but this pales in comparison to the size of the Communist coalition of the Cold War.
Q: Well, you believe that the US dominance has remained unchallenged so far. Well, some political scientists believe that the United States is voluntarily retreating from its position as a global hegemon, as a result of a remarkable increase in the costs of the
unipolar and hegemonic order and the considerable decrease in its utilities. What’s your viewpoint in this regard?
A: The problem for
America ns is that in fact it is not retreating . The size of the US’s global military presence is greater than it has ever been. Close
to one trillion dollars is spent on military, most of it feeding the global military machine . Obama’s more dovish
to foreign policy
has not significantly diminished our global presence ( even with the scaling down of activities in Iraq and
Afghanistan ). Irrespective of the personal convictions of Presidents, they have found the industrial-military complex difficult to tame. American society faces its greatest domestic challenges since the
Great Depression, and yet we have hundreds of bases in Europe alone. What‘s wrong with this picture? Does this appear to be a retreat?
Q: So, you are one of those who believe that with its massive military presence overseas, the U.S. has not retreated from its position as a hegemon. Let’s get to the next question. The global capitalistic economy is collapsing and its consequences for the unipolar and hegemonic order are beginning to appear gradually. What do you think about the impact of the downfall of global economic recession and its effects on the compasses of the U.S. power?
The recession affected many other nations more than it did the US. It is not clear that the US was a relative loser
on this one.
The American economy is strong and presently growing again. Moreover, to paraphrase Twain, “rumors of the death of global capitalism are pre-mature.” If anything, the
last 25 years has seen an expansion of capitalism , especially with the fall of the Iron Curtain. Just like in economic departments in American universities, the extreme left is
poorly represented politically and economically in the world today. Even in the last great bastion of Communism, China, the Communist ideology is almost completely bankrupt as a philosophy and practical guide,
both among the Chinese people and their leaders.
Their evidence is biased---hegemony is sustainable over the long-term
Nye 11 – Joseph S. Nye, Jr. is Dean Emeritus of the Kennedy School. He joined the Harvard Faculty in 1964. He developed
the theory of neoliberalism, and the concepts of soft power and smart power. He served as chairman of the National
Intelligence Council in 1993-94 and was assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs in the Clinton
Administration, “Zakaria's World :Are America's best days really behind us?” 3-8-11,, Accessed Date: 5-16-13 y2k
Fareed Zakaria is one of our most perceptive analysts of America's role in the world, and I generally agree with him. But in the case of his new special essay for Time, "Are America's Best Days Behind Us?," I
think he paints too gloomy a picture of American decline.
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Americans are prone to cycles of belief in decline , and the term itself confuses various dimensions of changing power relations. Some see the American problem
as imperial overstretch ( though
as a percentage of GDP,
the U nited S tates spends half as much on defense as it did during the
Cold War ); some see the problem as relative decline caused by the rise of others ( though that process could
S tates more powerful
than any other country);
leave the U nited
and still others see it as a process of absolute decline or decay such as occurred in the
fall of ancient Rome ( though Rome was an agrarian society with stagnant
growth and
strife ).
Such projections are not new. As Zakaria notes, America's Founding Fathers worried about comparisons to the decline of the Roman Republic. A strand of cultural pessimism is simply very American, extending back
to the country's Puritan roots. English novelist Charles Dickens observed a century and a half ago: "[I]f its individual citizens, to a man, are to be believed, [America] always is depressed, and always is stagnated, and
always is at an alarming crisis, and never was otherwise."
In the last half-century, polls showed Americans believed in their decline after the Soviet Union launched Sputnik in 1957, after Richard Nixon's devaluation of the dollar and the oil shocks in the 1970s, and after the
closing of Rust Belt industries and the budget deficits of Ronald Reagan's administration in the 1980s. At the end of that decade, a majority of Americans believed their country was in decline; yet within the next 10
These cycles of declinism tell
us more about Americans' collective psychology than underlying shifts in power resources, but as British journalist Gideon Rachman argued in these
years they believed that America was the sole superpower. And now, after the 2008 financial crisis and recession, polls show a majority believes in decline again.
pages recently, maybe this time decline is real. After all, as the Congressional Budget Office warns, on current trends the U.S. national debt will be equal to its GDP in a decade, and that will undermine confidence in
the dollar.
Zakaria lists other worrying indicators related to education and infrastructure. According to the OECD, American 15-year-olds rank 17th in the world in science and 25th in math. The United States is 12th in college
graduation rates, 23rd in infrastructure, and 27th in life expectancy. On the other side of the ledger, America ranks first among rich countries in guns, crime, and debt.
All these are very real problems, but one could also note that the U nited S tates is still first in total R&D expenditures , first in
university rankings , first in Nobel prizes , first on indices of entrepreneurship , and according to the World Economic Forum, the fourth-most competitive
economy in the world (behind the small states of Switzerland, Sweden, and Singapore). The U nited S tates remains at the forefront of technologies of the future like
This is hardly a picture of absolute economic decay, ancient Rome style. The truth is that one can draw a picture
of the United States today that emphasizes either dark or bright colors without being wrong. No one can be sure which shade
better portrays the future because the number of potential futures is vast, and which one comes to pass will
depend in part on decisions not yet made .
biotechnology and nanotechnology.
Drawing on the thinking of Mancur Olson, the late great political economist, Zakaria believes that America's very success has made its decision processes sclerotic, like that of industrial Britain. But American culture is
far more entrepreneurial and decentralized than that of Britain, where the sons of industrial entrepreneurs sought aristocratic titles and honors in London. If Olson is right, Zakaria says, the solution is to "stay
flexible." And despite recurrent historical bouts of concern about it, immigration helps keep America flexible. In 2005, according to Forbes, foreign-born immigrants had participated in one of every four technology
start-ups in the previous decade. As Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew once put it, China can draw on a talent pool of 1.3 billion people, but the United States not only draws on a talent pool of 7 billion, but can recombine
them in a diverse culture that enhances creativity in a way that ethnic Han nationalism cannot.
Zakaria also worries about the inefficient American political system. But the Founding Fathers created a system of checks and balances precisely to preserve liberties
at the price of efficiency. Moreover, just because we are now going through a period of excessively partisan politics and mistrust of government
doesn't mean the American political system is in decline . Some aspects of the current mood are probably cyclical and related to
unemployment, while others represent discontent with the bickering and deadlock in today's political process. Compared with the recent past, party politics has indeed become more polarized, but nasty
politics is nothing new and goes all the way back to the Founding Fathers. Supporters of John Adams reputedly once called Thomas Jefferson "a meanspirited, low-lived fellow, the son of a half-breed Indian squaw, sired by a Virginia mulatto father."
Part of the problem of accurate assessment is that faith in government became abnormally high among the generation that survived the Great Depression and won World War II. Over the long view of American
American government and politics have always
had problems, sometimes worse than today's. In assessing political decline, one must beware of the golden glow of the past . It is
easy to show decline if one compares the good in the past with the bad in the present.
history, it was overconfidence in government in the 1950s and early 1960s, not low levels thereafter, that was the anomaly.
In addition, we sometimes mistakenly idealize the efficiency of the political process in authoritarian countries like China. When it comes to infrastructure, for example, it is far easier to build high-speed rail lines
where there are weak property rights and few lawyers. But if one looks at the important question of how Chinese leaders are struggling to implement their 12th five-year plan -- reducing dependence on exports,
shifting to internal demand, and reducing regional inequality by moving industry to the west -- China is far from efficient. Although central bankers and economic planners know that revaluing the yuan would
promote these goals and help head off inflation, a strong coalition of coastal export industries and associated local party bosses seeks to preserve the status quo.
Zakaria notes that one Asian country after another is learning the secrets of Western success, and he is right. In The Future of Power, I argue that one of the two great power shifts of this century is the recovery of
Asia to what it represented before the Industrial Revolution led to the ascendance of the West: more than half the world's population and its economic production. We should herald Asia's recovery -- it has brought
millions out of dire poverty -- but those with excessive fear of China should remember that Asia is not one entity. In his important book Rivals, Bill Emmott reminds us that Japan, India, and others that are concerned
about the rise of China welcome an American presence. Can anyone similarly imagine Canada and Mexico seeking a Chinese alliance to balance American power in their neighborhood?
Nor is China likely to surpass America anytime soon. Yes, barring political uncertainties, China's size and high rate of economic growth will almost certainly increase its strength relative to that of the United States.
Still, China won't necessarily become the world's most powerful country as a result. Even if China suffers no major domestic political setback, many of the current projections based on GDP growth alone are too onedimensional. They ignore what are likely to be enduring U.S. military and soft-power advantages, as well as China's geopolitical disadvantages in the internal Asian balance of power.
Zakaria is correct that the U nited S tates faces serious problems . But issues that preoccupy us today , such as long-term debt, are not
insoluble ; see for example, the recommendations of the Simpson-Bowles commission, and remember that only a decade ago some people worried about the government surplus. Of course, such solutions
may forever remain out of reach. But it is worth distinguishing situations for which there are no solutions from those that could, in principle, be solved.The greatest danger to America is not debt, political paralysis, or
China; it is parochialism, turning away from the openness that is the source of its strength and resting on its laurels. As Zakaria says, in the past, worrying about decline has helped avert it. Let us hope that his
intelligent though darkly drawn picture will yet again start that healthy process.
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We’re leading in every sector---proves resiliency
Robert J. Lieber 12 is Professor of Government and International Affairs, Georgetown University, “Leader of the Pack,”
November 2012,, Accessed
Date: 4-18-13 y2k
Then, after criticizing both Kagan and me for our “failure to distinguish between what is known and what is unknowable,” Keohane sets out what he terms “half a
dozen things relevant to the future of the U.S. global role that can now be said with confidence.” Many of these observations are unexceptionable, but Keohane
misses a key point captured in my book’s subtitle: Why the United States Is Not Destined to Decline. Had I wanted to make an unqualified assertion
about the United States’ future, it would have been Why the United States Will Not Decline. Finally, Keohane’s concluding words about the strengths and
weaknesses of the position of the United States and the need to “summon the political coherence and willpower to devise and implement a sustainable
leadership strategy for the twenty-first century” are so close to my own thinking that they could virtually have been taken from the pages of Power and
Willpower. I
plead guilty to cautious optimism about the future of the U nited S tates, finding evidence for that position
in many of the very factors Keohane mentions: its size, material capacity , ability to rebound from difficulties ,
demographics , openness , and innovativeness . In addition, I cite the country’s lead in science and technology , its unique
research universities , its entrepreneurial immigrants , the depth and breadth of its markets , its military strength , and its
immense natural resources . Since the founding of the U nited S tates, the country’s experience has been one of unusual
flexibility and adaptability : it has had a raucous but robust political system with both liberty and the rule of law, a record of
overcoming repeated foreign and domestic crises , a slow but ultimately successful policymaking process , and a capacity
for responding to grave threats with great vigor and even ferocity. These traits, observed by Alexis de Tocqueville in the 1830s and
Winston Churchill in the mid-twentieth century, among others, are unique to the history and character of the United States. They do not guarantee that the
country will once again overcome its considerable problems, but together
with the material evidence , they provide a reasoned basis
for the concluding words of Power and Willpower: “Much remains to be done in domestic as well as foreign policy, but the robustness
of American society coupled with
decisive .”
unique capacities for adaptation and adjustment are likely
once again
to prove
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Internal Link: Human Rights Cred
Indefinite detention undermines US rights credibility and model of liberal democracy
Thomas C. Hilde 9 is a professor at the university of Maryland school of Public Policy where he teaches seminars in ethics
and policy and international environmental and development law and politics. “Beyond Guantánamo: Restoring U.S.
Credibility on Human Rights,” 2009,, DOA: 7-23-13, y2k
How to restore the credibility of a country whose foundations and self-understanding are based on the universality of freedom and
human rights , but that has violated precisely those rights by practicing torture in guantánamo and other prisons around the world? The image
of the united states as a role model of liberal democracy has suffered tremendously over the last eight years. in the name of the global
war on terror , former President bush suspended the law for those detained as possible terrorists. even though President Obama’s promise to close
guantánamo is recognized by the international community as a first step towards restoring u.s. credibility, several
problems require comprehensive policy solutions : how to proceed with detainees that are considered to be dangerous? What to do with detainees who are cleared of
suspicion, but might face torture in their country of origin? how to cope with evidence that is derived from torture? thomas c. hilde outlines several post-guantánamo detainee policy proposals – and their difficulties
– that address these distinctive sets of issues, such as military commission trials, continued preventive detention, a national security court or u.s. criminal court trials. in the long run, however, restoring credibility
through a reformed detainee policy is only one component of post-guantánamo credibility; the second indispensable element is accountability. Prof. hilde discusses the functions of different forms of accountability in
the process of reestablishing u.s. credibility on human rights. Whereas legal accountability requires the formal investigations of human rights violations, public-moral and pragmatic accountability refer to the need to
address the norms on which international society is based. Moreover, a public discourse is needed that confronts the stories of those who have suffered human rights violations and the empathetic aspect of human
A more comprehensive form of accountability can serve as both a means towards regaining u.s. credibility and
a strengthening of human rights culture.
