D I Dr . Ber nhard Schneider, A -3943 N eukott inghör manns 58 T + 4 3 2 8 5 3 / 7 2 3 5 8 , M o b i l e p h o n e + 4 3 . 6 7 6 7 6 . 1 4 0 0 0 , pl@nschmie.de, www.makeplans.at Consulting Engineer for Urban Planning, Project evaluation Background: Expected need to balance growing demand and quality expectations against increasingly overburdened transport infrastructure, making use of new opportunities in the field of telematics. There is an urgent need to progress along the priority hierarchy of avoiding, shifting (between modi, in time) and controlling traffic more efficiently. Challenge Facing this multiple challenge, city planners in cooperation with applied research units and entrepreneurial development departments in Europe have identified various strategies. They have to be applied in a mix that corresponds to the specific nature of the given problems of an agglomeration, but also to the available budget and to public acceptance – one might say, they need to be “orchestrated”. Efficient multi-modal urban traffic solutions require activity at many levels. The following lists mentions some example of such strategies recently developed in urban agglomerations which have taken the lead: Developing city quarters into fully functional de-centralized units which offer citizens all they need so they won’t have to leave the quarter too often building on rich hutong tradition (“cities of short distances”, “villages within the city”) Do what it takes in order to make a bus- or city-train-ride more cheap, quick AND comfortable than a ride on a motorbike Customization of Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS) to specific traffic conditions of the urban agglomeration; real-time online monitoring of traffic situation evaluating floating vehicle data and/or floating phone data, developing of an overarching ITS architecture at national level Application of mobility- (in particular: road) pricing instruments. Traffic control systems (head-up information at the main highways, monitor information at metro/bus-stops); including air pollution-responsive traffic control. Dynamic public and private traffic management solutions in case of accidents/incidents Settlement planning following public transport infrastructure (and not the other way round) – public transport access as a prerequisite for the zoning of new residential settlements as practiced e.g. in the suburbs of Berlin) Continuous safety improvement regulations, including standardized accident reporting, and evaluation of safety impact of measures set. Good Practice Building on this analysis, four areas of good practice were identified which were deemed suitable for mutual learning with China: - A transport association for urban agglomerations, - a mobility-pricing solution, - a pedestrianization of an old town center, and - a zero-tariff system for urban transportation. Transport Associations for Urban Agglomerations By tradition, each larger European city has a transport company, a transport service network and a tariff system of its own. Most of them are municipality-owned, but in some countries several years ago such companies have been largely privatized; for example the French Veolia group’s last year’s turnover made up 100 M€ from the operation of formerly public urban and suburban bus-lines alone. For passengers, locally operate transport means to change trains/busses at city limits, to buy one more ticket1 and in many case also to pay more. In this situation, from the 1980`s on, most urban regions operate joint associations with the aim: passengers should not feel it when they cross an administrative border. Also schedule information and online-ticket-sale are frequently being pooled in these services. Example: Transport Association Rhein-Ruhr, Germany This associationi is an example of an initiative which did more than just harmonizing ticket sale and prices: 1 Distance-dependent pricing according to 5 price categories Pre-paid ticket offers Offers for special target groups, e.g. handicapped persons Price reductions for travels to the adjacent area covered by other transport associations departure monitor configured for PC desktop and cell phone background Ticket reservation Mobility warrancy Marketing activities such as trial offers to convince car-users Customer information Operation of a customer info center with online info-desk Tendering; not only own soft measures, but also even infrastructure investment is The principle is „one trip – one ticket“ - being carried out via the association. Joint bike rental infrastructure with region-wide bike return Joint staff training Such regional organizations are able to offer and maintain higher quality information and marketing support services than the various members (transport companies) could, and this is due to improved ease of use and to economies of scale. - Single members of the association would be able to develop and promote offers only for their small territory, which would cause inconvenience to passengers passing the border to another transport micro-area, and would lead to high “information update costs” among passengers. - Only the larger transport area brings economies of scale needed to invest into novel customer-friendly solutions. - Pooling of resources: Such pooling may relate to the vehicle park, to human resources, and to preparation and maintenance costs of logistics and telematics solutions. In China, there are examples of efficiently working transport associations available for instance for the city and suburbs of Foshan (approx. 