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Supervisor: Jolle Demmers
Date of Submission: July 30th 2012
Trajectory followed: Research and thesis writing only (30 ECTS)
Word Count: 26.578 words
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Table of content
Acknowledgements………………………………………………...7
Introduction…………………………………………………………9
Chapter 1: Theory….……………………………………………....15
1.1 Critical Discourse Analysis……………………..15
1.2 Scott’s theory on hidden transcripts…………...17
1.3 Social Identity Theory…………………………...18
1.4 Citizenship as a performance…………………...21
Chapter 2: Stigmatization………………………………………...25
2.1 Discourse Analysis……………………………....27
2.2 Metaphors………………………………………...36
Chapter 3: Involvement in civil society.....……………………...39
3.1 Perceived stigmatization………………………..39
3.2 Tactics……………………………………………..47
Chapter 4: Belief structures and forms of citizenship …………51
4.1 Belief structures…………………………………..52
4.2 Forms of citizenship……………………………..60
Conclusion………………………………………………………....67
Bibliography……………………………………………………….73
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Acknowledgements
I would like to thank my respondents for trusting me with their stories
I would like to thank my supervisor Jolle Demmers for pushing me to find my story
I would like to thank my friends and family for supporting me. Especially Marije, Corinne
and Alicia for listening to my thoughts and stories over and over again.
I would like to thank Marco Lambooij for his graphic design support
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Introduction
This award means three things to me. That is dreaming. I’d like to tell all the
young people out there that it is important to dream [..] This award also stands
for the conquering of fears. Because I have quite some. And unfortunately also
the Netherlands has fears. These days we are being injected with fears
(acceptance Speech Nasrdin Dchar, Dutch movie award gala: September 30th
2011).
---------------------On the 9th of June 2010, in the general elections in the Netherlands, the PVV [Freedom Party]
won 15,5 percent of the seats. The party benefited from the loss of the traditionally big
parties the PvdA [Labor Party], the CDA [Christian Democrats] and the VVD [Liberal Party],
who together only received 55,5 percent of the votes. During the twentieth century these
three parties together continuously received between 75 and 90 percent of the votes (Vossen,
2011:179). The PVV is a relatively new party, set up in 2006 by the former MP of the Liberal
Party Geert Wilders. The election program of the PVV for the 2010 elections revolved around
the topics of challenging Islam and mass immigration, but also held a populist rhetoric
against the political establishment in The Hague. The front man of the PVV is known for his
fierce statements such as warning about a Tsunami of Muslims and pleading for a head-ragtax. Previously, in 2008 he co-produced the short movie Fitna, in which he warns against
world domination by Muslims. In 2010 Wilders stood trial for hate speech and insulting of
Muslims and Moroccans. Although the judge concluded that Wilders insulted both Muslims
and Moroccans and that his statements were on the border, or maybe over the border of
what was allowed, Wilders was acquitted of all charges.
The PVV is not he first populist party in the Netherlands, nor is it the first party with an antiIslamic rhetoric. Especially since 9/11 there have been multiple politicians and newly
founded parties who focused on challenging Islam or Muslims. However, all of the former
parties were relatively unsuccessful, with the LPF [Pim Fortuyn’s list] as the most successful,
securing government position that lasted several months. Also, the rhetoric used by the PVV
and Wilders is more extreme than that of previous parties (Zwaan, Zembla: April 24 th 2010).
The PVV won two elections in a row, growing from 5,5 to 15,5 percent in the 2010 elections.
After the elections the party went into a formal supporter position of the minority
government of VVD and CDA. In this position the PVV had formal influence on the
government policies of the minority government. Although the PVV did not get into
9
government, because the parties did not agree on the status of the Islam, it did hold a very
powerful position. Also, symbolically the cooperation between the government and the PVV
can be seen as a partial legitimization of the PVV rhetoric by the other parties. Both the VVD
and the CDA have been heavily criticized by the other parties for working together with a
party that stigmatizes Muslims in the Netherlands. On top of that, international
organizations such as Human Rights Watch and the Council of Europe are critical about the
situation in the Netherlands on the position of Muslims and policy on Muslims (van der
Valk, 2012:13).
After the elections in 2010 I feared for the future of the Netherlands, with a populist party in
a powerful position in the government. I wondered what would this mean for policies on
Muslims and foreigners, and for our reputation abroad. I also wondered why are there so
many people in the Netherlands who vote for such a party. However, after the first big shock
of the new government, things seemed to get back to normal. And apart from some incidents
around statements made by Wilders, or by other politicians about Wilders, politics seemed to
continue as normal. It almost made it seem as if it was not that bad and people, especially
Muslims were not as affected by the powerfull position of the PVV as I had expected.
On September 30th of 2011 during the annual Dutch movie award gala, the Gouden Kalven
Gala, the Moroccan Dutch actor Nasrdin Dchar won the award for best actor. In his speech
the actor dedicated his award to three things, conquering your fears, love and making your
dreams come true. According to the actor not only did he have a lot of fear, but also the
entire country was injected with fear. Dchar comments on a speech of the vice-prime
minister Verhagen, in which he states that he understand the fear of foreigners:
Well mister Verhagen and Geert Wilders and all those people who stand behind you, I am Dutch, I
am a Dutchman. I am very proud of my Moroccan blood. I am a Muslim! And I have a Fucking
Golden Calf [name award] in my hands, so be afraid!
The speech got a lot of attention in the media and in social media, with a lot of people
praising the actor as a role model for successful young Moroccan Dutchman. After watching
the speech, I, like many others, was touched by his words. Not so much because of the
brilliance of the speech, but because it, yet again, made me aware of the seriousness of the
political situation in the Netherlands. This speech, and the overwhelming attention it
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garnered, shows that there are Muslims who are affected by the stigmatization of the PVV
and the government’s perceived support for the party.
In my research I will examine how stigmatization of Muslim communities in the Netherlands
plays out in the lives of young Muslims. There seems to be no obvious effect of perceived
stigmatization on Muslims in the Netherlands in the form of open protest. I want to study
what less-visible effects there are, while focusing on young Muslims who are involved in
civil society. In both media and literature, the main focus has been on young Muslims who
turn against society. I want to study the effect of stigmatization on young Muslims who do
not turn against society, but make an effort to contribute to society. Therefore my research
group consists of young Muslims who are active in civil society through a social
organization.
Research group
My research group consists of young Muslims who act as citizens in the Netherlands.
Bekkers and Karr (2008:35) distinguish three types of acts of citizenship performances, first
being involved in politics, second social support for peers and third being involved in a
social organization. In my research I will focus on people who are active in civil society
through a social organization. According to Alice Walker (as cited by Scott, 1990:43), we
cannot expect involvement in civil society from people who are being stigmatized by that
same society. Therefore the performances of my participants can be seen as a contradiction.
In chapter 1 I will further discuss this, what seems on the surface to be a contradiction.
Apart from being a Muslim and being involved in civil society, my participants are all either
participating/enrolled/registered in, or graduated from, higher vocational education or
university. In addition to being perceived as Muslims, they can also all be considered a
foreigner, because of their looks, their nationality, or their parent’s nationality. Apart from
these similarities, my research group is very diverse. Most importantly, they have different
cultural backgrounds and differ in how religious they are. As I will explain in chapter 2 my
research group is not a group in the more traditional sense that they created the group
themselves. Rather the group membership is forced upon them part of the time by some
people in society. Also they do acknowledge that they can be seen as part of this group even
if they don’t feel like part of the group.
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Ontological and epistemological standpoints
Before I will turn to my research design I will go into the ontological and epistemological
standpoints that underlie my research. Ontologically, both structures in society and
individual drives are the starting point of my analysis. Structures in society can be seen as
created by people, who then act upon these structures, but are also able to change the
structures. Epistemologically, I will focus on the meaning that people give to events and
human action from within. I follow in the perspective of Idealism, where it is stated that
human activity is an expression of meaning given to their conduct and where the goal is to
understand how people select and interpret events and action (May, 1994:14).
Research design
In line with my epistemological standpoints, my research is designed to understand the
performances of my participants from within. Therefore I did in-depth interviews. Since
through these interviews thoughts and stories are created, the data is generated (Ritchie and
Lewis, 2003:142). In my interviews the five key features of in-depth interviews as described
by Ritchie and Lewis (ibid:148) can be found. First, I combined structure with flexibility since
I had an short topic list for each interview, but during the interview I mainly followed my
participants stories. Second, the interviews were interactive and through the interviews I
generated data. Fourth, my interviews were (partly) captured in its natural form since I used
a voice recorder to record them. And last, I used different techniques to generate data. In the
first part of the interview I mainly asked content mapping questions to identify relevant
issues and in the second part of the interview I switched to content mining questions, to
explore each issue in detail.
The credibility of my interviews partly depends on my interview skills such as avoiding
leading questions and the ability to create a facilitative relationship with my participants
(ibid:156). I have confidence in my interview skills, since I have a background in psychology
where I completed courses in interview skills. However, it always has to be taken into
account that the stories that my participants told me partly depend on the questions that I
asked and my abilities as an interviewer.
Getting access to my participants was difficult at first, because there is not one specific social
site to meet participants or databases with their contact details. Therefore I started off with
contacting Islamic social organizations. I also made use of my own network, who spread my
call for respondents via social media, email and their own personal contacts. Later I made
use of a the non-probability sampling technique called snowballing, where I asked my
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respondents for other possible respondents in their network (Nichols, 2002:70). Since my
participants were not randomly selected, the data in my research cannot be used to
generalize to the research population of all young Muslims who are active in a social
organization. What I can do, however, is show the common features and differences in the
stories of my participants. Also, I can confirm the existence of certain theoretical concepts,
however, if I did not find certain theoretical concepts in my field research it cannot be
concluded that the concept does not exist in the research population, only that in my
research I cannot confirm its existence. I can also not draw any quantitative conclusions
based on my data.
I did my fieldwork in May and June of 2012. In all I interviewed sixteen people, fifteen of
which were Muslims under thirty, who I therefore consider young Muslims. One of my
participants was in his late thirties, but I decided to interview him as well since he had been
active in civil society for a long time so he could tell me about the changes over time. He also
had a lot of contacts in different organizations, so he could help me understand the bigger
picture instead of the other more personal stories. All of my participants volunteered to
participate in my research. The interviews are anonymous, so the names that I will use are
fabricated. For the same reason I will not use the names of the organizations that my
participants were active in. My research mainly consists of in-depth interviews with my
participants, which took place at a location of their choice. During the interviews I asked
about their involvement in the social organization and the factors that influenced their
involvement. I also tried to check my initial assumptions and conclusions with my
participants, to see whether they agreed with me and recognized their stories in my analysis.
Analytic Frames
In my thesis I will answer the question how perceived stigmatization from politics affects the
citizenship performances of young Muslims active in civil society in the Netherlands. To
answer this question I will combine elements of different analytic frames. Analytic frames
are fundamental to social research, because they can constitute ways of seeing (Ragin,
1994:61). As will be explained in Chapter 1, combining different analytical frames is not a
straightforward process, since the different frames are based on different ontological and
epistemological standpoints. In Chapter 1, I will give some background information on the
different research fields of the different frames that I use and the different underlying
assumptions. In Chapter 2 I will conduct a discourse analysis of the election program of the
PVV. Here I will work in the field of Critical Discourse Analysis of Fairclough, and Framing
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Analysis of Benford and Snow. This chapter focusses on understanding the social world as
created by the PVV and understanding how the created discourse resonates in society. In
Chapter 3, I will turn to the field of subaltern studies, using the Scott’s theory on hidden
transcripts. In line with the field of subaltern studies I will study the effect of stigmatization
from the perspective of the stigmatized. In this chapter I will answer the question of how
stigmatization is perceived by young Muslims. Also I will study how the perceived
stigmatization affects the involvement in civil society of my participants. The ontological and
epistemological standpoints of subaltern studies and critical discourse analysis are similar. In
the last chapter however, I will turn to a completely different field of research using Tajfels
Social Identity Theory. In chapter 1 I will explain how I will combine elements of this theory
with my own ontological and epistemological standpoints. In Chapter 4, I will answer the
question of what belief structures are held by my participants and what tactics are used to
deal with the lower status of their group. I will link the different belief structures and tactics
to different forms of citizenship that my participants act from. In my conclusion I will tie the
different chapters together, when I will turn to my main question. I will also elaborate on the
strong and weak points of my research and make some suggestions for further research.
Goals
My research serves two of the main goals of social research as described by Ragin (1994).
First I am testing and refining theories (ibid:35-37). My thesis is very theory based and will
contribute to the different theories in three ways. First, I am contributing to the knowledge
on belief structures of Tajfel, by testing the concepts in real life. Second, I will contribute to
the knowledge on the concept of citizenship, since I am following in a new tradition were
citizen as a performance is studied. Last, my research also contributes to solving what seems
to be contradiction. As further explained in Chapter 1, it is not to be expected that people
who are stigmatized by society will try to contribute to society by being active in civil
society. In other words, it is not to be expected that my participants, young Muslims in the
Netherlands would be active in civil society. I cannot fully solve this contradiction, but in
Chapter 3 I will demonstrate that involvement in civil society can also be used as a means of
protest, when using the lens of Scott’s hidden transcripts. My second goal is giving voice to
my participants (ibid:43). Muslims in the Netherlands are in a marginal position in society
and the stories of young Muslims who turn against society dominate the media and social
research. In my research I want to give voice young Muslims who contribute to society, but
are still at times stigmatized because of their looks or religion.
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1 Theory
In this chapter I will present the four main analytic frames that I use throughout this thesis;
Critical Discourse Analysis, Scott’s theory on Hidden transcripts, Social Identity Theory and
citizenship as a performance. Some of the theories are based on different ontological and
epistemological standpoints and are therefore not easy to combine. As I stated in the
introduction, this thesis is based on the ontological standpoints of Idealism. Both individual
drives and structures in society are taken as a starting point for analysis. Also the focus is on
understanding human action from within. Since not all of the analytic frames in this thesis
are based on the same underlying assumptions I will explain how I take elements from these
frames and combine these with my own standpoint.
1.1 Critical Discourse Analysis
In chapter 2 I will conduct a discourse analysis of the election program of the PVV. I will first
explain what a discourse is and why it is seen as important for analysis. Then I will turn to
the specific tradition of discourse analysis that I use in this thesis, Critical Discourse
Analysis.
According to Jabri (1996:94) we have to look at discourses of how people explain the social
world to understand human action. It places the story at the core of the Analysis (Demmers,
2012:chapter6:3). Through a discourse people tell who they are and who they are not.
Discourses are represented in text and talk. These texts do not simply describe a situation,
but they also do something. Language creates situations by interpreting and giving meaning
to events (Jabri, 1996:94-95). Discourse analysis forces us to look at how people present
themselves and others. This is based on the assumption that groups are created and not
given. This is in accordance with the work of Baumann (1999:59), who tells us not to look at
the characteristics of a group, but at the boundaries between them.