Indefinite detention violates human rights law
Owen Bowcott 13 is legal affairs correspondent, "Guantanamo Bay Force Feeding Inhuman and Degrading," 5-2-13,, DOA: 7-23-13, y2k
Force feeding hunger strikers in Guantánamo Bay is against international medical standards and should be stopped,
according to a group of senior UN officials. The human rights experts also warned that indefinite detention of suspects at the US prison camp in Cuba
constituted "cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment" and should end, in a statement released through the UN's office of the high commissioner for
human rights. The declaration has been published in response to the hunger strike that started in February and involves up to 100 detainees. At least 21 are being forcibly fed. The statement says: "According
to the World Medical Assembly's Declaration of Malta, in cases involving people on hunger strikes, the duty of
medical personnel to act ethically and the principle of respect for individuals' autonomy, among other principles,
must be respected. "Under these principles, it is unjustifiable to engage in forced feeding of individuals contrary to their informed and voluntary refusal of such a measure. Moreover, hunger strikers
should be protected from all forms of coercion, even more so when this is done through force and in some cases through physical violence. "Healthcare personnel may not apply undue pressure of any sort on
individuals who have opted for the extreme recourse of a hunger strike. Nor is it acceptable to use threats of forced feeding or other types of physical or psychological coercion against individuals who have
voluntarily decided to go on a hunger strike." The statement is signed by El Hadji Malick Sow, chair of the UN working group on arbitrary detention; Juan E Méndez, UN special rapporteur on torture; Ben Emmerson,
UN special rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights, and Anand Grover, UN special rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental
The Guantánamo detainees' lack of legal protection and
the resulting anguish caused by the uncertainty regarding their future has led them to take the extreme step of a
hunger strike to demand a real change to their situation." Their continuing detention was "a flagrant violation of
health. It is supported by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. The experts pointed out that: "
international human rights law and in itself constitutes a form of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment".
The Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, said: "We have received specific information regarding the severe and prolonged physiological and psychological damage caused by the detainees' high degree of uncertainty over basic
aspects of their lives, such as not knowing whether they will be tried or whether they will be released and when; or whether they will see their family members again." Emmerson drew attention to the fact that the
US government had admitted there were at least 86 prisoners who had been cleared for transfer. "In other words," he noted, "all relevant security-related government agencies or authorities have expressly certified
The UN experts called on the US to either charge or release the detainees.
Washington should "adopt all legislative, administrative, judicial, and any other types of measures necessary to
prosecute, with full respect for the right to due process, the individuals being held at Guantánamo naval base or,
where appropriate, to provide for their immediate release or transfer to a third country, in accordance with
international law."
that those detainees do not represent a threat to US security."
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Undermines liberal credentials of US---damages democratic ideals
Thomas C. Hilde 9 is a professor at the university of Maryland school of Public Policy where he teaches seminars in ethics
and policy and international environmental and development law and politics. “Beyond Guantánamo: Restoring U.S.
Credibility on Human Rights,” 2009,, DOA: 7-23-13, y2k
Apart from these practical issues, however, the very existence of the U.S. torture institution points to a deeper crisis at the
core of the liberal democratic conception of human rights . Historically, the foundational principles of liberal democracy
include human dignity, individual autonomy, and the primacy of liberty. The doctrine suggests, in Locke’s and Mill’s formulations,
that normative or regulatory limitations on individual autonomy and liberty are justifiable only when individuals cause harm to others or when they engage in
acts of cruelty that deny others’ dignity, autonomy, and liberty. These
de jure principles of liberalism have often hung in a precarious
balance with de facto violations of those principles: the universalizing impulse of principles of individual dignity
and freedom in tension with violent means for protecting or preserving a society from enemies both real and
imagined. Such contradictions have always been at the heart of the struggle to articulate a robust and legitimate conception
of human rights embedded in liberal democratic institutions as the principle of equal respect for all persons . Consider the liberal
notion of toleration, for instance — how far does one tolerate the intolerant? How far does one extend human rights to enemies who wish to destroy you? At
what point does the state’s defense of a society or constitution become an assault on human dignity and liberty? Liberalism, despite de facto violations of its
principles, attempts to give reason to the management of this balance between substance (its core values — say, autonomy) and procedure (its means of
defending those values — say, habeas corpus or universal suffrage). Institutions
may fail in practice to live up to these principles —
such as in the case of racial bias in criminal sentencing — but the ideals are perhaps most important in giving
guidance to and procedures for the ongoing reconstruction of society’s institutions . One important strength of liberal
democracy is precisely in its ongoing deliberation through democratic means over the meaning of its basic
principles. Such deliberation at its best both defines those principles and is simultaneously an instance of them in action. This perpetual balancing act
between substance and procedure defines many of the institutions of modern liberal democracy and, indeed, much of international law. For such a state,
however, institutionalization of torture represents liberalism’s preservationist procedures tipping the balance
towards an increasingly authoritarian defense of its substance . A torturing society , especially a society with an open policy of
torture (which is where the “torture works” argument leads),
is no longer a liberal democratic society respectful of human dignity and
freedom . Indeed, here the basic principles of liberal democratic society are inconvenient obstacles in the pursuit of
other goals. The complexity of the current issues requires more than legal and moral accountability.
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Internal Link: Soft Power
Indefinite detention issue damages US soft power
UNU 10 United Nations University, “Event report: Obama and the World: One Year Later, With Jean-Marc Coicaud and
Tom Farer,”
30 March 2010,, DOA: 7-23-13, y2k
The Ambassador of Zambia asked Dean Farer to give an assessment of Obama’s policy towards Africa, given that he made no reference to this continent during the talk. Dean Farer explained that he saw an overlap
between the policies of George W. Bush and Obama in relation to Africa. Indeed, the US has increased the flow of resources to the continent and has placed an emphasis on medical assistance, in particular for
HIV/AIDS, as well as for improved governance (openness, pluralism, and corruption reduction). He also mentioned that the message of both presidents was very much focused on development, stability and increased
a UNICRI representative criticized the Obama
administration’s lack of action in closing Guantanamo. Dean Farer responded that the president had to consider the intensity
production of public goods in order to make African countries attractive to private investment. Finally,
of the domestic political opposition he would encounter . Moreover, the Guantanamo issue, a very important symbol of
soft power, is closely related to matters such as indefinite detention without trial and trial by special military tribunal. Further issues arose
when Obama was briefed about the legal and political complexities of convicting dangerous individuals for whom
evidence was secured through forms of intelligence that cannot be disclosed.
Indefinite detention is ineffective---fosters terrorism and damages soft power
Daphne Eviatar 10 is Senior Associate @ Human Rights First, "Indefinite Detention Would Harm, Not Help, National
Security," 11-19-10,
DOA: 7-23-13, y2k
Wittes and Goldsmith are correct that fighters in enemy forces can be held in military detention until the war is
over. But that’s a law of war aimed at foreign soldiers who have not committed crimes, but pose a future danger
by virtue of their status as enemy soldiers. They are to be released once hostilities have ceased. It makes no sense in the context of admitted mass murderers who committed the
most heinous terrorist strike in history on U.S. soil. The “war on terror” of which they are supposedly a part will, by definition, have no end.
To the extent that
Goldsmith and Wittes are arguing merely for detaining suspected terrorists a few more years until the
political tides turn, it’s worth remembering that justice delayed is often justice denied.
The challenges the government faced in convicting Ghailani all stemmed from his having been held for a prolonged
period in military and CIA custody. First, none of his statements could be used because, as the government admitted, the CIA had coerced
them out of him. And much of the other evidence was compromised by the passage of time. At least one witness available in the earlier successful
1998 bombings trial in 2001 was now dead. And many of the witnesses brought in 12 years after the crime couldn’t
remember what they’d seen or said just after the bombing happened . On the witness stand, they appeared to be
contradicting their earlier statements to the FBI. Ghailani’s defense team effectively used that to question their
credibility and raise doubts in the jurors’ minds about what role Ghailani really played in the terrorist plot hatched
more than a dozen years ago.
Sitting in the courtroom, I was constantly aware that the witnesses flown in from Tanzania and Kenya were being asked to remember such minute details as which of two people with the same name in a shop in Dar es Salaam in 1998 handed over the cash to
purchase a truck or a gas tank (one of them was Ghailani), or what Ghailani told a friend once about his future travel plans, more than a decade later and often after dozens of interrogations by the FBI. I had to wonder if they were really testifying based on
memory, or based on what the government might have suggested it wanted to hear. The jury may well have been wondering the same thing.
Prolonged indefinite detention , then, only complicates the government’s ability to prove a terrorist’s guilt later. It could
mean the inability to ever hold serious criminals accountable at all . The victims of the 9/11 terror attacks – and the potential victims of all forms of
terrorism — deserve better than that.
Of course, those who favor indefinite military detention without trial may respond that “justice” isn’t really their
concern. The most important thing is U.S. security, and if we can incapacitate terrorists by locking them away for
the rest of their lives without a trial to make sure we’ve got the right ones, well, that’s the price we need to pay.
even if one believes that national security trumps all, the failure to provide a fair trial to
suspected terrorists will ultimately do far more harm to U.S. national security than it will do good . Nothing enrages people
Setting aside any constitutional arguments with that,
more than hypocrisy, and the failure to adhere to the basic principles of fairness and due process that we press
others to adopt around the world would only help al Qaeda win new and more vicious recruits. If the United States’
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experiment with torture techniques taught us anything, it’s that our global reputation is fragile and that abusive detention
and interrogation of suspects won’t win the war on terrorism; on the contrary , it will fuel further attacks.
Now is not the time to resign ourselves to abandoning both law and principle in the name of national security. We already know that going down that path will lead to just the opposite.
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Internal Link: Allies
Detention policies create scandals that damage our relations with allies
Alfred W McCoy 12 is the J R W Smail Professor of History at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. "Impunity at Home,
Rendition Abroad," 8-16-12,, DOA: 7-23-13, y2k
After a decade of fiery public debate and bare-knuckle partisan brawling, the United States has stumbled toward
an ad hoc bipartisan compromise over the issue of torture that rests on two unsustainable policies : impunity at
home and rendition abroad . President Obama has closed the CIA’s “black sites,” its secret prisons where American
agents once dirtied their hands with waterboarding and wall slamming. But via rendition -- the sending of terrorist
suspects to the prisons of countries that torture -- and related policies, his administration has outsourced human
rights abuse
to Afghanistan, Somalia, and elsewhere. In this way,
he has avoided the political stigma of torture, while tacitly tolerating such
abuses and harvesting whatever intelligence can be gained from them.
deeply divided politics. It
This “resolution” of the torture issue may meet the needs of this country’s
cannot, however, long satisfy an international community determined to prosecute human rights
abuses through universal jurisdiction . It
damage U.S. standing with allies worldwide .
runs the long-term risk of another
sordid torture
scandal that will further
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Impact: Credibility – Heg
Soft-power is key to leadership
Sankar Sen 5 is Former Director of Indian National Police Academy, The Statesman, 4-5-5, L/N
anti-American sentiment is sweeping the world after the Iraq war. It has, of course, been aggravated by the aggressive style of the
present American
President. Under George Bush, anti-Americanism is widely thought to have reached new heights. In the coming years the USA will lose
more of its
ability to lead others if it decides to act unilaterally . If other states step aside and question the USA's policies and
objectives and seek to de-legitimise them, the problems of the USA will increase manifold. American success will lie in
melding power and cooperation and generating a belief in other countries that their interests will be served by working
with instead of opposing the United States . It is aptly said that use of power without cooperation becomes dictatorial
and breeds resistance and resentment. But cooperation without power produces posturing and no concrete progress. There is also another disquieting
development. It seems American soft power is waning and it is losing its allure as a model society . Much of the rest
of the world is no longer looking up to the USA as a beacon. Rising religiosity, rank hostility to the UN, Bush's doctrine of preventive war, Guantanamo Bay etc are
creating disquiet in the minds of many and turning them off America.
This diminution of America's soft power will also create disenchantment and may
gradually affect American pre-eminence.