800.000 inhabitants)ii. This city claims to have implemented the first Chinese model of integrated public transport pricing. Light-rail systems for mass passenger transport Light rail has a long-standing tradition in China, but in many cities the solution was abandoned when cheap buses became available. In Beijing, trams were in operation already in 1899, and also Tianjin and Fushun were equipped with tramways very early. In Changchun, the existing tramway has been introduced 70 years ago, and also Dalian still maintains its old tramway system. Shenyang city operates a modern rail-tram; in Shanghai and in close-by Zhangjiang as well as in Tianjin there are rubber-tired trams. Rubber tires were chosen because of hilly city surfaces. Wuhan, Shenzhen, Zhuhai have electricity-driven light-rail systems under construction. Reportedly also in Beijing and Nanjing, railcars shall be introduced. Apart for road crossings, rails will be laid on parts of roads which are closed for car traffic, electronic systems will influence traffic lights to speed up rail-traffic, and modern telematics solutions will be used for logistical planning and passenger information. There are also high-quality tramcar manufacturers in China. With prices kept at moderate 1-2 Yuan per ride, tram acceptance is high wherever there are tram systems. Trams should be much more frequently built as a measure to combat both road congestion and smog. It is paradox that in Tianjin, tramways are not planned for the crammed city center but for the outskirts, and that this is explained by the authorities saying that the city roads are too much crammediii to build a light-rail system into them. This statement neglects the finding of all cities which have introduced tramways in their centers – they contribute much, much more to car frequency reduction and cause little additional use of space. Mobility Pricing. Definition Mobility pricing is a solution to collect a price for the use of each transport infrastructure, which grants the right to use the infrastructure for a certain mileage and not for a certain period. Commuters pay by trip when using their car just as they need a ticket when riding a bus or going by tram. It is not at all an idea of this century: In the 16th century in Austria and Germany the formerly used system of charging toll only from those entering a road was accomplished by a second payment for those leaving the road, and this payment in some cases depended of the distance travellediv. Some experts such as the German transport consultant Transcare based at Wiesbaden, use the term “intelligent toll” as a synonym for mobility pricing solutions in order to express that such a pricing system is not only more sophisticated, but that apart of its function of revenue generation it also implements a certain traffic control effect. Mobility pricing solutions can relate to entire nations (as the solution for trucks in Austria, the solution for the state of Oregon, etc.), to entire cities (San Diego), to the access to cities (Oslo, Stockholm, London…) or to certain routes only. Most mobility pricing solutions are satellite-based city-toll administration systems which allow behavior steering effects by flexible pricing. To give an example, there may be a moderate fee per km charged for each use of a citizen`s private car or motorcycle, which might considerably rise for routes and day-times in which a traffic-jam might show up. Moreover, it is no problem for such solutions to differentiate prices according to the emissions of the vehicle and to the social status of the driver (e.g. alleviation of elderly persons or for commercial transportation). Basically, mobility pricing should relate to both individual and public transport, to passenger and to freight transport, to road-, rail- waterway- and airborne travel. But often, especially in North America, the term is used in relation to passenger car travel alone. According to the regional constellation, there may be good reasons to introduce mobility pricing for one sector only. Whilst price collection from individual car users will build on data transmitted by transponders or mobile phones, for public transportation mostly ticket-based solutions are being discussed. Their most advanced form is BIBO (“be-in/beout”), i.e. the charging of a fare that reflects the distance actually travelled in a userfriendly way. Passengers need not use any devices, but just pass gates equipped with touchless smart-card readers. Acceptance For the time being, only a small percentage of early adopters among the European metropolitan transport authorities have introduced mobility pricing solutions. But a high percentage of them has started thinking about introducing such solutions, although most of them do not discuss the issue in public. It seems to be a rule that political bodies never come up with such promises in the time before elections, because the topic is hardly ever seen as helpful for winning elections, and in pre-election campaigning they even often defy