Afghanistan File
WNDI PF Afghanistan File ............................................................................................................................. 1
Topic Overview ............................................................................................................................................. 2
Definitions ..................................................................................................................................................... 4
Definitions (1/3) ........................................................................................................................................ 5
Definitions (2/3) ........................................................................................................................................ 6
Definitions (3/3) ........................................................................................................................................ 7
Pro Evidence ................................................................................................................................................. 8
Troops Can’t Solve Stability (1/3) ............................................................................................................. 9
Troops Can’t Solve Stability (2/3) ........................................................................................................... 11
Troops Can’t Solve Stability (3/3) ........................................................................................................... 13
Troops Bad – Instability........................................................................................................................... 14
Troops Bad – Terrorism........................................................................................................................... 16
Troops Bad – Civilian Deaths................................................................................................................... 17
Troops Bad – US Reputation ................................................................................................................... 18
Withdrawal = Reconciliation ................................................................................................................... 19
Reconciliation with Taliban Key .............................................................................................................. 21
Withdraw Good – Psychological Harms .................................................................................................. 23
AT: Key to Solve Terror ........................................................................................................................... 27
Con Evidence ............................................................................................................................................... 28
Stay the Course (1/2) .............................................................................................................................. 29
Stay the Course (2/2) .............................................................................................................................. 31
Troops Key to Afghan Takeover (1/3) ..................................................................................................... 32
Troops Key to Afghan Takeover (2/3) ..................................................................................................... 33
Troops Key to Afghan Takeover (3/3) ..................................................................................................... 35
Afghan Takeover Key .............................................................................................................................. 36
Key to Stability (1/2) ............................................................................................................................... 38
Key to Stability (2/2) ............................................................................................................................... 39
Key to Solve Terror (1/2) ......................................................................................................................... 40
Key to Solve Terror (2/2) ......................................................................................................................... 42
Afghanistan Key War on Terror .............................................................................................................. 43
Leaving Now Increase Violence (1/2)...................................................................................................... 44
Withdrawal = Taliban .............................................................................................................................. 46
AT: Too Poor To Solve Stability ............................................................................................................... 47
Topic Overview
This file will focus on the 2011 WNDI public forum topic regarding Afghanistan. The resolution is
as follows: The United States Federal Government should end the war in Afghanistan .
The pro side of the resolution will argue that continued troop presence is both unnecessary and causes
larger problems. The con side will argue that we need to maintain our current troop presence in
Afghanistan in order to stabilize the country and to win the war there.
This topic has been hotly debated since the beginning of US action in Afghanistan. The war in
Afghanistan started in 2001 and American troops have occupied various parts of the country since the
beginning of the war. While the US may have occupied the nation’s capital, Kabul, since 2001 the war is
still considered active as an insurgency between the ethnically Pashtun Taliban, which are mostly
located in the Kandahar region of Southern Afghanistan, and American, NATO and Northern Alliance
forces (The Northern Alliance is a collection of smaller ethnic groups (mostly from Northern Afghanistan)
that have supported the American war since its beginning).
There are a couple of main impacts that will be debated on this topic. The most apparent are
impacts like stability of Afghanistan, death of US soldiers, and the cost on the US of maintaining this long
and protracted war. The stability of Afghanistan hinges on whether or not the Afghan security forces
can be trained and the job of maintaining the security of Afghan civilians. There is also the issue of
corruption that plagues the stability of the country, particularly; the Karzai government is accused of
supporting the Taliban. US soldiers will obviously continue to die if they are left in the country,
particularly if there is not much progress made on curbing the corruption that allows the Taliban to
continue the insurgency. There are also huge financial costs associated with a protracted war in a
foreign country.
Pro Arguments
The pro side of this debate will be arguing that the US should end the war in Afghanistan. There
are three major reasons that you should argue that we should end the war. The first major reason is
fairly obvious, that US soldiers die in Afghanistan because we are incapable of dealing effectively with an
insurgency. There are many reasons why US troops are ineffective in dealing with the insurgency. The
strongest of these arguments that is in this file is the fact that Afghanistan is a poor country which
inevitably leads to more instability, but also that there is immense corruption in the Karzai government.
This means that regardless of the troop presence in Afghanistan the impacts that the Con will forward
are inevitable. The other, more offensive argument is the impact that troops have on the country more
generally. US military activity has killed more civilians than actual combatants; the civilian death toll
since 2006 is around 10,000 with the numbers increasing each year since 2006. As the war drags on,
those death tolls with surely rise based on increasing reliance on inaccurate drone strikes. The removal
of US forces will stop these unnecessary deaths. The best way to leverage this impact is to combine it
with the evidence that says that instability is inevitable with troops in the country because the main
point the Con is going to attack is that troops cause stability. Your evidence on this question is pretty
good it discusses how the reason al-Qaeda and the Taliban are able to keep recruitment up is because of
the US troop presence which means the Con is trapped in a cycle of insurgency which they can’t get out
of. Your solution on how to solve stability in the country should be focused on reconciliation with the
Taliban, any strategy for effective government in Afghanistan is going to have to rely on some level of
Taliban support. The most important thing you can articulate to your judge regarding the need for
Taliban input is to make sure that they understand that the Taliban and al-Qaeda are not the same
thing.
Con Arguments
The con side of this debate will be arguing that the US should maintain its troop presence and
military missions in Afghanistan. This includes things like drone strikes as well as traditional ground
forces. The main points of attack for the Con should be regarding the necessity of troops to maintain
stability in the country. There are a number of reasons that US troops are needed in Afghanistan at this
point. The first reason is that the Afghan security forces are not enough to maintain stability in the
country, there are an insufficient number of them trained currently and the US military presence is who
is currently training these self-defense forces. Secondly, these troops are critical to the nation building
that will create long term stability. If we don’t have security forces insuring that schools that are built
are not blown up by insurgents, then education falls by the way side giving way to madrasas that breed
terrorism and further insurgents. The Afghan security forces are necessary to maintain long term
stability because the American presence, even if there for a much longer time, will still need to
eventually be withdrawn and the only way to allow the Afghani government to maintain legitimacy is to
have its own security force capable of dealing with the insurgency.
Definitions
Definitions (1/3)
‘the’ means all parts
Merriam-Webster's Online Collegiate Dictionary, no date, http://www.m-w.com/cgibin/dictionary
4 -- used as a function word before a noun or a substantivized adjective to indicate reference to a group
as a whole <the elite>
The United States is the 50 states or the federal government
Random House Unabridged, 2006
“United States,” Dictionary.com, accessed 07/19/08
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/United%20States
a republic in the N Western Hemisphere comprising 48 conterminous states, the District of Columbia,
and Alaska in North America, and Hawaii in the N Pacific. 267,954,767; conterminous United States,
3,022,387 sq. mi. (7,827,982 sq. km); with Alaska and Hawaii, 3,615,122 sq. mi. (9,363,166 sq. km).
Capital: Washington, D.C. Abbreviation: U.S., US
The United States is a federation of states
"United States." Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary. 2008. Merriam-Webster Online. 19 July
2008 http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/United States
a federation of states especially when forming a nation in a usually specified territory
Federal means government where power is shared with states
Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary. 1993, p. 426
federal: 2b. A form of government in which power is distributed between a central authority and a
number of constituent territorial units.
Federal Government Is Administered By A Union Or Confederation Of States
Black, Henry Campbell. Black’s Law Dictionary. 1979, p. 550
Federal Government: The system of government administered in a nation formed by the union or
confederation of several independent states.
‘Government’ means a ‘nation’-state
Webster's Revised Unabridged Dictionary, © 1996, 1998,
http://www.dictionary.com/search?q=government, accessed September 8, 2002.
4. The person or persons authorized to administer the laws; the ruling power; the administration. When
we, in England, speak of the government, we generally understand the ministers of the crown for the
time being. --Mozley & W. 5. The body politic governed by one authority; a state; as, the governments
of Europe.
Should means ought to
Dictionary.com 2006
“Should,” Dictionary.com, accessed 07/19/08
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/SHOULD
must; ought (used to indicate duty, propriety, or expediency)
Definitions (2/3)
Should means an obligation
Miriam Webster, 2011
“Should”, Miriam Webster.com, accessed 6/27/11
used in auxiliary function to express obligation, propriety, or expediency
End means to cease an activity or action
Miriam Webster, 2011
“End”, Miriam Webster.com, accessed 6/27/11
cessation of a course of action, pursuit, or activity
End means the point after which something no longer exists
Cambridge Dictionary, 2011
“End”, Cambridge English Dictionary Online, Accessed 7-6-2011
the point in space or time after which something no longer exists
End means the final part of an activity
OED 2011
“End,” Oxford English Dictionary, accessed 7/11/2011
a final part of something, especially a period of time , an activity, or a story
War is concentrated effort to end something bad
Princeton Word Net, 2011
“War,” Princeton Word Net, accessed 7/11/2011
a concerted campaign to end something that is injurious
War is a conflict between nations or between parties within a nation
Dictionary.com 2011
“War,” Dictionary.com, accessed 06/27/11
a conflict carried on by force of arms, as between nations or between parties within a nation; warfare,
as by land, sea, or air.
War is fighting between two political communities
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 7/28/2005
“War,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, accessed 6/29/11
War is a phenomenon which occurs only between political communities, defined as those entities which
either are states or intend to become states (in order to allow for civil war).
Afghanistan means the Republic of Afghanistan whose capital is Kabul
Dictionary.com 2011
“Afghanistan” Dictionary.com, accessed 7-7-2011
a republic in central Asia, NW of India and E of Iran. 23,738,085; 250,000 sq. mi. (647,500 sq. km).
Capital: Kabul.
Definitions (3/3)
Afghanistan is bordered by Pakistan Iran and Russia
Princeton Word Net, 2011
“Afghanistan,” Princeton Word Net, accessed 7/11/2011
a mountainous landlocked country in central Asia; bordered by Iran to the west and Russia to the north
and Pakistan to the east and south
Pro Evidence
Troops Can’t Solve Stability (1/3)
Poverty is the biggest roadblock to stability, no amount of military force is going to
save it
Chris Herlinger, Writer for the Catholic News Service. 1/17/2008. Catholic News Service,
“Afghanistan’s Kabul Shows Economic Divide in War-Torn Country.”
http://www.catholicnews.com/data/stories/cns/0800319.htm
A recent report by the U.N. Development Program noted gains in education and health care in
Afghanistan, as well as some economic progress in the country, where the Islamic-fundamentalist
Taliban ruled from 1996 until U.S.-led forces ousted it in 2001. But the report also warned that "the
needs of many remain unfulfilled" and noted that Afghanistan's measures of humanitarian benchmarks
like health, life expectancy and education remained the lowest among its neighbors. That placed
Afghanistan 174th out of 178 countries, with only four countries -- all in sub-Saharan Africa -- with lower
marks. Paul Hicks, Afghanistan country representative for the U.S. bishops' Catholic Relief Services,
called poverty "the single biggest threat" Afghanistan is facing. And the harsh winter season takes its
worst toll on the poor at a time of year when there is little agricultural activity, "the backbone of
livelihoods for most people," he told Catholic News Service in late December. "There is destitute
poverty in Kabul, hidden behind tall walls or behind the veil of a begging widow whose children live
mainly on tea and bread," Hicks said from Herat, in western Afghanistan. "Economic development in
Afghanistan will only be superficial if there is not a new focus and commitment on relieving the suffering
of the extreme poor." Hicks told CNS the solution to the country's problems is "not a quick fix."