Legitimacy is key to band-wagon
Lavina Rajendram Lee 10 is a lecturer in the Department of Modern History, Politics and International Relations at
Macquarie University, Australia, and has a PhD in International Relations from the University of Sydney. “US Hegemony and
International Legitimacy,” 1-25-10,, Accessed date: 11-7-12 y2k
This book examines US hegemony and international legitimacy in the post-Cold War era, focusing on its leadership in the two wars on Iraq. The preference for unilateral action in
foreign policy under the Bush Administration, culminating in the use of force against Iraq in 2003,
has unquestionably created a crisis in the legitimacy of US
global leadership . Of central concern is the ability of the U nited S tates to act without regard for the values and
interests of
allies or for international law on the use of force, raising the question : does international legitimacy
truly matter in an international system dominated by a lone superpower?
US Hegemony and International Legitimacy explores the relationship
between international legitimacy and hegemonic power through an in depth examination of two case studies – the Gulf Crisis of 1990-91 and the Iraq Crisis of 2002-03 – and examines the extent to which
normative beliefs about legitimate behaviour influenced the decisions of states to follow or reject US leadership .
subordinate states play a crucial role in consenting to US leadership and endorsing it as
legitimate and have a significant impact on the ability of a hegemonic state to maintain order with least cost .
Understanding of the importance of legitimacy will be vital to any attempt to rehabilitate the global leadership
The findings of the book demonstrate that
of the United States under the Obama Administration.
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Impact: Soft Power – Laundry List
Soft power prevents extinction – disease, climate change, terrorism, and great power war
Joseph Nye 8 is professor of international relations at Harvard University, “American Power After the Financial Crises,”, DOA: 7-23-13, y2k
Power always depends on context, and in today's world, it is distributed in a pattern that resembles a complex three-dimensional chess game. On the top chessboard, military power is largely unipolar and likely to
The bottom
chessboard is the realm of transnational relations that cross borders outside of government control, and it includes
actors as diverse as bankers electronically transferring sums larger than most national budgets at one extreme, and terrorists
transferring weapons or hackers disrupting Internet operations at the other. It also includes new challenges like pandemics
and climate change . On this bottom board, power is widely dispersed, and it makes no sense to speak of unipolarity, multi-polarity or hegemony. Even in the aftermath of the
financial crisis, the giddy pace of technological change is likely to continue to drive globalisation, but the political
effects will be quite different for the world of nation states and the world of non-state actors. In inter-state politics, the most
remain so for some time. But on the middle chessboard, economic power is already multi-polar, with the US, Europe, Japan and China as the major players, and others gaining in importance.
important factor will be the continuing "return of Asia". In 1750, Asia had three-fifths of the world population and three-fifths of the world's product. By 1900, after the industrial revolution in Europe and America,
Asia's share shrank to one-fifth of the world product. By 2040, Asia will be well on its way back to its historical share.
The "rise" in the power of China and India may create
instability , but it is a problem with precedents, and we can learn from history about how our policies can affect the outcome. A century ago, Britain managed the rise of
American power without conflict, but the world's failure to manage the rise of German power led to two
devastating world wars. In transnational politics, the information revolution is dramatically reducing the costs of computing
and communication. Forty years ago, instantaneous global communication was possible but costly, and restricted
to governments and corporations. Today it is virtually free to anyone with the means to enter an internet café. The barriers to entry into world
politics have been lowered, and non-state actors now crowd the stag e. In 2001, a non-state group killed more Americans
than the government of Japan killed at Pearl Harbor . A pandemic
spread by birds or travelers on jet aircraft
could kill more people than
perished in the first or second world wars . This is a new world politics with which we have less experience. The problems of power diffusion (away from states) may turn out to be
The problem for American power in the 21st century is that there are more and more
things outside the control of even the most powerful state. Although the United States does well on the traditional measures, there is increasingly more going on in
the world that those measures fail to capture. Under the influence of the information revolution and globalisation, world politics is
changing in a way that means Americans cannot achieve all their international goals acting alone. For example,
international financial stability is vital to the prosperity of Americans, but the United States needs the cooperation of
others to ensure it. Global climate change too will affect the quality of life, but the United States cannot manage the
problem alone. And in a world where borders are becoming more porous than ever to everything from drugs to
infectious diseases to terrorism, America must mobilise international coalitions to address shared threats and
more difficult than power transition among states.
As the largest country, American leadership will remain crucial. The problem of American power after this crisis is not one of decline, but realisation that
country cannot achieve its aims without the help of others.
even the largest
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Indefinite Detention Negative – ADI
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***A2: Solvency
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Congress Fails – Executive Power Key
Congressional oversight is bad, broad executive war powers key to WOT
Yoo 2006 (John Yoo, deputy assistant attorney general from 2001 to 2003, professor at the University of California at
Berkeley School of Law, September 2006, “How the Presidency Regained Its Balance,” AEI,
To his critics, President Bush is a “King¶ George” bent on an “imperial presidency.” But the¶ inescapable fact is that war
shifts power to the¶ branch most responsible for its waging: the executive. Harry Truman sent troops to fight in Korea¶ without
Congressional authority. George H. W.¶ Bush did not have the consent of Congress when¶ he invaded Panama to apprehend Manuel Noriega.¶ Nor did Bill Clinton when
he initiated NATO’s¶ air war over Kosovo.¶ The Bush administration’s decisions to terminate the 1972 antiballistic missile treaty and to¶ withdraw from the International
Criminal Court¶ and the Kyoto accords on global warming rested¶ on constitutional precedents going all the way¶ back to Abraham Lincoln.¶ The administration has also
been energetic on¶ the domestic front. It has reclassified national¶ security information made public in earlier administrations and declined, citing executive privilege,¶ to
disclose information to Congress or the courts¶ about its energy policy task force. The White¶ House has declared that the Constitution allows¶ the president to sidestep
laws that invade his executive authority. That is why President Bush has¶ issued hundreds of signing statements—more than¶ any previous president—reserving his right
not to¶ enforce unconstitutional laws.555555 A
reinvigorated presidency enrages President Bush’s critics, who seem to believe that
the Constitution created a¶ system of judicial or Congressional supremacy. Perhaps¶ this is to be expected of the generation of legislators
that¶ views the presidency through the lens of Vietnam and¶ Watergate. But the Founders intended that wrongheaded¶ or obsolete legislation
and judicial decisions would be¶ checked by presidential action, just as executive overreaching is to be checked by the
courts and Congress.¶ The changes of the 1970s occurred largely because we¶ had no serious national security threats to¶ United States soil, but plenty of
paranoia¶ in the wake of Richard Nixon’s use of¶ national security agencies to spy on¶ political opponents. Congress enacted¶ the War Powers
Resolution, which purports to cut off presidential uses of force¶ abroad after sixty days. It passed the Budget and Impoundment Act to eliminate¶ the
modest presidential power to rein in¶ wasteful spending. The Foreign Intelligence and Surveillance Act required the¶ government to get a warrant from a special court to
conduct wiretapping for¶ national security reasons.¶ These
statutes have produced little¶ but dysfunction, from flouting of the war¶
powers law, to ever-higher pork barrel spending, to the¶ wall between intelligence and law enforcement that
contributed to our failure to stop the 9/11 attacks .¶ The 1970s shifted power from the president to Congress,¶ and the latter proved a far
more accommodating boss to¶ federal agencies looking for budget dollars—a fragmented¶ legislature is obviously much
easier to game than a chief¶ executive. But 535 members of Congress cannot manage¶ day-to-day policy. A legislature’s
function is to draft the¶ laws of the land, set broad goals, and spend taxpayer revenues in the national interest—not to micromanage.
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Civilian Courts Fail—Laundry List
Congressional bans prevent detainee travel and jurisdictions refuse to accept detainees to be tried—
also undermines the legal system
Mataconis 2011(Doug, Attorney, JD from George Mason University School of Law, April 4, "Obama Administration To
Abandon Plans For Civilian Trials For 9/11 Plotters",
After a quixotic two year search for a proper venue and process for a civilian trial Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and the other 9/11 defendants
being held in the military prison at Guantanamo Bay, the Obama Administration has apparently abandoned those plans completely:¶ In a major reversal, the Obama
administration has decided to try Khalid Sheikh Mohammed for his role in the attacks of Sept. 11 before a military
commission at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, and not in a civilian courtroom.¶ Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr. is expected to announce on Monday afternoon that Mr.
Mohammed, the self-described mastermind of the attacks, and four other accused conspirators will face charges before a panel of military officers, a law enforcement
official said. The Justice Department has scheduled a press conference for 2 p.m. Eastern time.¶ Mr. Holder, who had wanted
to prosecute Mr. Mohammed
before a regular civilian court in New York City, changed his mind after Congress imposed a series of restrictions barring
the transfer of Guantánamo detainees into the United States, making such a trial impossible for now, the official said.¶ Mr.
Mohammed and the accused conspirators were charged before a military commission at Guantánamo Bay late in the Bush administration, and had given signs that they
were preparing to plead guilty. But their trial was cut short in January 2009 when President Obama, as one of his first moves after his inauguration, froze all tribunal
proceedings at Guantánamo to start a review of the counterterrorism policies he inherited from former President George W. Bush.¶ The administration eventually
decided to prosecute some terrorism suspects in civilian courts, but to keep using a revised form of tribunals for others. Mr. Obama placed Mr. Holder in charge of
deciding where each detainee should be tried.¶ The reality of the situation is that
there wasn’t a jurisdiction in the United States that wanted to
be the home of what would arguably be the highest profile criminal trial in American history. That’s why Congress acted
in the manner that it did, on a bipartisan basis. There had been some speculation that KSM and the others would be tried in a civilian trial held on a secure
military base somewhere, but even that ran into the roadblock of local authorities who objected to being the locale for a trial that would
potentially be a major target for terrorism. So, in the end, the Obama Administration really had no other choice but to
reverse its previous decision.¶ In the end, though, it’s just as well that they did because it was clear from the beginning that a trial for Khalid Sheikh
Mohammed and the other 9/11 suspects would have been a complete and total fraud and a perversion of justice. In a real trial, there is at least some possibility that, at
the end, the Defendant could be found innocent and go free, but that was never a possibility for a civilian trial of KSM. Back in November 2009, Attorney General Holder
made clear that KSM and the others would never be set free regardless of what happened at trial. Just a few months later, White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs said
that the Administration expected that KSM would be executed after he was found guilty. President Obama said much the same thing himself in an MSNBC interview in
November 2009. In an ordinary criminal trial, statements like this from the nation’s chief executive and his assistants would be considered poisoning the jury pool, but
they illustrate the basic fact that the Administration never intended to give KSM a real trial, they just wanted a show trial:¶ Every day it appears more and more that the
White House wants it both ways. They want to claim that this is a fair trial but also an act of venegeance. The terrorists will be treated as if they might be innocent — key
to a fair trial — but at the end of the day they’ll get their comeuppance. If KSM & Co. get off on a technicality, don’t worry, they’ll still be locked up, but when they’re
convicted the White House will claim it was always a fair process. They’ll get a fair trial from an impartial jury in New York, but it’s “fitting” and “poetic justice” that the
jury will be drawn from the community that was viciously attacked on 9/11. Fair but vengeul, honest but foreordained, instructive to the world but really just about the
law: The rhetoric from the White House and the Democrats isn’t persuasive to those who listen closely and certainly won’t be persuasive to foreigners Obama is
determined to impress.¶ The point of all of this is to show that the rule of law is intact, but what
the White House is doing is in fact undermining
the legitimacy of the legal system by having it do something it shouldn’t . Obama, Pat Leahy, and the rest preen as if they are morally superior
for preferring civilian courts, but what they are doing is undermining civilian courts, and it gets worse every time they open their mouths.¶ The
military tribunal system is not without its own flaws, of course, and the same “show trial” element exists there to the extent that it is quite clear that KSM would not be
found not guilty and would most definitely not be released if he was. In reality, what this demonstrates is the extent to which both Congress and the Bush Administration
dropped the ball in the years after 9/11 in failing to adopt some kind of statutory framework governing the detention of these people. I don’t like the idea of indefinite
detention without some judicial review. A President should not be permitted to label anyone, even a foreign national, a “terrorist” and lock them away forever without
any review by a third party to determine whether or not they there is a legitimate reason to detain them. As much as I dislike indefinite detention, though, I like even less
the idea of the
justice system being used to “send a signal” when it’s clear that the outcome in Court will have absolutely no
impact on whether or not someone continues to be detained. That’s not justice, it’s a Stalinist show trial.
