DEPARTMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
PAKISTAN
SUB-NATIONAL GOVERNANCE PROGRAMME
BUSINESS CASE
September 2012
1
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
ADP
AusAid
CAR
CDS
CGA
CIDA
CPI
CPIA
DAC
DCO
DDCF
DFID
EC
EDO
FATA
FRA
GDP
GEM
GIS
GIZ
GPS
GSDRC
HDI
HMG
IRR
J-PAL
KPK
M&E
MDG
MO
MoU
MTBF
NFC
NGO
NOC
NPV
OBB
ODI
OECD
OJEU
OPP
PCNA
PDU
PEOP
PFC
PRMP
PRP
PSLM
PSP
PTCs
RCTs
RIPORT
Annual Development Programme
Australian Aid
Capability Accountability and Responsiveness
Comprehensive Development Strategy
Country Governance Analysis
Canadian International Development Agency
Corruption Perception Index
Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act
Development Assistance Committee
District Coordination Officer
District Development Challenge Fund
Department for International Development
European Commission
Executive District Officer
Federally Administered Tribal Areas
Fiduciary Risk Assessment
Gross domestic product
Gender Empowerment Measures
Geographical Information System
Die Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
Global Positioning System
Governance and Social Development Resource Centre
Human Development Index
Her Majesty Government
Internal Rate of Return
Jameel Poverty Action Labs
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
Monitoring and Evaluation
Millennium Development Goals
Management Organisation
Memorandum of Understanding
Medium Term Budgetary Framework
National Finance Commission
Non-Governmental Organisation
No Objection Certificate
Net Present Value
Output Based Budgeting
Overseas Development Institute
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
Official Journal of the European Union
Orangi Pilot Project
Post Crisis Needs Assessment
Provincial Delivery Unit
Punjab Economic Opportunities Programme
Provincial Finance Commission
Punjab Reforms Management Programme
Provincial Reforms Programme
Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurements
Peace Building Support to Post Crisis Needs Assessment
Parent Teacher Councils
Randomised Controlled Trials
Regional Institute of Policy Research and Training
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SBP
SDU
SNG
SPDC
TA
TI
TTP
UC
UN
UNDP
UNESCO
UNICEF
USAID
VFM
WB
WDP
WGI
State Bank of Pakistan
Service Delivery Unit
Sub-National Governance
Social Policy and Development Centre
Technical Assistance
Transparency International
Tehrik-e- Taliban Pakistan
Union Councils
United Nations
United Nations Development Programme
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
United Nations Children's Fund
United States Agency for International Development
Value for Money
World Bank
World Development Report
World Governance Indicators
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1.
Programme Summary
1.1
What support will the UK provide?
The UK government will provide technical assistance and programme funds to improve
District Government performance in Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The funds will
improve management of service delivery and, by strengthening the evidence base on which
decisions are made, responsiveness to citizens. The programme will enhance government
transparency, local accountability and openness to citizens. The programme will work in six
focal districts in each Province, and with provincial governments, providing a platform for
other DFID programmes.
DFID will provide funding over four and a half years, 2012-16, to support this work.
1.2
Why is UK support required?
What need are we trying to address?
Pakistan faces significant social, economic and security challenges. Poverty is increasing
and the gap between rich and the poor is widening. Provision of basic services falls far short
of international norms and many groups, especially women, are excluded from access to
services. As a result, over a third of Pakistanis remain poor, and under-educated, with some
vulnerable to involvement with violent groups.
Governance lies at the heart of Pakistan’s deepest economic and social problems. The
dominance of military, bureaucratic and political elites has long distorted governance and
resource distribution. Weak social indicators reflect public sector mismanagement over many
decades. Weak capability and accountability are compounded by corruption. These
shortfalls undermine public confidence in the state and hamper Pakistan’s progress towards
the MDGs.
Reversing this requires government to deliver better services for poor and excluded people.
This involves changing not only service delivery arrangements, but also public sector
institutions, particularly the performance of district governments, which manage and monitor
local services, including education and health.
What will we do to tackle this problem?
Experience in Pakistan over the past decade has shown that top-down governance reform
programmes cannot on their own produce concrete, positive benefits for citizens. So this
programme will also work directly with District Governments, improving their capability and
removing the governance constraints that hamper service delivery. While DFID’s health and
education programmes support work on improving delivery within those sectors, this
programme will tackle common problems common to all service delivery, such as weak
planning, a lack of evidence on which to base policies and budgets, poor staff performance
management, corruption, and inadequate accounting to citizens and legislatures. Provincial
governments will be key partners in this approach, helping solve problems that can’t be fixed
locally and supporting roll-out of successful solutions across each Province, giving the
programme scale.
There is strong evidence that improving local government leads to better – and more
accountable – services for poor citizens. But evidence on how best to improve district
governance is limited, especially in conflict affected states like Pakistan. There are some
very promising initiatives already running, and the programme will immediately scale these
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up (e.g. Output Based Budgeting and GIS – see below). It will couple this with innovation,
encouraging district officials to test ideas, learn and demonstrate what delivers better
services, build political support, and then, by working with Provinces, scale up. The
programme will emphasise building an evidence base for this programme and others.
In terms of security, economics and ethnic mix, KPK and Punjab are markedly different, but
their governance environments have many common features. Both are dealing with the
concentration of responsibility and authority at provincial level that has come from the
abolition of locally elected government bodies in 2010 and thorough-going devolution from
federal level in mid-2011. DFID therefore proposes a single sub-national governance
programme, which can be flexibly tailored to each Province. This approach will enable
comparative analysis and cross-learning.
The timing is right for this programme. Starting now will enable the programme to present
initial work to new governments and support the introduction of new local government
structures after national elections, possibly including the re-introduction of some form of
elected local bodies.
In KPK the programme will:
 scale up an Output Based Budgeting (OBB) pilot from 12 to 32 provincial
departments. Provide earmarked financial aid for conditional grants to implement
OBB across six districts in at least health and education sectors.1 The EC will support
a further seven districts, thus covering over half the Province in total. This is in line
with the Government’s ambitious plans, and the maximum it feels is achievable in the
short-medium term. The Provincial Government has allocated Pakistan Rupees 1
billion annually (approximately £7 million at current rates).
 provide technical assistance (TA) in districts and at Province level (through a
Provincial Delivery Unit - PDU) to support OBB scale-up. TA will help districts and the
province better plan, budget for, and target services through evidence-based
planning, and more consultation with poor communities.
 Set up a District Delivery Challenge fund so that as OBB sets performance targets
for districts, the Challenge Fund will enable them to innovate with ways of improving
services to meet those targets. The Fund will also help tackle corruption (for
example, by using GPS-enabled mobile phones to track whether government staff
turn up for work where and when they should, and whether they ask for unsanctioned
payments. or by using GPS to codify property data to detect tax evasion). Successful
pilots will be scaled up and rolled out through OBB.
 Provide a new GIS mapping capability to help the provincial government map
service provision across the Province, raise revenue, track expansion, highlight gaps
and get early warning of potential negative reactions that could fuel conflict.
 develop and implement Provincial Right to Information legislation to enhance
government transparency.
In Punjab, the programme will establish comparable joint working between provincial and
district officials (key to OBB’s success in KPK), but the programme will be configured slightly
differently to fit the context, particularly as there are no plans for OBB at present. The
programme will:
 provide district TA to help districts collect better data and evidence, increase
transparency, and consult the public on key decisions, thus improving planning,
budgeting and coordination and helping tackle corruption.
1
Output Based Budgeting framework allocates and disburses funds against pre-agreed service delivery targets.
Initial results from two pilots districts suggest success depends on two key factors: (i) clear incentives for districts
to improve delivery; and (ii) interactive working by district and provincial officials so that both fully understand the
context and work together to solve problems.
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 Set up a District Delivery Challenge Fund to:
a) fund pilot initiatives to encourage districts in Punjab to innovate with ways to
improve service delivery.
Selection of initiatives will be informed by
comprehensive technical and political economy analyses, and a range of
stakeholders from citizen groups, legislatures and provincial and district
governments. A similarly robust process will monitor these initiatives, so that
decisions to adapt, scale-up or close pilots are made on the basis of a strong
understanding of ground realities – including their impact on women and girls.
provide performance-grants for districts to incentivise improvements.
 fund the World Bank to lead other pilots, specifically using mobile phone
technology to improve transparency and accountability, and trialling performancebased funding for services delivered by the private sector.
 work with the provincial government and World Bank, to pick up existing pilots,
evaluating their effectiveness, tweaking where necessary and taking the most
successful quickly to scale.
 support Provincial Delivery Units to monitor district improvements, address
bottlenecks, identify good practice, and work with and support line departments to
drive reforms down to districts across the Province, capitalising on Punjab’s strong
political drive to improve transparency and services.
 expand Punjab’s GIS mapping capability to help government track service provision
across the Province.
 develop Provincial Right to Information legislation to enhance government
transparency.
In both provinces, the Provincial Delivery Unit will liaise with key service delivery
departments to collect and analyse performance data and present periodic reports to the
Chief Secretary, Chief Minister and other senior officers. Our support will help the Delivery
Units to drive improved management and data collection. This will include building IT-based
data interfaces so that senior managers can regularly review indicators of departmental and
district performance, collect and disseminate the results of district pilots, and have
information and evidence to hand for policy making and public communications.
Where will the programme be implemented?
The programme will focus on 12 districts (two clusters of three in each province, each
cluster centred on Districts that are divisional headquarters). Districts in Pakistan are big
geographically and in population size. Twelve districts will cover over 20 million people.
Working in districts that are also Divisional Headquarters will make for easier scale up
across the rest of the division. Our TA support to each cluster of three districts will be based
at Divisional Headquarters. Each Division is headed by a Senior Official of Commissioner
rank. On average there are 6 districts within a division, so doubling the potential reach of the
programme.
The programme will also work with the delivery units of Provincial Governments in
Peshawar and Lahore, supporting scale-up across the whole of both Provinces, and lesson
learning between them.
Careful and conflict sensitive identification of the 12 target districts will be undertaken in
conjunction with Provincial Governments. In Southern Punjab, one cluster will be located to
allow collaboration with DFID’s Punjab Economic Opportunities Programme (PEOP). In
KPK, DFID’s engagement in the original OBB pilot districts of Buner and DI Khan will
continue and district selection will be coordinated with the Peace Building Support to Post
Crisis Needs Assessment (PSP) programme. As much as possible, it will operate in districts
where DFID’s Aawaz, health and education programmes are also present.
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Who will be implementing the support we provide?
DFID will contract an international Management Organisation selected by competitive tender
to deliver most of the programme in partnership with provinces and districts, and to manage
a consortium of partners combining local, national and international capability. The MO will
commission, on DFID’s behalf, independent research and evaluation. The World Bank will
manage DFID funding for some pilots as noted above and below. A Steering Group will
oversee the programme in each Province, with members from provincial and district
government, DFID, the World Bank, other development partners, civil society and private
sector organisations.
1.3
Are other donors supporting this, or similar projects?
The Punjab part of the programme has been designed jointly with a new World Bank
governance project. The Bank’s programme is still in design, but anticipates cross-cutting
interventions (e-government, e-procurement, public-private partnerships) at the Provincial
level, working through the same Provincial Delivery Unit, and complementing this
programme’s district focus. The Bank will also be funding some pilot initiatives but these will
be focused on the productive sectors (agriculture, livestock, etc.). This programme will draw
on the Bank’s expertise to advise on Right to Information Legislation, and manage and
scale-up pilots using mobile phones and other new technologies.
The EC, World Bank and GIZ2 are all working in KPK and there has been close co-ordination
to ensure complementarity. The EC is planning to support conditional grants in Malakand
along the lines of the DFID Buner and DI Khan model (so we will not select the ECsupported districts there), and to establish tehsil-level community development funds,
dovetailing with this programme. As manager of the multi donor trust fund for border areas,
to which DFID is the biggest donor, the World Bank has established a KPK governance
support unit to coordinate governance activities under the Post Conflict Needs Assessment
(PCNA). The unit should provide a forum for influencing government policy and donor
activity in KPK that this programme can exploit. GIZ plan to launch a sub-district governance
programme in KPK to improve revenue collection, reduce violence against women and
improve capacity at tehsil level.
DFID will continue to manage closely the synergies with other donors and capitalise on our
substantial investments to date in governance in both provinces. For example, our
investment in human resource management under the KPK provincial reform programme,
and in particular in developing performance based job descriptions, will be a vehicle in our
own and others’ programmes for embedding a culture of results at District level and across
all sectors.
1.4
What are the expected results?3
o
7.5m people (the poorest 30% of the population of 12 Districts) having better
access to services as a result of TA building the capacity of frontline delivery units
(e.g. health centres, schools) and almost 4m benefiting from the scaling up of
pilot initiatives (e.g. water and sanitation, rubbish collection);
o
1.3m people in Punjab having better access to services as a result of mobile
phone technology tracking quality of services;
2
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit, GmbH (German Society for International
Co-operation, Ltd.)
3 Estimates based on actual data and reasonable assumption in the economic appraisal
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o
600,00 beneficiaries in KPK due to improved budgeting linking resources to local
service delivery, including at least 200,000 immunised children, 70,000 girls
enrolled in primary school, and 250,000 having better school facilities;
o
4m people benefiting from scaled up services as a result of the Provincial
Delivery Units unblocking cross-sector governance bottlenecks;
o
20,000 officials benefiting from more and better use of evidence (including from
GIS mapping) to improve the quality and targeting of services;
o
130,000 people empowered to seek recourse from government, demand better
services and hold the state to account for their delivery through pilots around
Right to Information legislation.
What will change as a result of our support?
District governments will manage services more efficiently and effectively. Decision-making
and policy formulation will be better founded in evidence and so make government more
responsive to needs. More open and transparent district government will be easier to hold to
account and will reduce space for bribery and corruption. All this will lead to improvements in
access to quality services for poor people, and particularly women and girls. That in turn will
contribute to increased trust in government and make for more stable democracy in
Pakistan.
