Enclosure 1
JOINT ARCTIC COMMAND
SEARCH AND RESCUE EXERCISE
GREENLAND SEA 2013
(SAREX Greenland Sea 2013)
FINAL EXERCISE REPORT
Product Status:
Version / Release: 2.0
JOINT ARCTIC COMMAND
3900 NUUK
GREENLAND
SAREX GREENLAND SEA 2013
Final Exercise Report
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PRELIMINARY PAGES
DATE: 01 November 2013
SUBJECT: SAREX GREENLAND SEA 2013 Final Exercise Report (FER)
REFERENCES:
Authority. JOINT ARCTIC COMMAND (JACMD) as the Officer Scheduling the Exercise (OSE) and Officer
Conducting the Exercise (OCE) authorizes the Documentation – SAREX Greenland Sea 2013 Final Exercise
Report (FER).
Promulgation. The SAREX Greenland Sea 2013 FER has been developed in accordance with SAREX
Greenland Sea 2013 Exercise Plan Part Three (EXPLAN Part 3) - Evaluation, Analysis and Reporting.
Distribution. According to Annex A. Addressees are authorized and encouraged to distribute copies of
this document to all stakeholders and interested parties as they see fit.
Stig Oestergaard Nielsen
Major General
RECORD OF CHANGES:
Version
Date
Description
1.0
2013-10-01
Draft - for review
1.1
2013-10-22
PXD Working Document
2.0
2013-11-01
Final version
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Table of Contents
1.
Letter of Promulgation .................................................................................................................. 6
2.
Summary of Action Items ............................................................................................................. 7
3.
Exercise Abstract .......................................................................................................................... 8
3.1. Command and Control ............................................................................................................. 9
3.2. Participating Units and Organizations ..................................................................................... 10
3.3. Exercise Aim and Training Objectives ..................................................................................... 12
3.4. Training Audiences vs. Training Objectives ............................................................................. 12
4.
Exercise Description ................................................................................................................... 14
4.1. Exercise Setting .................................................................................................................... 14
4.2. Scenario and Conduct of the Exercise ..................................................................................... 14
4.3. Background for the Scenario .................................................................................................. 18
4.4. Evaluation, Analysis and Reporting Design .............................................................................. 18
5.
Achievement of the OSE’s Training Objectives .............................................................................. 19
5.1. SAREX Greenland Sea 2013 Training Objectives ...................................................................... 20
6.
Subject Area Enclosures ............................................................................................................. 21
6.1. Search Operations (Training Objective no. 1) .......................................................................... 21
6.2. Rescue Operations (Training Objective no. 2) ......................................................................... 22
6.3. Evacuation Operations (Training Objective no. 3) .................................................................... 24
6.4. Medical Support (Training Objective no. 4) ............................................................................. 24
6.5. Use of Air for Medical Evacuation (Training Objective no. 5) .................................................... 24
6.6. Media and Press Management (Training Objective no. 6)......................................................... 25
6.7. Counter Maritime Pollution (Training Objective no. 7) .............................................................. 25
6.8. Experimentation (Not a Training Objective) ............................................................................ 26
6.9. Post Exercise Discussion (PXD) in Nuuk .................................................................................. 26
Annex A: Distribution ........................................................................................................................ 28
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List of Abbreviations
AO
Area of Operations
SA
Situational Awareness
AOR
Area Of Responsibility
SAR
Search and Rescue
ARCC
Air Rescue Coordination Centre
SMC
SAR Mission Coordinator
CONOPS
Concept of Operations
SITREP
Situation Report
COMPLAN Communications Plan
SOP
Standard Operating Procedure
DV
Distinguished Visitor
SRU
Search and Rescue Unit
ENDEX
End of Exercise
STARTEX Start of Exercise
EO
Exercise Objective
TA
Training Audience
EXBRIEF
Exercise Brief
PTA
Primary Training Audience
EXCON
Exercise Control
TO
Training Objective
EXDIR
Exercise Director
TTX
Tabletop Exercise
EXPLAN
Exercise Plan
FCC
Final Coordination Conference
FER
Final Exercise Report
FIR
First Impression Report
IPC
Initial Planning Conference
IAMSAR
International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and
Rescue
JRCC
Joint Rescue Coordination Centre
MEL/MIL Main Event List and Master Incident List
MPC
Main Planning Conference
MRCC
Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre
O/T
Observer/Trainer
OCE
Officer Conducting Exercise
ODE
Officer Directing Exercise
OPV
Offshore Patrol Vessel
OSC
On-Scene Coordinator
OSE
Officer Scheduling Exercise
POB
Persons On Board
PXD
Post-Exercise Discussions
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1. Letter of Promulgation
In order not to lose the Arctic SAREX momentum following The Arctic Council SAREX Agreement in 2011
and in the wake of the Greenland Sea 2012 SAREX (10-12 September 2012) Denmark decided to plan for
SAREX Greenland Sea 2013 at a fairly late stage. Due to a short planning cycle it was decided to re-use
the SAREX Greenland Sea 2012 scenario with some adjustments. In order to bring Arctic SAREX into a
more suitable and long term planning cycle the Danish Arctic Ambassador recommended to the Arctic
Council that responsibility for future SAREX should follow the chairmanship of The Arctic Council. This
recommendation has been well received by Canada, the incoming Chair of the Arctic Council. Canada will
be planning and hosting the Arctic SAREX in 2014.
SAREX Greenland Sea 2013 (02-06 September 2013) served several purposes; Firstly to follow up on
Lessons Identified (LI) from SAREX Greenland Sea 2012 and secondly as an add-on from 2012 a tabletop
exercise (TTX) to plan and coordinate counter maritime pollution. Unlike the 2012 SAREX, an external
staff of Exercise Control (EXCON) was planned to take over the EXCON responsibilities during the SAREX
2013 execution giving the staff of the newly established Joint Arctic Command opportunity to become
fully engaged as exercise players. Finally a number of trials related to communications, surveillance and
search were incorporated in the exercise.
Some 1.000 people from different organizations across the Arctic were involved in the exercise. The
scenario was once again centered on a cruise ship in distress in a remote Arctic area, necessitating a
large and complex maritime search and rescue (SAR) operation. As such, SAREX Greenland Sea 2013
illustrated the importance and usefulness of international cross-border cooperation and coordination.
Maritime SAR off Greenland’s coastline is principally a national responsibility of the Kingdom of Denmark
but the exercise showed bilateral and multilateral cooperation to be of paramount importance in order to
avoid extensive loss of lifes following a ship disaster. At the same time, the exercise provided an excellent
opportunity for testing the counter maritime pollution state of readiness as a TTX but also to follow-up on
Arctic SAR plans and procedures on a larger scale. Gaining experience in cooperation amongst the
stakeholders was a key priority and for this reason, the exercise can be described as a success.
Exercises like SAREX Greenland Sea 2013 are primarily conducted to develop organizations' ability to
handle disasters. Subsequently, the knowledge and learning achieved through exercises must be
operationalized through analysis and evaluation. The evaluation of SAREX Greenland Sea 2013 generally
shows that the participating organizations were able to coordinate and coorporate in a remote area. The
personnel in the tactical field response demonstrated very high professional skills and dedication in their
efforts to save lives. However, while it is encouraging to note that many actions and procedures worked
well during SAREX Greenland Sea 2013, the areas where weaknesses or room for improvement have
been pointed out have precedence in this Final Exercise Report. More specifically, the evaluation
highlights inadequate means of communications; ; The need for an Air Task Organization for handling a
large number of aircraft; the need for a formal SAR cooperation agreement between the national
coordination forums at the strategic level in Denmark/Greenland and Iceland focusing on national
coordination and cooperation in case of emergency responses; the need to develop a contingency plan
for deploying counter maritime pollution equipment most effectively to Greenland etc. etc.
