COLD WAR, GLOBALISATION AND THE RISE OF US HEGEMONY:
FROM YALTA TO VIETNAM
AT THE END OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR, THERE WAS A GLOBAL
VACUUM OF POWER. EUROPE, THE TRADITIONAL FOCUS OF
INTERNATIONAL POWER, HAD BEEN DESTROYED BY WAR.
BRITAIN WAS ON ITS KNEES, FRANCE HAD BEEN HUMBLED BY
OCCUPATION AND GERMANY HAD BEEN ANNIHILATED
ECONOMICALLY AND DEFEATED. IN THE FAR EAST, THE MAJOR
POWER, JAPAN, WAS OCCUPIED AND DEFEATED AND THE
EUROPEAN COLONIES WERE IN A FERMENT OF NATIONALISM. OF
THE MAJOR POWERS ONLY THE USA HAD EMERGED FROM THE
WAR RELATIVELY UNSCATHED – ITS ECONOMY HAVING BEEN
SAVED FROM DEPRESSION BY THE WAR. THE SOVIET UNION,
WHICH HAD UNTIL WWII BEEN ISOLATED FROM THE OUTSIDE
WORLD AND CONSUMED BY INTERNAL TURMOIL, HAD EMERGED
AS A STRATEGIC POWER BUT, IN ITS FIGHT TO THE DEATH WITH
NAZISM, HAD BEEN SEVERELY WEAKENED.
IN THE FIRST PART OF THE LECTURE, I AM GOING TO LOOK AT THE
REASONS WHY THE COLD WAR BROKE OUT. I WILL EXAMINE WHY
IT WAS THAT, AFTER FIVE YEARS OF WAR, THE US THE SOVIET
UNION AND THEIR ALLIES LOCKED IN ANOTHER BATTLE WHICH
WOULD LAST FOR OVER 40 YEARS, ONLY ENDING WITH THE
COLLAPSE OF THE USSR IN 1991.
IN THE SECOND SECTION, I WILL LOOK AT SOME OF THE MAIN
EVENTS OF THE FIRST 30 YEARS OF THE CONFLICT – A CONFLICT,
WHICH ALTHOUGH LABELLED THE “COLD WAR”, STILL RESULTED
IN THE DEATHS OF MILLIONS OF PEOPLE.
INTRODUCTION
ONE THING WE MUST BE CLEAR ABOUT IS THAT ANY COUNTRY’S
FOREIGN POLICY IS ESSENTIALLY SELFISH. IN DEVELOPING AND
EXECUTING ITS FOREIGN POLICY, A COUNTRY SEEKS TO ENSURE
THAT IT DERIVES THE GREATEST POSSIBLE ADVANTAGE FROM ITS
RELATIONS WITH OTHER NATIONS, THAT IT PROMOTES ITS OWN
OBJECTIVES AND POLICY GOALS. THE COLD WAR WAS NO
DIFFERENT – BOTH THE US AND THE USSR DEVISED AND
IMPLEMENTED FOREIGN POLICIES WITH THE INTENTION OF
GAINING ADVANTAGE AND ASSURING THEIR OWN SECURITY.
THE USA IN 1945
AS THE WAR CAME TO AN END, WASHINGTON WAS MOST
CONCERNED ABOUT THE FUTURE OF CAPITALISM. APART FROM
THE USA ITSELF, ALL OF THE MAJOR CAPITALIST STATES HAD
BEEN EITHER DESTROYED OR SERIOUSLY WEAKENED BY WAR.
AMERICAN POLICYMAKERS WERE HAUNTED BY THE PROSPECT OF
A RETURN TO THE ECONOMIC DEPRESSION OF THE 1930S. THEY
FEARED THAT IF EUROPE WAS LOST TO CAPITALISM THEN IT
WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE TO PREVENT THE EVENTUAL
DESTRUCTION OF THE AMERICAN WAY OF LIFE AS IT WAS
SLOWLY STRANGLED BY COMMUNISM.
BUT TO AMERICANS, WHO HAD PREVIOUSLY SHIED AWAY FROM
INVOLVEMENT IN WORLD AFFAIRS, THIS SITUATION ALSO
PRESENTED OPPORTUNITIES. EVER SINCE THE REVOLUTION,
AMERICANS HAD BELIEVED THAT THEY WERE GOD’S CHOSEN
PEOPLE AND THAT CAPITALISM WAS HIS CREATION – THEIR
VISION WAS TO CREATE A CITY UPON THE HILL. AMERICANS
BELIEVED, AND STILL BELIEVE, THAT THEY HAVE WHAT HAS
BECOME KNOWN AS A MANIFEST DESTINY TO CIVILISE THE REST
OF THE WORLD; THAT THEY HAVE A HIGHER PURPOSE TO SERVE
IN THE WORLD THAN OTHERS – A GOD-GIVEN DUTY TO PROMOTE
FREEDOM AND TO CHRISTIANISE THE WORLD. AS TOM PAINE PUT
IT “THE CAUSE OF AMERICA IS IN GREAT MEASURE THE CAUSE
OF ALL MANKIND.”
THE VERY CREATION OF THE USA HAD, OF COURSE, BEEN AN
IMPERIAL PROJECT. FROM THE EARLY 17TH CENTURY WHITE
SETTLERS HAD EXPANDED THEIR AREA OF OCCUPATION BY
CONQUEST AND BY PURCHASING VAST TRACTS OF LAND FROM
OTHER EMPIRES. IN THEIR OWN TERMS, THEY HAD CIVILISED THE
CONTINENT AND, BY THE 20TH CENTURY, WERE INTENT ON
CIVILISING THE REST OF THE PLANET WITH THEIR VERSIONS OF
DEMOCRACY AND CAPITALISM. IN 1919, THEY HAD TRIED TO
REMAKE THE WORLD IN THEIR OWN IMAGE BUT HAD FAILED TO
OVERCOME THE ENTRENCHED INTERESTS OF THE OLD EUROPEAN
EMPIRES. IN 1945, AMERICANS HAD ANOTHER OPPORTUNITY.
AMERICA WAS, THEREFORE, BOTH IDEOLOGICALLY PREDISPOSED
TO EXPANSION AND HAD GOOD PRACTICAL REASONS FOR
INTERVENING IN WORLD AFFAIRS.
THE USSR IN 1945
AND THE SOVIET UNION ALSO BELIEVED THAT IT WAS JUSIFIED IN
INSISTING THAT ITS NATIONAL INTERESTS OUGHT TO BE TAKEN
INTO ACCOUNT IN THE POSTWAR SETTLEMENT. NOT
UNREASONABLY, THE SOVIETS FELT THAT THEY WERE DUE
RECOGNITION FOR THEIR ROLE IN DEFEATING HITLER. THE USSR
HAD LOST ABOUT 20M OF ITS PEOPLE DURING THE WAR AND THE
GERMAN INVASION HAD DESTROYED ABOUT ONE-HALF OF ITS
INDUSTRIAL CAPACITY. THE RED ARMY’S WAR OF ATTRITION
AGAINST THE WEHRMACHT HAD ESSENTIALLY BROKEN THE
BACK OF THE NAZI FIGHTING MACHINE – FOR EXAMPLE AT
STALINGRAD, THE SOVIETS HAD LOST ABOUT 1M SOLDIERS BUT
STILL INFLICTED THE FIRST SIGNIFICANT DEFEAT ON THE
GERMANS IN WHAT BECAME THE TURNING POINT OF THE WAR.