Which of the planned outputs of the project are attributable to UK support?
Results at output level will be directly attributable to UK support. Where SNG is seeking
impact and outcome level results similar to other DFID programmes, attribution will be
adjusted between the programmes. There is complementarity, but not duplication, with other
donors. If overlaps transpire, attribution of results will be assessed and agreed. In real life,
many complex interactions contribute to social and political changes. Robust M&E will help
analyse how and why change is occurring.
How will we determine whether the expected results have been achieved?
We will use existing surveys and routine data, as well as new tools, surveys and research
designed for the purpose, to monitor against the log frame and determine value for money.
Independent evaluation – including impact evaluation - will determine the extent to which
changing outcomes and impact are attributable to this programme. Given limited evidence in
this field, SNG will be an investigative as well as implementing programme – improved
knowledge will be an important product. The programme aims to build the evidence base at
district level, to improve implementation and feed into other DFID programmes, and serve as
a public good.
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2.
Strategic Case
2.1
Context and need for DFID’s intervention
2.1.1
Challenges
A stable, prosperous and democratic Pakistan is vital for social and economic development
and for wider national and international interests. Continuing or worsening fragility has
serious political and security implications for Pakistan, the entire region and beyond.
Since independence in 1947, Pakistan’s resources have disproportionately benefited
military, bureaucratic and political elites, at the expense of the development and security
needs of its citizens, especially women, young people, and religious, ethnic and other
minorities.4 Over a third of Pakistan’s 171 million people remain poor and under-educated,
with some vulnerable to involvement in violent groups.5 DFID’s two focal Provinces, Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) and Punjab are home to 120m people, of which an estimated 30% live
in poverty.6
Pakistan has some of the worst social indicators in South Asia and following positive trends
between 2002 and 2006, they are again deteriorating. Pakistan‘s ranking in the Human
Development Index (HDI) has slipped from 120 in 1991 to 145 in 20117 and the disparity
between the rich and the poor is increasing, especially in urban areas.8 While official data
are not available, multiple sources suggest income poverty is increasing.9 This is inextricably
linked to social exclusion based on class, biraderi, caste, gender, ethnicity and a range of
other factors.10 Gender inequality is extreme in Pakistan and violence against women is
endemic.11 Pakistani women and children suffer from some of the highest rates of
malnutrition in the world.12
4
Gazdar, H. (2007). Class, Caste or Race: Veils over Social Oppression in Pakistan
Pakistan Economic Survey 2008-09 p1967, Government of Pakistan, Planning Commission. In the absence of a
recent census, population figures are best estimates. See also Pakistan Millennium Development Goals Report
2010 Government of Pakistan Planning Commission Centre for Poverty Reduction and Social Policy
Development, Islamabad, September 2010
6 Population and poverty figures for Pakistan vary considerably. This is an accepted estimate amongst
practitioners.
7 34% of primary school aged children are out of school; 44.5% of adults are illiterate (60% for women); almost 1
in 5 children die before their fifth birthday; and only 45% of households have access to sanitation. See
http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/PAK.html
8 An Overview of Poverty and Inequality Situation in Pakistan, Centre for Poverty Reduction and Social Policy
Development, Working Paper no WP/PI/05-2011, Islamabad, May 2011
9 The Pakistan Social And Living Standards Measurement Survey 2010-11, SPDC’s 2007 report ’Income Poverty
at District Level: An application of small area estimation technique’ and UNDP’s Indices of Multiple Deprivations
2004-04 to 2007-08 together provide a good indication of trends. PSLM data records 43% of respondents in
Rajanpur, 67% in Muzzafargarh and 41% in DG Khan stating that their economic situation had become worse or
much worse compared with the previous year. Responses from the poorest districts in KPK (Upper Dir, Shangla
and Lakki Marwat) are similar.
10 Social exclusion revolves around a range of factors including class, biraderi (clan) caste, gender, ethnicity,
hereditary occupational group, access to land ownership and productive resources. Poor households in Pakistan
are characterised by large family sizes and lack of access to water, sanitation, and decent livelihoods.
11 Pakistan ranked 133 in Gender Gap Index among 135 countries according to the Global Gender Gap Report
2011. Women in Pakistan face violence, discrimination and inequality in almost every aspect of life. Many live in
an atmosphere of fear, with their lives are guaranteed only in exchange for obedience to social norms and
traditions. The most abusive forms of violence are faced by women in their own homes. See Udin Babur, Zaheer,
Violence Against Women in Pakistan: Current realities and strategies for change, Pakistan, pg 4 and Gender
Inequality, Social Exclusion and Maternal & Newborn Health Briefing Paper, Research and Advocacy Fund,
October 2010
12 Pakistan National Nutrition Survey 2011 (draft)
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9
Governance lies at the heart of Pakistan’s deepest economic and social problems. The
capture of the State by military, bureaucratic and political elites over decades has left a
legacy of poor governance (see Table 1 below)13 and development indicators. Widening
fissures and inequalities risk fuelling intolerance and community violence, making minorities
and women especially vulnerable. Parts of the state (most notably the military) are robust
and well-organised, but most government structures are weak, particularly at sub-national
level. Low levels of government accountability are compounded by corruption that infiltrates
all aspects of life. Poor planning and management mean that most government services do
not meet the needs of the majority. These shortfalls undermine public confidence in the
state: 79% of Pakistanis have ‘lost hope’ in the current government’s ability to improve
people’s lives.14 Improving services requires more capable and delivery-focused district
government. This programme aims to help the Governments of Punjab and KPK begin to
address this.
Table 1: Governance performance
Indicator
Ranking and performance
World Bank CPIA
CPIA scores are low (3 out of 6)
th
Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) 99 out of 109 countries, value = 0.386 (2009). Estimated Pakistan
population: 177 million, 82 million are female
Fiduciary Risk Assessment (FRA)
Substantial: Loss of household income to bribery has increased from
Rs 9,428 in 2009 to Rs 10,537 in 2010.
World Governance Indicators (WGI)
Indicators for 1996 – 2008 published in 2009: In bottom 33% for all
dimensions – scores range from 1% to 33%
2010 Transparency International’s Pakistan ranked 139 out of 180 countries. Corruption cost 2010: Rs
223 billion (equivalent to 1.5% of GDP), 11.37% over 2009’s Rs. 196
Corruption Perception Index
billion.
Pakistan’s economic challenges are also daunting. The macro-economic situation has
become fragile in recent years, characterised by high inflation, revenue shortfalls and a
structural fiscal deficit of 6.6%.15 Growth dropped to 2.4% in 2010-11 compared with strong
growth (over 7% per annum) in the three years up to 2007.16 At 9.2%, Pakistan’s tax to GDP
ratio is the lowest in South Asia. The economy is hobbled by high levels of debt, and an
array of ailing state-owned enterprises.17 The country’s economic position has been made
worse by earthquakes and floods, the impacts of which were magnified by inadequate
infrastructure and disaster risk management. Floods in 2010 wiped an estimated 2% off
economic growth rates and cost £6 billion.18 KPK and Southern Punjab were particularly
badly hit. Climate change is predicted to increase both droughts and flooding.
Against this challenging backdrop, public services in Pakistan fall far short of satisfying basic
needs. Only 25% of households are satisfied with sewerage and sanitation services, 39%
with water supply, 35% with government health services and 58% with government
education services.19 The private sector is stepping up - low cost private education has
ballooned, and up to 70% of Pakistanis use private health care20 - but is largely unregulated
13
Country Governance Analysis 2011, DFID Pakistan April 2011
Gilani Weekly Poll, August 1st-5th, 2011, Gallup & Gilani Pakistan. www.gallup.com.pk
15 State Bank of Pakistan Annual Report 2010-11. http://sbp.org.pk/reports/annual/arFY11/Anul-index-eng-11.htm
16 See http://www.sbp.org.pk/departments/stats/PakEconomy_HandBook/Chap-1.3.pdf
17 Ibid.
18 White Paper Budget 2011-12 Government of the Punjab Finance Department June 2011 Page 1
19 Social Audit Local Roundtable Report, Youth Development and Economic Growth, Planning Commission,
Government of Pakistan. Centre for Poverty Reduction and Social Policy Development
and Delivery of Public Services, UNDP Pakistan, Islamabad, April 2010
20 Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement Survey 2010-11
14
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and uncoordinated. There is pressure for change. A dengue epidemic in Punjab in 2011 and
recent deaths due to contaminated drugs have heightened demands for government to do
better. Popular frustration is playing into election debates right now, but will continue to rise
long-term as the population doubles (by 2050)21 and Pakistan becomes more urban (50% by
2030).22 Meeting this challenge will require better governance.
DFID’s 2011 Country Governance Analysis (CGA) notes that political instability has
escalated since 2008 putting government under severe pressure. The human costs of
conflict are high - terrorist attacks, security forces operations, ethno-political violence, intertribal clashes, drone attacks, and cross-border attacks cost 7,107 Pakistani lives in 2011.23
This has declined by over 25% since 2009, but is still an eight-fold increase since 2006. The
2011 World Development Report concludes that ‘poverty reduction in countries affected by
major violence is on average nearly a percentage point slower per year than in countries not
affected by violence’.24 This is borne out in Pakistan - the government estimates the
economic costs of the insurgency at $35bn over the last 8 years.25
In terms of security, economics, culture and ethnic mix, KPK and Punjab are markedly
different. The influence of the Pakistani Taliban (TTP) in the Federally Administered Tribal
Areas (FATA) and parts of KPK has had a direct and daily impact on governance and
poverty. UNESCO data show girls’ education to be severely affected by the conflict26 and
rising militancy has triggered an increase in annual police budgets from Rs 7 billion to Rs 20
billion in the last three years27 squeezing sums available for other services. 36% of the
Province’s 35 million people live in poverty – higher than the national average – and
perceptions of corruption are particularly high. However, there are signs of hope - following
indications in 2008 that the TTP was capitalizing upon the state’s failure to provide justice
and security, extremist acts in mid-2009 shifted public opinion sharply against the TTP in
favour of the military.28 Successive KPK governments have stuck by the Comprehensive
Development Strategy and following devolution in mid-2011, the province has embraced
autonomy and is seeking to increase local revenue generation.29
With over 100m people, (56% of Pakistan’s population) and 65% of revenue generation,
Punjab, by contrast, is far wealthier than its neighbours and dominates national life.30
Punjabis make up 75% of the army and the northern and central districts of the Province
possess almost three quarters of Pakistan’s industry and its most productive agriculture. 31
Most of Punjab’s establishment and a great many ordinary Punjabis associate their
provincial identity with that of Pakistan as a whole and, in contrast to KPK, militant recruits
21
United Nations: World Population Prospects, the 2010 revision, medium variant. See
http://esa.un.org/wpp/Other-Information/faq.htm
22 UN World Urbanisation prospects 2009 http://esa.un.org/unpd/wup/index.htm
23 Pakistan Security Report 2011, Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, 2012
24 World Development Report, Conflict Security and Development, World Bank Group
25 KPK Minister of Finance Budget Speech 2010 (p2), Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
26 UNESCO: Think piece prepared for the Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2011, The hidden crisis:
Armed conflict and education pg 46-48. The Pakistan Social and Living Standard Measurement Survey (PSLM)
2007-08 shows two of the almost three million children not enrolled in basic education in KPK, are girls. While
around half of the population are illiterate, this rises to over 70% among females aged 9-39 years.
27 SPDC ‘Social Impact of the border areas’ Annual Review 2009-10 reported that poverty incidence rose from
25% to 54% in those districts contiguous with FATA
28 Ladbury, Sarah and Maliha Hussein 2008. Developing the Evidence Base for Hypotheses on Extremism and
Radicalization in Pakistan, Independent report to DFID, April 14 th
29A new 50% share of provincial revenues (Rs16 Bn in 2010) has incentivised KPK’s Government to prepare an
economic growth strategy which aspires to make the province a business hub and financially autonomous. KPK’s
2010/11 annual development budget stood at Rs69 Bn and is projected to rise to Rs104 Bn for 2012/13 reflecting
the potential increase in locally generated revenues. Source: interviews with Government of KPK senior officials
30 Lieven, Anatol, Pakistan a Hard Country, Penguin Group, 2011, p260
31 Lieven, Anatol, A Mutiny Grows in Punjab, The National Interest, February 2012,
http://nationalinterest.org/article/mutiny-grows-punjab-4889
11
are a tiny percentage of the population. But inequalities are huge across the Province. In
Southern Punjab, sympathy for militant groups runs deeper, intersecting with higher rates of
poverty.32 School enrolment rates there are 30-35%, compared to a provincial average of
65%, and poverty stands at 40.4% - considerably higher than the rest of the Province.33
Land ownership is highly concentrated and rates of bonded labour are the highest in
Pakistan.34 As employment in farming declines, government schools are failing to prepare
students for anything else and militancy is increasing. This is important because relatively
small incidents in Punjab shape perceptions of state stability across Pakistan.
Despite significant differences between the two Provinces, their governance environments,
set out below, have similarities. Following thorough-going devolution ushered in by the 18th
Amendment in mid-2011 Punjab and KPK face the same challenge. Both need to strengthen
capability, accountability and responsiveness of government in order to improve trust in the
state. Central to this is improving service delivery. DFID therefore proposes to support both
governments through a single sub-national governance programme, which can be flexibly
tailored to each Province, while enabling comparative analysis and cross-learning.