Weakness of government and poverty are the larger problems with Afghanistan, a
troop presence is useless
Ali Ahmad Jalali, Former Interior Minister of Afghanistan and Currently Distinguished Professor at the
Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies at National Defense University. 1/10/2008. Afghan.cc,
“Afghanistan: Regaining Momentum.” http://afghan.cc/blogs/afghan/archive/2008/01/11/2467.aspx
The drivers of instability include insurgency, chronic weakness of the Afghan government and state
institutions, exploding drug production, and a weak economy. Uncoordinated military operations by
international forces and shifting political dynamics in the region are additional contributing factors.
These challenges have serious implications for stabilization efforts and state-building in Afghanistan.
Frustrated by increasing insecurity and the ineffectiveness of security forces, the government tends to
make tactical deals with corrupt nonstate power brokers and special-interest groups, parties who
benefit from instability. These relationships evolve into another source for popular disenchantment. The
problem will only intensify as the nation gets closer to presidential elections in 2009. Political deals,
posturing, and compromises linked to the election could upset a number of long-term strategic
priorities. Within the government, an ongoing destructive blame-game, with its attendant accusations
and rhetoric populism, job insecurity, and mutual fear, continues to impair morale and effectiveness.
This situation breeds suspicion within the ruling elite and generates mistrust between the executive and
legislative branches. The lack of trust has also tainted relations between the Afghan government and its
foreign partners. The perception of impending failure drives domestic interest groups and neighboring
nations to hedge their bets. Traditionally, nonstate power networks thrive as the central government
loses effectiveness. There are often signs of revival and rearming of subnational networks by former
militia commanders and local power holders.1 Moreover, latent and potential spoilers (nonstate power
brokers and government officials) try to reach out to insurgent elements and their foreign supporters in
an effort to negotiate individual deals. Despite a significant growth of the economy and sociopolitical
developments, increased insecurity and poor governance have blunted the public’s enthusiasm, even in
relatively stable areas. As a result, people are losing confidence in the government and hope for a
peaceful future.
Troops Can’t Solve Stability (2/3)
Military will fail to stabilize the country, their actually making it worse
Elaine Sciolinom NYT, 10/3/2008, “U.S. strategy in Afghanistan will fail, leaked cable says”,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/03/world/asia/03iht-afghan.4.16680324.html
A coded French diplomatic cable leaked to a French newspaper quotes the British ambassador in
Afghanistan as predicting that the NATO-led military campaign against the Taliban will fail. Not only
that, but the best solution for the country will be the installation of an "acceptable dictator," the
British envoy reportedly added. "The current situation is bad, the security situation is getting worse, so
is corruption, and the government has lost all trust," Sherard Cowper-Coles, the British envoy is quoted
by Jean-François Fitou, the deputy French ambassador to Kabul and the author of the cable, as saying.
The two-page cable - which was sent to the Élysée Palace and the French Foreign Ministry on Sept. 2,
and was leaked to the investigative and satirical weekly Le Canard Enchaîné, which printed excerpts in
its Wednesday edition - said that the NATO-led military presence was making it harder to stabilize the
country. "The presence of the coalition, in particular its military presence, is part of the problem, not
part of its solution," Cowper-Coles was quoted as saying. "Foreign forces are the lifeline of a regime
that would rapidly collapse without them. As such, they slow down and complicate a possible
emergence from the crisis."
Corruption at the local government level means that even if security is established
initially, the Taliban can simply take it over again when US troops leave
Alissa Rubin, The New York Times, 5-12-2010, “Afghans’ Distrust Threatens U.S. War Strategy”,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/13/world/asia/13afghan.html
Nearly a year into a new war strategy for Afghanistan, the hardest fighting is still ahead, but already it is
clear that the biggest challenge lies not on the battlefield but in the governing of Afghanistan itself.
Afghan elders met Tuesday at a Marine base near Marja in Helmand Province, part of an American plan
to build mutual trust. That has been the early lesson of the American-led offensive in February in Marja,
in Helmand Province, where most Taliban insurgents either were beaten back or drifted away. Since
then, Americans and Afghans have struggled to establish a local government that can win the loyalty
of the Afghan people, something that is essential to keeping the Taliban at bay. The success of the far
larger offensive in the coming weeks in Kandahar, the Taliban heartland, may well depend on whether
Afghans can overcome their corrosive distrust of President Hamid Karzai’s government. Mr. Karzai was
confronted with that issue when he met with American officials this week, including President Obama
on Wednesday. The two leaders seek to repair months of badly strained relations and come together at
a crucial moment, both for the NATO countries involved in the fighting and for Afghanistan itself. Mr.
Obama plans to begin withdrawing American forces a little more than a year from now. If the timetable
is not daunting enough, an April report by the Pentagon to Congress found that by most measures, the
country is, at best, only a little better off now than it was a year ago. Progress so far appears well off
pace to meet the American goals. The insurgency has spread to some new places, notably the north
and northwest of the country, although it has diminished in a few areas. It is now made up of more
than half a dozen groups with different agendas, making it that much harder to defeat, or negotiate
with, even if the Americans and Afghans could agree on a strategy for doing so. In 120 districts that the
Pentagon views as critical to Afghanistan’s future stability, only a quarter of residents view the
government positively. And the government has full control in fewer than a half dozen of these districts.
Despite the commitment of more troops by Mr. Obama and a new strategy that has emphasized the
protection of Afghan civilians, few in Afghanistan believe that a functional government that holds the
country together can be created on the timetable outlined. “It was very unrealistic to think that in 18
months they would be able, with the Afghan government, to secure a very large part of the country
which is insecure today,” said Nader Nadery, a commissioner on the Afghan Independent Human Rights
Commission, who travels extensively around the country. “Look at only Marja. It took such a long time
just to secure that area.” The timeline also leaves many Afghans reluctant to back the Americans and
the Afghan government, because they fear that the members of the NATO coalition may be leaving
soon, Mr. Nadery said. The point was echoed by European diplomats. “I did not anticipate the increasing
sense of uncertainty among Afghans that Americans and Europeans will pack their bags and leave the
country in the coming weeks and months,” said Vygaudas Usackas, who recently arrived in the country
to serve as the European Union’s special representative to Afghanistan. “We all understand we can’t
succeed by 2011,” Mr. Usackas said. Even as American troops clear areas of militants, they find either
no government to fill the vacuum, as in Marja, or entrenched power brokers, like President Karzai’s
brother in Kandahar, who monopolize NATO contracts and other development projects and are
resented by large portions of the population. In still other places, government officials rarely show up
at work and do little to help local people, and in most places the Afghan police are incapable of
providing security. Corruption, big and small, remains an overwhelming complaint.
Troops Can’t Solve Stability (3/3)
Violence is still going on despite increased troop presence
DEB RIECHMANN, Associated Press, 7-10-2011, “US general: Afghan fight continues outside cities”,
http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5hgAZZfE6df7PRBtoGT3FdDnwwsug?docId=5e8
e6c377c1e45c6bcf6781855c8be43
Insurgent attacks are down in some heavily populated areas of Afghanistan where U.S.-led coalition
troops have been concentrated, but violence continues in rural areas, an outgoing American
commander said Monday. U.S. Army Lt. Gen. David Rodriguez, who directed day-to-day operations in
the war, spoke briefly to reporters just before he officially ended his job as commander of the U.S.-led
coalition's Joint Command and deputy commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan. "The violence has gone
down where we've focused our efforts," he said standing on the tarmac at a Kabul military airport just
before he boarded a plane bound for Europe. "You have to watch it very carefully because the violence
is now outside instead of inside the populated areas. It takes a lot work to really understand the
nuances of what's happening." Over the weekend, Gen. David Petraeus, the outgoing commander of
U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan, said insurgent attacks in May and June were down slightly from
the same months last year. Petraeus, who is retiring from the military to become the next CIA director,
said it appeared the downward trend would continue through July. The Taliban issued a statement
Monday rejecting this claim. "This is a baseless statement and there is no reality in it," the insurgent
group said in an e-mail responding to Petraeus' comments. The group said they have not decreased
attacks and called Petraeus' comments "propaganda." Rodriguez maintained that fighting was down.
"The violence has been down for a little while and it's not in the densely packed areas, but outside
more often than not," Rodriguez said.
Big footprint fails, causes recruitment surges and institutional fatigue
Steve Clemons, Washington editor at large for The Atlantic and editor in chief of Atlantic LIVE, 6-282011, “US Forces in Afghanistan: Too Big to Succeed”,
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2011/06/us-forces-in-afghanistan-too-big-tosucceed/241146/
COIN was a nifty formula that led to occupation of a country and redirection of the habits and security
situation of villages and neighborhoods. Only problem is that occupation has its downsides. As US
forces surged into corners of Afghanistan, so too did Taliban recruitment surge. America's big
footprint in Afghanistan has contributed to an impression that the military is overstretched, suffering
from institutional fatigue. Even General David Petraeus has said that his troop recommendations to
the President were not based on an assessment of America's overall strategic needs and position -but were focused exclusively on the needs of the Afghanistan/Pakistan environment. In other words,
America's most famous and arguably successful general, a celebrity now in his own right, has been
advocating that his venture be the Moby Dick of concern in America's national security portfolio -rather than a more balanced venture weighed against other problems with which the US is strapped.
