I-deals and organizational commitment: Introducing the role of I-deal
uniqueness
Brigitte Kroon ª*, Charissa Freese ª, Susanne P.D. de Kort ª
Work in progress: Please do not quote
(ª) Tilburg University, School of Social and Behavioral Sciences, Department Human Resource Studies
(*) corresponding author: b.kroon@uvt.nl
1. Introduction
Due to societal developments such as increased individualization, reduced life-time employment
careers, and worker accountability for their own careers, employees increasingly negotiate their own
employment conditions to tailor them to their personal needs and aspirations (Rousseau, 2001).
Employers are not averse to these developments, as they realize that creating personalized
employment arrangement might be the key to create committed employees (Rousseau, 2005). By
tailoring employment conditions to employee needs, employees are expected to experience
reciprocal obligations towards their employer, resulting in higher levels of organizational
commitment. Idiosyncratic deals, or I-deals in short, can be considered the ultimate form of
customizing employment relations (Kroon & Freese, 2012). As assumed in literature, employees will
show positive organizational behavior and attitudes when they successfully negotiate an I-deal
(Rousseau, 2005). Empirical research on the effects of I-deals on commitment, however, is limited
and inconsistent (Rosen, Slater, Chang & Johnson, 2013).
While prior studies focused on the internal organizational uniqueness of the I-deal, we argue
that ‘non-standard’ evaluations expand beyond the borders of the own organization. Due to
employees’ increased job mobility and knowledge of possibilities in the external labor market (Ng,
Sorensen, Eby & Feldman, 2007), employees expand the non-standard evaluation of employment
conditions beyond organizational borders. Subsequently, we argue that the effects of I-deals on
commitment may vary considerably due to differences in the perceived external uniqueness of the Ideal. To examine this effect, we developed the construct of I-deal uniqueness. The purpose of this
study, then, is to examine how the uniqueness of the I-deal outside the organization influences
organizational commitment. Moreover, we also study the relative contribution of the I-deal in the
complete employment relationship, where it concerns the relationship with organizational
commitment. We therefore investigate the perceived uniqueness of the total employment package
and the interaction effect of uniqueness of I-deals and the total employment contract in explaining
organizational commitment. This study contributes to the existing knowledge on I-deals in multiple
ways. To date, only a few researchers tested the influence of I-deals on commitment and found that
certain types of I-deals influence affective, normative and continuance commitment (Hornung et al.,
2008; Rosen et al., 2011). This research enhances the understanding of the effect of I-deals on
organizational commitment, and may validate previous research. Secondly, it contributes to the
literature on I-deals by introducing and operationalizing the construct of I-deal uniqueness. In doing
so, it is the first study to examine the role of I-deal uniqueness in creating organizational
commitment. Finally it separates the explanatory effects of I-deals from effects of the complete
employment contract on organizational commitment from the effects of the total employment
contract.
2. Theory
2.1 Idiosyncratic deals
I-deals are “voluntary, personalized agreements of a nonstandard nature that individual workers
negotiate with their employers regarding terms that benefit them both” (Rousseau, 2005, p. 8). The
element of mutual benefits differentiates I-deals from other personalizes arrangements such as
favoritism or cronyism (Rousseau, 2005). An I-deal may be negotiated on different subjects:
development, flexibility, taskload (Ng & Feldman, 2010, Rouseau & Kim, 2006) and financial
incentives (Rosen, et al., 2011). I-deals are also heterogeneous in scope. Some employees may have
only one I-deal, while others have a largely non-standard employment package. Furthermore, I-deals
can differ in timing (e.g. ex ante or ex post negotiation) and initiation (e.g. by the employer or the
employee). Due to factors like liberalization of labor laws, increased individualization and labor
market pressures, employers have adopted I-deals as a strategy to attract and retain valued
employees and create loyalty and effort (Hornung, Rousseau & Glaser, 2008; Ng & Feldman, 2010).
We argue that the potential of I-deals to impact on commitment depends on the extent to which
employees perceive their deal as genuinely unique as compared to the employment benefits they
could have received elsewhere. In this case, the reference point of evaluating the I-deal is not the HR
practices of the employing organization, but the state of affairs with regard to employment benefits
in the whole field of potential employers.