Three dynamics shape the governance context for this programme. First, the 18th
Amendment devolved wide ranging responsibilities to the Provinces, including education,
health, and social welfare. The preceding 7th National Finance Commission award shifted
financial allocations to provinces as well, increasing the provinces’ share of the federal
divisible pool from 46.75% to 56% in the first year and to 57.5% annually thereafter.35 It also
enacted significant fiscal decentralization by allowing provincial governments to introduce
new taxes, borrow money from the State Bank and international institutions (subject to
underwriting by Federal Government), and allocate resources as they see fit. Between July
and November 2011 alone the provinces had collectively borrowed Rs 56 billion. 36 These
radical reforms bring budgets and planning one step closer to communities, presenting
opportunities to reform and improve local government. Politicians are keen to demonstrate
progress to an expectant public, particularly in the run-up to elections.
Second, following the lapse in 2010 of the Local Governance Ordinance 2001, local
governance (district and below) is stuck in a confusing limbo. Elected bodies at district and
tehsil level (Union Councils) have been dissolved and elected Nazims (mayors) abolished.
Their powers have been assumed by unelected administrators (District Coordinating Officers
– DCOs) with few channels, and no official incentives to be accountable to local people.37
Ironically, as the 18th Amendment came into force, local accountability has been reduced.
Fiscal devolution has only extended as far as Provinces. Local government, which delivers
and monitors most basic services, has been reduced to an executive arm of the provincial
government with almost no budget autonomy and no control over staffing.38 Following
32
Pakistan: Violence Vs. Stability, A National Net Assessment, Working Draft: 5 May 2011, pp105-106
Southern Punjab Briefing Note prepared for DFID. This source material is Restricted.
34 In 2000, 5% of owners in the South held approximately 37% of owned area and 7.8% of owners held 46% of
owned area in the West. Ibid.
33
35
Finance Division, Government of Pakistan, Federal Budget: Budget in Brief 2011-12
Iqbal, Shahid, ‘Provinces borrowing heavily from SBP’ Dawn, November 25, 2011. www.dawn.com
The impact of the changes was neatly captured by Zakaullah Khan Kattak, District Coordination Officer in
Nowshera, KPK Province speaking at a local governance forum in May 2011. He commented that: “Today there
was no efficient system of authority prevailing in districts after the recall of the Local Government Ordinance of
2001. Having worked in the devolved system he felt that the previous system was better than the chaotic case
now. Now he had 13 departments to look after but no organisational staff to assist him nor did he have the power
to remove staff as punishment. The departmental staff had aligned themselves with the grassroot political leaders
and did not consider the DCO as their leader. The provincial government also did not listen to him. The district
governance system was thus broken.” See Newsletter on RIPORT Forum consultation on effectiveness of Local
Governance in Districts 23 May 2011 www.riport.org
38 Wage hikes of 25% and then 50% enacted precipitately by the Federal Government in the past few years,
forced Provincial Governments to follow suit and, in many districts, 90-95% of the budget is now absorbed by
36
37
12
national elections, and in response to a constitutional requirement, Punjab and Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa will re-establish local government structures in the course of the next year.
Provinces are at various stages of passing legislation and planning elections. Provincial and
district administrations will need help preparing for and implementing changes.
A third important consideration is Pakistan’s impending national election, due to take place
by April 2013. Pakistani politicians focused on their electoral fortunes have limited time or
appetite for long-term reforms at present, but are keen to demonstrate that they are listening
to people’s demands, and are busy making promises about a better future. Imran Khan’s
platform of anti-corruption and better services is leading traditional parties to pay more
attention to these issues, at least rhetorically. This may open space for reform, although it is
far from certain. Ambiguity over the timing of polls, and potential changes in national and
provincial governments create short-term uncertainties for this programme. A flexible
approach is required, together with active tracking of risks.
While politics are fluid, the underlying governance dynamics are stable and well
documented. Pakistan’s governance environment is weak and largely deteriorating as set
out below.
State capability is generally weaker in KPK than in Punjab, but both Provinces have seen a
significant decline in recent years, undermining government performance at Province level
and below. World Governance Indicators showed an increase in Pakistan’s government
effectiveness between 2000 and 2007. Since then, Pakistan has fallen sharply in the
rankings to 19/100 in 2009.39 District administrations, which are responsible for delivering
most government services, are particularly weak, and hampered by unclear administrative
structures, inadequate financing, poor allocative efficiency, and inadequate mechanisms to
manage government employees.
Accountability of state institutions has shown some improvement following a return to civilian
rule in 2008. A burgeoning media and mass access to internet and mobile phones have
increased information flows and debate in both Provinces, although government
transparency remains limited. Smaller political parties have adeptly used new social media
to engage young people and city dwellers, providing a lightning rod for citizens to signal their
dissatisfaction with the status quo. This is pushing traditional parties to respond, by more
seriously courting public opinion. The number and capacity of civil society organisations is
also growing, particularly in KPK. While most are weak on advocacy, recent advances in
legislation protecting women’s rights demonstrate that sustained lobbying efforts can reap
rewards.40 The operating space for international NGOs is tough, and often affected by
international relations, particularly in Southern Punjab, and KPK, and in FATA, where the
security situation creates particular challenges.41 Despite improvements noted above, the
deeply entrenched patronage networks that drive Pakistan’s political processes continue to
stifle accountability overall. Political rights and freedoms have deteriorated in recent years –
in part due to the security situation.42 The justice system remains under-resourced and
staff wages (mainly for teachers and health workers). This is crowding out funding for operating costs,
maintenance and new innovations to help improve services.
39 World Governance Indicators, 2000-2009, World Bank Group
40 The amendment of the Hudood Ordinance in 2006 with the Women’s Protection Bill and the passing in 2011 of
the Acid Control & Acid Crime Prevention Bill and The Prevention of Anti-Women Practices (Criminal Law
Amendment) Bill together represent historic progress. However, the greater challenge will be implementation,
particularly in areas where customary justice occupies the void left by failures of the formal system. The informal
justice system in the SWAT valley is an example. See EC Governance Profile of Pakistan, page 7. See also,
Farida Shaheed, The Women’s Movement in Pakistan: Challenges and Achievements.
41 Like diplomats, NGOs are required to obtain ‘No Objections Certificates’ for travel, and in KPK and FATA are
usually closely escorted by the Frontier Corps. This significantly constrains their freedom to operate and their
ability to engage with communities.
42 See http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363&year=2011&country=8108
13
hamstrung by capacity constraints, inequities and political interference. Women face
particular barriers in accessing justice.43 Pakistan is ranked 60th among 66 countries (lowest
in South Asia) on the rule of law index.44
State responsiveness has not improved since 2008 despite the return to democracy.
Pakistan’s poor record in upholding human rights continues, linked to rising insurgency and
sectarian and ethnic conflict. Despite commitments to increase budget allocations for poverty
reduction,45 high levels of military spending, debt financing, and the costs of running lossmaking state-owned enterprises46 all squeeze out resources for basic services, affecting
progress towards the MDGs.
Corruption has also increased significantly since 2008 and public distrust of officials and
politicians is high. According to Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Survey,
2010, 70% of Pakistanis perceive the current federal government to be more corrupt than its
predecessor.47 Perceptions of Provincial Government corruption have also worsened.48
Tackling this is urgent, but extremely difficult. Neither Government, nor most of the political
opposition, appear exercised on the issue. The political cadre and the bureaucracy appear
content with the status quo. Citizens have ‘learned to live’ with corruption and donors are not
engaging directly on the subject. Anti-corruption drives have in the past been a device for
settling political scores, or neutralising political or business rivals, rather than improving
governance. This taints public sentiment towards anti-corruption initiatives.
2.1.2
Evidence base and investigative approach
There is increasingly strong evidence that liberal democracies (i.e. fully democratic
governments) are more likely than autocracies or transitional democracies to deliver
economic growth, poverty reduction and stability, and meet the basic needs of their people
over the long run.49 Democracies based on inclusive political settlements, are more
responsive to their citizens and generally make better progress towards the MDGs than
poorly governed, non-responsive ones.50 Moreover, democracies generally have higher
growth rates than autocracies,51 giving better poverty reduction outcomes.52 Effective
governance is a key factor underlying economic growth53 and poverty reduction.54 The
capability and accountability of institutions is also crucial to breaking cycles of violence in
fragile and conflict-affected states like Pakistan.55
43
Social Audit of Local Governance and Delivery of Public Services Pakistan National Report UNDP Islamabad,
April 2010
44 http://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/
45 The Fiscal Responsibility and Debt Limitation Act makes it mandatory to spend 4.5% of GDP on pro-poor
growth and to double expenditure, as a % of GDP, on health and education. In the current year Punjab has
increased its allocation for poverty reduction expenditures to Rs367 billion; in KP, it was Rs103 billion
46 State Bank of Pakistan Annual Report 2010-11. http://sbp.org.pk/reports/annual/arFY11/Anul-index-eng-11.htm
47 Transparency International, National Corruption Perception Survey 2010
48 National Corruption Perception Survey TI Pakistan 2010 http://www.transparency.org.pk/report/ncps.php
49 Sen, A (2009) Development as Freedom, Oxford University Press.
50 DFID (2009) Building the State and Securing the Peace, Emerging Policy Paper, p.2
51 Low income democracies have average growth rates 30% higher than low income autocracies. See Halperin
H, Siegle J and Weinstein M (2010) The Democracy Advantage: How democracies promote prosperity and
peace.
52 World Bank (2005) Economic growth in the 1990s – learning from a decade of reform.
53Kaufmaan D. and Kraat, A. (2002) Growth Without Governance, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper
No 2928.
54 www.adb.org/poverty/good-governance
55 Op Cit, WDR 2011
14
Legitimacy lies at the heart of state-society relations and is a core component for building
stable democracy.56 Legitimacy is established through a range of factors including
international recognition, ideology and traditional authority, but the performance of the state
(e.g. economic growth and service delivery) is central over the longer term.57 Legitimacy
requires states to respond to public expectations. Provision of decent public services is an
important part of this. Pakistan’s Post Crisis Needs Assessment – written following conflict in
North West Pakistan in 2009 - specifically points to failures in service delivery as a key factor
undermining government legitimacy and fuelling conflict.58
In Pakistan, the majority of people are not satisfied with Government’s performance on
service delivery. A 2010-11 Federal Government household perception survey59 reported
declining satisfaction with services being delivered by the state: 31% were satisfied with
basic health facilities (compared with 40% in 2008-09), 61% were satisfied with schools
(63% in 2008-09), and 10% with police (unchanged from 2008-09). In Kohistan, KPK, only
7% of households were satisfied with their basic health facilities. Women face particular
barriers in accessing services due to limitations on their movements (needing permission),
lack of control over household resources, competing domestic responsibilities, and the fact
that physical facilities, services and transport to them aren’t designed with women in mind
(lack of separate service windows, washrooms, sitting areas, too few female providers).60
Inadequate service delivery is a major barrier to progress towards the MDGs.61
Weak governance is the major and persistent constraint hampering service delivery. The
World Development Report 2004 highlighted that “making services work for poor people
involves changing not only service delivery arrangements, but also public sector
institutions.”62 The World Bank has underscored the same point in relation to Pakistan; “The
achievement of Pakistan’s development objectives depends on improved governance of the
public sector – greater transparency and accountability, strengthened legal and regulatory
frameworks especially for private sector activity, improved responsiveness, and a better
interface with citizens.”63
Evidence from around the world suggests decentralisation can lead to improved perceptions
of government performance64 as local governments tend to know more about the people
they serve, and interact with them more frequently, creating opportunities to build
accountability.65 The private sector can play a key role too, although this is no panacea. In
Pakistan, for certain services and in insecure locations only the state has the reach to
provide for the rural poor because incentives for private sector investment are weak.
Moreover, the state will need to be an effective planner, regulator, contractor and custodian
to manage growing private sector delivery. Improving the performance of the state is
necessary for improving services.
Papagianni, K. (2008) ‘Participation and State Legitimation’: in C. Call with V. Wyeth (eds.) Building States to
Build Peace, Lynne Rienner, USA
57 See Norad The Legitimacy of the State in Fragile Situations (2009) prepared for OECD DAC. Available at:
http://www.norad.no/en/tools-and-publications/publications/publication?key=134243
58 PCNA ref
59 Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement Survey 2010-11, Government of Pakistan, Statistics
Division, Federal Bureau of Statistics, September 2011
56
60
BRIEFING PAPER: Gender Inequality, Social Exclusion and Maternal & Newborn Health
The Government’s 2010 review of MDG performance concluded that “....unless there is urgency and a
renewed and concerted effort…there is a high risk of considerable shortfalls in the MDGs set for 2015.” See
Pakistan Millennium Development Goals Report 2010 Government of Pakistan Planning Commission Centre for
Poverty Reduction and Social Policy Development Islamabad September 2010, page 6
62 WDR 2004 Overview
63 Report No. 53553-PK Country Partnership Strategy For The Islamic Republic Of Pakistan For The Period FY
2010-13 World Bank, Washington DC July, 2010
64 Public Sector Reform – What Works and Why? World Bank Group, 2008
65 Lessons Learned from Donor Support to Decentralisation and Local Governance, OECD 2004
61
15
District governments manage and monitor the delivery of basic services across Pakistan, but
capability at this level is particularly weak as districts have never been capacitated to
properly plan, coordinate or budget for services. The district share of resources is
determined through the Provincial Finance Commission Award, a formula that determines
the sums awarded to districts through a ‘one line’ transfer covering salaries, some
operational costs and the district development budget. Since 2006, district development
budgets have been progressively squeezed by federally mandated salary hikes and high
levels of inflation. Once constituting up to 50% of the district budget, development funds now
comprise only 3-5% of the budget in many districts66. Weak capacity at district level means
provincial governments have opted not to devolve further funds to make up the shortfall, but
instead plan services from provincial capitals and send earmarked funds down to districts for
them to deliver. For example, in 2010 only Rs 1.5 billion of KPK’s Rs 66 billion development
budget was devolved to district control.67 The rest was spent through development schemes
managed top-down by the Province. This creates a vicious cycle - with such paltry sums at
stake, the incentives for rigorous financial management at district level have dimmed and
skills have eroded. Procurement practices are particularly susceptible to corruption; while the
rules have been strengthened, capacity and incentives to follow them are weak. Only when
capability is strengthened will Provinces be convinced to devolve more financial decisionmaking to local level. Departments post Executive District Officers (for health, education,
finance and planning, livestock, agriculture etc.) into each district to help manage and
coordinate services, but with little control over planning and budgets, district officials have
limited ability to coordinate services in practice.
