Against intrinsicness: A return to the logical
BRETT BRICKER1
Affirmative utilization of intrinsicness arguments against disadvantages has increased in recent years, despite
the lack of theoretical discussion surrounding their utility or legitimacy. There is a need to formally extend
arguments about intrinsicness outside of the time and competitive limits of policy debate rounds. I argue that
the academic disadvantages of intrinsicness arguments outweigh the benefits, even if some affirmative teams
have had success in using them. I will support this claim first by addressing the arguments in favor of
intrinsicness, and then providing a different, yet not revolutionary, model that judges and debaters can use to
evaluate the intrinsic consequences of the affirmative plan.
Despite the effectiveness and widespread utilization of intrinsicness arguments in both high school and
college policy debate, recent discussion of this tool has been limited. The most recent discussion has occurred
on the Georgia Debate Union blog – a discussion started by Will Mosley-Jensen, and continued by debate
theoreticians in the Comments section (Mosley-Jensen). Mosley-Jensen, drawing on previous articles by Solt
and McKinney, argues that the use of affirmative intrinsicness arguments has significant educational benefits
for academic debate. From these three articles I discern, and will address in order, two supposed benefits to
using intrinsicness arguments: first, that they are the “logical” approach to debate (Mosley-Jensen para. 3);
second, that they aid in “the removal of weak disadvantages” (McKinney para. 14).
Those arguing for intrinsicness arguments, and debaters using them, often claim that a disadvantage
should not be considered because, “[t]he rational policymaker would, of course, argue that the affirmative plan
should be done if feasible accompanying measures can also be adopted to prevent unwanted side effects”
(McKinney para. 5). This model of rational policymaking is flawed for three reasons.
First, this conception of a rational policymaker misplaces the role of the judge. The judge, quite clearly, is
not an individual with infinite power over all United States Federal Government action. If you don’t believe me,
look in the back of the room. Instead, the judge is an informed citizen evaluating the benefits and
disadvantages of a governmental proposal. This limited power of the judge makes immediate political or
financial consequences of the plan entirely relevant. For example, a judge with power over all federal policy
might not worry about the plan’s effect on the midterm election, given that this judge could just “logically” avoid
all of the impacts to the disadvantage. However, a citizen-judge should be very concerned about political
consequences of the plan because those would likely be outside of their control. To argue that this is not a
“logical concern” is ludicrous – given that no judge, debater, or citizen will ever have power over every action of
the Federal Government.
Quite the contrary, the concern of finite time, resources and political capital should be of great import to
those advocating political change. Not only are more politically expedient policies more likely to be
implemented, but social movements that attempt to change government policy often entertain significant costs
that make pursuit of other goals, at least in the short-term, less likely (Rosenberg 343). Therefore, the fact that
a “rational policymaker” may be able to avoid negative consequences of the plan, the rest of us – and by this I
mean everyone – have no such luck. We can’t hope to “pass the plan and not cut NASA funding” through a
magical wand; rather, citizens should be actively concerned about the consequences of their advocacies
because the results will not be so easily avoided. This criticism applies to all affirmative intrinsicness
arguments – whether logical or empirical (Mosley-Jensen para. 2). If the political consequences of the plan
cause the GOP to win the midterm, prevent START passage or cause financial reform to pass, these are
consequences that must be accounted for by an engaged and concerned citizen. If the financial cost of the
plan is so great that it would require tradeoffs with other programs, this must be accounted for as well. And, if
the plan were to collapse US-Japan relations, even if some other stop-gaps could serve to save the
relationship, an active citizen must consider whether these solutions would be chosen, not simply whether they
should.
Second, the “rational policymaker” argument assumes that rational policymakers are not concerned about
political consequences of the proposals that they support. Whether for good or bad, it is quite clear that politics
is at the forefront of every successful politicians concern. Whether manifest through the policies politicians
support, or public statements they make, we shouldn’t pretend as if policymakers don’t take their own stock of
political capital into account. This isn’t a new phenomenon; it’s true of American politics since its conception:
This new and turbulent political world required the new nation’s leaders to practice a kind of politics
both resembling and diverging from the politics of today. Given that modern Americans hate politicians
1
MA Candidate at the University of Kansas, NDT Champion
and love their national icons, it is natural for them to assume that the greatest figures of American
history never were and could not have been politicians. For example, they like to think that
Washington never had to do any fund-raising, that Hamilton was not interested in political spin, and
that Jefferson was an idealistic statesman…Hamilton not only was concerned with political spin – he
was a ferocious and prolific writer for the public press, defending his measures and assailing his
foes…Finally, rather than being a retiring philosopher with no gift for politics (as he sometimes
presented himself), Thomas Jefferson was a master politician by the standards of his era. (Bernstein
76)
If as debate theoreticians we are attempting to create the most “logical,” or real world form of debate, then it
follows (under this model) that disregarding political concerns should most certainly be avoided.
