Silver Fire Programmatic/Cost Fire
Review Gila National Forest, U.S. Forest
Service
The Silver Fire on June 17, 2013—the fire’s tenth day. (Photo taken from the Incident Command Post.)
National Oversight Review
By
The National Incident Management Organization
April 2014
Silver Fire Programmatic Cost Fire Review
Gila National Forest
USDA Forest Service, April 2014
“We will successfully manage fire
on the landscape and fully evaluate
risks with a broad perspective and
consideration for the people we
serve and the landscapes
we protect.”
Thomas L. Tidwell, Chief
U.S. Forest Service
Jon Agner, Incident Commander, Type 3 Incident
Management Team, provides Silver Fire updates
to residents of Hillsboro at a June 10
community meeting.
Table of Contents
Purpose ....................................................................................................................................................2
Silver Fire Summary .................................................................................................................................2
Silver Fire Chronology ..............................................................................................................................7
Meeting the Six Review Objectives – Key Observations .........................................................................8
Lessons Learned..................................................................................................................................... .19
Recommendations .................................................................................................................................. 19
Observations ........................................................................................................................................... 20
Attachments ........................................................................................................................................... 21
Objective of this Review
The primary objective of these Programmatic Cost Fire Reviews is to evaluate and document risk
management decision processes and actions taken on incidents and their direct or indirect effect on
costs. The review and objective analysis provides recommendations to management for incidentspecific and programmatic process improvements based on comprehensive analysis of incident
documentation.
This allows for improvement of program performance, operations, evaluation of costs, and
facilitates the application of focused improvements. In addition, the reviews provide an
opportunity to evaluate the clarity of communication of the Chief’s Leader Intent and the
effectiveness of implementation in the field.
The results of the reviews provide information crucial to the well-established learning environment
and continued improvement in fire management in the U.S. Forest Service.
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Silver Fire Programmatic Cost Fire Review
Gila National Forest
USDA Forest Service, April 2014
Review Objectives
Objectively look at actions
taken by the Incident
Management Team and the
local Agency Administrator to
meet the direction provided
by the Forest Service Chief
Assess the consideration and
effectiveness of applying risk
management concepts to
incident cost through the
associated decisions and
expenditures as an outcome
Identify best business
practices used on fires this
past season
Identify how social and
political issues factored into
our decision making
Identify which current
procedures can be enhanced
or expanded
Identify improvements that
can be made in sharing and
clarifying expectations
Review Team Members
Judy Palmer, Team Lead,
Finance Section Chief, NIMO
John Truett, Operations
Section Chief, NIMO
Gene Madden, Safety Officer,
NIMO
Bea Day, FFMO, Cibola NF
Sue Zahn, Contract Operations
Program Manager, FAM, Region
5
Paul Keller, Writer-Editor,
Wildland Fire Lessons Learned
Center
Purpose
On December 20, 2013, James Hubbard, Deputy Chief for State
and Private Forestry (S&PF), issued a letter identifying ten large
fires that occurred in Fiscal Year 2013 to be reviewed. The fires
were selected based on complexity and national significance.
They represented a cross section of our risk management and
investment performance, which included financial, size, and
overall complexity.
On January 17, 2014, Tom Harbour, Director of Fire and Aviation
Management (FAM), delivered a letter to the Regional Fire
Director, Region 3 (R3), identifying Judy Palmer as the lead to
conduct the review on the Silver fire. The purpose of these large
fire reviews is to learn from those who were directly involved in
decision making and share those lessons based on the 2012 Risk
Decision Framework—which was included with the May 25, 2012
Wildfire Guidance letter signed by James Hubbard.
Upon receipt of the Director’s letter, the review team leader met
with the R3 Fire Director. In the initial meeting they discussed the
purpose of the assignment and how best to satisfy its intent.
Further, in addition to identifying necessary fire documentation,
they also identified a number of individuals who would be able to
contribute information. Interviews were conducted by the review
team throughout February and March 2014.
Silver Fire Summary
[This section tells the story of the Silver Fire, including
management decision-making regarding objectives, strategy and
tactics—how the initial decision for direct attack changed due to
the fire’s complexity; how strategy and tactics were always
focused on assuring firefighter and public safety and the
protection of values at risk.]
The Silver Fire was started by lightning on June 7, 2013 on the
Gila National Forest in an area which had experienced only
minimal fire activity since the 1940s. The initial fire was located
in steep, rugged terrain that consisted primarily of mature stands
The strategy selected for the fire was full suppression—
ensuring limited exposure to firefighters and addressing
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Silver Fire Programmatic Cost Fire Review
Gila National Forest
USDA Forest Service, April 2014
public safety while taking action to protect critical values at risk.
of dry mixed aspen, mixed conifer, subalpine fir, and spruce fir. Areas within these mixed
conifer stands were impacted by Douglas-Fir Tussock Moth, Western Pine, and the Ips (aka
“engraver”) Beetle—resulting in substantial high mortality, standing dead trees, and heavy
loading of fuels on the ground.
Because of these factors the Forest anticipated that this fire start would become a longduration incident from the onset. Initial attack (IA) resources assigned to the fire—from
the Forest’s Silver City Ranger District—included eight firefighters, supported by
helicopters and air tankers.