2.2 Organizational commitment
Meyer and Allen (1991) proposed a three-component measure of organizational commitment:
affective commitment, normative commitment and continuance commitment. All three components
reflect the psychological states of employees, which characterize the type of employee’s attachment
to the organization. However, the nature of these psychological states differs. Affective commitment
refers to “the employee’s emotional attachment to, identification with, and involvement in the
organization” (Meyer & Allen, 1991, p. 67). It is related to acceptance of organizational values, the
willingness to exert effort and a desire to stay with the organization because employees want to.
Normative commitment can be viewed as an obligation to stay, employees feel they ought to
because they believe it is morally right to stay. Finally, continuance commitment is associated with a
conscious awareness of the costs leaving the organization and difficulties in finding a new job.
Employees stay within the organization because they need to (Meyer & Allen, 1991). Because of their
different nature, the three components of organizational commitment have different implications for
workplace behaviors like turnover, absenteeism and citizenship. Both affective and normative
commitment are positively related to performance and work behaviors like OCB and attendance,
while continuance commitment does not correlate with OCB and correlates negatively with job
performance and stress (Meyer, Stanley, Herscovitch & Topolnytsky, 2002). These results suggest
that affective commitment and normative commitment benefit the organization, while continuance
commitment does not serve the organization. This implies that creating affective and normative
commitment through I-deals should be fostered, while I-deals solely creating continuance
commitment should be minimized. This leads to our first hypothesis that I-deals have an effect on
organizational commitment.
Hypothesis 1. I-dealers have higher levels of organizational commitment (affective, continuance and
normantive) than employees who do not have I-deals.
2.3 I-deals and organizational commitment
I-deals relate to organizational commitment through instrumental as well as socio-emotional
processes. The instrumental value of I-deals lies in the actual improvement of the fit between
personal needs of employees with the working conditions offered by the employer. Employees
become committed to the organization because they see a beneficial or equitable exchange between
their contributions to the organization and the I-deal they receive (Cohen, 2007). Continuance
commitment follows from the employees’ awareness of the costs involved in the potential loss of the
I-deal when the employee leaves the organization to work for another organization. Positioned in the
Employee-Organization framework on push and pull forces for staying and leaving (Hom, 2012), this
I-deal is categorized as a “pull to stay” force. Following Meyer, Becker and Vandenberghe (2004) it
can be argued that employees who remain because they fear forfeiting these kinds of I-deals if they
leave (e.g. a form of continuance commitment) do not necessarily feel affectively committed to the
organization. By offering financial I-deals that are focused on benefits, compensations, and
remunerations, and flexibility I-deals (focused on working at home and flexible working hours)
employees become committed to the organization because of the threat of losing these valued
outcomes, especially when lacking job alternatives. In other words, we assume that financial and
flexibility I-deals contribute to continuance commitment, as employees want to maintain their
benefits and rewards. Although this reasoning seems valid, empirical research on remuneration Ideals and commitment is scarce and evidence is rather weak. Powell and Meyer (2004) found that
arrangements such as pay, benefits and promotion opportunities and lack of alternatives were
positively related to continuance commitment. A study by Rosen et al. (2011) showed that financial Ideals were only weakly related to continuance commitment. This leads to our second and third
hypotheses.
Hypothesis 2: Financial I-deals are related to continuance commitment.
Hypothesis 3: Flexibility I-deals are related to continuance commitment.
The relationship between I-deals and commitment can also be explained by socio-emotional
processes. Social exchange theory predicts that when the organization offers additional inducements
such as I-deals, this will evoke affective reciprocal reactions (Cohen, 2007). By granting I-deals,
organizations show an additional preparedness to invest in the employees’ needs that carries beyond
the instrumental value of the I-deal. I-deals signal trust in the employee and appreciation of an
employees’ value to the organization (Hornung et al., 2008). These relational aspects of the I-deal
induce a need by the employee to restore the balance with the organization by contributing to the
well-being of the organization to maintain equity in a mutually beneficial relationship (Meyer & Allen,
1991), which is met by showing positive affective reactions, such as a strong desire to stay with that
employer (affective commitment). Furthermore, the recognition of organizational investments
(granting I-deals) may cause an imbalance in the employee/organization relationship (Meyer & Allen,
1991). Consequently, employees will feel morally obligated to reciprocate with a moral feeling of
obligation to continue employment (normative commitment) (Cohen, 2007). Development I-deals
like career development, work content or training are related to these positive work experiences. By
granting development I-deals, organizations “provide individuals a special contribution, often
involving symbolic and social-emotional elements, [like] trust, appreciation, [and] personalization”
(Hornung et al., 2008, p. 656). Development I-deals therefore contribute to affective and normative
commitment in multiple ways: through the feeling of being a special individual who receives rare and
valued resources, and through the moral obligation to compensate organizational investments
(Cohen, 2007; Ng & Feldman, 2010). Empirical evidence on the relationship between development Ideals and affective and normative commitment is more profound, albeit still in a descendant stage.