Mosley-Jensen attempts to avoid this criticism by backtracking from the strength of his original argument,
stating:
[T]he politics disad is not necessarily dead because of intrinsicness responses; there are political
ramifications of any policy and those political ramifications are usually carried out in the public arena.
The disadvantage would simply have to be re-explained as a reason why the USFG would be forced
to take, or forgo, certain action because of a policy decision… (December 6th Comments para. 10).
But it is unclear how, with the idea of fiat assumed in the intrinsicness test, that any plan would really “force” a
separate action to be forgone. Especially since affirmative intrinsicness arguments aren’t bound by
immediacy, there is not a single politics disadvantage that would be viable under his model. Mosley-Jensen
provides following example of a politics disadvantages that supposedly fits under this model:
[I]f the USFG were to ratify the CTBT that there would be a reaction among various lobbying groups
and political parties opposed to its ratification would mobilize. Whether they would specifically mobilize
against health care or Obama or future arms control measures is obviously up for debate, but that is as
it should be. (December 6th Comments para. 10)
However, passing CTBT is certainly not mutually exclusive with health care or future arms control measures;
therefore, even if passage of future policies becomes more difficult, this concern is irrelevant in the MosleyJensen model. If Mosley-Jensen’s backtrack really is the model of intrinsicness that he supports, then every
other piece of legislation is intrinsically tied to a plan that uses Congress:
The legislative process is laborious and time-consuming, and the time available for Senate floor action
each year is limited. Every day devoted to one bill is a day denied for consideration of other legislation,
and there are not enough days to act on all the bills that Senators and Senate committees wish to see
enacted. (Carr and Bach 8)
Assuming most intrinsicness advocates supporter a stronger model, then it is extremely difficult to think of any
viable politics disadvantage – in fact I cannot think of one. Thus, the single greatest concern of most rational
policymakers (political feasibility) is only discussed when we remove affirmative intrinsicness from our
argumentative vocabulary. For some, this may beg the question of the educational value of the politics
disadvantage – this concern will be addressed below.
Third, the “rational policymaker” argument justifies nearly infinite negative conditionality. Since the “rational
policymaker” argument is premised upon concerns of reciprocity with negative counterplans, intrinsicness (at
its logical extreme) justifies similar negative abuses (Mosley-Jensen para. 4). For example, if affirmative teams
are allowed to intrinsically test each negative disadvantage – possibly each one in multiple ways – then, by
hoisting the affirmative on their own petard, the negative can surely test the plan and each advantage in
multiple ways as well. While the advantages and disadvantages of conditionality are beyond the scope of this
article, unlimited conditionality is most assuredly an unfair and un-educational tool for the negative.
These three reasons provide sufficient evidence to negate the benefits of the “rational policymaker”
argument in support of affirmative intrinsicness arguments. This model misplaces the role of the judge,
misjudges concerns of rational policymakers, and has theoretical implications that may justify an expansion of
a harmful trend in policy debate – unlimited negative conditionality.
The second major argument used by those advocating affirmative intrinsicness arguments is their
effectiveness in “the removal of weak disadvantages” (McKinney para. 14). However, it is not just the removal
of weak disadvantages, it is the removal of nearly all impacts. For example, if the plan resulted in U.S. arms
sales to Taiwan, intrinsicness would remedy that impact. If the plan resulted in the U.S. attacking Iran, an
intrinsicness test would be sufficient to terminate that impact. And, if the funding for the plan traded off with
other major priorities, the intrinsicness test to take funding from other places would remedy this impact as well.
While more than just politics disadvantages are at risk from affirmative intrinsicness arguments, usually the
disadvantages that are discarded are politics disadvantages of some nature. I will defend the politics
disadvantage from two angles: first, its theoretical legitimacy; second, its educational legitimacy.