Troops Bad – Instability
Troops are often the target of hostility, they are like a lightning rod
Terrell E. Arnold, retired Senior Foreign Service Officer of the US Department of State whose overseas
service included tours in Egypt, India, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, and Brazil. Chairman of the Department
of International Studies of the National War College and Deputy Director of the State Office of Counter
Terrorism and Emergency Planning. 1-19-2010, “Afghanistan - Winning Will Not Matter”,
http://www.rense.com/general89/afgg.htm
The true needs of this conflict, its actual service of US interests, and the real results of the attacks are all
obscure subjects. US official announcements report military successes. These are basically in the class of
"We threw a bomb and it went off." Pakistani and Afghani reports uniformly detail killings of innocent
bystanders as well as outright wipeouts of targeted families. These are in part truth and in part
counter-propaganda. Official reports are used in Washington to justify the $100 billion plus per year this
war is costing. Reports on the ground serve to build America's burgeoning supply of enemies. One
sensibly can ask where all of this is headed. The alleged American goal is the pacification of
Afghanistan and the elimination of regional support for terrorism. However, it appears demonstrable
that daily the cadres of Afghani people who roundly hate the United States expand and diversify. At
the same time the pools of injured families, tribal communities and ethnic groups grow with each drone
attack. The gross effect is to turn a war for hearts and minds into a wholesale transfer of respect and
sympathy to the other side. This means that the United States is not merely losing this war; it is
planting the seeds for enduring hostility. After eight years of little more than jungle warfare, it is
obvious that a military attack on militants in this region kills some alleged enemies while generating
some more real ones. The hardest question to answer is: Why? The answer is a moving target. It is now
clear that even before the 9/11 attacks the Bush administration had a plan make war in the region,
starting with the invasion of Iraq, but 9/11 became the excuse. After the attacks of 9/11, the US invaded
Afghanistan before US officialdom had a clear picture of who had carried out those attacks. They were
blamed on al Qaida even though the evidence (as distinct from the charge) for that assertion was
information eventually obtained by torture. The allegedly self-admitted mastermind of the 9/11 attacks,
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, only provided that detail after being repeatedly tortured and brutishly
confined.
Troop presence in Afghanistan only increases terrorism and Taliban resurgence
Rebecca Griffin, Political Director of Peace Action West, 12-2-2009, “President Obama’s escalation in
Afghanistan: unrealistic and costly”, http://blog.peaceactionwest.org/2009/12/02/president-obamasescalation-in-afghanistan-unrealistic-and-costly/
History has proven that military force is highly ineffective when it comes to dealing with terrorist
groups. The RAND Corporation reviewed all terrorist groups that ended in the last 40 years, and
determined that only 7% were defeated by military force. Policing and intelligence and political
reconciliation were far more useful, and they extrapolate from this information that the US should have
a light military footprint in Afghanistan if any. Escalation will backfire. Not only is sending additional
troops unlikely to improve the situation on the ground, it could easily exacerbate the situation.
Afghanistan expert Gilles Dorronsoro noted that the presence of foreign troops is the top factor in the
resurgence of the Taliban, and recommended that “the best way to weaken, and perhaps divide, the
armed opposition is to reduce military confrontations.” Rather than reducing the moment of the
Taliban, the stated goal of President Obama’s policy, escalation will light a fire under a growing
insurgency. President Obama is correct in noting that the Taliban is not popular with the Afghan
people, but the United States’ popularity is on the wane. In a poll in early 2009, just 18% of Afghans
said the number of foreign forces should be increased. US intelligence reports this year noted that only
about 10% of the insurgency is ideologically motivated Taliban; the majority are people fighting to repel
foreign invaders or for economic gain. The US is adding fuel to the fire by aggressively pursuing
insurgents who have no international agenda with an escalation of troops.
Troops Bad – Terrorism
Troop presence angers citizens and forces support of terrorist groups because of
misguided American attacks
Jacob G. Hornberger, founder and president of The Future of Freedom Foundation, B.A. in economics
from Virginia Military Institute and JD from University of Texas 2-9-2009 “Immediately Withdraw from
Afghanistan Too” http://www.fff.org/blog/jghblog2009-02-09.asp
Third, by exiting the country, the U.S. military will no longer be dropping bombs on Afghan wedding
parties and others, which would immediately reduce the incentive for new recruits to join the
terrorists. The reason that the ranks of the terrorists are larger than they were seven years ago is
because the U.S. military has killed lots of people who had nothing to do with the terrorists, especially
all those people in the wedding parties that have been bombed. That sort of thing tends to make
people angry and vengeful. While it’s true that the terrorists could still come to the United States and
conduct terrorist attacks after a U.S. withdrawal, at least the ranks of the terrorists will no longer be
continuously swelled by the bombing of Afghan wedding parties and others unconnected to the
terrorists.
Interventionist foreign policy is what fuels terrorism, they join up because we are in
Afghanistan
Malou Innocent, foreign policy analyst at Cato, 6-10-2010 “Afghanistan Turning from Sandbox to
Quicksand for U.S.,” http://www.cato.org/pressroom.php?display=ncomments&id=344)
Today, top U.S. and NATO commander, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, said the campaign to secure Kandahar,
a key Taliban stronghold, will require more time than originally planned. The most astonishing part of
Gen. McChrystal's admission was that it took him so long to reach it. There is good reason to be
skeptical that the U.S.-led coalition can reduce violence, eradicate corruption, and build a capable
Afghan government that can take over the fight before U.S. troops draw down next summer. While
Western leaders tend to blame the Afghan people for the mission's present failings, many of these
problems reflect more the inherent complications of nation-building than an issue of the Afghans
themselves. For sure, that country's amalgam of disparate tribal and ethnic groups, many of whom
have historic grievances against the others, hampers stabilization and reconstruction efforts.
Unfortunately, however, people in Washington are too afraid to admit that we don't have all the
answers. But if, as some people say, rebuilding Afghanistan is necessary for U.S. security, the only logical
conclusion is that sometimes the necessary is the impossible. It is time to scale back U.S. troop
presence in Afghanistan before more damage is done—particularly with radical Muslims worldwide
who are driven toward terrorist acts every day by interventionist U.S. foreign policies.
Troops Bad – Civilian Deaths
Military force is bad, it causes civilian deaths
BBC Monitoring South Asia – Political, 07/07/2007, “Paper slams NATO for civilian casualties in
Afghanistan,” Nexis
Is NATO the strongest military organization in the world? Around 350 civilians have been killed in
military operations carried out by NATO as part of the coalition forces [in Afghanistan] over the past
three months. The figure indicates that three civilians are killed every day [on average] in a specific area,
in the south of the country. One should concentrate on few issues in order to evaluate and analyse this
situation. The first one is that NATO and coalition forces describe themselves as the best military
organization in the world in terms of their equipment, possibilities, military theories and activities which
meet specific military standards. What is the philosophy behind their presence in Afghanistan? To
protect peace and fight terrorism?! This comes at a time when a large number of people have been
killed by these forces so far. Earlier, a large number of civilians were killed in Urozgan Province, which
aroused the anger of [Afghan President Hamed] Karzai. However, it was not all. The NATO forces said
that Karzai was right and consoled him, and once again civilians were killed in Helmand Province.
Perhaps, one can say that the problem is with Afghan intelligence services which cannot precisely
identify and report about significant and dangerous hideouts of terrorists and the Taleban, and about
places where they lay ambushes. The NATO forces carry out heir military operations on the basis of
reports supplied to them by the Afghan security and intelligence forces. In this case, who is responsible
for this or is it enough to identify the guilty? Nevertheless, they have not found an effective and
workable method or strategy in this field and are continuing their careless operations.
Troops cause civilian deaths, removing them would stop most of them
Matthew Hoh, Senior Fellow at the Center for International Policy and the Director of the Afghanistan
Study Group, 7/27/2011, “Matthew Hoh: Time to bring the troops home from Afghanistan”,
http://augustafreepress.com/2011/06/27/matthew-hoh-time-to-bring-the-troops-home-fromafghanistan/
Nationwide, a U.S.-led campaign of night raids on homes has terrorized families, while a massive nationbuilding program funded by U.S. taxpayers has enriched a corrupt few and disenfranchised a poor
majority. Again, betraying our own values, we looked the other way when elections were stolen for the
second time in as many years. The number of civilian deaths are on pace to surpass the totals from
2010, the deadliest year of the war for civilians since 2001. The result: Eight in ten Afghan men now say
the U.S. presence is bad for Afghanistan.
Troops Bad – US Reputation
The US doesn’t have the means to create a stable Afghanistan, this means troops will
only hurt the US international reputation
Malou Innocent, foreign policy analyst at the Cato Institute, “No More Troops for Afghanistan,”
8/16/2011, http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=10550
But while military leaders like Gen. Stanley McChrystal say a new strategy must be forged to "earn the
support of the [Afghan] people," Washington does not even have the support of the American people.
The U.S. does not have the patience, cultural knowledge or legitimacy to transform what is a deeply
divided, poverty-stricken, tribal-based society into a self-sufficient, non-corrupt, and stable electoral
democracy. And even if Americans did commit several hundred thousand troops and pursued decades
of armed nation-building--in the middle of an economic downturn, no less--success would hardly be
guaranteed, especially in a country notoriously suspicious of outsiders and largely devoid of central
authority. The U.S. and its allies must instead narrow their objectives. A long-term, large-scale presence
is not necessary to disrupt al Qaeda, and going after the group does not require Washington to pacify
the entire country. Denying a sanctuary to terrorists that seek to attack the U.S. can be done through
aerial surveillance, retaining covert operatives for discrete operations against specific targets, and
ongoing intelligence-sharing with countries in the region. Overall, remaining in Afghanistan is more likely
to tarnish America's reputation and undermine U.S. security than would withdrawal.
Withdrawal = Reconciliation
Reducing presence makes it sustainable and facilitates a settlement with the Taliban
Rory Stewart, Ryan Family Professor of the Practice of Human Rights and Director of the Carr Center
for Human Rights Policy, 1-14-2010, “Afghanistan: what could work,”
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2010/jan/14/afghanistan-what-could-work/?page=4
This may be fatal for Obama’s ambition to “open the door” to the Taliban. The lighter, more political,
and less but still robust militarized presence that his argument implies could facilitate a deal with the
Taliban, if it appeared semi-permanent. As the President asserted, the Taliban are not that strong. They
have nothing like the strength or appeal that they had in 1995. They cannot take the capital, let alone
recapture the country. There is strong opposition to their presence, particularly in the center and the
north of the country. Their only hope is to negotiate. But the Taliban need to acknowledge this. And the
only way they will is if they believe that we are not going to allow the Kabul government to collapse.
Afghanistan has been above all a project not of force but of patience. It would take decades before
Afghanistan achieved the political cohesion, stability, wealth, government structures, or even basic
education levels of Pakistan. A political settlement requires a reasonably strong permanent government.
The best argument against the surge, therefore, was never that a US operation without an adequate
Afghan government partner would be unable to defeat the Taliban—though it won’t. Nor that the
attempt to strengthen the US campaign will intensify resistance, though it may. Nor because such a
deployment of over 100,000 troops at a cost of perhaps $100 billion a year would be completely
disproportional to the US’s limited strategic interests and moral obligation in Afghanistan—though that
too is true. Instead, Obama should not have requested more troops because doing so intensifies
opposition to the war in the US and Europe and accelerates the pace of withdrawal demanded by
political pressures at home. To keep domestic consent for a long engagement we need to limit troop
numbers and in particular limit our casualties. The surge is a Mephistophelian bargain, in which the
President has gained force but lost time. What can now be done to salvage the administration’s
position? Obama has acquired leverage over the generals and some support from the public by making
it clear that he will not increase troop strength further. He has gained leverage over Karzai by showing
that he has options other than investing in Afghanistan. Now he needs to regain leverage over the
Taliban by showing them that he is not about to abandon Afghanistan and that their best option is to
negotiate.