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Civilian Courts Fail—Erodes Legal Systsem
Trying terrorists in civilian courts undermines the legal system—that turns the aff
Blitstein 2008(Ryan, Pacific Standard Staff, July 11, "Terror Trials May Distort Civilian Courts",
Last month, the
U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Bush administration, ruling that suspected terrorists at Guantánamo Bay
could challenge detention in federal courts. Yet as detainees fight for greater legal protections, trials like theirs might erode existing
protections for civilian defendants whose cases have nothing to do with terrorism.¶ In an upcoming article, University of California, Berkeley law professor
Charles Weisselberg explores how prosecutions in the “war on terror,” by lowering standards for conviction or easing
rules for admissible evidence, may change the way judges and prosecutors deal with people accused of federal crimes .¶ In
the debate over what to do with suspects inhabiting the gray area between crime and military conflict, Weisselberg says, such adverse effects are often ignored.¶ After
the 9/11 attacks, the United States military and intelligence agencies rounded up thousands around the world who they identified as potential threats to Americans.¶ In
some cases, there was specific evidence of their involvement in the 9/11 plot or another impending attack. In the past, the government had successfully prosecuted many
such suspects in traditional Article III federal courts, and since then, thousands have been convicted, often for “support” crimes like passport fraud.¶ Yet many detainees’
sole transgression was joining al-Qaeda or finding themselves in Afghanistan when U.S. soldiers invaded. Standard domestic prosecutions would likely have rested on
shaky ground, but international laws of war didn’t deal well with them, either.¶ “In regular war, the other guy is wearing a uniform. Here, the status is a more contested
issue. Assuming you have somebody who’s a member of al-Qaeda, who had nothing to do with 9/11 but is generally hostile to the U.S., it’s not necessarily clear you have
any crimes you could get them for,” said Tung Yin, a law professor at the University of Iowa.¶ The Bush administration opted for extreme caution. The executive branch
labeled some prisoners “enemy combatants,” holding many without trial or prosecuting them in military commissions, claiming that such actions were necessary to
protect American citizens. As Justice Antonin Scalia wrote in dissent last month, letting Guantánamo prisoners argue before civilian courts would “make the war harder on
us. It will almost certainly cause more Americans to be killed.” Among administration supporters and critics, these debates are often couched in the balance between
liberty for the accused and security for the population, of abiding by the rule of law versus the at-times impractical standards of evidence in civilian courts.¶ Weisselberg,
however, believes the
judicial ripple effects may reach beyond accused terrorists, with criminal law and procedures from
terrorism trials bleeding over to federal cases. Across the political spectrum, others have raised similar concerns. Current Attorney Gen. Michael
Mukasey argued in a 2007 Wall Street Journal op-ed article that adapting conventional legal rules to deal with terrorists could “infect
and change the standards in ordinary cases with ordinary defendants in ordinary courts of law.Ӧ That commentary helped inspire
Weisselberg to examine how it might happen. Here’s one scenario: The U.S. Supreme Court has often pointed to lengthy interrogations — as short as eight hours in one
case — as key factors in finding the resulting statements involuntary. Those decisions might be contradicted by a terrorism trial in which a judge allows statements made
during a monthslong interrogation, setting a precedent for long interrogations by, for example, local cops.¶ This hasn’t quite occurred yet, but the case of alleged “dirty
bomber” Jose Padilla came close. Lawyers claimed Padilla was held for more than a year without access to counsel and that statements he made were involuntary. While
prosecutors agreed not to introduce the statements at trial, they reserved the right to use them to call Padilla’s credibility into question on the witness stand.¶ Similarly,
judges may interpret terrorism-focused laws in ways that affect other kinds of defendants. Ahmed Ressam, an al-Qaeda-trained Algerian, was stopped at the Canadian
border on his way to detonate explosives at Los Angeles International Airport. Federal prosecutors charged him with, among other counts, carrying explosives “during the
commission of any felony,” adding 10 years to his sentence.¶ The U.S. Court of Appeals reversed that conviction because the felony he was charged with — making false
statements on a customs declaration — bore no relationship to carrying explosives.¶ Mukasey appeared before the Supreme Court in May, arguing that the government
should have the flexibility to add the explosives charge, related or not. Ressam’s lawyer said that such a broad construction would allow prosecutors to add the count to
anyone charged with a felony, offering the extreme example of a person carrying a can of gasoline while using $150 in illegal food stamps. The government prevailed.¶ “It
was an interpretation in favor of the government of a substantive law, with an eye to terrorism-related prosecutions,” Weisselberg said.¶ Already, provisions
of the
USA PATRIOT Act have been used in unrelated prosecutions, such as in cases involving child pornographers, and some
fear assistant U.S. attorneys will extend the strategies to less egregious crimes.¶ “You should expect the same actors to be involved, the
same investigators and prosecutors. If you see it work for terrorism, it might be used in other areas,” said Robert Chesney of Wake Forest University School of Law.¶ To be
sure, some of this innovation could be advantageous. Chesney noted that the
Patriot Act gave investigators the authority for roving wiretaps
following an individual, as opposed to a specific phone.¶ It’s difficult to document such trends, as even categorizing cases as “terrorism-related” can be
subjective. But history has shown their existence. Tens of thousands of “war on drugs” cases led to rulings on issues ranging from
searches of public school students to when the government must divulge evidence of racial discrimination, though Weisselberg
acknowledges the scale of that campaign is larger than anti-terror efforts.¶ Perhaps more relevant, in a study of cases between 1941 and 2001, Northwestern University’s
Lee Epstein
found that during wartime, the Supreme Court is 10 percent less likely to rule in favor of a litigant claiming
infringement of his rights.¶ If terror-related decisions are likely to infect average criminal trials, should the government
try suspected terrorists outside the Article III system? There’s little agreement on an answer – and for many, the issue is of little concern.¶ Mukasey
and the Bush administration believe many should be prosecuted by military commissions. The University of Utah’s Amos Guiora is among several legal scholars proposing
separate domestic terror courts that would give suspected terrorists only some constitutional protections. Loyola Law School’s David Glazier believes we should employ
laws of armed conflict to humanely detain suspected terrorists until they can be tried in federal court.¶ Weisselberg
doesn’t think restructuring
adequately addresses the predicament. “I don’t think there will be a way to protect U.S. law against these influences, even
if we were to remove many cases from the federal courts system,” he said.
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Civilian Court Fails—Can’t Prosecute
Logistical barriers prevent trials in civilian courts
Perazzo 2007(John, Front Page Magazine, February 6, "Why Civilian Trials for Terrorists are a Bad Idea",
Apart from the question of whether military tribunals are a good idea philosophically, trying terrorists and war criminals in civilian
rather than military courts poses a number of serious problems from a practical standpoint. For one thing, the rules defining
admissible and inadmissible evidence in each venue differ dramatically. In civilian trials, neither coerced testimony, nor confessions made in
the absence of a Miranda warning, nor hearsay evidence can presented to the court; in military tribunals the opposite is true, provided that the court determines such
evidence to have “probative value to a reasonable person.” Crona and Richardson explain the profound significance of this: A
relaxation of the hearsay rule
might become critical in a prosecution for terrorism where it may be impossible to produce live witnesses to an event
which occurred years earlier in a foreign country. For example, the indictment in the Pan Am Flight 103 case details the alleged purchase of clothing,
by Libyan intelligence agent Abdel Bassett, for placement in the suitcase with the bomb. The clothing was used to disguise the contents of the suitcase containing the
bomb, which was placed inside a radio-cassette player. Under
the rules of evidence applicable in U.S. District Court, the prosecution
would have to produce in person the Maltese shopkeeper to identify Abdel Bassett as the man who allegedly purchased the clothing back
in 1988, as opposed to producing the investigator who tracked down the shopkeeper and showed him a photograph of Abdel Bassett. Even if we assume that the
shopkeeper could be located six years or more after the fact, we recognize that it is nearly impossible to secure involuntary testimony from a
witness who is a citizen of a foreign country, especially one that historically has been less than sympathetic to the United
States. The reach of a federal court subpoena simply does not extend to Malta. The rules governing the admissibility of coerced testimony and hearsay have a direct
bearing on the case of Jose Padilla, who is now being tried in a civilian court. In June 2004 the Justice Department released a declassified document enumerating Padilla’s
various terrorist plans and his al-Qaeda connections. The information therein came not only from Padilla’s own admissions, but also from a number of additional al-Qaeda
detainees who independently confirmed (sometimes through coerced testimony) the details that Padilla gave, particularly about the plots to detonate a “dirty bomb” and
to blow up apartment buildings. But none of this evidence will be admissible in Padilla’s current trial. Consequently,
he is being formally charged with
offenses of far less gravity than those detailed in the aforementioned Justice Department document. As The New York Times
explains: [C]onstrained by strict federal rules of evidence that would prohibit or limit the use of information obtained during
[coercive] interrogations, the government will make a far more circumscribed case against Mr. Padilla in court, effectively
demoting him from Al-Qaeda’s dirty bomber to foot soldier in a somewhat nebulous conspiracy. … Senior government officials have said publicly
that Mr. Padilla provided self-incriminating information during interrogations, admitting, they said, to undergoing basic terrorist training, to accepting an assignment to
blow up apartment buildings in the United States, and to attending a farewell dinner with Khaled Sheikh Mohammed, the suspected master planner of the Sept. 11
attacks, before he flew to Chicago in 2002. But any
confessions by Mr. Padilla while he was detained without charges and denied
access to counsel — whether or not he was mistreated, as his lawyers claim — would not be admissible in court. And it is
unlikely that information obtained during the harsh questioning of Al-Qaeda detainees would be admissible, either.... Trials of terrorists in civilian courts
are beset by further practical limitations as well. Consider, for example, a hypothetical instance where U.S. military personnel capture a foreign
terrorist overseas and transport him to the United States, against his will, for trial. Explains attorney Mitchell Lathrop: “Immediately apparent are the issues
of the legitimacy of the exercise of criminal jurisdiction over him by the United States, i.e., his arrest in the first instance,
and his involuntary transportation to the United States. Then come the issues of the selection of the proper jurisdiction
for the trial, the application of the laws of his own country, the selection of a jury, and even personal and subject matter
jurisdiction of U.S. courts. Any qualified defense lawyer would certainly challenge jurisdiction and a series of complicated appeals would inevitably result. In the
final analysis, a plea bargain could well result just to avoid the interminable delays.” Dealing with terrorists under such a set of rules is analogous
to participating in a shootout where only the enemy’s weapon is loaded. Moreover, it signals to the watching world that Americans have
become consumed by guilt vis a vis the allegedly irredeemable flaws of their own culture and, as a consequence, do not possess the requisite courage for dealing
aggressively with those who would seek to destroy their country.
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Civilian Courts Bad—Terorism
Enforcing civilian trials prevents intelligence gathering—that’s uniquely key to prevent another attack
WND 2013(WND, independent news company dedicated to uncompromising journalism, seeking truth and justice and
revitalizing the role of the free press as a guardian of liberty, March 10, "Obama 'Rewarding' Terrorists With Civilian Trials",
McCarthy admitted that he and fellow prosecutors have amassed a strong conviction record against terrorist suspects , but
possible exoneration is not his biggest concern. He said trials in civilian court always trigger intelligence flows that make our
nation more vulnerable.¶ “You have to turn over discovery, meaning all of our intelligence files under the due process
rules. You’re also, in effect, rewarding the worst actors,” McCarthy said. “Basically, we’re taking the insane position that if you’re a foreign or even an American enemy
combatant, and we happen to catch you in Yemen, we can take you out with a drone strike with no due process, no anything, even if you haven’t actually carried out a
terrorist attack yet. But if you hit the jihadist jackpot and manage to get to the United States and kill 3,000 Americans, we’ll bring you into Manhattan and give you the
bells-and-whistles civilian trial. That’s a pretty perverse set of incentives to give our enemy.”¶ The
case of the first World Trade Center bombings
proved to McCarthy that terrorists who have full legal protections in U.S. courts have no incentive to reveal vital
information. He said the military commissions system is very different.¶ “One of the best benefits of the law of war paradigm that we
switched to after the 9/11 attacks is that if you treat people like enemy combatants, you can detain them and
interrogate them counsel,” said McCarthy, noting that this concept has nothing to do with enhanced interrogation techniques.¶ “I’m talking simply, over a long
period of time, to try to question people and glean information. When you’re in a terrorist war, as the war that we’re in right now is,
intelligence is really your No. 1 asset,” he said.¶ According to McCarthy, Obama is squandering chance after chance of picking up
valuable intelligence.¶ “You can’t really foresee a traditional end to this war. The only thing you can do is get whatever intelligence is
available to you to try to identify the cells and stop the plot. That’s how we protect the country,” McCarthy said. “Unfortunately, the Obama
administration has really adopted a posture where when they can kill or capture, they generally kill. When they capture or
when someone falls into their lap as happened this week, they bring the person right into the civilian justice system, which means you don’t get to interrogate them.”