The fire was fought aggressively during the initial phase. However, during the evening
burning period, crews experienced difficulty controlling fire spread. The fire area’s steep,
rocky terrain contributed to these escalating fire conditions. Spotting continued
throughout the night. Active fire behavior—including hazardous rolling material—
threatened firefighters. Ground crews were unable to establish Lookouts, Communication,
Escape routes, and Safety zones (LCES). These conditions and a concern for firefighter
safety caused the IA Incident Commander (IC) to disengage firefighters from their
suppression efforts. Suppression tactics and strategies were reassessed and changed to
account for these changing conditions.
Due to Rapid Fire Spread and Expected Burning Conditions: Incident Complexity
Increases
June 8, 2013 at 0800 Mountain Standard Time (MST), the District transitioned the fire from
a Type 4 management organization to a Type 3 management organization. Firefighters
were still unable to engage the fire due to lack of safety zones, escape routes, medical
extrication sites, and high fuel concentrations. Available aviation resources were therefore
used to keep the fire in check while fire strategies and options were evaluated and
considered. The Forest participated in a conference call to discuss this with the Regional
Office. Due to the fire’s rapid spread and expected burning conditions, the decision was
made to transition to a Type 2 Incident Management Team (IMT).
On June 9, 2013, the fire grew from 450 to 2,250 acres. It easily burned through the
retardant and hand lines that were in place. Fire resources were unsuccessful in
establishing a good anchor point. Heavy helicopters were used to delay the fire from
progressing to State Highway 152 and the Black Range Crest. At approximately 1900 MST,
the fire crossed the Black Range Crest and made several small pushes to Emory Pass Vista.
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Silver Fire Programmatic Cost Fire Review
Gila National Forest
USDA Forest Service, April 2014
The Silver Fire on the incident’s second day. (Photo taken from Air Attack airplane.)
That evening a decision was made, in conjunction with the sheriff and partners, to evacuate
the community of Kingston. On June 10, 2013, the Northern Arizona (NAZ) Type 2 IMT was inbriefed. The strategy for the fire continued to be full suppression, ensuring limited exposure to
firefighters and addressing public safety while taking action to protect critical values at risk (VAR).
[See Attachments “Silver Fire Incident Strategy and Risk Assessment”.]
Management Action Points Identified
The IMT looked for opportunities to shorten the duration of the fire in areas with critical
values at risk, implementing tactics and strategies to minimize risk and exposure to
firefighters. This included conducting small burn outs when conditions and timing availed
themselves. The planning area for the incident expanded. Management Action Points1
(MAPs) were identified and developed in cooperation with the Gila National Forest, New
Mexico State Forestry, New Mexico State Police, New Mexico Department of Transportation
(DOT), Silver City Mayor’s Office, Sierra and Grant county commissioners and other elected
local and state officials, New Mexico Department of Air Quality, private land owners, and
the public.
“Management Action Points” are geographic points on the ground—or specific points in time—where an escalation or
alternative of fire management actions is warranted. Timely implementation of these actions when the fire reaches the
“Action Point” is generally critical to successful accomplishment of fire management objectives; also called, “Trigger
Points”.
1
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Silver Fire Programmatic Cost Fire Review
Gila National Forest
USDA Forest Service, April 2014
The Silver Fire as viewed from the community of Kingston on the fire’s fifth day. Kingston is surrounded by U.S.
Forest Service lands. There was a concern that the fire could spot into town and then blow back up the drainage.
The majority of the suppression effort/expense was therefore focused on implementing burn out operations
around the town site—designed to moderate fire behavior as the flame front came down the drainage.
Within the southern portion of the planning area (south of Highway 152) the Northern
Arizona Type 2 IMT implemented indirect line construction in conjunction with assessing
direct line construction where fire behavior, weather, and terrain aligned. This strategy
allowed for a high probability of success on the south and east sides of the fire.
Critical Values at Risk
Within the northern portion of the planning area (north of Highway 152), the Northern
Arizona Type 2 IMT executed indirect and point protection tactics in and near the
community of Kingston, as well as for other values adjacent to the existing fire perimeter.
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Silver Fire Programmatic Cost Fire Review
Gila National Forest
USDA Forest Service, April 2014
Besides Kingston, these values at
risk included the communities of
Hillsboro, Ladder Ranch,
Hermosa, Forest Service
infrastructure, Highway 152, and
various range allotments and
infrastructure. In addition, due to
potential post-fire flooding in the
Kingston, Hillsboro, and Mimbres
areas, the need for a planned
response was identified. This
was addressed and discussed at
Silver Fire public meetings.
A guiding management decision
on this incident was to keep the
A DC-10 applies aerial retardant on the Silver Fire. Aircraft were mainly
fire on National Forest Service
used on this incident to help protect communities in the Wildland-Urban
Interface areas.
lands and minimize damage to
private lands. Kingston, which
sits at the bottom of the Middle Percha drainage, is surrounded by Forest Service lands.
There was a concern that the fire could spot into town and then blow back up the drainage.
The majority of the suppression effort/expense was therefore focused on implementing
burn out operations around the town site—designed to moderate fire behavior as the flame
front came down the drainage.