Ng and Feldman (2010) found a positive relationship between contract idiosyncrasy (level of pay,
advancement opportunities, skill training, career development opportunities, job security, and
support for personal problems) and affective commitment. An essential limitation of this study
however is the absence of separate measures for different types of I-deals and their isolated effect
on different types of commitment. Rosen et al. (2013) found that I-deals that involved arrangements
in the area of job content (tasks, responsibilities) contributed to higher affective commitment. And
Liu, Lee, Hui, Kwan and Wu (2013) found that development I-deals and flexibility I-deals enhanced
affective commitment, through perceived organizational support.
Development I-deals address affective and normative commitment through the process of social
exchange (trust, fulfillment, special meaning), while financial and flexibility I-deals relate to
continuance commitment, because of the potential loss of valuable outcomes. Based on this
reasoning, the following hypotheses are formulated:
Hypothesis 4: Development I-deals are related to normative and affective commitment.
2.3 I-deal uniqueness
In this section, the employee’s evaluation of the value of the I-deals is put central by focussing on the
I-deals uniqueness. By definition, the frame of reference of I-deals considers the extent to which
employment conditions are unique compared to similar co-workers within the same firm. I-deal
uniqueness, however, concerns the degree to which employees think these voluntary, personalized
agreements are likely to be offered by other companies. Thus, while both concepts address the nonstandard nature of employment conditions, I-deals have a within-firm focus whereas I-deal
uniqueness has a between-firm focus. Furthermore, I-deal uniqueness reflects a higher level of
distinctiveness in employment conditions. The employees’ employment benefits are considered to
be special both within and beyond the borders of the own organization. Consequently, the impact of
the instrumental and social-emotional processes underlying the relationship between I-deals and
commitment, and therefore the intensity of changes in employee commitment, will depend on the
level of external uniqueness.
Hypothesis 5. The more I-dealers perceive their I-deal as externally unique, the higher their level of
organizational commitment (affective, continuance and normative).
Because it might well be that organizations offering I-deals are more advanced in their HR practices
and therefore a more attractive employer, we also assess the contribution of the uniqueness of the Ideals versus the complete employment benefit package of the employee. Would it be possible for
the employee to find the same benefits elsewhere?
Hypothesis 6. The more employees perceive their total employment contract benefits as externally
unique, the higher the level of organizational commitment
And finally, we investigate the relative contribution of the uniqueness of I-deals in explaining
organizational commitment as compared to the uniqueness of the complete employment benefits
package. We assume that both having an I-deal and a unique employment benefits package will
result in higher levels of organizational commitment. These employees are at the top of the pyramid
of employment relationships. They have a wonderful employment benefits package and on top of
that an I-deal. This will create strong bonds between the employee and the organization. We
therefore hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 7. The relationship between employment benefit uniqueness and organizational
commitment is moderated by I-deals, such that it is stronger for people who have I-deals.
3. Method
3.1 Data collection procedure
In order to identify employees who successfully negotiated I-deals, department managers in a variety
of organizations were approached to participate in a study on employee evaluations of the
employment terms and conditions. Requirements for participation in the study included a minimal
organization size of 50 employees, and a minimal department size of 7 employees. When the
manager agreed to participate, all employees in this department were given a hardcopy
questionnaire, which was collected by the research team to ensure confidentiality.
This procedure resulted in a total of 572 employee questionnaires of 71 organizations. Of these
employees, 97 employees indicated that they have had negotiated one or more I-deals (17%).
3.2 Sample
The initial sample contained organization units where none of the respondents reported to have
successfully negotiated an I-deal. Given that the distribution between people with and without Ideals was skewed towards the latter, and to increase the comparability of working contexts of
respondents, we removed all respondents of units where no I-deals were reported from the sample.