Civilian trials provide unique intelligence opportunities for terrorists
Mukasey 2009(Michael, Former US attorney general, October 19, "Civilian Courts Are No Place to Try Terrorists",
The challenges of a terrorism trial are overwhelming. To maintain the security of the courthouse and the jail facilities where defendants are housed,
deputy U.S. marshals must be recruited from other jurisdictions; jurors must be selected anonymously and escorted to and from the courthouse under armed guard; and
judges who preside over such cases often need protection as well. All such measures burden an already overloaded justice system and interfere with the handling of other
cases, both criminal and civil. ¶ Moreover, there
is every reason to believe that the places of both trial and confinement for such
defendants would become attractive targets for others intent on creating mayhem, whether it be terrorists intent on
inflicting casualties on the local population, or lawyers intent on filing waves of lawsuits over issues as diverse as whether those captured in combat
must be charged with crimes or released, or the conditions of confinement for all prisoners, whether convicted or not.¶ Even after conviction, the issue is
not whether a maximum-security prison can hold these defendants; of course it can. But their presence even inside the
walls, as proselytizers if nothing else, is itself a danger. The recent arrest of U.S. citizen Michael Finton, a convert to Islam proselytized in prison and
charged with planning to blow up a building in Springfield, Ill., is only the latest example of that problem.¶ Moreover, the rules for conducting criminal
trials in federal courts have been fashioned to prosecute conventional crimes by conventional criminals. Defendants are
granted access to information relating to their case that might be useful in meeting the charges and shaping a defense, without regard to the wider impact
such information might have. That can provide a cornucopia of valuable information to terrorists, both those in custody and those
at large. ¶ Thus, in the multidefendant terrorism prosecution of Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman and others that I presided over in 1995 in federal district court in
Manhattan, the government was required to disclose, as it is routinely in conspiracy cases, the identity of all known co-conspirators,
regardless of whether they are charged as defendants. One of those co-conspirators, relatively obscure in 1995, was Osama bin Laden. It was
later learned that soon after the government's disclosure the list of unindicted co-conspirators had made its way to bin Laden in Khartoum, Sudan, where he then resided.
He was able to learn not only that the government was aware of him, but also who else the government was aware of . ¶ It
is not simply the disclosure of information under discovery rules that can be useful to terrorists. The testimony in a public trial, particularly under the
probing of appropriately diligent defense counsel, can elicit evidence about means and methods of evidence collection
that have nothing to do with the underlying issues in the case, but which can be used to press government witnesses to
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either disclose information they would prefer to keep confidential or make it appear that they are concealing facts. The alternative is to
lengthen criminal trials beyond what is tolerable by vetting topics in closed sessions before they can be presented in open ones.
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***A2: Terrorism Advantage
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A2: Link—Detention Doesn’t Drive Recruitment
Detention doesn’t drive al Qaeda—comparatively less important in recruiting
Joscelyn 2010(Thomas, The Weekly Standard, December 27, "Gitmo Is Not Al Qaeda's 'Number One Recruitment Tool'",
THE WEEKLY STANDARD has reviewed translations of
34 messages and interviews delivered by top al Qaeda leaders operating in Pakistan and
January 2009. The translations were published online by the NEFA
Foundation. Guantanamo is mentioned in only 3 of the 34 messages. The other 31 messages contain no reference to Guantanamo. And even in the
three messages in which al Qaeda mentions the detention facility it is not a prominent theme.¶ Instead, al Qaeda’s leaders repeatedly focus on
Afghanistan (“Al Qaeda Central”), including Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri, since
a narrative that has dominated their propaganda for the better part of two decades. According to bin Laden, Zawahiri, and other al Qaeda chieftains, there is a ZionistCrusader conspiracy against Muslims. Relying on this deeply paranoid and conspiratorial worldview, al Qaeda routinely calls upon Muslims to take up arms against Jews
and Christians, as well as any Muslims rulers who refuse to fight this imaginary coalition. ¶ This theme forms the backbone of al Qaeda’s messaging – not Guantanamo. ¶
To illustrate this point, consider the results of some basic keyword searches. Guantanamo
is mentioned a mere 7 times in the 34 messages we
reviewed. (Again, all 7 of those references appear in just 3 of the 34 messages.) ¶ By way of comparison, all of the following keywords are mentioned
far more frequently: Israel/Israeli/Israelis (98 mentions), Jew/Jews (129), Zionist(s) (94), Palestine/Palestinian (200), Gaza (131), and Crusader(s) (322).
(Note: Zionist is often paired with Crusader in al Qaeda’s rhetoric.)¶ Naturally, al Qaeda’s leaders also focus on the wars in Afghanistan (333 mentions) and Iraq
(157). Pakistan (331), which is home to the jihadist hydra, is featured prominently, too. Al Qaeda has designs on each of these three nations and implores
willing recruits to fight America and her allies there. Keywords related to other jihadist hotspots also feature more prominently than Gitmo, including Somalia (67
mentions), Yemen (18) and Chechnya (15). ¶ Simply put, there is no evidence in the 34 messages we reviewed that al Qaeda’s leaders are using Guantanamo as a
recruiting tool. Undoubtedly, “Al Qaeda Central” has released other messages during the past two years that are not included in our sample. Some of those messages may
refer to Guantanamo. And some of the al Qaeda messages provided by NEFA, which does a remarkable job collecting and translating al Qaeda’s statements and
interviews, may be only partial translations of longer texts. ¶ However, the messages we reviewed also surely include most of what al Qaeda’s honchos have said publicly
since January 2009. These messages do not support the president’s claim. A closer look at the 3 out of 34 messages in which “Al Qaeda Central” actually referred to
Guantanamo reveals just how weak the president’s argument is. Even in these messages al Qaeda is far more interested in other themes .¶ In
a February 17, 2010 message entitled, “The Way to Save the Earth,” Osama bin Laden made an offhand reference to Guantanamo. But it is hardly a prominent feature of
the terror master’s message. As bin Laden makes clear in the opening lines, his main concern is climate change.¶ “This is a message to the whole world about those who
cause climate change and its dangers – intentionally or unintentionally – and what we must do,” bin Laden said. Bin Laden blames the “greedy heads of major
corporations” and “senior capitalists” who are “characterized by wickedness and hardheartedness” for the supposed deleterious effects of global warming.¶ Bin Laden
does refer to Guantanamo, but it is brief and in the context of a rambling passage. In the surrounding sentences, bin Laden criticizes America for
waging war in Iraq for oil, incorrectly claims that America and her allies have “killed, wounded, orphaned, widowed and displaced more than 10 million Iraqis,” and calls
President Obama’s acceptance of the Nobel Peace Prize “an extreme example of the deception and humiliation of humanity.” ¶ If bin Laden’s February 17th message is
evidence that al Qaeda is using Guantanamo as a recruiting tool, then it is also evidence that al Qaeda is using climate change and President Obama’s Nobel to earn new
recruits.¶ The other two messages in our sample that refer to Guantanamo do not fare much better when any amount of scrutiny is applied.
Detention is only a small part of terrorist recruitment—the aff can’t solve
Lynch 2010(Marc, Associate Professor of Political Science and the Director of the Institute for Middle East Studies at the
George Washington University Elliot School of International Affairs, June, "Rhetoric and Reality: Countering Terrorism in the
Age of Obama",
The nature of the threat posed by al Qaeda has changed significantly in the years since 9/11. There are at least three interlocking dimensions
to the al Qaeda challenge: the central organization, often termed al Qaeda Central; a network of affiliated movements; and a decentralized network of like- minded
groups and individuals. Al Qaeda in any variant is no longer capable of attracting mass Arab support as it may have appeared back in 2001 and 2002. Its ability to appeal to
mainstream Muslims as the avatar of resistance to the United States has dramatically declined since peaking mid-decade. However, its
ideology and networks
have taken root in several capable and resilient local affiliates, and in an increasingly active Western milieu. Despite years of pressure and the
recent escalation of drone strikes that have reportedly decimated its leadership, the core of the organization remains intact – presumably in Pakistan – as does its ability
to craft and disseminate narratives attractive to specific populations susceptible to radicalization. Recent plots against the American homeland sug - gest the possibility of
a new strategy. U.S. strategy has begun to adapt, and should continue, to adapt to the evolving nature of the threat. Al Qaeda’s reduced mass appeal should not be taken
for granted. In the months after 9/11, even as American forces were destroying al Qaeda’s sanctuary in Afghanistan, many feared that it was the vanguard of a mass
movement capable of uniting Muslims against the West. Many
Muslims who knew little about al Qaeda or bin Laden found the narrative
it presented – of an America leading a global campaign against Islam – plausible. While al Qaeda was motivated by a distinctive salafijihadist ideology, bin Laden’s public rhetoric and the propaganda videos directed toward mainstream Arab audiences focused
on issues of widely-shared Arab and Muslim concern: Palestine, Iraq, domestic corruption and American hegemony. After
9/11, this narrative gained strength even as al Qaeda’s core leadership was scattered and damaged by the American invasion of Afghanistan. Israel’s bloody re-occupation
of the West Bank in April 2002, the invasion of Iraq, Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo and American rhetoric all fueled al Qaeda’s narrative. Its propaganda wove such
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developments together to argue that the United States was in fact at war with Islam – a belief that became alarmingly widespread across the Muslim world – and that al
Qaeda represented the authentic leader of the Islamic world in that struggle.
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A2: Link—Detention Key to Terrorism
Detention is key—can’t successfully prosecute them
Walen 2011(Alec, Professor of Law at Rutgers School of Law, June 22, "A Unified Theory of Detention, With Application to
Preventitive Detention for Suspected Terrorists", Maryland Law Review, No. 4, V 70,, NOTE: ST=Suspected Terrorist,
LTPD=long-term preventive detention)
A more legitimate concern is that it may be particularly difficult to bring a successful prosecution against an ST. Matthew
Waxman wrote: [I]nformation used to identify terrorists and their plots includes extremely sensitive intelligence sources and
methods, the disclosure of which during trial would undermine or even negate counterterrorism operations ; [and] the
conditions under which some suspected terrorists are captured, especially in faraway combat zones or ungoverned
regions, make it impossible to prove criminal cases using normal evidentiary rules . . . . 74 The first reason—that the relevant information
is highly sensitive—presumably applies primarily to prosecutions based on foreign detentions in which the activities of the CIA or the cooperation of foreign states is at
issue. 75 The Guantanamo Review Task Force, however, concluded: [T]he principal obstacles to prosecution in the cases deemed infeasible . . . typically did not stem from
concerns over protecting sensitive sources or methods from disclosure, or concerns that the evidence against the detainee was tainted. While such concerns were present
in some cases, most detainees were deemed infeasible for prosecution based on more fundamental evidentiary and jurisdictional limitations tied to the demands of a
criminal forum . . . . 76 In other words, the
problems with prosecuting detainees at Guant ́ anamo were primarily based on Waxman’s
second concern and jurisdictional limitations, such as that the federal material support laws, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A and 2339B, “were not amended to
expressly apply extraterritorially to non-U.S. persons until October 2001 and December 2004, respectively.” 77
Indefinite detention is necessary to prevent attacks—multiple scenarios
Walen 2011(Alec, Professor of Law at Rutgers School of Law, June 22, "A Unified Theory of Detention, With Application to
Preventitive Detention for Suspected Terrorists", Maryland Law Review, No. 4, V 70,, Newton: NOTE: ST=Suspected
Terrorist, LTPD=long-term preventive detention)
Because the jurisdictional limitations would not apply to most cases going forward, Waxman’s second concern—that the
conditions of capture would make
it difficult to use normal evidentiary rules to prosecute STs—is the primary obstacle to prosecuting STs domestically in the
future. But, that concern would not apply to domestic prosecutions of terrorists captured in the United States. This is not to deny that prosecuting domestic terrorism
cases is difficult; it is only to say that prosecuting domestic STs is not so distinctly difficult that there is reason to use LTPD instead. 78 These distinctive difficulties seem
likely to arise only with regard to STs who are captured abroad or who are captured domestically but whose prosecution would depend on evidence obtained from
abroad. 79 To deal with those cases in which prosecution of STs might be distinctly more difficult than prosecution of normal criminals, President Obama has agreed to
use Military Commissions (“MCs”) for the prosecution of some Guantanamo detainees. 80 These MCs allow the prosecution, for example, to use different evidentiary
rules that admit more hearsay than would be allowed in a civilian trial. 81 Use of these different evidentiary rules should not be automatically disqualifying. What matters
is that criminal trials preserve fundamental procedural fairness. If trials do not preserve fundamental fairness, however—if the trial system is corrupted by reliance on
unreliable hearsay; if the defendant is prevented from seeing secret evidence, such that he does not have a fair opportunity to respond to it, or even to advise his counsel
(who might be allowed to see it) how best to respond to it; 82 or if the standard for conviction is allowed to slip below proof beyond a reasonable doubt 83 —then the
State might as well admit that its concern is not so much with punishing past crimes as it is with preventing future ones. For if the State uses such unreliable procedures,
then it is implicitly admitting that it does not really care about proving that the detainee committed a crime; it is simply using the facade of the criminal law in order to
lock up someone considered to be a future threat. In that case, pretending to use criminal law is pointless; it would be more honest and more effective simply to move
into a regime that uses LTPD. But if MCs can maintain basic procedural fairness, they can provide a meaningful alternative forum that accommodates the special problems
that arise in dealing with evidence obtained abroad. 84 In sum, there is actually not much reason to think prosecutions of STs captured in the United States are beyond
the capacity of U.S. courts. Nor are STs typically super-villains capable of wreaking the kind of destruction on the United States that some authors presuppose they are.