Ontologically, in discourse analysis it is not agency or structure that is seen as the main
source of human action, but a combination of the two. People have agency, but the options
on how to act are limited by structures in society. These structures are not seen as something
outside social life, but as created, reshaped and changed through human interaction
(Demmers, 2012 chapter 6:5). However not everyone can change the dominant discourse.
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The dominance of one discourse over the other is related to power (Jabri, 1996:96-97).
Therefore, people with more power, like politicians have more influence on the dominant
discourse than others. However, people are not seen as puppets on a string who just follow
the elites. In order for them to tap into a discourse it has to be socially meaningful. Discourse
analysis asks how a specific discourse becomes important at a certain time and place, and it
also asks why (Demmers, 2012:chapter 6:10). It distinguishes between the form and function
of a discourse. How are groups and the relation between them presented and why are they
represented in this way. Epistemologically, discourse analysis is clearly on the side of
understanding human performances from within instead of explaining them from without.
I will use the framework of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) to present the discourse in the
election program in a social context. This framework will serve as a guideline on what to
include in the discourse analysis. Jorgensen and Philips (2002:76) note that in discourse
analysis, as well as in other qualitative research approaches, there is no fixed procedure for
the production of material and for the analysis of these materials. There is not one systematic
way to do discourse analysis. There are however several attempts made to create one specific
analytic framework for discourse analysis. Although this framework can be used as a
guideline on how to do discourse analysis, for me the strict regulation on what counts as
good material and what steps need to be taken to do the correct discourse analysis is too
much of a limitation. Essentially, discourse analysis is about making an interpretation of an
interpretation of a social world (Demmers, 2012 chapter 6: 17), and although this needs to be
done systematically, it also leaves the door open for creativity. Therefore the model of CDA
will serve as a guideline in my analysis and not as a specific step-by-step method of
discourse analysis. Importantly, since it will come down to an interpretation of an
interpretation of a social world, I will try to make my interpretation as transparent as
possible through the use of a lot of quotes. This way the steps that I take and the way that I
draw my conclusions are clear and also open for interpretation.
In CDA, the relations between a discourse and social and cultural developments are studied
(Jorgensen and Philips, 2002:60). According to Jorgensen and Philips (ibid:60-62) there are
five common features in different CDA approaches. First, discursive practices both create
and consume texts and are seen as an important form of social practice which contributes to
the constitution of, the social world. Second, discourses are seen as both constructed by, and
constructing of social practices. Third, in CDA, concrete use of text in social interaction is
analyzed. Fourth, it is believed that discourses create and reproduce socially unequal
situations. And finally, it is critical in the sense that the goal of CDA is to uncover these social
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inequalities. Therefore CDA does not see itself as neutral, but takes the side of the oppressed
group. This is the main reason for my choice of CDA as a model for the discourse analysis of
the election program of the PVV. With this analysis I will show that there is a stigmatizing
discourse in the program. Consequently I will argue that there is an inequality created
between Muslims and non-Muslims.
1.2
Scott’s Theory on Hidden Transcripts
In chapter 3 I will analyze how stigmatization in the discourse presented by the PVV is
perceived by my participants. I will do this using the analytic frame of Scott’s theory on
hidden transcripts. This is a theory from the field of subaltern studies. I will first give some
background information on this field and then describe Scott’s theory.
Subaltern studies came up in India in the 1980’s as a reaction to post-colonialism and
nationalism. Subaltern studies critiques the elite perspective that history takes according to
them. Subaltern studies wants to give voice to the subaltern and write history from below.
One of the main underlying assumptions of this field is that the subaltern have agency and
therefore do not passively accept their circumstances. Although subaltern groups are at
times limited by the structures in society, they are not the puppets on a string that we find in
Marxism (Ludde, 2001:4-5).
According to Scott (1990:108-109) groups that are dominated in society do not experience
their position passively. Scott rejects the idea of cultural hegemony, a concept roughly
defined by Gramsci (1971; as cited by Lears:1985:168) as "the 'spontaneous' consent given by
the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the
dominant fundamental group.” This means that the values of the dominant group become
generally accepted and therefore people become unaware that they are dominated. Scott
(1990:108-109) instead argues that common sense tells us that there must be a great
psychological cost to being insulted on a regular basis. Although there often seems to be a
lack of a general response from groups that are dominated, Scott does not conclude that this
means that people comply with their position or that they are unaware of it. Scott (ibid:1)
compares the interaction between dominant and dominated group with performing a play
that does not necessarily coincide with one’s private opinion. It makes sense that dominated
people are not completely honest about being dominated in the face of the powerful.
The public interactions between groups are called the public transcripts. The public
transcripts will usually complement the hegemonic view that the dominated group does not
know that they are dominated. However, it is in the public domain that the power of the
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dominant group is most effective. If we only study the public transcript we are likely to
conclude that the dominated group has, accepted or is unaware, of its position (ibid:4). Scott
(ibid:13) concludes that both the social sciences and conflict studies mainly focus on studying
public transcripts, especially when the public transcript has become institutionalized.
However, the public transcript is not the entire story. The oppressed situation of the group
denies them a negative reciprocity, the ability to trade an insult for an insult (ibid:23). In the
more private spheres where the dominant group is not present, dominated groups are free to
express their real opinions. This is what Scott call the hidden transcript.
The hidden transcript is the discourse that the dominated group holds when they are out of
sight of the dominant group (ibid:4). The hidden transcript is specific to a social site, since it
can be expressed in public when not confronted with the powerful, but must stay hidden
when the dominant group is present. The hidden transcript is broader than speech alone.
The content of both the public and the hidden transcript is a constant struggle between the
powerful and the dominated (ibid:14). Scott (ibid:9) argues that when we want to study the
effect of power relations, studying the hidden transcript is essential.
I use the analytic frame of Scott because I study the effect of perceived stigmatization from
the perspective of the stigmatized, in this case Muslims in the Netherlands. Therefore my
data consists of interviews with young Muslims involved in civil society, in which I asked
them about their involvement in civil society. This frame is also on line with my own
ontological and epistemological standpoints.
1.3
Social Identity Theory
In the last chapter I will analyze what belief structures my participants have and what tactics
they use to deal with the lower status of the group. Belief structures are a concept from Social
Identity Theory of Tajfel. I will first give some background information on Social Identity
Theory. The theory is based on different ontological and epistemological standpoints than
the other analytic frames. However, as I will explain, since I will only use the concept of
social belief structures it is possible to use this analytic frame too.
In the Social Identity Theory by Tajfel (as explained by Spears, 2011:203), the group identity
is seen as a distinct form of identity, next to, for example, the individual identity or moral
identity. Identity is the explicit or implicit answer to the question who are you? This question
has two components. First it can be singular or plural, so either an individual identity or a
group identity. Second it can be about who you think you are, but also about how others see
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you (Vignoles, Schwartz and Luyckx, 2011:2). One’s identity thus gives an answer to who
you are and how you are seen by others.
The social identity is used to explain and understand intergroup behavior, such as, for
example, discrimination. Sherif (1966; as cited by Tajfel, 1982:1-2) defines intergroup
behavior as a situation in which individuals belonging to one group interact collectively or
individually with another group or its members in terms of their group identification. The
social identity is one identity among many, and according to Tajfel, not necessarily more
important that other identities. In the intergroup context a social identity can however,
become more important or the most important source of identification. According to the
social identity perspective both personal identity as well as the social identity are viewed as
shaped by the social context (Vignoles, Schwartz and Luyckx, 2011:8-9). Therefore identity
categorizations can have particular meanings in a specific time and context, which can be
debated and changed (ibid:4). So for example being a Muslim means something different
today in the Netherlands, than it did two hundred years ago in Morocco.
Social Identity Theory came into being in the 1970’s, as an answer to the perceived inability
of the individualistic approaches to explain these social phenomena. The founding father of
the theory is Henri Tajfel, a Polish Jew who survived the second world war. Through the
theory Tajfel tried to explain how groups are formed and can turn against each other in the
name of identity (Spear: 2011:202). Social Identity Theory explains inter-group behavior on
the basis of fundamental human needs. These are the universal needs to categorize, to belong
and the need for a secure sense of self (Demmers, 2012 Chapter 2:1-2). To simplify the
complicated world human beings categorize, not only object but also people. The creation of
categories of fruits like apples and pears is superimposed by humans, since the fruits don’t
have a say in their categorization. With human beings however, we are not only categorized
by others, but we can also identify with the group we are categorized with (Brewer, 2001:20).
Therefore our social identity consists not only of ascription but also of identification. Our
identification with a group connects us to the group and helps us tell ourselves and others
who we are, and who we are not, in both cognitive and emotional sense (Spears, 2011:203).
The core of Social Identity Theory is that individuals try to reduce uncertainty and achieve a
secure and positive sense of self by joining a group (Demmers, Chapter 2:3). When you
identify yourself with the group that you are seen as a part of, then you can become attached
to the group. The attachment to a group helps fulfill the need to belong (Brewer, 2001:20).
In social identity theory a distinction is made between one’s own group, often called the ingroup, which serves as a source of meaning and value, and other groups, often called the
19
out-group, that can be used as a source of comparison (Spears, 2011:202). Group members
can use their group as a source of positive self-evaluation as long as the group can be
evaluated positively compared to other groups. Through social comparison we can assess
the true meaning or value of one’s own group (ibid:203).
In Social Identity Theory the underlying ontological standpoint is that universal drives are
seen as the main source of human action. Since the human drives in social identity theory are
naturally inherent to human beings, specific human behavior is seen as universal and not
context specific. In other words, we all want to belong to a group and we all want this group
to be evaluated positively (Demmers, 2012 chapter 2: 13). Epistemologically, Social Identity
Theory tries to explain human action from without. Social Identity Theory is based on
research manly done in laboratories, like experiments (ibid:12). Because human action is seen
as mainly caused by universal human needs, actions are seen as predictable. This means that
if we put any random group of people in the same situation they are expected to behave in
the same way.
Although Social Identity Theory can be useful in explaining certain group behavior, it does
leave us with some questions. The theory gives an answer to the question why groups are
formed, but does not give any insight into where these groups come from. So in the case of
the Netherlands, the theory helps explain why there are groups like Muslims and nonMuslims, but not where these groups come from. This is because in Social Identity Theory
the social and historical context is left out of the explanation of intergroup behavior.
According to Huddy (2001:129) this is one of the main shortcomings of the theory. The real
world is far more complicated than the laboratory settings on which the theory is based. Also
the theory does not give an answer to the question why the membership of one group can
become more important to an individual than the membership to another group. Also it does
not explain why we identify with one group and not with another (ibid:131). Why do we
currently not see ourselves mainly as members of groups based on level of education?
The founding father of the theory, Henry Tajfel accepted the critique and argued that it was
not the task of social psychologist to answer questions about why specific groups are formed
(Demmers, 2012:11). In his last book called Human groups and social categories (1982) a step
towards a more context-dependent approach can be found in the concept of social belief
structures. With the introduction of social belief structures, Tajfel took a step away from the
original ontological standpoints. Apparently it is not only universal needs that drive human
action but also a person’s perception. In the social belief structures, the research field of
Social Identity Theory and Discourse Analysis come together. Because not all people can
20
depend on the status of their group to evaluate themselves positively, there are several
strategies available for members of low status groups to change or deal with the lower status
of the group. The amount of strategies available to group members to overcome the lower
status of their group depends upon the importance of the group identity to them and on the
perception of the boundaries between the groups, the so called social belief structures. In
other words, it depends on the perception of the group which belief structures are available. If
the group identity is not too important for an individual, moving to a ‘higher’ group is an
option. This is an individual strategy based on the social mobility belief structure. This
option also depends on the salience of the boundaries between groups (Spears, 2011;207). A
woman can (generally) not became a man, and a black person cannot become white. The
group as a whole can also try to change the status of a group when he or she has a social
change belief structure. According to Tajfel and Turner (1979, as cited by Spears, 2011:207)
this can only be done when the members of the group perceive the status of the group as
illegitimate and unstable. Several options are available to change the status of the group. One
option is to change the characteristics by which groups are compared (Huddy, 2001:135). A
group that is not the smartest can still see themselves positively as the nicest group. Another
strategy is to creatively change the negative status of the group. One of the most famous
examples of this is the slogan “black is beautiful.”
Although such a slogan does not
necessarily change the status of the group, they can be seen as a form of resistance (Spears,
2011:207). A last option to change the status of a lower group is to weaken the higher status
group through the use of violence. A last possible optional tactic to deal with the lower
status of the group is to exit the social setting by, for example, leaving the country (ibid).
In my research I will only look at the concept of belief structures. To my knowledge the
different belief structures and strategies available to lower status groups have not been
studied extensively outside of laboratory settings. Therefore my research will contribute to
the knowledge on belief structures by studying the concept in real life.
1.4 Citizenship as a performance
In chapter 4 I will also look at the different forms of citizenship that my participants have.
Citizenship is a concept that deals with the relationship between the individual and society.
It tries to answer the questions of who belongs to a polity, how the members of a polity are
regarded and how they exercise power (Presten, 1997; as cited by Bora and Hausendorf,
2006:480). In this section, I will first look at the definition of citizenship and I will try to
21
explain why there is more than one definition of citizenship. Then I will look at citizenship as
a performance, a concept that I will use in my research.
When looking for a definition of citizenship it must be concluded that there is not one allencompassing definition of citizenship (Fairclough, Pardoe and Szerszynsky, 2010:412). One
of the reasons for the absence of such a definition is that the notion of what it means to be a
citizen has changed throughout history. Michael Schudson studied how citizenship has
changed over the last centuries in the United States of America. According to Schudson
(2001:429) studying citizenship in different times and places helps us understand that there is
not one type of citizenship. Therefore we have to be very critical with generalizing the
concept of citizenship and instead focus on the concrete experience of a certain time and
place. Especially in today’s more multicultural and multi-religious society there are many
different notions of what it means to be a citizen. According to Zoonen, Vis and Mihelj
(2010:249) this is nowhere more visible than in the current debates around the position of
Muslims in western societies, where there is great disagreement about who can be
considered a citizen of what entity. Also in today’s multimedia world it is also possible for
people who are traditionally not considered a citizen, such as children and asylum seekers
to act as a citizen. Though the new media the actions of children have become more
autonomous (Hartley, 2010:233-234). This is called media citizenship, which is more selforganized and voluntary than more traditional notions of citizenship. The media citizenship
can be more creative and even silly (for example the satire on YouTube) and has become an
important part of the current political landscape (ibid:241).