Numerous MAPs were reached during the tenure of the Northern Arizona Type 2 IMT. The
appropriate response actions were taken each time. The fire entered an active period from
June 18-24, 2013 growing more than 50,000 acres, much of it north into the Aldo Leopold
Wilderness.
The Northern Arizona Type 2 IMT timed out on June 24, 2013 and was replaced by the New
Mexico Type 2 IMT. The New Mexico IMT continued most of the previously planned and
implemented actions, which included preparation and application of a large firing
operation to secure the flank south of McKnight Canyon.
On June 27, 2013 the fire transitioned from wind-driven to plume-dominated, causing it to
cross the prepared indirect fire line south of McKnight Canyon, making this line unusable.
Aerial ignition continued north of McKnight Canyon that focused on minimizing highseverity impacts within Aspen Mountain and the upper Mimbres drainages. Continued
indirect line construction utilized sparse fuels and was coordinated with structure
protection in the Upper Mimbres Valley. All actions and strategies continued to minimize
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Silver Fire Programmatic Cost Fire Review
Gila National Forest
USDA Forest Service, April 2014
These Gila National Forest preseason Risk Management
sessions and discussions proved to be instrumental in
developing the strategy and Leader’s Intent for the IMT.
exposure to all responders while simultaneously striving to ensure the highest probability
of success.
Fire Management Actions and Advantageous Fuel Type Stops Spread of Fire
On July 3, 2013 the north edge of the fire burned into an area of numerous large fire scars
that were expected to moderate fire behavior. Typically, these fire scars slow fire spread
even while the fire continues to advance. Consequently, due to the fire management
actions and the wildfire entering this different fuel type, the Silver Fire ceased its spread
without further suppression action.
Silver Fire Chronology
Day(s)
Date
Command
Size From
209s
4
06/0710
Type 3
2,250
Actions
Silver Fire starts
and T-2 team
ordered
Percent
Contained
Cost From
209
0
$500,000
20
$9,138,100
63
$14,162,500
T-2 IMT assumes
command 06/10
5-19
06/1106/24
Type 2
80,000
20-30
06/2507/04
Type 2
138, 540
4 days delegation to
a different IC
Different T-2 IMT
assumes command
06/25
31-38
07/0511
Type 3
138,546
T-3 IMT assumes
command 07/05
85
$14,300,000
39-100
07/1209/10
Type 4/5
138,546
Forest/District
100
Total
$14,300,000
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Silver Fire Programmatic Cost Fire Review
Gila National Forest
USDA Forest Service, April 2014
“We assess, analyze, communicate, and share
risk before, during, and after incidents.”
Thomas L. Tidwell, Chief
U.S. Forest Service
Meeting the Six Review Objectives – Key Observations
1. Objectively Look at Actions Taken by the Incident Management Team and the
Local Agency Administrator to Meet the Direction Provided by the Forest
Service Chief.
Prior to the 2013 fire season, the Gila National Forest conducted a Risk Management
session that included stakeholders. Additionally, Landscape Risk Assessments were
performed on all six of the Forest’s Ranger Districts. The area of the Silver Fire had
been identified as an area of concern by Line Officers and Fire Staff. These preseason
discussions proved to be instrumental in developing the strategy and Leader’s Intent
for the Silver Fire IMTs. They provided a better understanding and acceptance by
partners, cooperators and community leaders.
Furthermore, the District had worked with the community of Kingston in 2004,
implementing thinning and fuel break construction projects. This project also added
strength to the relationship and trust between the community and the Forest.
Through the early spring 2013, the Forest continued to conduct preseason briefings
with the Grant County Commissioners. The Gila National Forest has also established
and enhanced excellent communication and working relationships with both state and
county officials. These beneficial relationships proved instrumental during the course
of the Silver Fire.
Specific Actions that had a Direct, Positive Influence on Risk Management and Cost
Containment
Specific actions that had a direct, positive influence on risk management and cost
containment were developed and supported by the early strategy meetings that the
Forest held with partners, cooperators, and stakeholders. These meetings allowed the
IMT and Forest time to focus on tactics needed for a large fire incident. For the most
part, these strategies and tactics were developed based on firefighter/public safety and
values at risk, all of which helped minimize overall costs on this incident.
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Silver Fire Programmatic Cost Fire Review
Gila National Forest
USDA Forest Service, April 2014
Summary of specific actions taken that had direct, positive effects on risk management
and cost containment:

Assessing risk management enabled the Forest to identify a large planning area
known as a “Big Box” suppression strategy (see page 12).

Implementing long-term tactics versus a “direct” fire line suppression strategy.
(Had going direct been the chosen tactic there would have been an increased
need for more resources and unnecessary exposure to firefighters.)

Fire crews were used to reduce fuel loading and conduct point protection. As
this need diminished, crews were released and suppression forces were
reduced.

There was minimal aircraft used outside the Wildland-Urban Interface areas.
Chronology of Benefits Associated with Strategic Planning and Collaboration
Early in the Silver Fire incident, a long-term plan and strategic plan were built with
input and cooperation from key Forest Staff, the IMT, Fire Staff, and cooperators and
stakeholders. The focus was to look from one to two weeks out and to display these
objectives and the fire’s long-term plan to the public and elected officials. This
successful collaborative undertaking benefitted from the earlier pre-season Strategic
Risk Management session conducted with all stakeholders.