The real problems, instead, are these: First many
STs who could be prosecuted in the United States are captured abroad in conditions
where evidentiary issues complicate the prospects of obtaining a successful prosecution. Second, as in any criminal case,
there is always a chance the prosecution will fail to obtain a conviction. And, finally, if there is strong —perhaps clear and
convincing— evidence that an ST is a significant terrorist capable of contributing in a distinctive and nontrivial way to the
kinds of terrorist attacks that do cause harm at the very high end of the criminal spectrum, then there is good reason to
question whether such a person should simply be released if he is not convicted of a crime. Jack Goldsmith, a former Assistant
Attorney General in the George W. Bush administration, made this last point when he wrote that, in criticism of the Obama administration’s drive to prosecute STs, “highstakes terrorism trials” are problematic in part because “the
government cannot afford to let the defendant go.” 85 While I would disagree with this
these STs were released abroad into
countries where the policing capacity could not adequately ensure that they did not return to terrorist activities—
position if it was applied to U.S. citizens, Goldsmith is, I believe, correct with regard to STs from other countries. If
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including activities that would affect U.S. citizens abroad, our allies, and the United States itself—then there is good
reason to consider using LTPD in those cases.
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A2: Impact—No Terrorism
No risk of terror attack—organizations weak
Zenko and Cohen 2013(Micah, Fellow in the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations, and
Michael, Fellow at the Century Foundation, March 14, "Clear and Present Safety", Foreign Affairs, Accessed from
None of this is meant to suggest that the United States faces no major challenges today. Rather, the point is that the problems
confronting the country are
minimal risks to the lives of the overwhelming majority of Americans. None of them -- separately or in combination -- justifies the alarmist
rhetoric of policymakers and politicians or should lead to the conclusion that Americans live in a dangerous world.¶ Take terrorism. Since 9/11, no security threat has
been hyped more. Considering the horrors of that day, that is not surprising. But the result has been a level of fear that is completely out of
proportion to both the capabilities of terrorist organizations and the United States’ vulnerability . On 9/11, al Qaeda got tragically
lucky. Since then, the United States has been preparing for the one percent chance (and likely even less) that it might get lucky again. But al Qaeda lost its safe
haven after the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, and further military, diplomatic, intelligence, and law enforcement
efforts have decimated the organization, which has essentially lost whatever ability it once had to seriously threaten the
United States. ¶ According to U.S. officials, al Qaeda’s leadership has been reduced to two top lieutenants: Ayman al-Zawahiri
and his second-in-command, Abu Yahya al-Libi. Panetta has even said that the defeat of al Qaeda is “within reach.” The near
collapse of the original al Qaeda organization is one reason why, in the decade since 9/11, the U.S. homeland has not suffered
any large-scale terrorist assaults. All subsequent attempts have failed or been thwarted, owing in part to the incompetence of their
perpetrators. Although there are undoubtedly still some terrorists who wish to kill Americans, their dreams will likely continue to be frustrated by
their own limitations and by the intelligence and law enforcement agencies of the United States and its allies.
manageable and pose
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A2: Impact—No Nuclear Terror
No risk of nuclear terror
Mueller and Stewart 2012(John, Senior Research Scientist at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies
and Adjunct Professor in the Department of Political Science at Ohio State University, Senior Fellow at the CATO institute,
and Mark, Australian Research Council Professorial Fellow and Professor and Director at the Centre for Infrastructure
Performance and Reliability at the University of Newcastle, Summer, "The Terrorism Delusion", International Security,
Volume 37, Number 1, MUSE)
Over the course of time, such essentially delusionary thinking has been internalized and institutionalized in a great many ways. For example, an
extrapolation of
delusionary proportions is evident in the common observation that, because terrorists were able, mostly by thuggish means, to
crash airplanes into buildings, they might therefore be able to construct a nuclear bomb. Brian Jenkins has run an internet search to
discover how often variants of the term “al-Qaida” appeared within ten words of “nuclear.” There were only seven hits in 1999 and eleven in 2000, but the number
soared to 1,742 in 2001 and to 2,931 in 2002.47 By 2008, Defense Secretary Robert Gates was assuring a congressional committee that what keeps every senior
government leader awake at night is “the thought of a terrorist ending up with a weapon of mass destruction, especially nuclear.”48¶ Few of the sleepless, it seems,
found much solace in the fact that an al-Qaida computer seized in Afghanistan in 2001 indicated that the
group’s budget for research on weapons of
mass destruction (almost all of it focused on primitive chemical weapons work) was $2,000 to $4,000.49 In the wake of the killing of Osama bin Laden,
officials now have many more al-Qaida computers, and nothing in their content appears to suggest that the group had
the time or inclination, let alone the money, to set up and staff a uranium-seizing operation, as well as a fancy, super-hightechnology facility to fabricate a bomb. This is a process that requires trusting corrupted foreign collaborators and other criminals,
obtaining and transporting highly guarded material, setting up a machine shop staffed with top scientists and
technicians, and rolling the heavy, cumbersome, and untested finished product into position to be detonated by a skilled
crew—all while attracting no attention from outsiders.50¶ If the miscreants in the American cases have been unable to create and set off even the
simplest conventional bombs, it stands to reason that none of them were very close to creating, or having anything to do with, nuclear weapons—or for that matter
biological, radiological, or chemical ones. In fact, with perhaps one exception, none seems to have even dreamed of the prospect; and the exception is José Padilla (case
2), who apparently mused at one point about creating a dirty bomb—a device that would disperse radiation—or even possibly an atomic one. His idea about isotope
separation was to put uranium into a pail and then to make himself into a human centrifuge by swinging the pail around in great arcs.51 ¶ Even
if a weapon were
made abroad and then brought into the United States, its detonation would require individuals in-country with the
capacity to receive and handle the complicated weapons and then to set them off. Thus far, the talent pool appears, to
put mildly, very thin. ¶ There is delusion, as well, in the legal expansion of the concept of “weapons of mass destruction.” The concept had once been taken as a
synonym for nuclear weapons or was meant to include nuclear weapons as well as weapons yet to be developed that might have similar destructive capacity. After the
Cold War, it was expanded to embrace chemical, biological, and radiological weapons even though those weapons for the most part are incapable of committing
destruction that could reasonably be considered “massive,” particularly in comparison with nuclear ones.52 And as explicitly rendered into U.S. law, the term was
extended even further to include bombs of any kind, grenades, and mines; rockets having a propellant charge of more than four ounces; missiles having an explosive or
incendiary charge of more than one-quarter ounce; and projectile-spewing weapons that have a barrel with a bore more than a half inch in diameter.53 It turns out then
that the “shot heard round the world” by revolutionary war muskets was the firing of a WMD, that Francis Scott Key was exultantly, if innocently, witnessing a WMD
attack in 1814; and that Iraq was full of WMD when the United States invaded in 2003—and still is, just like virtually every other country in the world.
No nuclear terrorism. If they haven’t done it with more power over 15 years, they won’t now.
Sigger, 10 (Jason, Defense Policy Analyst focusing on Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defense issues,
“Terrorism Experts Can Be Alarmists, Too”,
You find the famous bin Laden 1998 quote about WMDs, references from George "slam dunk" Tenet's book on al Qaeda intentions and actions in the desert, meetings
between Muslim scientists and suppliers, statements by terrorists that were obtained under "interrogations," and yes, even Jose Padilla's "dirty bomb" - a charge which
people may remember the US government dropped because it had no evidence on this point. And no discussion about AQ would be complete without the "mobtaker"
device that never really emerged in any plot against the West. That is to say, we
have a collection of weak evidence of intent without any
feasible capability and zero WMD incidents - over a period of fifteen years, when AQ was at the top of their game, they
could not develop even a crude CBRN hazard, let alone a WMD capability. Mowatt-Larsen doesn't attempt to answer the obvious question why didn't AQ develop this capability by now? He points to a June 2003 article where the Bush administration reported to the UN Security Council that
there was a "high probability" that al Qaeda would attack with a WMD within two years. The point that the Bush administration could have been creating a facade for its
invasion into Iraq must have occurred to Mowatt-Larsen, but he dodges the issue. This is an important report to read, but not for the purposes that the author intended.
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It demonstrates the extremely thin thread that so many terrorist experts and scientists hang on when they claim that
terrorists are coming straight at the United States with WMD capabilities.
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A2: Impact—No Lashout
Public won’t demand retaliation
Jenkins-Smith and Herron 2005 (Hank, Ph.D., Professor at the University of Oklahoma, and Kerry G., Professor at the
University of Oklahoma, "United States Public Response to Terrorism: Fault Lines or
Our final contrasting set of expectations relates to the degree to which the public will support or demand retribution against terrorists and supporting states. Here our
data show that support
for using conventional United States military force to retaliate against terrorists initially averaged above
midscale, but did not reach a high level of demand for military action. Initial support declined significantly across all demographic and belief
categories by the time of our survey in 2002. Furthermore, panelists both in 2001 and 2002 preferred that high levels of certainty about
culpability (above 8.5 on a scale from zero to ten) be established before taking military action. Again, we find the weight of evidence supporting
revisionist expectations of public opinion.¶ Overall, these results are inconsistent with the contention that highly charged events will
result in volatile and unstructured responses among mass publics that prove problematic for policy processes . The initial
response to the terrorist strikes demonstrated a broad and consistent shift in public assessments toward a greater perceived threat from terrorism, and greater
willingness to support policies to reduce that threat. But even
in the highly charged context of such a serious attack on the American
homeland, the overall public response was quite measured. On average, the public showed very little propensity to undermine
speech protections, and initial willingness to engage in military retaliation moderated significantly over the following year.¶ Perhaps most interesting is that
the greatest propensity to change beliefs between 2001 and 2002 was evident among the best-educated and wealthiest of our respondents— hardly the expected source
of volatility, but in this case they may have represented the leading edge of belief constraints reasserting their influence in the first year following 9/11. This post-9/11
change also reflected an increasing delineation of policy preferences by ideological and partisan positions. Put differently, those whose beliefs changed the most in the
year between surveys also were those with the greatest access to and facility with information (the richest, best educated), and the nature of the changes was entirely
consistent with a structured and coherent pattern of public beliefs. Overall, we find
these patterns to be quite reassuring, and consistent
with the general findings of the revisionist theorists of public opinion. Our data suggest that while United States public
opinion may exhibit some fault lines in times of crises, it remains securely anchored in bedrock beliefs.
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***A2: Leadership Advantage
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A2: Human Rights Cred—Plan Insufficient
Plan can’t solve Human Rights—too many alt causes and institutional barriers
Nossel 2008(Suzanne, Guardian Staff, November 19, "Closing Gitmo is just the beginning",
While abuses carried out as part of the fight against terrorism cost the US its position of leadership on human rights
issues globally, regaining that status will require more than just bringing counter-terrorism tactics in line with
international norms. While the Bush administration hailed democracy and freedom as centrepieces of its foreign policy, in practice it tended to sideline human
rights considerations within its important bilateral relationships.¶ To cite just a few examples, disregard for human rights has contributed to a culture of lawlessness in
Pakistan's tribal areas. Despite $10-12bn in mostly military US aid to Pakistan since 2001, civilians affected by the current conflict are left defenceless in squalid, diseaseinfested camps – some of which the UN refugee agency cannot reach – where their frustration with the US-led war effort only grows. As part of its effort to stabilise this
strategically vital region, the
US must invest in building institutions that support the rule of law and ensuring that approaches to
security uphold human rights. In neighbouring Afghanistan, the US needs to take immediate steps to reduce civilian
casualties in military operations, and to press for an end to corruption, which is both fuelling the conflict and
undermining popular faith in democratic governance.¶ In contemplating political agreements to end the conflict the US must avoid strengthening the
hands of the region's most brutal warlords. While human rights will not be the sole consideration governing multi-faceted relationships with foreign governments, the
new administration needs to affirm their place on the agenda and work with like-minded voices to press for progress.¶ The
US also has work to do in terms
of strengthening the international human rights infrastructure. The Bush administration distanced itself from the
international human rights community by failing to ratify key treaties and absenting itself from new institutions of human rights enforcement.