Phased withdrawal provides incentives for a negotiated settlement
Pascal Zachary, member of the In These Times Board of Editors, author, teacher of journalism at
Stanford University and fellow at the German Marshall Fund, “Op-Ed: The Case for Withdrawal from
Afghanistan War”, Veterans for Common Sense, 10-15-2009,
http://www.veteransforcommonsense.org/index.ph p/national-security/1428-g-pascal-zachary)
The election fiasco pushed Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.), an influential Democrat, to predict
Afghanistan "will remain [a] tribal entity." Such a place would require a strong U.S. military presence to
hold together and (perhaps) the emergence of a homegrown dictator ruling the country with a "strong
hand." Yet the very presence of American troops inflames ethnic differences. Afghans view Americans as
invaders and occupiers, and their very presence galvanizes opponents, creating more resistance. As
Afghan army spokesman Zahir Azimi has said, "Where [American] forces are fighting, people think it is
incumbent on them to resist the occupiers and infidels." The self-perpetuating nature of the conflict
explains the profound pessimism expressed by some with deep experience in the region. British Gen.
David Richards, who served in Afghanistan, said in August that stabilizing the country could take 40
years. While such predictions are dismissed as hysterical, they are simply the logical extension of Levin's
insistence that the United States "increase and accelerate our efforts to support the Afghan security
forces in their efforts to become self-sufficient in delivering security to their nation." These efforts at
self-reliance inevitably involve a significant American presence on the ground, which in turn fuels the
very cycle that Levin insists he wants to avoid: a costly quagmire. The alternative to a McChrystal
escalation or a Levin quagmire requires no leap into the unknown but rather recognition of limits of
American power and the legacy of Afghan history. The script for withdrawal is essentially already
written--in Iraq, of all places. For the sake of temporary peace, Iraq has essentially been partitioned into
three "sub-countries," two of which are essentially ethnic enclaves. The same could be done in
Afghanistan--though the number of sub-divisions could be larger, and acceptance of Taliban rule over
some of them would be required. In this scenario, a phased pullout of U.S. forces could accompany the
negotiated "government of national unity," which--like in Iraq--would preserve the "notional" nation of
Afghanistan while effectively deconstructing the territory into more manageable pieces. The United
States once blithely dealt with the Taliban (Dick Cheney, after all, famously met with the Taliban prior to
bin Laden's attacks). While retaining the right to attack al Qaeda on Afghan soil, the Obama
administration could tolerate Taliban rule if the result of a stable Afghanistan was to free more
resources and attention to Pakistan's urgent security issues. The embrace of realism could well coevolve with the re-emergence of a moral center to American foreign policy.
Reconciliation with Taliban Key
Reconciliation with the Taliban is vital to stability
Azeem Ibrahim, Former Research Fellow at the International Security Program and at the Kennedy
School of Government at Harvard University, "Obama's 'Troops in' Movement Will Not Force the
Taleban Out", 1-21-2009, International Security Journal,
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/18784/obamas_troops_in_movement_will_not_force_
the_taleban_out.html
Until now, the option of negotiation or power-sharing with moderate elements of the Taleban has not
been on the table because of the assumption that the Taleban were monolithically committed to
violence. That can no longer be assumed. In November 2006, one of its leading supporters in Pakistan,
Maulana Fazlur Rahman, stated publicly that the Taleban could stand as a party in Afghan elections as
his Islamist party had recently done in Pakistan. Some Taleban members have argued that the Afghan
state’s army and police should be strengthened in order to persuade allied forces to leave sooner. Some
officials in the Afghan government have said that they were approached by Taleban leaders seeking to
negotiate in 2004. And there have been reports of negotiations in Saudi Arabia between Taleban
representatives and the Afghan government. It can also no longer be assumed that the Taleban are
committed to al Qaeda. They remain two distinct organisational entities divided by language. There are
no Afghans at the top of al Qaeda and no Arabs at the top of the Taleban. And two Taliban spokespeople
have talked publicly about divergence between the two groups. The bottom line is that our war aims can
still be achieved, but not by force alone. Lasting stability in Afghanistan will only be achieved by
negotiating with moderate elements in the Taleban and opening the way for them to share power. That
will bolster the legitimacy of national government in Afghanistan, and ultimately divide and weaken the
insurgents. Troops will be necessary to reduce the insurgency. But this should be seen as a means to the
end of ending the conflict by enabling us to negotiate from a position of relative strength. Only a powersharing government which includes the least extreme elements of the Taleban will be able to achieve
the other three war aims — ensuring that Afghanistan remains a legitimate state, ensuring that it can
handle its own security, and keeping core al Qaeda out of the country. The current government is
committed to a stable, secure and democratic Afghanistan, but we have to start looking at the country
long term. We will not be able to secure the Karzai government after we leave. The only way to ensure
that the next government commits to these objectives is to engage moderate Taleban in a powersharing government now.
Reconciliation is crucial to ending the insurgent attacks
Fotini Christia and Michael Semple, Assistant Prof of Political Science @MIT and fellow at the Carr
Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvard's Kennedy School, “Flipping the Taliban,” July/August 2009
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65151/fotini-christia-and-michael-semple/flipping-the-taliban
THE PRICE OF PEACE A FOCUSED CAMPAIGN to win the cooperation of significant elements within the
Taliban can succeed. For one thing, there is popular support for reconciliation in Afghanistan. In a
nationwide poll sponsored by abc News, the bbc, and ard of Germany and conducted in February 2009,
64 percent of the respondents stated that the Afghan government should negotiate a settlement with
the Taliban and agree to let the group's members hold office if they agree to stop fighting. One model of
inclusion is the talks between the Taliban and Afghan officials that took place in Mecca under the
auspices of the Saudi government last fall. By hosting and endorsing the process, Riyadh generated
greater engagement from core Taliban leaders with its initiative than had been generated by previous
ones because of the moral authority the Saudi kingdom has within the movement. Informal feedback we
received from insurgents suggested that the Saudi process helped promote dialogue and prompted
different parts of the insurgency to contemplate what an eventual settlement might involve. That said, it
would be a distraction to focus too much on the prospect of a comprehensive settlement: in the short
and medium terms, it seems highly unlikely that Taliban leaders will be willing to strike a broad deal with
the Afghan government. They might not even be capable of doing so, because the Taliban is not a
unified or monolithic movement. Some leaders and commanders who are influential within the
movement are open to rapprochement, but a dialogue conducted through a single authorized channel
could be hijacked by Taliban hard-liners: no Taliban leader would be prepared to openly challenge the
hard-liners' resistance to dialogue. Reconciliation is an incremental process, and it should start before
the pursuit of any comprehensive settlement. One important step is for the Afghan government to tailor
its approach to the needs of the fighters. The Taliban are predominantly Pashtun and conservative, but
the movement also contains legions of men who fight for reasons that have nothing to do with Islamic
zealotry. For many, insurgency is a way of life. The fighters are affiliated with partic- ular commanders
and receive comradeship and protection within their group. Unless they protect a drug- trafficking
route, they tend not to be highly paid, but an occasional stipend from their commander is better than
unemployment. And even if many fighters are fundamentally nonideological, membership in an
insurgent network - in which elders and peers tell them that opposing foreign forces is virtuous - offers a
kind of respectability. A well-organized reconciliation program would thus have to offer substitutes for
all these benefits: comradeship, security, a livelihood, and respectability.
Withdrawal Good – Psychological Harms
Troop presence is harmful to American soldiers
Matthew Hoh, Senior Fellow at the Center for International Policy and the Director of the Afghanistan
Study Group, 7/27/2011, “Matthew Hoh: Time to bring the troops home from Afghanistan”,
http://augustafreepress.com/2011/06/27/matthew-hoh-time-to-bring-the-troops-home-fromafghanistan/
By the administration’s own account, al-Qaeda has not existed in any meaningful capacity in Afghanistan
since we successfully scattered them in 2001. Over the last decade, they have evolved into an
increasingly flat or networked organization(s) of individuals and small cells around the globe that is most
successfully attacked through good intelligence, international law-enforcement cooperation and
surgical-strikes, such as the raid against Osama bin Laden’s compound in Pakistan. Our Afghan war
policy does not affect al-Qaeda. American troops killed or maimed in Afghanistan and others who have
returned home with physical and mental injuries, increasing numbers of whom are taking their own
lives, cannot be said to have made a worthy sacrifice. We must acknowledge to families that their losses
did not prevent another Sept. 11.
Maintaining troops in Afghanistan will only increase psychological trauma for our
soldiers
John Matson, Scientific American, 6/27/2011, “Legacy of Mental Health Problems from Iraq and
Afghanistan Wars Will Be Long-Lived”, http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=ptsdawareness-day-afghanistan
As Operation Enduring Freedom, the war on terror in Afghanistan, winds down and some 33,000 U.S.
servicemen and servicewomen return from overseas in the next year, a plan announced by President
Obama on June 22, the psychological issues that veterans face back home are likely to increase.
Some of the key psychological issues affecting the approximately two million American troops deployed
to Iraq and Afghanistan since 2001 have been traumatic brain injury (TBI), depression and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD)—and the diagnoses often overlap. A 2008 report by the RAND Corp.
think tank estimated that more than 26 percent of troops may return from the wars on terror with
mental health issues.
Withdrawal Good – Costs (1/2)
The war costs lots of money
Richard Wolf, USA TODAY, 5/13/2010, “Afghan war costs now outpace Iraq's”,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/military/2010-05-12-afghan_N.htm
The monthly cost of the war in Afghanistan, driven by troop increases and fighting on difficult terrain,
has topped Iraq costs for the first time since 2003 and shows no sign of letting up. Pentagon spending in
February, the most recent month available, was $6.7 billion in Afghanistan compared with $5.5 billion in
Iraq. As recently as fiscal year 2008, Iraq was three times as expensive; in 2009, it was twice as costly.