that such measures are being thought of. In countries with a less mature or with a recently damaged democratic climate and with politicians and media acting very much through simplified populist campaigns, mobility pricing is very often strictly rejected in public opinion. Although heavily complaining about traffic congestion, less-well informed citizens have a tendency to prefer solutions such as additional or broader highways as long as they do not live where they shall be built. Only in periods of high particulate matter pollution, there are majorities for mobility pricing. In less trustworthy political settings, citizens distrust any changes in taxation, as from experience they cannot believe that they will replace taxes. They think that when new taxes get introduced, the old ones will nevertheless remain, and thus oppose any change in taxation. Acceptance depends also on the question, whether revenues will be used for a repayment of highway erection costs, or on the financing of external costs and of alternative to fossilfueled passenger car mobility. The first solution will attract sympathy from liberally minded groups in favor of reduced public spending, the latter will attract ecologically aware citizens. Big data Mobility pricing comes along with the collection and permanent evaluation of huge amounts of vehicle- and passenger-related geo-data, yet mature technological solutions are available which have proven capable to reliably process this steady information flow. There is no basic technical problem in handling the data amount (the system just needs to regularly charge a car-holder with geo-data and current traffic load of streets). If deemed useful, also the number of passengers per vehicle could be taken into account in pricing, but this would require a higher data capturing effort. Prices are normally charged by a smart card, and real-time cost development could be displayed on the navigation screen of passenger vehicles. The main problem related to data is not so much their technical handling but rather the compliance of data collection and use with national legislation on protection of individual data and the growing unwillingness of citizens to have themselves observed. Data might be misused. Good paractice Successfully implemented solutions are available in - Oslo, Norway (1990), - Stockholm (2003) “trängelskatt” after a referendum - London 2003, Extra charges for peak load travel are being chargéd at Stockholm, but not in London. - state-wide in Oregon (USA) 2007, - Austria (state-wide for truck traffic – 2010) were well accepted as they managed to protect personal data. - California: transponder-linked high-occupancy toll (HOT) lanes in L.A. and San Diego - San Francisco 3$ per entry to the old center, - Rome, Italy - Hongkong. - Brisbane, Melbourne, Sydney (Australia) - Singapore has introduced road pricing in 1998, and later on also an integrated mobility pricing for rail and road. - Netherlands: general pre-paid system with social differentiation. “Spitsmijden”v Other city regions such as Aucklandvi (NZ) have simulated impacts of a road pricing solution. Pros and Cons: + system might replace taxes and other toll systems, e.g. for trucks. + synergies with introduction of a recommendation management solution such as a system informing whenever a driver can save time by switching to public transport. + Toll-collect technology: already time-tested in trucks. Currently system operation costs make up 13,5 % of net revenue. This share might even sink. + The solution although cost-neutral for public authorities and households, can allow to avoid jams and to create better awareness on eco-behavior. - Cost transparency and “true cost” systems are not necessarily superior and fairer. - Potential danger of privacy misuse - multiple (e.g. commercial, political, military) use of passenger data cannot be excluded - Demand steering effect over-estimation - A smarter city is not necessarily more livable and loveable - Phenomenon of introducing data-based policies first for a good purpose, with this purpose later on removed, whilst tax revenue creation and data collection remain. A deeper look at the “Cons” About Cost Transparency Advocates of mobility pricing often refer to the argument that mobility pricing allows to improve cost transparency. In the German-speaking countries, the respective term is “system of true costs”. Of course, markets are built on the principle that when I buy some apples I should not have to be for the tomatoes the guy next beside to me is buying. But in each market economy that has not yet abandoned the objective of social balance, there are many good reasons why some goods should be cheaper or more expensive than their cost structure reflects. In some cases such a deviation of pricing from costs will reflect externalities such as costs of environmental measures, but in many cases there might be other reasons, for instance that the transactions are that there is a reason to keep a good accessible to poorer citizens by decretion of lower political prices, as we find it happen in the health care sector. And just think about the rule in many economies to subject goods and services to different VAT tariffs according to the nature of the product. VAT brings about that all prices