The next administration must demonstrate in tangible ways that the US is prepared to cooperate with others in building and strengthening mechanisms to protect and
advance human rights in the 21st century. Its
absence from key forums and debates has created space for spoilers who seek to vitiate
existing human rights norms and prevent new ones from taking hold.¶ In 2005 the UN adopted a new norm, the "responsibility to protect",
affirming the duty of states to protect their own populations, and the obligation of the international community to step in when they won't do so. But the new norm
has flunked its first test in Darfur, where the government has suborned rampant human rights abuses and the
international community has failed to intervene effectively. Working with allies to build broad-based support for rigorous human rights
enforcement is a long-term project that needs to start right away. Necessary steps also include re-engaging with the international criminal
court, a body that has begun to prove itself as a vital instrument of international accountability for war crimes. ¶ Building US credibility on human rights will be a longterm project requiring a steady hand against the buffeting forces of foreign policy reality. Done right, the wider human rights agenda could make
closing Guantánamo look like the easy part.
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A2: Human Rights Cred—Doesn’t Solve
Rights credibility fails
Donnelly 2002(Jack, Professor of International Studies at the University of Denver, "Globalization and Human Rights",
Page 230)
Second, the
implicit “liberal” justifactory theory of the Universal Declaration is frequently contested. Even where “liberal
democratic” values have no serious challenger, they often are more a “default option” than anything else; that is, they are
accepted largely because the obvious alternatives have been delegitimated. To the extent that this is true, the penetration of the
contemporary international human rights norms into the practices of states and the consciousness of citizens is likely to
be extremely limited. Thus human rights often prove more valuable for condemning or resisting old practices than for
building new social and political orders. For example, many who shared “Western” assessments of what was wrong with the totalitarian
regimes will not share “Western” views about what should be created in their place, or how to get there.
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A2: Soft Power—Alt Cause: Wiretapping
The aff can’t solve—outrage over wiretapping
Jordans and DiLorenzo 2013(Frank and Sarah, Boston Globe Staff, July 1, "Kerry tries to quell European outrage over
NSA eavesdropping",
French President Francois Hollande
demanded on Monday that the United States immediately stop its alleged eavesdropping on
European Union diplomats and suggested that the widening surveillance scandal could derail negotiations for a freetrade deal potentially worth billions.¶ The Obama administration is facing a breakdown in confidence from key allies over secret
programs that reportedly installed covert listening devices in EU offices . Many European countries had so far been muted about revelations
of the wide net cast by US surveillance programs aimed at preventing terrorist attacks, but their reaction to the latest reports indicate Washington’s allies are
unlikely to let the matter drop without at least a strong show of outrage.¶ The White House wouldn’t comment on the new reports, but
officials said President Barack Obama has not spoken to his counterparts in Europe about the revelations since they were published Sunday in a German weekly.¶ US
Secretary of State John Kerry said Monday he didn’t know the details of the allegations, but tried to downplay them, maintaining that many nations undertake various
activities to protect their national interests. He failed to quell the outrage from allies, including France, Germany and Italy.¶ ‘‘We
cannot accept this kind of
behavior from partners and allies,’’ Hollande said on French television on Monday.¶ He insisted the US explain its practices and end the eavesdropping
immediately. And he issued a veiled threat that France would dig in its heels on sensitive negotiations to ink a free-trade deal that would link countries that make up
nearly half of the global economy. The deal would likely serve as a model for all future such agreements worldwide.¶ ‘‘We can only have negotiations, transactions, in all
areas, once we have obtained these guarantees for France, but that goes for the whole European Union and I would say for all partners of the United States,’’ he said.¶
Europe’s outage was triggered by a Sunday report by German news weekly Der Spiegel that the US National Security Agency bugged diplomats from friendly nations —
such as the EU offices in Washington, New York and Brussels. The report was partly based on an ongoing series of revelations of US eavesdropping leaked by former NSA
contractor Edward Snowden.
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A2: Soft Power—Fails
Soft power is a false concept—only wealth and power affect influence
Doctorow 2013(Gilbert, Research Fellow of the American University in Moscow, May 20, "Soft power is largely an
American PR gimmick",
There is not much in all of this for the Kremlin to use in furtherance of its foreign policy objectives. But then the fact that Hilary Clinton chose Nye as the State
Department’s house philosopher during her tenure did not change the substance of Obama’s foreign policy even if it may have influenced the sound bites. And it could
not be otherwise, because soft
power is largely a public relations gimmick.¶ Since Nye is an idealist rather than a realist, he
systematically fails to understand that soft power is above all a by-product of wealth and success. America’s undisputed
power of attraction to peoples around the world (when it is not invading hapless countries) has more to do with its per capita GDP
than with any other factor. This explains the passion of ambitious people everywhere to send their children to American
colleges, whatever their ratings. It explains the popularity of Hollywood and pop culture and much more. There is nothing wrong with this; it is all understandable in
human terms. But it has relatively little to do with vibrant civil society or any beacon of human rights radiating from
Washington, D.C. In this respect, the best thing that Russia or China can do to further their soft power is to get richer quick.
Soft power doesn’t work—military power is the only influence
Fan 2007 (Ying, Senior Lecturer in Marketing at Brunel Business School, Brunel University in London, November 14, “Soft
power: Power of attraction or confusion?”)
Despite its popularity, the concept soft power remains a power of confusion. The definition is at best loose and vague. Because of such confusion it
is not surprising that the concept has been misunderstood, misused and trivialised ( Joffe, 2006a ). Criticisms of soft power centre mainly around three aspects: defi nition,
sources and limitations. There may be little or no relationship between the ubiquity of American culture and its actual influence .
Hundreds of millions of people around the world wear, listen, eat, drink, watch and dance American, but they do not identify these accoutrements of their daily lives with
America ( Joffe, 2006b ). To Purdy (2001) soft
power is not a new reality, but rather a new word for the most effi cient form of
power. There are limits to what soft power could achieve. In a context dominated by hard power considerations, soft
power is meaningless ( Blechman, 2004 ). The dark side of soft power is largely ignored by Nye. Excessive power, either hard or soft, may not be a good thing. In
the affairs of nations, too much hard power ends up breeding not submission but resistance. Likewise, big soft power does not bend hearts; it twists
minds in resentment and rage ( Joffe, 2006b ).¶ Nye’s version of soft power that rests on affection and desire is too simplistic
and unrealistic. Human feelings are complicated and quite often ambivalent, that is, love and hate co-exist at the same time. Even within the same
group, people may like some aspects of American values, but hate others. By the same token, soft power can also rest on
fear ( Cheow, 2002 ) or on both affection and fear, depending on the context. Much of China ’ soft power in south-east Asia testifi es to this.
Another example is provided by the mixed perception of the United States in China: people generally admire American technological superiority and super brands but
detest its policies on Taiwan.
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A2: Soft Power—Doesn’t Solve Heg
Soft power doesn’t solve heg—it’s only a byproduct of leadership
Layne 2002 (Christopher, visiting fellow in foreign policy studies at Cato, October 6, “The Power Paradox”,
U.S. strategists
believe that "it can't happen to us," because the United States is a different kind of hegemon, a benign hegemon that others
will follow willingly due to the attractiveness of its political values and culture. While flattering, this self-serving argument misses the basic
point: Hegemons are threatening because they have too much power. And it is America's power--not the self-proclaimed
benevolence of its intentions--that will shape others' response to it. A state's power is a hard, measurable reality, but its
intentions, which can be peaceful one day but malevolent the next, are ephemeral. Hegemony's proponents claim that the United States can
inoculate itself against a backlash by acting multilaterally. But other states are not going to be deceived by Washington's use of
international institutions as a fig leaf to cloak its ambitions of dominance. And in any event, there are good reasons why the U.S. should not
reflexively embrace multilateralism. When it comes to deciding when and how to defend American interests, Washington should want a free hand, not to have its hands
tied by others.
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A2: Russian Collapse—No Impact
Russia is stable and the impact is empirically denied
Zavinovsky 12 (2-7-12-[ Konstantin Zavinovsky is editor of "Geopolitics" magazine and researcher at the Institute of
Advanced Studies in Geopolitics and Auxiliary Sciences (ISAG) "Political And Economic Stability In Russia Will Attract Foreign
Investment" Claims Institute; ROME, February 7, 2012 /PRNewswire/ --]
Konstantin Zavinovsky of the Institute of Advanced Studies in Geopolitics and Auxiliary Sciences, has said that relative economic growth in Russia in recent years has
improved the quality of life in Russia, and the prospect of foreign direct investment into the country. Zavinovsky said: " The
Russian economy in the last
decade has seen a steady growth. After the economic crisis in the late 90s, starting from 2000 GDP per capita in Russia increased steadily rising from about $
7600 in 2000 to nearly $ 17000 in 2011. This means that the index more than doubled in 10 years. The growth was interrupted only for a year
because of the 2008 financial crisis which produced a slight decline in GDP per capita in 2009. But already next year, in 2010, this index started to grow and almost
reached pre-crisis level. According to the forecasts of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) the index will grow steadily over the next year to nearly $ 22000 in 2016. We
should add that in the same period inflation in the country declined from 20.78% in 2000 to 8.8% in 2011 (6.1%, according to the Russian Ministry of Finance - Minfin) and
according to the forecast of the IMF inflation in Russia is to diminish in future and will reach 6.64% in 2014 (4.5%, according to Minfin). "With
the rise of income
the quality of life of Russian citizens in recent years has improved considerably. And thus the image of Russians in the
world has also changed. For example, in Italy 10 years ago the Russians were seen as a backward people, rather poor and far away from European civilization,
now the Russians have become a symbol of wealth and economic well-being. Russian customers are very appreciated in Italy both by small traders on the narrow streets
of Rome, Florence andVenice and by the great Italian fashion designers such as Salvatore Ferragamo, who believes Russians to be "customers number one in Europe".
Precisely for this reason at the end of last year the Michele Norsa CEO announced that "over the next five years we expect to double sales volume in Russia, where the
growth will be +20% annually over the past 24 months". Dirk Bikkemberg also stated that Russian clients are the target of extreme importance because thanks to them
flagship store in Milan, considered by many as a loss, not only got in balance with the accounts but also opened 47 new stores in 2011. Italian newspapers say that due to
purchases of Russian clients sales of the Italian outlets in contrast to the general crisis. The most important Italian financial newspaper Il Sole 24 Ore suggested making
investments in the Russian ruble bacause Russia has a high economic growth and its national debt is very low. The tourism industry that made Italy famous also makes
plans with a focus on the Russian customers. The examples are numerous and cover many sectors, while news of this kind are discussed widely in the Italian press. This
shows that currently the Italian business world has confidence in the Russian market and is ready to invest in it. "So
in only 10 years, Russia managed to
change her image in Italy (in Europe and the world). Today it appears as a stable country, a country with an economic growth
and with many investment opportunities. This change wasn't an easy one and required great efforts from the Russian
government in 2000 when Russia was economically weak - in 2000 GDP was almost half of that of 1992. Today Russia's GDP is nearly 7 times bigger
than that of 2000 and amounts to nearly 2 trillion dollars. According to IMF, this figure is expected to rise and in 2016 GDP will amount to 3 trillion. The increase of
Russia's prestige in the eyes of the Europeans and the strong economic growth were possible thanks to political and
economic stability of the country which was a merit of politicians who led Russia in recent years. The political destabilization of
Russia would lead to distrust of the future of the Russian market and foreign capitals would flee from the country. So Russia should continue to move in
the same direction of political stability if it wants to preserve and enhance the economic well-being and thus to remain
an attractive country for foreign investment."
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A2: Russian Relations—No Solvency
A host of alt causes means no relations solvency.