Another reason for the absence of an all-encompassing definition of citizenship, is that the
concept is used in many different fields. For example the legal field where the focus is on
who lawfully can or cannot be considered a citizen. In social studies on citizenship the
emphasis is on norms, practices, mechanisms and identities (Isin and Turner, 2002: 4). In my
research I will focus on the practice of citizenship. Instead of focusing on citizenship as a
status within the boundaries of a nation state, as done in a legal perspective, I will look at
how young Muslims act as citizens. Zoonen et al. (2010:252) define this as citizenship as a
performance, which is not studied as a legal concept that you either have or do not have, but
as something you can choose to act upon. This is also done by Fairclough, Pardoe and
Szersynsky (2010:412), who do not focus on what citizenship is, but on how citizenship is
performed. The difference between the legal concept of citizenship and citizenship as a
performance is defined by Fouberg (2002:84) as to distinguish between formal citizenship
and substantive citizenship. Formally states determine who the citizens are. However, since
22
we live in a more internationalized world we are often not only citizens of a country, but also
of a region, city, or supranational organization such as the EU. Apart from this formal
citizenship it is up to the people which citizenship they choose to act upon. Asen (2004:205)
also looks at the act of citizenship but instead defines citizenship as a mode of engagement.
A modes inclines agency, therefore he does not only focus on what is done, but also why
something is done. Citizenship can be performed in everyday embedded practices and
routines, as well as occasional acts and interactions (Zoonen, et al.:252). For example, in their
research Zoonen et al. (2010) see the uploading of YouTube clips in reaction to the movie
Fitna (a movie co-produced by Geert Wilders) as a performance of citizenship. The
advantage of studying citizenship as a mode is that the concept of citizenship is loosened
and the focus is on how citizenship is actually acted out (Asen, 2004:205).
In my research I will use the concept of citizenship as a performance in two ways. First to
define my research group, in which I will focus on young Muslims who act as citizens. I
define this using a distinction made by Bekker and Karr (2008:35) of three different forms of
acts of citizenship. First being involved in politics, second social support for peers and third
volunteering for a social organization. My research group consists of people who act
according to this last form, they are active in civil society through a social organization. The
citizenship performances of this group can be seen as controversial. According to Walker (as
cited by Scott, 1990:43) it is unrealistic to expect involvement in civil society from groups
who are marginalized by that same society. She illustrates this with the example of the lack
of willingness of black people to sign petitions against nuclear weapons. Nuclear warfare can
in a way be seen as revenge on a white society that black people have been victimized by.
Along the same lines it can be argued that Muslims would not be interested in contributing
to a society that they are stigmatized by. However, in my research I study young Muslims
who are involved in civil society. This means that there is a contradiction between the stigma
of a Muslim and the performances of these young Muslims. In this thesis I cannot fully
answer the question why people are involved in civil society in a society that they perceive
themselves to be stigmatized by. I do argue that involvement in civil society cannot only be
used as a means to act like a citizen, but also as a means to change the position of one’s
group in society. Therefore involvement in civil society can be seen as more than just
contributing to society, but also as a means of changing society. Moreover, a form of
resistance can be found in the citizenship performances, when using the analytic frame of
Scott’s hidden transcripts.
23
A second way in which I will use the concept of citizenship as a performance is in studying
the effect of perceived stigmatization on forms of citizenship. As described previously, in
today’s society we are citizens of many entities at the same time. How and of what entity we
perceive ourselves to be a citizen of is up to us. Therefore, while all being involved in civil
society my participants can act as citizens of different entities. The work that they do for a
social organization is thus not necessarily an act of Dutch citizenship, but possibly an act of,
for example, European citizenship. I define these different entities as different forms of
citizenship. In Chapter 4 I will study what forms of citizenship are used by my participants.
In the conclusion I will turn to the main question of how perceived stigmatization translates
into citizenship performances. They way that I use citizenship as an analytic frame is in line
with my ontological and epistemological standpoints, since I am studying the perceptions
that my participants have of their own performances from within.
In this chapter I gave an overview of the four main analytic frames in this thesis, Critical
Discourse Analysis, Scott’s theory on hidden transcripts, Social Identity Theory and
citizenship as a performance. I gave some background information on the different theories
and their underlying assumptions. In the following chapters I will go further into how I
specifically use each analytic frame to answer my questions.
24
2 Stigmatization
It’s the Polish. It’s the Greek. It’s the artists. It’s the Muslims. It’s the elite.
It’s Europe. It’s the other (Ramsey Nsar, March 26th NRC.nl).
-------------------In this chapter I will analyze stigmatization in the political discourse of the PVV. To do this I
will do a discourse analysis of the election program of 2010 and I will analyze the metaphors
used by the PVV to support their discourse. My main question is about the perception of
stigmatization. Doing a discourse analysis of the election program instead of just analyzing
how my participants perceive stigmatization is perhaps contradictory in the sense that a
discourse analysis will tell me something about the social world as created by the PVV.
Within the epistemology of discourse analysis is the idea that social research is about
understanding people’s perceptions of the social world (Demmers, Chapter 6 2012:23).
People’s perceptions of the social world affect the way that they act towards others. Since
people’s perceptions about the social world differ, there are multiple realities of which none
is right or wrong. The question is even if and how we could know this. More importantly it
is not about knowing the social world from without, but understanding a person’s
perception of the social world, since that is what drives action (ibid:16-17). Even though I can
analytically check if there is stigmatization in this discourse, for my main question it does
not matter whether there is a stigmatizing discourse, because my research is dealing with
25
how stigmatization is perceived. Analyzing stigmatization in the discourse however, for me
justifies that I interviewed a specific group of people about how they perceive stigmatization.
The discourse allows me to ask my question to young Muslims living in the Netherlands.
Also it says something about my social world and perceptions. Apparently I believe that the
discourse presented by the PVV is significant enough to take as a starting point of my
research and for me the PVV rhetoric is an important building block of this perception. In the
next chapter I will turn to how stigmatization is perceived by my participants.
In this chapter I will make use of Fairlcough’s model of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), as
described in chapter 1. Before I will turn to the discourse analysis I will first give the
definition of stigma that I will use in this thesis. Then I will discuss how I will do the
discourse analysis, while making use of Fairclough’s model. In this model three elements are
distinguished: The social context, text analysis and the use of existing discourses. I will
constitutively turn to these different elements in my analysis. In the last section of this
chapter I will discuss the metaphors that are used by the PVV to strengthen their story.
There are many definitions of stigma. One often cited definition is the one from Goffman
(1963; as cited by Link and Phelan, 2001:364) who defines stigma as “an attribute that is
deeply discrediting and that reduces the bearer from a whole and usual person to a tainted,
discounted one. Along the same line Crocker et al. (1998; ibid: 365) indicate that “stigmatized
individuals possess (or are believed to possess) some attribute or characteristic that conveys
a social identity that is devaluated in a particular social context. According to Link and
Phelan (ibid:367-371) stigma is constituted of four components, the labeling of human
differences (1), dominant cultural beliefs relate labeled persons to undesirable characteristics
(2), labeled persons are placed in distinct categories (3), and the labeled persons experience
status loss or discrimination.
Stigmatization theory in my research creates my research group, Muslims in the
Netherlands. In reality there is no such thing as the Muslims group in the Netherlands. Muslims
are a divers set of individuals who differ extensively on many aspects (Open societ
foundations, 2010:23). Through stigmatization the PVV creates what seem to be a unified
homogenic group. So the category that I’m researching is not a group, but only seen as a
group through the eyes of some. According to Tajfel (1982:2)a group is something both
external and internal and we cannot have a group without the two. So in order for group
behavior to happen a group has to be seen as a group by others. However the people in the
group also have to identify with the group to some extent. It is necessary that they are at
26
least aware that other see them as part of the group and that they have some value
connotations of their group membership. In chapter 3 I will argue that my research group
are not only seen as a group by others, but that they are also aware that they are seen as
members of the group. Also they all have some value connotation of their group
membership. This does not mean however that my research group necessarily agrees that
they are one unified group, or that they like being seen as part of this group. They all do
recognize however that they can be seen as group member.
In Fairclough’s model of CDA, as described by Jorgensen and Philips (ibid:66-71) discourses
contribute to the creation of social identities, social relations and systems of knowledge and
meaning. Consequently it serves three functions, an identity function, a relational function
and an ideational function. In this model language is seen as a communicative event
consisting of text, a discursive practice and a social context. When doing a discourse analysis
all three elements should be covered. A text should be analyzed by studying its formal
features. The discursive practices consist of an analysis of which already existing discourses
are used. And the social context in which the text is used should always be taken into
account. When analyzing the PVV election program of 2010, I will first analyze the larger
historical and social context in which the text is used. Then I will analyze the vocabulary
used in the text and finally, I will analyze which already existing discourses are used.
2.1
Discourse analysis
Context
According to CDA a discourse cannot be understood without taking the context of the
discourse into account (ibid:68). The context of a discourse can help us understand how a
discourse became dominant at a certain time and place. Although discourses tell people
something about who they are and what normal behavior is, people do not just tap into a
discourse. In order for them to tap into a discourse it has to be socially meaningful
(Demmers: 2012:chapter6::10). The text that I will analyze for this discourse analysis is the
election program of the PVV for the general elections of 2010. One of the main topics of the
PVV was challenging Islam and mass immigration (PVV, 2010:13). When looking at the
social and historical context of this discourse it is important to look at three contextual
factors. First, the recent migration history of Muslims in the Netherlands. Second, the rise of
xenophobia in Dutch politics prior to the PVV. And finally it is important to look at how
general elections in the Netherlands take place. Last I will give some possible explanations of
why the PVV could be successful in this specific social context.
27
In the mid-1960’s migrant workers from Spain, Turkey and Morocco started arriving in the
Netherlands. Although the initial idea was that they would only stay for a limited amount of
time, in the 1970’s they were joined by their wives and families under family reunification
legislation. Most families lived in the suburbs of the big cities, were houses were large and
cheap compared to the city center. Increasingly in the 1980’s native Dutch families moved
out of these areas and these neighborhoods became inhabited mainly by the Moroccan
immigrants and to a lesser extent immigrants from Turkey (Open society foundations,
2010:31-32). Over the years the Muslim immigrants were more often viewed negatively in
the public debates. According to van der Valk (2012:19) this was a tendency that happened
in more places in Europe. Muslims can be stigmatized by (mis)using crime rates or by
blaming other problems in society on them. Also Muslims became more visible, because they
are more explicitly addressed as a group by policymakers, the media and scientists. This can
be seen as another contributing factor to the rise of the anti-Islamic view. According to van
der Valk it is also possible that the increasing attention on Muslims in policies, the media and
society over the years is a consequence of the different generations of immigrants in the
West. Assumedly there is a different reaction to first- than to second- and third- generation
immigrants. Whereas with the first generation of immigrants it is accepted that they came to
just work, there is less emphasize on the need to integrate. With future generations however,
the demand to integrate is stronger.
In the 1980’s and 90’s some xenophobic populist parties came into being, but were never able
to raise lasting support. After the turn of the twenty-first century however, several populist
parties came into being that were able to raise a fair amount of support for limited amounts
of time, beginning with Pim Fortuyn’s List (LPF). The LPF can be categorized as a populist
party in a sense that it turned against the political establishment and wanted to give the
power back to the ordinary people. Moreover, it held a xenophobic rhetoric that talked about
the threat of immigrants to society and a threat of cultural backwardness that was linked to
rise in crime rates and discrimination against woman. The party was led by the charismatic
leader Pim Fortuyn, who was murdered days before the general elections of 2002. Without
it’s leader the party quickly fell apart (Van Kessel, 2010:73-74). After Fortuyn, Rita Verdonk,
a former minister for justice form the Liberal Party started her own party, Proud of the
Netherlands (TON) but she did not make it into parliament.
In 2006, the former MP of the liberal party Geert Wilders started his own party, The Freedom
Party (PVV). Like Fortuyn, Wilders criticizes the political establishment, but his tone is
harsher. Moreover, one of his main points is challenging Islam and immigration. In 2006 the
28
party first took place in the general elections, receiving 5,9 percent of the votes (Van Kessel,
2010:75). The political leader of the PVV, Geert Wilders, dominates the party in terms of
selection and training of candidates, planning political strategy and articulating the party’s
program and ideology (Vossen, 2010:179-180). After 2006, in speeches and interviews
Wilders increasingly showed a more radical form of Islamophobia. Wilders turns away from
promoting assimilation from Muslims, to rejecting Muslims and Islam altogether. He
pleaded for the banning of the Koran and the emplacement of a ‘head-rag-tax’ on
headscarves. He also made many infamous remarks about Muslims and the Koran, of which
his remark on banning Muslims who do not adhere to Western culture from Europe is the
most extreme case (ibid:184-185).
During many public speeches and debates in parliament Wilders stigmatized Muslims as
untrustworthy and their culture as threatening to the Dutch identity (Vossen, 2011:185).
Dozens of individuals and organizations complain against Wilders (DE Tijd, June 24th, 2011)
and in 2008 Wilders is charged with (1) insulting Muslims, (2) hate speech against Muslims,
(3) inducement to discrimination against Muslims and (4) hate speech against non-Western
immigrants (Rechtbank van Amsterddam, June 23rd 2011). The charges are based on several
newspaper interviews with the politician, and the short movie Fitna that he co-produced.
Wilders is well known for his anti-Muslim policy’s, but most of his speeches are delivered in
parliament, where politicians are granted immunity. In the final verdict on the 24th of June
2011 the judge states that the movie Fitna contains fragments that suggest that the increasing
amount of Muslims in the Netherlands leads to an increased amount of criminality, therefore
these images might be a form of hate speech towards Muslims (NRC, July 4th, 2011). In
general the judge concluded that Wilder’s statements might be rude or insulting, but not
punishable (De Tijd, June 24th, 2011).
Last, it is important to understand the Dutch election system to understand the context of the
party program of the PVV. In the general election the people vote for parliament, which
consists of 150 seats. This is done by voting on political parties. Since many parties take part
in the election, usually none of the parties reaches a majority. To form a government parties
try to form coalitions to preferably reach a majority. The forming of coalitions is important in
understanding the election process, because it means that none of the parties gets the power
to implement it program fully, and therefore has to compromise with other parties.
There are several possible explanations for why the PVV could be successful in this specific
social context. These explanations can be divided into two categories based on the two
29
ontological standpoints. The first category consists of explanations that take individual
drives as a starting point of their analysis. The second category takes the structures in society
as a starting point for analyzing human action (Demmers, 2012 introduction:16).
When looking at possible explanations that take individual action as a starting point of their
analysis, two explanations stand out. First, elite theories on ethnic conflict. In these theories
new leaders may try to gain support by playing the ethnic card. Instead of dealing with the
real issues at stake, such as an economic crisis, these leaders try to divert the political debate
toward other issues such as culture and identity. By saying that one is talking in the name of
a specific ethnic group, one hopes to raise the support of this group (Demmers, 2012 chapter
1:13). This tactic can also be found in the rhetoric of Wilders who continuously focusses on
the Dutch identity, and claims to be speaking on behave of the Dutch (see text analysis
below).
