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Sustainable Construction – Regulation through Intermediation?
Sustainable Construction Workshop
Paris, June 2012
Dr. Libby Schweber
University of Reading
Professor Susse Georg
Dept of Planning, Aalborg University at Copenhagen
Professor Martin Guy Sexton
University of Reading
This project was funded by the EPSRC (EP/E001645/1) Sustainable design templates in
the UK, France and Denmark
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Introduction
The Brundtland Commission Report of 1987 put a particularly ambitious vision for
sustainable development onto the global agenda; ten years later the Kyoto Protocol
(1997) privileged the reduction of green house gas emissions and energy issues more
generally. Within the EU, a series of directives began the work of translating these
overarching goals, calling on member states to introduce new procedural and
performance requirements. For example, the 2002 EU building directive demanded a
number of changes to energy requirements for new and existing buildings. The transnational character of these and related initiatives is often seen to challenge national
policy processes. A number of scholars single out global environmentalism as a driver
for policy innovation. More specifically they point to the introduction of new types of
policy tools and actors (Goldman, 2001; Sonnenfeld & Mol, 2002).
While these general trends may be common across the EU, national policies are also
context dependent. Member countries vary in their combinations of welfare and neoliberal modes of governance. Similarly, within each country, sectors vary in their
relations to government and in their dominant business models. When it comes to the
construction sector, the response of EU member states has been both uniform and
diverse. Since 2002, member states have incorporated EU targets into their regular
revisions of building codes. Some have accelerated the pace of revisions; others have
developed and published schedules of anticipated changes. Some have developed
above compliance standards. Some have introduced new certification schemes, while
others have strengthened existing ones. In many countries these changes have been
introduced as part of broader strategies for sustainable development, at either the
national or sector level.
This paper compares national, sectoral policy responses to EU requirements for the
construction sector in Denmark and the UK. Of the two cases, the UK is often seen to
have embraced neo-liberal reforms of their welfare state the most enthusiastically,
while DK is closer to a coordinated market economy, that is generally known for its
“institutional competitiveness” (Campbell & Pederson, 2007). In both countries these
models depend on a network of quasi state and extra state actors who work at the
interstices between political and economic institutions, establishing links and
articulating goals. We refer to this work as ‘intermediation’. A comparison between
these two cases sheds light on the way in which national institutional models shape the
translation of EU directives into specific policies and instruments.
This paper examines these issues by contrasting:
1. The development of national policies for sustainable development in general and
for the construction sector in particular since 2001, with a focus on energy and
social issues.
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2. The translation of those policies into techniques and instruments and the ‘fit’
between policy discourse and policy instruments, with a special focus on the role
of non-state actors and extra-state instruments.
This latter analysis provides a basis to consider the innovative (or conservative)
character of national responses to EU demands. This, in turn, provides an opportunity
to develop an analytic framework which can be deployed more widely, to other
countries and other sectors in the future.
Literature review
A number of literatures draw attention to changing policy modes and to the leading role
of environmentalism and/or sustainable development in those changes. These include
sociological versions of neo-institutionalism, political science work on environmentalism
and policy regimes and critical studies of accounting.
The application of neo-institutionalism to environmentalism and sustainable
development draws attention to the impact of changing societal expectations and
regulations on firm behaviour and to the active role of firms and social movements in
shaping emergent policies (Hoffman & Ventresca, 2002). A central concern in this
literature is the way in which consensus comes to be built around the meaning of
sustainability and embedded in societal level rules which in turn inform or constrain firm
level behaviour (Jennings & Zandbergen, 1995). Whereas much of the literature on the
meaning of sustainability focuses on what people say, institutional theory highlights the
way in which meanings are embedded in rules and practices.
Another important contribution of this literature concerns the attention, which it pays
to the structure and logic of the governance structures and actors (fields) associated
with sustainable values and practices. For example, Lounsbury et al (2002) trace
transformations in the (governance) structures surrounding solid waste management.
An important theme in much of this literature involves the role of the nation state and
more importantly, the framework for governance, which it sets up for sustainable
development. Whereas Jennings and Zandbergen (1995) contrast command and control
with market based forms, our own study explores variations in mixed neo-liberal and
coordinated market economies. Our central research question concerns the impact of
dominant institutional logics on emergent forms of governance for sustainable
development in the construction sector.
Some institutionalists draw on theories of translation (Czarniawska & Jeorges, 1996) to
draw attention to the extensive work involved in the transposition of meanings and
practices from one context to another (Boxenbaum, 2005; Campbell, 2004). As these
studies point out, policy innovation does not develop in a vacuum. Instead it is shaped
by the broader institutional landscape. A growing political science literature on policy
regimes draws attention to the path dependence of national responses to EU
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regulations. Four features of this work are particularly relevant for this study. These
include: 1. the attention which it draws to variations in governance forms and more
specifically in neo-liberal regulatory regimes (Janicke & Weidner, 1997; Sonnenfeld &
Mol, 2002), 2. the identification of environmental regulation as a primary area for
governance innovation (Arts, Leroy, & van Tatenhove, 2006; Gouldson & Bebbington,
2007), 3. the focus on policy mechanisms and instruments, ranging from trans-national
tools (Higgins & Tamm-Hallström, 2007; Locanto & Busch, 2010) to national instruments
and 4. the focus on new types of actors associated with more indirect modes of state
control (Heritier, 2002; Janicke & Weidner, 1997).
A related literature on policy discourses and specific instruments and techniques
(Christie, 2006; Lehtonen, 2011; Pawson & Jacobs, 2010) helps to explore these
variations. According to Jordan et al (2005), changes in political rationalities can
fruitfully be studied through changes in policy instruments. To the extent that the
theorized shift to regulatory forms of neo-liberalism is progressing, this should be
evidenced in a shift to new non-state actors and types of instruments. Jordan et al
contrasts ‘government’, which they associate with command and control type
instruments, with ‘governance’, which they associate with market and voluntary types.
One of Jordan et al’s main findings is that, despite the anticipated change in
environmental policy governance, Western European states continue to privilege
regulations in national energy governance. A second finding concerns national variations
in the mix and deployment of policy instruments. This observation draws attention to
the overlay of different types of instrument and the need to examine variations in the
combination of types of instruments.
The interest in the construction sector lies in its importance economically as well as
socially and environmentally. The sector is both a leading business sector and an
important vehicle for the delivery of social goals, be it in the form of schools, hospitals,
infrastructure or homes. In the UK, for example, 35% of recent construction work was
for public sector clients (down from 40% owing to the recession) (ONS, 2012) and the
sector is often the target of strategies to jump start the economy. In DK, public sector
clients have figured less prominently in the construction statistics over the last decade
due a decline in the construction of social housing and a tax freeze reform limiting
municipal spending (Dansk Byggeri 2006). In 2010 less than 20% have been public sector
clients (Dansk Byggeri, 2011). That said, national and local government have been
prone to step in and support construction projects, e.g. in the 1930s and ‘40s the
government subsidized social housing and in the 1980s and ‘90s it invested in urban
regeneration. In the current recession, the government’s initiative to mitigate climate
change (e.g. infrastructure) is also expected to provide opportunities for the
construction sector.
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A comparison of business sector governance around trans-national energy directives
provides an opportunity to examine arguments concerning the emergence of new
modes of regulation around environmental issue. As the discussion which follows
indicates, in both DK and UK, the construction sector exemplifies the growing use of
non-state actors and indirect modes of government/governance to roll out
environmental and/or climate policy. Non-state actors include industry organizations,
firms, professional consultants, civil society actors and standards organizations.
Examples of instruments include taxes, subsidies, unofficial standards and ‘concepts’
such as Zero Emission Buildings (DK) and Zero Carbon Homes (UK), policy targets and
benchmarks, certification schemes and assessment tools.
The comparison also allows for an exploration of the impact of national contexts on
government responses to trans-national institutional change and for a comparison of
changes in policies and strategies across the two cases. More specifically, it draws
attention to the influence of sectoral logics. Finally, the comparison between DK and
the UK provides an empirical basis to examine the continuity or convergence of national
(sectoral) policy traditions around new global priorities.
The analysis which follows contrasts national policy aims with the policy instruments
which have been introduced to support that policy. The focus is on governance of
energy and social dimensions of sustainability. The first was selected because of its
growing dominance of the environmental agenda in Western Europe and explicit EU
directives concerning energy in buildings. The second was chosen because of the direct
challenge which it potentially poses to neo-liberal aims and objectives.
The classification of policy instruments draws on a typology which Koeppel and ÜrgeVorsatz (2007) developed through their study of policy instruments for reducing
greenhouse gas emissions from buildings. The typology distinguishes between four
types of mechanism: 1. command and regulatory instruments, such as building codes
and mandatory certification programs, 2. economic and market-based instruments, such
as Kyoto flexibility mechanisms 3. fiscal instruments and incentives, such as tax
exemptions and capital subsidies and 4. support information and voluntary action.
When it comes to the construction sector, the distinction between market and fiscal
instruments is less meaningful, given that much of the construction sector is not subject
to the Kyoto mechanisms. For the purposes of this paper we have collapsed the two
columns, leaving us with three types of mechanisms: mandatory, economic and
voluntary. Table 1 summarizes these differences and provides examples of each type.