The shift is occurring because the Pentagon is adding troops in Afghanistan and withdrawing them from
Iraq. And it's happening as the cumulative cost of the two wars surpasses $1 trillion, including spending
for veterans and foreign aid. Those costs could put increased pressure on President Obama and
Congress, given the nation's $12.9 trillion debt. "The overall costs are a function, in part, of the number
of troops," says Linda Bilmes, an expert on wartime spending at Harvard University. "The costs are also a
result of the intensity of operations, and the number of different places that we have our troops
deployed." Obama made clear Wednesday that the U.S. role in Afghanistan would remain long after
troops are withdrawn, a process planned to begin in July 2011. "This is a long-term partnership," he said
during a news conference with Afghan President Hamid Karzai. Continued American support will be
crucial as U.S. troop levels and costs in Afghanistan escalate: •The number of U.S. servicemembers in
Afghanistan has risen to 87,000, on top of 47,000 from 44 other countries. At the same time, the
number of U.S. servicemembers in Iraq has dropped to 94,000. By next year, Afghanistan is to have
102,000 U.S. servicemembers, Iraq 43,000. •Afghanistan will cost nearly $105 billion in the 2010 fiscal
year that ends Sept. 30, including most of $33 billion in additional spending requested by Obama and
pending before Congress. Iraq will cost about $66 billion. In fiscal 2011, Afghanistan is projected to cost
$117 billion, Iraq $46 billion. To date, Pentagon spending in Iraq has reached $620 billion, compared
with $190 billion in Afghanistan. •Costs per servicemember in Afghanistan have been roughly double
what they are in Iraq since 2005. That is due to lower troop levels, Afghanistan's landlocked location,
lack of infrastructure, high cost of fuel and less reliable security. "The cost just cascades," says Todd
Harrison of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. "That's always been an issue in
Afghanistan." "Iraq, logistically, is much easier," says Lawrence Korb of the Center for American
Progress. "You get the stuff to Kuwait and just drive it up the road."
The war costs money, and it hurts the US economy
Devin Dwyer and Luis Martinez, ABC News, 6-22-2011, “Afghanistan War Costs Loom Large Over
Obama Troops Announcement”, http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/afghanistan-war-costs-soar-obamatroops-announcement/story?id=13902853
While the United States grapples with debt and deficit crises, taxpayers are expected to spend more
than $118 billion this year in Afghanistan for military operations, base security, reconstruction, foreign
aid, embassy costs and veterans' health care. That's more than double the amount the Department of
Homeland Security spends per year to secure the nation's borders, screen air travelers and help
Americans recover from natural disasters, among other services. Afghanistan war spending is roughly six
times the annual budget of NASA. All told, the war that began in October 2001 has cost taxpayers more
than an estimated $443 billion, according to the Congressional Research Service, and the lives of more
than 1,523 U.S. military service members. Polls show the U.S. public has become increasingly war weary,
leading members of both parties -- including some Republican candidates for president -- to pressure
Obama to expedite his Afghanistan plan and reprioritize the war funds. The pace of U.S. withdrawal
proposed by Obama "sounds a little slow and a little cautious, when you look at one out of every six
Defense Department dollars going in support of what we're doing in Afghanistan," former Utah governor
and GOP presidential candidate Jon Huntsman said today on "GMA." "Nine years and 50 days into this
conflict, the money that has been spent on both conflicts, well over $1 trillion, I think we have to say,
'What have we accomplished in Afghanistan?'" he said. Huntsman is not alone. While 57 percent of
Americans in the latest ABC News poll say the war has contributed to long-term national security, far
fewer, 25 percent, say it has contributed "a great deal," which is the kind of payback many want to see,
given the war's steep price tag. The Pentagon says all of its war-related costs since Sept. 11, 2001,
including in Iraq, have topped $1 trillion. Add diplomatic expenses and care for veterans and total
government spending reaches an estimated $1.3 trillion.
Withdrawal Good – Costs (2/2)
The cost of the war is so high it’s the main reason for SQ withdrawals
Rajiv Chandrasekaran, The Washington Post, 5/30/2011, “Cost of war in Afghanistan will be major
factor in troop-reduction talks”, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/cost-of-warin-afghanistan-will-be-major-factor-in-troop-reduction-talks/2011/05/27/AGR8z2EH_story.html
Of all the statistics that President Obama’s national security team will consider when it debates the size
of forthcoming troop reductions in Afghanistan, the most influential number probably will not be how
many insurgents have been killed or the amount of territory wrested from the Taliban, according to
aides to those who will participate. It will be the cost of the war. The U.S. military is on track to spend
$113 billion on its operations in Afghanistan this fiscal year, and it is seeking $107 billion for the next. To
many of the president’s civilian advisers, that price is too high, given a wide federal budget gap that will
require further cuts to domestic programs and increased deficit spending. Growing doubts about the
need for such a broad nation-building mission there in the wake of Osama bin Laden’s death have only
sharpened that view. “Where we’re at right now is simply not sustainable,” said one senior
administration official, who, like several others interviewed for this article, spoke on the condition of
anonymity to discuss internal policy deliberations. Civilian advisers, who do not want to be seen as
unwilling to pay for the war, are expected to frame their cost concerns in questions about the breadth of
U.S. operations — arguing that the troop surge Obama authorized in 2009 has achieved many of its
goals — instead of directly tackling money matters. When the president’s war cabinet evaluates troopwithdrawal options in the next few weeks presented by Gen. David H. Petraeus, the top coalition
commander, “it’s not like each of them will have price tags next to them,” the official said. But “it’s
certainly going to shape how most of the civilians look at this.” The question of cost will have a far
greater impact on the eventual decision than it did during the White House debate about the Afghan
surge in late 2009. The heightened fiscal pressures, coupled with bin Laden’s killing four weeks ago,
could shift the balance of power in the Situation Room toward Vice President Biden and other civilians
who had been skeptical of the surge and favor a faster troop drawdown than top commanders would
prefer. “Money is the new 800-pound gorilla,” said another senior administration official involved in
Afghanistan policy, who also spoke on the condition of anonymity. “It shifts the debate from ‘Is the
strategy working?’ to ‘Can we afford this?’ And when you view it that way, the scope of the mission that
we have now is far, far less defensible.” Military and civilian officials agree that the cost of the Afghan
mission is staggering. The amount per deployed service member in Afghanistan, which the
administration estimates at $1 million per year, is significantly higher than it was in Iraq because fuel
and other supplies must be trucked into the landlocked nation, often through circuitous routes. Bases,
meanwhile, have to be built from scratch.
AT: Key to Solve Terror
Taliban control doesn’t mean al-Qaeda returns to Afghanistan, we can withdraw
without risking terror attacks
Robert Jervis, Adlai E. Stevenson Professor of International Affairs @ Columbia University 9-14-2009
"Withdrawal without winning?"
http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/09/14/withdrawal_without_winning
Most discussion about Afghanistan has concentrated on whether and how we can defeat the Taliban.
Less attention has been paid to the probable consequences of a withdrawal without winning, an
option toward which I incline. What is most striking is not that what I take to be the majority view is
wrong, but that it has not been adequately defended. This is especially important because the U.S.has
embarked on a war that will require great effort with prospects that are uncertain at best. Furthermore,
it appears that Obama's commitment to Afghanistan was less the product of careful analysis than of the
political need to find a "tough" pair to his attacks on the war in Iraq during the presidential campaign. It
similarly appears that in the months since his election he has devoted much more attention to how to
wage the war than to whether we need to wage it. The claim that this is a "necessary war" invokes two
main claims and one subsidiary one. The strongest argument is that we have to fight them there so that
we don't have to fight them here. The fact that Bush said this about Iraq does not make it wrong, and as
in Iraq, it matters what we mean by "them." Presumably if we withdrew the Taliban would take over
much of southern and eastern Afghanistan. This would be terrible for the inhabitants, but would it
harm us? I don't think anyone believes that the Taliban would launch attacks against us or our allies,
so that the menace is not a direct one. Instead, the fear is of a repetition of the pre-2001 situation in
which al Qaeda would have bases that would facilitate attacks. Obviously, this is a danger, but how
great a one? The Taliban would not want to repeat what happened after 2001, and so I do not think
one can simply assume that Taliban control would automatically lead to al Qaeda control. Nor is
Afghanistan the only country that might permit an al Qaeda presence. Somalia is perhaps as
troublesome, and yet noone calls for the U.S. to re-intervene there. Furthermore, al Qaeda has some
sort of base of operations in Pakistan now (and is not likely to lose it even in the best outcome across
the border); how much worse would it be if we withdrew? In part, this might depend on exactly what
"withdrawal" means and on what "bases" mean. Clearly al Qaeda grew by having large training camps in
Afghanistan before 9/11, more than they have now in Pakistan and which they might be able to
reestablish, presumably on a smaller scale, if we left. But are these still needed? The fact (assuming it is
a fact) that 9/11 could not have happened without those camps does not mean that their
reestablishment would lead to renewed terrorism. To put this another way -- and this is a genuine
question and not a rhetorical one -- what sort of facilities might be established in Afghanistan that would
increase the danger to the U.S.? It presumably would be easier for al Qaeda to operate, but would this
translate into more and more effective attacks?
Con Evidence
Stay the Course (1/2)
The United States is winning the trust of the Afghan people by providing enough
security to exist normally
Nick Kitson, Lieutenant Colonel, 6/9/2010, “Afghanistan: A war we’re winning,”
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/afghanistan-a-war-were-winning-1994934.html
Of real significance though, and a sure sign that we and the Afghan Government we support are having
effect, is the in-fighting that has begun to boil over amongst our Taliban adversaries. It seems that the
locals may be getting increasingly fed up with the extremism of the external militants loyal to Quetta
and out-of-area power brokers. While we continued to fend off our enemy, often with a fierce fight, and
targeted them ruthlessly when the appropriate opportunity arose, one of this Battle Group's principal
achievements was to take the heat out of the fight. Our soldiers took considerable extra risk upon
themselves to move in these small numbers amongst the people, not to overreact when provoked and
do their very best to engage with the locals so as to pass the message of what we stand for, what we are
trying to achieve and to ask them what they want from the Government. We were told since before we
deployed that our mission was about "winning the argument" and we left a situation where the
argument is most definitely being had – and it is a socio-political argument not a fighting argument. The
most important thing is that, now Sangin has a credible District Governor committed to his people and a
better future, the argument is between the people and the Afghan Government. Our role was simply to
provide enough security for them to exist normally and to bring them together. Reducing the levels of
fighting on the streets of the centre certainly helped that begin to take place. If war is politics by other
means (as Clausewitz tells us) then we can tentatively take heart that we are now perhaps beginning to
move back towards politics. The Helmand Provincial Governor, Gulab Mangal, visited again in early April
and was visibly impressed by what the new District Governor had achieved in his month in office.