A second explanation that takes the individual as a starting point in analyzing human action,
is the concept of relative deprivation of Gurr (1970: as cited by Demmers, 2012 chapter 4:12)
who argues that people who anticipate losses are motivated to support movements that
defend their group status. This concept is beautifully demonstrated in the research television
program Zembla of October 23rd 2010, where the research team goes to a village called Spijk,
close to the German border, where over 50 percent of the population voted for the PVV. In
the episode called Henk en Ingrid in Spijk an answer is sought to the question why so many
people in this village voted for a party with an anti-Muslim rhetoric, when there are no
Muslims living in the area. In other words, how can the inhabitants of this village vote
against something that they never come in contact with? In the interviews in the episode it
becomes clear that most of the people who voted for the PVV are struggling to get by and are
disappointed in the help that they expected to get from the government. This so called
relative deprivation, getting less that you expected to get, influences the voting of the
inhabitants. On top of that it is believed that immigrants do get a lot of help from the
government, for example furnishing their apartments. So it is not that these people hate
Muslims and therefore vote for the PVV, it is that the PVV promises to take care of them first.
Another explanation for the success of the PVV is a theory that takes the structures in society
as a starting point of the analysis. Demmers and Mehandale (2010:61) explain the rise of
xenophobia in the Netherlands by combining the need to belong with structural changes in
society. The Dutch traditionally belonged to one of the four groups in society, the Roman
Catholics, the Protestants, the Social democrats and the Liberals. Today these traditional
groups are no longer dominant in society. The change in the Dutch society to a neo liberal
30
economy can lead to a frustration in society, because the need to belong of the population is
no longer answered. These frustrations provide an opportunity for politicians to bring
ethnicity into the picture. Wilders scapegoats Muslims for what is wrong in society and by
that he creates new groups, the Dutch and the Dutch people of foreign descent (ibid:65).
These new groups can fulfill the need to belong for the population.
Although I could never vote for a party that stigmatizes an ethnic or religious group, these
explanations make me understand why these other people did. And on the one hand it is a
consolation, since these people did not necessarily vote out of hate for a part of society. On
the other hand this also showed how easily people can be tricked into voting for a party that
stigmatizes groups of the population based on false information.
31
Text
In my analysis of the election program of the PVV I will make use of the concept of collective
action frames as described by Benford and Snow (2000). Benford and Snow work in the field
of social movement theory, where they focus on frame analysis. Ontologically this field is
based on the same assumptions as discourse analysis. The analysis of human action does not
focus on either individual action or on structures in society, but on a combination of the two.
Frame analysis, like discourse analysis, is mainly concerned with understanding human
action from within. Just as in discourse analysis the underlying assumption is that there is
not one social reality. So conflict is understood as socially and discursively constructed,
where the rhetorical battle over what the conflict is about is just as important as physical
battles (Demmers, 2012 chapter 4: 18). Collective action frames are used by social movements
to signify events and to actively create and maintain meaning for participants, bystanders
and observers (Benford and Snow, 2000:613).
The discourse in the election program can also be seen as a collective action frame, since it
serves as a framework to interpret events. Also it strives to mobilize people to vote for the
PVV. According to Benford and Snow (ibid:615) a collective action frame has three core
framing tasks. First it has to diagnose a situation that needs to be changed. Second, it needs
to create a prognosis on how to change the situation, and last, it needs to motivate people to
act. In this section I will show that these three framing tasks can be found in the election
program of the PVV. I will also briefly discuss the style of the text. In this discourse analysis I
make use of the election program of the PVV. There are many more text that can be used to
analyze the stigmatizing discourse presented by the PVV. Since the goal of my analysis is to
support my perception that there is stigmatization from politics, I choose for this text that is
used to show the political standpoints of the PVV in the elections of 2010.
The first framing task is to diagnose a situation that needs to be changed. The use of
boundary framing can be done to create different groups. When boundaries are framed, not
only different groups are created, but also the boundary between good and evil is drawn
(ibid:616). In the discourse presented in the election program of the PVV two created groups
can be found. Through discourses unified coherent groups can be created, even though
reality is more complicated (Jabri, 1996:134). In the election program one created group is the
Dutch:
Our ancestors turned a swamp delta into something the whole world is jealous of. Behind the dikes,
32
prosperity and tolerance is achieved unlike anywhere else, with freedom for everyone and tolerance
towards everyone who is tolerant to us (PVV, 2010:5).
To strengthen the idea of the existence of one group, images of past glories can be used to
create a sense of togetherness (Jabri, 1996:132). Jabri (ibid:134) calls this a discourse of origins
though which categories of origins are created. The naming of past glories can also be found
in the election program of the PVV:
Here the act of Abjuration was written. In this the States General, the most powerful man of Europe
was stopped. The King of Spain was told that his power was unfunded if not supported by the
civilians. Our people declared themselves independent and stood alone in a battle against Europe for
eighty years (PVV, 2010:5).
The language and some of the words used are extremely old fashioned and at times seem to
refer to the language in the national anthem. For example the king of Spain is referred to as
the king of Hispanien (in italics in election program), which is similar to the referral in the
national anthem.
The other group that is created in the election program is Islam and the Muslims:
Our pride, to which the Dutch gave part of their salary out of conviction for decades, the welfare state,
has become a magnet for luck seekers from Islamic countries. No longer a shield for the weak, but a
take out for uneven amounts of lazy Muslim immigrants. Henk and Ingrid pay for Ali and Fatima
(ibid:6).
The us-and-them rhetoric is spelled out continuously through the program. According to
Jabri (1996:109) in a discourse the other is presented as a unity that is characterized by
stereotyping. According to van Leeuwen (2009:8) it is notable how articles are used to make
a clear distinction between entities or concepts. For example, the Islam and the Dutch.
In the party program there is a distinction made between moderate and extreme Muslims.
However, according to the PVV there is no such thing as a moderate Islam:
Islam strives for world domination. Jihad is a duty for every Muslim. The Koran dictates behavior in
conflict with our constitutional state (PVV, 2010:13).
33
The diagnosis presented in the election program of the PVV is Islamization in which the
Muslims are the source of evil and the ordinary Dutch suffer from them.
The second framing task is to create a prognosis on how to solve the problem (Benford and
Snow, 2000:616). In the election program of the PVV the political elites in the Hague,
especially the left wing politicians are blamed for the mass immigration and it’s presumed
consequences:
We cannot and will not accept the multicultural nightmare done to us. The Dutch people did not ask
for mass immigration and should not pay the price for it. It’s not Henk and Ingrid’s fault. It’s the fault
of the left wing elites who think the world looks like Woodstock (PVV, 2010:7).
Again: a population lead by the wrong leaders has to say goodbye to the ruling ideology.[…] This is
what we are doing. We determine ourselves independent of the elites and their ‘ideals’ (ibid:6).
Therefore the solution is to vote for the PVV:
The choice presented to us on the 9th of June is a simple one: more multicultural precipice or recovery
of our traditional norms and values. Choose for safety or choose for more criminality. Choose for Islam
or for the Netherlands (ibid:7).
It must be noted that a prognoses on the solution of the problem does not necessarily come
from one diagnoses. It is possible that people agree on a diagnosis, but see different solutions
to the perceived problem (Benford and Snow, 2000:616). Taking into account that this is a
party program to raise votes, it makes sense that other parties would be blamed. In the
rhetoric in the election program a discourse of exclusion as described by Jabri (1996:130) can
be found. The two created groups, the Dutch and the Muslims are turned against each other
and it has to be one or the other. This division can be seen in the last quote from the party
program in which you have to choose either for Islam or for the Netherlands.
With this, the third function of framing can be found, a motivation for action (Benford and
Snow, 2000:617). With the motivation task, it is essential that people who can possibly be
mobilized feel that they have agency to change the situation. Often language is used that has
a sense of urgency, severity, efficacy and propriety. A sense of urgency is created, most
explicitly in the following statements:
34
Our democracy is in the biggest crisis since Thorbecke (PVV, 2010:5).
Who thinks Islamisation is a one-issue is unable to count. Mass-immigration has enormous
consequences for all facets of society. Economically it’s a disaster, it spoils the quality of our education,
increases unsafety in the streets, leads to exodus of our cities, dispels Jew’s and gay people and flushes
decades of female emancipation through the toilet (ibid:6).
So far I have analyzed the three framing tasks of Benford and Snow in the elction program of
the PVV. I will now briefly discuss the language style of the program, making use of a
language analysis done by van Leeuwen (2009) on the language style of Geert Wilders
during speeches. Just as in his speeches, Wilders uses a simplistic and militaristic style.
According to van Leeuwen the language is simplistic because Wilders uses main sentences
and the structure of his text are very systematic. The language is also concrete and a lot of
examples are used. This style can also be found in the election program which consists
mainly of main sentences and short paragraphs, succeeded by short statements. Problems are
made concrete and a lot of examples are used:
Let’s highlight one sector: even health care is Islamatizing quick. Muslim woman who refuse
treatment by male doctors, Muslim’s who do not want to be washed by male nurses, Islamic elderly
who demand Halal food from the cooks in their retirement home, home care workers who need to bring
translators because their patients only speak Turkish or Arabic (PVV, 2010:6-7).
Also the content of the election program is presented in a very militaritic way, where the two
groups are set against each other. The PVV talks about a battle and about a fiscal thread and
an explosion of mass immigration. The present situation is characterized as losing the
Netherlands:
Neighborhood after neighborhood, street after street, school after school is Islamatized (ibid:5).
According to van Leeuwarden (2009:8), this also contributes to the simplistic style since a
clear distinction can be made between good and evil. In the last section of this chapter I will
further examine the militaristic language, when I discuss the use of metaphors in the PVV
rhetoric.
35
Existing discourses
In the party program the PVV refers to several already existing discourses. In the model of
Critical Discourse Analysis as presented by Jorgensen and Philips (2002:69) it is important to
look at how texts are built on existing discourses that can influence on how the texts are
perceived. When looking at stigmatization of Muslims there are four important discourses
that are referred to: first, the Henk and Ingrid discourse, second, the discourses on the
Murders of van Gogh and Fortuyn, third, the discourse on Muslims terrorism after 9/11, and
finally, the discourse on Eurabië. I will shorty summarize these different discourses.
In the party program two names are often referred to, Henk and Ingrid. These names are
used as a metaphor for ordinary citizens as opposed to the elites or other non-ordinary
citizens such as immigrants (Hirsh Ballin, 2011:19). This metaphor is not only used in the
election program, but is part of the standard vocabulary used by Wilders. Moreover, other
politicians stated to use the term as well, either to attack the PVV or to explain their own
viewpoints.
Two other names that come up are Pim Fortuyn and Theo van Gogh. The first being the
leader of a former populist party who was murdered. And the second is a documentary
maker who was murdered in 2004:
The faith of Pim Fortuyn and Theo van Gogh is a warning and a memory (PVV, 2010:6).
Both were openly critical about the Islam, and their deaths are often framed as an attack on
the Western idea of freedom of speech (Demmers and Mehandale, 2010). The use of actual
deaths contribute to what Benford and Snow (2000:196) call the resonance of a frame. The
fact that the frame is built on empirical facts contributes to its credibility. No one can deny
that these men had an openly anti-Islamic view. And no one can deny that they are dead.
According to Benford and Snow it does not matter whether the fit between the frame and the
events in the real world actually match, but if they can be perceived to be linked. This
discourse thus strengthens the idea that there is a situation where it is us against them. Also
it justifies the insulting language that is used, since both people were killed for being
insulting and their murder was generally perceived as unjust.
Another well-known discourse that the party program built upon is the terrorist attack on
9/11. The PVV uses these attacks as an example of the hate of Muslims against the West:
36
Among Muslims there is great support for the introduction of the Sharia, the Jihadish attacks on 9/11
and the revolt against Jews and the West (PVV, 2010:13).
Van der Valk (2012:12) concludes that the negative image of Muslims in the Netherlands was
created most specifically after 9/11 and the murder of Theo van Gogh in 2004. Since then the
image became more prominent and negative. These horrible events are used as proof for the
hate of Muslims against the West and help create a sense of urgency. The growth of Muslim
extremism and terrorism in the new millennium, as well as the war on terror, have served as
a trigger in the growing anti-Islam tendency (ibid:19).
The last discourse that is used in the party program is the discourse on Eurabië. The term
refers to the unification of Europe and Arabia, as it is believed that the Islam wants to
dominate Europe. In this discourse, the idea is that in the oil crisis in the 1970’s European
leaders secretly sold Europe to the Arab world under the name of an Euro-Arab dialog. The
Arab world is supposed to perceive Europe as a doomed and decadent continent. Muslim
immigrants are allowed into Europe by the same leaders that sold the continent, with the
aim of destroying western culture and civilization and replacing democratically elected
governments with autocratic ones. Institutes in the West are perceived to be undermined by
the Islamic world (ibid:45-46). In the election program of the PVV this discourse is referred to
as a warning:
Thanks to the club in Brussels Europe is becoming Eurabië quickly (PVV, 2010:13).
In this first section I did a discourse analysis of the election program of the PVV. I looked at
the social and historical context in which this discourse in created. Also, I analyzed the party
program of the PVV to support my statement that there is stigmatization from politics.
Finally, I briefly looked at other discourses that are used by the PVV to support their own
discourse. In this last section of this chapter I will briefly discuss the use of metaphors in the
rhetoric used by Wilders, using the analysis of Steuter and Wills (2010) on post 9/11 media
representations.
Metaphors
Steuter and Wills work along the same tradition as Benford and Snow (2010) and conclude
that language does not simply describe events but also creates them (Steuter and Wills,
37
2010:153). According to Steuter and Wills (ibid:155) there is often a dehumanizing discourse
present in the media reports on the war on terror. Recurring metaphors of diseases and
animals are often used in American and European media. The dehumanization encourages
an unconscious transformation by which entire populations are stripped of their humanity
(ibid:154). A similar use of metaphors can be found in the rhetoric used by Wilders. In this
section I will discuss the use of metaphors of war and dehumanization that are used to
describe Muslims.
As noted previously, the election program of the PVV is full of militaristic and war
metaphors. This was also found in the media analysis of Steuter and Wills. The authors
conclude that war metaphors help create a clear narrative of aggressors and victims, this can
be used to cover up the reality where the threat and enemy is less clear (ibid:153). The war
metaphors in the election program of the PVV help create a clear enemy: Islam.