Local level development needs are easily overlooked by Provincial top down planning. Some
are picked up by local Members of the Provincial and National Assemblies who hold
discretionary funds, but these are off budget and outside local government accounts, so
coordination with broader spending plans is limited. This causes huge strain on the recurrent
budget, since vote-winning new buildings go up in large numbers, but no provision is made
for operational and maintenance costs.68 There is little meaningful oversight over how
discretionary funds are spent, leaving them susceptible to perceptions of politicised decisionmaking. The result can be badly managed services that aren’t properly linked to needs. A
survey by USAID‘s ‘Districts that Work’ project concluded that education, health, water,
drainage and waste collection were the highest public priorities for improvement.69 These are
all local government responsibilities. The survey highlighted citizens’ dissatisfaction with
government accountability, transparency, access and responsiveness at all levels.
Over the last four years, DFID has invested in helping provinces improve systems and
policies for planning, budgeting, human resources management, and monitoring and
evaluation. This has delivered important results. In KPK, rolling out new job descriptions
has better aligned staffing with new responsibilities for service delivery devolved under the
18th Amendment and enabled a payroll and pensions audit that will stop false payments and
could save the government up to £3 million. Stakeholder consultations resulted in sizeable
new pro-poor initiatives being included in KPK’s budget for 2011-2012. A study on the
impact of Punjab’s development budget on recurrent spending encouraged the government
to reconsider the balance between the two budgets70. Improved planning enabled Punjab’s
66
Interviews with district officials in Punjab and KP
67
Provincial and district budgets of KP 2010-11
68 A study in Punjab revealed that every rupee of development spending has a knock on cost of 6 paisa on the
development budget. DFID TAMA, and Planning and Development Department, Government of Punjab.
Assessing Financial Impact of Development Portfolio. Rep. Crown Agents. December 2010.
69 National Survey October 2008 and March 2010, The Local Government System, Citizens’ Perceptions and
Preferences, Shahzad Arif, William Cartier, Andrew Golda & Ritu Nayyar-Stone (2008), revised and updated by
Ritu Nayyar-Stone, Colby Clabaugh & Sarah Polen (2010), May 2010
70
A one rupee increase in the development budget leads to an almost Rs 0.60 increase in the
recurrent expenditure with a lag of one year. DFID TAMA, and Planning and Development Department,
16
Department for Livestock and Dairy to develop a Medium Term Budgetary Framework
(MTBF) for FY11/12 and integrate budget allocations with a new sector strategy. But
successes have been patchy, take time to embed and are hard to sustain.
Five main lessons have emerged:
 that working with Federal and Provincial Governments is necessary, but not sufficient for
improving service delivery at the citizen/state interface. Improving district government
performance is also crucial.
 that the split of responsibilities means improving district performance requires both
districts and provincial administrations to support reform.
 that DFID needs to stay nimble, and remain closely engaged with the programmes as
they evolve. Achieving institutional reform in a political environment as fluid as Pakistan’s
requires navigating complex political economies and being able to identify and create
opportunities for reform, as well as creating constituencies to support and sustain it once
momentum has been established. This requires a ‘hands-on’ approach.
 (from DFID’s support for federal medium term budget frameworks, and continuing
support throughout successive phases of public sector reform in KPK) that staying the
course on long-term core reform efforts including during periods when progress slows.
 that incentives are key.
2.1.3
Impact and Desired Outcome
The impact of the SNG programme is: more stable democracy in Pakistan. The desired
outcome is, by 2016: poor people in Punjab and KPK finding that services better meet their
needs. The programme will achieve this by:



enhancing the evidence-base used by sub-national government for key decisions
about service provision (a first step towards accountability);
encouraging sub-national governments to be more transparent and responsive to
poor people’s needs; and
strengthening the capability of sub-national government to ensure provision of decent
services to poor people.
By tackling the governance bottlenecks that hamper social sector delivery but sit outside of
the sectors, the programme will improve government performance in ways that are directly
visible and relevant to citizens. Examples include: tracking whether teachers and nurses turn
up for work, both where and when they should; improving district procurement processes to
reduce financial leakages and shoddy construction; enhancing data collection on the
quantity and quality of services being delivered so that decisions are more closely based on
needs, making the public more aware of the services they should be getting, inviting
communities to feed into planning and budgeting decisions, tackling petty corruption, and
establishing mechanisms for citizen feedback and complaints. The programme will target
women and girls and seek to measure its impact on them, since they form the single largest
excluded group in Pakistani society, and by reaching them it is likely that we are reaching a
broader range of excluded groups. The SNG programme cannot transform the quality of
democracy in Pakistan on its own, but by improving services and making citizens’ views of
government more positive, it will improve trust in the state. By making district government
more delivery-focused, the programme will provide a platform for other DFID programmes.
Government of Punjab. Assessing Financial Impact of Development Portfolio. Rep. Crown Agents. December
2010
17
2.1.4
Why should DFID intervene?
2.1.4.1 Strategic fit
The programme will help deliver two of the objectives set out in DFID Pakistan’s Operational
Plan,71 namely ‘making democracy work’ and ‘getting the state to deliver’. In line with DFID’s
global Business Plan 2011-2015,72 it will contribute directly to strengthening governance,
and indirectly to improving security in Pakistan. The programme reflects UK priorities
outlined in the Peace Building State Building Framework (2010), and the Capability,
Accountability and Responsiveness (CAR) framework. It is in line with two of the UK National
Security Council’s objectives for Pakistan, namely, ‘to help Pakistan consolidate democracy’
and ‘to support Pakistan to deliver macro-economic stability, growth, and services for its
citizens.’
The programme will be a vehicle for implementing DFID Pakistan’s anti-corruption strategy.
By improving government effectiveness and transparency, and use of evidence in decisionmaking, it will help reduce scope for nepotism and patronage-based resource allocation. It
will compile evidence on the impact of corruption, test and scale up mechanisms for
reducing the rent-seeking, bribery and misuse of funds that blight people’s day-to-day
dealings with the state. The programme will capitalise on high level political enthusiasm in
Punjab for a new ‘transparency’ agenda and increasing involvement of KPK citizens in
budget setting and management.
The programme will enhance other DFID programmes. It will help DFID’s large education
and health programmes achieve more and faster results by pushing for better district budget
management, better coordination, more transparency, and greater citizen involvement in
decision-making and monitoring of government-run projects and services – especially for
women and girls. It will generate information about what does and does not work that can be
fed into other programmes. In return, the sector programmes will help direct the SNG
programme to the most important upstream bottlenecks. As DFID’s Aawaz programme helps
communities make their voices heard, the SNG programme will encourage and help
government to respond. It will encourage district and provincial governments to share more
information with communities and consult them on key decisions. By helping government
build-up evidence on the quality and targeting of services being delivered (for example
through utilising BISP data on female headed households and poverty scorecards) and
community perceptions of those services, and by encouraging officials to base decisions
more squarely on that evidence, the programme will encourage greater accountability to
women and girls, and by inference, poor and socially-excluded people more broadly.
Working with provincial and district administrators in KPK will complement community level
rule of law and access to justice work undertaken by the Peacebuilding Support to the PCNA
(PSP) Programme. The SNG Programme will retain the option of supporting reform of FATA
institutions (as a counterpart to the PSP’s community level governance work) if the
institutional environment there becomes more conducive (and if the MDTF does not cover it).
2.1.4.2 Opportune timing
Following the 18th Amendment, and in anticipation of new local government systems being
established after elections, this is an opportune time for DFID to support better local
government. In the run-up to national and provincial elections, the timing is right for getting
into districts, building relationships, collecting evidence, piloting innovations and starting to
build capacity. The programme will be in place in time to present initial work to new
71
72
Operational Plan 2011-2015 DFID Pakistan February 2011
Business Plan 2011-2015 DFID May 2011
18
governments, and to support the set-up of new local government structures after national
elections, including the likely re-introduction of some form of elected local bodies. Provincial
Finance Commission awards are likely to be updated to correspond with new local
government systems. If they see greater budget devolution to districts, the programme could
help support this process.
2.1.5
Risks of intervening
The proposed programme is judged to be medium risk. This reflects a limited evidence base.
The Management Case sets out a full consideration of risks, but four are worth noting here:
 that after elections new provincial governments are not interested in pushing for better
district performance. This seems unlikely given growing public pressure to revive local
government structures. The Aawaz programme will be part of mitigating this.
 that the programme partners with reform-minded politicians and/or bureaucrats who then
leave post (for example following elections). To mitigate this, the programme will need to
maintain a mix of interventions and build constituencies for reform, and not rely on single
champions in any given locale.
 that the programme gets too stretched across unconnected local innovations that can’t
be scaled up – the programme would then fail to be transformative. To avoid this, the
programme will focus firmly on piloting only as a path to scaling up, ensure clear cut-off
criteria for activities that prove unfeasible, and work with the provincial delivery units and
line departments to pick up pilots that work. This will need active management by DFID
staff.
 that the programme duplicates other DFID investments – particularly health and
education programmes. The programme is designed to complement health and
education programmes, not duplicate them. Nevertheless close coordination will be
required. The Management Case sets out how this will be ensured.
Unintended consequences are a risk in this complex institutional context. Psychological and
sociological research73 warns of the potential for conflict when groups feel ‘relative
deprivation’ and the frustration of unmet expectations. We have been mindful of this in
design: the programme will be to the advantage of those who are most excluded by current
governance shortfalls in KPK and Punjab and will build on work that has helped settle
conflicts in the past (including around KPK’s Post Crisis Needs Assessment). Huntington
contends that conflict occurs when political institutions lack the capacity to accommodate
rapidly rising demands.74 The programme aims to build institutional capability (as
recommended by the World Development Report 2011) to help address this, and contribute
to peace-building.75 But risks remain and the programme will monitor resource transfers and
rapid change for conflict impact and look out for negative side-effects of interventions,
including on local political economies.
Groups, including militant groups, could directly or indirectly derail progress, for example by
playing on identity politics. Key mitigation measures will include using conflict sensitive
criteria when selecting districts and target groups, ensuring government communicates with
communities (including through ethical messaging) and can explain and demonstrate
benefits to different groups, including for both men and women. Risk analyses will be
needed in some areas to outline possible scenarios in the event of conflict rising.
73
Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel, Princeton University Press, 1970
Huntingdon 1968
75 James Putzel and Jonathan Di John October, Meeting the Challenges of Crisis States: Overview Paper, Crisis
States Research Centre, 2011
74
19
3.
3.1.1
Theory of change
The theory of change for the Sub National Governance programme is outlined in the
Strategic Case and reflected in the log frame. It is drawn from the experience of donors
working on governance in Pakistan in recent years as well as international evidence. The
outcome is that by 2015/16 poor people in Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa report that
government services are better meeting their needs. This will contribute to achievement of
the impact of more stable democracy in Pakistan (through increased trust in government)
(by 2020). The aim is to make district governments more delivery focused. Better services
will make government more relevant to people, improving the social contract and reducing
the likelihood of violent conflict associated with relative deprivation. We recognise that
service delivery alone will not drive people to support democracy, but this theory of change
takes its cue from the 2011 World Development Report, which underscores the strength and
legitimacy of institutions as the central factor in managing state-society relations.
To achieve the outcome, several outputs need to be achieved: sub-national governments
need to have the capability to ensure provision of decent services to poor and excluded
groups (especially women and girls), decisions by sub-national governments need to be
based on more robust evidence, that evidence (and government decisions) needs to be in
the public domain, and governments need to be more responsive to poor people’s needs. 76
More capable and responsive governments that can demonstrate they are making decisions
based on robust evidence should help reverse dwindling public confidence in the state. The
theory of change is summarised in Figure 1.
3.1.2
Hierarchy of objectives
Impact
More stable democracy in Pakistan (through increased trust in government)
Outcome
Poor people in Punjab and KPK report that services are better meeting their needs
Outputs
1. Capability: Strengthened sub-national government capability to deliver basic
services
2. Accountability: Decisions by sub-national governments are based on robust
evidence that is in the public domain
3. Responsiveness: Sub-national government services are more responsive to
people’s needs, particularly women and girls
This theory of change starts from a recognition that Pakistan has some of the worst social
indicators in South Asia. Public services fall far short of satisfying basic needs and citizens
are dissatisfied with local government performance.77 Government’s failure to respond to
public expectations is eroding the social contract, and the legitimacy of the state.78
76
Until locally elected bodies are reconstituted, this programme will struggle to work on accountability per se.
Improving the evidence on which local government bases decisions, and putting evidence into the public domain
as a means of improving transparency are two important steps towards better accountability and are judged to be
appropriately stretching but achievable under this programme.
77 Social Audit of Local Governance and Delivery of Public Services, UNDP Pakistan, Islamabad, April 2010
78 Gilani Weekly Poll, August 1st-5th, 2011, Gallup & Gilani Pakistan. www.gallup.com.pk
20
Many of the blockages to service delivery relate to governance, and solutions often lie
outside the social sectors. The World Development Report 2004 highlights that improving
local systems and processes can translate into visibly better services that are welcomed by
citizens.79 DFID’s Nepal Programme showed that District government capability can be
improved even in the absence of elected local bodies80.
International evidence underscores the importance of political will for driving forward reform
programmes.81 In Pakistan, limited political commitment has blighted attempts at top-down
structural changes in core government policies and systems.82 The theory contends that
governance challenges can better be approached bottom-up, by addressing specific service
delivery bottlenecks at local level, and using local successes to inspire broader change.