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It is important that these and other relevant conclusions and learning points from SAREX Greenland Sea
2013 are now being followed up upon. Readers are therefore encouraged to closely consider the LI and
action items suggested in the FER with a view to implementing changes that may strengthen emergency
preparedness in both a national and in a wider Arctic context. Given that the exercise was organized by
Danish authorities, the lessons identified and action items set forth in the FER (sections 6) are mostly
aimed at emergency preparedness within the Kingdom of Denmark but some of them are of a more
general character and may be of concern to organizations and cooperation forums in all eight Arctic
Nations; Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the United
States of America.
Finally, it must be stressed that although the overall conduct of the exercise was successful, not
everything went according to plan. Technical difficulties were encountered which not only affected the
performance and opportunities of the Training Audience (TA) but also forced Exercise Control (EXCON) to
engage in dynamic scripting for the Main Event List/Master Incident List (MEL/MIL). The difficulties were
especially related to weather conditions, transportation of TA to the Area of Operations (AO) and
inadequate technical means of communications but also to issues such as limited experience with the
common C3 SAR log system.
As the exercise progressed most challenges were resolved in a satisfactory manner but there is still a
need to evaluate the technical lessons closely in order to implement simple and effective means of
communication in the Arctic region. Communication and relay stations are crucial to enable effective
SAR operations in the high Arctic.
2. Summary of Action Items
This section briefly summarizes the conclusions and recommendations identified during the SAREX
Greenland Sea 2013 and the Post Exercise Discussion in Nuuk 22-23 Oct 2013 included in section 6.









Investigate if MRCC Nuuk have all needed communication systems at disposal for SAR.
Consider developing a common international SAR log to be used by all SAR organizations in the
Arctic region.
Consider having a fixed wing search craft on SAR alert in Greenland throughout the summer
season.
Consider strengthening the JACMD manning on the Air and on the Logistical side.
Test mobile self-sustained satellite internet transceiver solutions capable of covering at least 10
NM with internet.
The OSC is responsible for the SAR coordination and as such responsible for including all the on
scene actors – including the captain of the ship in distress.
Consider developing a Standard Operational Procedure (SOP) for local emergency plan for
casualty assemblies delineating local responsibilities.
Consider establishing a formal SAR cooperation agreement between the national coordination
forums at the strategic level in Denmark/Greenland and Iceland focusing national coordination
and cooperation in case of emergency responses.
Consider establishing an Air Task Organization for handling a large number of aircraft as a part of
JACMD contingency plans.
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



Develop a contingency plan for deploying counter maritime pollution equipment most effectively
to Greenland.
Update the JACMD SOP for countering maritime pollution to include the international operational
guidelines on maritime pollution operationalized in accordance with JACMD responsibilities.
Consider updating bi-lateral and multi-lateral cooperation agreements on countering maritime
pollution.
Consider expanding JACMD environmental section to become a knowhow center for countering
maritime pollution in the Arctic.
Future exercise recommendations:
 Investigate if JACMD can get an unclassified exercise frequencies package to be used in future
exercises.
 Facilitate that the On Scene Coordinator (OSC) and the Police are able to plan for investigating
criminal activities on board ships in distress in parallel to rescue/evacuation operations.
 National representatives are responsible for that own national safety regulations are included in
the EXPLAN’s safety Annex while safety at all times is a national responsibility.
 Develop a communication plan for handling the Media and Press at JACMD and continue training
the Media and Press handling in future exercises – also with external counterparts.
 When JACMD is Primary Training Audience (PTA) JACMD should not be the Officer Scheduling the
Exercise (OSE) and the Officer Conducting the Exercise (OCE). Have an external Core Planning
Team in charge for planning and executing future similar exercises.
 Consider separating the Distinguished Visitors Day (DV-Day) Program from the exercise play and
have the DV-Day as an Arctic SAR introduction show letting the units introduce themselves as
Arctic SAR capacities.
 Consider running experimentations at the DV-Day.
3. Exercise Abstract
SAREX Greenland Sea 2013 was a live full-scale SAR exercise using the main planning products for SAREX
2012. The exercise was executed as realistically as possible given prevailing circumstances in a remote
Arctic area. Meteorological data, geography, borders, infrastructure, political and economical conditions,
etc. all corresponded with reality.
The AO for SAREX Greenland Sea 13 (i.e. the primary exercise arena) was the Greenland Sea, King
Oscar’s Fiord, Ella Island and Mestersvig Airstrip in northeastern Greenland. Reykjavik and Keflavik in
Iceland, approximately 600 nautical miles or 1.000 km from the AO, were used as the main maritime and
air hubs for maritime and air assets proceeding into the AO.
The exercise took place from 02-06 September 2013. It was divided into three phases and three events:
Phase 1 – Pre-STARTEX Phase (Greenland Sea): Before 02 Sep 2013
Phase 1 was the pre-STARTEX phase to get all Training Audiences (TA) ready and in place before SAREX
Greenland Sea 2013.
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Phase 2 – Search Phase (Greenland Sea): 02-03 Sep 2013
Phase 2 including STARTEX and the initiation of the SAR operation focused the effective use of all
available units and how the search for the missing cruise ship was organized and conducted.
Phase 3 – Rescue and Evacuation Phase (King Oscar’s Fiord): 04-05 Sep 2013
Phase 3 focused the rescue and the evacuation of the cruise ship crew and the passengers from King
Oscar’s Fiord with only two small airstrips and no other infrastructure or a major air/sea port. In parallel,
the TAs had to handle a counter maritime pollution disaster from the cruise ship.
Day five of the exercise, 06 September 2013, was used for hot wash-ups and other post-ENDEX activities.
The execution of the exercise was mainly driven by the MEL/MIL, which was uploaded to the Apan
Exercise Management WEB-page www.apan.org (only available to EXCON). Throughout the exercise the
MEL/MIL injects were dynamically adjusted by the EXCON as needs arose, e.g. handing out new TetraFlex radios to all the relevant on-scene TA prior to Phase 3.
3.1. Command and Control
Joint Arctic Command (JACMD) was Officer Scheduling the Exercise (OSE) and Officer Conducting the
Exercise (OCE). During the execution phase 02-06 September 2013 the role and the responsibilities of
the key EXCON positions; the Exercise Director (EXDIR), Officer with Primary Responsibilities (OPR) and
the Chief Analyst were filled by staff from the Danish Chief of Defence Headquarters (HQ). The reason
for having an external EXCON running the execution phase was made upon recommendations from
SAREX Greenland Sea 2012 recommending JACMD to be trained as a new-established HQ during SAREX
Greenland Sea 2013.
The external EXCON was furthermore supported by a number of Observers/Trainers (O/Ts) embarked on
board HDMS VAEDDEREN and a number of O/Ts located with Training Audiences (TAs) elsewhere.