Politics disadvantages come in all shapes and sizes. Some are based on the process of the plan being
implemented, some are based on the political blame or credit associated with the plan’s implementation, there
are Obama Good, Obama Bad, and even disadvantages based on the political capital of the first lady. As a
general rule, a politics disadvantage is more viable if the plan has extreme political consequences and the
impact of the disadvantage relies on some political calculation to be implemented (or blocked). While this is
long-winded, and obvious to some, I want to make clear that I am not defending every politics disadvantage;
rather, I am defending the importance of discussing political consequences of an affirmative plan. Whether the
plan influences the START debate or NMD is beyond my concern – as long as it is clear that affirmative
intrinsicness discards all politics disadvantages. I will leave it up to the debaters to figure out the likely political
impact of the plan on other political endeavors.
First, from a theoretical perspective, debate should focus on political consequences because if the negative
can win that political concerns are an inherent barrier to the affirmative, then this discussion is core negative
ground. While arguing against inherency of the affirmative is rarely a winning strategy for the negative, its
theoretical underpinnings must not be forgotten (Bates 16). Inherency is valuable not just to prove that the
affirmative has not occurred yet, but also to ensure that there is something existential guaranteeing the plan
will not occur in the status quo. In many instances this existential barrier is politics itself. Therefore, if the
affirmative is able to argue that politics acts as the inherent barrier to the plan, then it is surely within the
negative’s theoretical right to argue that the political barrier preventing the plan’s passage is beneficial (Bates
17). Absent discussion of this inherent barrier affirmative teams will most certainly choose affirmatives that the
only inherent barrier is politics, therefore significantly limiting any negative ground.
Second, discussing the political consequences of affirmative plan ensures a more valuable education than
whatever the value of affirmative intrinsicness is purported to be. Politics disadvantages encourage students
to research the political issues of the day, and stay up to date with the quickly changing global concerns.
While topic committees of both college and high school topics do a thankless job, the politics disadvantage is
the best way to keep the educational value of debate fresh throughout the year, even as parts of the topic
become stale. This is not a reason to prefer a bad politics disadvantage to a good case turn, or more specific
strategy, but it is a strong argument to not discount a whole set of disadvantages entirely. Especially given the
polarized state of Congress under the Obama administration, the political consequences (good or bad) must
be up for discussion.
Finally, I propose a model for affirmatives to answer “weak disadvantages” or disadvantages that are not
sufficiently triggered by the affirmative. Affirmative teams, instead of using the “rational policymaker” argument
as a permutation, should use a similar argument against the uniqueness of the link. If disadvantages really are
weak, or not triggered by the affirmative, then why must the affirmative use a permutation or rely on a faulty
model or intrinsicness to beat the disadvantage? Instead, affirmative teams should argue:
1) Intervening actors will prevent the disadvantage impacts, but not the plan’s impacts.
2) The disadvantage doesn’t have a unique link because the plan is insufficient to alone trigger the link.
Either, other issues will trigger the link, or the threshold of the link is so strong that the plan is too weak to
influence the impact.
These two arguments rely on similar themes that intrinsicness advocates support. They both teach logic,
research and rationality. However, they don’t rely on introduction of a new fiated action (even if called a test)
to defeat the disadvantage.
Affirmative intrinsicness, while an interesting thought experiment, has had its day. The arguments in
support of intrinsicness are weak and better accessed by a discussion of “intervening actors” and “link
uniqueness” than by the current incarnation of affirmative intrinsicness. Surely, this discussion will not end
here. I urge respondents to focus on the inadequacies of the model explained above, instead of rehashing the
benefits of affirmative intrinsicness. This will hopefully allow the discussion to move past the impasse of
intrinsicness good vs. bad, to a model of just what exactly it means to be intrinsic to the plan.
Works Cited
Bates, Benjamin. “Inherency, Strategy and Academic Debate.” Rostrum. 2002. 76(5): 15-18. Print.
Bernstein, Richard. The Founding Fathers Reconsidered. Oxford University Press, 2009. Print.
Carr, Thomas and Stanley Bach. “The Legislative Process on the Senate Floor: An Introduction.” Senate
Resources. 2002. Web. 16 May 2010.
McKinney, T.A. “Rehabilitating Intrinsicness.” Debater’s Research Guide. Wake
Forest University, 1991.
Web. 15 May 2010.
Mosley-Jensen, Will. “Theory of Intrinsicness.” Georgia Debate Union. Georgia Debate, 04 December 2009.
Web. 15 May 2010.
Rosenberg, Gerald. The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1993. Print