IN RETURN, THEY ARGUED THAT EASTERN EUROPE, WHICH HAD
BEEN USED BY NAPOLEON, KAISER WILHELM AND HITLER TO
INVADE RUSSIA, SHOULD BE UNDER THEIR CONTROL TO PREVENT
FURTHER INVASIONS FROM THE WEST – THE BOLSHEVIKS ALSO
REMEMBERED THAT THE BRITISH AND AMERICANS HAD INVADED
RUSSIA IN 1919 TO SUPPORT THE WHITE RUSSIANS. IN 1945, THEY
HAD A MAJOR ADVANTAGE WHEN MAKING THIS CASE AS THE RED
ARMY ACTUALLY OCCUPIED THE TERRITORY THAT WAS
STRATEGICALLY IMPORTANT TO THEM.
LIKE THE AMERICANS, THE SOVIETS ALSO UNDERPINNED THE
PRACTICAL WITH THE IDEOLOGICAL. MARXIST-LENINIST THEORY
PROCLAIMS ITS UNIQUE ABILITY TO UNDERSTAND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND TO CHART A COURSE FOR THE
EVENTUAL VICTORY OF COMMUNISM OVER CAPITALISM. IT WAS
LENIN WHO PROVIDED THE COMMUNISTS’ EXPLANATION FOR THE
COURSE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THROUGH HIS THEORY
OF IMPERIALISM. LENIN’S THEORY PROVIDED AN EXPLANATION
FOR WHY THE COMMUNIST REVOLUTION HAD BROKEN OUT IN
RUSSIA AND NOT THE MOST ADVANCED CAPITALIST STATES, AS
MARX HAD PREDICTED. HE ARGUED THAT ADVANCED
CAPITALISM WOULD GENERATE SUPER-PROFITS AND WOULD
THEN SEEK TO MAXIMISE WEALTH BY EXPORTING THOSE PROFITS
TO POOR COUNTRIES, WHICH WOULD THEN BE EXPLOITED.
EVENTUALLY, CAPITALIST NATIONS WOULD DIVIDE THE WORLD
INTO COLONIES, HE SAID, AND THEN GO TO WAR OVER THEM.
LENIN HAD ESSENTIALLY EXPANDED UPON MARXIST THEORY,
WHICH PREDICTED THAT THE OPPRESSED PROLETARIAT WOULD
RISE UP AGAINST THE RULING CLASSES, BY ARGUING THAT
RUSSIA – THE NATIONAL SURROGATE FOR THE PROLETARIAT –
HAD RISEN UP AGAINST THE INTERNATIONAL CAPITALIST ORDER
– MARX’S RULING CLASS. FOR LENIN, THE RUSSIANS WERE THE
“CHOSEN PEOPLE” WHOSE HISTORICAL MISSION IT WAS TO LEAD
ALL OF MANKIND ALONG THE ROAD TO PROGRESS BY ACTING AS
THE VANGUARD FOR ALL OPPRESSED PEOPLES.
THE OUTBREAK OF THE COLD WAR
AT THE END OF THE WAR, NEITHER THE USA NOR THE USSR
WANTED OR NEEDED TO PROLONG THE CONFLICT. THE USA DID
NOT WANT TO MAINTAIN THE HUGE ARMIES THAT HAD BEEN
CONSCRIPTED TO FIGHT THE WAR. AND FOR ITS PART, THE SOVIET
UNION WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO PURSUE FURTHER CONQUESTS
IN EUROPE, DESPITE WHAT MANY IN THE WEST BELIEVED.
BUT THE GRAND ALLIANCE WHICH HAD DEFEATED NAZISM HAD
BEEN A MARRIAGE OF CONVENIENCE. STALIN HAD SUSPECTED
THAT THE USA AND BRITAIN HAD PUT OFF THE D-DAY LANDINGS
BECAUSE THEY PREFERRED THAT RUSSIANS DO THE DYING. ON
THE OTHER HAND, MANY AMERICANS, AND CHURCHILL, WERE
DYED IN THE WOOL ANTI-COMMUNISTS WHO BELIEVED THE
SOVIETS TO BE INTRINSICALLY EVIL.
SO, WHY DID THE COLD WAR BREAK OUT?
FIRST, I THINK BECAUSE OF THE CENTURIES-OLD CONTEST WHICH
HAD RAGED OVER EASTERN EUROPE. BOTH WESTERN EUROPE
AND RUSSIA HAD SOUGHT TO DOMINATE THE STRATEGICALLY
VITAL EAST OF EUROPE. IN 1945, THE CONFRONTATION OVER
EASTERN EUROPE, AND ESPECIALLY POLAND, WAS BETWEEN THE
AMERICANS AND THE SOVIETS. FOR THE SOVIETS, THEIR
NATIONAL SECURITY WAS DEPENDENT ON THEM PREVENTING
INVASION FROM THE WEST, AS I HAVE SUGGESTED.
IN THE US, HOWEVER, PUBLIC OPINION HAD BEEN PERSUADED BY
ROOSEVELT THAT A DEAL COULD BE DONE OVER EASTERN
EUROPE – CATHOLIC AND POLISH-AMERICAN CONSTITUENCIES
WERE VERY POWERFUL SHAPERS OF PUBLIC OPINION AND WERE
OUTRAGED WHEN THE SOVIETS REFUSED TO CAVE IN.
FOR HIS PART, STALIN BELIEVED THAT THE WEST, AND
CHURCHILL IN PARTICULAR, WERE RENEGING ON THE DEALS
THAT HAD BEEN DONE DURING THE WAR ABOUT THE POSTWAR
SETTLEMENT. AT TEHERAN IN 1943, ROOSEVELT, CHURCHILL AND
STALIN HAD AGREED THAT RUSSIA WOULD ANNEX EASTERN
POLAND WHILE POLAND WOULD BE COMPENSATED WITH
EASTERN GERMANY. THEY ALSO AGREED THAT POLAND WOULD
BE PART OF A SOVIET ZONE OF INFLUENCE. THE NEXT YEAR IN
MOSCOW, CHURCHILL AND STALIN HAD DIVIDED UP THE
BALKANS. BY THE TIME OF THE YALTA CONFERENCE, IN
FEBRUARY 1945, STALIN WAS EXPECTING THESE DEALS TO BE
RUBBER-STAMPED AND THUS AMERICAN AND BRITISH ATTEMPTS
TO RE-OPEN THE POLISH QUESTION DID NOT GO DOWN WELL.
FROM THE AMERICANS’ POINT OF VIEW, THEY UNDOUBTEDLY
UNDERESTIMATED THE STRENGTH OF SOVIET CONCERNS. THEY
ALSO SERIOUSLY OVERESTIMATED THEIR ABILITY TO INFLUENCE
SOVIET POLICY – THEY HAD SOLE POSSESSION OF THE ATOMIC
BOMB WHICH THEY REGARDED AS AN “INSTRUMENT OF GREAT
POLITICAL POTENTIAL”; WASHINGTON SOUGHT TO USE SOVIET
REQUESTS FOR AID AS BARGAINING COUNTERS FOR CONCESSIONS
OVER EASTERN EUROPE, BUT WERE REJECTED.
SO, THE ACTIONS OF THE AMERICANS, NOW LED BY HARRY
TRUMAN, EXACERBATED STALIN’S PARANOIA. STALIN WAS IN
SOLE CONTROL OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AND HIS
PERSONALITY WAS WRITTEN ALL OVER IT. HE WAS
IDEOLOGICALLY ANTIPATHETICAL TO THE WEST; HE WAS
EXTREMELY SENSITIVE ABOUT SOVIET SECURITY; AND BY
NATURE HE WAS DECEITFUL, SUSPICIOUS AND HAD SHOWN IN
THE PURGES OF THE 1930S THAT HE WAS QUICK TO SPOT AN
OMNIPRESENT ENEMY.
BUT THE QUESTION OF PERSONALITY ALSO AFFECTED US POLICY.