This framework provides a basis for our own comparison of the types of instruments
mobilized in the UK and DK
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Dominant institutional logics: the policy and sectoral context in the UK and DK
The UK context
In order to assess the innovative character of national policies regarding energy and
social sustainability in the construction sector, it is important to say a few words about
policy making and the construction sector in each country. Taking the UK first, as
indicated above, of all the countries in the EU, the UK has probably taken the neo-liberal
agenda the furthest. This is evident in a radical programme of privatization and
deregulation, which Thatcher and the Conservative government initiated in the 1980s
and which Blair and New Labour continued after their election in 1997. While the
extensive privatizations were introduced in the name of free market competition, most
of the newly privatized firms remained large monopolies; to protect the ‘public interest’
they were (and continue to be) subject to a heavy regime of micro-level management
from above in the form of endless frameworks, performance targets, benchmarks and
annual reporting (Jenkins, 2006). Within Government, departments and ministries were
given autonomous budgetary control and subject to a similar type of regulation. This
approach has been continued by the current Conservative-Lib-Dem coalition (2010-).
Viewed from this perspective, the UK epitomizes the neo-liberal regulatory state.
Another key aspect of the neo-liberal turn in Britain was Thatcher’s deliberate
undermining of local government control and centralization of authority in the Treasury.
From the perspective of the construction sector, these developments had a number of
consequences. First, they changed the client base of the sector, depriving it of a
predictable and steady source of demand associated with the postwar governments’
ambitious programmes of housing and infrastructure development (Green, 2011). The
significant curtailment of local authority budgets and extensive privatization of bodies
such as the British Airport Authority (BAA) and British Rail transformed this source of
demand. This, in turn, exacerbated the global move to out-sourcing. Within
Government, the central procurement body, which had coordinated government assets
(The Property Service Agency), was dissolved and responsibility for asset management
was devolved to separate governmental departments, each of which set up its own
property division (Burnes & Corum, 1999).
In the late 1990s the Government launched a concerted effort to reform the sector. The
campaign was premised on the arguably mistaken impression that the construction
sector was conservative and resistant to change. The aeronautics and automotive
industries were held up as ‘best practice’ models. The “Improvement” or “Change
Agenda”, as it is called, was based on the highly influential Egan Report, Rethinking
Construction (1998)i. In contrast to other such reports, this one had enormous impact
and it continues to set the agenda for policymakers and industrialists alike. According to
Green (2011) , the ‘Improvement Agenda’ was informed by a mixture of enterprise and
audit cultures, with little understanding of the sector itself or of the impact which
universal management fixes might have. Some of the keywords of the report were
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‘efficiency’, ‘client focus’, and ‘partnering’. The main aim of the report was to get the
sector to ‘modernise’ by adopting a proposed set of management methods.
As for other sectors, the main policy instruments were frameworks, key performance
indicators, benchmarking and endless audits. In addition, the government created and
enrolled a number of quasi-governmental industry bodies to develop policy instruments
and monitor progress. Key amongst them was the Movement for Innovation (M4I), the
Achieving Excellence Programme, designed to develop guidelines for public sector
procurement, and the Construction Best Practice Programme, which was granted £2
million to ‘raise awareness’ of the Egan principles. The ten Key Performance Indicators
associated with the Egan Report included: construction cost, construction time,
predictability – cost, predictability – time, defects, client satisfaction – product, client
satisfaction – service and company performance, through: safety, profitability and
productivity. Other key policy instruments included support for demonstration projects
(the initial grant was for £500 million, to be administered by M4I) and an exhortation to
government departments to act as best practice clients, providing leadership for others
to follow.
In terms of sustainable development, there was no mention of environmental
objectives; although the report did focus considerable attention on the reduction of
waste in the name of economic efficiency. Social dimensions were reduced to business
related issues, such as recruitment, skills development and health and safety. The only
target with any kind of social dimension was a 20% reduction in annual reportable
accidents, which was justified in terms of a potential reduction in project costs (Green,
Harty, Elmualim, Larsen, & Kao, 2008). This business focused specification of social
goals was later developed into a Respect for People toolkit and set of guidelines, by
Constructing Excellence, an umbrella body created in 2003 to drive the change agenda
forward. In recent years a call for the digitalization of construction practices has been
added to the list of management innovations designed to ‘modernise’ the sector. In
2011 the government announced its intention to require collaborative 3D BIM on its
publically-funded projects by 2016; however the basic culture of enterprise and audit
continues to inform the logic of reform.
The DK context
The situation in Denmark is similar in the sense that a neo-liberal regime of policies has
gradually been put into place over the course of the last thirty years; it differs, however,
in the centralization of political authority and consequent scope of change. Commonly
referred to as “new public management”, these policy changes are generally associated
with the neo-liberal Liberal-Conservative coalition government that was in power from
2001-2011. During its ten year reign, the DK coalition government designed and
introduced more than 15 major public reforms aimed at enhancing the efficiency and
quality of public (welfare) services, customizing them to meet citizen needs while
simultaneously increasing public sector transparency and increasing innovation within
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the public sector. Whereas in the UK, the Thatcher government effectively broke the
power of both the unions and local authorities, in DK municipal authority was on the
one hand strengthened when the 2007 Structural Reform reduced the number of
municipalities from over 250 to 98 and on the other hand reigned in by the state
government’s tight financial control. In 2011, the DK government changed once again;
the newly elected Social-Democratic government appears to be pursuing many of the
same policies as their predecessors. In DK, the welfare state tradition of consensual
politics, between unions, industry and government, emerged from the neo-liberal
transformation intact, making for a far more consensual policy process than is currently
the case in the UK.
As in the UK privatization and deregulation were high on the political agenda as was
increasing the efficiency of the public sector. However, the extent to which these
objectives were realized appears to have been less extensive. In what may seem to be a
paradoxical development, the pace of privatizations, begun in the 1990s under a Socialdemocratic government, slowed under the Liberal-Conservative coalition government
(2001-2011). In contrast to the UK, the use of public tenders and public-private
partnerships have not become well established practices - despite the many claims as to
the merits of these respective practices; performance contracts have not become a
standard procedure in the public sector; and the number of services for which the users
must pay has been limited. This relative ‘failure’ of the DK coalition government’s
strong ideological arguments for extending market-thinking to the public sector can be
partly ascribed to the relative weakness of the central state, compared to the UK.
Whereas in the UK, the Thatcher government significantly restricted the authority of
local government, in DK, the provision of many welfare services remains the
responsibility of relatively autonomous municipal governments (Pedersen & Löfgren,
2012).
In DK, the construction sector first emerged as a distinct ‘sector’ in the post World War
II building boom, when the Danish government sought to meet the shortage of social
housing. Based on a model of industrialization within manufacturing, the Danish
government initiated a (first) ‘modernization process’ that was to last into the 1970s.
This involved the harmonization of local building regulations and the creation of a
national building code containing a series of construction norms to enable the use of
more standardized components. It was also marked by the integration of new
production methods such as pre-fab, contributing to the ‘industrialization’ of the
otherwise craft-dominated construction of buildings (Jensen, 2011). Ever since the end
of the post-war building boom in the 1970s, the sector had been subject to extensive
criticism for its lack of productivity. In the 1990s, the criticism intensified. One study
showed that it took twice as many man-hours to build a house in 1986 as it did some
seventeen years earlier in 1969 (BUR 1990 in Kristensen, Emmitt, & Bonke, 2006, p.503).
Another showed that the sector was less competitive (higher costs/lower productivity)
than the construction sector in other countries, that too many mistakes were made in
the construction process, and that the buildings did not live up to customer
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requirements (Erhvervsfremstyrelsen, 1993). In addition to this, the construction sector
was being called upon to orient itself to international markets (FRI, 1990).
Taken together, these arguments constituted a renewed call for modernizing the sector,
paralleling that in the UK. The government’s vision for how this could be achieved was
based on three tenets: increasing market transparency, increasing innovation and
enhancing collaboration within the sector. The measures taken to realize these
ambitions included establishing a government created “Evaluation Unit” to monitor
company performance (using KPIs for price, punctuality, accidents, mistakes, customer
satisfaction, etc.) and ranking them so that customers would have greater insights into
company deliverables. Public-private partnerships were generally endorsed as
promoting collaboration and the use of public procurement (particularly in connection
with social housing) as well as an IT implementation programme, aimed at digitalizing
the building processes, were considered instrumental for inducing companies to
innovate (Erhvervsfremstyrelsen, 1993). Another measure aimed at increasing
innovation was a strengthening of building research. Although originally conceived of as
the responsibility of government (funded through a specific construction project tax),
this idea has been aborted, and construction research is now primarily funded by
general government research grants or from a private foundation.