Using improving service standards as a route to tackle governance problems will be less
contentious than addressing them head on. Based on evidence from other countries, it is
assumed that making a district more delivery focused will improve service standards, which
will be welcomed by citizens and spur local politicians to support. This will motivate officials
in other districts to pilot similar reforms. It is assumed that successes in improving services
will make the governance reforms that produced them stick and spread (because decisionmakers will see the benefits for themselves).
Unblocking governance-related bottlenecks in one sector will have read across to others. It
is assumed that Provincial politicians and civil servants will spot connections and push for
successful approaches to be applied in other sectors. By working at Provincial level, as well
as with districts, the programme will help governance reforms spread, leading to wider
benefits beyond the initial sector. The programme’s success will rest on rolling out
innovations Province-wide. Isolated local successes will not be enough.
District reforms will increase transparency and the use of evidence in decision-making. This
will reduce discretion and cut across local patronage networks. It will generate spoilers. A
critical assumption, which will be carefully monitored, is that local elites are prepared to cede
some of their power to allow reforms to proceed. Evidence indicates that elites do not
willingly cede power, but that particular circumstances may encourage or induce them to do
so.83 For example, a pilot in Gujranwala deftly overcame resistance from a key local
powerbroker by inviting him to launch a ‘Property Deed Facilitation Centre’, and thus gain
public credit for the new facility. At a macro level, a recent analysis of the 18th Amendment
argues that elites were prepared to concede ground as no one political party wished to be
seen as breaking an important historical consensus.84 Working directly with provincial
79
In Kerala, India, a better informed public voiced their demands for more gender equality and better education
resulting in decreased infant mortality and higher female school enrolment. In Uganda, monthly publication of
school budgets triggered the monies reaching schools to shoot up from 20% to 80% of the allocated budget, and
enrolment rates then soared. In Johannesburg a new city management team revamped municipal services, better
aligning services against needs and improving councillors’ oversight. See WDR 2004
80 Local governments receive untied resources based on a formula that incorporates minimum conditions and
performance measures. The minimum conditions are based on planning and management (e.g. annual plans and
budgets for the district); financial management (e.g. internal audit) and transparency. Performance measures
also evaluate the results that each district is able to produce in planning and programme management, budget
management, financial management, communication and transparency and monitoring and evaluation. Local
Governance and Community Development Programme, DFID Nepal
81 International evidence suggests that interventions focused solely on capacity-building and strengthening public
institutions have generated mixed results. Unsworth, S, Focusing Aid on Good Governance: Can Foreign Aid
Instruments be used to Enhance “Good Governance” in Recipient States?”, Global Economic and Governance
Programme Working Paper 2005/18.
82 For example, see Aide Mémoire, Punjab Resource Management Programme, PRMP- TAMA , Third Annual
Review 23-27 May 2011, DFID Islamabad and Annual review of ‘Support to the Government of Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa Province and Capacity Building of FATA Secretariat’, DFID Islamabad, February 2011
83 GSDRC Helpdesk Research Report, 15/04/2011
84 Haris Gazdar, ‘Democracy in Pakistan: The Chasm’ Economic and Political Weekly, May 29 2010
21
politicians and senior civil servants will be important for overcoming local spoilers. In the
current tough environment, only the personal involvement of senior politicians and
bureaucrats is sufficient to overcome institutional inertia and pockets of resistance.
The programme anticipates that political commitment may wax and wane. It has been
designed to manage this risk. In patronage based societies like Pakistan, political will often
proves superficial and banking on champions is risky. By working on a spread of
interventions at district and provincial levels, the programme will build momentum for reform.
It will demonstrate multiple successes at local level and scale up the most promising
innovations, rather than relying on champions to drive large-scale, top down reforms. Given
uncertainties created by the upcoming elections, the programme has been designed flexibly
so that components can be enlarged or wound down as the situation evolves.
The programme will push government to focus more on women and girls, since they
disproportionately lack access to decision-makers and are excluded from services. Given
prevailing social norms, change in gender relations is likely to be incremental not
revolutionary. However, this programme will focus on improving health, education, water,
sanitation and other municipal services that matter to women and girls. It can contribute
significantly by encouraging government to talk more to women and increase their access to
essential information through more government transparency. The cumulative impact of
these outcomes coordinated with other DFID programmes (PSP, Aawaz, Education, Health,
etc.) will transform many women’s lives.
22
Figure 1: Results chain
Outputs
Inputs
1. Decisions by subnational governments
are based on robust
evidence
• District budgets based on
evidence of peoples needs
Management
Organisation - technical
assistance to district
and provincial
governments
Monitoring and
Evaluation
District Delivery
Challenge Fund
District Govts
Service
Delivery Units
Financial Aid
for OBB in KPK
World Bank led
service delivery
innovations
• Successful service
improvement pilots move to
scale
• Government use GIS to
monitor quality and quantity of
services
2. Sub-national
government services
are more responsive to
peoples‘ needs
• More of budget allocated to
pro-poor interventions
• Mobile phone pilots lead to
improved access to services
by the poor
3. Strengthened subnational government
capability to deliver
basic services
• District planning more
performance based
• School based procurement
delivers better VFM in KPK
Impact
Poor people
in Punjab and
KPK find that
services better
meet their
needs
- Increased
satisfaction with
health and
education services
- Reduced cost of
corruption to
households
- Access to
improved health
and education
services
More stable democracy in Pakistan
DFID
Outcome
• Budget allocations for propoor services reach service
delivery units
23
The SNG theory of change is deliberately similar to that of Aawaz, which states that: “if
democratic processes in Pakistan are more open, inclusive and accountable to citizens (by
2016), this will contribute to achievement of a stable, inclusive and tolerant democracy in
Pakistan (by 2020).” The key difference is that Aawaz will work with communities to increase
demand for better government, while SNG will work within local government, encouraging
officials to open up to communities. We will co-ordinate on geography to ensure they meet in
the middle. SNG also links to the PSP Programme’s impact statement that ‘poor people in
the Border Areas benefit from a more stable environment and faster progress on MDG
targets’. The key difference here is one of geography and focus. PSP will work with
centralised security and justice institutions and aim to improve local governance in FATA.
The SNG programme will not work in FATA, or at least not initially. It could support FATA
institutions if the institutional environment becomes more conducive in future and the MDTF
does not cover it.
SNG could be assessed as a high risk programme because the evidence base underpinning
the proposed output interventions is weak. However the mitigating actions laid out below
bring the risk down to medium. Evidence supporting output to outcome and outcome to
impact assumptions is much stronger. Nevertheless important assumptions need to hold.
Output to outcome assumptions:







Increased government productivity will result in better services
Better collection and use of evidence by district governments85 will lead services to
be better targeted towards poor people, especially women86
Communities will welcome improvements in the way government delivers services
Sufficient numbers of local officials and politicians will support innovations to
generate a momentum towards reform
Provincial politicians and civil servants will scale up successful local innovations
Provincial politicians and civil servants will push for successful approaches to be
applied in other sectors
Provincial politicians and civil servants will be able to overcome spoilers in enough
cases, to maintain momentum for reform
The outputs to outcome assumptions are currently realistic, but will need to be kept under
review through on-going political economy analysis and managed through risk mitigation. In
particular, the economic appraisal (below) assumes that increasing government productivity
will lead to measurable improvements in services for target groups. The logic is sound, but
given uncertainties in the environment, we will need to check on an annual basis that
emerging evidence supports the assumption and that the programme is delivering a positive
return on the investment. The log frame and monitoring approach have been devised to
ensure we measure progress in productivity and relate it to service improvements, and to
test whether better services are reaching excluded groups, in particular women and girls.
The main outcome to impact assumption is that improved services will strengthen citizen
confidence in the state, encouraging peaceful and stable democratic processes. This
assumption is reasonable: as noted in the Strategic Case, quality and quantity of public
services undoubtedly has a bearing on state legitimacy. Dwindling public confidence is
Global initiatives such as the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab’s (J-PAL) Governance Initiative have
demonstrated that rigorous evaluation, combined with active dissemination of results, can help to shape policy
reforms. See http://www.povertyactionlab.org/about-j-pal
86 The Orangi Pilot Project (OPP) in Karachi (see http://www.oppinstitutions.org/); the Lodhran Pilot Project in
Punjab (see http://lpp.org.pk/); the Trust for Voluntary Organisations (http://www.tvo.org.pk); and the Karachi
Police Liaison Committee (http://www.odihpn.org/humanitarian-exchange-magazine/issue-50/partnering-forsecurity-the-citizens-police-liaison-committee-in-karachi-pakistan) are examples of programmes that have
successfully trialled and implemented small-scale interventions to community problems.
85
24
undermining the social contract in Pakistan. In KPK this makes it difficult for the state to rule
by consent, causing it to lose legitimacy and become vulnerable to competition from
militants. However, the extent to which improving services can bolster trust in the state is
less clear – it is only one of a number of factors. We know that grassroots participative
processes for planning and monitoring public services have helped boost confidence in
government in Pakistan and elsewhere.87 The PSP Business Case notes that the military’s
better communication tactics and their seriousness in tackling the militants in Swat in 2009
did build citizen’s trust and that this contributed to driving the militants out. But trust must be
maintained and increased by civil administrations and politicians – a harder and longer-term
task given system weaknesses, lack of credible complaints processes, and entrenched
patronage politics. The Helmand Monitoring and Evaluation Programme has ranked public
services that contribute to government legitimacy and demonstrated that the ranking
changes over time. This compounds the challenge for government, and underscores the
importance for government of regularly sounding-out public demand.88
3.2
Relevant Information and Evidence
There is strong evidence that public service reform is crucial for better government
functioning and that decentralisation can help to improve services. But best practice on how
to go about strengthening sub-national governance is more limited. Evidence relevant to
complex and conflict-affected environments like Pakistan is particularly patchy. The
evidence supporting each of the specific options is set out below.
A range of literature underscores the importance of locally driven public sector reform for
countries wishing to improve policy-making capability, increase civil service efficiency and
professionalism, and tackle corruption.89 International evidence is also clear on the link
between institutional reform and better service delivery.90 Evidence from India, Indonesia,
Uganda and elsewhere suggests that decentralisation of government authority can be
positive, as local governments usually have better information about the people they serve,
and interact with them more frequently than higher tiers of government, providing
opportunities to build stronger accountability to citizens.91 This enhances allocative efficiency
by better matching of public services to local popular preferences.92 Fisman and Gatti also
found evidence that decentralization can reduce corruption (although this is not clear cut).93
However, decentralisation processes the world over are complex, and largely driven by
politics (especially electoral incentives) and institutional dynamics.94 Local politics is highly
87
National Solidarity Programme, Afghanistan; http://www.nspafghanistan.org/ and http://www.spu.com.pk/; and
http://www.ghkint.com/Services/InternationalDevelopment/Strengtheninggovernanceandmanagement/Strengthen
ingDecentralisedLocalGovernment.aspx
88 ‘Conflict, Security and Development’ World Development Report 2011 World Bank Group
89 Public Sector Reform - What Works and Why? World Bank Group. 2008. Web. 31 Jan. 2012.
<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTOED/EXTPUBSECREF/0,,menuPK:4664077~pagePK:6482
9575~piPK:64829612~theSitePK:4663904,00.html>.
90 ‘Making Services Work for the Poor’ World Development Report 2004 World Bank Group
91 Jean-Paul Faguet, 2004. "Why So Much Centralization? A Model of Primitive Centripetal Accumulation"
Economic Organisation and Public Policy Discussion Papers 43, LSE.
92 For example, Bolivia’s decentralisation successfully re-geared public sector investment towards the needs of
municipalities. Lessons Learned to Donor Support to Decentralisation and Local Governance." OECD, 2004.
93 Fisman, Raymond & Gatti, Roberta, 2002. "Decentralization and corruption: evidence across countries,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(3), pages 325-345, March.
http://www.hceronline.com/?q=node/35
94 Eaton, Kent, Kai Kaiser, and Paul Smoke. "Public Sector Governance - The Political Economy of
Decentralization Reform." World Bank Group. 2010.
<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPUBLICSECTORANDGOVERNANCE/0,,contentM
DK:22717760~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:286305,00.html>.
25
vulnerable to elite capture.95 The literature highlights the importance of securing strong
political backing for any institutional reform process, and notes the risk of replicating national
power dynamics at local level without reforming them. Avoiding this requires understanding
and carefully navigating the interplay between politics, bureaucratic incentives, and
institutional and legal structures to build up better accountability to citizens.96
In Pakistan, this is challenging. DFID’s Country Governance Analysis (2011) highlights the
complex patronage systems and entrenched networks of corruption that permeate the
country’s political economy and notes deteriorating governance and economic trends.
Political economy analysis undertaken as part of the design process shows that
constitutional and regulatory frameworks of the state do not represent the reality of power in
Pakistan. Instead, power is primarily exercised through extended kinship networks,
operating top down from the main political dynasties, through clan and tribal networks all the
way to village level. As a result, the formal architecture and informal institutions of the state
largely serve pre-existing power structures and are likely to resist changes that challenge
the well-established, elite-based, political settlement. Breaking through this, to enhance
government accountability to citizens, will be very difficult. So far, decentralisation has
effectively strengthened the grip of the established political parties, whose support networks
are provincially based, implicitly reinforcing the informal hierarchies of dynastic patronage,
which prevail in Pakistan right down to local level.97
Against this backdrop, the international evidence is clear: a technical fix will not transform
governance. Changing the way government does business is intensely political, and will
require strong backing.98 Building capability is necessary, but on its own will not transform
the way district governments manage and deliver services for poor people or for those
communities where militant groups fill the void left by the state’s failings (e.g. flood affected
communities in KPK in 2010).99 Greater responsiveness to citizens will be needed if we are
to avoid reinforcing elite capture of resources at local level. More transparency, and
decisions based on more robust evidence (rather than patronage) will provide a first step
towards local accountability.