THE ARRIVAL OF TRUMAN AS PRESIDENT BROUGHT INTO THE
WHITE HOUSE SOMEONE WHO HAD NO FOREIGN POLICY
EXPERIENCE AT ALL. IN CONTRAST TO THE OUTWARD LOOKING,
INTERNATIONALIST ROOSEVELT, WHO HAD WEATHERED THE
POLITICAL STORMS OF THE WAR, TRUMAN WAS A
STEREOTYPICAL MID-WESTERNER – SUSPICIOUS OF FOREIGNERS
AND ESSENTIALLY INWARD LOOKING. CERTAINLY UNSCHOOLED
IN THE ARTS OF DIPLOMACY AND PREDISPOSED TO TAKE A
TOUGH LINE WITH THE SOVIETS.
BUT MOST WORRYING FOR THE WEST WERE THE ATTEMPTS BY
THE SOVIETS TO EXERT INFLUENCE BEYOND THEIR ZONE OF
OCCUPATION. IN EARLY 1946, MOSCOW SOUGHT TO EXTEND ITS
INFLUENCE INTO IRAN. ALTHOUGH THE THEY WERE REPULSED,
FOR MANY IN THE WEST THIS WAS PROOF POSITIVE OF SOVIET
EXPANSIONISM. WINSTON CHURCHILL, NOW OUT OF POWER,
PROCLAIMED THAT “AN IRON CURTAIN HAD DESCENDED IN
EUROPE”.
IN 1947, GEORGE KENNAN, A SOVIET EXPERT AND STATE
DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL, SPELT OUT WHAT WOULD BECOME US
POLICY TOWARDS THE SOVIETS FOR THE NEXT FORTY-ODD
YEARS. HIS “CONTAINMENT” THEORY WAS THAT THE USSR WAS
EXPANSIONIST AND THAT A FAILURE TO SPREAD COMMUNISM
WOULD EVENTUALLY LEAD TO THE INTERNAL COLLAPSE OF THE
COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT. HE SAID THAT THERE WERE FIVE KEY
INDUSTRIAL CENTRES IN THE WORLD – THE USA, UK, GERMANY
AND EUROPE, JAPAN AND THE USSR – AND THAT FOUR OF THEM
WERE IN THE WEST AND SHOULD STAY THAT WAY. KENNAN
ARGUED THAT ELSEWHERE THE WEST COULD AFFORD TO BE
FLEXIBLE, BECAUSE POINTS ON THE PERIPHERY WERE
EXPENDABLE. IN THE PERIOD UP TO 1991 US POLICY WOULD
SOMETIMES BE FLEXIBLE AND ON OTHERS RESULT IN MASSIVE
RETALIATION WHEN THE CONTAINMENT LINE WAS BROKEN. HIS
MESSAGE WAS THAT, BY THE CLEVER USE OF POLITICAL,
DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC POWER THE USSR WOULD BE
FORCED INTO COLLAPSE.
IN THE SAME YEAR, COMMUNIST INSURGENCIES IN GREECE AND
TURKEY, BOTH TRADITIONALLY BRITISH SPHERES OF INFLUENCE,
EXPOSED THE UK’S INCAPACITY TO DEFEND WESTERN INTERESTS
AND IT WAS LEFT TO TRUMAN TO STEP IN. IN WHAT BECAME
KNOWN AS THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE, HE PROCLAIMED THAT THE
WORLD WAS DIVIDED BETWEEN “FREE PEOPLES” AND
GOVERNMENTS WHICH RELIED ON “TERROR AND OPPRESSION”
AND THAT AMERICANS HAD TO CHOOSE BETWEEN TWO WAYS OF
LIFE. HE ASKED FOR PERMISSION FROM CONGRESS TO OPPOSE “A
CERTAIN IDEOLOGY” WHEREVER IT APPEARED IN THE WORLD.
THE GREEKS AND THE TURKS GOT $400M OF AID AND TRUMAN
HAD TAKEN ON AN OPEN-ENDED COMMITMENT TO OPPOSE
COMMUNISM; HE HAD DIVIDED THE WORLD BETWEEN TWO
OPPOSING WAYS OF LIFE AND MADE IT QUITE CLEAR THAT THERE
WAS NO CHOICE OTHER THAN BETWEEN THE AMERICAN WORLD
VIEW AND THAT OF THE SOVIETS. KENNAN NOTED WITH SOME
CONCERN THAT HIS IDEAS ABOUT CONTAINING THE SOVIET
UNION HAD BEEN USED TO JUSTIFY AN OPEN-ENDED
ENGAGEMENT WHICH POTENTIALLY INVOLVED MILITARY AS
OPPOSED TO THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC COUNTER MEASURES
HE HAD SUGGESTED.
LATER THAT YEAR, ANDREI ZHADANOV, A CLOSE ALLY OF
STALIN’S, REPLIED FOR THE SOVIETS. HE REVIVED STALIN’S
ANALYSIS, MADE IN THE 1930S, WHICH POSITED THE EXISTENCE
OF “TWO CAMPS” IN THE INEVITABLE STRUGGLE BETWEEN
COMMUNISM AND CAPITALISM; ZHADANOV DECRIED THE USA AS
EXPANSIONIST AND SAID THAT THE USSR WAS THE ONLY
OBSTACLE TO AMERICA’S WORLD SUPREMACY; AND HE ARGUED
THAT THE USSR HAD OFFERED COOPERATION BUT HAD BEEN
REJECTED BY WASHINGTON.
SO, WHY DID THE COLD WAR BREAK OUT?
FORWARD THREE THEORIES:
HISTORIANS PUT
1. THE TRADITIONAL VIEW HOLDS THAT THE US SIMPLY
REACTED TO THE THREAT POSED BY THE USSR TO ITS
EXISTENCE.
SUPPORTERS OF THIS ORTHODOX APPROACH
ARGUE THAT, IN THE FACE OF SOVIET AGGRESSION,
AMERICANS HAD NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO CONFRONT THE
CHALLENGE OR FACE A SLOW DESTRUCTION OF THEIR WAY
OF LIFE BECAUSE COMMUNIST EXPANSION WOULD
STRANGLE CAPITALISM.
2. A LATER ANALYSIS PROMOTED THE IDEA THAT THE USSR
WAS A BARRIER TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF AMERICAN
POSTWAR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES. THIS
REVISIONIST LINE DOES NOT DENY THAT THE USSR WAS
SEEKING TO EXPAND ITS INFLUENCE – ALTHOUGH IT
DOUBTS WHETHER IN THE 1940S MOSCOW WAS CAPABLE OF
DOING SO – BUT POINTS TO WASHINGTON’S OWN
EXPANSIONIST AIMS AND ITS TRADITIONAL HOSTILITY
TOWARDS SOVIET COMMUNISM AS EVIDENCE OF AMERICA’S
EQUAL CULPABILITY.
3. MORE RECENTLY HISTORIANS HAVE ARGUED THAT THE
COLD WAR WAS NOT A PRODUCT OF A COMPETITION FOR
WORLD DOMINATION BUT THE RESULT OF A SEARCH BY
BOTH EAST AND WEST FOR POSTWAR SECURITY. THEY
SUGGEST THAT GLOBAL DISORDER, MUTUAL DISTRUST AND
A LACK OF UNDERSTANDING OF EACH OTHER’S PRIORITES
LED TO THE CONFRONTATION WHICH DOMINATED THE FIFTY
YEARS AFTER WORLD WAR II.
NSC 68 AND THE KOREAN WAR
FOR ALL THE TENSION BETWEEN THE USA AND THE USSR IN THE
EARLY POSTWAR YEARS, NEITHER WAS KEEN TO RAISE THE
MILITARY STAKES. EACH HAD REDUCED THE SIZE OF THEIR
MILITARIES AS THE DEMANDS OF RECONSTRUCTION REQUIRED
CIVILIAN LABOUR AND PRODUCTION.