Whereas in the UK, a similar call was accompanied by strict requirements for public
procurement, new types of formal contracts and an extensive audit regime, in DK, with
the exception of the Evaluation Unit’s monitoring of the sector, these remained at the
level of general exhortations. In DK the panacea for sector’s ‘ills’ was digital
construction (ATV, 1999; Erhvervsfremstyrelsen, 1993) and digitalizing the entire
building process, enhancing the sector’s innovative capacity through partnering, and
increasing productivity has continued to be the government’s prime priorities. This
development is a full decade prior to the UK push for BIM. It also reflects the
government’s ‘soft’ approach to voluntary self regulation. In DK, digitalization was
presented as a desirable aim; in the UK it is being imposed on the sector through
mandatory requirements for public sector construction (albeit a full decade later).
The construction sector has undergone significant changes over the last two decades.
Concentration has increased, as exemplified by the “Nordification” of DK contractors.
Large Nordic contractors have grown at the expense of middle-sized ones as they have
bought out DK ones. Also, the number of companies oriented toward international
markets has also grown (Kristensen et al., 2006). Nevertheless, the sector is still
criticized for being less innovative and less productive than industry (Clausen, 2002). As
for sustainability, this was hardly an issue within the sector until the late 1990s and early
‘00s, even though there had be a growing interest in ‘urban ecology’ amongst activists
and within the Housing Ministry earlier in the beginning of 1990s (Boligministeriet,
1995). Although the construction sector has had a long-standing interest in health and
safety issues (through the labour movement), environmental aspects were not widely
considered. The construction sector was first called upon to become sustainable in
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2001, as part of DK government’s national policy for sustainable development, as a
follow up to the Rio Convention in 1992.
A comparison of sector and modernisation logics
As this discussion suggests, many of the same themes figure in both the DK and UK state
policies for the construction sector. In both countries the sector was singled out in the
1990s as ‘backward’ and subject to a modernization campaign, marked by calls for
increased efficiency, inter-firm cooperation and transparency. Three key differences
would seem to distinguish between the cases. The first concerns the pervasiveness and
persuasiveness of the neo-liberal state reform. In the UK, the past 30 years have
witnessed significant privatization, accompanied by the shift of authority from local to
central government and an extensive audit regime. In DK, in contrast, privatization has
not been as extensive and local authorities have retained considerable autonomy and
authority. The second contrast involves the extent to which the central government
attempted to micro-manage change (again, this would seem to have gone much further
in the UK, as the discussion which follows suggests). In the UK, policy making has shifted
to the central government and implementation has been overseen by newly created
(large) firm-government bodies, such as M4I. In DK, with the exception of the Evaluation
Unit, the process has been more collaborative and industry involvement has been
greater. Finally, the subordination of social goals to market logics would seem to have
gone further in the UK than in DK.
Strategies for Sustainable Construction: Aims and objectives
UK policy aims
In the UK the concept of sustainable development challenged the ‘Improvement
Agenda’ in a number of ways. Whereas the Egan Report focused on clients and short
term business growth, sustainability called for attention to a much wider set of
stakeholders, including future generations and social justice. Whereas the Egan Report
defined quality in terms of contractual obligations, such as delivery on time and within
budget, notions of sustainability privileged the whole life cost and the life time value of
the building. In principle, trans-national and national commitments to sustainable
development should have led to a significant re-think of the ‘Improvement Agenda’.
However, at least until now, this has not happened. Instead, sustainability would seem
to have been re-defined through the Egan lens. This process points to the importance of
dominant policy styles in mediating the impact of trans-national environmental
directives as well as to future challenges as increases in policy targets and public
pressure bring the tension between the dominant business models and principles of
sustainable development to a head.
The UK is one of the few countries to have developed explicit sector level strategies for
sustainable development, whereas in DK the sector level strategies are part and parcel
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of more overarching strategies, e.g. the national strategies for sustainable development,
the development of cleaner products and energy, and climate change strategies.
Two documents encapsulate the UK strategy (prior to the election of the Coalition
government in 2011). Both were published in conjunction with a more general national
strategy for sustainable development. In May 1999 the Government published A better
quality of life – a strategy for sustainable development for the United Kingdom. This was
followed with a sector level strategy entitled Building a Better Quality of Life (1999). In
2005, the Government came out with a revised national strategy entitled Securing the
Future, followed by a revised sector level strategy entitled Review of Sustainable
Construction (2005). These documents provide the basis for the discussion of aims and
objectives and policy instruments which follows. A more detailed study would include
the myriad of other reports which were published during this period, refining,
complementing and covering for these core reports. Most notably they would include
an extremely detailed strategy for the procurement of the government’s estate and the
associated reports of the National Audit Office monitoring progress and recommending
actions. They would also examine in greater detail the Coalition’s Low Carbon
Construction Plan and Action Plan (2010), and the influential Low Carbon Construction
Innovation and Growth Team report (2010) introduced one year after their entry into
office. For a more comprehensive list of key reports and developments see Table 2.
If one compares New Labour’s general strategy aims with its strategy for sustainable
construction one can identify a progressive narrowing in goals. Whereas the general
strategies articulate many of the aspirations of the Bruntland Report, the sector specific
strategy translates those goals through the lens of the Egan Agenda.
A Better Quality of Life (1999) sets out five priorities, including:
•more investment in people and equipment for a competitive economy
• achieving higher growth whilst reducing pollution and use of resources
• sharing the benefits of growth more widely and more fairly
• improving our towns and cities and protecting the quality of the countryside
• contributing to sustainable development internationally
As these bullet points indicate, the Report privileges economic aims, but balances them
with environmental and social issues including equity and contributing to global well
being. In Building a Better Quality of Life (1999) these goals have been considerably
narrowed. The construction sector, we are told, can contribute to these general goals
by:
• being more profitable and more competitive
• delivering buildings and structures that provide greater satisfaction, well-being
and value to customers and users
• respecting and treating its stakeholders more fairly
• enhancing and better protecting the natural environment
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• minimising its impact on the consumption of energy (especially carbon-based
energy) and natural resources
Whereas these bullet points highlight the sector’s impact on the consumption of energy,
energy does not receive particular attention in the body of the strategy. Instead, most
of the discussion of environmental goals focuses on “reducing waste via design”, thus
echoing the Egan Report’s emphasis on waste reduction for efficiency. In terms of social
sustainability, it is important to note that, in the move from the general policy
statement to the construction sector strategy, commitments to broader social goals
have disappeared to be replaced by a focus on customers, users and stakeholders.
Turning to the chapter entitled ‘Construction and its Stakeholders’, the discussion
focuses on the existing ‘Respect for People’ strategy with its focus on Health and Safety,
recruitment and staff training. Moreover the definition of stakeholders is narrowed to
‘shareholders, pensioners, employees and suppliers’. The aim of sustainable
construction is to “provide greater satisfaction, well being and value to customer and
users”. While this is broader than the Egan focus on ‘clients’, it is considerably narrower
than the Government’s commitment to “enhance quality of life, meet peoples’
expectations and aspirations; share benefits off growth more widely and fairly, a more
inclusive society”, as articulated in A Better Quality of Life (1999)
If one now compares the statements of 1999 and 2005/6, there is evidence of almost
manic policy activity. Whereas the 1999 strategy was 31 pages long, the 2006 version is
over twice as long. More importantly, it is replete with initiatives, ranging from the
creation of special commissions to the development of action frameworks, performance
indicators, targets and guidelines. The general strategy goals remain roughly the same.
The key objectives in the 2005 general strategy include:
 Living within environmental limits
 Ensuring a strong healthy and just society
 Achieving a sustainable economy
 Promoting good governance
 Using sound science responsibly
Construction sector aims are to promote a built environment that:
 minimises adverse impacts on the environment, during construction and in use,
whilst enhancing the natural surroundings;
 maximises the positive contribution to business activity through the whole life of
the building;
 helps to encourage productivity through being flexible for future use, building
cost-efficiently and improving people's working environment;
 takes fully into account the impact of construction on the surrounding
environment by seeking to maintain biodiversity within the location and avoiding
any unnecessary pollution;
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
wherever possible, makes use of modern methods of construction to improve
building efficiency and minimise environmental effects on construction sites.
The most notable shift in aims between 1999 and 2005 involve the place of economic
growth. In each of these headings, qualifications are introduced to privilege economic
over social and environmental aims. The aim is not to reduce pollution, but to reduce
‘’unnecessary pollution” and the economic aim is to “maximize the positive
contribution” (of sustainability) to business activity. The Egan Agenda is strikingly
present in the reference to ‘modern methods’, the meaning of which will become clear
in the next section. Compared to the 2000 statement, all mention of satisfaction and
well being, fairness and enhancement have disappeared from sector level goals. At the
same time, far more frameworks, action plans, benchmarks and targets have been
introduced along with a multiplication of new types of non-state actors created to
facilitate environmental governance. When it comes to energy, the core objective was
the ‘efficient management of energy resources’; social sustainability was again framed
in terms of the existing Respect for People agenda. The commitments to both energy
and social sustainability were not expanded at the level of aims, but instead developed
in the setting of targets and development of frameworks and guides for best practice.