Metaphors of diseases or animals can be used to dehumanize the enemy. In the rhetoric of
Wilders, the use of disease metaphors is most clearly present when he describes the spread
of Islam. Wilders calls the Islam a sick ideology that will sicken the country. He talks about
Islamization and warns that in twenty years they will be everywhere (De Pers, November
27th 2007). Steuter and Wills (2010:162) argue that when an enemy is described as a disease
extermination is a logical human response. So the enemy is stripped of its humanity. Also at
times, Wilders uses animal metaphors with the most well know example of the head-rag-tax.
In Dutch there is a distinction between the word for the head of a person (called hoofd) and
the head of an animal (called kop). Wilders uses the last to describe headscarves.
In this chapter I analyzed stigmatization in the political discourse of the PVV.I did a
discourse analysis of the election program of 2010. I first described the social context in
which the text was used and described several explanations for the success of the PVV
during the elections. Then I analyzed the text of the program, making use of framing tasks
proposed by Benford and Snow. I also analyzed the existing discourses that were used in the
election program. Last, I briefly discussed the use of metaphors in the rhetoric used by
Wilders. In the next chapter I will discuss how stigmatization is perceived by my
participants.
38
39
3 Involvement in civil society
He who reaps hate, will also harvest it. This same thing holds for love (Derek
Otten, February 16th 2011, derekotten.nl).
---------------------In chapter 2 I looked at the discourse presented by the PVV, using the model of Critical
Discourse Analysis of Fairlcough. I showed that through boundary framing the discourse
creates two groups, the Muslims and non-Muslims, of which the Muslims are seen as part of
a situation that needs to be changed. The discourse of the PVV is a macro level discourse at
the political level. The use of CDA is in line with the macro level analysis of the PVV
rhetoric. In this chapter I will study how this discourse is perceived on the micro level,
namely by my participants. Where I used an analytic lens in chapter 2 for macro level
analysis, I will use a micro level analytic frame to analyze the perception on a personal level.
In this chapter I will make use of the analytic frame of Scott theory on hidden transcripts to
analyze how the political discourse as presented by the PVV is perceived by my participants.
In chapter 1 I discussed this theory and some of the underlying assumptions. I choose the
analytic frame of Scott to analyze my data, because it allows me to look further than the
obvious conclusions on how stigmatization is perceived by the stigmatized. I started of my
research wondering why there is no protest from the Muslims community against the
powerful position of the PVV. Some of the obvious conclusions would be that they either
don’t perceive stigmatization, or that it is not so bad as to protest against, or that they
comply with it. With the theory of Scott I will change my analytic lens from looking to
obvious signs of protest to more hidden forms of protest. I will use this analytic frame to
analyze how stigmatization is perceived by my participants and how it’s affected the way
that they are active in civil society. I will first draw a general conclusion based on the
assumption that there is a form of resistance in the involvement in civil society. In the last
section I will distinguish four different tactics on how this is done.
3.1 Perceived of stigmatization
In this section I will look at how stigmatization is perceived by young Muslims active in civil
society. Just as Wilders perceives that Islam is a threat to society, so can young Muslims
perceive that they are being stigmatized based on this perception. This does not entail that
any of these perceptions are right or wrong, or that because they are perceptions they are not
40
real. In fact they are very real since people act in the social world based on these perceptions.
But because they are perceptions, several different perceptions can be found in different
people at the same time, all affecting their performances. So different people can interact
with each other, on different perceptions, in the social world.
When I talked with my participants about stigmatization of Muslims in the Netherlands,
their stories differed in the amount of stigmatization they perceived and if they felt attacked
personally or not. On one end of the spectrum we have the story of Erol who continuously
emphasized that he did not feel attacked by Wilders:
I have never been insulted by what Wilders or someone like him said. I never felt anything because of
it. Actually. Not ever.1
Although he did not deny that there is stigmatization in politics, he emphasized that he was
not attacked by it and more importantly that he is not a victim but someone with ample
opportunities in life. On the other end of spectrum people there are people who do feel
stigmatized like Parveen:
And Islam is, because of our big pink elephant Wilders, uhm yes, is put in such a negative light. I
cannot even become angry, I really have to laugh about the thing he says. Just because it is so bizarre
and ridiculous, but it still hurts a lot if you see that, that because you have a certain religion you are
judged. I have been really scared also, for a while, will we become the new Jews?2
What I did notice was that, especially people who did say that they were not affected by it,
made the stigmatization smaller by either saying that it wasn’t that bad, or that it was funny.
In this there are several coping mechanisms as presented by Scott that can be found. None of
them, however, said that there is no stigmatization. Since all of my participants are highly
educated, actively involved citizens who speak Dutch perfectly, they do not fit the stigma of
lazy and bad Muslims. They also recognize that they do not fit the stereotype and that if
people know them they would notice this. They do also know that if people do not know
them well, they might think that they do fit the stereotype and that they therefore can be
judged by the stereotype. An example of this can be seen in the story of Emir:
1
2
Authors interview on April 7th 2012
Authors interview on May 4th 2012
41
Yes, the other day for example, at soccer, I asked for, we were in a sports hall right, I asked someone do
you have a ball pump so I can inflate my ball. And then he said, uhm yes there is one in the back. So I
went to the back and someone else came and said: “He what are you doing, what are you doing here?”
You know, as if I was stealing or something like that. And then I though, come on man, you really
think a five euro pump is interesting? You know. But he, to say that that marks me. It does not affect
me. It’s about deeper stuff.3
A lot of my participants also felt joy in proving the stigma wrong. Like Parveen who spoke
perfect Dutch and wanted to make sure that people noticed this, and know that she is a
foreigner and a Muslim:
Yes, yes, I really want to show that there are successful foreigners too, uhm, that is something
separate, well it has to do with religion, but it does not come from religion. It’s more of a cultural
aspect, to want to show that. I also found it really good that that my Dutch is better than a lot of
people around me, being a foreigner. So I also make sure that they know that. Yes. Because I know then
that, yes, there are so many negative points that are being emphasized. Look at the positive points for a
change. And I am being good. And I hope to get that to, that confirmation.4
Again, the stigma is not denied even though in her case she clearly did not fit the stigma. In
this quote it can also be seen that even though she did not fit the stigma, she felt the need to
actively prove that she did not. Apparently, even by not being affected in a negative and
direct way, the way she acted was still affected by it in a more positive way.
The most notable way in which I noticed that the perceived stigmatization was with
participants who did not look like the stereotypical Muslim. When you do look as is
expected by others, as a Muslim, you have a choice to express your religious identity or not.
The people I spoke with who did not obviously come across as Muslims explained to me that
they did not always chose to express their religious identity, because they did not always feel
like dealing with the expected responses. This shows that there is the perception that you can
be stigmatized by people if they know you are a Muslim. Mehadi explains this:
I did not feel talked about, but I did feel uncomfortable in expressing that this is my religion. Because,
my experiences have also been that people, because you don’t like, when you have normal, with people
I have a normal interaction. And when you say that, well yes I’m a Muslim, it happened that
something changed. At that makes it of course, I was, how old was I? In my teenage years off course.
3
4
Authors interview on April 5th 2012
Authors interview on May 4th 2012
42
And then this is of course very sensitive. And you think I also want to go and suff like that. And that
also affects us. And of course it is also that, I haven’t always found it easy to show it. And that is a
shame when you look back.5
Although the stories of my participants on stigmatization differ on some points there are a
couple general patterns. First everyone notices that there is a stigmatizing discourse present
in politics, although the power of this discourse is perceived differently by different people.
Second, my participants did not fit the stereotype of bad, lazy Muslim and they all knew
that. Still they all knew that there are situations in which they can be judged based on the
stereotype even though they do not fit the stereotype. They perceive that they can be judged
based upon just the stigma and not their actual performances. All of my participants
emphasized that they did not go through life being constantly aware of their religious
identity or other’s perceptions of this identity. This makes me conclude that at times the
young Muslims that I talked to felt that there are two groups created, the Muslims and the
non-Muslims, of which the Muslims are seen in a bad light. And only because they might
look Muslim, or be a Muslim they felt that they could be viewed negatively as well.
However, all my participants seemed to understand that the success of the PVV was not
necessarily based on en masse Muslim hate, but that people could also vote for the PVV for
other reasons like disappointment in the government. This is in accordance with the possible
explanations for the success of the PVV that I discussed in chapter 2. What surprised me in
my interviews is that I was not the only one who was aware of the tactics used by the PVV to
gain support from people who did not necessarily hate Muslims. In most of my interviews
with young Muslims my participants talked about the smart tactics and actually praised
Wilders for his intelligence:
Eman: No these are smart tactics, everyone talks about it. I think he handles it in an intelligent way.6
Farid: a lot of it is driven by economy?
Interviewer: yes so looking for some kind of scapegoat?
Farid: that’s it exactly.7
5
Authors interview on May 15th 2012
Authors interview on May 11th 2012
7
Authors interview on May 1st 2012
6
43
Mohammed: yes, it’s rotten to say, but I’m not affected anymore by what he says. Yes, I cannot take it
serious anymore. With Fortuyn I could still get angry, but with Wilders, at the beginning it often
surprised me, and then I stopped that. You notice it with everything he says that he goes over the top,
because that is what he wants. He is not looking for debate, he is looking for a reaction. And that
reaction means that more and more stupid things are being said. And instead of a sound bit of two
seconds, he then gets a sound bit of thirty seconds. I mean you don’t have to be an Einstein to
understand that. He just says head-rag-tax, not because he seriously thinks that he can get that
through parliament, but he knew that by making that one statement, it would be repeated fifty times in
a fifteen minutes bracket. And with that the news for the coming week is dominated by the word headrag-tax as described by Wilders.8
Some people take this as a relief that things aren’t that bad as they seem. If people do not
vote out of hate, but because they misunderstand the cause of their disappointment then at
least they are not hateful people:
Raja: I tell you honestly I get annoyed with certain statements, and what I’m going to say sounds very
arrogant, but this is anonymous anyway haha, but uhm I think the majority of the people are just very
stupid. They believe things way to easily. And they do not have the ability to think critically. One
person says it is the foreigners who are stealing the jobs, and as a group of sheep everyone follows […]
I do not feel attacked, cause you can have that, you cannot blame people for things they do not know.
So talking in PVV terms, I can fight Henk and Ingrid, but they do not know any better.9
The fact that many people that I interviewed understood that a great part of the PVV’s
support was probably not based on hate towards them partly disappointed me. If they did
not feel attacked by the PVV, because they understood that there wasn’t as much hate as
Wilders makes it seem, then why should I be worried about it? However, just because there
is an understanding of why people vote for the PVV, this does not mean that there is also
acceptance towards the PVV for using these tactics. However, an open protest towards the
use of these tactics is not perceived as an option. One of my respondents clearly explained
this to me when I asked him why there why there was no mass protest from the Muslim
community, after he explained to me that it can be awful to have someone talk about
something you believe in such a denigrating way:
8
9
Authors interview on May 26th 2012
Authors interview on May 25th 2012
44
Interviewer: Why is there no mass protest from the Muslims?
Mohammed: Because the Muslims understand one thing, the day that they do that is the day that
people think Wilders is right. Then it is an Islamic problem. Something that can manifest themselves
in big numbers, that you did not see coming. There’s literally been talk about whether we should do
something within the Muslim community. And the majority decided to do nothing, because when we
are standing there tomorrow then it is true what he says, we are a club that can internally organize
big things. So today that’s a protest and tomorrow it is a revolution.10
Looking at it from this perspective, the worst thing to do for Muslims would be to protest
against the PVV, since it can be turned into an advantage by the PVV. And since most of my
respondents clearly understood the tactics used by the PVV and even praised Wilders’s
intelligence, it makes sense that they can perceive that this mass protest will be used against
them. This line of reasoning is in accordance with Scott’s assumption that dominated groups
cannot openly fight back because they don’t have the power. Therefore it may seem that they
are unaware of, or comply with their position. In this case, young Muslims might have the
power to protest, but this will probably become counter-productive. This did not mean that
no one wants to stand up to the PVV and attack it for its tactics and statements, it is just not
the perceived that the Muslims community (if there is even such a thing) should be the one
to do this:
Mohammed: The protest against stigmatization of a group should not come from this group, but from
the masses saying we protect you.
In his perspective it should not be the Muslims who protest against stigmatization, but the
people who aren’t stigmatized.
Mohammed: We have a society, a community where it seems that the Moroccans are doing something
in their perspective, but nothing is done for them. They have been to the judge, the judge told them to
go home. In politics there are of course people who stand up to Wilders, but in reality Wilders can
actually say what he wants. Moroccans are asking themselves, where are the mass protest? How can it
be that in a country like the Netherlands, a country like the Netherlands that remembers every year on
the 4th of May that a group of Dutch people where destroyed systematically. Every year “Never
again”. How can it be that this Dutch population does not understand what is going on? That must
feel very wrong.
10
Authors interview on May 26th 2012
45
Apparently my perception that it should be the Muslims who protest against being
stigmatized is not shared by my participants. And as described above, it is understandable
that there are no mass protest from the Muslims community. This however does not mean
that there is no reaction from Muslims to the PVV, it just means that I had to adept my lens
in order to see it. My conclusion is that in their involvement in civil society a reaction to the
stigmatization can be found. In order to understand this reaction we first have to go back to
the discourse presented by the PVV. In the election program of the PVV, as discussed in
chapter two, a dark picture of the future is painted and although there are some indications
given to show that this future will happen, the worst is yet to come:
Islam strives for world domination. Jihad is a duty for every Muslim. The Koran dictates behavior in
conflict with our constitutional state (PVV:2010: 13).
Also the PVV gives a solution for the perceived problem. According to them the people in
the Netherlands have a choice:
Are we powerless? Do we need to stand by and watch how everything that is important to us is
destroyed by uncontrolled elites? Of course not. The Netherlands has to choose for solutions. If we
want to we can do anything (PVV:2010:6-7).
On the one hand this view of the future can make some people vote for the PVV, believing or
hoping that they will prevent this from happening. However, since an important part of the
PVV’s discourse is based on the future, it is also debatable if this is actually going to happen,
or if it is just the perception of the party. The future has to show if the PVV was right or
wrong. Logically, for Muslims who want to integrate into Dutch society, a future where the
PVV is right is the worst case scenario.
Mohammed: my idea of Wilders is that what he eventually wants is that someone will try to do
something to him. Because the day that that happens, and off course it won’t succeed because he is
surrounded by security, it won’t work. He is playing with something and the risks are acceptable to
him. He hopes that with this bullshit and this crying and screaming, to accomplish that someone will
try to attack him. And favorably that person is a Muslim or a Moroccan. Because than he can finally
say, I told you so, what I warned you for all these years, it is true. They are trying to silence me. That
46
is what they want. And then you get so many votes for him that potentially he will get a majority and
then the situation will defiantly change. And that’s why you cannot say I’ll let this one go.