BUT, IN THE US, THE MACCARTHYITE WITCHHUNTS HAD BEGUN
AND THE FEBRILE ATMOSPHERE WAS TURNED TO PARANOIA BY
TWO EVENTS IN 1949. FIRST, THE SOVIETS EXPLODED THEIR OWN
A-BOMB. WESTERN POLITICIANS AND MILITARY HAD NOT
EXPECTED THIS TO HAPPEN SO SOON AND ASSUMED THAT SPIES
HAD SOLD WESTERN SECRETS TO MOSCOW. LATER THAT YEAR,
THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS UNDER MAO ZEDONG DEFEATED THE
PRO-US GOVERNMENT OF CHIANG KAI-SHEK. AT ONE STROKE THE
WORLD’S MOST POPULOUS NATION HAD GONE COMMUNIST AND
MACCARTHY’S SUPPORTERS BLAMED FELLOW TRAVELLERS IN
THE US GOVERNMENT, ESPECIALLY IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT,
FOR THIS REVERSE.
IT WAS THESE EVENTS, AND THE AMERICAN RESPONSE, THAT
PITCHED THE COLD WAR INTO A NEW PHASE, ONE WHICH, AS
KENNAN HAD FEARED, TURNED THE COLD WAR INTO A TRIAL OF
MILITARY STRENGTH.
IN APRIL 1950, THE US NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DREW UP
NSC 68. THIS DOCUMENT COMPLETELY ALTERED THE AMERICAN
APPROACH TO THE COLD WAR. IT ADVOCATED “AN IMMEDIATE
AND LARGESCALE BUILD-UP IN OUR MILITARY AND GENERAL
STRENGTH AND THAT OF OUR ALLIES WITH THE INTENTION OF
RIGHTING THE POWER BALANCE AND IN THE HOPE THAT
THROUGH MEANS OTHER THAN ALL-OUT WAR WE COULD INDUCE
A CHANGE IN THE NATURE OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM.”
WASHINGTON’S TWIN OBJECTIVE WAS; FIRST, TO BUILD UP A
LARGE AND EXPENSIVE CONVENTIONAL FORCE OF TROOPS AND
WEAPONS CAPABLE OF STOPPING THE RED ARMY. PERHAPS THE
MOST ICONIC WEAPON OF THE TIME WAS THE B-52
INTERCONTINENTAL BOMBER, STILL IN USE TODAY. THE
AMERICANS ALSO PLANNED TO DEVELOP A HUGE FORCE OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO DETER THE SOVIETS.
NSC 68 ASSUMED THAT MOSCOW SOUGHT WORLD DOMINATION,
THAT THE USSR RELIED ON ITS MILITARY TO PURSUE ITS AIMS
AND THAT ONLY MILITARY OPPOSITION WOULD STOP IT; AND
THAT SOVIET FAILURE TO EXPAND WOULD INEVITABLY LEAD TO
ITS PEOPLE OVERTHROWING THE COMMUNIST LEADERSHIP. THE
US, THEREFORE, HAD MOVED BEYOND CONTAINMENT TO
EMBRACING THE DESTRUCTION OF THE SOVIET UNION.
NSC 68 ALSO ARGUED THAT ANY LOSS OF POSITION FOR THE
WEST, FOR EXAMPLE, A SUCCESSFUL WAR OF NATIONAL
LIBERATION IN A COLONY, WOULD BE EVIDENCE OF COMMUNIST
EXPANSION. THE NOTION OF THE COMMUNIST OMNIPRESENCE
HAD BEEN BORN AND WOULD COLOUR US POLICY IN THE 3RD
WORLD FOR DECADES TO COME.
FOR GEORGE KENNAN, THIS SWITCH IN POLICY WAS TOO MUCH.
HE HAD DISAGREED WITH TRUMAN’S DECISION TO REBUFF MAO
ZEDONG IN FAVOUR OF SUPPORTING THE NATIONALIST RUMP
WHICH HAD HOLED UP IN FORMOSA, NOW TAIWAN. HE ALSO
BELIEVED THAT THE USSR WAS INCAPABLE OF ACHIEVING
WORLD DOMINATION. AND HE THOUGHT THAT TRUMAN SHOULD
BE WILLING TO TRY NEGOTIATION AS A TOOL OF FOREIGN
POLICY. NSC 68 WAS NOT AT ALL TO HIS LIKING. TRUMAN’S
POSITION WAS THAT THE SOVIET’S ONLY UNDERSTOOD POWER
AND THAT DIPLOMACY WOULD HAVE TO WAIT UNTIL THE
POSITION OF STRENGTH HAD BEEN BUILT.
IN FACT, THE CHINESE REVOLUTION HAD NOT EXACTLY BEEN A
CAUSE FOR JUBILATION IN MOSCOW. TRUE, IT SEEMED TO
INDICATE THE INEXORABLE FORWARD MARCH OF COMMUNISM.
BUT THE ARRIVAL OF THE CHINESE IN THE FRATERNAL CAMP
PRESENTED A CHALLENGE TO THE SOVIET’S PREVIOUSLY
UNCONTESTED POSITION OF LEADERSHIP. IT ALSO MEANT THAT
MOSCOW WOULD HAVE TO PROVIDE ECONOMIC SUPPORT TO ITS
FELLOW COMMUNISTS IN THE OVERWHELMINGLY UNDEVELOPED
CHINA AT A COST TO ITS OWN LIMITED RESOURCES. FINALLY, IT
DIVERTED MOSCOW FROM ITS PRIME CONCERN, WHICH WAS
EUROPE.
BEFORE THE INK WAS DRY ON NSC 68, THE HARDLINERS IN
WASHINGTON APPEARED TO BE PROVED RIGHT. ON 25 JUNE 1950,
THE NORTH KOREAN ARMY INVADED SOUTH KOREA AND
THREW DOWN A CHALLENGE TO WASHINGTON THAT IT FELT
COULD NOT BE IGNORED.
KOREA, A JAPANESE COLONY SINCE 1910, HAD BEEN LIBERATED
BY SOVIET AND AMERICAN FORCES AT THE END OF THE WAR. THE
TWO ARMIES MET AT THE 38TH PARALLEL, WHICH BECAME THE
TEMPORARY BORDER PENDING UN-ORDERED NATIONAL
ELECTIONS. THE FAILURE OF BOTH SIDES TO AGREE ON THE
TERMS FOR RE-UNIFICATION LED TO VIRTUAL CIVIL WAR IN THE
SOUTH. IN AUGUST 1948, WASHINGTON SUPPORTED THE
PROCLAMATION OF A REPUBLIC IN THE SOUTH AND INSTALLED A
FORMER JAPANESE COLLABORATOR SYNGMAN RHEE AS
PRESIDENT. THE COMMUNIST-CONTROLLED NORTH IMMEDIATELY
CLAIMED JURISDICTION OVER THE SOUTH. ALL THIS TOOK PLACE
AS BOTH US AND SOVIET TROOPS LEFT THE COUNTRY.
THE NORTH KOREAN LEADER, KIM IL-SUNG, WHO HAD LED THE
COMMUNIST RESISTANCE TO THE JAPANESE, SOUGHT STALIN’S
PERMISSION TO RE-UNIFY KOREA MILITARILY AND RECEIVED A
RELUCTANT BLESSING FROM MOSCOW. FOR MANY HISTORIANS,
THESE EVENTS INDICATE THAT THE KOREAN INVASION WAS, IN
FACT, A WAR OF NATIONAL LIBERATION RATHER THAN AN
ATTEMPT AT COMMUNIST EXPANSION.