DK policy aims
In Denmark, the notion of sustainable construction was first introduced in the national
strategy for sustainable development, “Thoughtful development – our common
responsibility” (Regeringen, 2001). The Government’s strategy for ensuring sustainable
development rest on 8 aims or principals:
 The continued development of the welfare society while seeking to break the
link between economic growth and the effects that this can have on the
environment and the natural resources
 Ensuring a healthy and safe environment for everyone, and maintaining a high
level of protection
 Ensuring biodiversity
 Improving the use of the resources
 DK continues to play an active internationally
 Ensuring that environmental considerations are taken in all sectors of the
economy
 Ensuring that the market structure supports sustainable development and,
finally, ensuring that
 Sustainable development, as defined in the Brundtland Commission’s report, is a
common responsibility.
As this list indicates, the DK government explicitly linked its strategy for sustainable
development to the Brundtland Commission’s broad definition of sustainability and to
its Rio translation into three pillars. The report also recognizes current tensions
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between the three ‘pillars’ and the need to reconcile them. As in the UK, environmental
concerns were largely framed in terms of protecting resources and improving their use.
The report identified the built environment as an important object for achieving these
goals; it did not, however, develop a sector specific policy. The implication of this
general strategy for the built environment is described in the body of the report as
follows:
Buildings and infrastructure are an essential part of society’s economic and
cultural capital and play an important role for society’s resource use and
environmental damage. The energy used to construct and operate buildings
accounts for half of DK’s energy use, while most of DK’s use of raw materials is
associated with the construction of buildings and infrastructure. It is therefore a
big challenge to visualize and reduce resource consumption and environmental
damage throughout the buildings’ life-time. This can be achieved by improving
the buildings’ use-value, flexibility and quality, so that the life time is extended
and the need for changing the buildings is limited (Regeringen, 2002, ch.9).
Construction was, despite being noted for its energy consumption, oddly not listed
among the sectors that need to be involved in combating climate change (Regeringen,
2002, ch.11) As in the UK, social sustainability was addressed in terms of health, safety
and jobs. In contrast to the UK, the DK strategy explicitly called on the sector to think in
terms of building life time and use.
The 2001 elections marked the end of a decade with Social Democratic rule, and with
the change of government the national strategy was revised and titled “Our common
future – Balanced development” (Regeringen, 2002). The overarching aims and
description of the construction sector were essentially the same as in the Social
Democrats’ strategy, and the neo-liberal government reiterated the overarching critique
that the Social Democratic government had made regarding the construction sector’s
lack of competencies within sustainable construction. The report indicated that
“the government will motivate an increased demand for sustainable and energy
efficient buildings. Growth and a good environment must go hand in hand.
Different kinds of instruments will be used – ranging from market-based
instruments as a form of self-regulation to [command and control] regulation.
This will take place by stimulating the development of sustainable products and
through the introduction of a new labeling scheme that the sector can use to
declare the buildings’ resource use, effect on health and on the environment”
(Regeringen, 2002, ch.14).
Compared to the previous Government’s national strategy, this version emphasized the
use of (non-descript) market-based instruments and voluntary (informative) measures
such as labeling. Once again, although reference was made to the energy use
associated with the sector, this issue was not specifically addressed as part of the
climate issue (Regeringen, 2002, ch.4). As in the UK, what appears to have had priority
15
was economic growth, with resource and energy efficiency figuring as a key to realizing
this end.
The emphasis on energy efficiency pervaded the follow-up document, “Action plan for a
renewed effort in energy saving – energy saving and the market”, which, as the title
indicates, also emphasized the importance of utilizing market mechanisms in reducing
energy consumption (TEM, 2005). The grounding principles for the action plan included
cost efficiency, increasing competitiveness, reducing costs, taking a “balanced
approach” to what should be done, and developing more energy efficient products that
can enhance business development and increase exports. In 2009 the government
introduced its first Strategy for reduction of energy use in buildings (Regeringen, 2009).
Although the theme - energy efficiency - and the arguments for it - ensuring economic
growth - were essentially the same as in previous documents, the policy process was
new. Whereas earlier strategies were the work of a single ministry, the Strategy for
reduction of energy use in buildings was the work of multiple ministries all of which
were involved in the government’s energy strategy. These included: the Ministry of
Economic and Business Development, the Climate and Energy Ministry, the Ministry of
Finance and the Ministry of the Interior and Social Affairs. The strategy was based on
recommendations from a specially created “partnership” consisting of 22 members,
representing leading architecture and construction companies and component
suppliers, the main interest and professional organizations, knowledge
organizations/think tanks, a few NGOs and some of the leading clients.
What is interesting in this development is the active involvement of a host of actors, and
that these actors are all actively involved in developing “calculative practices” (Callon &
Muniesa, 2005) for evaluating buildings and setting the standards for what is to be
expected in the future. Emphasis is still given to economic growth, extending the
sphere of markets (also in light of the liberalization of the energy/electricity markets),
and enhancing energy efficiency; the difference being that there are many more of the
stakeholders actively involved in normalizing this agenda. Another striking feature of
the DK strategy concerns the commitment to whole life approaches to measurement
and valuation. This contrasts sharply with UK policy statements, although the UK
frameworks for government procurement do emphasize whole life integrated
approaches.
As for the social dimensions of sustainable construction these are almost lost from view,
with one notable exception contained in The 2020 Vision – Construction with Meaning,
developed and issued by the Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs (2006) in
collaboration with 20 top managers from the construction sector, including investors,
consultants, component producers, real-estate and facilities management. This report
suggested that the building and construction industry should be considered as
“meaningful” for not just the users and the various parties within the sector but also for
society at large, and that the building and construction industries’ responsibilities should
be extended to include other things than increasing productivity: If the sector is to be
16
meaningful for society, then it has to contribute to resolving society’s challenges with
regard to social, health and energy issues and play an important role for citizen wellbeing as well as competitiveness (EBST, 2006, pp.12-15). This call to go beyond market
measures of values in sharp contrast with the UK government’s taken-for-granted
assumption that social and environmental measures should be assessed in terms of
their contribution to economic growth.
A comparison of policy aims
As this discussion suggests, in both the UK and DK, national policies for sustainable
development posited broad environmental and social goals and in both countries these
were linked (and, to a certain degree, subordinated) to economic efficiency gains.
Similarly in both countries initial commitments to resource efficiency and worker wellbeing were privileged over broader goals of climate change mitigation or social and
generational equity. In both countries, the EU building directive (2002) was followed by
a shift in the focus of policy objectives from resource efficiency to energy efficiency and
carbon reduction. In the UK, the translation from national to sector specific aims
involved a narrowing of goals and a privileging of economic over social and
environmental goals. This is particularly evident in the reformulation of environmental
goals from environmental stewardship to waste reduction for efficiency and of social
aims as limited to ‘shareholders, pensioners, employees and suppliers.’ A similar move
can be seen the DK focus on ‘health, safety and jobs.’ That said, the DK policy aims
stand out for their emphasis on a whole life approach to building. While UK
policymakers introduce this consideration at the level of policy instruments, it does not
enter into the formulation of policy aims.
In the UK, the construction sector was singled out as a key sector for realizing these
goals, whereas in DK, the construction sector was not initially the focus of specific policy
efforts. In the UK, sustainable development was modeled after an existing
improvement agenda; the government initially turned to bodies created specifically for
that agenda to deliver sustainability. In DK, the election of a neo-liberal LiberalConservative coalition government in 2001 was the occasion for promoting the market
as an effective means to promote changes in the construction industry, while continuing
to articulate the sector’s responsibility for citizen well-being. This commitment would
seem to have been continued under the current coalition government.
As for the policy process, in the UK, policy formulation initially followed the Egan lead,
by excluding industry from significant involvement, except at the level of delivery. In
DK, in contrast, the linkage of ‘modernization’ with sector specific energy policies led to
greater industry consultation and involvement in the policy process. In both countries,
responsibility for energy policy and more specifically sector improvements were spread
across a number of different ministries, opening the way for conflict as well as
coordination.
17
Strategies for Sustainable Construction: Policy Instruments
In the UK and DK, both the modernization and sustainability strategies for the
construction sector were accompanied by the inflection of existing policy mechanisms
and introduction of new tools. The discussion of the UK case focuses on the 2005/6
strategies, while the analysis of policy instruments for the DK takes its point of
departure in the 2009 Strategy for reducing energy use in buildings, but adds to this
actions/initiatives taken by actors outside the formal policy circles.
The discussion distinguishes between regulatory, economic and voluntary mechanisms,
where the latter includes support, information and exhortations to voluntary action.
When discussing policy instruments it is helpful to keep in mind that the EU 2002
building directive called for a number of policy measures, including the introduction of
minimum standards on the energy performance of buildings, labelling systems for
energy use in buildings, a common methodology for calculating the integrated energy
performance of buildings and regular inspections of boilers and central air conditioning
systems. All call for regulatory and control type of mechanisms. While the EU has a
number of directives focused on aspects of social sustainability, none are explicitly
targeted at the construction sector, although issues of skills training, diversity and
human rights clearly affect employment practices.
Policy instruments in the UK
The Review of Sustainable Construction (2006) explicitly presents the strategy as “part of
the Improvement Agenda”. The objective is to help deliver sustainable construction
through target setting. In a discussion of means, the Review advocates: “a mixture of
regulation, guidance, encouragement and demonstration and managed networks”.