are to some extent political prices, and then most economies do have special taxes on real estate, labor and fossil fuel. So as a principle, one may be cautious when talking about “true cost”-pricing. When economists suggest cost transparency, in most cases they do not just want the consumer to KNOW the true price of a good, but they want him to PAY it. Examples of cost transparency without charging full costs are not frequently found, but there are some. For instance, in Austria health service is in many cases for free or just subject to a small contribution. Yet, once a year health insurance companies which pay the rest send the consumer a breakdown of actually accounted costs, and thus want to give the consumer an impression of real costs. This might be an interesting suggestion for a mobility-priced transport sector as well and would deserve further consideration because of its possible impact on cost awareness, but this is not the point of the current discourse. Current discourse wants to take the passenger transport sector as it is, and to distribute its costs equally among the voyagers. For this purpose, it suggests to quantify “real” costs of public and individual passenger transport as precisely as possible, which means to have cost tables which show costs per kilometer for highways, roads, streets, small and big passenger cars, split up into costs of rush-hours and more “quiet times”. By charging much higher costs for a kilometer in an urban traffic jam, city population would pay more than now, whilst villagers would pay less. Müller-Jentzsch, although an advocate of true cost charging, does not go that far to suggest higher prices per kilometer for travels in mountainous areas characterized by high freeway construction and maintenance costs. One may of course pose the question, whether there is any good reason for postulating prices that mirror costs as a dogma. This is not a dogma in a socialist economy, where certain prices may be kept low because of political priorities, and neither is it a dogma in a market economy where prices first and foremost mirror willingness to pay. Just have a look at your cosmetics shelf or into your medicine cabinet, and you will find this to be true. Thus, the better concept should be to develop a price structure which offers the best steering effect. This might not only include the differentiation of prices according to regional GDP, in order to support marginal rural countries (this is likely to happen in the EU), but might also comprise alleviations for depopulating regions. Motivation to buy cars with low fuel consumption Influencing day-time distribution of vehicles (jam mitigation) Perceived (out-of-pocket-) cost Avoiding of “tanking tourism” (drivers fill tanks beyond borders in low-fueltax-states) Socially equitable Data misuse excluded Political stability (see chapter below) Taxation of fossil fuel Mobility pricing possible no rather no problem in border regions to states with other policy rather high possible no Low, might be easily turned into the contrary Example to illustrate “true costs” (Austria) True costs of road transport are often presented as costs of road maintenance alone. This does not reflect the full scope of costs. According to HERRY, there are the following direct costs (and indirect ones mentioned further below): 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. road maintenance road construction Building and maintenance of parking lots Street and road cleaning Street lighting Roadside ditches, verges Deficit of road police and accident cleaning (fire brigades,…) Subsidies for car and road construction industries The direct costs of raod transport in Austria according to HERRYvii made up 4.812.000.000 € (= approx. 700 € p.a. per capita in 2014 prices) + 9,222.000.000 € (=approx. 800 € per citizen at 2014 prices) for external costs caused by environmental pollution and costs of car accidents. Without taking into account external costs and accident costs, HERRY assumes a total cost financing ratio of 94%, but when they get included into total prices, this ratio decreases to 32%. With public transport covering approx. 35% of its direct costs by revenues, external and accident costs would have to be taken into account here as well in order to achieve comparable results. These externalities are much lower for public transport than for individual road transport, and for this reason - but also because to some extent public buses use roads accounted among individual transport costs – the share of self-financing of individual transport in Austria exceeds self-financing of public transport on road, rail and waterways. Nevertheless, this fact should not serve as an argument for the further strengthening of individual transport, because the results would differ a lot, if the public sector would stop investing into road construction and if he would chargé higher road tolls. In such a scenario, net public budget expenses (cost minus revenues) would be much lesser than now. In this scenario, and additional positive effect will arise from the fact that a permanent reduction of individual transport would also make possible to use former parking and street area for other purposes. If charging just direct costs without costs of air pollution, noise, land