THE INVASION ALMOST SUCCEEDED AND WITHIN A FEW WEEKS
THE NOTH KOREANS WERE IN SIGHT OF VICTORY. BUT US-LED
UNITED NATIONS FORCES RETALIATED AND SOON HAD DRIVEN
THE NORTH KOREANS BACK TO THE 38TH PARALLEL. TRUMAN,
NOW UNDERSTANDING THAT MOSCOW WAS A RELUCTANT ALLY
OF KIM’S AND BELIEVING THAT THE CHINESE WOULD NOT JOIN
THE WAR AGREED TO THE INVASION OF THE NORTH AND SOON US
FORCES WERE WITHIN SIGHT OF THE CHINESE BORDER. HOWEVER,
TRUMAN HAD MISCALCULATED AND THE CHINESE ARMY
SUPPORTED BY SOVIET AIRCRAFT LAUNCHED A COUNTERATTACK
AND DROVE THE US-LED FORCES BACK TO THE 38TH PARALLEL.
OVER THE NEXT THREE YEARS THE WAR BECAME A BLOODY
STALEMATE AROUND THE OLD TEMPORARY BORDER.
THE KOREAN WAR WAS SIGNIFICANT FOR A NUMBER OF
REASONS:
FIRST, IT CONVINCED THE AMERICANS THAT NSC 68 HAD
CORRECTLY ANALYSED THE SITUATION AND THAT MILITARY
MIGHT WAS THE KEY TO EVENTUAL SUCCESS.
SECOND, IT PROVOKED THE US TO EXTEND EVEN FURTHER THE
NOSTRUMS OF NSC 68. CONTAINMENT, EVEN BY MILITARY MEANS
WAS NO LONGER THE OBJECTIVE. TRUMAN’S AUTHORISATION TO
INVADE THE NORTH WAS THE FIRST TEST OF ROLLBACK – NO
LONGER WOULD THE WEST BE CONTENT TO REACT, IN FUTURE IT
WOULD SEEK TO PUSH BACK THE COMMUNIST DEMON.
THIRD, THE KOREAN WAR CONVINCED THE WEST OF THE NEED TO
TURN WEST GERMANY AND JAPAN INTO BULWARKS AGAINST
COMMUNISM. BOTH COUNTRIES WERE NOW SET ON A PATH TO REINDUSTRIALISATION AND RE-ARMAMENT.
FOURTH, RELATIONS BETWEEN THE CHINESE AND THE SOVIETS
DETERIORATED AS BEIJING WAS FORCED INTO WAR AS A RESULT
OF STALIN’S MISCALCULATION AND WAS PREVENTED FROM
MOPPING UP THE NATIONALISTS ON FORMOSA.
BY THE TIME THE KOREAN WAR ENDED, IN JULY 1953, TRUMAN
WAS GONE, STALIN WAS DEAD AND THE COLD WAR HAD BECOME
A STALEMATE BETWEEN THE TWO SUPERPOWERS.
DWIGHT EISENHOWER, WHO BECAME PRESIDENT IN 1953, WAS
CONCERNED ABOUT THE PRICE TAG WHICH CAME WITH NSC 68.
YES, HE WAS IN FAVOUR OF A HUGE NUCLEAR FORCE SO THAT HE
COULD THREATEN WHAT HE TERMED “MASSIVE RETALIATION”
BUT HE WAS LESS KEEN ON HAVNG A LARGE CONVENTIONAL
FORCE. WHILE HE SUPPORTED THE POLICY OF ROLLBACK, HE
PREFERRED THE NOTION OF FIGHTING “LIMITED WARS” –
EISENHOWER DID NOT WANT TO RISK LARGE AMERICAN
CASUALTIES AGAIN AFTER THE UNPOPULARITY OF KOREA. HIS
PREFERRED TACTIC WAS TO RETALIATE IN A MANNER, AND IN
PLACES, OF HIS CHOOSING. AS THE FOCUS OF THE COLD WAR
SHIFTED TO THE 3RD WORLD, THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY BECAME HIS WEAPON OF CHOICE.
MEANWHILE, IN MOSCOW, STALIN’S DEATH HAD NOT BROUGHT
CHANGES TO THE AIMS OF SOVIET POLICY. THEY REMAINED:
- THE SECURITY OF THE USSR
- THE STRENGTHENING OF SOVIET MILITARY AND ECONOMIC
CAPACITY
- AND CONSOLIDATION OF THE COMMUNIST BLOC UNDER
SOVIET LEADERSHIP.
BUT THE TACTICS DID CHANGE. THE NEW, MORE COLLECTIVE
LEADERSHIP WHICH EMERGED FIRST UNDER GEORGI MALENKOV
AND LATER UNDER NIKITA KHRUSCHEV BROUGHT MORE
FLEXIBILITY TO STALIN’S FOREIGN POLICY, WHICH HAD LEFT THE
USSR ISOLATED. MOSCOW NOW SOUGHT TO BROKER AN END TO
THE WAR IN KOREA; IT TOOK ON A MORE POSITIVE ROLE IN THE
UN; AND THE SOVIETS EVEN UNDERMINED THEIR OWN IDEOLOGY
BY SUGGESTING THAT, PERHAPS ONLY TEMPORARILY,
COMMUNISM AND CAPITALISM MIGHT BE ABLE TO CO-EXIST. THE
NOTION OF “PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE” BECAME THE MANTRA
FOR THE 1950S. THE USSR HAD GOOD REASONS FOR THIS
APPROACH AS THE COST OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION
THREATENED TO PREVENT IT DELIVERING BENEFITS TO ITS
PEOPLE – CONSUMER GOODS AND EVEN FOOD WERE OFTEN IN
SHORT SUPPLY.
AFTER HE CAME TO POWER, IN 1955, KHRUSCHEV THREW CAUTION
TO THE WIND AND REJECTED SOME OF THE MOST CHERISHED OF
STALIN’S POLICIES. HE AGREED TO THE END OF SOVIET
OCCUPATION OF AUSTRIA AND THE SOVIETS TOOK PART IN THE
GENEVA CONFERENCE WHICH DISCUSSED A SETTLEMENT OF THE
VIETNAM PROBLEM – OF WHICH MORE LATER. AND HE TRASHED
STALIN’S “TWO CAMPS” IDEOLOGY BY TAKING A DIPLOMATIC
PLUNGE INTO THE 3RD WORLD. WHEREAS STALIN NEVER LEFT THE
USSR AFTER 1945, KHRUSCHEV POPPED UP EVERYWHERE.
KHRUSCHEV’S POLICIES, THOUGH A POLAR OPPOSITE OF
STALIN’S, WERE FIRMLY ROOTED IN LENIN’S IDEAS THAT
PERMANENT OR TEMPORARY NEUTRALITY IN THE HISTORIC
STRUGGLE BETWEEN COMMUNISM AND CAPITALISM WAS AN
OPTION. INDEED, KHRUSCHEV WAS ABLE TO ARGUE THAT HIS
POLICIES HELD OUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT NEUTRALISM – WHICH
HE ALSO PROMOTED IN EUROPE, ESPECIALLY IN WEST GERMANY –
WOULD EVENTUALLY DELIVER VICTORY TO COMMUNISM AT A
REDUCED RISK OF WAR.
DURING THE 1950S, SOVIET POLICY THUS SEEMED MORE IN TUNE
WITH THE WAY THE WORLD WAS DEVELOPING. THE END OF THE
SECOND WORLD WAR HAD UNLEASHED NATIONALIST SENTIMENT
THROUGHOUT THE COLONIAL WORLD. INDIA AND PAKISTAN HAD
BECOME INDEPENDENT IN THE LATE 1940S AS HAD INDONESIA. IN
1955, THE NEWLY EMERGING NATIONS MET AT BANDUNG IN
INDONESIA IN A CHALLENGE TO THE DOMINANCE OF BOTH THE
USSR AND USA. AS THEY BUILT A NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT,
KHRUSCHEV’S APPROACH WAS MORE ATTRACTIVE TO THESE
YOUNG NATIONS. HE SEEMED MORE DYNAMIC THAN THE AILING
EISENHOWER, WHOSE POLICIES HAD RESULTED IN THE CRUSHING
OF POPULAR GOVERNMENTS IN IRAN AND GUATEMALA BY THE
CIA AND WOULD LEAD TO A CIA-LED INVASION OF INDONESIA, IN
1958.