This resulted in a final sample of 572 employees. The organization units were in different industries
(Health care, 26%; financial institutions, 17%). The average age of the respondents was 40.5 years
(SD = 11.82). The sample contained slightly more women than men (56%). About half of the sample
completed higher education (49%) and most respondents had a permanent contract (83%). Table 1
shows the types and distribution of I-deals in the sample, compared to demographic characteristics
(gender, type of contract, level of education, fulltime/parttime). Most I-deals concern flexibility
(working at home, on different hours, additional days of/sabbatical) (n=60), followed by
development I-deals (training, extra tasks, careerstep) (n=39) and financial I-deals (bonuses, salary
raise) (n=36). People with financial I-deals differed significantly form people without I-deals in terms
of educational level. Flexibility I-deals were significantly more present when people reported having
a permanent contract.
====
Insert table 1 about here
====
3.3 Measures
3.3.1 I-deals
In the current paper, we wanted to get an objective indication of the presence of I-deals. Since most
respondents would be unaware about the construct I-deal, we developed a series of questions to
sensitize respondents about their awareness of I-deals, before asking whether they had an I-deal
themselves. First, a definition was provided about standard terms and conditions of employment:
“Terms and conditions of employment that apply to all employees. Often, these are described in a
personnel manual, company handbook or in a CLA”. Respondents had to indicate whether they knew
such policies were available in their organization: “Does your organization have a personnel
handbook containing formal rules for terms and conditions of employment?”, and “Does a CLA apply
to your terms and conditions of employment?” Possible responses were: No, Probably not, Probably,
Yes.
Next, respondents were asked to report whether they had an I-deal after reading the following
instruction: “Sometimes people agree to deviate from standard terms and conditions of employment,
because this benefits the employee as well as the organization better than the standard conditions.
These deviations are called I-deals. I-deals are exceptions to standard terms and conditions of
employment that employees negotiate themselves with their employer, and that can vary from one
employee to another”. Another sensitizing question lead respondents to think about I-deals in their
organization: “Do you know whether in your organization exceptions to the standard terms and
conditions of employment are allowed occasionally?”. Possible responses were: No, Probably not,
Probably, Yes.
After these sensitizing questions, two questions lead the respondent to judge whether they had an Ideal themselves. The first question was: “Did you ever ask your employer to make an exception to
the standard terms and conditions of employment in your organization, to adjust to your personal
circumstances?” ( No / Yes). If positive, a follow-up question concerned the presence of an I-deal:
“Did you succeed in negotiating a personalized, non-standard agreement about terms and conditions
of employment (an I-deal)?”( No / Yes).
Employees who responded positively to this last question were subsequently asked to answer ten
questions about the type of I-deal they negotiated with their employer: “About WHICH terms and
conditions of employment did you succeed to negotiate an I-deal (personalized agreement)?”. Nine
questions with checkboxes related to previously published categories of I-deals: Financial I-deals
(Bonusses / allowances / extra salary; Salary development ); Development I-deals (Chances for
promotion; Training and education; Extra tasks / responsibilities); Flexibility I-deals (Working outside
the office; Flexible working hours; Longer holidays/additional days off/ sabbatical leave) (Rosen et al.,
2013); and I-deals concerning support with personal problems (Ng & Feldman, 2010). The final
question was open ended: Other, namely …..
The latter two types of I-deals (personal support / other) were ticked only 13 and 7 times
respectively and were therefore excluded from the analyses. Answers were recoded per I-deal type,
such that when one or more types were present, the respondent’s score to that I-deal type equals 1.
Hence, three dummy variables were created for the presence of I-deals: Financial I-deals (0-1),
Development I-deals (0-1) and Flexibility I-deals (0-1). Zero indicates absence of an I-deal type.
Respondents without I-deals score zero on each type.
3.3.2 I-deal external uniqueness
Given the possibility that respondents have more than one I-deal, the questionnaire included a
sensitizing question about which I-deal was most important to them. After that, two questions were
asked about the perceived external uniqueness of that I-deal. These were: “This I-deal is a reason to
stay with this organization”, and “I can also get this I-deal in another organization”. Responses were
scored on a five point Likert scale ranging from totally disagree to totally agree. Items correlated r
= .51.