The evidence suggests that Option 2 would have limited traction. A top-down approach will
not be sufficiently sensitive to local political economy dynamics to help change them. An
internal review of DFID Pakistan’s recent institutional reform programmes concluded that:
‘Fundamental constraints can include lack of political will on the part of both leaders and
staff. Institutional change often (if not always) involves winner and losers and the
perceptions of those involved can be critically important to success.’100 Option 2 lacks the
ability to get alongside those whose behaviour needs to change. It risks falling into the
common trap of failing to address ‘the fundamentally political nature of governance reform;
the incentive structures and social values of those involved, and; the informal linkages
between citizens, officials and politicians’.101
95
Grindle, Merilee S. Going Local: Decentralization, Democratization, and the Promise of Good Governance.
Princeton: Princeton UP, 2007.
96 Lessons Learned from Donor Support to Decentralisation and Local Governance." OECD, 2004.
97 This tallies with evidence from elsewhere that: ‘decentralisation has tended to devolve inadequate power from
the centre, to be subject to domination by local elites who do not have a pro-poor agenda, to suffer from weak
administrative capacity and weak local staff, and subject to political interference, corruption and abuse of power’.
See DFID (2011) Governance Portfolio Review, p22 and Jütting, Johannes P., Corsi, Elena and Stockmayer,
Albrecht (2005) ‘Decentralisation and Poverty Reduction’, OECD Policy Insights No. 5, Paris: OECD.
98 Op Cit Eaton, Kaiser and Smoke
99 Unsworth, S, Focusing Aid on Good Governance: Can Foreign Aid Instruments be used to Enhance “Good
Governance” in Recipient States?”, Global Economic and Governance Programme Working Paper 2005/18.
100 DFID Pakistan Lesson Learning Exercise: Institution Building Programmes, December 2012
101 DFID (2011) Governance Portfolio Review, p22 and Khan, Mushtaq (2009) ‘Governance Capabilities and the
Property Rights Transition in Developing Countries,’ SOAS Research paper, www.research4development.info
26
There is more evidence to support Option 3. Extensive research shows that online and
mobile technologies can enhance delivery of public services to poor people through
improved accountability and transparency.102 They are also well-suited to tackling
corruption.103 Recent ODI studies suggest that tailored problem-focused approaches are
better able to identify feasible interventions, in addition to explaining constraints and
challenges.104 This is backed by research from Afghanistan.105 However, experience
forewarns that having a good idea, implementing it locally, demonstrating success and
telling the good news to others will not necessarily lead to replication elsewhere.106 While
reformers do exist, the bureaucracy at large has few incentives to support transparency and
accountability which would risk undermining the informal systems of resource transfer that
underwrite the current political settlement. The challenge for this programme is therefore to
bring pressure for change to bear locally, encouraging district governments to open up more
to the public.
Conventional governance approaches have balanced weaknesses in the ‘supply side’ of
state provision through increased attention to the ‘demand side’ (via local democratisation,
government outreach and citizen-empowerment initiatives). But recent research suggests
that enhancing ‘direct accountability’ does little to help people who have no access to
services in the first place, and are too vulnerable to undertake the effort and risks involved in
trying.107 Governments need to reach out to excluded groups, such as women and girls. This
supports the approach offered by Options 3 and 4. Case studies from the Centre for the
Future State (2010)108 show that bottom-up demand improves public provision only when
coupled with action on the side of the state (or by political movements or professional
organisations representing front-line providers). Even in modern cities like São Paulo and
Mexico City, only a tiny minority of poor people raise complaints or make demands on public
officials about public services (either directly or through third parties).109 But evidence from
South Asia (see boxes below) shows that even the poorest people respond when
opportunities arise. The Orangi Pilot Project shows the scale of success achievable when
government works hand in hand with the community.
102
Kuriyan, Renee, Savita Bailur, Bjorn-Soren Gigler, and Kyung-Ryul Park, Technologies for Transparency and
Accountability: Implications for ICT Policy and Implementation, World Bank (draft)
103 Harnessing Social Media Tools to Fight Corruption, LSE, 2011
104http://www.odi.org.uk/work/programmes/politics-governance/topics/details.asp?id=451&title=sectoral-problemdriven-political-economy-analysis
105 Evidence from the DFID Funded Helmand Monitoring and Evaluation Programme shows that institutional and
economic progress can be achieved even when there are on-going challenges to governance. For example,
individual agencies have maintained staff discipline in the face of poor prevailing behaviour by politicians and the
public sector at large. HMEP source material is confidential.
106 Evans, S. H. & Clarke, P. 2011.
107 See ‘Putting Citizens at the Centre: Linking States and Societies for Responsive Governance’, The
Development Research Centre on Citizenship, Participation and Accountability, June 2010
108 http://www2.ids.ac.uk/gdr/cfs/pdfs/AnUpside-downViewofGovernance.pdf
109 P.H. Houtzager, A. Acharya and A Gurza Lavalle, Associations and the Exercise of Citizenship in
New democracies: Evidence from Sao Paulo and Mexico City, Citizenship DRC, Institute of Development
Studies, Working Paper 285, May 2007
27
“I was able to mobilise about 43 communities in
the entire Baldia Town [Karachi]. We constructed
about 5,000 pit latrines with five different types of
designs, according to soil composition. We
organised local people for operation and
management of construction and we shifted the
priorities of the communities to sanitation. In 1981
we also started home schools in Baldia town by
starting 60 home schools in the entire area. This
was a concept where health, hygiene, sanitation,
pit latrine construction and community education
training were part of the literacy and non-formal
education. These schools became so successful
UNICEF started giving these teachers supplies
like material, books, hygiene education, and oral
rehydration salts. Then we introduced primary
healthcare, we trained these girls as primary
healthcare workers also.”
An urban sanitation programme in Karachi’s
kachi abadis (slums) reached over 800,000
people on a self-help basis (see box opposite
and below).110 In Balochistan, a ‘Community
Support Process’ succeeded in opening 1500
girls’ schools in five years, enrolling a total of
70,000 girls.111 In India, a women’s
cooperative called SEWA has gradually
gained over a million members across nine
states. SEWA is almost completely governed
by the poor women who make up its
members, each of whom pay an annual
membership of Rs5.112
From an interview with Dr Quratulain Bakhteari,
Director, Institute for Development Studies and
Practices (IDSP), Quetta By Shujauddin Qureshi.
NGORC Journal, August 2006.
The Orangi Pilot Project (OPP) began work in the Orangi katchi abadi in 1980. Started by
the renowned development theorist and practitioner, Dr Akhtar Hameed Khan, OPP was
based on his concept of research and extension. After an initial period of action research and
extension education, sanitation was identified as the first point of intervention.
Subsequently, a model of low-cost sanitation evolved, which was rapidly adopted by the
communities and changed the onthe-ground-environment dramatically. The ‘componentsharing model’ as it came to be known, placed responsibility for building household and
lane- level sanitation infrastructure (which is referred to as ‘internal development’) on the
residents, while the government (municipal authorities) were responsible for building and
maintaining secondary infrastructure including mains, disposal and treatment (known as
‘external development’). Direct assistance to communities by OPP and the effect of
demonstrations of its work benefited over 108,000 households (over 865,000 people) in
nearly 7,600 lanes, representing almost 90 per cent of the entire settlement of Orangi.
Collectively, communities invested nearly US$1.7 million of their own money in their
sewerage system, in addition to investments made by the government, mainly on external
development.
Human Settlements Discussion Paper Series, Theme: Water – 6, Lessons from Karachi: the role of
demonstration, documentation, mapping and relationship building in advocacy for improved urban
sanitation and water services
Option 4 has the broadest evidence base although this too has gaps. The literature
highlights the importance of developing strong linkages between local, provincial and federal
governments as part of the reform process.113 This is relevant in Pakistan, where the huge
size of provinces and split of responsibilities between Provincial and District levels mean
reforms can only occur when the two work together and communicate well. Our OBB pilot in
110
Orangi Pilot Project, Karachi
QUALITY OF PRIMARY EDUCATION IN PAKISTAN, Preparatory Document for the Ministerial Meeting of
South Asia EFA Forum, 21-23 May, 2003, pg 28
112 http://www.hceronline.com/?q=node/35
113 Romeo, Leonardo. "Local Governance Approach to Social Reintegration and Economic Recovery in Postconflict Countries." UNCDF, 8 Oct. 2002.
111
28
KPK highlights this. There is evidence that using GIS mapping systems can help better
target services to poor people.114 Punjab’s decision to roll out the Jhang ‘citizen feedback
model’ is a good example of how top level support can sponsor local reforms to make them
stick. They can also spread: Toba Tek Singh District has independently applied the citizen
feedback model to its Police Offices.
3.2.1
Summary of the quality of the evidence
The evidence in support of this programme is limited, especially from within Pakistan.
Table 4: Evidence rating
Option
Evidence rating
2
Limited
3
Limited
4
Limited
3.2.2
Climate change and environment
Pakistan is highly exposed to the impacts of climate change, including extreme heat and
rising temperatures. Precipitation rates may become more variable, with low lands becoming
drier and mountainous regions wetter. Under current global emissions scenarios, Pakistan’s
averages temperatures will rise by more than predicted global averages: by up to 1.5C by
2020 and up to 5C by 2080 over baseline.
Districts in KP and Punjab are vulnerable to a range of natural hazards, notably flash floods,
large riverine floods and earthquakes. 2010 floods hit both KPK and Southern Punjab hard.
An unprecedented 400mm of rain in just 36 hours fell on Peshawar, Dir, Risalpur, Cherat,
Parachinar and Upper Dir. This contrasts with average annual rainfall of 40mm. KPK was
the hardest hit province, with approximately 2.7m survivors identified by the UN as needing
immediate humanitarian assistance. One-fifth of Pakistan's total land area was underwater,
directly affecting 20 million people through destruction of property, livelihood and
infrastructure. Nearly 2,000 were killed.
Flash floods are common in steep areas. Rapid run off can destroy homes and infrastructure
on a localised basis. Vulnerability is heightened by old or poorly built or sited infrastructure
(roads, bridges, culverts, schools, health centres), often flouting codes and standards.
At the same time, droughts will also be more likely. The Stern Review on the Economics of
Climate Change115 suggests Punjab will become significantly drier. Significant areas of land
are already uncultivated due to a shortage of water. Punjabis living in valleys and low-lying
areas are also at risk of more erratic (including later or shorter) monsoon rains and sudden
surges in rivers due to the accelerated melting of glaciers.
A long term concern is the impact of climate change on agriculture. Dry areas, including arid
and semi-arid regions in the Punjab are – on top of water shortages – facing temperatures
close to tolerance limits. Climate change is likely to change growing periods of crops, alter
The UK’s Helmand Monitoring & Evaluation Programme uses GIS tools to map public perceptions. This
shapes international thinking on delivery of assistance in the province. An ODI assessment of GIS in water
sector initiatives in Sub Saharan Africa found positive results similar to those the SNG programme is hoping to
achieve. See ODI Policy Paper 29, 2007, Mapping for better accountability in service delivery: Assessing
WaterAid’s work in mapping water supply and sanitation delivery to the poor
115 Nicholas Stern, The Economics of Climate Change, Cabinet Office , HM Treasury, January 2007
114
29
scheduling of cropping seasons, increasing crop stresses (thermal and moisture), change
irrigation requirements, alter soil characteristics, and increase the risk of pests and diseases.
The SNG programme, with its focus on governance and capacity building, is unlikely to have
negative impacts on climate change or the environment. There are no funds being directed
into infrastructure development, or any other area that might be considered mal-adaptive.
Pakistan has very low levels of greenhouse gas emissions per capita. While improved
governance may result in increased economic activity in the regions targeted, it is unlikely
that this will have a material impact on emissions, and in fact, may result in net benefits from
improved land management and soil carbon sequestration, and better urban planning.
In terms of potential benefits, improved governance structures are likely to be more effective
in dealing with social issues arising from environmental events and natural disasters.
Communities are aware that some infrastructural investments are increasing their
vulnerability, but they do not have the means to influence decisions. Increasing transparency
and the use of evidence in local planning processes would provide opportunities for
community-level engagement. Bringing in science and local knowledge of hazard threats
would help improve accountability. In doing so, the programme would help build community
resilience. Scale up of local improvements could create pathways by which climate change
issues might be integrated into provincial planning (urban and rural) and policy-making,
particularly where issues threaten economic development or stability.
The success of the SNG programme is potentially exposed to the impacts of large scale
environmental disaster, both directly in the two Provinces or in neighbouring regions. Such
shocks are uncertain and outside the influence of programme. However, the programme will
increase the capacity of regional authorities to respond to events.
In the long run, the potential to sustain economic development and increase prosperity will
be dependent on improving the resilience of vulnerable populations to climate impacts, and
in particular the availability of productive agricultural land and water resources. The
programme does not target these aspects directly. However, the governance capacity and
connections developed by the programme should help provinces, districts and communities
in mitigating risks and impact.
The programme will therefore seek to integrate the following activities into programme
implementation where possible:



Ensure that climate and environmental risk are integrated, along with demographic
analyses, into policy and budgeting processes. Use Output Based Budgeting to
influence resilient outcomes, particularly in agricultural policy planning and water
provision (Option 2+4);
Enhance structures and systems for assessing vulnerability and risk. For example,
enhancing the GIS mapping systems proposed in KPK and Punjab to integrate layers
of environmental risk and vulnerability in order to enhance disaster response planning
(Option 2+4);
Include climate risk and disaster response in social consultations (Option 3+4) to build
the evidence base for planning infrastructural investments and urban development and
responding to natural disasters and flood risks.
All options have minimal environment and climate risks as they are based on governance
and capacity building issues. They are all assessed as low/no risk (C). The key risks and
opportunities are set out below in Table 5.