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3.2. Participating Units and Organizations
Training Audience (TA), Exercise Control (EXCON), Role-player (RP)
Country
Units
Canada
1 Hercules Transport Aircraft C-130 (Incl. 8 + 2 SAR Techs)
1 OPS-Officer in Keflavik
TA
RP
X
X
X
X
2 EXCON embarked in HDMS VÆDDEREN
2 Observer/Trainers on Ella Island
JRCC TRENTON
X
X
2 Observer/Trainers in MRCC Nuuk
Kingdom
of
Denmark
HDMS HVIDBJOERNEN incl. LYNX (HVBJ)
EXCON
X
HDMS VAEDDEREN incl. LYNX (VDRN – Simulating cruise ship)
X
HDMS KNUD RASMUSSEN (KNUD)
X
1 Challenger Maritime Recce Aircraft CL-604
X
1 Hercules Transport Aircraft C-130
X
1 Maintenance Support Team
X
1 Senior Umpire on board HVBJ
X
3 Teams from Squadron 690 MEDEVAC (22 all in all)
X
1 Air Transport Wing (ATW) Coordinator in Keflavik
X
1 Tactical Air Command make-up team (TAC DEN)
X
1 TAC DEN EXCON member on board VDRN
X
1 TAC DEN Observer/Trainer at MRCC Nuuk
X
Danish National Operational Staff (NOST)
X
Danish National Police
X
1 Chief of Defence Role-Player (CHOD DEN)
X
3 CHOD DEN EXCON Staff members embarked in VDRN
X
1 CHOD DEN Media Role-Player embarked in VDRN
X
2 JACMD EXCON embarked in HDMS VAEDDEREN
X
25 Danish journalist students as Role-Players
Danish Emergency Management Agency (DEMA)
X
X
2 DEMA Observer/Trainers at MRCC Nuuk
X
Sirius Military Dog Sledge Patrols as security
Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre Nuuk (MRCC Nuuk)
X
X
1 x Danish Navy SAR SME in MRCC Nuuk (SME)
X
4 x Naval Home Guard SAR SMEs with HVBJ, KNUD and ICG
X
Air Rescue Coordination Centre Soendre Stroem (ARCC)
X
Greenland Police Command Station (CS)
X
2 Greenland Police Registration Team Command Posts (CPs)
X
2 Observer/Trainers on CP Mestersvig and CP Ella Island
X
20 Greenland Police Students as “cruise ship passengers”
X
1 Police Students’ leader
X
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Country
Units
Greenland Emergency Management Commission (GEMC)
TA
RP
X
1 Police Observer/Trainer in GEMC
X
Greenland Department of Housing, Nature and Environment
X
Greenland Department of Health and Infrastructure
X
1 Department of Health Role-Player
X
Danish Maritime Authority in Greenland
X
Air Greenland Operation Centre
X
1 Air Greenland AS-350 helicopter including sling
X
Mestersvig Airstrip
X
1 NAVIAIR AFIS controller located in Mestersvig
X
2 Greenlandic journalists (KNR+Sermitsiaq)
X
2 Danish journalists (Danish Radio+JyllandsPosten)
X
MRCC Torshavn
X
1 MRCC Torshavn Observer/Trainer on board HVBJ
X
18 Role-Players and Observers with different Training Audiences
Iceland
EXCON
X
ICGV TYR incl. 1 Observer/Trainer
X
1 Coast Guard Maritime Surveillance Aircraft DASH-8 (300)
X
1 DASH-8 Observer/Trainer
X
X
X
Keflavik Airfield
X
ICE-SAR Teams (16 persons)
X
15 ICE-SAR Roleplayers as casualties
X
SAR-TECH Jumpers (8 persons)
X
Joint Rescue Coordination Centre Iceland (JRCC Iceland)
X
National Crisis Coordination Centre (NCCC)
X
1 NCCC Observer/Trainer
X
1 OPS-Officer in Keflavik
X
1 Response Group (Fire and Rescue Services)
X
National and Municipality Police
X
The Environment Agency of Iceland
X
The National Health Sector
X
Host Nation Support (HNS)
X
1 EXCON in VDRN
X
Personnel for staff elements at different command levels
X
1 Police Liaison Officer at Mestersvig Airstrip
X
Norway
Joint Rescue Coordination Centre (JRCC) Bodoe
X
USA
2 Air National Guard, AW109 C-130
X
JRCC BOSTON
X
1 USCG Observer/Trainer on board VDRN
X
3 USCG Observer/Trainers at MRCC Nuuk
X
1 ANG 109AW Observer/Trainer at MRCC Nuuk
X
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3.3. Exercise Aim and Training Objectives
The aim of SAREX Greenland Sea 2013 was to train the SAR organisations of the 8 Arctic Nations in a real
live exercise providing SAR cooperation training to all participants in a remote Arctic environment.
Additionally, and as an add-on from SAREX Greenland Sea 2012, Maritime Pollution should play a part in
SAREX 2013. To this end, seven Training Objectives (TO) were established and approved by the
participating nations:
No. Training Objective
1
Effective search operations and cooperation between all involved centres
and units
2
Effective rescue operations and cooperation between all involved units
3
Effective evacuation operations and cooperation between nations and all
involved units
4
Effective medical support and cooperation between nations and all
involved units
5
Effective use of air for medical evacuation between nations and involved
units
6
Effective media and press management between nations and all involved
units
7
Effective planning for counter Maritime Pollution between Arctic authorities
and organizations
Event 1
Event 2
The seven TOs form the framework for evaluation in this report and the observations, discussions and
conclusions in section 5 and 6 are structured according to the TOs.
3.4. Training Audiences vs. Training Objectives
TO no. 1.
Initially, the Primary Training Audiences (PTA) during the Search Phase for the missing cruise ship
(Scenario Phase 2) were the Rescue Coordination Centres (RCCs) in Norway; Iceland; the Faroe Islands
and in Greenland. MRCC Nuuk was the overall responsible RCC during the Search Phase. As the scenario
evolved other RCCs and their supporting capacities were included as PTA. In the AO the PTA was the
immediate response forces within the Exclusive Economical Zones (EEZ) of Greenland and Iceland such
as Offshore Patrol Vessels; Maritime Surveillance Aircraft; neighbouring countries Air Support; local
helicopters and other identified support and assistance available in the AO. During Phase 2 the primary
objective was to conduct an effective search and the cooperation between all involved RCCs and units.
Another primary objective was to train the On-Scene-Coordinator (OSC) tasking process and to train the
OSC hand-over procedures between the search units. Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) co-located with the
PTA as O/Ts observed, trained and reported their observations to the EXCON on board HDMS
VAEDDEREN.
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TO no. 2.
The PTA during the Rescue Phase (Scenario Phase 3) were extended to include participating nations’
highest emergency coordination committees for national and bilateral coordination and support.
Consequently, nations identified and suggested expeditionary capacities ready and relevant for the
ongoing SAR rescue operation in King Oscar’s Fiord. MRCC Nuuk was responsible for identifying the
needed capacities, to coordinate national and international deployments and the re-enforcement of the
SAR operation in the AO in coordination with the OSC. In addition to the emergency coordination
committees Greenland’s Police and the department of Health and Infrastructure and the department of
Housing, Nature and Environment within the Government of Greenland were included as PTA.
Greenland’s Police was responsible for registering the crew and passengers from the cruise ship in
distress and the departments within the Government of Greenland to prepare and coordinate within their
responsibilities, respectively.
Again, SMEs co-located with the PTA as O/Ts observed, trained and
reported to the EXCON on board HDMS VAEDDEREN. Role-players simulated cruise ship casualties and
different relevant national authorities.
TO no. 3.
The PTA during Evacuation Phase (Scenario Phase 3) were as mentioned in the description of TO no. 2.
MRCC Nuuk was still responsible for the ongoing rescue while the Greenlandic Police were responsible for
planning, organizing and executing the evacuation in accordance with the issued Evacuation Plan. Again,
SMEs co-located with the PTA as O/Ts observed, trained and reported to the EXCON on board HDMS
VAEDDEREN. Role-players simulated cruise ship casualties being evacuated but also different relevant
national authorities.
TO no. 4.
The PTA related to TO no. 4 were medics deployed into theatre and their reach-back organizations plus
the doctors and their triage at all levels. Achieving the TO depended on the deployment and the reachback effectiveness but also on the cooperation and the triage at both the tactical and the operational
level. O/Ts observed and reported their observations to the EXCON on board HDMS VAEDDEREN.
TO no. 5.