This session reinforced established working relationships, trust, and the understanding
of the risks of which each agency were most concerned. It included very frank, in-depth
discussions on how to manage the fire, including the fire’s strategic and tactical plans.
Once again, with an overriding emphasis on risk management and cost containment.
In summary, this prior working relationship and trust established when the IMT
allowed the fire to burn with minimum resources—checking the fire in remote, rugged,
sparse fuels—had two positive direct effects: 1) Firefighter exposure and risk was
reduced by not placing them in hazardous conditions in those areas where the values at
risk were minimal; 2) The expense to pay for those firefighters and supply them (if they
were to be placed there) was also avoided. At the same time, this action permitted these
resources to be better used in preparing other defensive lines and boundaries that
eventually would be areas of concern as the fire perimeter changed.
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Silver Fire Programmatic Cost Fire Review
Gila National Forest
USDA Forest Service, April 2014
“Success continues to be defined as safely
achieving reasonable objectives with the least
firefighter exposure necessary, while enhancing
stakeholder support for our management.”
Thomas L. Tidwell, Chief
U.S. Forest Service
Furthermore, this strategic
session with key partners
also allowed participants
to have honest, open
conversations
on
the
Forest’s direction to the
IMT. The session included
discussions with the IMT’s
Operations personnel and
the Strategic Operational
Planners (SOPLs). Overall,
this
session
allowed
everyone to understand
what the fire’s long-term
plan would entail.
Due to terrain, fuel type, and exposure to ground crews and
aviation personnel, direct attack on the Silver Fire was not feasible.
The strategy included securing Kingston, opening Highway 152,
providing point protection for houses and private property, and
keeping the fire east of Forest Road 150.
In doing so, community
concerns were addressed.
The Forest was able to
clarify its management
intent to the IMT, ensuring both the Forest and IMT shared a common vision with this
long-term fire management plan. This consensus helped achieve a significant
understanding regarding strategy and tactical decisions, driven by the probability of
success to meet reasonable objectives. An essential, common acceptance of these
objectives was established among all parties. A poster [see page 25] was created to
illustrate the plan for dissemination among the public and elected officials to display
the comprehensive elements of this long-term planning effort.
The suppression emphasis on the Silver Fire was to use “point protection” to protect
critical values at risk. This was underscored in meetings and strengthened the tactical
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Silver Fire Programmatic Cost Fire Review
Gila National Forest
USDA Forest Service, April 2014
“Every fire meets reasonable objectives and receives
a safe, effective, and efficient response.”
Thomas L. Tidwell, Chief
U.S. Forest Service
decisions that were developed in concert with the Agency Administrator’s (AAs)
direction.
Due to terrain, fuel type, and exposure to ground crews and aviation personnel, direct
attack was not feasible. The strategy included securing Kingston, opening Highway 152,
providing point protection for houses and private property, and keeping the fire east of
Forest Road 150.
To address some of the more problematic safety concerns associated with the fire, the
IMTs established several mitigations. For instance, access to the east side of the fire
was limited due to the highway closure because of safety concerns (from rolling debris)
and the long drive time to operational areas. Further, the IMT established several
additional mitigations, including: 1) Established a satellite camp on the east side of the
incident; 2) Staged road guards at key locations to regulate traffic and prevent
unnecessary traffic from entering the fire area; 3) Staged road clearing equipment to
remove rock slides and rolling debris as quickly as possible to help keep the roads
open; and, 4) limited access into the active fire area to operational resources, thereby
limiting exposure to the fewest possible. These actions and others helped to reduce
traffic and exposure of firefighter and other personnel to hazards while helping to
ensure vital links remained open to appropriate fire personnel.
2. Concentrate on how well we are applying Risk Management Concepts that
Generate Positive Cost Containment Outcomes.
At first, initial attack efforts on the Silver Fire were direct and aggressive as the
conditions and available resources permitted. Due to concerns over firefighter safety
such as steep terrain, difficulty in establishing LCES, etc., the decision was made to
transition suppression strategies from “direct attack” to “point protection” of identified
values including the Kingston community, as well as natural resources such as
wilderness, timber, and watersheds. While management realized there were areas
where direct fire suppression might be applied these places could potentially
jeopardize firefighters.
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Silver Fire Programmatic Cost Fire Review
Gila National Forest
USDA Forest Service, April 2014
Fire crews working on the
south end of the Silver Fire on
June 17. Throughout this
incident, the Gila National
Forest managers were clear
that there would be no
transferring of risk to the fire
crews.
Taking a lesson from the previous year’s Whitewater Baldy Fire, the Forest therefore
identified a large planning area, known as a “Big Box” strategy (in which fire crews
implement an indirect fire line anchored from defensible fuel breaks away from the main fire
and conduct burn out operations). Taking the fire to safer ground and reducing the
exposure factors associated with this decision was an emphasis by the IMTs and was in
alignment with the AA’s Leader’s Intent. This strategy led to burning out areas in the
pinion-juniper fuel type. While the decision to execute this strategy was risk-based, it
became evident that an increased emphasis on exposure and risk vs. gain conversations
between the IMT and the Forest was appropriate.