IN 1957, THE SUCCESS OF THE SPUTNIK LAUNCH – THE FIRST MANMADE OBJECT TO REACH SPACE – AND THE VICTORY OF FIDEL
CASTRO IN 1959 SEEMED TO SHOW THAT THE SOVIETS WERE THE
FORCE OF THE FUTURE.
IN FACT, THE SOVIETS WERE MERELY ADAPTING THEIR TACTICS
TO SUIT THE SITUATION. LIKE THE US, THE SOVIETS ALSO VIEWED
THE 3RD WORLD AS ANOTHER BATTLEGROUND IN THE WAR
AGAINST THE WEST – AND ONE WHICH CARRIED A LOWER RISK OF
MUTUAL ANNIHILATION IF THINGS WENT WRONG. BUT, FOR THE
MOST PART, KHRUSCHEV’S GRAND GESTURES WERE JUST THAT.
AND THE SOVIETS FOUND THAT THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN THE 3RD
WORLD BROUGHT WITH IT SIGNIFICANT ECONOMIC COSTS WHICH
THEY COULD ILL-AFFORD. THE IDEOLOGICAL CONTORTIONS THAT
MOSCOW WENT THROUGH IN ORDER TO WOO THE 3RD WORLD
ALSO UPSET THE CHINESE, WHO BELIEVED THAT THEY WERE
GOING SOFT ON THE HISTORIC STRUGGLE.
BUT, AND THIS IS A BIG “BUT”, KHRUSCHEV FOR ALL HIS FAILINGS
PUT THE USSR ON THE GLOBAL DIPLOMATIC MAP. NO LONGER
COULD THE SOVIETS BE IGNORED. HIS POLICIES MEANT THAT THE
US WAS NOT LEFT UNCHALLENGED IN ANY PART OF THE WORLD
AND WASHINGTON WAS FORCED ONTO THE DEFENSIVE.
IMPORTANT COMMUNIST GAINS WERE MADE TOO, ESPECIALLY IN
INDONESIA AND CUBA.
IN FACT HIS PROPAGANDA WAS TOO GOOD. THROUGHOUT THE
1950S THE SOVIET NUCLEAR AND MISSILE ARSENAL WAS
PITIFULLY SMALL. BUT KHRUSCHEV WAS GOOD AT PERSUADING
PEOPLE THAT THE SOVIETS HAD OVERTAKEN THE US IN THE ARMS
RACE. IN THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1960, JOHN KENNEDY
CASTIGATED HIS OPPONENT, RICHARD NIXON – WHO HAD BEEN
EISENHOWER’S VICE PRESIDENT – WITH THE CHARGE THAT HE
HAD ALLOWED THE SOVIETS TO BECOME STRONGER THAN THE
USA. KENNEDY WON THE ELECTION BY A WHISKER AND
EMBARKED ON A NEW ARMS RACE TO MAKE GOOD THE DEFICIT.
EVENTUALLY, KHRUSCHEV’S FAILURE TO DELIVER THE SUCCESS
HE HAD PROMISED LED TO HIS DOWNFALL IN OCTOBER 1964.
HAVING PLUNGED THE USSR INTO A NEW ARMS RACE, HIS
FAILURE TO FACE DOWN THE US DURING THE CUBAN MISSILE
CRISIS AND HIS INABILITY TO TURN ROUND THE WOEFUL SOVIET
ECONOMY WERE TOO MUCH FOR HIS COMRADES. HE WAS OUSTED
BY LEONID BREZHNEV, WHO INSTITUTED THE NEXT CHANGE IN
THE CHARACTER OF THE COLD WAR.
BY THE END OF THE 1960S, BREZHNEV FACED AN ALTOGETHER
DIFFERENT WORLD FROM THAT SEEN BY HIS PREDECESSORS.
FIRST, THE WORLD WAS INCREASINGLY MULTI-POLAR WITH THE
EMERGENCE OF CHINA AND EUROPE AS A POTENTIAL CENTRES OF
WORLD POWER. IN 1969, THE SINO-SOVIET SPLIT OCCURRED AS
THE TWO FRATERNAL POWERS FOUGHT A BORDER WAR AND
CHINA, NOT THE USA, BECAME MOSCOW’S PRINCIPAL ENEMY.
SECOND, THE HUGE EXPANSION OF THE SOVIET MILITARY WHICH
HAD BEGUN IN THE EARLY 1960S HAD BROUGHT THE SOVIETS
WITHIN REACH OF MILITARY PARITY WITH THE USA. MOSCOW
WAS WITHIN SIGHT OF A MUCH CHERISHED GOAL OF BEING AN
EQUAL OF THE USA’S, NO LONGER HAVING TO NEGOTIATE FROM
A POSITION OF WEAKNESS.
AND THIRD, THE SOVIET ECONOMY WAS IN AN EVEN WORSE MESS
THAN UNDER KHRUSCHEV. BREZHNEV’S EARLY EXPERIMENTS
WITH “MARKET SOCIALISM” HAD FAILED TO IMPROVE THE
QUALITY AND QUANNTITY OF GOODS AVAILABLE TO THE SOVIET
PEOPLE AND DISCONTENT WAS RIFE. THE ONLY OPTIONS OPEN TO
THE SOVIETS WERE RADICAL RESTRUCTURING OF THE ECONOMY
OR GAINING ACCESS TO WESTERN TECHNOLOGY TO IMPROVE
QUALITY AND PRODUCTIVITY.
THESE THREE DRIVERS RESULTED IN THE POLICY KNOWN AS
“DETENTE”. DETENTE WAS A MORE THOROUGHGOING VERSION
OF KHRUSCHEV’S POLICY OF “PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE”. WHAT
MARKED IT APART FROM PREVIOUS POLICIES WAS NOT THE
THEORY BUT THE DEGREE OF COOPERATION INVOLVED. THE AIM
OF DETENTE WAS TO REACH AGREEMENTS WITH THE WEST ON A
WIDE RANGE OF ISSUES LIKE ARMS CONTROL, TRADE, CRISIS
SETTLEMENT, SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND MORE. IT AMOUNTED
TO A POLICY OF ACTIVE COLLABORATION WITH THE WEST.
DETENTE WAS A RESPONSE BY THE SOVIETS TO THE NATURE OF
THE WORLD THEY FACED, NOT DRIVEN BY IDEOLOGY BUT A
PRACITICAL WAY OF ADDRESSING THE PROBLEMS THEY FACED
AND OF ACHIEVING LONG-HELD POLICY OBJECTIVES.
IN EUROPE, DETENTE ACHIEVED POLICY GOALS PURSUED BY
MOSCOW SINCE THE END OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR.
POLITICAL CHANGES IN WEST GERMANY BROUGHT SOCIAL
DEMOCRATS TO POWER UNDER WILLY BRANDT, WHO SIGNALLED
THAT HE WANTED THE TWO GERMAN STATES TO BE RECONCILED.
AGREEMENT WAS REACHED IN WHICH WEST GERMANY
RECOGNISED THE EXISTENCE OF EAST GERMANY AND THE
TERRITORIAL SETTLEMENT BETWEEN GERMANY AND POLAND IN
1945.
THIS WAS A MAJOR TRIUMPH FOR MOSCOW AND ALLOWED IT TO
MOVE ON TO THE BIGGER ISSUE OF WESTERN AGREEMENT TO THE
POSTWAR SOVIET SPHERE OF INFLUENCE IN EASTERN EUROPE.