Effective use of Air for Medical Evacuation needs careful planning and coordination between all the
stakeholders. The PTA related to TO no. 5. were the Police as responsible for the Evacuation, MRCC
Nuuk as the Air Task Coordinator (ATC) and all other Air Planners involved. The Police forwarded their
Evacuation requirements to MRCC Nuuk and O/Ts observed how effectively Air was used for Medical
Evacuation and reported their observations to the EXCON on board HDMS VAEDDEREN.
TO no. 6.
This year the Media and Press PTA were Joint Arctic Command, the Greenlandic Police and Greenland’s
Emergency and Management Commission in Nuuk. O/Ts observed and reported how professional the
PTA handled the massive pressure from 25 journalist students simulating the local, the national and the
international media and press like the BBC, CNN and the New York Times.
TO no. 7.
As an add-on from SAREX 2012 a Maritime Pollution TTX played an important part in this year’s SAREX.
O/Ts observed the planning and the cooperation between the stakeholders and the efficiency of the
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current contingency plan for getting Counter Maritime Pollution equipment into theatre and reported to
the EXCON on board HDMS VAEDDEREN.
4. Exercise Description
4.1. Exercise Setting
Geographic distances and the lack of infrastructure were two major factors in the planning and execution
of SAREX Greenland Sea 2013. The AO was the Greenland Sea, King Oscar’s Fiord, Ella Island and
Mestersvig Airstrip. Reykjavik and Keflavik in Iceland, approximately 600 nautical miles or 1.000 km from
the AO, were used as the main hubs for maritime and air assets proceeding into the AO. No towns or
settlements exist on the northeastern coast of Greenland that can provide facilities or assets that might
help a search and rescue effort. The only permanent human presence in the area is the Danish Sirius
Military Dog Sledge patrols, which maintain a number of depots along the coast.
Seasonal temperatures for the AO are between -1°C and 4°C. In September the average precipitation is
56.6 mm and mean number of days with precipitation is 12 days. From 10-13 September, there is an
average of 13.5 hrs. of daylight plus approximately 5.5 hrs of nautical twilight. In the first two days of the
exercise, the weather was relatively rough in the Greenland Sea, with gale force winds off shore, while it
was comparatively calm in King Oscar’s Fiord. Ice conditions were mostly clear, with isolated drifting
bergs.
4.2. Scenario and Conduct of the Exercise
At the Post Exercise Discussions (PXD) in Nuuk in the period 22-23 Oct 13 it was concluded that the
scenario for SAREX Greenland Sea 2013 was realistic though capacities had to be pre-positioned prior to
the exercise.
The scenario involved a medium-sized cruise ship the “ARCTIC VICTORY” (simulated by HDMS
VAEDDEREN) with 250 passengers and crew, which first went missing in the Greenland Sea and later ran
aground in King Oscar’s Fiord off Ella Island, followed by an explosion and resulting fires on board. For
this exercise, operations were minimized during the night due to insufficient EXCON personnel for 24hour operations.
The exercise setup called for a multitude of tasks in the operational response, including maritime search
and rescue; fire fighting at sea; evacuation by sea and air; deployment of emergency medical personnel,
fire and rescue personnel, and police registration personnel; use of a specialized search team with
cameras and listening equipment to locate missing persons below deck; triage and emergency medical
treatment by doctors and paramedics at sea and on shore; establishing a reception facility for evacuees
on land, establishing guard duty to protect evacuees against the possibility of attacks by polar bears;
continuous updating of the SAR service’s Persons On Board (POB) list and the police’s Disaster Involved
Registry (DIR) with identities and medical status of evacuees, etc, etc. All in all, the intent was to closely
simulate the many challenges of coordinating a multinational search and rescue effort in the high Arctic.
The scenario was initiated on Day 1, when the cruise ship failed to report position on time through the
mandatory reporting system GREENPOS to Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) Nuuk,
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Greenland. The situation called for efforts to establish communication with the cruise ship, subsequent
notification of other Rescue Coordination Centers (RCCs) in the high Arctic region, and tasking of all
available aircraft and surface vessels for a search operation in the Greenland Sea. MRCC Nuuk acted as
the SAR Mission Coordinator (SMC), while the Royal Danish Air Force (RDAF) CL-604 Challenger initially
assumed the role of On-Scene Coordinator (OSC), being the first asset in the area. It later handed OSC
duties over to HDMS HVIDBJOERNEN (HVBJ), which was the first ship to arrive. For training purposes, a
number of handovers were conducted of the OSC and Aircraft Coordinator (ACO) roles throughout Days 1
and 2, something that in a real-life operation should of course be limited to a minimum in order to
prevent confusion and loss of situational awareness.
On Day 1 EXCON was forced to withdraw the HDMS KNUD RASMUSSEN (KNUD) with the purpose of predeploying participants to Ella Island for phase 2 of the exercise. The RDAF Challenger, the Icelandic
Coast Guard (ICG) vessel TYR, and HVBJ and HVBJ’s organic helicopter executed a search in the open
sea including an OSC chop from the Challenger to the HVBJ. No actual search targets were deployed, as
this would have been the scripted task of KNUD otherwise engaged. During the search the RDAF
Challenger successfully dropped 4 x US Coast Guard ‘Self Locating Datum Marker Buoys’ (SLDMBs) used
by RCC Boston and MRCC Nuuk to develop the Search Area.
Day 2 was in general nicely conducted in accordance with the script. As an example the search area
assigned by MRCC Nuuk corresponded precisely with the search area developed by RCC Boston.
Day 2 was primarily focused on the search for a missing life raft from the ‘ARCTIC VICTORY’ with 12
persons on board. Furthermore, MRCC Nuuk was a part of a satellite experimentation project of getting
satellite photos from the search area. At the end of Day 2 the “ARCTIC VICTORY” reported their position
and it was confirmed that all 12 passengers from the missing life raft were safe which concluded the
search phase and Event 1.
In the morning on Day 3, “ARCTIC VICTORY” with all 250 crew and passengers suddenly ran aground
near Ella Island in King Oscar’s Fiord. The ship initially reported the situation well in hand, with minor
fires and no widespread panic. However, it soon became apparent that the ship’s crew did not, in fact,
have the situation under control. Subsequently, an explosion in the engine room resulted in multiple
injuries, fire on board and tilting of the ship. Hence, the need arose for an extensive rescue operation to
save the crew of 50 persons and the 200 passengers (simulated by Greenland Police Students and crew
from HDMS VAEDDEREN), who were either still on board or had entered life rafts. Full evacuation was
necessary and, as exercise artificiality, in order to train the land-based rescue teams, including the police,
this involved establishing a land based reception facility on Ella Island, rather than use the space on
board the ships in the area.
Emergency medical support assets were shipped, flown, and parachuted in to conduct triage and to treat
the casualties. An evacuation chain was established to transport evacuees, first by small boats to Ella
Island, then by helicopters and small aircraft from Ella Island to Mestersvig Airstrip, where a Casualty
Staging Unit for triage was established, and then onwards by large aircraft to Iceland, where the nearest
full hospital was located. Unfortunately, this evacuation chain was somewhat delayed on Day 3 by a
number of factors:

EXCON had to freeze the exercise in the morning on Day 3 to ensure that all relevant TA had
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


received and been instructed in operating the new Tetra-Flex VHF radios. TA using the same radios
and frequencies was a Lesson Identified from SAREX Greenland Sea 2012 to be tested in SAREX
Greenland Sea 2013. Unfortunately, it had not been possible to distribute the radios prior to SAREX
Greenland Sea 2013 leaving EXCON no other options than to freeze the exercise in the morning of
Day 3.
EXCON also had to freeze the exercise prior to deployment of the Canadian SAR-TECH Teams from
the Canadian C-130 Hercules in order to ensure that all safety precautions including clear lines of
communication, pre-positioning of safety-boats prior to the parachute drop etc.