Throughout the incident, the Forest was clear that there would be no transferring of
risk to the fire crews. This is why strategies and tactics in the steep, inaccessible terrain
were to go indirect versus direct. In addition, the Forest continually assessed, analyzed,
and communicated risk management objectives to the State and landowners.
Throughout this process, cooperators and partners alike concurred with the selected
strategies and tactics. The IMT was given a broad decision space and the AA continually
provided Leader’s Intent that ensured a constant consideration toward costs and
firefighter exposure in relation to benefits received, including contingency plans and
MAPs designed to reduce negative consequences.
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Silver Fire Programmatic Cost Fire Review
Gila National Forest
USDA Forest Service, April 2014
One of the driving factors regarding safety was that any other strategy would have put
firefighters in remote and difficult terrain that would have limited or prevented access
to Emergency Medical Service (EMS). Thus, the strategy implemented on the Silver Fire
was not to commit personnel where there was a low probability of success and/or
when risk of injury/death could not be reasonably mitigated. Throughout the duration
of the Silver Fire, excellent communication and coordination was carried out with the
State of New Mexico. One of the many benefits of this collaboration was allowing all
stakeholders to be prepared even if, or when, the fire was to burn across boundaries
that included private inholdings.
Other Risk Management and Cost Containment Decisions and Actions
Implemented on the Silver Fire:

Cost management and cost thresholds were either identified in the AAs Letter of
Intent or in the Wildland Fire Decision Support System (WFDSS). Included in the
AAs Letter of Intent was the request to work closely with the Forest Supervisor and
the Fire Staff Officer prior to initiating orders for significant numbers of resources
or implementing costly tactical aviation action.

The “Five Rights2” from the 2012 Risk Decision Framework were considered at the
onset of the Silver Fire. The Chief’s “Letter of Intent for the 2013 Fire Season” reemphasized what the Forest was and has been doing in the past.

The Forest and State were supportive of cost efficiencies employed by the IMT and
ensuring that the appropriate assets were used to safely implement tactics in
support of the fire’s objectives. There were no outside influences that forced the
IMT to make other decisions. By assessing risk management, the Forest was able to
consider a “Big Box” suppression approach, ensuring that this strategy and tactics
would limit unnecessary exposure to firefighters as well as expenditures.
2
The “Five Rights” from James Hubbard, Deputy Chief for State and Private Forestry, U.S. Forest Service; 2012 Wildfire
Guidance: “Effective interaction between agency administrators and incident commanders is essential to safe, efficient
and effective management of incidents, utilizing: 1) The Right Plan (as informed by the Risk Decision Framework); 2) in
the Right Place (where we have a reasonable probability of success); 3) at the Right Time (when we have favorable
conditions for efficient and effective suppression); 4) with the Right Assets (those suppression assets needed to safely
implement tactics in support of reasonable objectives);5) for the Right Duration (release resources as soon as they are no
longer needed).”
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Silver Fire Programmatic Cost Fire Review
Gila National Forest
USDA Forest Service, April 2014
There was clear Leader’s Intent and understanding that the Silver Fire was going to be a long-term event that
needed to be managed safely and effectively. Specifically, the Agency Administrator, District Rangers, and
Forest Fire Staff discussed concerns about extreme fire behavior and intensities within mixed conifer forests.
(Photo by Jon Agner, Incident Commander, Type 3 IMT.)

There was clear Leader’s Intent and understanding that this incident was going to
be a long-term event and needed to be managed safely and effectively. Specifically,
the AA, District Rangers, and Forest Fire Staff discussed concerns about extreme fire
behavior and intensities within the mixed-conifer forests. The IMT, therefore, was
tasked with reducing the burn severity by utilizing aerial ignition along the ridges to
help back fire off the top. This tactic helped bring fire down into the vegetation
changes where the fire could be suppressed on the ground without increasing
exposure and undue risk to the firefighters.

Due to the wilderness characteristics of the Aldo Leopold Wilderness and the fire’s
extreme behavior, the indirect/point protection strategy was appropriate to
minimize risk to responders, providing for the “Five Rights”, and the highest
probability of success.

During a 2013 preseason Risk Management session, the Forest discussed “the fire
that keeps you up at night” with Forest employees and stakeholders. This special
risk assessment exercise was conducted in the same vicinity of the forthcoming
Silver Fire.
3. Identify Best Business Practices Used on Fires this Past Season.
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Silver Fire Programmatic Cost Fire Review
Gila National Forest
USDA Forest Service, April 2014
Best Business Practices this past year on the Gila National Forest included the ability of
assessing Risk Management that enabled the Forest to look “Big Box” and, thereby,
implement tactics where they would be most useful and successful in meeting both risk
management and cost containment objectives.
For example, the early strategy meeting held with the Forest, IMT, State and County
emergency management officials, and the county Fire Management Officer (FMO)
allowed for the focus on this incident to be on long-term tactics versus a “direct attack”
suppression strategy which would have required more resources, additional costs, and
unnecessary exposure to firefighters.
In addition, management of the Silver Fire included the effective use of assigned
resources. Once suppression objectives were implemented and achieved in one area of
the fire, these resources were then re-allocated to other priority areas on the fire rather
than continuing to order new resources. One of the lessons learned from the Silver Fire
incident was the benefit of having the Forest participate in pre-fire season risk
management sessions that included discussions on how to best protect values at risk
with numerous stakeholders.