However, this also means that there is an alternative possible: a future were the PVV is
wrong. What I noticed in my interviews is that all my participants, in one way or another
tried to present the PVV’s view of the future as wrong, not by saying that he was wrong but
by actively challenging one or more of the assumptions underlying Wilder’s future image:
Mohammed: yes, but there it comes, then it might be our job, the possibly higher educated, to explain
to people that this is Wilders’s tactic, that he is provoking. The best way to deal with this is to not
respond. I always say, one of the best things that ever happened in the Netherlands, in this whole case,
is the reaction from the Islamic and Moroccan community to the movie Fitna. There was a disaster
scenario foreseen and eventually nothing actually happened. And nothing happens because in the run
up there’s been a lot of talking with organizations and individuals, like listen why do you really think
he does this? And then we explained to people that he only does this, as every yes I will call it
provoker, he is provoking a response. And the worst thing that you can give him is a response.
Raja: and yes you know what they say, good news is no news.11
Mohammed: I belief much more that you do not need to respond to these kind of people, but that you
have to do something more productive, or let’s call it preventive in a different way.12
In one way or another my respondents all attack one of the underlying assumptions of the
PVV discourse through their involvement in civil society. In chapter 2 I analyzed the PVV
discourse make use of the analytic frame of Benford and Snow. Through a discourse the PVV
creates a situation that needs to be changed: the Muslims in the Netherlands. This is based on
two underlying assumptions. First, that there is a Muslim and a non-Muslim group in the
Netherlands. And second, that the Muslim group has bad intentions towards Dutch society.
This view is supported with empirical facts like the Murder of Theo van Gogh by a Muslim,
which is used as evidence. There is great diversity in the way that my participants did this
and if they were purposefully doing this, but without exception they all attacked one of the
underlying assumptions of the PVV discourse.
11
12
Authors interview on May 25th 2012
Authors interview on May 26th 2012
47
The way that my participants tried to attack one of the underlying assumptions is quite
diverse. This is in line with the theory of Scott (1990:134) who concludes that the
cohesiveness of the hidden transcript among the dominated group depends on the
homogeneity and cohesion among the group. Since Muslims in the Netherlands are not one
cohesive group there are different ways in which the PVV’s prediction is fought. In the next
section I will distinguish four different ways in which this is done.
3.2
Tactics
From my respondents I found four different tactics used by the young Muslims to try to
create a different future, two on a more personal level and two on a group level. I chose the
word tactics and not groups or people because the different tactics are sometimes combined.
On the personal level I call the first tactic being Dutch. People who use this tactic mainly
identify with the Dutch identity, but in contrast to non-Muslims they also present themselves
is as being good. They contribute to society via a social organization to show that they belong
to this society and are just as good as the non-Muslims. When I asked about their identity,
respondents who used this tactics came up with a list of arguments as to why they were just
as Dutch as I was. And more so why they weren’t a foreigner. The respondents who used
this tactic were involved in civil society, but not necessarily in an organization where other
Muslims were involved, and used their involvement in civil society as proof that they were
good citizens. By presenting themselves as a full member of society they deconstruct the
boundary frame of Muslims and non-Muslims on a personal level.
Ebrahim: a big part of it is accepting yourself. Ok I’m here, I might not have Dutch parents, but I go
to a Dutch school, I have a Dutch passport, I work like a Dutch person, I pay my taxes just like a
Dutch person, I have health insurance just like a Dutch person. Why would I see myself differently?
Why, I used to have a Dutch girlfriend and then I felt even more like I was Dutch. Actually, yes there
is no difference between me and the Dutch person sitting next to me.13
The second tactic I call being a role model. Just as the first tactic, the respondents who used
this tactic see themselves as good and contributing to society. They do not necessarily
identify themselves as being mainly Dutch, but see their multi-cultural background as
something positive. They can be involved in organizations with or without Muslims, but
they do have ties with the Muslim community. As the name already shows they not only see
13
Authors interview on April 4th 2012
48
themselves and their position in society as positive, but also see it as an inspiration for other
Muslims. So on a personal level they turn the negative Muslim identity presented by the
PVV into something positive. And on a group level they inspire others to do the same and to
be involved in civil society.
Eman.: I would find it very important for some people who have a certain image of the Muslim, to
change that image to a certain extend by taking myself as an example. If someone does not fit the
image then how does he deal with that? But also to be the kind of person where other Muslims can
unite behind. That they think there is someone there who tries to vocalize what we all feel. And also for
youngsters, that they know that he, it’s not like it is us against them, because one of us is sitting with
them to talk about it. So I think a role model for my support base, together with the idea, uhm, the idea
of some people in society of Muslims, that would be two main goals when I would get involved in
politics.14
On the group level, the first tactic is changing the relationship between Muslims and nonMuslims. This is done by people who do identify themselves as a Muslim and just like the
role models, see this as positive. The organizations that they work with try to improve the
relationship between the Muslims and the non-Muslims. Sometimes this is done by only
improving the view of “the other” in one of the groups. Other times this is done by bringing
different people together. Although people who use this tactic acknowledge that there are
two different groups, they do try to prevent these two groups from turning against each
other. If these groups will not turn against each other, the future as the PVV predicts it,
cannot happen.
Farid: you can solve problems in many ways and one way is to get to know each other better. And you
do that amongst other things by sharing your story. And I noticed that I have a certain lifestyle as a
Muslim in the Netherlands and I thought it would be great if the people that I know, who are not
represented in newspapers or on television and who are also normal Muslims. So I thought like let’s
show it more from my perspective.15
The last tactic is helping young Muslims integrate in society. As mentioned before, a lot of
my respondents do acknowledge that there might be Muslims who turn themself against
society. Research shows that is done mainly because of stigmatization and not because they
14
15
Authors interview on April 11th 2012
Authors interview on May 1st 2012
49
do not like the Netherlands in general. Still, if this will happen on a large scale, Wilders
prediction of the future will come true. Through the last tactic young Muslims try to prevent
this from happening by helping Muslims to integrate in the Dutch society. This group is
involved in an organization that deals directly with mainly young Muslims that are
perceived to be at risk of turning against society. By lowering the risk that this will actually
happen, people involved in these organization try to prevent Wilder’s future from being
realized. The people who use this tactic thus try to prevent the creation of more empirical
facts, like the murder of van Gogh, that can be used by the PVV to support their discourse.
Ebrahim: And you can imagine a bit that Moroccan guys are nowadays in the news not exactly uh..
when you are labeled. They feel like some kind of second class citizens and that makes them think that
that is true and then the problems start. And our target group is actually mainly guys who felt
wronged by society. Then we see these guys who are like fuck society, what has society ever done for
me? And that guy is actually right only on the other hand we say there is a way that you can achieve.
There is a way towards society.16
In this chapter I looked at how stigmatization in the PVV disocurse is perceived by my
participants. I did this while making use of the analytic frame of Scott (1990) on hidden
transcripts. I concluded that although my participants did not fit the stigma, they did feel
that at times they could be treated based on this stigma. However they also understood that
much of the success of the PVV was probably based on other reasons than Muslim hate. This
does not mean that it is accepted that the PVV uses these tactics. However, just like the
dominated groups as described by Scott, my participants felt that it is not in their best
interest to openly protest against the PVV since this can be counter-productive. In their
involvement in civil society a form of protest can be found. In one way or another all my
participants fight one of the underlying assumptions of the PVV discourse as presented in
chapter two. I concluded this chapter with distinguishing four different tactics that I found to
fight one of the underlying assumptions. In chapter 4 I will elaborate on these four tactics by
trying to link them to the belief structures as described Tajfel (1982).
16
Authors interview on April 4th 2012
50
51
4 Belief structures and forms of citizenship
The sympathetic and intelligent Dchar has the potential to become the face of
the successful young Moroccan Dutch. An application on which member of
parliament Tofik Dibi has applied with changing success up until now (Hans
Berekamp, NRC, October 3rd 2010).
Of course I am happy for him, just for a Dutch person who realized his dream
[ ..] and he is not a trove for the Moroccan Dutch but for the Dutch. Of
someone who has a dream and chases that, and who can achieve anything
(Tofik Dibi, De Wereld Draait Door, October 3rd, 2010)
-----------------In chapter 2 I analyzed stigmatization in the election program of the PVV through the lens of
Critical Discourse Analysis. In chapter 3 I analyzed how stigmatization in the presented
discourse is perceived by my participants, using Scott’s analytic lens of hidden transcripts.
Both analytic lenses are based upon similar ontological and epistemological standpoints, so
the switch from one to the other is made without major complications. In this chapter I will
again switch my analytic lens, this time to the Social Identity Theory (SIT) of Tajfel. As
already explained in chapter 1, Tajfels theory is based on different ontological and
epistemological standpoints than Critical Discourse Analysis and the theory of Scott. These
standpoints are based on specific views on what mainly drives human action and the role of
social research (Demmers, 2012 introduction:16). Since the different standpoints are opposite
views, one person (in this case me) cannot have both at the same time. By using elements of
different theories a decision has to be made on what standpoints are taken as the starting
points of the analysis.
As explained in chapter 1, Tajfels theory is based on the assumption that human action is
mainly driven by universal human needs. Therefore the individual is taken as a starting
point of the analysis. Both other analytic lenses are based on the idea that the combination of
individual drives and structures in society should be taken as a starting point of the analysis.
With the introduction of the social belief structures (the perception that someone has of the
boundary between groups), Tajfel took a step in the same direction, since not only the
universal human needs are seen as important in understanding human action, but also one’s
perception of the structures in society. Since I will use the element of social belief structures
from Tajfel’s theory, I will stick with the ontological standpoints that both structures in
52
society and individual drives should be taken into account when analyzing human action. In
line with Tajfel’s theory, I accept that people have a need to belong and a need for a positive
sense of self. However, I also believe that a person’s understanding of the social world must
be taking into account when analyzing human action.
Epistemologically, SIT is mainly concerned with explaining human action from without. The
other theories are mainly concerned with understanding human action from within. In my
research I am concerned with understanding human action from within. This is also in line
with my methodology of doing in-depth interviews in a non-experimental setting. Therefore
I am using Tajfel’s concept of social belief structures to understand human action from
within instead of explaining it from without. Theories within the field of social identity are
based upon experiments and thus outside of the real world (Demmers, 2012 Chapter 2:4). In
my research I did not make use of experimental settings. I will therefore take the different
belief structures and tactics of Tajfel as a starting point, to see if I find the same belief
structures outside of a laboratory setting. My research will therefore contribute to the
knowledge on social belief structures, since I am studying it in the real world.
In the first part of this chapter I will analyze what belief structures my participants held and
what tactics they used to deal with the negative status of their group. I am testing the
concept of Tajfel in the real world to see what I will, and will not find in real life. Since I
interviewed a limited amount of people that I did not randomly select, I cannot conclude that
the absence of a social belief structure or tactic in my participants means that it does not
exist. Only I did not confirm its existence either. In the second part of this chapter I will look
at the forms of citizenship that my participants act upon. This will contribute to the new idea
of studying citizenship as a performance instead of a status.
4.1
Belief structures
In the previous chapter I looked at how perceived stigmatization affects the way that young
Muslims are involved in civil society. I concluded that in different ways my respondents
tried to prevent the future that the PVV predicts from happening. I found four different
tactics that were used to undermine one of the underlying assumptions of the PVV’s
discourse. In this section I will try to link these different tactics to the social belief structures
of Tajfel (1982). According to Tajfel, a person in a lower status group has several options to
deal with the lower status of the group. The options available depend on how the boundaries
between different groups are perceived. Tajfel distinguished two different belief structures,
53
the social mobility belief structure and the social change belief structure. Within these belief
structures several tactics are possible to compensate the lower status of one’s group. I will
consecutively turn to the different belief structures and tactics.
Social mobility belief structure
People who have a social mobility belief structure perceive that they can cross the
boundaries between groups. If a person belongs to a lower status group and has a social
mobility belief structure, that person can cross over to an higher status group to achieve a
positive sense of self. This is a tactic on a personal level, since it does not change the status of
the original group, but of an individual (Spear, 2011:207). This belief structure is similar to
the first tactic described in the previous chapter, being Dutch. A couple of my respondents
showed this tactic, by presenting themselves as mainly Dutch instead of Muslim or a
foreigner. For example Erol who explains to me that he does not feel extra motivation to help
foreigners, or Turkish people since he mainly identifies himself with being Dutch:
Erol: I feel more Dutch than Turkish. So I do not think I have to especially help Turkish people or uhm
maybe on some points but I wouldn’t be really motivated to do that.
54
Interviewer: And towards Dutch people, that you want to change them or let them come into contact
with someone from Turkey?
Erol: No because I feel like a Dutch person too. So then, now I really think about your question, are
you motivated to help other foreigners or something like that. But I don’t have that. No not at all.17
Social change belief structure
A person with a social change belief structure does not feel that he or she can switch to
another group. To get a positive sense of self the status of the group needs to be changed.
There are several ways to do this. The first is to lower the status of the other group by
weakening that group in a fight (ibid). In my fieldwork I did not find anyone with a hostile
attitude towards the Dutch or other out groups. One possible explanation for this is that they
would not tell me, a Dutch person, that. However, my respondents were people who tried to
contribute to society and volunteered to participate in my research. Therefore it does not
seem likely that they had a hostile attitude towards the Dutch. This does not mean that there
17
Authors interview on April 7th 2012
cannot be other people who use, or want to use, this as a tactic. But in my research
population this seem like a highly unlikely tactic.
A second tactic is to try to directly change the status of one’s group. In my research I did find
people who used this tactic by posting themselves as a role model, this is similar to the
second tactic presented in chapter 3. People who used this tactic perceived the status of their
group, Muslims in the Netherlands, as illegitimate since it is based on part of the group who
are over represented in the media. By positing themselves as a role model, they showed that
the status of the groups is partially wrong. All people who used this tactic, and most of my
other respondents, did acknowledge that there are things that need improvement in the
Muslim community. So the status of the group was not seen as completely false. Only the
negative side was perceived to be over-represented and not enough attention was given to
the positive sides. This is clearly explained by Fatima:
You actually hear a lot of negative things about this neighborhood, but I feel like we can also present
ourselves in a positive light for a change. We can also show that it can go well. And not these few
rotten apples who ruin it for the rest. I mean there are lots of people here who are doing really well.
[..]
At times I think let them talk, you know. It goes in into one ear and out through the other. I know
better. Because I know a lot of Muslims or Moroccans or other foreigners who are doing great. But on
the other side I think, uhm this negative image is there for a reason, it comes from somewhere. How
can I, well not balance that, but uhm how can I make sure that people look further than that that one,
that that one negative side.
[..]
I had that in the, a few years ago I had that, then with the death of Theo van Gogh, I had, then there
was a bit of a lot of unrest, because that happened in this neighborhood too. I organized in the Indische
buurt [name neighborhood], cause I did an internship there, I specifically focused on uhm, with
woman and with a Muslim background I made an effort for this neighborhood. So we organized days
where we planted plants for the neighborhood. And we uhm, we organized coffee mornings for the
neighborhood. We organized big cleaning mornings for the neighborhood. You know stuff like that.