Establishing local satellite internet connection in the fiord systems above 72N was also a
recommendation from SAREX Greenland Sea 2012 to be tested during SAREX Greenland Sea 2013.
During Day 1 and 2 the Danish Telegraph Regiment (TGR) was responsible for establishing an
internet link from Mestersvig to Ella Island for testing purposes. Unfortunately, the link system never
became operational due to failure in one of the relay stations. Not having internet connection
hampered using the common C3-log system but also EXCON’s ability to coordinate the exercise play
using Apan as the EXCON steering and management tool.
The Distinguished Visitors Day (DV-Day) was held on Day 3. Due to other tasks in Daneborg the
Sirius Sledge Patrol was not as strongly manned as expected on Ella Island. Subsequently, the DVDay program had to be adjusted. EXCON decided to use KNUD’s SAR vessel to transport VIPs to the
participating TAs to watch the exercise unfold. HDMS HVIDBJOERNENs rubber dinghy was also used
as VIP transportation leaving the OSC without Response Team transportation. The decision of
including the SAR vessel and the rubber dinghy in the DV-Day program led to confusion within the
TA, not having the SAR vessel and the rubber dinghy at disposal; on the other hand the decision
resulted in a successful execution of the DV-Day.
HDMS HVIDBJOERNEN, as the OSC, organized the rescue assistance with available resources such as the
rescue/boarding teams from ICG TYR, HDMS KNUD RASMUSSEN, and HDMS HVIDBJOERNEN but also
the Canadian SAR-TECH Teams dropped from the Canadian C-130 Hercules. When the rescue/boarding
teams had gained control with the widespread panic, when the fire from the engine explosion was
extinguished and the casualties were carefully organized, the OSC, in close coordination with the Police
Command Post (CP) leader on Ella Island, decided to evacuate the 248 crew and passengers, leaving the
captain and the chief engineer on board for interrogation and blood sampling by the Police.
The boarding teams carrying out the damage control, the hands-on rescue and the evacuation effort on
the ”ARCTIC VICTORY” and elsewhere on Day 3 were professional and the cooperation was good
between all the units of different nationalities. However, it was observed that the OSC should have
focused more on the need for assistance on board the ‘ARCTIC VICTORY’ rather than focusing on taking
charge leaving the captain without influence. Another observation was that the boarding teams prioritized
fire and damage control higher than taking care of the casualties (which of course also could have been
the right decision based on how dangerous the situation was), and finally the boarding teams did not
immediately request a passengers’ list making it impossible to check if passengers were missing. It took
the boarding team a while to figure out that a number of passengers had entered some of the life rafts.
It was also observed that a number of unmarked “No-Players” interfered with the Ex-Play like VIPs and
EXCONs making it very hard for the Response Teams to separate “No-Players” from the Training
Audience.
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The most injured casualties were evacuated first and the rest followed in prioritized order. At Ella Island
the Police CP registered the incoming crew and the passengers, and organized the further evacuation to
Mestersvig Airstrip. In general, the evacuation was delayed based on the previous mentioned factors,
but another initial delaying factor was that Air Greenland had to extract the AS-350 helicopter on Day 3
due to a real life or ”No Play” task, which severely reduced the evacuation capacity from Ella Island to
Mestersvig to be only one LYNX helicopter. The VIPs arrived with TWIN OTTERs (TWOs) on Day 3 and a
bright TA member decided to enroll the TWOs in the evacuation chain, which naturally speeded up the
evacuation and made it up for the missing AS-350.
On the morning of Day 4 the EXDIR reset the situation having all the 250 crew and passengers back on
the “ARCTIC VICTORY” and the evacuation was started over once again. Not having the VIP program
running in parallel and having all SAR resources available, including Air Greenland’s AS-350 helicopter,
HDMS KNUD RASMUSSENs SAR vessel and HDMS HVIDBJOERNENs rubber dinghy, the rescue and the
chain of evacuation was improved on Day 4. The exercise play on Day 4 started as Day 3 with ‘ARCTIC
VICTORY’ running aground, engine explosions, widespread panic etc. The conclusion of rescue of Day 4
was that everything was fast and highly professional handled by the TA. During Day 4 the Danish
Emergency Management Agency (DEMA) Search Team searched the ‘ARCTIC VICTORY’ with special
cameras and listening equipment to make sure that all persons on board were located and evacuated.
The effort by the trained personnel coming on board the ”ARCTIC VICTORY” was excellent and their
conduct and cooperation was professional. Good use was made of floor plans of the ship in conducting
the search efficiently and in handing over search responsibilities between the teams.
After the ship had been confirmed empty, and the evacuation had been concluded with the last of the
evacuees arriving in Iceland, Event 2 ended and ENDEX was called.
During Day 3 and Day 4 a counter maritime pollution tabletop exercise (TTX) was conducted in parallel
with the rescue and evacuation operations. The Government of Greenland’s (GoG) Ministry of Housing,
Nature and Environment (MoHNE) was responsible for handling the oil spill from the “ARCTIC VICTORY”.
The GoG only had limited resources to deploy for countering the “ARCITC VICTORY” oil spill, and
consequently the MoHNE immediately requested counter maritime pollution assistance from Denmark.
After a political decision CHOD DEN ordered JACMD to take all necessary steps to plan for countering the
oil spill from the “ARCTIC VICTORY”.
JACMD used the counter maritime pollution Standing Operational Procedures (SOP) and requested
floating boomers at ADMIRALDANFLEET HQ. ADMIRALDANFLEET HQ immediately started to plan for
deploying the boomers and was ready for the deployment using a Danish C-130 Hercules on Day 4. The
feedback received from ADMIRALDANFLEET HQ was that the SOP for counter maritime pollution
assistance to JACMD was executed without any delaying factors or other complications and that no
critical remarks needed to be included in this report.
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4.3. Background for the Scenario
The background for the chosen exercise scenario was threefold. Firstly, the existing resources available
for Arctic SAR are scarce and the sheer enormity of the geographic distances will render any large-scale
SAR operation in or near the AO being extremely challenging for SAREX Greenland Sea 2013. The sea
line from the AO to the nearest major seaports in Iceland is approximately 600 nautical miles across open
sea. The average transit time at 15kts is approximately 40 hours.
Secondly, a steady increase in ship activities, though decreased cruise ship activities have been noted
during the last two years, the tendency of growing activities in the Greenlandic Waters is evident. The
polar sea ice has gradually withdrawn from the northeastern coast of Greenland during summers. As of
yet, the biggest cruise ships with thousands of passengers do not sail in the primary exercise area, but
small and medium-sized cruise ships do. Large ship accidents have occurred elsewhere off the Greenland
coast before, and the risk of a future major accident with potentially extensive loss of human life could be
high. Furthermore, Greenland’s coastline is environmentally vulnerable to maritime pollution. The risk of
pollution accidents increases with the increasing ship traffic, as well as the growth in mineral exploration
and extraction activities in the Arctic region.
Thirdly, the above factors have led to a growing awareness that it is of vital importance to strengthen the
Arctic emergency preparedness in general and SAR preparedness in the waters off Greenland in
particular. The Danish Defense, in cooperation with Greenlandic civil authorities, performs a number of
tasks in and around Greenland including airborne and seaborne surveillance, fisheries inspection,
pollution control and, not least, maritime and aeronautical search and rescue (SAR). These areas are
focus areas for development in the coming years and a Danish Arctic Response Force is in the process of
being established to support Arctic emergency challenges.
Similar development can be witnessed in the other Arctic nations and has resulted in the “Agreement on
Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic” and the Oil Spill Agreement
issued in 2013 and both signed by the eight member nations of the Arctic Council. SAREX Greenland Sea
2013 was conducted within this framework, and the large number of participating units and organizations
of different nationalities testified both to the commitments agreed upon and the potential for further
strengthening of SAR cooperation and coordination in the Arctic.