During the incident, a strategic session was facilitated with the AA, IMT, and
stakeholders. This collaboration led to very open discussions and consensus on longterm strategies to be prioritized and implemented. Planning sessions between the IMTs
SOPLs and operations personnel were also held to ensure that there was clear
understanding and agreement. Throughout the course of the Silver Fire, the AA and AA
representatives were present, engaged, and maintained situational awareness.
Recognizing that the fire would ebb and flow, reasonable expectations regarding
management strategies were set. Tradeoffs concerning fire size and length of fire
duration were made without compromising safety. In-depth strategy and tactical
discussions occurred regarding the benefits of allowing the fire to become larger rather
than spending money on tactics with minimal chances of success.
When resources were no longer needed, they were released from the Silver Fire. This
not only helped to minimize fire costs but permitted these resources to reenter into the
availability pool for other assignments. Both IMTs were excellent at keeping the Forest
appraised before initiating large orders for resources or implementing costly tactical
aviation actions. Keeping efficiency and cost-effectiveness was always an important
part of the management decision-making process on this fire. For instance, maintaining
the fire’s management organization size commensurate with the operation was an
ongoing goal that was successfully achieved throughout.
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Silver Fire Programmatic Cost Fire Review
Gila National Forest
USDA Forest Service, April 2014
Furthermore, the “Five Rights” suppression strategy/philosophy permeated every
discussion with the AA, IMT, and stakeholders. Specifically, every fire update focused
on the size of the organization and priorities.
Fire crews were used to reduce fuel loading and conduct “point protection” around the
Wildland-Urban Interface (WUI) areas, and then ramped down these crews were
reduced and released. This practice minimized the number of resources on the incident
and their exposure to risk. Similarly, aircraft were used on check/control strategies to
help safeguard the WUI areas. Outside of this priority suppression target WUI area,
very little aircraft time was invested. These decisions also helped to minimize overall
suppression costs.
Even though no large fires had recently occurred in this area, the Gila National Forest
has an extensive history and experience with long-term fires and focusing on values at
risk. In addition, prior relationships existed with the New Mexico DOT. For example,
when Highway 152 had to be closed, there was good coordination with this agency.
4. Identify How Social and Political Issues Factored into Our Decision Making.
Communicating Values at Risk and Fire Management Decisions
The Gila National Forest identified VAR both preseason and throughout the Silver Fire
duration. The Forest realized the importance of keeping the public and all stakeholders
informed of all fire activities as well as the decisions that were driving the management
of the Silver Fire.
Emphasizing Public Meetings and the Use of Social Media
as Effective Communication Tools
The Forest emphasized to the IMTs the importance of public meetings as well as
interacting with social media (such as Facebook and Twitter) and maintaining positive
communication interaction with the AA. While some of the smaller communities in the
Silver Fire area have minimal television and newspaper access, many of the residents in
these areas depend on and use social media. Public concerns were expressed regarding
the fire perimeter’s proximity to private property, as well as concerns about smoke.
Thus, the public desired specific rationale on strategies and tactics. All of these issues
were addressed at public meetings. The use of Google Earth became a very useful and
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Silver Fire Programmatic Cost Fire Review
Gila National Forest
USDA Forest Service, April 2014
The Silver Fire as seen from the community of Kingston on June 13,
the fire’s sixth day.
effective tool to display the fire and its management objectives at these meetings. The
AA emphasized public meetings and public collaboration as a beneficial means of
communicating key Silver Fire messages. In turn, these public meetings were very
proactive and positive.
Closing Highway 152 and Evacuating Community of Kingston was Well Supported
The rapid identification of the VAR and sharing this information with the public was
extremely helpful in assisting and clarifying the public’s understanding of why the
Silver Fire strategies were selected. For example, the closing of Highway 152 and the
evacuation of the community of Kingston was well supported despite all the potential
burdens it imposed on the general public and business community members.
Widespread Awareness That This Would be a Long Duration Fire
Due to the thorough, in-depth discussions with the AA, IMT, and stakeholders during
the landscape risk assessment, there was widespread awareness that this would be a
long-duration fire and that the main suppression strategy, emphasizing risk
management and cost containment, would include waiting for the fire to reach terrain
where suppression resources could be most safely and effectively deployed. In
addition, the “Five Rights” philosophy was explained and emphasized in all of these
discussions. Every Silver Fire update with the public and stakeholders focused on the
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size of the fire’s organization and the fire’s management and suppression priorities all
reflected in the Chief’s Letter of Intent for the 2013 Fire Season.
Building Trust with Public Members
The District Ranger stayed directly engaged with the community of Kingston which was
positive and built trust. Forest Management took care of the community’s needs both
through public meetings and one-on-one contact and prevented this additional
responsibility to be added to the already busy IMT. There was beneficial integration
with the Forest and the IMT throughout the duration of the Silver Fire.
5. Identify Which Current Procedures Can Be Enhanced or Expanded.
Should the Gila National Forest have another similar incident in the future, it would use
its same management approach again, including: the pre-season landscape risk
assessments, the risk management session, and social media.