30
Table 5: Assessment of risks and opportunities
Option Climate change and environment risks and
impact
1
C116
2
C
3
C
4
C
116
117
Climate
change
environment opportunities
C
B117
B
B
and
Low or no potential risk / opportunity
Medium / manageable potential risk / opportunity
31
3.3
How will progress and results be monitored, measured and evaluated?
3.3.1
Summary
The M&E strategy for the programme reflects the commitments made in the DFID Pakistan
Operational Plan 2011-15 and DFID Pakistan’s 2011 Evaluation Strategy (see Figure 5
below).
Figure 5: Alignment with key evaluation criteria
1
2
3
4
5
6
Evaluation criteria
Strategic importance for DFID. Does the programme make a
significant contribution to the objectives and results set out in the
DFID Pakistan Operational Plan?
Strategic importance for DFID, HMG and/or the international
development debate. Will the programme deliver on DFID-wide
priorities (e.g. women and girls), is it critical to wider National
Security Council objectives for Pakistan (e.g. on conflict) and/or will
it help to inform approaches elsewhere (e.g. on low-cost private
schools)?
Innovation. Is this a new approach where the evidence-base is, by
definition, weak?
Risk. Is an evaluation needed to demonstrate how the programme
rolled-out and to capture any lessons?
Size. Is it a significant investment of financial resources?
Demand. Do key partners want an evaluation?
Programme ‘fit’
√
√
√
√
√
√
As well as delivering specific interventions the SNG programme will be investigative, testing
different approaches (particularly in Punjab), and ensuring lesson-learning through its
lifetime. It will need rigorous monitoring and evaluation so that, for each area of work, we
can answer the questions: ‘does this activity produce the change (and the value for money)
expected, and if so why?’, ‘if not, why not, and can we modify or should we stop? and ‘does
it still work when scaled up and replicated elsewhere?’ The development of an M&E plan
will need to take into account the limited scope and detail of data currently available in the
public domain to inform our assessment of impact.
A two-tiered approach to monitoring and evaluation of the SNG programme is proposed:
1.
On-going integrated monitoring, evaluation and research at input and output level.
2.
Independent programme evaluation, including impact evaluation.
The plan will be elaborated further at the outset of the programme, by the Management
Organisation, and independently peer reviewed to ensure rigour. The Management
Organisation, by sub-contracting specialist research and evaluation expertise, will be
responsible for delivering baseline data and completing the interim and final evaluations.
Independence will be secured through DFID oversight, consultation with stakeholders, and if
necessary further peer reviews. Given its centrality to guiding the evolution of the
programme, the budget includes significant funding for M&E activities at £1.9 million
(equivalent to 5% of the total programme budget).
3.3.2
On-going integrated monitoring and evaluation
32
Monitoring and evaluation will play a central role throughout the delivery of the SNG
programme. Significant emphasis will be placed on frequent periodic monitoring of
performance against SNG outputs, indicators and milestones, and associated risks and
assumptions, as this will be used to adapt and improve interventions or to drop them if they
are not working. This integrated “formative” approach will be key to steering the programme
in the right direction.
The Management Organisation will be expected to establish a well-qualified and
experienced M&E team and must have the capability to carry out or commission (and build
partner capacity for) reliable primary data collection and quantitative and qualitative research
on the ground in Pakistan. Annual reviews, commissioned by DFID, and involving
programme partners and stakeholders will be the principal mechanism for assessing
progress to date and, if needed, redirecting or reprioritising activities and budget allocations,
but decisions will also be taken between annual reviews where the evidence for redirection
is available and compelling.
3.3.3
Independent SNG programme evaluation
The SNG programme will be evaluated independently across its life cycle - baseline, interim
and final. The OBB/conditional grant component of the programme in KPK will receive a full
impact evaluation. This will complement the integrated M&E and help assess the direct
impact of the programme and DFID attribution. Evaluation will draw on the results of the
integrated monitoring and evaluation exercises, but go beyond this:
-
Baseline Evaluation: This will help finalise the SNG programme logic including
important assumptions and risks. The baseline evaluation should draw a clear
explanatory picture of the status quo and refine the range of measurable quantitative
and qualitative indicators against which progress can be monitored and evaluated
throughout the life of the programme. It will be important to confirm current baselines
and establish missing ones as swiftly as possible. Where feasible this will be
undertaken in parallel with the selection of the Management Organisation.
-
Interim Evaluation(s): These will assess at 2 years the performance of the SNG
programme and how the outputs add up (the “summative” element), and provide
recommendations for improving the programme’s second half (the “formative”
element).
-
Final Evaluation: A final assessment of the SNG Programme (with a “summative”
focus) will ensure that lessons learned are captured and fed into the design of future
interventions.
Table 11 below provides specific details on interventions that are currently assessed as
amenable to evaluation and the potential approaches that could be used. Methods are likely
to combine controlled studies, surveys, and qualitative research, and will draw on and
strengthen existing data collection systems where they exist. Where quasi-experimental
approaches are considered most appropriate they will have to be undertaken in a robust
way with due consideration to risk of confounders (factors outside the intervention, including
the impact of other DFID programmes, that may affect the result and make it hard to tell
what difference the intervention itself is making,). Contribution analysis is one methodology
that could be used where experimental methodologies are not feasible. Contribution analysis
assesses the impact of the programme on the delivery of the outcomes relative to other
factors in play. The utilisation of good quality local research expertise will be critical for the
33
evaluation of SNG – the programme will be able to draw on the research mapping exercise
that is planned by DFID Pakistan in 2012.
34
Table 11: Examples of possible evaluation approaches for a sample of SNG interventions
Output and
Possible evaluation
Evaluation approach and considerations**
proposed activity
approaches*
Output 1 – decisions based on robust evidence
Structured surveys
Contribution analysis The activity tests whether the provision of analytical support to the governments of
that ensure
will set out to verify the
KPK and Punjab will lead to more evidenced based decision making and hence
policymakers
theory of change, or
improve their ability to deliver services more effectively. Evaluating this will entail
understand people’s
logic, behind the activity assessing the respective ‘contribution’ of (i) the intervention (i.e. the analytical
attitudes to their local
and take into
support provided) and (ii) other influencing factors.
service delivery units
consideration other
and the impact of their influencing factors.
Evidence of ‘contribution’ will be collected through a combination of quantitative and
decisions.
qualitative tools (surveys, document review and analysis, in-depth interviews, focus
groups, case studies).
Indicative
timetable
Baseline
evaluations +
follow-up
exercises
every 9 to12
months
Output 2 – services responsive to people’s needs
35
Mobile technology
pilots – ‘Electronic
register’ providing
evidence of teacher
attendance / Reporting
defective public
services via mobile
phone (e.g. water
pumps) / Tracking
health service delivery
Potential for
experimental
approaches (e.g. RCTs)
but more likely to be
quasi-experimental (e.g.
Propensity Score
Matching).
A number of schools/health units subjected to pilots could be selected (treatment
group) and matched to a control group of schools/health units sharing similar
characteristics (such as size, types of services offered, staff numbers and profiles,
population within 1km radius, accessibility) that have not been exposed to the pilot
project. Progress in the quality of service delivery and satisfaction levels would then
be monitored in both groups. All other things being equal, a faster rate of
improvement in the treatment group and higher levels of satisfaction among patients
would lead the evaluator to conclude that the intervention had been effective. This
kind of evidence could provide the rationale for scaling up the project to reach a
larger number of units.
Anti-corruption pilots –
e.g. posting budget
data and staffing
levels at schools – so
that parents know how
many teachers they
should expect to be
present, and how the
school’s budget has
been allocated.
Will need to be
combined with
qualitative research
(e.g. interviews, focus
groups, stakeholder
panels) to establish
casual linkages beyond
reasonable doubt.
Surveys implemented as part of the evaluation process should seek to achieve a
95% confidence level +/- 5% confidence interval at the district level. In addition to
conventional face to face surveying there is also scope for a telephone approach –
2009 Penetration rates: Punjab 62%, KPK 37%.
Baseline
evaluations (in
particular
surveys) +
follow-up
exercises
every 6
months
Output 3 – capability to deliver basic services
36
Rollout output based
budgeting through 12
departments to 6
districts in KPK
Potential for quasiexperimental
approaches. Will need
to be combined with
significant qualitative
research (interviews,
focus groups,
stakeholder panels) to
establish casual
linkages beyond
reasonable doubt.***
Contribution analysis
Assess how effectively budget is allocated and identification of efficiency gains (i.e.
reduced costs and improved public services) by (i) government departments
employing OBB (treatment group) matched with (ii) departments not employing OBB
(control group).
Ex-post evaluation/review of OBB progress to date will form baseline for rollout of
OBB elsewhere.
Baseline
evaluations +
follow-up
exercises
every 9 to 12
months
“Contribution” evidence of clear linkages between budget allocation, quality of
service delivery and efficiency gains (reducing costs and improved public services).
Similar quasi-experimental approaches could be adopted for extending GIS mapping
across Punjab.
*All evaluation approaches will need to pay particular attention to the impact of SNG activities on women and girls. This will mean ensuring
representative samples of women and girls in data collection efforts and disaggregating the results by gender.
** The evaluation approach will need to carefully complement the approaches being adopted by DFID’s other programmes so as to avoid
duplication of surveys and research efforts. A Stakeholder Management and Communication Strategy will be needed to ensure results of
evaluation are fully disseminated to numerous stakeholders of SNG programme including government at every level, beneficiaries and other
donors.
*** A problem that may be encountered in the evaluation of activities aimed at building capacity is that units of observation may be too few for
assumptions associated with parametric statistics to hold. In cases where sample size is small (say 10-20 observations) the importance of
baseline data is paramount. The more pre-and post- treatment data available, the more credible the impact estimate will be.
37
3.3.4
Challenges facing implementing M&E
Pakistan is not an easy environment to carry out M&E. Several factors will need to be
addressed in the design of the M&E approach including:




3.3.5
Data systems are generally weak leaving a dearth of baseline or time series data and
unclear responsibility for data collection spread across disparate agencies. While there
is some statistical capacity there remains an all-round skills shortage. Output 1
addresses this directly and will work with delivery units and districts to strengthen and
diversify data sources.
Conventional evaluation techniques, like household surveys designed to reach a
representative sample of the population, could become fraught with challenges in KPK
and Punjab. Freedom of movement may be curtailed (at least for international
consultants). Insecurity and association with foreign governments may present a threat
to researchers (local and international) and research subjects, and put obstacles in the
way of implementation and verification, potentially reducing the reliability of results. A
range of techniques including mobile technology and triangulation of sources will
mitigate.
As a traditional and conservative society, social interactions in KP and Punjab are
pervaded by the society’s traditional norms and this has a profound impact on
research. While social desirability bias118 can occur in any opinion poll, in societies
such as KPK and Punjab, constraints of culture, tradition, and social hierarchies, may
especially colour expressed opinions on contentious political, social and security
issues. The design of qualitative approaches will address this.
The difficulties associated with reaching women in a conservative society also pose a
challenge to undertaking research in KPK and Punjab, as their views may differ
significantly from those of men, particularly with regard to themes such as accessibility
of public health centres or education. Managing the risk of collecting intrinsically
skewed data is high, and finding ways to gather women’s views will be of critical
importance for the establishment of a credible M&E system.
Priorities for the first six months
The following steps will need to be taken to establish a full M&E framework and then to
manage its implementation:







Confirm output, outcome and impact indicators with the relevant stakeholders
Compile an inventory of the M&E frameworks being implemented by other DFID
programmes in the two provinces to help ensure complementarity and to avoid
duplication of effort and overlap
Design the detailed framework for M&E supported by written guidelines/operating
manual
Undertake research, studies and surveys to establish missing baselines
Confirm milestones and trajectory of change for each indicator
Set up systems for continuous tracking and reporting.
Design research to fill evidence gaps in the theory of change and to measure the
impact of corruption as part of rolling out DFID’s anti-corruption strategy
118
Social desirability bias is the tendency of respondents to answer questions in a manner that will be
viewed favourably by others. It can take the form of over-reporting good behaviour or under-reporting
bad behaviour
38
The Management Organisation will be responsible for developing and operationalising the
M&E framework. They may be able to draw on resources and expertise of the Policy,
Analysis, Research and Results (PARR) facility being set up by the Aawaz programme.
3.3.6 Log frame
Quest No of log frame for this intervention: 3490652
39
ANNEX 1 – LOGICAL FRAMEWORK
PROJECT NAME
IMPACT
More stable democracy in Pakistan
Pakistan - Sub National Governance (SNG)
Impact Indicator 1
Government Effectiveness (perceptions of the quality of
public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree
of its independence from political pressures, the quality of
policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility
of the government's commitment to such policies)
Planned
Baseline
National Score -0.7673
Rank 25.8 percentile
Milestone 1 2012/13
Score -0.76 or rank 26
Milestone 2 2013/14
Score -0.74 or rank 26.5
Milestone 3 2014/15
Score -0.73 and rank 27
Target (March 2016)
Score -0.71 and rank 28
Or 8% improvement over
baseline
Milestone 3
Score 3.2 and rank 22.1
Target (date)
Score 3.3 and rank 23.1
Or 8% improvement over
baseline)
Milestone 3
Rank 123
Target (date)
Rank 113
Or 15% improvement over
baseline
Achieved
Impact Indicator 2
Government capability in effective use of resources
improved (index measures progress towards
democracy and market liberalism and political
management performance)
Planned
Source
World Bank Institute Worldwide Governance Indicators 2010
Baseline
Milestone 1
Milestone 2
Score 3.06
Score 3.1 and rank 21.4
Score 3.1 and rank 21.6
Rank 21 out of 128
Achieved
Source
Impact Indicator 3
International Gender Gap (Score and Rank)
Planned
Bertelsmann Transformational Index 2010
Baseline
Milestone 1
Rank 133 out of 135
Rank 129
Milestone 2
Rank 126
Achieved
Source
World Economic Forum Gender Gap Report 2011
OUTCOME
Outcome Indicator 1
Baseline
Poor people in Punjab and Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa report that services
better meeting their needs
Percentage distribution of household satisfaction of
a)
Basic health unit facilities and service use
b)
School facilities and service use
KPK (PSLM 10/11)
a)36%
b)65%
Punjab (PSLM 10/11)
a)29%
b)63%
Planned
Milestone 1
Milestone 2
Milestone 3
Target (date)
Assumptions
Local surveys are
completed in focal districts
compared to province
wide with gender
disaggregated data (the
total population of
beneficiaries in KPK is
9,000,000 and in Punjab
is 16,200,000)
Improvements in levels of
satisfaction compared to
baseline 3% points higher
in focal districts compared
to province wide, with
gender disaggregated
data showing satisfaction
improving more rapidly for
women
Improvements in levels of
satisfaction compared to
baseline 7% points higher
in focal districts compared
to province wide, with
gender disaggregated
data showing satisfaction
improving more rapidly for
women
Improvements in levels of
satisfaction compared to
baseline 10% points
higher in focal districts
compared to province
wide, with gender
disaggregated data
showing satisfaction
improving more rapidly for
women
1. Raising the standard of public
services improves government
legitimacy by increasing trust and
confidence in government and
contributes to stability
2. Government's spending is effective
in targeting major service delivery
gaps.