And also something that you did together with other Muslims. To, yes uhm, yes also to show a
positive image, we invited all the neighbors. That we, that negative image with a positive experience
uhm.
[..]
55
It sounds a bit weird to feel responsible. I mean I’m not responsible for the deeds of someone else. But
somehow you feel, yes not obliged but a bit responsible to show a positive image.18
Mohammed also shows this tactic by getting involved in a non-Muslims organization, so his
board members get in contact with a Muslims or Moroccan:
It has nothing to do with being Moroccan [..] but I also do that, because there are people there with
their networks and those are the people who if they hear “fucking Moroccans”, that they will say “hey
you cannot say that, I am in a board with a Moroccan and he is a good guy, so where are you talking
about?” That’s also a way to influence things.19
Another way in which my participants tried to change the status of the group was help other
members of their group integrate into society. This is similar to the last tactic presented in
chapter 3. The perception underneath this tactic is that there are people in one’s group who
might not be integrated well into society, or who are at risk of not being able to integrate in
society. This does not mean that they cannot integrate in society, but the perception is that
they need more help because of their social background. By helping these people to better
integrate, in the long run the status of the group can improve. This can be found in the story
of Ebrahim who explains what the organization he works for does and with whom:
It are mainly youngsters at risk, street-kids mainly from (name Dutch city). And in the neighborhoods
where we work Moroccan youngsters are highly overrepresented. And uhm, what do we do with these
guys, the question should be what don’t we do with these guys. We make sure that these guys uhm,
that the threshold to seek for help is lowered. Uhm, in most Muslim communities it’s believed that as
soon as you start looking for help you cannot take care of yourself and things like that. We make sure
that these guys learn that they can make use of their society too. And that there are organizations and
I have to say that you do need motivation to do that. But eventually we can show them the doors, and
sometimes we can go through a door together, but it is not like we are going to do all the work for you.
You have to commit.20
Also Esra show this tactic when she explains her motivation to be active in civil society:
18
Authors interview on May 16th 2012
Authors interview on May 26th 2012
20
Authors interview on April 4th 2012
19
56
Yes maybe it’s that I want to help people to improve their life so that they can revolve in society. And
that they feel strong.21
Ozger also displays this tactic when she explains the social function of the mosque where she
volunteers. In her story it can be seen that she does not necessarily help people who are not
integrated in society, but people who might need some extra help in improving their
involvement in society:
Our parents came and they build a mosque together and that was only a room for prayer. And this
generation gives more meaning to that, to the mosque. It’s not only a room for prayer for us, but also
how can I survive? It sounds weird, but how can I live a good life and how can we help each other.
[..]
Most of the time when you look at the youngsters in the media, who do wrong, most of the time these
are youngsters who have questions, who have no answers, but who also do not work on that too. They
are in a void. But if you fill that void, than you are taking care of someone too.22
With this tactic it is also possible that people might need more help because they do not feel
accepted by society and therefore do not make an effort to integrate. This is explained by
Hafsa a school teacher at a so called black school (a school where over 50% of the students
have a foreign background), who explains how her students perceive their position in
society:
The kids have this image, or maybe they learn that at home or they hear a debate at Paul en Wittenman
[Dutch television news program] and then take a stance. Then they feel like “I knew it, they are all
assholes, they are all..” like that. Or “well they won’t like me anyway, I am only from Turkey, and I
only do VMBO [lower level in high school], this is a black school by the way, right?” And they build a
kind of bridge thinking I am not worth participating anyway.23
On a more personal level Raja explains how her perception of how people see her position in
society motivates her to help kids in the same position:
21
Authors interview on May 7th 2012
Authors interview on May 6th 2012
23
Authors interview on May 11th 2012
22
57
Something occurred to me, and to my sister too by the way, this is that people ask what do you do?
And when I say I’m still in school they ask what do you do then? And before I answer they say MBO
[intermediate vocational education], HBO [higher vocational education]? And yes we aren’t arrogant,
but no, then I say no, university. And then they say Oh. And we started thinking is that weird? And
these are things that you still run into. And it shouldn’t be like that, because uhm yes your looks do
not say anything about what you can do. And that is something, a thing that happens way too often.
and therefore you have to prove yourself more if you are a foreigner.
[..]
That’s an important reason to do this, and that’s what’s what I like about this association, they are
very involved in making foreigners aware that they are part of Dutch society. Make yourself visible
and stuff like that.24
Another tactic is to change the way that status is determined. For example, a sports team that
is in the bottom of the competition can still get a positive sense of self by declaring that they
are the friendliest or the prettiest team. With this tactic it is therefore possible for many
groups to have a positive sense of self by comparing themselves to other groups on different
point. In my research I did not find anyone making use of this tactic. A last option to change
the status of the group is to creatively change the negative image into a positive one. The
most well-known example of this is the slogan ‘Black is beautiful’. In my research
I did not find people who directly changed the negative status of the group in a creative way.
I did find people who creatively created a new group, namely a group of citizens of the
world. I will further discuss this group in the section about forms of citizenship. The fact that
I did not find anyone who used these last two tactics surprised me, because it seems like a
relatively easy way to deal with the lower status of one’s group. First because it is mainly a
individual mental change of how the group is perceived, so it does not necessarily exert any
costs. And second because it is possible to avoid an open conflict with other groups. As
noted at the beginning of this chapter, the fact that I did not find anyone using this tactic
does not mean that there is no one out there who uses it. It means that I cannot confirm the
existence of these tactics with my research.
24
Authors interview on May 25th 2012
58
Exit
A last possible tactic is to exit the context in which one has a negative status. In my research I
did find some people who thought about using this tactic by leaving the country. However
they did not leave jet, so it is possible that they never will make use of this tactic:
Hamsa: And if this continues then I will leave the Netherlands, then I will go and work somewhere
else. Because I do not want to be discriminated and when I get children then I want my kids to be
treated right. Because here you have the label foreigner and that will always stay with you even when
you’re kids are born in the Netherlands. And these kind of factors play a role in stopping people, if they
want to participate.25
Esra: I’ve had moments, and I am not at all extremely religious, I am religious but more to myself I
won’t try to convert anyone or something like that, but I have had moments that I thought, I leave this
country and uh. The sad thing is that when someone thinks like that and there are so many people
supporting that person [Wilders] while he is doing so many things wrong. Not even about the way he
thinks, but the way he acts, I think that’s a pity. This is not the Netherlands I lived in and where
people respect each other and live together. And then I think if you don’t want me anymore then I will
just leave, haha. And if I even had those thoughts, then there must be people who are more easily
defended who go crazy with every little thing.26
In addition to the tactics as described by Tajfel, I also found an extra tactic. This is the third
tactic presented in the previous chapter. People who use this tactic do not directly change
their group, but try to change the relationship between the groups. People who use this tactic
have a social change belief structure, since they do see themselves as a Muslims and nonDutch. Underlying this tactic is the perception that the negative status of the group is
partially wrong, and if people knew each other better, or interacted more, relations would
improve:
Hamsa: to get people together, to get people involved. And then you see that the differences are very
small. And that unfortunately happens too little in the Netherlands, and that’s why we see things
deteriorate. And that can affect the participation of youngsters.
25
26
Authors interview on May 2nd 2012
Authors interview on May 7th 2012
59
Parveen: because I know where I stand, a sort of grey area. And I also see it as my task to make a
bridge between the two worlds. I like that and see it as a challenge.27
Emir: but not only soccer, now I will round off the soccer story. But also when it comes to general
development. When are on a trip with Rashid, Khalid, Mustafa, Mohamed, yes then you know eachothers stories. But imagine that you also have Mark, Peter and Michael than you can really learn
something from each other.28
Another finding in my research is that the social believe structure that a person has does not
only depend on whether someone perceives that he or she can cross over to another group,
but also whether someone wants to cross over to another group. With some participants I
noticed that they did not feel they would never be accepted as Dutch, but that they just did
not fit in the Dutch group. Parveen explains this when she talks about how she used to try to
be Dutch, but in the end gave up because it did not feel like her true self:
I used to never feel discriminated. Absolutely a part of Dutch society, but because I got to know myself
better, I have yes, I have accepted my roots a bit more and that part of me, I realized I am a Dutch
Iranian and not a Dutch Dutch. And I am not an uhm, yes I am complete Dutch or a completely
Dutch person, but I do have a different background. And therefore I can be seen as weaker by society. I
am not, and it does not feel like I am, but I do realize that other people can see me like that. And on the
other side that also makes that I feel more relaxed, because I know better who I am, but sometimes you
do feel excluded, will it, will it ever happen that someone actually sees you as less. I became aware of
that I am.. am, I have never experienced it. But if I will experience it you are forced to see reality.29
From her story it can be concluded that she did not have one, but both social belief
structures. When she was younger she felt that she could become Dutch. Now she still feels
that she still can become part of the Dutch group, but that this does not feel like her true self,
so she switches to a social mobility belief structure. We do have to keep in mind that the
source of why she did not feel like she could be Dutch is unclear. It is possible that she never
felt truly accepted as a Dutch person and therefore did not feel like she could become Dutch.
It is also possible that she did feel accepted, but that she did not fit into the Dutch group.
27
Authors interview on May 4th 2012
Authors interview on April 5th 2012
29
Authors interview on May 4th 2012
28
60
In the first section of this chapter I looked at what belief structures my participants held and
what tactics they used to deal with the negative status of their group. In the next section I
will look at what forms of citizenship my participants act upon and how these are linked to
the different social belief structures.
4.2
Forms of citizenship
In chapter 1, I introduced the concept of citizenship as a performance. As explained,
citizenship is a very broad concept that is used in many different fields. In my research I am
not interested in someone’s legal citizenship status, but in citizenship performances. I choose
to do research among young Muslims who act as citizens because they are active in civil
society. I see them as citizens because they act as citizens by contributing to society. In the
current society we are not citizens of one entity, but of many. An example of this can be
found in the quotes at the beginning of this chapter. Both quotes are a reaction to the movie
award show, in which Nasardin Dchar received the award for best actor and used his speech
to make a political statement. In the first quote of Berenkamp it can be seen that this speech is
perceived as a political statement from a Moroccan Dutch actor. In the second quote by Tofik
Dibi this is seen as a statement from a Dutch actor. Although they are referring to the same
act, both speakers perceive the status of the actor as different. However, in my research I am
interested in how my respondents perceive their own citizenship performances. Although
my research group consists of active citizens within the territory of the Netherlands, they do
not all act as citizens of the same entity. In this section I will look at the different forms of
citizenship. I define forms of citizenship as citizenship of a certain entity and I will link the
different forms of citizenship to the different believe structures and tactics.
In my research group some people acted as active citizens of the Netherlands. The people
who acted as Dutch citizens all had a social mobility belief structure and used their
involvement in civil society as proof that they were in fact a Dutch citizen. The story of
Ebrahim shows that a form of citizenship is mainly based on perception, since he can be
considered citizen of Iran, or a foreigner as well, but he feels Dutch and therefore contributes
to the Dutch society:
Well first of all I just feel Dutch. If you for example see people and they ask where are you from that I
do say Iran, but I feel like a Dutch person. This is my country, I have to guard the Netherlands, this is
61
now my mother country. I just put myself over it. And if for example in the news people talk about
Muslims and the Islam and so on, that is not the group I consider Muslim.30
That one’s citizenship status is not an easy straightforward thing is shown in the story of
Hafsa who could not explain what she considered herself to be part of.
That we are something, that is already created, it’s already there. Just like the whole foreigner vs. local
story, it’s so unclear. When are you a foreigner, if you act like a foreigner or if it’s in, in your
passport?
[..]
I’m not sure yet. I am a Muslim, wear a headscarf. Uhm and that’s what I actually am, that’s not a
bad label. Just like you are a woman. That’s not a bad thing. But at the same time i do have Dutch
friends, I work with Dutch colleagues. But when I am at home with my parents, or with Moroccan
friends at a party, then I am Moroccan. So I am many things, I do not know. The other day I said I am
a citizen of the world, but I’m not sure yet.31
In her story it is also clear that an individual can switch from one citizenship status to the
other. At times she feels Dutch, which is linked to the perception of acting as a Dutch person
(I have Dutch colleagues and friends), and at other times she feels Moroccan. Especially among
Moroccans it was also common that people referred to themselves as Moroccan-Dutch and to
the Moroccan-Dutch community. People who saw themselves as Moroccan-Dutch citizens
did not feel part of Morocco anymore, but also not completely part of the Netherlands. The
boundaries between the Dutch and the Moroccans is perceived by them as unable to cross,
because even though they not Moroccan anymore, they are not Dutch. Also people from
other countries at times used the double citizenship status to present themselves. In the story
of Parveen you can see that the double status can be used as a positive thing since the part of
her that cannot make her fully Dutch is compensated by something extra. If she only saw
herself as Dutch then she wouldn’t have a completely positive sense of self since she has
limitations:
Interviewer: But you just said yourself that you are a Iranian Dutch.
30
31
Authors interview on April 4th 2012
Authors interview on May 11th 2012
62
Parveen: yes but this does not make me less Dutch than you. I am still Dutch, but just different. The
word less, that is something inferior. And you have to watch out with that. I get the thought. I am
born in another country. And I am not, I have certain limitations, for example with language, or uh.
Yes but to say that that is less. It is just different. I am just as Dutch, because if I hadn’t told you, you
wouldn’t have thought I was from another country. Maybe from somewhere more exotic, maybe that I
would have a mother from a more exotic place, he. But if I wouldn’t have said anything, you cannot
hear it when I talk.32
In my research I also came across a lot of people from Turkey, who really saw themselves as
Turkish and acting as a citizen of Turkey, even though they were well integrated in Dutch
society:
Ayse: although I grew up in the Netherlands, it’s not in my blood. My grandparents do not come from
the Netherlands.33
Interviewer: so are you Dutch? Or are you..
Ozgur: What a difficult question. Do you want an answer to that or.. I have to be very honest. I was
born in the Netherlands, but I have Turkish blood., I always felt part of the Turkish community, and
therefore I felt, I have to be honest, I feel Turkish.34
I’ve also been told many times about the strong Turkish community in the Netherlands. The
participants who felt Turkish had a social mobility believe structure, since they did not want
to become Dutch.