3.3.3 Organizational commitment
Organizational commitment was measured with the 13-item Dutch version of Meyer, Allen and
Smith’s (1993) Organizational Commitment Questionnaire (Jak & Evers, 2010). CFA confirmed a three
factor solution best fitted the data. These were: Affective commitment (α = .897), Normative
commitment (α = .865) and Continuance commitment (α = .611).
3.3.4 Control variables
Gender (men = 0, women = 1), age, having children at home, educational level, organizational tenure,
departmental tenure and contract hours were included as control variables.
4. Results
4.1. Descriptives and correlations
Table 2 shows all descriptives and correlations.
4.2 Hypotheses test
Hypotheses were tested using multiple linear regressions. The first hypothesis states that I-dealers
have higher levels of organizational commitment than employees who do not have I-deals. Table 3
shows the relative contribution that the presence of each type of I-deal (financial, development and
flexibility) has on affective, normative and continuance commitment after entering the control
variables. Having an i-deal in itself is not related to higher levels of organizational commitment.
Hypothesis 1 is rejected. Consequently, Hypothesis 2 (Financial I-deals are related to continuance
commitment, Table 4) and Hypothesis 3 (Flexibility I-deals are related to continuance commitment,
Table 5) were also rejected. Only development I-deals were related to affective commitment (Table
6). Hypothesis 4 is partially accepted; the relationship was not found for normative commitment.
Hypothesis 5 stated that the more I-dealers perceive their I-deal as externally unique, the higher
their level of organizational commitment. This hypothesis was only confirmed for development ideals (Table 7). Hypothesis 6 however, the more employees perceive their total employment
package as externally unique, the higher their organizational commitment is confirmed (Table 7). And
finally, hypothesis 7, was also accepted. The effect of a unique employment contract on commitment
is higher when employees have i-deals (Table 7/8).
5. Discussion
Our findings provide support for our hypothesis that I-deals lead to commitment only when
employees perceive that such arrangements are difficult to obtain in other organizations. In this
section, we discuss the limitations of the current study, as well as the implications for both research
and practice.
5.1 Limitations
There are several limitations in the present study that should be considered. First, the effect sizes of
ideal uniqueness on organizational commitment are relatively small (ΔR² = .04-.08). This does not
mean that ideal uniqueness is not important, but it does emphasize the relatively small effect of
ideals on organizational commitment. Furthermore, because the number of employees in the sample
with an I-deal was relatively low, results can only be viewed as indicative. More research is needed to
validate the results of this study.
Approximately one fifth to one third of Dutch employees report to have successfully negotiated an Ideal Nauta, Oeij, Huiskamp & Goudswaard, 2007; Kroon & Freese, 2012). The number of reported Ideals also depends on the strictness of the application of the I-deal definition in the questionnaire. A
major methodological disadvantage of measuring effects of I-deals is that sample sizes automatically
decrease to thirty or even twenty percent of the original data set. Studying the impact of different
kinds of I-deals reduce the sample size even further.
Second, since all variables are self-reported in nature and come from one single source, common
method variance possibly affected the observed relationships. To eliminate this source of bias,
procedures to protect respondents’ anonymity and reducing evaluation apprehension were used. In
future research, the use of other-report measures like supervisor-rated commitment could be used.
Third, due to the cross-sectional nature of this study, it was not possible to rule out reversed
causality. Due to a positive attitude towards their employer, employees with a high level of
commitment might consider their I-deal as more unique than employees with lower levels of
commitment.
Lastly, since data were collected at two different times and with two different sampling approaches,
interpreting and generalizing the results to other organizational setting may be limited. Nonetheless,
the diversified sample of sectors, occupations and job levels provides enough justification for
generalizing the data in Dutch settings. Moreover, results did not reveal a significant influence of
group differences on the proposed relationships.

The solo effect of i-deal on commitment is limited to affective commitment. I-deals lead to
affective commitment when employees perceive that such arrangements are difficult to
obtain in other organizations
•
The uniqueness of the total employment package seems more important than the
uniqueness of the i-deal in creating commitment.
•
However, this effect of employment contract uniqueness is stronger when employees have ideals.
Using i-deals to create a higher level of (affective) commitment is only successful if the content of the
i-deal is considered as genuinely unique.
However, offering a unique package of employment benefits is a more profound strategic employer
branding strategy in creating commitment
I-deals have an additional value in the creation of commitment for organizations that offer unique
employee benefits.
Need for additional theory on i-deal uniqueness
5.2 Implications for future research

How do employees create their perception of I-deal uniqueness?