consumption and road accidents, a daily commuter heading to Vancouver each day for work, would have to pay 12 Canadian Dollars per day. On demand elasticity Mobility pricing intends to shift traffic in time and space and between transport modes in order to avoid costly and annoying congestion. Participation in traffic jams already now is not free of cost. Most of all it costs time and nerves. Thus, most drivers who have a proper behavior option, avoid jams, and those who feel there is no such option get stuck in regular congestion. But given that congestion taxes are high enough, the Californian example shows that a certain jam reduction may be expected. Time elasticity seems rather restricted and is a long-term concept. It needs the breaking up of strict working hour schemes. Not all workplaces and schools can be that flexible, but some certainly could. As an alternative to mobility pricing, there could be a bonus-malus system in wage taxation for workers in urban areas, giving incentives for flexible working hours. Spatial elasticity (choice of an alternative route to avoid congestion): with more and more cars being equipped with start-stop-systems, this reaction will be undesirable from the environmental viewpoint. Alternative routes will be longer and thus cause more pollution. Alternative routes are often found in streets not prepared for heavy traffic, and thus show increased accident rates. They will stimulate urban planners to change traffic regulations, keeping such jam-refugees out by systems of one-way streets etc. Elasticity in respect to transport mode is what is most desirable for urban development. Such a shift can be reached only by concerted action comprising well-located P+R parking solutions with e-vehicle docking stations, cheap prepaid annual tickets, attractive public transport (in time, not crammed, quick, supported by info-displays, secure and clean), and by offering opportunities to work at home and to shift from real-time to virtual meetings, which requires broadband data transfer “to the last mile” in residential areas. To acquire this rush-hour-typical target group, it is important to offer independent bus- and tram-lanes, because passengers will not change from passenger car congestion into bus congestion. If these latter measures will not be implemented right when introducing a mobility pricing solution, there is a danger that congestion taxes will end up with a moderate environmental effect (however, yielding very high tax revenues in this case), and it might be quite unpopular. To the more, the modal split effect of mobility pricing will be gravely hampered by the fact that rush-hour surcharges will not relate to passenger car traffic alone, but will also be extended to public transport, where operators also wish to distribute the transport load more equally across day-time. As a conclusion, Müller-Jentzsch’s and others’ expectation that cost-reflecting pricing will show great beneficiary effects, might be an overestimation, and a system of high-capacity trams and buses with cheap of even free-ride on public urban and suburban transport financed by sharply increased taxation of fossil fuel might be a superior solution. Mobility pricing as an element of smart cities A smart city does not necessarily have to have a mobility pricing solution, but it is more likely to develop one because its technological and mental preconditions have already been preinstalled. In recent expert literature, there are also critical remarks on smart cities. Two of them shall be presented below to give an impression about this discourse: The first is taken from the work of the sociologist Richard SENNETviii. He has been analyzing the question why people do not like smart cities better than others, and why the cities which are most positively perceived, are far from being smart, He compares cities such as Songdo in South Korea and the smart city Masdar in the United Emirates with cities such as Rio de Janeiro. Lack of control enhances individual liberty, and a lack of structures creates market opportunities for micro-businesses. It seems that not only individual behavior patterns can adopt to new types of cities quite slowly, but that the smart city of the future as a concept is still somewhat incomplete. It is advanced in the way it makes structured use of novel opportunity created by quick computers able to rapidly process enormous amounts of data, but we must learn to pose smarter questions to devices designed to give certain smart answers. I tis also a lesson from slum upgrading in Mumbai that residents, while certainly happy about their being docked to functioning infrastructure, rejected the readily planned, uniform functional solutions and tried to save as much functional element of the slum into the new city structures. Preparing for large sports events, Rio has lately been taking big efforts to be smarter. Application ranges from flood prevention to traffic jam prognoses, efficient police work and smart public transport solutions. These measures have been accepted rather broadly as they had a coordinating character, not forming the image of the city but coordinating its functions. “The prospect of the orderly city has not be a lure for voluntary migration, neither in the past to European