Demonstration programmes are presented as the key means to communicate benefits
to business, associated with a range of indicators of progress.
Relevant performance indicators include the Key Performance Indicators associated
with the Strategy for Sustainable Development, along with two separate sets of
indicators, a set of Environmental Performance Indicators and Respect for People
Indicators, both developed by bodies created to implement the Egan Agenda. The
indicators were explicitly designed to be used by firms and Government departments in
annual reporting. Another key policy mechanism is the use of government procurement
to provide a model for other clients and construction firms. The aim is to lead by
example. Whereas in 2000 this was an aspiration, by 2006 the Government had
commissioned and developed an extensive framework for the measurement and
reporting of departmental management of Government Assets. Moreover, the National
Audit Office (NAO) was charged with monitoring and reporting back on departmental
performance annually and with making recommendations. The central role of the NAO
role in the design and monitoring of policy instruments both reflects and reinforced the
dominant audit culture at Whitehall.
18
Agencies involved in the production of these frameworks, actions and benchmarks
include a variety of government departments, most notably the Department for the
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), The Department of Trade and Industry
(DTI), the Environment Agency (EA), the National Audit Office (NAO) and the Sustainable
Development Commission (SDC), as well as joint industry – government bodies such as
the Movement for Innovation and Constructing Excellence, set up explicitly to roll out
the Egan Agenda. As the report explicitly states, the government sees its primary role as
“informative, to guide people”. In keeping with the Egan Agenda, this extends to
leveraging its role as client to provide a baseline of good practice (in word, if not in
deed), producing directives for local and regional planning authorities, producing reams
of guidance and resorting to more traditional command and control mechanisms in the
form of regulations.
When it comes to energy, the 2006 Review signaled a number of achievements
including: the Energy White Paper( 2003), Energy Efficiency Action Plan (2004),
Revisions to Part L of the Building Regulations (regarding energy), the Code for
Sustainable Homes (see below), and Planning Policy developments. The mix of policy
mechanisms in the UK can be characterized as largely regulatory and voluntary. While
the Government has introduced a number of market and fiscal mechanisms supporting
its carbon reduction commitment, most of these do not directly affect construction
firms. For example, the Climate Change Levy, which is a tax on energy use, is generally
passed on to clients and is not enough to affect design decisions or production
processes. Similarly, the Carbon Reduction Commitment which is a cap and trade
programme, only applies to firms that have a half-hourly metered electricity
consumption greater than 6,000 MWh per year, as such it does not include construction
firms. The primary fiscal mechanisms directly affecting the construction sector are the
aggregates and landfill levy, which are seen to support the Egan emphasis on waste
reduction.
When it comes to energy, the main regulatory instruments include the revisions to the
building codes, planning policy guidance and Energy Performance Certificates (which
were introduced in 2007 in response to the EU 2002 directive). The key and perhaps
most effective policy instrument are the revision of Part L (energy) sections of the
building code and planning requirements, which vary locally. In general, building
regulations in the UK are revised every 8-10 years. However, with the introduction of
the government’s carbon reduction commitments, Part L (the energy section of the
building regulations) was revised, partly or fully, in 1995, 2002, 2005, 2006, and 2010.
Voluntary energy related policy instruments include the Government’s official set of
Environmental Performance Indicators, to be used in reporting, and a very detailed
framework (replete with targets and benchmarks) for government procurement, which
private clients and firms are encouraged to follow. These, along with the numerous
demonstration projects, constitute the main mechanisms for educating and guiding
19
businesses. They are complemented by numerous professional guidelines. For
construction firms and clients, the multiplicity of different frameworks, action plans,
KPIs, benchmarks and targets is bewildering. While the plethora of voluntary
instruments attests to Government activity, its impact on the sector has yet to be
ascertained. Like the Egan Report on which they are modelled, most of these targets set
highly unrealistic universal goals, with little attention to the mediating effect of the
market or sector structure. In many cases ambitious goals for carbon or GHG emissions
can be met for one year or two, focusing on ‘quick wins’, but continued performance
depends on more structural change which both the government and sector have been
loath to support.
Turning to social sustainability, the policy regime relies on a similar mix of regulatory
and voluntary tools, with regulatory tools largely limited to issues of Health and Safety.
The Executive Summary of Review of Sustainable Construction cites current
achievements as including:
• Formation of Sector Skills Councils: Construction Skills, Asset Skills and Summit
Skills;
• Health and Safety: the incidence rates for fatal major and over-three day
injuries for 2003/04 were the lowest since current records began;
• Launch of Respect for People Code of Good Working Health and Safety
Practices – 350 organisations have signed up so far
The list is striking for the reliance on the Egan Reports reduction of social issues to those
elements deemed to be essential for relatively narrow economic goals of efficiency and
competitiveness. It is also notable for the emphasis on voluntary mechanisms, such as
the formation of Skills Councils with a purely advisory role and voluntary codes of
practice. More generally, the agenda continues to be shaped by the Respect for People
strategy which focused on the development of a framework for action, toolkit and
separate Key Performance Indicators. Other initiatives include the Sustainable
Communities Plan (2003), the use of Considerate Contractors (a widely used
certification programme) and the use of Design Quality Indicators, which were
commissioned to provide a broader indication of quality (beyond delivery to cost and
time). All of these mechanisms it should be emphasized are voluntary, thus
demonstrating the Government’s commitment to self regulation and its perceived role
as educator and guide. From the perspective of the construction sector, the most
effective tools remain regulatory mechanisms, most notably building regulations and
planning requirements.
Policy innovation in the UK
The Code for Sustainable Home offers a peculiar twist on the use of regulatory
instruments. The Code is one the centre pieces of the government’s implementation of
its ambitious commitments for carbon reduction. The Climate Change Act set the UK
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some of the most ambitious targets in Europe, calling for a national reduction of carbon
emissions by 20% by 2020 and 80% by 2050 relative to 1990 levels. The Code for
Sustainable Homes is a voluntary comprehensive building assessment tool which has
been transformed into a quasi mandatory tool. Instead of imposing a single target, the
Code called for a progressive increase in carbon reduction standards between 2008 and
2016, leading to a requirement for ‘zero carbon homes’ from 2016. In an innovative
move for a policy instrument, the government explicitly linked the successive energy
requirements of the Code to revisions of Part L of the building regulations.
Failure to specify what ‘zero carbon’ means initially generated enormous confusion and
consternation in the sector. In an example of sector engagement with institution
building and the way in which environmental issues are challenging dominant modes of
governance, this has led to the introduction of a novel form of industry-state
partnership in the policy process. In the process, the concept of zero carbon has been
progressively narrowed, with concrete requirements on building fabric and a restriction
of the requirement to the construction process (‘unregulated’ or discretionary use of
the building by occupants is no longer covered). The main outstanding issue concerns
the form and delivery of ‘allowable solutions’ in the specification of zero carbon.
Initial uproar from the industry led to the creation of a special task force, jointly chaired
by the Housing Minister and the House Builders Federation Executive Chairperson. This
was unusual in the UK context and pointed to a degree of industry – government
cooperation unseen since the pre-Egan era. The Zero Carbon Taskforce was established
in January 2007. Its terms of reference are to (CLG, 2007, p.97):
 identify the barriers to implementation of the zero carbon 2016 target and put in
place measures to address them;
 develop a commitment publication alongside the final Building a Greener Future
policy statement, which will set out the respective roles of Central and Local
Government and business as they move towards the zero carbon 2016 target;
and,
 develop a timeline for steps that need to be taken over the next ten years to
support the implementation of the zero carbon 2016 target.
In June 2008, a second body, the Zero-Carbon Hub (ZCH) was established by the Housing
Minister to support the delivery of zero carbon new homes by 2016 (ZCH, 2008). The
organization brings together state and industry actors, as well as NGOs such as the
Carbon Trust, whose interests map across numerous sectors. Its remit is to “assist the
housing development sector understand the challenges, issues and opportunities
involved in developing, building and marketing low and zero carbon homes”. In addition,
the ZCH advises the Government on the development of the energy and carbon
reduction parts of the Code. To coordinate the delivery of zero carbon homes and to
monitor delivery against the Government’s targets, the ZCH has been working closely
with the new build housing sector and other interested parties to establish a common
view on a series of broadly representative timelines. The timelines have been designed
21
to help build an understanding across the industry of what is required for zero carbon
delivery and to allow progress towards the 2016 target to be monitored and evaluated.
The ZCH serves a number of novel functions in the specification and implementation of
energy regulations. First, it provides a vehicle for the involvement of industry and
relevant non-government organizations in the specification of standards and
regulations. Secondly, it informs the housing sector of upcoming developments and
advises them on how to adjust their practices to accommodate a changing policy
context. Third, it serves to legitimize the Code and the progressive ramping up of the
Part L of the Building Regulations in the eyes of housing developers. Finally, the ZCH,
through its very creation and activities, also introduced a new type of regulatory
process, aimed at the specification of regulations.