-
Individual differences (pro self, pro social)
-
Influence of CBA or company specific policies
-
How is the comparison group determined?
-
Other potential influences???

What is the role of the psychological contract?

What about the non-standard evaluation of other employment conditions, besides I-deals?
5.3 Implications for practice

having an I-deal does not create commitment, having a unique I-deal does. Therefore, make
sure you benchmark

consider the ‘side-effects’ of I-deals. Create slightly higher commitment through unique Ideals should not lead to a significant diminishment of commitment of co-workers

consider your policy on employment conditions carefully. Which elements do you
standardize? What are flexible elements in your policy?

How do you communicate about I-deals?
References
Hornung, S., Rousseau, D.M., & Glaser, J. (2008). Creating flexible work arrangements through
idiosyncratic deals. Journal of Applied Psychology, 93, 655-664. doi: 10.1037/0021
-010.93.3.655
Kroon, B., & Freese, C. (2012). Dragen I-deals bij aan behoud en motivatie van medewerkers?
Tijdschrift voor HRM, 2, 43-58
Liu, J., Lee, C., Hui, C., Kwan, H.K., & Wu, L.-Z. (2013). Idiosyncratic deals and employee outcomes:
the mediating roles of social exchange and self-enhancement and the moderating role of
individualism.
Journal
of
10.1037/a0032571
Ng, Sorensen, Eby & Feldman, 2007
Applied
Psychology.
Advance
online
publication.
doi:
Ng, T.W.H., & Feldman, D.C. (2010). Idiosyncratic deals and organizational commitment. Journal of
Vocational Behavior, 76, 419-427. doi: 10.1016/j.jvb.2009.10.006
Rosen, C.C., Slater, D.J., Chang, C.H.D., & Johnson, R.E. (2013). Let’s make a deal: development
and validation of the ex post I-deals scale. Journal of Management, 39, 709-742 doi: 10.1177/
0149206310394865
Rousseau, D.M. (2001). The idiosyncratic deal: flexibility versus fairness? Organizational Dynamics, 29,
260-273. doi: 10.1016/S0090-2616(01)00032-8
Rousseau, D.M. (2005). I-deals: idiosyncratic deals employees bargain for themselves. Armonk, NY:
M.E. Sharpe
Rousseau, D. M., & Kim, T. G. 2006. When workers bargain for themselves: Idiosyncratic deals and the
nature of the employment relationship. Paper presented at British Academy of Management, Belfast.
TABLES
Table 1: Distribution of I-deals in the sample
Total
Gender¹
Educational level¹
(N = 572) Male Female Low/middle High
Requested an I-deal
107
43 (251) 62 (315)
17,1%
Obtained an I-deal
97
40 (252) 55 (317)
15,9%
Remuneration I-deal
36
19,7%
17,4%
19 (252) 17 (317)
7,5%
Development I-deal
39
5,4%
18 (252) 20 (317)
7,1%
Flexibility I-deal
60
6,3%
20 (252) 38 (317)
7,9%
12,0%
Contract type¹
Contract hours¹
Permanent Temporal Fulltime Parttime
50 (287)
57 (277)
92 (474)
14 (91)
58 (308)
45 (237)
17,4%
20,6%
19,4%
15,4%
18,9%
19,0%
45 (289)
52 (278)
85 (477)
11 (91)
52 (308)
40 (239)
15,6%
18,7%
17,8%
12,1%
16,9%
16,7%
12 (289)
24 (278)
31 (477)
5 (91)
20 (308)
13 (239)
4,2%
8,6%*
6,5%
5,5%
6,5%
5,4%
16 (289)
23 (278)
33 (477)
5 (91)
23 (308)
14 (239)
5,5%
8,3%
6,9%
5,5%
7,5%
5,9%
25 (289)
35 (278)
55 (477)
5 (91)
31 (308)
28 (239)
8,7%
12,6%
11,5%
5,5% †
10,1%
11,7%
Level of significance group differences: †p<.10 *p<.05
¹ Crosstabs ( χ²); ² Number of respondents “yes” (total number of respondents per category)
Note: Low/middle educational level; intermediate vocational, basic or elementary education,
high educational level; higher vocational or academic. Flexibility I-deals; flexibility in working hours and work place
fulltime contract = 36 hours per week or more
Table 2: descriptive statistics and correlations
1. Affective commitment
2. Normative commitment
3.