cities, nor today to the sprawling cities of South America and Asia. If they have a choice, people want a more open, indeterminate city in which to make their way: that is how they can come to take ownership over their own lives.”ix (quoation from a blog post http://urbanchoreography.net/2013/06/10/richard-sennet-the-stupefyingsmart-city/) As a conclusion, one may postulate that chosen solutions - should show not only good ease of use, - but should also appear in a way which in each situation makes clear that the human is the master and the technology is the slave, - should in no way over-regulate society - should not contribute to the trend of uniform cities. On the phenomenon of degradation of sustainability goals to mere profit generation Phase 1. Discussion, preparation 2. pilot implementation 3. Roll-out (lncl. legislation) 4. Fix policy element Objective Achieve true-cost charging solutions willingness2pay Social justice, fairness Eco-effects Macroeconomic benefits (pollution, less time wasted in jam, cheap administration) What happens Acceptance raising Measures Studies, conviction of intellectuals Business planning Lower prices for for solution socially weak providers (elderly, jobless, youth…) Measures against data robbery Incentives for lowemission vehicles, for more persons/vehicle,… Cross-funding of PT Public discourse point of no return Deconstruction in Waiting for the „suitable“ timeright moment window (budget commercialization crisis, switch to of … populism in polls…) Flat rate price No more crossfunding of PT Zero tariff as an effort of shifting passenger traffic to Public Transport Systems (Example: City of Tallinn, Estonia) History in 2003, a first 40% price cut was executed, and a complicated perquisite system was introduced. As a consequence, use of public transport rose considerably. Thus, efforts to further improve the system in the recent past, have been enacted on an already rather high service level. After a referendum at city-level in 2013, „zero tariff“ for locals was implemented, Non-residents of Tallinn pay 1,60 € per ride. When deciding to offer free ride, it was clear to the transport managers, that this could not be enacted immediately, but hat to come along with ambitious accompanying measures. Additional busses and suburban trains were bought in order to cope with expected additional passengers, new suburban lines were introduced, and bus-lanes were built. Objectives According to research carried out by the University of Stockholm, the citizens of Tallinn have decided to have free public transport for several reasons: - air quality improvement → health - Energy savings → payment balance - reduced cost for administration & controlling - Socially equitable for poor citizens - Better labor market inclusion of unemployed - make Tallinn more competitive as a place to live & work After 1 year (research of the University of Stockholm), achieved interim results were measured and evaluated: There was a passenger plus, although a moderate one. The total of passengers transported rose by 3%. Researchers found out that 1,2% of the growth was due to the zero-tariff, and that the remaining 1,8%were caused by the improved service offer. A rise in passenger transport figures could be witnessed especially in districts inhabited by elderly and poorer citizens. The total travel distance rose more moderately than the number of passengers transported. An increase of 2,5% of person-kilometers was measured. Car-traffic was also counted at strategic locations of the city. In the period of the tariff reform it showed no significant change. The plus in public passenger transportation this happened on the account of additional mobility induced. A shift from former pedestrians and cyclists to public transport could be witnessed, or rather a change in behavior. Had citizens who had to carry out short trips in times of pay-tickets more often decided to just walk, they now increasingly jumped a bus. It is a lesson of the evaluation of passenger behavior before and after zero tariff introduction, that car use is more strongly determined by expected jam and parking situations rather than by price deliberations. But this conclusion will most probably be influenced by the fact that even before the reform tickets were already cheap, and also by the fact that road congestions are a lesser problem in Tallinn (with only half a million of inhabitants) than in the larger European cities. The total cost of the tariff reform, not taking into account investment into improved transport quality, amounts to 12 M€ p.a. = 25 € per capita p.a. Effect on city population Many commuters registered in the period of the tariff reform as Tallinn residents in order to have free-ride rights. Therefore, additional growth (exceeding the typical growth per annum witnessed in other years of the decade) made up approx. 