4.4. Evaluation, Analysis and Reporting Design
As stipulated in the Exercise Plan Part Three (main body), the aim of the evaluation, analysis and
reporting for SAREX Greenland Sea 2013 is to improve upon and enhance cooperation on standard
operating procedures (SOPs) for Arctic SAR operations. To this end, the evaluation, analysis and
reporting design during the exercise and post-exercise included:

Tactical Analysis: Daily observations by O/Ts communicated through the Apan Exercise Steering
WEB-page, e-mail and other means, as well as observations and comments by EXDIR during nightly
update briefs. A battle rhythm to collect all necessary information was established and morning and
evening briefings were conducted throughout the exercise.
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
Hot wash-ups: A hot wash-up lead by EXDIR and COs from TA was held on the 6th of September
2013 in Mestersvig. To supplement this, all Training Audiences were encouraged to conduct hot
wash-ups within own organizations and units. A concept with a suggested content and format was
distributed, in which TA were asked to answer hot wash-up questions individually and/or through
group work and forward the answers to the Chief Analyst prior to Hot Wash-up via email.

First Impressions Report (FIR): Was to be distributed on the 6th of September 2013.

Draft Final Exercise Report (Draft FER). To be distributed to all stakeholders on the 1st of October
2013.

Post Exercise Discussions (PXD). To be conducted on the 22–23 of October 2013 in Nuuk, Greenland.
The PXD will focus on the participants’ suggestions for adjustments and additions to the Draft FER
text.

Final Exercise Report (FER): Will be approved, published and distributed to all stakeholders on 01
November 2013.
5. Achievement of the OSE’s Training Objectives
SAREX Greenland Sea 2013 was the largest multinational search and rescue exercise to be held in the
Arctic region in 2013. The SAREXs are the result of an increased cooperation amongst the Arctic Nations,
sharing concern for the safety in the Arctic region, with increased ship traffic as a consequence of the
global warming and reduced sea and polar ice.
SAREX Greenland Sea 2013 was designed to closely simulate the complexity and challenges of mounting
a search and rescue operation involving the rescue and evacuation of a fairly large number of people in
the remote Arctic. This in order to expose weaknesses in the organization and coordination so that these
might be turned into Lessons Identified (LI), remedied and ultimately resolved as Lessons Learned (LL).
The scope of the exercise was deliberately ambitious, in order to most accurately reflect the scale and
logistical difficulties of a live operation in a remote Arctic region visited by cruise ships very similar in size
and number of people on board to the simulated “ARCTIC VICTORY”.
SAREX Greenland Sea 2013 was meant as a follow-up on SAREX Greenland Sea 2012 and not least the LI
from last year to validate whether or not these LI could be changed to LL.
Apart from the LI and the experience and training value gained by the participating units and authorities,
the exercise again this year tested and validated the JACMD concept of operations (CONOPS), which calls
for two Arctic Patrol Vessels, one on the western coast and one on the eastern, to be permanently
stationed as far north as the pack ice allows during the summer, and an Arctic Patrol Frigate with organic
helicopter patrolling the rest of the coastline. Additionally one Arctic Patrol Frigate with helicopter is
stationed at the Faroe Islands, from where it can be deployed to the Greenland Sea.
Due to long distances, only JACMD assigned ships and ships from either Iceland, Norway (Svalbard) or
Canada, can be expected to reach an accident area in time to mount effective rescue operations.
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The CONOPS allows the organic helicopters on board the Off Shore Patrol Vessels (OPVs) to, if necessary,
be deployed forward to the Arctic OPVs in the far north as soon as the OPVs are in range, and provides
the only SAR helicopter capacity to be able to reach the remote north within 24 hours.
The exercise tested Air as the first response in the search operation, but also the ability to augment
available platforms, to reinforce the search operation and to establish temporary forward bases to
support the rescue and evacuation operations.
5.1. SAREX Greenland Sea 2013 Training Objectives
Briefly summarized Event 1 was the search phase of the exercise spanning the first two days, and Event
2 and 3 was the rescue and evacuation event plus the counter maritime pollution event spanning the final
two days.
The overall impression of the achievement of the Training Objectives is as follows:
1. Effective search and cooperation during the search operations were conducted by the units and the
involved authorities. However, not all the planned activities were played in accordance with the script
e.g. bad weather hampered dropping a life raft from a C-130 and on Day 1 HDMS KNUD RASMUSSEN
was used for transportation instead of participating in the search operation. Nevertheless, the overall
impression is that TO-1 was achieved.
2. The cooperation between the participating units and the rescue from the ‘ARCTIC VICTORY’ was
well-organized and effective. TO-2 was achieved.
3. A slow start on the evacuation process from Ella Island became more efficient later during Day 3 as
the registration team gained experience in organizing the registration, and the severely wounded
were starting to be evacuated. The evacuation from Mestervig to Iceland was well-organized and
effective. In general the overall impression was insufficient information sharing both horizontally and
vertically, especially at the strategic level. As an example there was no information exchange
between the Danish National Operational Staff (NOST), Greenland Emergency Management
Commission and the Icelandic counterpart the Icelandic ‘SST’. It is also unclear how the cooperation
between the respective countries’ health authorities played-out. However, with the evacuation of
casualties to Iceland and the rest of the crew and passengers to Nuuk, Greenland, TO-3 was
successfully achieved.
4. Effective Medical Support and cooperation between nations and all involved units. TO-4 Achieved.
5. Effective use of Air for Medical Evacuation between nations and involved units. TO-5 Achieved.
6. In general, and as during SAREX Greenland Sea 2012, the organizations had a hard time handling the
press and media pressure, especially JACMD during the search phase in Event 1. JACMD suffered
from not having a detailed press policy in place, but also an insufficient organization to deal with a
media storm like the pressure the journalist students put on JACMD HQ. The overall impression is
that JACMD HQ did not meet TO-6 during the search phase, though much better prepared and
organized during the search and the evacuation phase; TO-6 was met in Event 2. The overall
impression was that the Media TO-6 only was partly achieved.
7. Effective planning for counter Maritime Pollution between Arctic authorities and organizations. Event
3 was played as a tabletop exercise (TTX) and the overall impression was that TO-7 was achieved.
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The TO achievement visualized:
No. Training Objective
1
Effective search operations and cooperation between all involved centres
and units
2
Effective rescue operations and cooperation between all involved units
3
Effective evacuation operations and cooperation between nations and all
involved units
4
Effective medical support and cooperation between nations and all
involved units
5
Effective use of air for medical evacuation between nations and involved
units
6
Effective media and press management between nations and all involved
units
7
Effective planning for counter Maritime Pollution between Arctic authorities
and organizations
Event 1
Event 2
Stop-lights: Green (achieved), Yellow (partly achieved) and Red (not achieved).
The OSE’s Training Objectives have in general been met. What remains is to make the LI into LL by
making the necessary adjustments and to see if the desired effects have been achieved.
6. Subject Area Enclosures
The following subsections contain conclusions and recommendations from SAREX 2013 as they pertain to
each of the Training Objectives/Subject Areas. They are aggregated from multiple observations made by
both O/Ts, TAs and EXCON staffs, and confirmed during the Post Exercise Discussion (PXD) in Nuuk 2223 October 2013. The Lessons Identified (LI) are intended to be general in nature and should be of
interest to all involved parties. The LI from both SAREX Greenland Sea 2012 and SAREX Greenland Sea
2013 are included in enclosure 3 in a LI/LL-matrix divided into specific actionable items for COM JACMD
and secondly into LI/LL of general interest which may not be applicable to all nations or organizations.