Viewed from the perspective of the regulatory process, the establishment of the 2016
Task Force and ZCH was unprecedented. Until this point building regulations had been
specified by government, sent out for a period of consultations, and then decided
behind closed doors. While industry input was ‘invited’, industry representatives were
not involved in the actual specification of regulations. In contrast, the ZCH combines
state and non-state actors with diverse, often contradictory interests and views on role
of the housing sector in the policy process. Nor is the ZCH a temporary body. Instead
the government has stated its intention to retain the organization as a formal
consultative body. To appreciate the novelty of this development, it’s helpful to
compare the composition and policy input of the Zero Carbon Hub with the near
absence of construction actors (except for clients) from the Industry Task Force charged
with producing the Egan Report.
In principle this combination of Part L and the Code offers a strict regulatory regime with
a voluntary complement to educate housing developers and signal upcoming revisions,
thus helping the industry to prepare. In practice, a number of observations qualify its
impact. First, when the Code was initially introduced, the concept of zero carbon was
unspecified such that house builders were at a loss as to what this would mean. This
has been the occasion for extensive lobbying, organizing and policy consultation, the
outcome of which is not yet fully resolved. In addition the Code was introduced in 2008,
just before the recession hit and the level of new house building plummeted. In the
current market, the ability of the UK to meet its carbon reduction commitments
depends far more on programmes for retrofit than for new build.
Policy instruments in DK
According to the Government’s 2009 Strategy, Danish energy requirements for new
buildings are among the strictest in the world, and the Government would like to the
country to continue to have this lead position. Accordingly, the long-term vision is that
all new buildings should be “energy +” buildings, i.e. buildings that produce more energy
than they consume. However, the strategy notes, given that Danes spend more than
22
90% of their time in buildings due consideration must be given to ensuring the indoor
climate and the aesthetic qualities of buildings as well, therefore “new buildings should
not only be energy efficient, they should also be healthy and comfortable to be in” and
it is posited that indoor climate, comfort, architecture and energy need not be
contradictory (Regeringen, 2002, p.3). ( The DK Government presents the development
of buildings that live up to these ambitions as a market opportunity for the sector; the
realization of which depends on stricter energy consumption standards and the
developments of new products/components.ii
The strategy is based on a mix of initiatives with regard to improving the energy
performance of new and existing buildings, encouraging and engaging other actors in
energy conservation as well as a number of guidance/educational initiatives. In keeping
with Koeppel and Ürge-Vorsatz’s (2007) typology many of the initiatives involve changes
to the main regulatory instrument with regard to buildings in DK – the building code.
These changes include a gradual tightening of the energy performance requirements (a
25% reduction in energy use by 2010, an additional 25% reduction by 2015 and at least
a 25% reduction by 2020, totalling to at least a 75% reduction by 2020), stricter
requirements for the energy performance of the building envelope, the introduction of
a subsidy for windows living up to high performance standards, allowing for an
increased use of renewable energy in (rural) areas not serviced by central district
heating and for an increased use of solar panels (for water heating), adjustment of
ventilation norms and the development of standards to ensure the comfort and quality
of the indoor climate, as well as new component requirements. In addition to these
requirements, which Koeppel and Ürge-Vorsatz (2007) have labelled as a ‘normative’
control instruments, the strategy is also based on the use of ‘informative’ control
instruments, e.g. the mandatory labelling of windows and buildings and monitoring of
energy use of apartments, houses and other buildings. In addition, owners are obliged
to publish this data in the “Housing and Building Registratrar (BBR),” which contains
data on the size and condition of all buildings in DK. In addition, energy providers are
also required to assist homeowners in identifying how they can reduce energy
consumption.
Among the economic instruments mentioned in the Strategy is energy performance
contracting, i.e. encouraging municipal governments to develop Energy Service
Companies to help finance energy renovations and operate buildings through the cost
savings that are achieved. While similar measures have been trailed in the UK, they
have not been as effective. As in the UK, other (economic) instruments include various
subsidy programs to foster product development, enable demonstration projects as well
as to support experimental construction projects within social housing. In addition to
this, funding is also given for educational programs and information campaigns.
Most of these developments are framed in terms of the Government’s neo-liberal aims
of promoting transparency, supporting consumer choice and market growth. The
provisions that allow for monitoring and disclosing energy-related information in the
23
Danish “Housing and Building” register and those mandating the labelling of windows
and buildings can be seen as attempts to increase transparency and reframe both the
building and energy markets by providing the users with additional information. And
even the tightening of the building code (classified as a normative regulatory
instrument) was presented as providing a sense of direction for innovations which
would benefit the construction sector.
Moreover, in the years up to and after the Government developed its Strategy, there
have been a growing number of voluntary initiatives taking place, i.e. in connection with
the introduction of new concepts such as “Zero emission buildings” (www.zeb.aau.dk
and www.zeb.no). While zero emission buildings is a generic term used to designate
buildings with zero greenhouse gas emissions during their construction and operation,
there is considerable uncertainty as to what this more precisely entails, i.e. a common,
unambiguous definition and associated methodology for calculating the energy balance
has yet to be agreed upon. In DK, this is being worked out on case-by-case basis.
Supported by “strategic research grants” from the Danish government, a number of
demonstration projects have been set up to give content to the concept of ‘zero
emissions buildings’. Initiatives include “Bolig+” and “ Active Houses.” Both are
development projects undertaken by networks of companies and interest organizations,
and in the case of “Bolig+” local government. “Bolig+” is a multi-story housing
development project that is energy neutral (ZEB, on a yearly basis), intelligent and userfriendly, flexible, comfortable, and characterized by its high architectural quality,
whereas “Active Houses” are as the name indicates houses that produce more energy
that they consume. Both projects ‘go beyond’ existing regulatory requirements.
However, the key issue driving these projects was the increasing priority given to
reducing climate change. The aim in both instances is to demonstrate to the
construction sector and to end-users that it is possible to build, afford and live in an
aesthetically pleasing and energy efficient building/house.
Another noted form of voluntary action is the rapidly proliferating energy,
environmental and building certification schemes. These schemes - for passivhaus,
Green Buildings, BREEAM, LEED, EU’s Swan label, etc. – certify that building
performance live up to certain requirements, and through the signalling or reputational
effects associated with them, the schemes are considered as helping to alter existing
practices. As standards, they are inscribing particular qualities to the buildings that can
enable market transactions, e.g. higher rents in buildings that are certified. Although
much debated, both private companies and public organizations primarily use these
schemes on an ad-hoc basis.
A comparison of policy instruments
As Jordan et al (2005) noted, in both countries regulations continue to provide a primary
policy instrument. In both countries, building codes have been updated to support EU
24
and national goals. In the UK a second crucial regulatory driver involves the use of
planning permission to impose mandatory requirements. These requirements vary
locally, thus challenging large firms’ reliance on standard models. This in turn has led to
considerable firm level experimentation in how to meet anticipated requirements
associated with the Code for Sustainable Homes. The DK energy labelling scheme,
introduced in 1997, has served as inspiration for the EU directive (Jensen & GramHanssen, 2008) that has induced the introduction of mandatory informative command
mechanisms, such as the Environmental Performance Certificate in the UK. In the UK
these are primarily activated at points of sale, thus limiting their effectiveness
somewhat; in DK they are published in the BBR, which is also activated in market
transactions.
A key contrast between the two countries lies in the use of ‘voluntary’ mechanisms.
Whereas in DK, tools such as building assessment methods remain purely voluntary and
the industry is largely responsible for producing information and guidance, in the UK
these activities are government driven. In the UK one of the key vehicles is the
government’s use of public sector procurement both as a model of best practice and as
a source of client control. Government departments must measure and report their
procurement using an elaborate framework of performance targets and benchmarks
and they are audited by the National Audit Office. BREEAM assessments or their
equivalent are required for all public sector procurement. This is overlaid with
variations in local and regional planning requirements and local procurement
requirements. In DK, in contrast, the mobilization of green procurement is left to
individual local (municipal) governments. There is, however, a concerted effort on the
part of the Green Building Council of DK, an independent non-profit organisation with
members from across the construction sector, to have state and local government
adhere to a green certification scheme.
In the UK, the active involvement of central government in developing and supporting
quasi-voluntary mechanisms is equally evident in the extensive body of guidance
information which it has produced and commissioned. In DK, this type of top-down
direction is largely absent. In both countries, the government has also used
demonstration and experimental construction projects, often in social housing, to
develop knowledge and support innovation.
In both countries, a commitment to energy efficiency has led to the introduction of new
concepts capturing ambitious policy goals for new housing. In the UK, the relevant
concept is ‘zero-carbon’, in DK it is ‘zero emissions buildings’. In the UK, the problem of
specification has been the occasion for considerable innovation in the policy process,
leading to an unprecedented degree of industry involvement in the specification of
definitions and metrics. In the DK, specification would seem to be left to the sector,
with government support taking the form of demonstration projects.
25
A final difference between the two countries would seem to lie in the approach to
thermal performance, although this requires further investigation. In the UK the
regulatory focus does not extend much beyond the design and construction phases
(post occupancy evaluations being limited to the year after completion), where as in DK
there are attempts to address the use phase as well, e.g. as witnessed by the attempts
at developing standards for the indoor climate. This difference in emphasis can be linked
to the UK focus on clients (who are not usually occupants, but rather housing
developers, large private firms and public sector clients) as compared with the DK focus
on citizens.