Cohen 12 (Ariel, Senior Research Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Energy Policy in the Douglas
and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for
International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation, ‘12
Ph.D., “How the U.S. Should Deal with Putin’s Russia”, 3-7-12
Vladimir Putin’s victory in Russia’s presidential election was marred with fraud, but nevertheless he appears to have a mandate from the Russian
voters to rule for another six-year term. If re-elected in 2018, he may rule until 2024. Regardless of the outcome of the November U.S. elections, a clear Russia policy is
necessary, and it should not be the ill-fated “reset,” which naively bet on President Dmitry Medvedev’s staying in power.[1]
Roadblocks to Rapprochement
Anti-Status-Quo Foreign Policy. During his campaign, Putin provided ample insights into how he views the world and Russia’s
relationship with the U.S. The picture is bleak. Much of Putin’s pre-election rhetoric harkened back the 19th-century
nationalism and imperialism. He likes to quote the 19th-century Russian foreign minister Count Alexander Gorchakov that “Russia is concentrating.” Another
slogan from the same era, often heard in the Moscow policy circles, belongs to the Czar Alexander III: “Russia has no allies but its army and navy.” This is a
prescription for a prickly foreign policy, belt tightening, rearmament, wars with neighbors, and a chronic confrontation
with the West. Xenophobia. Anti-Americanism in Russia is rampant.[2] Putin has relentlessly created an image of Russia under attack from Western
enemies. It worked for the elections and is likely to continue as a pillar of Russia’s domestic and foreign policy. Putin accused U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and the
State Department of “giving the signal” for recent mass demonstrations in Moscow. Putin dehumanized opposition leaders by calling them “jackals scavenging near
Western embassies”[3]and, taking a page from Rudyard Kipling, “monkey packs.” After the elections, some of them—such as Alexei Navalny, Ilya Yashin, and hundreds of
others in Moscow and St. Petersburg—were detained during a post-election protest and issued summons to the notorious dissident-busting judge Olga Borovkova. It is
likely some of them will be jailed for some time. The New Imperial Union? Putin’s geopolitical vision for Fortress Russia dominating the former Soviet Union is an
independent pole in a “multi-polar world.” It includes the overlapping organizational spaces of the Joint Economic Space, the Customs Union, and the Eurasian Union
under the Russian leadership. The pressures on Georgia and Ukraine continue unrelenting, with the view to bring Kyiv into Moscow’s fold and to change the regime in
Tbilisi. Such a quasi-imperial contraption, however, will come at a cost—and Putin is willing to pay the price as long as oil prices are in triple digits. Enabler
of Iran
and Syria. Flush with oil cash, Putin chose to confront the West and the Arab world over Syria and Iran. Together with China, he imposed
two vetoes in the U.N. Security Council against the Syria sanctions. Russian support enables Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to kill his own people with impunity.
Rearmament. Putin put his money where his mouth is. He demanded that the U.S. severely curtail its NATO missile defenses, provide a treaty-like guarantee that
ballistic missile defense will not be aimed at Russia, and share these technologies at no cost. He also announced a $700 billion rearmament program, including a massive
nuclear missile modernization.[4] So much for President Obama’s “getting to zero.” Russia will also spend billions of dollars buying French Mistral assault ships, Israeli
unmanned aerial vehicles, and German combat training systems. No more autarkic military-industrial complex when the Russian software and electronics industries are
falling behind. The Real Problems However, Russia’s problems are the 21st century’s problems: the lack of good governance and the rule of law to make the
citizens safe and to attract domestic and foreign investment, the rise of Islamic minorities at home, poor relations with the West and the geopolitical competition with
China and Turkey, and a threat of economically falling behind even India and Brazil. Yet Russia is increasingly integrated into global trade flows. International business
views Russia as an unsaturated market for housing, durable and consumer goods, oil and gas services, and infrastructure. Today, much Soviet-era infrastructure—roads,
airports, and power stations—are falling apart and need trillions of dollars in investments. However, investors pay a high price for the Kremlin’s domestic heavyhandedness. As Russia joins the World Trade Organization this summer, the U.S. Congress is likely to lift the obsolete 1974 Jackson–Vanik Amendment, which predicated
Permanent Normal Trade Relations on free emigration. Yet, given the sorry state of the rule of law in Russia, Members of Congress are unlikely to remove the Jackson–
Vanik roadblock without gaining a legislative tool to address Russian corruption and human rights violations. “Reset” Failure The
current anti-American tilt of
Russian foreign policy prevents diplomatic cooperation , as a shared threat assessment and mutual understanding
between the U.S. and Russia in dealing with the changing global environment is currently absent. Despite clear statements to the
contrary by Putin and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, the Obama Administration repeatedly declared that it is not competing with Russia for regional influence—not in
the Middle East and not in Eurasia. Apparently, the Kremlin has not received the memo. Instead, Russia is attempting to constrain U.S. foreign policy with little or no
counteraction from Washington. Moscow would like to see the U.S. power so diminished in the Middle East and Europe that America could not act without Russia’s
permission.[5] To address Putin’s anti-American foreign policy, the U.S. should: Reexamine the strategy of “reset” with Russia. The President should commission the
National Security Council to form a task force for a bottom-up review of Russia policy in view of Putin’s return to the Kremlin and Moscow’s sabotage of the U.S. policies
on Iran and Syria. The U.S. should use its public diplomacy assets to “name and shame” Russia as an enabler of the Iranian and Syrian regimes. Revitalize relations with the
sovereignty-minded countries of Eastern Europe and Eurasia, which were neglected during the first two years of the Obama Administration. The U.S. should emphasize
ties with countries that care about their independence—Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan—without compromising the U.S.
democracy agenda and, if requested, provide economic advice and political-military cooperation, which is particularly timely as the U.S. is planning to withdraw troops
from Afghanistan by 2013. Consider the bipartisan bill called Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act, proposed by Senators John McCain (R–AZ) and Benjamin
Cardin (D–MD). It is named after a lawyer who exposed a $230 million corruption scheme and died in pre-trial detention, apparently as a result of torture, beatings, and
denial of medical care. The Magnitsky Act would ban most notoriously corrupt foreign officials from entering the U.S. and allow their ill-gotten property to be seized and
confiscated by U.S. courts. Similar legislation is being debated in Canada and some European countries. Tough Times Ahead Russia’s intransigent foreign policy will require
the Administration to recognize its “reset” failures and provide leadership and consistent and robust pushback. With
the fourth Putin term, it is Russia’s
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zero-sum foreign policy that prevents Washington and Moscow from exploring areas where there may be a convergence
of U.S. and Russian interests, including anti-terrorism, nonproliferation, and business ties. Spillover of disagreements
over security and geopolitics hinders cooperation in nonproliferation, global security, and business, as demonstrated in
clashes over Iran, Syria, and missile defense. Putin’s comeback could mean tough times ahead for U.S.–Russian relations.
But when engaging Moscow, the U.S. has to guard its national security interests, not engage in a self-deluding feel-good policy exercise.
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A2: Russian Relations—No Impact
Relations are useless
Ostapenko 9 (E. Ostapenko, Trend Daily News, 2009. “Normalization in U.S.-Russian relations not to change political
situation in world: analyst at French studies institute,” p. Lexis)
Normalization of relations between the United States and Russia will not assume a global significance and will not change the situation
in the world, since today Russia does not play the role it played formerly, Dominic Moisi, analyst on Russian-American
relations, said. "There is a country that is essential for the future of the world, it is not Russia, but it is China," Moisi, founder and senior advisor
at the French Institute for International Relations (IFRI), told Trend News in a telephone conversation from Paris. Speaking of the growing role of China, Moisi said that
the Chinese are soon going to be the number two economy in the world. Russian economy can not compete. As another important
aspect of the increasing weight of China in the world, Moisi considers the absence of problems with the aging of population, unlike European countries, including Russia.
"China has still the largest population in the world and it is not being reduced. The population of Russia is reducing strikingly year after year," said
Moisi, author of numerous reports on U.S.-Russian relations. He said China is not in the same category than Russia. "It is much more important today and the Americans
are absolutely aware of that. But at the same time it is important for the United States to have a descent relationship with Russia and not totally antagonistic one," said
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A2: Alliances—No Impact
Alliances don’t solve anything – Gulf War proves that countries will hate us no matter what.
Krauthammer, ‘3 (Charles, The National Interest, Winter 2002/2003)
A third critique comes from what might be called pragmatic realists, who see the new unilateralism I have outlined as hubristic, and whose objections are practical. They
are prepared to engage in a pragmatic multilateralism. They value great power concert. They seek Security Council support not because it confers any moral authority, but
because it spreads risk. In their view, a single hegemon risks far more violent resentment than would a power that consistently acts as primus inter pares, sharing rulemaking functions with others.12 I have my doubts. The
United States made an extraordinary effort in the Gulf War to get un support,
share decision-making, assemble a coalition and, as we have seen, deny itself the fruits of victory in order to honor coalition goals. Did
that diminish the anti-American feeling in the region? Did it garner support for subsequent Iraq policy dictated by the original
acquiescence to the coalition? The attacks of September 11 were planned during the Clinton Administration, an administration that made a fetish of consultation and did
its utmost to subordinate American hegemony and smother unipolarity. The resentments were hardly assuaged. Why? Because the
extremist rage against the
United States is engendered by the very structure of the international system, not by the details of our management of
Arizona Debate Institute
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A2: Heg—No Impact
Heg doesn’t solve war
Fettweis 2010(Christopher, Professor of National Security Affairs at the U.S. Naval War College, April, “Threat and
Anxiety in US Foreign Policy,” Survival, Volume 52, Issue 2 )
One potential explanation for the growth of global peace can be dismissed fairly quickly: US actions do not seem to have contributed much. The limited evidence suggests
that there
is little reason to believe in the stabilising power of the US hegemon, and that there is no relation between the relative level of
American activism and international stability. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defence spending fairly substantially .
By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defence in real terms than it had in 1990, a 25% reduction.29 To internationalists, defence hawks and other
believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible 'peace dividend' endangered both national and global security. 'No
serious analyst of American military
capabilities', argued neo-conservatives William Kristol and Robert Kagan in 1996, 'doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far
to meet America's responsibilities to itself and to world peace'.30 And yet the verdict from the 1990s is fairly plain: the world grew more
peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable
US military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums; no
security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races; no regional balancing occurred once the stabilis-ing presence of the US military was
diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in US
military capabilities. Most of all, the United States was no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined
while the United States cut its military spending under President Bill Clinton, and kept declining as the George W. Bush administration ramped the
spending back up. Complex statistical analysis is unnecessary to reach the conclusion that world peace and US military expenditure are unrelated.
No transition wars
MacDonald and Parent 2011(Paul, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College, and Joseph, Assistant
Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami, Spring, "Graceful Decline?", International Security, Volume 35, No.
4, Spring 2011, pp. 7-44)
In this article, we question the logic and evidence of the retrenchment pessimists. To
date there has been neither a comprehensive study of
great power retrenchment nor a study that lays out the case for retrenchment as a practical or probable policy. This article fills these gaps by
systematically examining the relationship between acute relative decline and the responses of great powers. We examine eighteen cases of acute
relative decline since 1870 and advance three main arguments. ¶ First, we challenge the retrenchment pessimists’ claim that domestic or
international constraints inhibit the ability of declining great powers to retrench. In fact, when states fall in the hierarchy
of great powers, peaceful retrenchment is the most common response, even over short time spans. Based on the empirical
record, we find that great powers retrenched in no less than eleven and no more than fifteen of the eighteen cases, a range of 61–83 percent.
When international conditions demand it, states renounce risky ties, increase reliance on allies or adversaries, draw
down their military obligations, and impose adjustments on domestic populations.¶ Second, we find that the magnitude of relative decline helps
explain the extent of great power retrenchment. Following the dictates of neorealist theory, great powers retrench for the same reason they expand: the rigors of great
power politics compel them to do so.12 Retrenchment is by no means easy, but necessity is the mother of invention, and declining great powers face powerful incentives
to contract their interests in a prompt and proportionate manner. Knowing only a state’s rate of relative economic decline explains its corresponding degree of
retrenchment in as much as 61 percent of the cases we examined.¶ Third, we argue that the rate of decline helps explain what forms great power retrenchment will take.
How fast great powers fall contributes to whether these retrenching states will internally reform, seek new allies or rely more heavily on old ones, and make diplomatic
overtures to enemies. Further, our analysis suggests that great
powers facing acute decline are less likely to initiate or escalate militarized
interstate disputes. Faced with diminishing resources, great powers moderate their foreign policy ambitions and offer
concessions in areas of lesser strategic value. Contrary to the pessimistic conclusions of critics, retrenchment neither requires aggression nor invites
predation. Great powers are able to rebalance their commitments through compromise, rather than conflict . In these ways,
states respond to penury the same way they do to plenty: they seek to adopt policies that maximize security given available means. Far from being a hazardous policy,
retrenchment can be successful. States that retrench often regain their position in the hierarchy of great powers. Of the fifteen great powers that adopted retrenchment
in response to acute relative decline, 40 percent managed to recover their ordinal rank. In contrast, none of the declining powers that failed to retrench recovered their
relative position. Pg. 9-10¶