The US will win - multiple reasons
Michael O’Hanlon, Director of Research and Senior Fellow of Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institute
(Michael, Director of Research and Senior Fellow of Foreign Policy @ Brookings, “In Afghanistan, The
Odds Are With Us,” 12-14-2009,
http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2009/1214_afghanistan_ohanlon.aspx)
First, Afghans want a better future for themselves. This is true for Afghans in their own country, as well
as for the Diaspora of Afghans around the world — many of whom have moved back home to help build
a new country, others of whom stand ready to invest, trade and assist in other ways. Most Afghans
reject war. They also reject the Taliban, by 90 percent or more in most polls. Among the majority of the
Afghan people who are not Pashtun, in fact, support for the Taliban is virtually zero. Even among the
Durrani, one of the two main Pashtun tribal groupings, support for the Taliban has been limited (the
Taliban’s main support has come from the Pashtun Ghilzai tribes). The Taliban is not a popular
insurgency. It is in equal parts a narco-terrorist organization willing to use drug smuggling to finance its
operations, an extremist Islamist movement with an intolerant view of nonbelievers and a backward
view of the role of women, and a ruthless organization willing to use brutal violence against innocent,
law-abiding citizens to impose its version of Islam. Yes, it has achieved impressive discipline in its ranks
in some ways, and battlefield momentum as well, but it has no positive vision for the country — and
Afghans know it. There are also many good and committed “average citizens” in the country today. In
Kandahar City citizens are telling authorities about the locations of up to 80 percent of all improvised
explosive devices before they go off, allowing security forces to defuse them. This high percentage,
higher than ever witnessed in Iraq, further suggests that our efforts to quell the Taliban may have found
unexpected support from the general population in one of the Taliban strongholds, support that a
counterinsurgency can build upon. Progress is apparent in other places too. In the town of Nawa in
Helmand Province, for example, an infusion of U.S. forces in 2009 has turned a previously lawless area
held by the Taliban into a relatively secure area where ordinary people can begin to get back to their
daily lives. Second, elements of the Afghan security forces are improving fast. This is most true for the
army. With NATO’s International Security Assistance Force focused intently now on proper training and
mentoring, the building of Afghan security forces that can protect their own people should accelerate.
Third, life in Afghanistan has actually improved somewhat compared with the recent past. Yes, the
progress is uneven, and the poor remain very badly off. But overall the economy, education, healthcare
and similar indicators are moving more in the right direction than the wrong one. Material progress has
contributed to a reservoir of goodwill among the Afghan people toward those in authority. President
Karzai, the United States, and NATO all still enjoyed at least 60 percent support from the population as
of summer 2009 — far better than the United States has enjoyed in Iraq. This popularity number is
fragile, and uneven among different groups, but we do have some advantages in how the Afghan public
views the situation nonetheless. Fourth, NATO in general and the United States in particular know how
to carry out counterinsurgency missions better than ever before. Troops are experienced in the art of
counterinsurgency and knowledgeable about Afghanistan. We also have excellent commanders, starting
with Central Command Combatant Cmdr. Gen. David Petraeus and Gen. McChrystal, who directs both
the NATO forces and the separate, U.S.-led counterterrorism force carrying out Operation Enduring
Freedom there.
Stay the Course (2/2)
Gates and Patreaus have said we’re winning the war
Lana Zak and Ben Forber, ABC News, 6-6-2011, “Is U.S. Winning in Afghanistan? Gates and Petraeus
Won't Say”, http://abcnews.go.com/International/gates-petraeus-us-winning-afghanwar/story?id=13771705
“We’re making progress,” said Gen. David Petraeus said when asked by ABC World News anchor Diane
Sawyer whether the U.S. was winning the now decade long war in Afghanistan. “We’re really loathed to
use this very loaded term of winning or losing.” Petreaus made his comments in an exclusive joint
interview with Sawyer along with his boss Defense Secretary Robert Gates. The interview was conducted
in Kabul, Afghanistan. “We’ve made enormous progress in a number of different geographic areas
within Afghanistan. And overall, the momentum has changed,” the general said. “I believe that we
have had a great deal of success in achieving the mission that our forces have been given… in terms of
disrupting Taliban activity, in terms of degrading their capabilities, in terms of denying them control of
population areas,” Gates said.
Troops Key to Afghan Takeover (1/3)
Troops are needed to train Afghan security forces, leaving now means they can’t
maintain security and stability
CSIS, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2009,
http://www.afghanconflictmonitor.org/2009/07/the-ansf-is-vital-to-natoisaf-success.html
President Obama‘s new strategy for Afghanistan is critically dependent upon the transfer of
responsibility for Afghan security to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). His speech announcing
this strategy called for the transfer to begin in mid-2011. However, creating the Afghan forces needed to
bring security and stability is a far more difficult challenge than many realize, and poses major
challenges that will endure long after 2011. A successful effort to create effective Afghan forces,
particularly forces that can largely replace the role of US and allied forces, must overcome a legacy of
more than eight years of critical failures in both force development and training, and in the broader
course of the US effort in Afghanistan. Such an effort must also be shaped as part of an integrated civilmilitary effort, and not treated simply as an exercise in generating more Afghan military and police
forces. Success will be equally dependent on strategic patience. There is a significant probability that the
ANSF will not be ready for any significant transfer of responsibility until well after 2011. Trying to expand
Afghan forces too quickly, creating forces with inadequate force quality, and decoupling Afghan force
development from efforts to deal with the broad weakness in Afghan governance and the Afghan justice
system, will lose the war. America‘s politicians, policymakers, and military leaders must accept this
reality—and persuade the Afghan government and our allies to act accordingly—or the mission in
Afghanistan cannot succeed.
Afghans can’t handle current security problems; need U.S.
Fredrick W Kagan, Professor of Military History at West Point, 05/07/2009, Planning Victory in
Afghanistan, http://www.aei.org/article/100020
The Afghan National Army consists of perhaps 70,000 troops (on paper). This number will rise gradually
to 134,000--itself an arbitrary sum, based on assumptions about what the fifth-poorest country in the
world can afford to pay for an army that is certainly too small to establish and maintain security. The
Afghan National Police are ineffective when not actively part of the problem. Afghanistan is significantly
larger than Iraq, its terrain is far more daunting, and its population is greater. The Iraqi Security Forces
that defeated the insurgency (with our help) in 2007 and 2008 numbered over 500,000 by the end.
There is simply no way that Afghan Security Forces can defeat the insurgents on their own, with or
without large numbers of coalition advisers.Breaking the insurgency will have to be a real team effort.
Coalition units must partner with Afghan army units to clear critical areas, and then work with local
leaders to develop local security solutions that smaller numbers of residual U.S. and Afghan troops can
support while other areas are cleared.
Troops Key to Afghan Takeover (2/3)
Afghan security forces have made progress, but they’re still a long way from effective,
and ineffective policing will lead to a stronger insurgency
Elizabeth Hamrick, The Heritage Foundation, 6/28/2011, “Training Afghanistan Security Forces
Essential for Peace”, http://blog.heritage.org/2011/06/28/training-afghanistan-security-forces-essentialfor-peace/
President Obama’s announced plan for accelerated troop reductions in Afghanistan puts at risk the
hard-earned battlefield gains made by the coalition forces over the last 10 months, but he rightly
highlighted significant progress in training Afghan security forces:
Afghan security forces have grown by over 100,000 troops, and in some provinces and municipalities
we’ve already begun to transition responsibility for security to the Afghan people. In the face of violence
and intimidation, Afghans are fighting and dying for their country, establishing local police forces…”
Progress in preparing Afghan security forces for eventual transition of responsibility is impressive, and
the NATO training mission headed by General William Caldwell deserves much praise. However, Afghan
security forces are still a long way from being able to maintain security on their own. The transition
from U.S.-led to Afghan-led security operations must be driven by conditions on the ground, not the
U.S. domestic political calendar. A hasty departure—before the necessary steps are taken to create a
sustainable, functioning Afghan security force—risks unraveling all the hard work put into training
these forces. The fate of the Afghan National Police (ANP) is of particular importance. Last week, the
Project 2049 Institute released a report on the progress of the Afghan National Police titled The Police
Challenge: Advancing Afghan National Police Training. The Heritage Foundation’s Lisa Curtis was part of
the senior-level study group convened to examine the challenges facing the ANP and to provide
recommendations for enhancing the prospects for success of the force. The report highlights the role
the ANP will play in maintaining peace and stability in Afghanistan during and after transition; identifies
the challenges it faces; offers solutions for the road ahead; and emphasizes that there is still much more
work to be done. A functional Afghan police force is an essential element of promoting rule of law and
development in Afghanistan. Officials within the Afghan military mission frequently comment on the
importance of ANP training to maintaining a minimal level of stability, which the force has yet to
achieve. Current estimates place nearly half of all ANP units at operational capacity. The ANP suffers
from shortfalls in both institutional and individual capacity. Without a more professional, trustworthy,
and capable police force, the security architecture necessary for sustainable post-conflict peacebuilding and development will likely fail. In fact, inadequate policing not only prevents the elimination
of the insurgency, but also benefits it. In an environment where police commonly ask for bribes, are
unable to resolve local disputes—let alone investigate criminal activity and arrest offenders—Afghan
civilians may be more likely to lend their support to extremist groups, which emerge as a sub-optimal
but necessary alternative to the inept police.” The NATO training mission will transfer full control of
Afghan security forces to the Afghan government in 2014. While this is still three years away, it is likely
to prove a challenging deadline. The report offers clear recommendations which, if followed, have the
potential to lead to a successful transition by 2014.
Aghan Army not ready for US withdrawal
Carl Levin, United States Senator from Michigan and Democratic chairman of the Senate Armed
Services Committee, 6-29-2010, “Opening Statement of Sen. Carl Levin, Senate Armed Services
Committee on the Nomination of General David H. Petraeus, USA, to be Commander, International
Security Assistance Force/ Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan”,
http://levin.senate.gov/newsroom/release.cfm?id=326028, DA: 7-19-10, AL
Building the capacity of the Afghan security forces to provide security is not simply what we seek; it’s
what the Afghan people seek. That’s what we were told by 100 or so elders at a shura in southern
Afghanistan last year. When we asked them what they wanted the United States to do, they told us
we should train and equip the Afghan army to provide for their country’s security, then depart. The
1,600 delegates to the Afghanistan Consultative Peace Jirga at the beginning of this month adopted a
resolution calling on the international community to “expedite” the training and equipping of the
Afghan security forces so they can gain the capacity “to provide security for their own country and
people.” I remain deeply concerned, however, by reports that relatively few Afghan army troops are in
the lead in operations in the south, where fighting is heaviest. The Afghan Army now numbers around
120,000 troops, including over 70,000 combat troops. In the past, ISAF reported that over half of Afghan
battalions were capable of conducting operations either independently or with coalition support.
However, a recent report by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction finds that
the capability rating system used by the training mission “overstated operational capabilities” of the
Afghan security forces and “has not provided reliable or consistent assessments.”