Continuance
commitment
4. Ideals yes
a. Development I-deals
b. Remuneration I-deals
c. Flexibility I-deals
5. I-deal uniqueness
6. Psy contr uniqueness
7. Men/Women
8. Age
9. Parttime/ fulltime
10. Permanent/ flex
11. Children living at home
N
562
564
564
M
3.36
3.22
2.23
93
39
36
60
93
558
569
562
547
568
562
16,3%
6,8%
6,3%
10,5%
3,13
2,91
56%
40.45
44%
16%
45%
sd
0.71
0.82
0.77
0,83
0,76
11,82
1
2
.27**
.22**
.25**
.08*
.07*
.00
.06
.30**
,28**
-.11**
.04
-.08*
-.12**
.02
.06
.05
.00
.06
.22*
,28**
-.06
-.09*
-.07*
.01
-.06
3
4
4a
4b
4c
5
.01
.00
-.04
.04
.22*
,09*
.02
.13**
.03
-.12**
.12**
.76**
.69**
.75**
.10
.12*
.00
.01
-.01
-.07
-.02
.50**
.36**
.07
,10*
-.02
-.01
-.03
-.02
.02
.26**
-.15
,08*
-.04
-.04
-.02
-.02
-.02
.20*
.09*
.07
.00
.03
-.07*
.00
.20*
.17
.01
.21*
.09
-.08
Table 3: regressions of all kinds of I-deals on organizational commitment (N=572)
Affective Commitment
1
2
B
β
B
-.14*
-.10
-.07
.00
.03
.00
Model
Gender
Age
I-deal (noyes)
Psy contract
uniqueness
R²
ΔR²
Table
β
-.05
.06
Model
Age
Gender
.08
-.01
-.01
.06
.03
.25
.26***
.27
.26***
.10
.10*
R²
ΔR²
.08***
.07***
Regression
for
.01*
commitment,
Normative Commitment
1
2
B
β
B
β
-.01
-.10*
-.01
-.08†
-.10
-.07
-.02
-.02
Empl contract
uniqueness
Remuneration
I-deal
(no/yes)
Psy * Rem Ideal
Continuance Commitment
1
2
B
β
B
β
.05
.03
.08
.05
.01
.13**
.01
.14**
.07
,01*
4:
Normative Commitment
1
2
B
β
B
β
-.10
-.07
-.02
-.01
-.01
-.10*
-.01
-.07
3
B
-.01
-.02
β
-.08*
-.01
.07***
.06***
interactions
.02*
with
Age
Gender
I-deal
3
B
.01
.09
β
.13**
.05
.27
.26***
.24
.24***
.11
.10*
.09
.08†
-.09
-.03
-1.38
-.44*
-.12
-.04
-1.14
-.34†
.41
.43*
.32
.31†
.01*
.08***
.07***
Affective Commitment
1
B
β
.00
.03
-.14
-.10*
Psy contract
uniqueness
Development
I-deal (no/yes)
Psy * Dev Ideal
R²
ΔR²
financial
Continuance Commitment
1
2
B
Β
B
β
.01
.13**
.01
.14**
.05
.03
.08
.05
.09***
.01*
.02*
.03**
.01*
Table6: Regression for commitment, interactions with development I-deal
Model
.03**
.01
.01*
2
B
.00
-.07
β
.06
-.05
3
B
.00
-.06
β
.06
-.05
.25
.26***
.23
.24***
.12
.04
-1.21
-.43*
.42
.48*
.08***
.07***
.09***
.01*
.03*
.01†
Table 7: regressions for organizational commitment considering i-deal uniqueness (N=93 = People with Ideals only)
Model
Gender
Age
Affective Commitment
1
2
B
β
B
.01
.12
.01
.08
.05
.15
i-deal
uniqueness
Empl
contract
uniqueness
R²
ΔR²
.01
β
.10
.10
Normative Commitment
1
2
B
β
B
β
-.01
-.07
-.01
-.09
.02
.01
.15
.09
Continuance Commitment
1
2
B
β
B
β
.02
.23*
.02
.22*
.33
.20†
.38
.23*
.19
.20†
.08
.08
.13
.13
.33
.30*
.35
.32**
.20
.17*
.12**
.11**
.01
.11**
.10**
.07*
.12*
.05