6.1. Search Operations (Training Objective no. 1)
6.1.1. Means and methods of communication
Conclusion and Recommendation
When initiating a SAR operation it is important that the SMC have all available communication systems to
alert all units in the area of the operation in order to get as many units/vessels as possible to assist, and
to alert the wider SAR organization to the operation being initiated. Investigate if the SAR authorities in
Greenland are setup to utilize all available distress communication systems, and if they have the
necessary distress communication equipment to conduct SAR operations. Follow up on the question in
the Arctic Contact Group to SAR in Greenland.
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6.1.2. Use of the common log system (The C3 SAR Log)
Conclusion and Recommendation
During SAREX Greenland Sea 2013 the common internet log proved extremely effective as both a SAR log
and as a SAR information tool for higher Commands and strategic coordination forums. The common log
has been updated with all SAREX Greenland Sea 2012 recommendations, including an off-line backup if
the internet connectivity is lost. During SAREX Greenland Sea 2013 and in the aftermath at the Post
Exercise Discussions (PXD) it was concluded and recommended that only entities directly involved in the
SAR operation should have writing access to the C3 SAR Log, and that other Commands and coordination
forums carefully should be identified and only have reading access. Terms for access should clearly be
stated in the Standing Operational Procedure (SOP). Finally, it was recommended to develop a common
international log system to be used by all SAR organizations in the Arctic region.
6.1.3. Search for life rafts from ships
Conclusion and Recommendation
Long distances and rough weather are making direct guidance of rescue units extremely important to
save lives in the Arctic. Fixed wing search craft will normally be the first in the operation area and
probably be appointed as OSC directing other SAR assets directly to the target. This scenario was trained
during SAREX 2012 and 2013 and proved highly effective. Having a fixed wing search craft on SAR alert
throughout the Arctic summer season in Greenland’s Search and Rescue Region (SRR) is recommended.
6.1.4. JACMD capability as SMC
Conclusion and recommendation
The manning at JACMD was observed inadequate in case of a short notice emergency like the SAREX
Greenland Sea 2013. It was generally recommended to strengthen JACMD manning on the operational
side like Air and the logistical with no or very little redundancy. Furthermore, it was recommended to
establish a plan for an immediate augmentation of JACMD HQ in case of emergencies and states of
higher alert. Finally, it was concluded to avoid having JACMD as OSE/OCE as MRCC in future SAREXs.
The priority should be having JACMD/MRCC Nuuk as PTA.
6.2. Rescue Operations (Training Objective no. 2)
6.2.1. Communications
Conclusion and recommendation
As recommended during SAREX Greenland Sea 2012, a simple and self sustained satellite internet
transceiver solution, easy put on a mountain top, capable of covering at least 10 Nm, is recommended as
the interim solution until internet SATCOM coverage in the fiord systems and above 72N is available.
Such systems are recommended to be tested and implemented immediately. If an area is covered with
internet the Tetra-Flex system can link-up and Tetra-Flex data be exchanged. Otherwise, it must be
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investigated if it is possible to deploy larger generators or attached fuel tanks for the Tetra-Flex relay
stations which was tested and failed during SAREX 2013.
As an alternative to internet SATCOM and Tetra-Flex the Greenlandic Police used HF making the lines of
communication long and the risk of losing information higher. Another alternative could be the newest
Iridium phones. It is possible to share data “raw text messages” using the newest Iridium pilot data
connection (like the ATW-690 and the ICESAR solution) used on Ella Island and Mestersvig. The system
could be useful for all actors as an alternative until having full internet coverage and Tetra-Flex running.
Conclusion and recommendation
During the PXD in Nuuk it was concluded that the EXPLAN had all the necessary Training Audience
contact and communication information needed for SAREX 2013. It was also concluded that the
participating units in general should have prepared better for the exercise by developing internal
communication plans and contact information as supplement. Units could easily have established their
own overview and distributed it internally as well as externally. However, it was recommended to
investigate if frequencies have to be classified or if it is possible for JACMD to plan an exercise using nonclassified frequencies.
Conclusion and recommendation
The Telegraph Regiment should be invited to participate in future SAREX planning conferences if they are
to support the exercise with equipment.
6.2.2. Criminal investigations
Conclusion and recommendation
During the PXD it was concluded that the OSC – in close cooperation with the Police – should plan for
encountering criminal investigation. Naturally, saving lives have the highest priority, but it is important to
plan for criminal investigation and interrogation in order to follow international standard procedures and
regulations. The decision is recommended included and tested in future exercises.
6.2.3. Rescue Teams
Conclusion and Recommendation
When a cruise ship is in distress and the captain has sent a mayday, the appointed OSC is responsible for
the rescue operation in total, not the cruise ship captain. This was the conclusion from the PXD. The
PXD forum also agreed on that the OSC primary task is to coordinate the rescue and the evacuation in
close cooperation with all units and their rescue teams, and strive to include and coordinate with the
cruise ship captain. The PXD found it very important that the OSC and the cruise ship captain are
coordinating to plan and prepare the rescue and the evacuation as effective as possible.
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6.2.4. Safety
Conclusion and recommendation
During the execution of SAREX13 an observation stated that the safety precautions related to the
parachuting jumps were not given sufficient priority. During the PXD safety was discussed and the
conclusion was that safety at all times is a national responsibility, however, safety related to parachuting
jumps should have been included and clearly stated in both the EXPLAN and in the Exercise script.
It was recommended that national representatives actively should submit national safety regulations to
the Core Planning Team during the Planning Conferences, and acknowledge that national safety is
included in the EXPLAN’s Safety Annex according the national regulations. Furthermore, representatives
should inform the host nation about specific national safety precautions to be included in the planning to
de-conflict and prevent misunderstandings.
6.3. Evacuation Operations (Training Objective no. 3)
6.3.1. Casualty assembly at Ella Island
Conclusion and recommendation
The conclusion from the PXD was that after a chaotic start at Ella Island things got well-organized and
the evacuation was executed according to the Evacuation Plan. As a supplement to the Evacuation Plan
it was recommended to establish a local emergency plan delineating responsibilities between all the
engaged units at Ella Island e.g. to prevent the casualties from getting cold and to plan for special care.
6.4. Medical Support (Training Objective no. 4)
6.4.1. Coordination at higher level
Conclusion and recommendation
Lack of communication and coordination between Denmark-Greenland and Iceland had a negative effect
on Iceland’s preparedness for receiving the casualties coming from Greenland. The nations should
prioritize a formal cooperation agreement on situations like SAREX Greenland Sea 2013 in order to
identify situations, priorities and responsibilities.
It was recommended to work out a bi-lateral cooperation agreement between Denmark-Greenland and
Iceland identifying situations, priorities and responsibilities and to establish a contingency plan with
defined roles and responsibilities and processes for communication between involved authorities and
agencies in each country.
6.5. Use of Air for Medical Evacuation (Training Objective no. 5)
Conclusion and recommendation
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At the PXD it was concluded that the use of Air for Medical Evacuation all in all was well planned and well
executed. The PXD forum agreed that the decision of selecting naval units for minor injured casualties
and air for severe injured casualties were right. The PXD also concluded that if a similar operation should
take place in a more isolated area far from an airstrip, there is a need for more helicopters and Short
Take Off and Landing (STOL) aircraft to enable transportation of casualties to the nearest airstrip, for
further Medical Evacuation by large fixed wing transportation aircraft. It was also concluded and
recommended to consider logistical aspects and the architecture of an Air Task Organization (ATO) for
handling a large number of aircraft as a part of JACMD contingency plans.