Troops Key to Afghan Takeover (3/3)
American troops are needed to train security forces and establish a stable government
Dilawar Sherzai, Daily Outlook Afghanistan, an independent newspaper in Afghanistan, 6-22-2011,
“Terror Continues in Afghanistan”, http://outlookafghanistan.net/topics?post_id=1021
At last, the much awaited number of American troops to be withdrawn from Afghanistan has been
announced. It, according to the statement of President Obama, has to be 10,000 till the end of this year
and 33,000 till September2012. There has been much controversy regarding the drawdown of the
American troops from Afghanistan. The most important issue being raised is the post withdrawal
scenario in the country. Keeping in view the controversial preparedness of Afghan National Security
Forces(ANSF) that have to replace the security arrangements after the drawdown of the American
troops, one can not easily reach to solid conclusions. But, it is for sure that the situation would turn
very challenging for Afghan forces to handle, if not impossible. The second controversial issue is the
political and administrative preparedness of Afghan government in the post withdrawal Afghanistan.
Definitely, the present government in the country has not been able to show that it possesses the
capability to address the diverse challenges, existing in Afghan socio-political scenario. In the same
regard government has rather made the co-operating and peace-loving factions turn against it, by giving
more preference to finding ways for negotiating with Taliban.
Afghan Takeover Key
An Afghan led government is the only way to have stability
Dilawar Sherzai, Daily Outlook Afghanistan, an independent newspaper in Afghanistan, 6-22-2011,
“Terror Continues in Afghanistan”, http://outlookafghanistan.net/topics?post_id=1021
Definitely the regional assistance can help much in bringing stability in the region, only if they are not
coated with the glazed hypocrisy. It is not just the matter of a single country, all the countries in South
Asia are influenced by this menace and they have to sort out the solution through collective efforts.
Pakistan itself has been suffering both in terms of human lives and financial losses. Now, they seem to
have realized that regional powers can really play a tremendous role for long lasting solution to the
problem. Further, the countries in south Asia seem to have been much irritated by the presence of
American troops in Afghanistan. All of them are in the favor of withdrawal of American forces from
Afghanistan, but they really have to make sure that the post withdrawal scenario must not turn into a
scenario wherein the regional powers exercise their own interests in Afghanistan that can result into
another proxy war. Withdrawal of US-led international troops must be taken in the perspective of
providing Afghanistan an opportunity to stand on its own, and this has to be facilitated by the
neighboring countries. They must realize now that no one can breed a wild animal without being bitten.
Who so ever has assisted terrorism has been bitten by it severely. The evolving scenario, in the region
in general and in Afghanistan in particular, has been reaching to its transition and whenever the
transition period arrives there are decisive changes both in physical law and in social phenomena.
Human beings, mostly the authoritative ones, do exercise some influence over the nature of the
changes that take place as a result of transition. We, the residents of Afghanistan especially those with
authority, have to exert our utmost efforts to make the nature of these changes more peace-loving, cooperative, and above all - non-violent.
Only an Afghani led government can stabilize Afghanistan, and troops are key
Xinhua, China’s National Newspaper, 7-7-2011, “Afghanistan at "critical juncture" for peace, stability:
envoy”, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90777/90856/7432352.html
Afghan UN Ambassador Zahir Tanin said here Wednesday that with Afghanistan being at a "critical
juncture" for peace and stability, their transition is a "rousing call" for them to take their lead and
assume national ownership. Tanin's statement came as he addressed the Security Council during an
open debate on Afghanistan. He told the Council that the transition to sovereignty has begun, with the
first stage of the process being implemented into seven Afghan provinces. "Transition is a rousing call
for Afghans to take the lead, for national ownership and leadership and for the government of
Afghanistan to assume its sovereign responsibilities," Tanin told the Council. Calling the process a
"carefully-formulated, comprehensive strategy," he said it "presupposes not only a gradual transfer of
security responsibilities until the end of 2014 to Afghan authorities, but also a conscientious
drawdown of international forces, accelerated training of the Afghan army and police, and
strengthening of governance" among many. "As the world has entered into a post-bin Laden era,
Afghanistan, the greatest victim of terrorism, is today at a critical juncture in its quest for peace and
stability," he said. "The Afghan government continues its crucial efforts to ensure that the process is
smooth and viable," he said. "However, there should be no doubt, for the transition process to sustain
and succeed, certain pre-conditions must be met." Tanin said that Afghanistan looked to the
international community to expedite training and equipping of security forces. Welcoming U.S.
President Barack Obama's announcement of the gradual drawdown of U.S. forces from the region, he
said it was a "testament to, firstly, the steady ability of Afghan security forces, and secondly, the
changed momentum of the war, despite the recent vicious attacks by the Taliban." "The reconciliation
process will be pursued as a matter of priority, consistent with the understanding that there is no purely
military solution, and that transition requires an inclusive settlement," Tanin said. Moving forward, he
said "we must think beyond ending the war, towards ensuring sustainable progress across all sectors,
security, governance and development," he said. According to Obama's plan, 10,000 troops will be
pulled out from the country by year end, and a total of 33,000 troops will be out by next summer, fully
recovering the surge troops the president announced late 2009.
Key to Stability (1/2)
U.S. presence key to stability
Somanahalli Krishna, Indian Prime Minister for External Affairs, 7/22/2010, “Longer international
presence needed in Afghanistan,” http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report_longer-internationalpresence-needed-in-afghanistan-sm-krishna_1413123]
With the US having announced that it will begin pulling out its troops from Afghanistan from July 2011,
India on Thursday said that "international presence" in the war-torn country was needed for a much
longer time. Just back from Kabul after attending an international conference on Afghanistan, External
Affairs Minister S M Krishna said that he shared President Hamid Karzai's enthusiasm for Afghan forces
to take over security of the entire country from 2014. "He is very enthusiastic and I am very happy about
it. He is also confident that he will be able to raise his own security force," said Krishna, who had
discussions with Karzai and US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in the Afghan capital. Asked if India was
willing to help in raising the security forces necessary for the task, the minister replied, "Well, if
Afghanistan asks India shall help. We have been helping Afghanistan in our own way. It depends on what
kind of help they seek and what kind of help we can render." Responding to a question as to whether
the US decision to commence troops pull out in a year was premature, Krishna said, "I feel that
international presence is needed in Afghanistan for a much longer time than it has now now been
projected. We hope that international presence will act as some kind of insulation to Afghanistan for
normalisation." Asked whether India would like the US to take a fresh look at its decision, the minister
said that New Delhi had conveyed its views to the US and to Afghanistan in bilateral meetings. To a
question on Pakistan's efforts to play the power broker in Afghanistan, Krishna said that India had
emphasised that initiative for future set up in the country had to be "Afghan-led and Afghan-owned".
Asked whether there was a shift in India's stand on good Taliban and bad Taliban, he said, "Well, we
cannot wish away Taliban. Who are Taliban--they are all citizens of Afghanistan. "There is a realisation
among individual members of Taliban that their movement is not not going to be helpful to Afghanistan
and that they should reconsider their association with Taliban. Then I think they should go back to the
Rapid withdrawal will only lead to instability
Washington Times, 2010, “Winning the war in Afghanistan,”
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/jul/19/winning-in-afghanistan-786391921/
Afghanistan has 34 provinces comprising 397 districts. Some are very secure, others decidedly not. In
that respect, Afghanistan is in a similar situation to Iraq's in 2007. A province-by-province approach to
Afghanistan - starting with the most secure areas and handing off responsibility for the defense of the
area to the Afghan government - could build the same kind of momentum it did in Iraq. It also could
help rebuild support with the American public for the war effort similar to the surge in Iraq. Such a
strategy will make progress in the war more comprehensible to the American people and build a more
solid political foundation in the country. This is critical because, as in the case of Vietnam, the enemy
cannot defeat U.S. forces on the battlefield but may be able to create domestic political conditions that
will make it difficult if not impossible to sustain the war effort .Handing over all the security
responsibilities to the Afghan government is a reasonable measure of success in the war, so this
approach lays out a road map to victory. It's important that the United States comes out of its longest
war with a check in the win column.
Key to Stability (2/2)
Time to build trust is needed to stabilize Afghanistan
Aryn Baker, Ariana an Afghan newspaper, 4-10-2009, “The U.S. in Afghanistan: The Longest War”,
http://www.eariana.com/ariana/eariana.nsf/allDocs/6A5503CFAB76671E87257594001C6654?OpenDocument
Here success cannot be measured in territory gained, schools built or clinics opened. Irrigation pipes
and water pumps are blown up by the insurgents as soon as they are built. The road the villagers so
desperately want has foundered, with construction forbidden by a Taliban edict that no one dares
disobey. It's a good day in the Korengal when an elder slips an oblique warning that one of the
observation posts might be attacked that evening. Sometimes progress is so slow it feels like a
stalemate, admits company commander Captain James Howell. But, he says, "if we can reach a point
where the villagers want to work with us and the Taliban are the only thing stopping them, that's
success." Howell knows his company won't be able to tame the valley completely. He's not sure his
successors will either. "To win this war," he says, "it's going to take patience."
Key to Solve Terror (1/2)
If the U.S. leaves Afghanistan, terrorism will still be a major threat.
BBC News, “Afghan paper fears factional fighting if foreign forces withdraw too soon,” 7/8/2010
LEXIS
An assessment of the warnings of John McCain, Liam shows that such concerns truly exist. Many political
and military experts believe that determining an exact date for the withdrawal of forces from
Afghanistan will cause the war to continue. It is also clear that the international forces cannot stay here
forever. However, their withdrawal should be conditional. It means that if the situation is satisfactory,
Afghan security forces are capable of ensuring security and can foil foreign terrorist threats to the
country, there will be no need for the presence of international forces in Afghanistan. Terrorism still
poses a serious threat to the security and stability of Afghanistan, the region and the world. The centres
where terrorists are recruited, trained, funded and armed are still active outside Afghanistan. Different
fighters, including suicide bombers, are trained in these centres and then sent to Afghanistan to attack
internal and international forces, government establishments, highways and civilians. The Afghan
military forces are not strong enough to ensure countrywide security. The most serious problem is that
the system has not yet politically, economically, militarily and socially stood on its own feet. If the
international forces leave prematurely, there is a strong possibility that factional fighting will resume
over power. A number of powerful people have already issued threats. If the international forces leave
prematurely, they will start fighting one another. This will again claim the lives of innocent Afghans. If
the international community, in particular America, wants to pave the way for its withdrawal, it must
strengthen the system. International forces can confidently leave the country only when Afghanistan has
a strong and self-sufficient system that can foil all internal and foreign threats to its security and stability
and implement economic programmes for the prosperity and well-being of people.
There will be a new surge of terrorism if the U.S. withdraws from Afghanistan too
early.