THIS ISSUE WAS THE MAIN TOPIC OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY
CONFERENCE, WHICH OPENED IN HELSINKI IN 1973. AFTER TWO
YEARS OF TALKS, THE HELSINKI DECLARATION SECURED JUST
WHAT THE USSR HAD SOUGHT SINCE 1945 – AN ACCEPTANCE OF
THE EXISTING EUROPEAN FRONTIERS. THIS SUCCESS WAS
QUALIFIED THOUGH BY THE WEST’S INSISTENCE THAT THE FINAL
TREATY INCLUDE REFERENCES TO HUMAN RIGHTS WHICH FOUND
SUPPORT AMONGST SOME SOVIET SATELLITES.
IN EUROPE THEN, DETENTE BROUGHT IMPORTANT GAINS FOR THE
SOVIETS BUT ITS TRUE TEST WOULD BE IN THE WAY IT ALLOWED
THE USSR TO MANAGE ITS RELATIONS WITH THE USA. AND THE
AMERICANS WERE READY FOR DETENTE FOR ONE REASON ABOVE
ALL ELSE: VIETNAM.
IN THE 1950S, THE AMERICAN ECONOMY WAS BOOMING. TO MANY
IN THE US THE POSTWAR FEARS OF DEPRESSION SEEMED TO HAVE
BEEN A BAD DREAM. ON THE BACK OF THE VAST INCREASES IN
DEFENCE SPENDING WHICH FOLLOWED NSC 68, IT WAS NOT JUST
THE MILITARY WHICH PROFITED. MASSIVE INFRASTRUCTURAL
INVESTMENT IN, FOR EXAMPLE, ROADS AND AIRPORTS – WHICH
BOTH HAD DUAL MILITARY AND CIVILIAN USE – AND A BOOM IN
JOBS MEANT THAT, SUPERFICIALLY AT LEAST THE AMERICAN
DREAM SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN REALISED. THIS WAS ALL IN
MARKED CONTRAST TO THE STATE OF THE SOVIET ECONOMY.
IN FOREIGN POLICY TERMS THOUGH, THE PICTURE WAS ALSO THE
OPPOSITE OF THAT IN THE SOVIET UNION. EISENHOWER’S
PROMISE TO ROLLBACK COMMUNISM WAS NOT BEING
DELIVERED. TO SOME IT SEEMED AS IF COMMUNISM WAS
GETTING AN EASY RIDE.
BUT JUST AS KHRUSCHEV WAS SEEKING FRIENDS AND ALLIES
AND WAS SEEMINGLY WILLING TO EMBRACE 3RD WORLD
NATIONALISM, AMERICA WAS HEADING IN THE OPPOSITE
DIRECTION.
WHILE THE USA LED THE TRULY ENORMOUS TASK OF NATIONBUILDING IN WEST GERMANY AND JAPAN – DEVELOPING
MODERN, CAPITALIST DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES WHERE BEFORE
THERE HAD BEEN DICTATORSHIP, IN THE 3RD WORLD AMERICA
PROJECTED ITSELF IN A DIFFERENT WAY. GONE WAS THE
POSITIVE IMAGE WHICH EMBRACED FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY
AND IN ITS PLACE THE US DEFINED ITSELF IN TERMS OF WHAT IT
WAS OPPOSED TO – AND IT WAS OPPOSED TO CHANGE.
BUILDING ON THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE, EISENHOWER HAD
REDUCED THE DEBATE TO A SIMPLE TEST – IF YOU’RE NOT WITH
US, THEN YOU’RE AGAINST US. TO BE WITH THE US COUNTRIES
HAD TO SUBSCRIBE TO WASHINGTON’S ANTI-COMMUNIST WORLD
VIEW. FAILURE TO PASS THE TEST AUTOMATICALLY MADE YOU
SUBVERSIVE AND COMMUNIST.
MOST OBVIOUSLY, THE EFFECTS OF THIS CAN BE SEEN IN TERMS
OF WASHINGTON’S APPROACH TO THIRD WORLD NATIONALISM.
DESPITE ITS OWN HISTORY AS THE FIRST COUNTRY TO THROW
OFF IMPERIALISM, THE US WAS DOGGED BY ITS FEAR THAT
CHANGE WOULD BE EXPLOITED BY COMMUNISTS. IT MADE
EVERY EFFORT TO FRUSTRATE SIGNS OF INDEPENDENCE IN THE
DEVELOPING WORLD MAINLY THROUGH SUBVERSION BY THE CIA.
OF GREATEST SIGNIFICANCE THOUGH WAS AMERICAN
DETERMINATION TO RESIST NATIONALIST AND COMMUNIST
FORCES IN VIETNAM, A COUNTRY OF NO REAL IMPORTANCE TO
THE US EXCEPT THAT WASHINGTON CONVINCED ITSELF THAT
VIETNAM’S LOSS WOULD TIP OTHER COUNTRIES INTO
COMMUNISM – THE SO-CALLED DOMINO THEORY.
IN 1945, HO CHI MINH, WHO HAD LED RESISTANCE TO THE
JAPANESE OCCUPATION, DECLARED INDEPENDENCE FROM
FRANCE WITH WORDS TAKEN FROM THE AMERICAN
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND WITH AN AMERICAN
SECRET AGENT BY HIS SIDE. WASHINGTON, HOWEVER,
TOLERATED THE RETURN OF THE FRENCH COLONIAL
GOVERNMENT AND SOON HO WAS FIGHTING THE FRENCH TO
ACHIEVE FULL INDEPENDENCE. IN 1954, AT DIEN BIEN PHU, THE
VIETNAMESE INFLICTED HUMILIATING DEFEAT ON THE FRENCH,
WHO LIKE THE BRITISH IN GREECE, PROVED UNABLE TO DEFEND
WESTERN INTERESTS.
AT THE GENEVA CONFERENCE OF 1955, A PEACE DEAL WAS
REACHED WHICH TEMPORARILY SPLIT VIETNAM AT THE 17TH
PARALLEL, WITH HO’S NATIONALISTS AND COMMUNISTS IN THE
NORTH AND A TEMPORARY FRENCH ADMINISTRATION IN THE
SOUTH. THE AGREEMENT PROVIDED FOR NATIONAL ELECTIONS IN
1956. THE AMERICANS REFUSED TO ACCEPT THE DEAL BECAUSE
OF COMMUNIST INVOLVEMENT WITH HO’S NATIONALISTS.
INSTEAD THE AMERICAN SET UP A PUPPET GOVERNMENT IN THE
SOUTH UNDER ANOTHER JAPANESE COLLABORATOR NAMED NGO
DINH DIEM AND THE DIE WAS CAST. THE AMERICANS EMBARKED
ON A PLAN TO SET UP SOUTH VIETNAM AS AN ANTI-COMMUNIST
STATE – AND WHY DID THEY DO THIS? WELL, BECAUSE THEY
FEARED THAT HO WOULD WIN THE ELECTIONS. BUT THEY HAD
DECIDED TO “SINK OR SWIM” WITH SOUTH VIETNAM.
DURING EISENHOWER’S PRESIDENCY, US MILITARY NUMBERS IN
VIETNAM NEVER EXCEEDED 1,000. BUT THE ELECTION OF JOHN
KENNEDY, IN 1961, CHANGED THAT AND SET THE COURSE WHICH
STILL WOULD DEFINE AMERICA FOR A GENERATION.