6.6. Media and Press Management (Training Objective no. 6)
Conclusion and recommendation:
Day 2, the first day with Media role-play, showed that especially JACMD was not prepared and manned to
handle the Media and the Press and suffered from not having a communication plan for handling the
situation. JACMD Lessons Identified from Day 2 was efficiently in-cooperated on Day 3 and the Media
and Press handling was improved compared to Day 2. It was also noticed that the internet was used
more effectively to inform relatives and the public. Becoming more internally focused and effective, the
extern communication and the coordination between the authorities in Nuuk, like who is responsible for
informing the Media and Press in which areas, were never observed effective. External coordination
between the stakeholders in Nuuk should be taken to future exercises for examine to become a Lessons
Learned.
6.7. Counter Maritime Pollution (Training Objective no. 7)
Conclusion and recommendation:
The PXD concluded that the Tabletop Exercise (TTX) for countering the Maritime Pollution in King Oscars’
Fiord was challenging for all involved parties. JACMD is responsible for countering oil spill incidents
outside the 3 NM borderlines off the coastline. The oil spill incident happened inside the 3 NM
borderlines of the coastline inside the National Park, not covered by the emergency preparedness
organization normally in force between the municipalities in Greenland. The Government of Greenland is
responsible for the National Park but had no immediate response plan ready for an oil spill incident in the
area. When the cruise ship ran aground and the oil spill was confirmed, the Government of Greenland
contacted JACMD asking for assistance. The incident between all the involved parties in Greenland and
counterparts in Denmark and Iceland revealed a number of LI like:
o
o
o
o
Investigate and develop a contingency plan for deploying counter maritime pollution equipment
most effectively to Greenland.
Attach the contingency plan to the JACMD Standing Operational Procedure (SOP); include a
description of the responsibilities; the coordination and the reporting system between the
Government of Greenland and JACMD.
Include how to handle dual-operations in Greenland in the SOP.
Continue working with the Danish Defense Center for Operational Oceanography (DDCOO),
exploiting new surveillance and oil drifting models for Greenland.
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o
o
o
Update bi-lateral and multi-lateral agreements and attach these to the JACMD SOP.
Delineate operational guidelines to become more operationalized in the JACMD SOP.
Develop JACMD environmental section to become a knowhow center of countering maritime
pollution in the Arctic.
6.8. Experimentation (Not a Training Objective)
Conclusion and recommendation
The use of radar data from satellites is a most valuable tool for monitoring the Arctic environment. It
allows large areas to be surveyed for oil spills, ships and icebergs. Correlation with AIS data can confirm
a ships identity as well as checking if the ship has the AIS turned on and is using it correctly. There are a
number of remaining challenges to be met. These include update frequency and coverage as well as
data availability. In addition, the methodology used needs further verification.
It is important that SARIS is kept updated with new and relevant meteorological and oceanographic
information, in order to support search and rescue operations in the Greenlandic and Faroe waters.
It is recommended that the use of radar satellites to monitor the Arctic environment continues to be
tested in new and different scenarios, in order to optimize the use not only of radar satellites but also
other sources of information and data. This could be done by conducting dedicated trials using Danish
units, maybe even as a mini-SAREX exercise in 2014 with only Danish participation.
It is recommended that DCOO continue to work on coordinating and improving the meteorological and
oceanographic support to the Arctic Command.
6.9. Post Exercise Discussion (PXD) in Nuuk
During the PXD Syndicate Leaders back-briefed their syndicate work, concluded and recommended on
observations and added three new LI to the previous listed (6.9.1. – 6.9.3.).
6.9.1. Future exercise planning and execution
In future exercises JACMD should not be Officer Scheduling the Exercise, Officer Conducting the Exercise
or EXCON, when JACMD focus should be on preparing as Primary Training Audience. Ideally, an external
Core Planning Team should plan and execute the Arctic SAR exercise.
6.9.2. Need for Air Space Management and an Air Control Officer
During the exercise the lack of an air space separation between the Canadian C-130, the Navy helicopters
and the Twin Otters delayed the operation and the drop of the Canadian SAR-Techs. The observation
was also submitted in 2012 but the lack of Air Space Management and an Air Control Officer became
crystal clear to all in 2013. During the PXD it was concluded and recommended to include Air Space
Management and an Air Control Officer in the operation and to promulgate the decision in the EXPLAN.
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6.9.3. Do not run the Distinguished Visitors Day in parallel to the SAREX
The Training Audience was frustrated trying to handle the rescue operation on Day 3 in parallel to the
execution of the Distinguished Visitors Day (DV-Day). The recommendation from the PXD was not to run
both the Rescue Phase and the DV-Day in parallel. Add a special day for the DVs, and let them see all
the units and let the units introduce themselves. This will probably satisfy the DVs but also allow the
Training Audience to concentrate on doing their SAR job without interference and frustration. The PXD
recommended having a special day running DV-Day Program and experimentations, not interfering with
the Training Audience and the exercise play.
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Annex A: Distribution
SENIOR ARCTIC OFFICIALS (SAO)
Canada
MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENCE
CANADIAN JOINT OPERATION COMMAND
MARLANTHQ HALIFAX
JRCC TRENTON
Denmark
MINISTRY OF THE STATE
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MINISTRY OF BUSINESS AND GROWTH
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE
MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
ARCTIC EMBASSADOR
NATIONAL POLICE
DANISH EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
DANISH MARITIME AUTHORITY
DANISH TRANSPORT AUTHORITY
CHIEF OF DEFENCE
ARMY OPERATIONAL COMMAND DENMARK
ADMIRALDANFLEET
TACTICAL AIR COMMAND DENMARK
1ST NAVAL SQUADRON
NAVAL WARFARE SCHOOL
DANISH TASK GROUP
AIR TRANSPORT WING SQUADRON 721
AIR TRANSPORT WING SQUADRON 690
EXPEDITIONARY AIR STAFF
CHIEF NAVAL HOME GUARD
NAVAL HOME GUARD DISTRICT WEST
Greenland
GOVERNMENT OF GREENLAND
MINISTRY OF HEALTH AND INFRASTRUCTURE
MINISTRY OF NATURE AND ENVIRONMENT
GREENLAND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT COMMISSION
THE HIGH COMMISSIONER TO GREENLAND
CHIEF CONSTABLE TO THE POLICE, GREENLAND
DANISH MARITIME AUTHORITY, GREENLAND
AIR GREENLAND
NAVIAIR FLIGHT INFORMATION CENTRE SONDRE STROM
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AASIAAT RADIO
Faroe Islands
HIGH COMMISSIONER TO THE FAROE ISLANDS
MINISTRY OF FISHERIES
MRCC TORSHAVN
Finland
MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR
FINNISH TRANSPORT SAFETY AGENCY
NAVY COMMAND FINLAND
MRCC TURKU, FINLAND
Iceland
MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR
ICELANDIC COAST GUARD
JRCC REYKJAVIK
Norway
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE AND THE POLICE
NORWEGIAN NATIONAL JOINT HQ COMNAV
JRCC BODOE
AIRLIFT SVALBARD
ROYAL NORWEGIAN AIR FORCE 333 SQUADRON
ASSOCIATION OF ARCTIC EXPEDITION CRUISE OPERATORS
Russian Federation
MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
MINISTRY OF TRADE
MINISTRY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION FOR CIVIL DEFENSE,
EMERGENCY AND ELIMINATION OF CONSEQUENCES OF NATURAL DISASTERS
RUSSIAN NAVY, NORTH FLEET
Sweden
MINISTRY OF ENTERPRISE, ENERGY AND COMMUNICATIONS
SWEDISH MARITIME ADMINISTRATION
NÄRINGSDEPARTEMENTET
SJÖFARTSVERKET
United States of America
EUROPEAN COMMAND
UNITED STATES COAST GUARD
JRCC BOSTON
UNITED STATES AIR NATIONAL GUARD 109TH AIRLIFT WING, NEW YORK
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INTERNAL (HQ JOINT ARCTIC COMMAND):
COM, COS, J1, J3, J4, J5, J7,
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