7.000 citizens. These were mainly persons with weekend residence out of town, working or studying and dwelling during the week in Tallinn. The registration of these persons as Tallinn residents brought the municipality additional tax revenues for her budget. Passenger statistics have improved in the course of the introduction of the zero-tariff model because of a positioning and passenger counting systems in all vehicles. All-door entry made bus-stops shorter and thus gradually speeded up travelling. Lessons for other cities - effect is high where fares are high and incomes are low and perquisites are missing - chronical passenger decrease can be stopped - use of PT for short trips instead of walking When interpreting the impact of the tariff reform, one has to take into account that in 2003, a 40% price cut took place, and that ever since a complicated perquisite system was introduced, until after the referendum in 2013 „zero tariff“ for locals came, whilst nonresidents pay 1,60 € per ride, and that the new solution had to come together with improved service quality (higher density of trains and busses). Main legal aspects affected by above-mentioned issues In the European Union, only basic issues of highly transnational character are regulated at Union level. Also for historical reasons, most of transport-relevant legislation is national. Austria is a country heavily affected by freight transit. When a province decided to ban heavy trucks from its transit freeways, this was when limits of national sovereignty first became visible to many citizens. EU-regulated matters are the location and improvement of trans-European traffic corridors (rail and road), some airport-related issues, maximum exhaustion of motor vehicles, percentage of biofuels in motor vehicle fuel, (still) the maximum weight of trucks, trans-nationally execution of services, free market access to entrepreneurship including the operation of transport services, etc. To explain the structure of transport-related legislation, Austria was selected for the following reasons: - In this EU member state, both time-related mobility pricing (for passenger cars) as well as a distance-related system for trucks above 3,5 t are being practiced, - Public transport has a meaningful tradition - Austria is a federal state which splits up legislation between federal laws and laws relating to just one province. Austrian Federal law directly regulates transport issues in the following laws: - railroad law from 1957, including rules for expropriation on eminent domain - bus-line act from 2006, - ship transport act updated in 2013 with traffic regulation guidelines for lakes and waterways, - road traffic act from 1960, many times updated. Comprises rules for transparent display of fuel prices at filling stations, but does not regulate the prices themselves. - freight transportation act, - act on not-schedule-based commercial passenger transport (GelVG) 1995, - Act on toll for the use of federal roads (including regulations on mileage-dependent pricing for highway use) - Act on bus-line services from 1996, - motor vehicle act with its executive by-law from 1967, including regulations on driver training and licensing, completed by a law on driving licenses - Act on the financing of federal roads from 1996 - Act on the entitling of ASFINAG (state-owned highway construction and operation company), - Act on transportation of animals, etc. A passenger transportation act (as there is e.g. in Switzerland) is missing. Such an act would lay down basic rules for public transport pricing at local, regional and national level, and in times of growing interlinking of regional transport solutions and e-ticketing could certainly be seen as useful. Many other laws are not solely focused on transport issues, but are of high relevance to the issues discussed in this paper: - law on protection of data privacy VAT act, Fossil fuel taxation act from 1960, regularly updated. Air pollution act By-law on emission trade by-law regulating biofuel admixture natural gas market act electricity market act telecommunication act act on strategic environmental impact assessment aviation act Provincial laws accomplish the legal landscape of the transport sector; the most relevant matters regulated by provincial laws are: - Provincial road laws (relating to minor roads) - Construction regulations, - law on mandatory erection of garages for residential and other objects, etc. - of course, also the Austrian constitution plays a role here, for instance because of its principle of gaining equal rights to every citizen. Literature i ii http://www.vrr.de/blaetterkatalog/VRR_Gremienhandbuch/blaetterkatalog/index.html http://www.traffictechnologytoday.com/news.php?NewsID=23922 iii http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trams_in_Tianjin iv Stolz, O. (1953), Geschichte des Zollwesens, Verkehrs und Handels in Tirol und Vorarlberg von den Anfängen bis ins XX. Jahrhundert (Schlern–Schriften 108), Innsbruck v Van Nunen, J.A.E.E., Huibregts, P., Rieveld, P. (2011), Transitions Towards Sustainable Mobility: New Solutions and Approaches for Sustainable Transport Systems, Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, New York vi Ministry of Transport (2008), Auckland Road Pricing Study, Auckland vii HERRY Consult (2002), Österreichische Wegekostenrechnung Straße 2000, im Auftrag des BMVIT 2001, Wien viii A flexible city of strangers, in Le Monde Diplomatique, London ix Blog post http://urbanchoreography.net/2013/06/10/richard-sennet-the-stupefying-smart-city/ SENNET, R. (2001), Richard Sennett, the flexible human SENNET, R. (2013), The stupefying smart city, in: proceedings of Urban Age Electric City Conference