KENNEDY WAS A MAN OF ACTION. HE WAS THE PRESIDENT WHO
WOULD CLOSE THE MISSILE GAP; HE WAS THE MAN WHO WOULD
REACH THE MOON; HE WAS THE MAN WHO WOULD ROLLBACK
COMMUNISM WHERE HIS PREDECESSOR HAD FAILED. HE TOLD
AMERICANS THAT THEY WOULD “BEAR ANY BURDEN TO WIN THE
FREEDOM OF MAN”. AND KENNEDY WAS DETERMINED NOT TO
LOSE VIETNAM. AS THE VIETNAMESE SOUGHT TO REMOVE THE
PUPPET GOVERNMENT IN THE SOUTH, KENNEDY FIRST SENT MORE
MILITARY ADVISERS AND THEN FIGHTING TROOPS TO SE ASIA. BY
1963, AMERICA WAS EMBROILED IN A WAR WHICH KENNEDY
THOUGHT HAD TO BE WON. WHEN HE WAS ASSASSINATED, THERE
WERE 16,000 AMERICAN SOLDIERS IN VIETNAM. HIS SUCCESSOR,
LYNDON JOHNSON WAS SUCKED FURTHER INTO THE QUAGMIRE
AND BY THE END OF 1968 THERE WERE 568,000 AMERICAN TROOPS
IN VIETNAM.
ALL THE WHILE THAT THE US WAS BOGGED DOWN IN VIETNAM,
THE USSR HAD CLOSED THE MISSILE GAP AND WAS REAPING THE
PROPAGANDA BENEFITS OF SEEING THE WORLD’S MOST
POWERFUL NATION UNABLE TO DEFEAT A BUNCH OF ASIAN
PEASANTS.
RICHARD NIXON, WHO WON THE 1968 ELECTION, WAS, DESPITE
BEING THE CONSUMATE COLD WAR WARRIOR, ABOVE ALL A
PRAGMATIST. HE REALISED THAT IT WAS NOT IN AMERICA’S
INTEREST TO OPPOSE EVERY SIGN OF AGGRESSION, RATHER HE
WAS KEEN TO PRESERVE INTERNATIONAL ORDER. NIXON’S
PRIORITY WAS TO GET OUT OF VIETNAM SO THAT THE US COULD
CONCENTRATE ON THE REAL PROBLEMS FACING IT. BUT HE
WANTED TO PRESERVE THE SOUTH AND TO RETREAT WITH
HONOUR.
HIS FIRST MOVE WAS TO EXPLOIT THE SINO-SOVIET SPLIT AND, IN
1972, HE BECAME THE FIRST US PRESIDENT TO VISIT COMMUNIST
CHINA. BUT THE REALITY WAS THAT IT WAS THE SOVIETS WHO HE
NEEDED IN ORDER TO ESCAPE FROM VIETNAM AND IT WAS JUST
AT THIS POINT THAT BREZHNEV’S NEED FOR ACCESS TO
AMERICAN TECHNOLOGY MEANT THAT THE TWO SUPERPOWERS
BOTH HAD AN INTEREST IN TALKING.
OVER THE NEXT THREE YEARS, DETENTE BECAME THE FOCUS OF
COLD WAR DIPLOMACY AS THE AMERICANS AND THE SOVIETS
TALKED ABOUT VIRTUALLY EVERYTHING. THREE SUMMIT
MEETINGS TOOK PLACE IN 1972, 1973 AND 1974 BETWEEN THE TWO
POWERS AND AGREEMENTS WERE REACHED ON ARMS CONTROL,
STRATEGIC MISSILE REDUCTION, THE OUTLAWING OF
BIOLOGICAL WARFARE, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND
TRADE. AND THE SOVIETS ALSO HELPED NIXON TO REACH A DEAL
WITH THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WHICH ALLOWED HIM TO
WITHDRAW AMERICAN TROOPS FROM VIETNAM, IN 1973, WHILE
PRESERVING THE SOUTH FROM ATTACK.
WHILE NIXON WAS ABLE TO SECURE HIS CHERISHED GOAL OF AN
END TO THE VIETNAM WAR, THE SOVIETS GAINED ENORMOUSLY
FROM DETENTE.
- THEY WERE AT LAST BEING TREATED AS EQUALS BY THE
USA
- THEY HAD MARGINALISED THE CHINESE
- THEY HAD SECURED AMERICAN TECHNOLOGY FOR THEIR
AILING ECONOMY
BUT BY 1975, DETENTE WAS DEAD. NIXON’S WATERGATE
PROBLEMS INCREASINGLY CONSUMED HIM BEFORE HE RESIGNED
IN 1974; THE 1973 YOM KIPPUR WAR EXPOSED SUPERPOWER COOPERATION AS ONLY SKIN DEEP AND THE INVASION OF SOUTH
VIETNAM AND THE SWIFT DEFEAT OF THE SOUTH’S GOVERNMENT
IN APRIL 1975 SOUNDED THE DEATH KNELL FOR THIS LATEST
PHASE OF PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE.
SO, HOW CAN WE SUMMARISE THE FIRST 30 YEARS OF THE COLD
WAR?
FIRST, IT CAN BE DESCRIBED AS A STRUGGLE TO FIND A NEW
INTERNATIONAL ORDER TO REPLACE THE OLD EUROPEAN
IMPERIAL SYSTEM. BOTH THE USA AND THE SOVIET UNION HAD
EMERGED AS THE MAJOR POWERS IN 1945 – WITH AMERICA BY
FAR THE STRONGER OF THE TWO. AND THEY HAD EMBARKED ON
A CONTEST, YES, FOR SURVIVAL BUT ALSO TO RE-MAKE THE
WORLD IN THEIR OWN IMAGE.
BOTH POWERS WERE IDEOLOGICALLY PRE-DISPOSED TO
EXPANSION, BOTH FELT THAT THEIR SECURITY DEPENDED ON
SUCCESS IN THE GLOBAL STRUGGLE FOR SUPREMACY, NEITHER
UNDERSTOOD THE OTHER AND THEY VIEWED EACH OTHER AS
MORTAL FOES. IN THIS SENSE THE COLD WAR WAS INEVITABLE.
SECOND, NEITHER THE AMERICANS NOR THE SOVIETS HAD FIXED
COLD WAR FOREIGN OR MILITARY POLICIES. BOTH ADAPTED
THEIR APPROACHES ACCORDING TO THEIR UNDERSTANDING OF
THE SITUATION AT ANY GIVEN TIME. THE LEADERS OF BOTH
COUNTRIES HAD DIRECT INFLUENCE ON THE POLICIES THEY
DEVISED AND FOLLOWED – SOME MORE THAN OTHERS. BUT THE
IDEA THAT SOVIET POLICY WAS MONLITHIC WAS AS MUCH A
NONSENSE AS WAS THE IDEA THAT THE AMERICANS WERE
SIMPLY DEFENDING FREEDOM.
FINALLY, AFTER ALL THE CONFLICT OF THE PRECEDING 30 YEARS,
BY 1975 BOTH THE USA AND THE USSR HAD BECOME WEAK. THE
USSR, WAS HAMSTRUNG BY AN INEFFICIENT ECONOMY UNABLE
TO DELIVER QUALITY GOODS TO ITS CITIZENS AND WAS RUNNING
AN INCREASINGLY FRACTIOUS EMPIRE.
FOR ITS PART, THE USA HAD JUST EJECTED A PRESIDENT WHO
WAS A CRIMINAL. AND 58,000 OF ITS TROOPS HAD DIED IN A WAR
THAT IT SHOULD NEVER HAVE FOUGHT, IN WHICH AT LEAST 2
MILLION VIETNAMESE DIED, AND WHICH HAD TORN THE
COUNTRY APART. AND ALL IN THE NAME OF IDEOLOGY.
IN 1975, THE TWO SUPERPOWERS WERE FACING DIFFICULTIES OF
DIFFERENT KINDS AND FOUND THEMSELVES IN AN INCREASINGLY
MULTIPOLAR WORLD. IT SEEMED, THOUGH, THAT THE COLD WAR
HAD WANED AND THAT COMPETITION BETWEEN THE USA AND
THE USSR WAS LESS INTENSE. THE TWO YOUNG LIONS OF 1945
HAD HAD THE SHINE KNOCKED OFF THEM BY 1975.