Discussion and Conclusion
This paper has compared UK and DK efforts to develop and implement policies for
sustainable development in the construction sector. More specifically, it has contrasted
government responses to EU building directive 2002. The analysis focuses on the
relation between policy aims and mechanisms.
In both countries, reliance on mandatory system of building codes and regulations
points to the continued importance of command and control mechanisms. Where the
DK and UK differ is in the additional policy mechanisms which governments have
mobilized to meet the requirements, first of the modernization agenda, and then of
pressures for sustainable development. A key argument in this paper is that the way in
which individual EU member states have responded to the first, has shaped their initial
responses to the latter. Although as the environmental goal posts surpass the capacity
of dominant neo-liberal and coordinated market mechanisms to deliver, this may (have
to) change.
The paper began with Campbell and Pederson’s (2007) contrast between the Anglo neoliberal state and a coordinated market economy in DK. This contrast can be seen in the
extensive privatization in the UK since the 1980s and in the introduction of market
mechanisms into public-private relationships (rather than classical free market
mechanisms in the conventional sense). These have been accompanied by the
centralization of government functions and an extensive audit culture. In DK,
modernization and sustainable development have relied on a more corporatist mode of
governance. Limited privatization, relative to the UK, has been accompanied by a more
cooperative approach in which industry is actively enrolled in the design and
implementation of government policy. When it comes to sustainability, the government
has used building codes to set minimum standards and left industry to translate more
ambitious policy aims into directives for action. In both countries modernization has
been accompanied by a move to greater transparency and accountability.
When it comes to policy discourse, a comparison of policy documents in the two
countries underlines a common set of themes with slight differences in inflection.
Common themes include the modernization tropes of efficiency, client interest and
26
transparency and sustainable development goals of resource efficiency and citizen
welfare. Differences in inflection can be seen in the UK subordination of environmental
and social goals to economic growth and DK recognition of the need to reconcile current
tensions between these different types of aims. While these may reflect differences in
national policy culture, they also point to differences in the Party in power when these
different documents were produced. That said, it is worth noting that whereas in the
UK, New Labour continued and even intensified neo-liberal policies introduced by the
Conservative government, in DK the Liberal-Conservative government moderated and
even slowed down the pace of privatization introduced by the Social Democrats prior to
2001. This observation supports the general contrast between neo-liberal and
coordinated market state.
A key structural difference which both informs and results from these political
differences concerns the centralization of political authority. In the UK, centralization
went hand in hand with neo-liberal reform, thus clearing the way for a centralized
regulatory state. In DK, the neo-liberal Liberal-Conservative coalition of 2001-2011
worked within the confines of Denmark’s long standing tradition of decentralized
government and a clear division of labour between different levels of government. This
in turn limited the scope of privatizations and limited the use of an audit culture to
control local government and industry. It also accounts for contrast between top down
and bottom up approaches, as evidenced in the UK reliance on endless frameworks and
formal targets and the DK emphasis on industry-state cooperation in policy
development.
At the level of policy instruments, both countries exhibit a similar mix of policy
instruments. In keeping with Jordan et al’s (2005) observations both countries rely
heavily on building codes to implement their policies for sustainable construction. Both
also rely on a mix of other command and voluntary mechanisms to complement this
basic mechanism, with less investment in economic mechanisms. Additional command
mechanisms include planning requirements in the UK, which are a major driver, and
mandatory certification programmes for buildings and appliances in both countries, as
mandated by the EU building directive. Where the two countries differ is in the nature
and mix of voluntary mechanisms (many of which are subsidized by the State, giving
them a quasi economic dimension). In both countries, voluntary mechanisms such as
demonstration projects are subsidized by the State, giving them a quasi economic
dimension, although the primary goal is to support innovation and, thereby, to give
content to abstract concepts such as ‘zero emission buildings’. In the UK, these projects
are complemented by extensive experimentation by large construction firms, concerned
with how they will meet already announced future increases in building regulations.
In the UK, so-called voluntary mechanisms have increasingly assumed a quasi
mandatory quality, whereas in DK, changes continue to be industry driven. The UK
hybrid between control and voluntarism is epitomized by the Code for Sustainable
Homes whose energy component tracks future increments in Part L building codes. It is
27
also evident in the government’s leverage of its role as a major client to impose beyond
regulation requirements on central government procurement and an associated set of
performance targets and audit mechanisms. The use of this mechanism in the UK (and
absence in DK) can be partly ascribed to the greater importance of public sector
procurement in construction sector demand as well as to the top-down approach of the
‘Improvement Agenda’ more generally. Thus, whereas in the UK, specially constituted
government bodies and the National Audit Office oversee government policy for the
construction sector, in DK oversight seems to be located in professional bodies. It is also
less formalized.
This comparison between policy aims and instruments in the two countries raises a
number of points for the literature on eco-governance. It also suggests a framework for
more in-depth analysis of policy responses to trans-national requirements. The
literature on eco-governance underlines innovations in the policy process and
governance structures. More specifically it points to the inclusion new types of actors.
Jordan et al argued that these developments could be tracked through changes in the
types of policy instruments at play and predicted a shift from command type
instruments (both normative and informative) to market, fiscal and voluntary tools.
Their analysis of the construction sector in 8 EU countries documented the persistence
of command type regulations and a mix of policy instruments.
Our own discussion calls for the development of this argument in a number of
directions. First, it calls for a closer examination of who is involved in the development
and deployment of those tools and a more nuanced analysis of which actors in the
construction sector are directly affected. Secondly, it calls for much greater
contextualization of these ‘mixes’, both so as to explain them and to assess their impact.
Two contexts would seem to be particularly important. These include the
modernization agenda, which, we argue, set the framework for the elaboration and
implementation of policies for sustainable construction, and the impact of neo-liberal
reform on the construction sector. This latter point is important as it accounts for
differences in the centralization of state authority and in the relative autonomy of
industry actors.
Finally, similarities in the language of reform in the two countries highlights the need for
move beyond a formal comparison of command, economic and voluntary tools to their
implementation. The study of policy impact and effectiveness will help to establish
whether the seeming more directed nature of UK policy and more ad hoc, bottom up
character of DK responses to calls for sustainable construction are grounded in practice.
If they are, such a study will draw attention to the way in which particular policy
instruments either ‘fit’ with dominant business models and practices or contribute to
their transformation. If they aren’t, research will draw attention to a ‘mis-alignment’
between policy logics and business logics, the negotiation of these tensions and their
consequences for sustainable development and the built environment
28
Turning to the theme of standardization and innovation, this paper contributes a
number of points to this topic. First, it confirms the eco-governmentality claim that
global environmental requirements have led to innovations in the policy process.
Interestingly, many of these changes have developed around the introduction and
subsequent specification of unachieveable and ambiguous policy goals, such as ‘zerocarbon homes’ and ‘zero emissions buildings’. As institutional theorists suggest, new
environmental goals invite institutional work, aimed at influencing the content of
institutional rules. While this was already standard practice in DK, it marks a break in
the dominant practice in the UK (or rather a return to the pre-Thatcherite practice of
tripartite cooperation between unions, business and government, without the unions).
In DK, in contrast, environmental legislation has provided an opening for the (modest)
introduction of the type of auditing and reporting mechanisms common in the UK, but
hitherto rare in DK, as evidenced by the creation of the Environmental Unit.
This latter observation draws attention to the introduction of new types of
intermediation between traditional policy actors. This is evident in the introduction of
smart meters and reporting mechanisms at the building level and the involvement of
energy companies in educating clients. It is equally evident in the increasing use of
performance targets and auditing (in the UK) and transparent reporting (in DK). One
option would be to write this off as an instance of regulatory capture, but this would not
‘capture’ (sic) the ways in which these non-government actions augment the existing
regulatory instruments. It is not, as the regulatory capture argument would suggest,
that these are weakened, replaced or markedly tweaked to favour particular actors
within the sector (even though the actors may have this intention or aspiration).
Instead, it appears that environmental issues have been the occasion for the
development of an elaborate network of intermediaries, made up of non-government
actors calculative and rhetorical devices (Callon & Muniesa, 2005) charged with
documenting building performance.
One contribution of this paper is to call attention to variations in the content, form and
function of these new forms of intermediation. As the comparison between the UK and
DK illustrate, these processes are inflected by national policy styles and governmentsector relations. Thus, whereas in the UK, there is a move to impose common
standards, in DK the emphasis is on raising awareness and ad hoc solutions. These
observations call for a movement beyond simple observations of isomorphism to a more
detailed analysis of the origins of these networks (do they build on existing actors and
practices, do they change them or have they been created de novo and if so, by whom)
and how they function. This, in turn, would allow for a more nuanced understanding
both of their impact on the distribution of both economic and political power and on
market and policy logics more generally. They would also provide the basis for a more
systematic analysis of their effectiveness as policy mechanisms and their impact on the
delivery of a more sustainable built environment.