The people in my research all have a foreign background. Although most of them were born
in the Netherlands, they all had parents from another country. In the current society in the
Netherlands, they have all on occasion been told that they are not Dutch, whether they
themselves feel Dutch or not. Also many of my respondents do feel a strong link with their
foreign cultural background. Therefore some of my respondents feel not completely Dutch or
foreign, but a bit of both. This possibly negative position of being in between two groups is
turned into a positive status by referring to oneself as citizen of the world. This way one is
32
Authors interview on May 4th 2012
Authors interview on April 27th 2012
34
Authors interview on May 6th 2012
33
63
still part of Dutch society, but there is also something else, or somewhere else where that fills
the part of them that is not Dutch. Parveen Clearly explains how she does not feel completely
Dutch and does feel attacked by Wilders, while she does feel that she is part of the
Netherlands even if she does not want to stay here forever:
Parveen: No I have a certain, when Wilders came in power I though like oh my god I’m leaving the
Netherlands. Yes, but you probably have the same problems in another country. On the other hand, I
am a sort of world citizen, and I really like to go everywhere. I really want to go to Asia, but that is
more out of world citizenship then out of fear.
[..]
Interviewer: So you are part of the Netherlands?
Parveen: yes, oh yes if that is your question. When I was on a holiday in Iran I came home to the
Netherlands and when I walked through Schiphol. Yes I was very happy to be at home. I almost
wanted to lie on the floor. I’m back.35
Farid: I have a Pakistani background, but we do not have double nationalities, only the Dutch.
64
Really only Dutch?
Yes, I was born in the Netherlands, and I always lived in the Netherlands. And whether I will go to
Turkey, or Morocco or America, that Dutch stays with you of course [..] I think I have that more
easily, that here I am Dutch. Although I also see myself as a citizen of the world.36
The last (possible) form of citizenship that I came across is a difficult one. Some of my
respondents were active in civil society, and thus acting as citizens, explicitly as a Muslim.
This was especially present in the story of Emir who on occasion referred to himself as
Moroccan Dutch, but also explained that he neither felt really attached to Holland or
Morocco, nor to the Moroccan Dutch community. He was an active citizen and the main
group that he acted for, or as a part of, was the (Moroccan Dutch) Muslim community.
Although according to my definition of forms of citizenship, he most clearly acted as a
Muslim citizen, the fact that this is also a religion made me wonder whether this was in fact a
form of citizenship. Traditionally we are citizens of countries or cities; entities that have
35
36
Authors interview on May 4th 2012
Authors interview on May 1st 2012
institutions and a specific legal status. However when viewing citizenship as a performance I
also accepted that a person could be a Moroccan-Dutch citizen or a citizen of the world,
because that was what they are acting as part of. Therefore, if some of my participants are
active citizens, since they are active in civil society and they are motivated to do this because
of belonging to the Muslim community, then I have to accept that in this case being Muslim
is a form of citizenship. The fact that there are people who are seemingly well integrated in
Dutch society (they speak the language well, have a good education and are active in civil
society) but see themselves mainly as Muslim, seems to fit into what Roy (2004, as cited by
Dijkink, 2006:378) describes as globalized Islam. According to Roy there is a trend among
Muslims of de-terroritization and a-politicization. In this trend Islam is no longer linked to a
specific territory but to an imaginary space called the virtual Ummah. Muslims who follow
this trend do not try to create an Islamic state, but live in secular societies where they try to
both live in accordance with Islamic principles and as members of a secular society. Along
similar lines the involvement in civil society of these participants a combination can be found
of living in accordance with Islamic principles and integrating into Dutch society.
In the first section of this chapter I looked at what social belief structures my participants
held, to test this concept of Tajfel in an non-laboratory setting. I found people with a social
mobility belief structure and people with a social change belief structure. Therefore I showed
that both belief structures exist in the real world. I also found people who held both a social
mobility belief structure and a social change belief structure at different points in time. This
shows that a person’s belief structure is not static, but can change over time. I also found that
a person’s belief structure does not only depend on whether someone feels that he or she can
cross to another group but also if that person wants to cross to another group.
I also looked at what different tactics are used to deal with the negative status of the group. I
did find people who directly tried to change the status of the group, either by presenting
themselves as a role model or by trying to help other members of the group integrate into
society. I also found people who thought about leaving the country. In this an exit strategy
can be found, although they only thought about leaving. I also found people who creatively
created a new group, a group of world citizens. This can be seen as creatively changing the
status of the group, since the negative stigma of foreigner is changed into a positive feature
of worldly person. However, they did not directly change the status of the Muslim or foreign
group, since they created a new group. I did not find people who tried to change the way
that the status of the group was determined, or people who tried to weaken other groups.
65
With my research design I can only confirm the existence of certain tactics. Since I only
interviewed a limited amount of people who I did not randomly select, I cannot conclude
that the absence of a certain tactic with my participants means that no other members of the
same group do not use these tactics. Only that I cannot confirm the existence of a specific
tactic in the real world if I have not found it.
In the second section of this chapter I looked at the forms of citizenship that my participants
acted upon. I define the form of citizenship as the entity that someone perceives themselves
to be part of. This is in line with a new tradition in which citizenship is studied as a
performance instead of a legal status. In my research all the participants with a social
mobility belief structure acted as Dutch citizens. They presented their involvement in civil
society as proof that they were Dutch, since they contributed to Dutch society. People with a
social change belief structure acted as citizens of different entities. Some of my respondents
with a Turkish background really perceived themselves as Turkish, although they were
active citizens in the territory of the Netherlands. Some of my respondents with a Moroccan
background held a double form of citizenship at the same time, that of Moroccan-Dutch. This
double form of citizenship in one could also be found in people with another background
such as Parveen with an Iranian background. On top of the national entities, some of my
respondents also viewed themselves as citizens of the world. Lastly, I also found people who
mainly saw themselves as Muslims, and acted as citizens from based on that identity.
Studying the performances of my participants as performances of citizenship shows that
similar performances can mean different things to the actors. All of my respondents were
active in civil society in the territory of the Netherlands, but some were acting as Dutch
citizens while others acted as Turkish citizens or citizens of the world. This shows that it is
important to not only look at a specific act from the outside, but also study how the actor
perceives the act. In my conclusion I will discuss the different forms of citizenship further
and look into the question of how perceived stigmatization affects the different forms of
citizenship of young Muslims active in civil society.
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67
Conclusion
After the second world war people all over Europa agreed that we should
never again let this happen. Since then antidiscrimination policies have been
introduced in the law. These laws are now under pressure from a growing
Islomaphobe ideology, that became very powerful since the PVV became in a
very powerful position in the government (van der Valk:2012:121).
[…]
Countering this growing Islamaphobe ideology must be actively done by
upholding important democratic values such as equality, tolerance, diversity,
antidiscrimination, freedom and responsibility (van der Valk:2012:125).
---------------------In my thesis I examined how stigmatization of Muslim communities in the media and
politics played out in the lives of young Muslims in the Netherlands who are active in civil
society. I used the elections of 2010 and the government position of the PVV as a focus point
of my research. The powerful position of the PVV is not an isolated event, but part of an
ongoing anti-Muslim and anti-foreigner tendency (Zwaan, Zembla: April 24th 2010). My
main question is how perceived stigmatization from politics affects the citizenship
performances of young Muslims active in civil society in the Netherlands. In order to answer
this question I first answered three sub-questions. In Chapter 3, I looked at how
stigmatization is perceived by my participants and how it affect their involvement in civil
society. In Chapter 4, I looked at the different belief structures of my participants and the
different tactics that they used to deal with the negative status of their group. Additionally, I
also looked at what forms of citizenship my participants acted upon. My general conclusion
is that my participants differed in the amount of stigmatization that they perceived, but that
they all felt at times that they could be judged based on the stigma instead of their actual
performances. They also all understood that stigmatization could be used as a tactic, to gain
political support so that people do not necessarily vote as a result of hate for Muslim, but
possibly for other reasons. Also it is understood that the discourse as presented by the PVV
is based on several assumptions about the future of the Netherlands. Through their
involvement in civil society my participants all fought one of the underlying assumptions of
the discourse of the PVV. The different ways in which they did this depended on their social
belief structure. These social belief structures also affected the forms of citizenship of my
respondents.
68
My main question is about the effect of perceived stigmatization. This implies that I am
studying a causal relationship between a perception and action. My research design only
allows me to show the existence of certain perceptions and performances, it does not allow
me to draw any conclusions about causality. When studying my conclusions it has to be
taken into account that I am showing links between perceptions and performances. I cannot,
however, concluded that one effects the other. So I cannot say that my participants were
active in civil society because they perceived that they were stigmatized, or that they acted
out of specific forms of citizenship because of this perception. Again, I can only show the
existence of a certain perception and performance. Further research has to give more insight
into the nature of this relationship.
I started my research with two main goals, testing and refining theory and giving voice to
my participants. In this concluding chapter of my thesis I will analyze to what I extent I
fulfilled these goals and make suggestions for future research. I will also evaluate the strong
and weak points of my research.
33
The first main goal of my research was to refine and test theory. I contributed to the theory in
three ways. First, I took the concept of social belief structures from Tajfel. This concept, like
the other concept in Tajfel’s Social Identity Theory are mainly based on experiments in
laboratory settings (Demmers, 2012 Chapter 2:12). In my research I used the concept outside
of a laboratory setting and tested its existence in the real world. With my research I can
confirm the existence of the social belief structures and some of the tactics in real life. I have
also illustrated how my participants used these tactics. Because of my research design I can
only confirm the existence of certain concepts. The fact that I did not find some of the tactics
in my research only means that I cannot confirm its existence. I can also not say anything
about the quantitative aspects of the belief structures and tactics. Further research may
provide more insight into both these quantitative aspects as well as the possible link between
specific social belief structures or tactics and specific groups. For example, in my research
most of the people with a Turkish background had a social change belief structure. With my
research design however, I cannot conclude the majority of people with a Turkish
background have a social change belief structure. More quantitative research can give further
insight into this possible link between a Turkish background and a social change belief
structure.
69
My research also shows that people can have both social belief structures at different points
in time. Further research could offer insight into how and why people’s social belief
structures change. My research confirms the underlying assumption of the social belief
structures that it is not only human needs that drives action, but also people’s perceptions of
the social world. As explained in Chapter 1, Social Identity Theory is originally build on the
assumption that human action is based on human needs and that therefore human action is
predictable. With the social belief structures, a step was taken into a different ontological
view in which it is viewed that both human needs and individual perceptions were
important in analyzing human action. Since I showed that the performances of my
participants are not all similar, but were mediated by the different social belief structures, I
confirmed the idea that perceptions should also be taken into account when analyzing
human action.
Second, my research also contributes to a new analytic frame of studying citizenship as a
performance. Traditionally citizenship is seen as a status that someone either does or does
not have. When looking as citizenship as a performance, citizenship is something that
someone chooses to act upon. My research group consisted of active citizens within the
territory of the Netherlands. However, they do not all perceive their performances as acts of
Dutch citizenship. In my research I found people who perceived that they acted as Dutch
citizens, Dutch-Moroccan citizens, Turkish citizens, citizens of the world and Muslim
citizens. Although their performances all might have looked the same on the outside, the
perceptions behind them differed. This again supports the idea that it is also important to
look at perceptions of performances to understand human action.
With my research I showed that my participants acted out of different forms of citizenship.
We have to keep in mind that this is their own perception of their performances. Also, with
my research design I can only show that there are different forms of citizenship that my
participants act upon. This shows that it is useful to take the different forms of citizenship
into account when trying to understand their performances. Further research has to give
insight into the qualitative characteristics of the different forms of citizenship. Future
research also may give more insight into what it means to have a different form of
citizenship. For example, some of my participant acted out of Muslims citizenship. What
does this form of citizenship mean for other possible forms of citizenship? Can a person who
acts as a citizen of Islam also perceive himself as a Dutch citizen or citizen of the world?
The final way in which I contributed to my first main goal, is by examining what seemed to
be a contradiction in the citizenship performances of my participants. According to Alice
70
Walker (as cited by Scott, 1990:43) we cannot expect involvement in civil society from people
who have been stigmatized by that same society. In my research I looked at young Muslims,
who are stigmatized by parts of society, but who also contribute to society through a social
organization. By using the analytic frame of Scott’s theory on hidden transcripts, I showed
that the involvement in civil society from my participants can not only be seen as
contributing to society, but also as a means to changing society. Through their involvement
in civil society my participants all fought one of the underlying assumptions in the
stigmatizing discourse as presented by the PVV. These underlying assumptions were not
completely denied, but by being active in a social organization my participants all played
their part in changing dynamics. It has to be kept in mind that this conclusion is based on my
interpretation of the performances of my participants, using the analytic frame of Scott. And
although some of my participants were purposefully doing this, others were active in a social
organization not being aware that their performances attacked the underlying assumptions
of the stigmatizing discourse. My interpretation of their performances is affected by a double
hermenetic view, since my interpretation is an academic interpretation of the interpretation
of the performances of my participants (Demmers, 2012 introduction:17). My conclusion is
thus not only affected by how my participants interpret their own performances, but also
how I interpret their interpretation. Since my interpretations might also been affected by my
own assumptions my conclusions are not completely objective. I cannot just turn of my own
assumptions and ideas, I could only make myself aware that I have certain assumptions and
that I have to be critical about how these could have affected my conclusion. Throughout my
thesis I tried to be as open as possible about my own assumptions and possible prejudices. I
also used a lot of literal quotes to make my conclusions as transparent as possible. This
leaves the door open for critique.
The second main goal in my research was to give a voice to my participants for two reasons.
First, I felt that the stories from young Muslims that turned against society dominated in
both the media and literature. Second, I wanted to understand why people who are
stigmatized by a party that holds a powerful position in their government do not stand up
and protest against being stigmatized. I believe I fulfilled this goal, since my research shows
that there are young Muslims in the Netherlands who contribute to society even though they
at times experience the effects of stigmatization. My research therefore helps to give a more
diverse picture of young Muslims in the Netherlands. Also, in my research I showed why
there is no visible mass protest from the Muslim community against being stigmatized by
71
the PVV. As Mohammed explained to me, it would probably be the worst thing to do, since a
mass protest can be used by the PVV to strengthen the idea that there is a Muslim
community that can organize mass events against non-Muslims. Through their involvement
in civil society my participants were much more constructive in changing society and their
position in it.
During my research I often wondered about the relevance of my research for the field of
conflict studies. The Netherlands is not a war torn society, nor is it on the verge of becoming
one. Whenever I ride my bike across the city and I see a woman with a headscarf passing me
on her bike, I cannot help but smile and think that in contradiction with the PVV rhetoric
there is integration possible. So why devote my entire research to one party with a
stigmatizing view in a country where in reality people do live together without killing each
other? I found my answer in the quote that I used at the beginning of this chapter from van
der Valk. For over sixty years the Netherlands and the majority of Europe have not
experienced war on their territories. This does not mean however that we can just sit back
and assume that this will never happen to us again. In accordance with van der Valk, I
believe that the absence of war is something that has to be actively upheld. And although I
do not wish to conclude that the PVV is leading the Netherlands to war, I do believe that
there are at least tactics used that can create a breeding ground for conflict in the future.
72
73
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