3. The Average district population in
KPK is 1.5 million and in Punjab is
2.7million. The surveys will inform the
actual figures.
Achieved
Source
Outcome Indicator 2
Reduced cost of corruption in land registration to
households.
Planned
Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement Survey (PSLM) 2010/11 and Local Surveys
Baseline
Milestone 1
Milestone 2
Milestone 3
No scorecards in place.
Identified reforms for
5% decrease in cost of
8% decrease in cost of
Conduct cost of corruption Patwari system and local corruption linked to land
corruption linked to land
per household per year
household surveys
registration per household registration per household
survey across focal
completed in focal districts using patwari system per per year.
districts (the total
year.
beneficiaries in KPK is
9,000,000 and in Punjab
is 16,200,000)
Target (date)
15% decrease in cost of
corruption linked to land
registration per household
per year.
Achieved
Outcome Indicator 3
Source
Cost of corruption per household per year survey across focal districts
Baseline
Milestone 1
Milestone 2
Milestone 3
Target (date)
40
Access to improved health and education services
Planned
No scorecards in place
(the total beneficiaries in
KPK is 9,000,000 and in
Punjab is 16,200,000)
Gender disaggregated
scorecard in place in focal
districts and first
performance assessment
conducted
2% improvement in
scorecard performance
compared to first year and
3% more people receiving
adequate quality services
5% improvement in
scorecard performance
compared to first year and
5% more people receiving
adequate quality services.
7% improvement in
scorecard performance
compared baseline. At
least 10% more people
receiving adequate quality
services.
Achieved
Source
Scorecard monitoring by communities, district officials, plus independent performance audit/Programme will conduct survey with
Nutritional Status and Gender Segregated data on access.
INPUTS (£)
INPUTS (HR)
Gov't (£0)
DFID (FTEs)
HoDFIDP (SCS)
RegGovAdv (A1)
Ho GG (A1)
PM GG (A2)
SNG Team Leader (A1)
PR Punj (A2)
PR KPK (A2)
PO Punj (B2)
PO KPK (B2)
PFM Adv (A2L)
PFM/AC Adviser (A2)
SDA (A1)
Edu Adv (A2)
Health Adv (A2)
Conflict Adv (A2)
Other (£0)
Total (£33,600,000)
DFID SHARE (100%)
DFID (FTEs)
2%
3%
10%
10%
60%
50%
50%
70%
70%
40%
50%
5%
5%
5%
5%
OUTPUT 1
Output Indicator 1.1
Decisions by sub-national governments District budgets based on evidence of people’s needs
are based on robust evidence
Milestone 1
2 needs assessments
done per district with a
focus on women and girls
Milestone 2
3 districts have budgets
based on evidence
including needs
assessments in 2 sectors,
100,000 beneficiaries
Milestone 3
6 districts have budgets
based on evidence
including needs
assessments in 4 sectors,
400,000 beneficiaries
Target (date)
Evidence-based lobbying
effective in changing
budget allocations in 6
sectors, 600,000
beneficiaries
Planned
No population based
3 needs assessments
for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa assessment of needs (the done per district with a
total population in KPK is focus on women and girls
9,000,000)
6 districts have budgets
based on evidence
including needs
assessments in 2 sectors,
100,000 beneficiaries
6 districts have budgets
based on evidence
including needs
assessments in 4 sectors,
400,000 beneficiaries
Evidence-based lobbying
effective in changing
budget allocations in 6
sectors, 600,000
beneficiaries
Planned
for Punjab
Baseline
No population based
assessment of needs (the
total population in Punjab
is 16,200,000)
Achieved
```````````````````````````````
Assumption
1. Bureaucracy is responsive to the
demands of politicians
2. Local and provincial politicians
welcome assistance that helps them
connect better to citizens in order to
bring about policy changes
3. Governments scale up the piloted
service delivery improvements
irrespective of DFID funding
4. Increased community involvement
in setting local spending priorities
5. The GIS activity will be housed in
the Urban Unit in PnD department. It
could be delayed if the Urban unit is
not established in time.
Achieved
Source
Observation of Committee meetings and analysis of records/ Budget strategy papers, AWAAZ programme data including PAR reports
Output Indicator 1.2
Successful service improvement pilots move to scale
and are evaluated
`````````````````````````````````````````````````````````````````````````
```````````````````
Planned
for Punjab
Baseline
No DFID funded service
improvement pilots in
place
Milestone 1
Pilots identified and 2
supported with technical
assistance in 2 districts
benefiting 36,000 people
Milestone 2
6 pilots up and running. 2
pilots assessed and
scaled up across 4
districts benefiting
additional 200,000 people
Milestone 3
4 pilots assessed and
scaled up across 6
districts benefiting
additional 400,000 people
Target (date)
Pilots translated into
standard service and
rolled out across province,
2,600,000 beneficiaries
Achieved
41
Planned
No DFID funded service
for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa improvement pilots in
place
Pilots identified and 2
supported with technical
assistance in 2 districts
benefiting 25,000 people
6 pilots up and running. 2
pilots assessed and
scaled up across 4
districts benefiting
150,000 people
4 pilots assessed and
scaled up across 6
districts benefiting
300,000 people
Pilots translated into
standard service and
rolled out across province,
1,350,000 beneficiaries
Milestone 3
Health and Education
mapping completed in 6
districts
Target (date)
10,000 officials
benefiting from GIS
usage. GIS starting to be
used as standard
monitoring tool beyond
focal districts
Health and Education
mapping completed in 6
districts
10,000 officials
benefiting from GIS
usage. GIS starting to be
used as standard
monitoring tool beyond
focal districts
Achieved
IMPACT WEIGHTING (%) 30
Output Indicator 1.3
Government use GIS to monitor quantity and quality of
services
Source
District records and independent audit and evaluation
Baseline
Milestone 1
Milestone 2
Planned
No GIS in use
2 new GIS nodes are in
Health and Education
for Punjab
place for specific aspects mapping completed in 3
of services benefiting
districts
5,000 users each
Achieved
Planned
No GIS in use
for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
2 new GIS nodes are in
place for specific aspects
of services benefiting
5,000 users each
Health and Education
mapping completed in 3
districts
Achieved
Source
Implementation reports, third party valiation reports and external audit reports
Govt (£0)
Other (£0)
INPUTS (HR)
DFID (FTEs)
See under outcome for whole programme
OUTPUT 2
Sub-national government services are
more responsive to peoples' needs
Output Indicator 2.1
Proportion of budget allocated to pro-poor interventions
Planned
for Punjab
Baseline
No budget consultations
Achieved
Planned
Budget Strategy Paper
for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 2012/13.
RISK RATING = High
Total (£1,865,000)
DFID SHARE (100%)
Milestone 1
3% shift in budget to propoor expenditure (that
specifically benefits
women and girls)
compared to baseline
(following public budget
consultations including
women and private
sector)
Milestone 2
5% shift in budget to propoor expenditure (that
specifically benefits
women and girls).
Proportion of ADP
devolved to district is
doubled to 6% and 10% of
that budget is allocated
against public demand.
Milestone 3
7% shift in budget to propoor expenditure (that
specifically benefits
women and girls).
Devolved proportion of
ADP is doubled to 6% and
10% of that budget is
allocated against public
demand.
Target (date)
15% shift in budget to propoor expenditure (that
specifically benefits
women and girls)
Estimated 3.75 million
beneficiaries in focal
districts
3% shift in budget to propoor expenditure (that
specifically benefits
women and girls)
compared to baseline
(following public budget
consultations including
women and private
sector)
5% shift in budget to propoor expenditure (that
specifically benefits
women and girls).
Proportion of ADP
devolved to districts is
doubled to 6% and 10% of
that budget is allocated
against public demand.
7% shift in budget to propoor expenditure (that
specifically benefits
women and girls).
Proportion of ADP
devolved to districts is
doubled to 6% and 10% of
that budget is allocated
against public demand.
15% shift in budget to propoor expenditure (that
specifically benefits
women and girls)
Estimated 3.75 million
beneficiaries in focal
districts
Assumptions
5. Bureaucrats and politicians willing
to explain their spending decisions by
reference to publicly available data
Achieved
Source
42
Output Indicator 2.2
Mobile phone technology pilots lead to improved
access to services
Budget records and analysis, observation of consultations / Budget Strategy Papers (BSPs)
Baseline
Milestone 1
Milestone 2
Planned - Punjab
No phone pilots in place
Phone pilots in place in 4
focal districts
Milestone 3
10% (130,000) complaints 15% (195,000) complaints
about barriers to access
about barriers to access
are actioned
are actioned. All pilots
assessed and 1 pilot
scaled up across all focal
districts
Target (date)
1,300,000 beneficiaries
from complaints actioned.
30% complaints about
barriers to access are
actioned. Successful
pilots established as
standard component of
service delivery in focal
districts. 1 successful pilot
is scaled up across
Punjab.
Achieved
Source
Call centre records, decision making and monitoring reports
IMPACT WEIGHTING (%) 20
RISK RATING = High
INPUTS (HR)
Govt (£0)
Other (£0)
Baseline
District plans are not
performance orientated.
Milestone 1
Provincial Delivery Unit
established, and
performance framework
developed
6 departments rolled out
OBB in 2 districts.
Total (£6,058,000)
DFID SHARE (100%)
Milestone 2
6 districts teams agree
targets
Milestone 3
6 districts delivering
services against agreed
targets
Target (date)
10 % (£9 million)
efficiency savings to
public expenditure in focal
Districts. Estimated 3.75
million beneficiaries in
focal districts
8 departments rolled out
OBB in 4 districts.
6 districts fully delivering
services under OBB
framework.
20% (£18 million)
Efficiency savings to
public expenditure in focal
Districts. Estimated 3.75
million beneficiaries in
focal districts
See under outcome for whole programme
OUTPUT 3
Output Indicator 3.1
Strengthened sub-national government District planning is more performance orientated.
capability to deliver basic services
District planning is more performance orientated.
Planned
for Punjab
Achieved
Planned
32 departments adopted
for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa OBB at provincial level. 2
(Health and Education)
departments rolled out
OBB in 2 districts
Assumption
Assuming we can identify standard
- unit costs to inform efficiency
saving analysis.
Punjab agrees to performance
management framework for District
Governments.
KP Government remains committed
to OBB and conditional grants
rollout.
Achieved
Source
District Business plans, Cabinet Decisions, Conditional Grant Allocations, Third Party Validation of Service delivery, Annual Evaluations conducted by Govt. Third
party analysis of budgets
Output Indicator 3.2
School based procurement delivers better VFM
Baseline
Planned
Managing school based
for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa procurement in place in 2
districts in KPK
Milestone 1
5% (£1 million) efficiency
savings through school
based procurement.
Milestone 2
15% (£3 million) efficiency
savings through school
based procurement.
Milestone 3
20% (£4 million) efficiency
savings through school
based procurement.
Target (date)
40% (£8 million) efficiency
savings through school
based procurement in 6
districts
43
Achieved
Source
District Business plans, PTCs procurement records, Independent audit, Annual Evaluations conducted by Govt
IMPACT WEIGHTING (%) 50
Output Indicator 3.3
Non-salary budget for pro-poor services reach service
delivery units in a timely fashion.
Planned
for Punjab
Baseline
No expenditure tracking
Achieved
Planned
No expenditure tracking
for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
Milestone 1
Expenditure tracking for
pro-poor expenditure lines
established in 1 sector in
focal districts and
percentage of non-salary
budget allocations
reaching service delivery
units in a timely fashion
established
Milestone 2
Percentage of budget
allocation reaching
service delivery units is
improved by 5% at least
Milestone 3
Percentage of budget
allocation reaching
service delivery units is
improved by 10% at least
Target (date)
Percentage of budget
allocation reaching
service delivery units is
improved by 15% and
expenditure tracking
established as standard
practice
Expenditure tracking for
pro-poor expenditure lines
established in 1 sector in
focal districts and
percentage of budget
allocations reaching
service delivery units
established
Percentage of budget
allocation reaching
service delivery units is
improved by 5% at least
Percentage of budget
allocation reaching
service delivery units is
improved by 10% at least
Percentage of budget
allocation reaching
service delivery units is
improved by 15% and
expenditure tracking
established as standard
practice
Achieved
Source
Third Party Validation and independent audit
Govt (£0)
Other (£0)
INPUTS (£)
INPUTS (HR)
RISK RATING = Medium
Total (£12,565,000)
DFID SHARE (100%)
See under outcome for whole programme
44
45