BBC News, “USA to brace for new surge of terrorism if withdraws from Afghanistan,“ 7/8/2010
http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T978
7946933&format=GNBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T9787946945&cisb=22_T
9787946944&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=10962&docNo=6, LN
The main concern is that setting a deadline will give concessions to the Pakistani military, which
supports the Taleban, and it will open the way for its interference in Afghanistan. Taleban and their
allies are now stronger than ever and as Taleban spokesman, Zabihollah Mojahed, says, Taleban have
the upper hand. Is withdrawing from Afghanistan in this situation not tantamount to abandoning the
field for the Taleban? Surprisingly, the decision to withdraw from Afghanistan is announced at a time
when General Petraeus is speaking of victory in the nine year war without telling us how we can tell that
this war is being won. There is no doubt that the Taleban interpret this decision as their victory and can
use it as an effective propaganda tool to recruit more fighters. The Afghan ambassador is right when he
says that too much reliance on an unrealistic timetable will only embolden the enemy and prolong the
war. Considering the reconciliatory efforts of the government of Afghanistan, it is not clear who the
enemy is. Currently, Taleban have the upper hand despite extensive presence of foreign forces and
national army and police. What guarantees are there that the country and the people will be better
defended in the absence of these forces? Premature withdrawal of American forces can only boost the
morale of the opposition front and make the government of Afghanistan vulnerable. Moreover, the
question that has to be asked is how is this decision made nine years later? There is no doubt that if the
United States of America withdraws from Afghanistan without ensuring durable peace, it will have to
strengthen its defences against terrorism on its own borders. One of the consequences of this
premature withdrawal will be violation by the government of Afghanistan for its survival of all the values
enshrined in the constitution and a hasty reconciliation deal with the opposition.
Key to Solve Terror (2/2)
Withdrawing all troops would cause al-Qaeda to re-establish bases in Afghanistan
Fredrick W Kagan, Professor of Military History at West Point, 05-07-2009, Planning Victory in
Afghanistan, http://www.aei.org/article/100020
Afghanistan is not now a sanctuary for al-Qaeda, but it would likely become one again if we abandoned
it. Mullah Omar, the head of the Taliban government we removed in 2001, is alive and well in Pakistan.
He maintains contacts with Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and the other key al-Qaeda leaders,
who are also based in Pakistan (although in a different area). Mullah Omar supports Taliban fighters in
southern Afghanistan from his Pakistani havens, while al-Qaeda and its affiliates support insurgents in
eastern Afghanistan. Allowing Afghanistan to fail would mean allowing these determined enemies of the
United States to regain the freedom they had before 9/11.
Afghanistan Key War on Terror
Afghanistan stability is key to Middle East stability because it is critical to the war on
terror
ANATOL LIEVEN, 2007 (SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW WITH THE NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION, MIDDLE
EAST POLICY, SPRING, HTTP://WWW.MEPC.ORG/FORUMS_CHCS/47.HTML)
So looking at the inevitable consequences of American withdrawal, the situation after America does
withdraw, what should we be concerned with most critically? Well, the first is something which is too
often not talked about in the context of the Middle East, and that is of course Afghanistan. De facto
defeat in Iraq will be bad enough. De facto defeat in Afghanistan would be a catastrophic humiliation for
the United States, and would in effect mark defeat in the war on terror as a whole. Now by defeat in
Afghanistan I don't mean that the Taliban can actually chase us out like Vietnam in '75. But that we also
get into a situation where America, and Britain for that matter, and whoever remains there, which won't
be very many allies, I think, are suffering a continual stream of heavy casualties with no prospect of
actually creating a successful, halfway successful and stable Afghan state. Now this fits into the Middle
East not just because American strategy as a whole in the war on terror, but also because Iran is
absolutely critical to the stabilization, the development of Afghanistan. And not just that, but if in the
future we ever face the situation in which we are going to withdraw from Afghanistan as well, well then,
we go back to the situation before 9/11 in which Iran and Russia were critical to keeping the Northern
Alliance going against the prospect of the Taliban conquering the whole country.
Leaving Now Increase Violence (1/2)
No forces means larger resurgence
Conn Carroll, Assistant Director for The Heritage Foundation's Strategic Communications, 9/28/2009,
http://blog.heritage.org/tag/iraq/
The war in Afghanistan cannot be effectively waged merely with air power, predator drones, and special
forces. In the late 1990s, the Clinton Administration hurled cruise missiles at easily replaceable al-Qaeda
training camps in Afghanistan, but this “chuck and duck” strategy failed to blunt the al-Qaeda threat.
The Bush Administration’s minimalist approach to Afghanistan in 2001 was a contributing factor that
allowed Osama bin Laden to escape from his mountain redoubt at Tora Bora. Afterwards, Washington
opted to focus narrowly on counterterrorism goals in Afghanistan–rather than counterinsurgency
operations–in order to free up military assets for the war in Iraq. This allowed the Taliban to regroup
across the border in Pakistan and make a violent resurgence. The “small footprint” strategy also failed in
Iraq, before it was abandoned in favor of General Petraeus’s counterinsurgency strategy, backed by the
surge of American troops, in early 2007. Despite this record of failure, some stubbornly continue to
support an “offshore” strategy for landlocked Afghanistan today. But half-measures–the hallmark of the
“small footprint” strategy–will not work. Precise intelligence is needed to use smart bombs smartly. Yet
few Afghans would risk their lives to provide such intelligence unless they are assured of protection
against the Taliban’s ruthless retaliation.
Troops are critical to effective counter insurgency strategies
Paul G Buchanan, Expert in issues of strategic, comparative, and international politics. 07/19/2010,
Two Sides of the Afghan COIN, http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/HL1006/S00208.htm,
The first version, championed by General David Petraeus (who accepted a demotion from US Central
Command leader to assume McChrystal’s role in Afghanistan), is a US version of the traditional “hearts
and minds” counter-insurgency campaigns in which a so-called “inkblot” or “seize-hold-and-build”
strategy is used whereby conventional forces roughly divided equally into combat and civilian
assistance units fan out into disputed territory to establish secure control of designated localities,
then provide humanitarian and nation-building assistance to local populations while driving
insurgents further away from areas previously under their control. As each “inkblot” secures its
territory the conventional force expands its reach outwards in terms of combat and governance
capability, eventually overlapping and saturating the countryside with its presence amid an
increasingly supportive population. That denies the insurgent enemy the support and cover it needs
to continue effective insurgent combat operations, which forces it to surrender or negotiate a
peaceful settlement with US-backed authorities. The British campaign against Malaysian insurgents in
the 1950s is considered to be the exemplar case from which Petreus and other Western commanders
have drawn inspiration. The inkblot strategy relies heavily on non-combat reconstruction and
rehabilitation efforts, to include civilian nation-building assistance once effective security has been
established in the original focal points. Because it is “population-centric,” it requires a “surge” in troops
not for combat operations but in order to undertake the force protection, good governance
development and civilian assistance projects vital to the “hearts and minds” component of the
strategy. Special operations troops are used to eliminate or degrade enemy leadership targets, obtain
intelligence and disrupt insurgent logistical flows as well as provide mentoring and training to local
security (especially counter-insurgency) forces. The overall emphasis, however, is on building trust and
making allies, not on large-scale kinetic operations. This strategy was evident in Iraq, where Petraeus
trialed his approach in Sunni-controlled areas so as to deny al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) safe haven. Although
this meant forming alliances with Baathists and other remnants of Saddam Hussein’s regime as well as
Sunni militants responsible for the killing of US personnel in places like Falluja and Ramadi, it did result
in a pacification of the Sunni countryside, decimation of AQI (as a result of adroit exploitation of Iraqi
Sunni resentment of foreign jihadists in their midst), and a subsequent re-balancing of post-Saddam
Shiia-Sunni conflict in ways that mitigated Iranian influence in the Iraqi political process. Although the
eventual outcome of this strategy is still uncertain and subject to reversal, it has worked well enough to
allow for a timetable for gradual withdrawal of US troops to be drawn up in parallel with Iraqi central
government assumption of primary security responsibility for the country.
Withdrawal = Taliban
Withdrawal now means the Taliban takes over when we leave
Lisa Curtis, Heritage's senior research fellow on South Asia, specializes in U.S. policy toward India,
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Nepal, 6-3-2010, “Kandahar Initiative Stands a Good
Chance To Spell Beginning of The End for Taliban”,
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Commentary/2010/06/Kandahar-initiative-stands-a-good-chanceto-spell-beginning-of-the-end-for-Taliban
By highlighting that the U.S. will begin withdrawing troops in July 2011, President Obama signals to
Afghans and others that the U.S. is not truly committed to prevailing over the Taliban This weakens
Afghan resolve to resist the Taliban now for fear they will be back in power in the near future. It also
reinforces Pakistan's inclination to hedge on its support for the Afghan Taliban leadership based on its
territory. These mixed signals are found in the National Security Strategy released by the Obama
Administration last week. The document highlights the need to succeed in Afghanistan and to prevent
the Taliban from overthrowing the Afghan government. But this resolute language is coupled with a
reiteration of the President's promise to reduce troop levels beginning in mid-2011.President Obama
must understand that premature withdrawal of U.S. troops fuels the perception in the region that
Taliban victory is inevitable. That can only undermine his own strategy.
AT: Too Poor To Solve Stability
NGOs are partnering with the military to end poverty and provide alternatives to the
Taliban
James Carafano, The Washington Examiner, “Winning Afghanistan, in war and peace”, 5-22-2011,
http://washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/columnists/2011/05/winning-afghanistan-war-and-peace
As the Marines scoured the countryside for Taliban leaders, they also did as much as they could to get
the people of Helmand on their side. They put into practice something Carl Schramm, an economist at
the Kauffman Foundation, dubs "expeditionary economics." Schramm argues that the quickest path to
stabilization is to focus on creating the markets that yield the most rapid growth in revenue and
employment. The Marines focused on giving the locals attractive options to being dollar-a-day Taliban
warriors or peons for drug lords. In doing so, our troops forged some inventive partnerships. One group
they latched on to is Spirit for America. This not-for-profit, American-based organization has a simple
mission: get U.S. troops whatever they need to help the locals. Unlike other nongovernmental
organizations that keep their distance from the military, Spirit of America staff actually embed
themselves in Marine units. They collect a list of what's needed, then work with local Afghan
contractors to get the right stuff to the right place with no red tape. What results is a cascade of
essentials, from school supplies to midwife supplies, from mechanics' tools and sewing machines to
water barrels. Thanks to this civilian-military teamwork, schools, bazaars and businesses now thrive
where there once were only Taliban and al Qaeda. Spirit for America pursues its mission with "zero"
government funds. Yet their partnership with the Marines in Helmand is helping win the war in
Afghanistan, one village at a time. It's the kind of ingenious problem solving that has always enabled
America to win wars ... and to win peace.