Other Successes Noted on the Silver Fire:
 Bringing in a Buying Team to purchase and track expenditures rather than using
Forest resources allowed Forest business to continue uninterrupted.

Having an Incident Business Advisor (IBA) help with cost tracking and
expenditures.

Inserting a District Ranger to deal with day-to-day operations enabled the fire
unit’s District Ranger to focus solely on the fire. This also allowed him to attend
public meetings and generally be more accessible to the public and stakeholders.

Burned Area Emergency Response (BAER) assessments were started while the
fire was still active. This helped to ensure that the BAER assessments and
implementation were under way prior to the monsoon season. Typically, there
is a very short window of opportunity for BAER teams to start and complete
their work before weather conditions change and prevent them from completing
their task.
6. Identify Improvements that can be Made in Sharing and Clarifying Expectations
There were some concerns with Resource Advisors on the incident (including non-local
Resource Advisors not checking in with divisions on the fire creating safety and
communication issues). The Gila National Forest is therefore developing a protocol
guidebook for Resource Advisors that will better clarify and emphasize procedures and
direction for how Resource Advisors engage with IMTs.
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By prior arrangement, the cost share agreement between the State of New Mexico and
Forest Service is based by land ownership or acres burned, not on effort. To ensure
their understanding of this process, all incoming IMTs should be thoroughly briefed by
the Forest upon their arrival.
Lessons Learned
Recommendations
Hold Early Strategic Sessions with Your Cooperators and Stakeholders
The strategic session held early in the planning of the Silver Fire management with the
Forest, IMT, state and county emergency management officials, and the county Fire
Management Officer, was highly beneficial. In fact, one of the IMTs is considering
including this step into its SOPs. Sharing these early strategy sessions with cooperators
and stakeholders should be standard practice on all large fire incidents.
Insert Temporary District Ranger
Inserting a District Ranger to deal with day-to-day operations enabled the Silver Fire
unit’s District Ranger to focus solely on the fire. This also allowed the fire unit’s District
Ranger to attend public meetings and generally be more accessible to the public and
stakeholders. Assigning a temporary Line Officer like this should be a standard practice
on all large fire incidents whenever possible.
Promote Line Officer Commitment and Accessibility with Public
The Silver Fire unit’s District Ranger stayed directly engaged with the community of
Kingston through public meetings and one-on-one contact with homeowners and
business leaders. This collaboration helped build trust and cultivated positive attitudes
and understanding toward the Silver Fire’s management decisions. This type of Line
Officer commitment and accessibility should occur on all large fire incidents.
Ensure Early BAER Assessments
Burned Area Emergency Response (BAER) assessments were started while the Silver
Fire was still active. This decision helped to ensure that BAER assessments and
implementation were well underway prior to the monsoon season. If possible, such an
early BAER response should occur on all large fire incidents.
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Photo shows where the Silver Fire burned in the area of Highway 152 near Emory Pass.
Burned Area Emergency Response (BAER) assessments were started while the Silver Fire was
still active. This decision helped to ensure that BAER assessments and implementation were
well underway
prior to the monsoon season.
Identify Potential Fire Camp Site Locations Preseason
As the Silver Fire perimeter changed and resources had farther and farther to travel,
there was difficulty in identifying suitable fire camp locations. Forest planning and the
IMT realized the appropriate planning for potential locations regarding various-sized
base camps, spike camps, etc., needs to occur preseason. All units should implement
such preseason planning for potential fire camp locations.
Observations
Public Communication Strategy
To help the public understand and accept the suppression strategy and tactics on the
Silver Fire required a planned, comprehensive communication strategy that included
public meetings and interaction via social media. Thus, throughout the fire, the public
was briefed in detail. In addition, throughout, there was good integration with the
Forest and the IMT on public collaboration and communication information processes.
Best Business Practices
Best Business Practices this past year included the ability of assessing risk management
that enabled the Forest to look “Big Box” and implement tactics where they would be
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most effective. The early strategy meeting allowed for the focus on long-term tactics
versus going direct which would have required more resources, costs, and unnecessary
exposure.
Use of Aerial Ignition
The IMT used aerial ignition on the Silver Fire along the ridges to help back fire off the
top. This tactic was utilized to bring fire down to the vegetation changes without
increasing the exposure to the firefighters on the ground.
Use of Assigned Resources
This incident also made good use of assigned resources. Once work was met in fire
areas, the resources were then moved to areas of need instead of continuing to order
new resources.
Assessing Risk Management with Stakeholders
The Forest participated in pre-season risk management sessions. These sessions
included numerous stakeholders and discussions concerning protecting values at risk.
During the incident, a strategic session with the AA, IMT, and stakeholders was also
held. This collaboration led to very open discussions and consensus on the long-term
strategies to be employed.
Reconsider the Timing of this Fire Review
Both the Forest and Region felt that this fire review could have been done earlier, either
during the incident or in the fall. Spring is a very busy time for Region 3, with seasonal
fire hiring and spring fire training occurring. When this review is released, the Forest
therefore needs to be given the appropriate lead time to ensure that they have talking
points prior to it going public on the web.