29
In conclusion, the above discussion calls attention both to similarities in the types of
directives and processes accompanying calls for sustainable construction and to
variations in their implementation. Far from privileging either the state or industry,
these new policy processes introduce new layers of intermediation, whose impact has
yet to be systematically examined. When it comes to government policy, this analysis
warns against a simple analysis in terms of two discrete, coherent actors (industry and
the state) and calls for more nuanced analysis of the way in which policy instruments
are enacted and their impact. When it comes to standards and innovations, it cautions
against the location of standards in state and institutional level mechanisms and
innovation in individual and firm level action. Instead it locates innovation in both the
institutional and firm/individual levels and calls for a multi-level analysis of the dynamic
interaction between them. Finally, the recognition of new modes of governance at the
interstices of state and industry calls for investigation into the democratic implications
of new forms of global governance and their impact on dominant business and political
logics.
30
Table 1: Classification of policy instruments chosen for assessment in the study
Based on a similar table in Koeppel and Urge and Vorsatz (2007)
Control and regulatory
instruments
Normative:
−Appliance
standards
−Building
codes
−Procurement
regulations
−Energy
efficiency
obligations
and quotas
Fiscal and
market-based
instruments
Informative:
− Mandatory
audits
− Utility
demand-side
management
programs
− Mandatory
labelling and
certification
programs
−Tax
exemptions /
reductions
−Capital
subsidies,
grants, subsidized
loans
− Energy
performance
contracting
− Cooperative
procurement
− Energy
efficiency
certificate
schemes
Support,
information
and voluntary
action
− Voluntary
certification and
labelling
− Voluntary and
negotiated
agreements
− Public leadership
programs
− Awareness
raising,
education,
information
campaigns
− Detailed billing
and
disclosure
programs
31
Table 2: Key policies and documents shaping the governance of energy in buildings, DK
and UK
Year
1987
1992
1994
International
event/regul
Brundtland Report
Rio Summit
1995
DK Document
UK Document
Building Code, BR95,
BR-S98
Sustainable
Development: The
UK strategy
Revisions to building
regulations, Part Liii
Ministry of Housing:
“Urban Ecology,
Buildings and Housing
– An Action Plan”
[Boligministeriet:
Byøkologi, bygninger
og boliger – En
handlingsplan]
1997
1998
1999
2000
Kyoto Protocol
CHANGE IN GOVT
-Rethinking
Construction (Egan
Report)
-Agenda 21
construction (CIB)
-A Better Quality of
life (White Paper,
policy case for
sustainable
Development)
-Achieving Excellence
in Construction
initiative (guides for
government
procurement,
including one on
sustainability in 2007)
-Major revisions to
Building Regulations
-Building a Better
32
2001
2002
-EU Building
Directive
-Rio+10:
Johannesburg
Summit
Quality of Life (sector
level strategy)
Agenda 21: ”Udvikling -Modernising
med omtanke – fælles Construction (NAO
ansvar” [Thoughtful
report, marks intro of
development – our
policy cmt to
common
sustainable
responsibility] (DK
procurement)
follow up to the Rio
-Climate Change Levy
Convention)
(for high consuming
firms)
Establishment of the
Construction Panel;
Action Plan for
Sustainable
Development in the
Danish Building and
Construction
Industries, EPA.
Following CHANGE OF -Revision to building
GOVT in 2001: Above regulations;
mentioned document
-Renewable
reworked: ”Fælles
Obligation
fremtid – udvikling i
(obligation on energy
balance” [Our
co.s to develop
common future –
renewable supply,
balanced
initially 3%, 2010
development]
raised to .11%)
-Accelerating Change
(2nd Egan Report)
2003
2004
-The Construction
Best Practice
Programme (CBBP)
developed
Environmental Key
Performance
Indicators for the
construction industry,
-Sustainable
Communities Plan
PPS 22 Renewable
33
2005
2005
2006
“Handlingsplan for
fornyet energispare
indsats” [Action plan
for (renewed) energy
savings] – the DK
energy strategy
toward 2025, Ministry
of Transport and
Energy.
New law on “Energy
savings in bldg”,
follow up to EU
Directive
2020 Vision:
Construction
Energy
Energy Efficiency
Action Plan
(minor) revisions to
Building Regulations,
Part L
Securing the Future
(revised national
sustainable
development
strategy)
-Planning policy
statement (PPS 1)
Delivering sustainable
development
-Achieving Excellence
in Construction
Procurement Guide
11: Sustainability,
- revisions to Building
Regulations, Part L to
incorporate EU
directive
-Review of
Sustainable
Construction (revised
sector level strategy)
Draft planning policy
statement: Planning
and Climate Change.
Supplement to
Planning Policy
Statement 1’
-Low Carbon Building
Programme-grants
for inv in MGTs
(2006-9 for
demonstration
34
2007
The New Energy
Plan for Europe
2008
European plan on
Climate Change (2020-20 target) 1,
proposal to recast
building directive
1
projects)
-revisions to Part L
standards, includes
compulsory CO2
emissions
calculations and
airtightness testing
for new buildings
Energy Review
UK Climate Change
Programme (UKCCP)
revised
-Code for Sustainable
Homes introduced as
voluntary standard
(all new homes must
be zero carbon by
2016; non domestic
by 2019)
-System of Energy
Performance
Certificates for new
homes (following
European Energy
Performance of
Buildings Directive
-Climate Change and
Sustainable Energy
Act legally binding
framework to cut
GHG emissions by
80% against 1990
levels by 2050;
requires 5-yearly
carbon budgets to be
set for coming 3
budgets/15 years)
Aims of EU Plan on Climate Change: by 2020, reduce by 20% the emissions of greenhouse gases,
increase by 20% the energy efficiency in the EU and to reach 20 % of renewables in total energy
consumption in the EU
35
2009
-“Cirkulærer om
energieffektivisering i
staten” [Amendment
to the Law: Increasing
State Energy
Efficiency]
-“Lovbekendtgørelse
om miljøvenligt design
af energirelaterede
produkter” [Legally
binding rules on
environmentally
friendly design of
energy related
products]
-Lov om
energimærkning af
energirelaterede
produkter
[Law on Energy
Labelling of energy
related products]
-Regeringens strategi
for bæredygtig
udvikling
“Vækst med
omtanke”
[Government Strategy
for Thoughtful
Growth]
-“Strategi for
reduktion af
energiforbruget i
bygninger” [Strategy
for the reduction of
energy use in
buildings], Developed
by a cross-ministerial
collaboration between
4 ministries:
Økonomi‐ og
Erhvervsministeriet/Erhvervs‐ og
Byggestyrelsen, Klima‐
-Low Carbon
Transition Plan
(White Ppaper on
how government will
meet Climate Change
Act targets)
36
og Energiministeriet/
Energistyrelsen,
Finansmini-steriet og
Indenrigs‐ og
Socialministeriet.
2010
2011
Planned policy
interventions
Directive
Revision of the
2010/31/EU on the Building Code BR10
energy
performance of
buildings (recast)
member states
must establish and
apply minimum
energy
performance
requirements,
ensure certification
of building energy
performance; must
ensure that by 2021
all new buildings
are ‘nearly zeroenergy’
-Revised building
regulations –
alignment with Code 25 % reduction in
CO2 emissions from
new buildings,
relative to the level of
emissions that would
have resulted from
the Part L standards
introduced in 2006
- CSH level 3
compliance
mandatory for all
new homes
-Govt sets targets for
reduction of carbon
emissions for govt.
depts. (10% in one
year)
-Feed-in-Tariff
(replaced Low Carbon
Buildings Programme)
-Low Carbon
Construction Plan
and Action Plan
-(New) Government
Construction
Strategy
-Renewable Heat
Incentive
Green Deal, Smart
meters, Energy Co.
Obligations, revised
version of domestic
EPC
CHANGE IN GOVT
37
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i The ‘Improvement Agenda’ was shaped by three key documents: Latham, M. 1994. Constructing the
Team: Final report of the Government/Industry Review of Procurement and contractual arrangements in
the UK Construction Industry. London: HMSO., Egan, J. 1998. Rethinking Construction: Report of the
Consruction Task Force to the Deputy Prime Minister, John Prescott, on the scope for improving the
quality and efficiency of UK construction. London. , and Strategic Forum. 2002. Accelerating Change.
London. Of the three documents the first Egan Report tends to dominate discussions and thus will be
privileged in this discussion.
ii An example of this is the product panel on buildings introduced by the Danish EPA in 2001. The aim was
to “make social and economic growth environmentally neutral” through an extensive use of LCA to
increase energy efficiency within the building and construction industry (EPA, 2001:4). Particular emphasis
was given to: cutting the consumption of non-renewal energy; reducing and optimizing the use of scarce,
non renewable material resources; and improving health and safety by reducing the use of hazardous and
environmentally harmful substances. Not being particularly productive, the panel was dismantled some
years later.
iii Note most building regulations get update every 8-10 years, Part L was updated in 1995, 2002, 2005
(minor), 2006, 2010 and there’s a planned updated for 2013. Aim is to get to zero carbon by 2016 for
domestic and 2019 for commercial new building.