Attachments
Silver Fire Incident Strategy and Risk Assessment [See pages 22-24]
Long-Term Strategic Analysis [See page 25]
Silver Fire Incident Strategy and Risk Assessment
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Values at Risk
The Silver Fire is being managed under a full suppression strategy based upon values at
risk. The primary values at risk (as identified in the Gila NF Delegation of Authority):
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
Public and firefighter safety
Structures, outbuildings and infrastructure of Hillsboro and Kingston communities
Watersheds feeding communities of Hillsboro, Kingston, San Juan and Sherman
Forest lookouts, campgrounds and communities sites
Natural and cultural resources and recreation sites
Fire Environment
The terrain is characterized by a predominately north-south ridgeline (the crest of the
Continental Divide) at an elevation of 7000-8000 feet. A series of steep, rugged drainages
flow east and west downhill from the divide. Fuels consist of mixed conifer along the crest,
ponderosa pine in the canyons and shaded aspects. The timber transitions through PinionJuniper, ending in shrub dominated grasslands at the lowest elevations. Weather patterns
are very dynamic. Winds are generally SW but topography generates upslope winds on
both sides of the divide. Monsoonal moisture impulses create an east/southeast wind.
Thunderstorms generate regularly over the mountains. Hwy 152 is the only road crossing
the divide. The majority of the area is roadless with a transition into the Aldo Leopold
Wilderness Area at the northern edge of the fire perimeter (as of 6/14). A few small
inholdings are present with scattered historic sites.
Fire Behavior
During the second burning period, the fire became well established on both sides of the
divide. Fire spread was driven by nighttime, downslope winds toward the community of
Kingston and daytime realignment for upslope runs and short range spotting. Structure
protection was immediately triggered utilizing a previously constructed FS fuel break and
augmented with structure protection resources. All other direct control options were
abandoned due to the inability to establish an anchor point in steep terrain and the absence
of reasonable medical response/extrication of potentially injured fire fighters. Based upon
the values at risk, firefighter exposure associated with direct attack in the timber fuel type
was determined to be too high to be acceptable. Indirect attack options were identified to
allow incident personnel the necessary time to “meet the fire on our terms” and presented
the greatest opportunity for containment success.
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Strategy
A strategic risk analysis was completed by the forest and IMT. Values at risk (VARs) were
identified and the probability of the values being impacted was determined by analysis
(FSPro and other decision support tools), local knowledge, and IMT observations.
Consequences were determined for each VAR. The community of Kingston was determined
to be the highest value resource with the highest probability of being impacted and the
greatest consequences. Additional in-holdings, forest improvements and ecological values
were identified and addressed with mitigation measures such as structure wrap, sprinkler
systems or direct fire suppression actions to prevent the fire from reaching them. Planning
for risk mitigation measures for additional VARs is on-going.
1) VAR 1. Public/Firefighters: Risk to the public was mitigated through evacuations
and closures. Risk to firefighters is being mitigated through strategic planning, an
incident level operational risk assessment and real-time risk decision making.
Probability of success is high.
2) VAR 2. Kingston/Hillsboro: Kingston has a structure protection group embedded
with hoselays, sprinklers and structure wrap to support the previously constructed
fuel break. Appropriately timed burnout operations around the community have
been implemented as the fire demanded. Probability of success is high.
3) VAR 2a Additional Private Land/structures: The royal John Historic mining site has
a sprinkler system, fuel reduction and mobile engines. Probability of success is high.
4) VAR 4. Forest Improvements: Other Forest in-holdings have been prepped with
structure wrap and the Hillsboro Peak Lookout was burned around with aerial
ignition. Probability of success is high.
5) VAR 3. Watersheds: No suppression actions are planned to prevent the fire from
impacting the identified watersheds due to terrain, fuel loading and firefighter
safety. Aerial ignition is being evaluated to minimize fire impacts to watersheds.
Probability of success is moderate.
Indirect lines (roads, dozer, handline, natural fuel transitions) have been identified along
the east and south sides of the fire. Hand and aerial ignition may be used to further secure
these lines and/or to minimize fire intensity as needed. Probability of success is high.
Highway 152 has held for several miles and will be used as a tactical control feature to
delay fire spread north and east. Probability in holding uncontained fire south of the
highway is moderate. Recent moderations in weather and fire behavior coupled with fire
movement into less volatile fuel types may present limited opportunities for direct
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perimeter containment where access is reasonable. These opportunities are rare.
Assessments are ongoing for such opportunities within continued indirect efforts.
Monitoring of “cold” perimeter is on-going by aerial supervision. Probability of success is
moderate to high.
Additional VARs north and east of the fire are being evaluated. Management Action Points
(MAP) have been developed to address rare events and threats to VAR to the north of the
fire. Assessment of fire progression relative to MAPs and VARs is on-going as part of the
adaptive strategic risk analysis.
Concern over potential fire spread to the northeast is based on probability modeling, the
timing and arrival of summer monsoonal weather pattern and volatile fuel conditions.
Northeast spread is anticipated. Values at risk in this area remain low with an-going
discussion with landowners to engage the fire on favorable ground outside the fire
perimeter if the identified eastern control line was compromised. A series of MAPs have
been developed based on VARs. Incident personnel will continue to evaluate changing
conditions and update MAPs as needed.
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