POS 6476
Bureaucratic Politics in the U.S.
Spring, 2015
Thursday periods 5-7
316 Anderson Hall
Prof. David Hedge
Office: 218 Anderson
Phone: 273-2367
E-mail: [email protected]
Office Hours: Tuesday, 9:30-11:00, Wednesday 1-2:30, and by appt
Public bureaucracies are at the very center of government and for that matter
American society. This semester we will consider how bureaucracies relate to one
another and their political, economic, and social environments in (primarily) the
American political system. More particularly, we will examine the means by which
citizens and their governments achieve (or not) accountability and control of the
administrative sector. Among the topics we will consider are the growth of the
administrative sector, political control of bureaucracy, regulatory federalism, and
networks. A number of questions guide that analysis.
How has the administrative sector changed over the course of American
history? What factors are responsible for those changes? What is the nature and
source (s) of bureaucratic power in America?
What tools do various political actors use to control and oversee public
bureaucracies? How effective are those tools?
What role does the bureaucratic sector play in American politics and governance?
How do the problems of accountability and control play out in a federal system of
government or where responsibility for policy is shared with the private sector?
Required Texts
Richard Nathan. 1975. The Plot that Failed: Nixon and The Administrative
Presidency. John Wiley. (used copies available through ebay, Barnes and Noble or
David E. Lewis. 2003. Presidents and the Politics of Agency Design. Stanford
University Press.
Additional readings are available on-line through the UF e-library or provided by
your instructor (labeled @below).
1. Class time will be spent reviewing the week's readings. While the readings are
often extensive, I expect them to be read (and on time) and I expect you to be
prepared to summarize, critique, and draw implications from each of the assigned
readings (you will be asked to write a brief 1-2 page reaction paper most weeks). My
role will simply be to guide the discussion. I do not intend to lecture. As with all my
courses, I do not take attendance. Nonetheless I expect you to attend each class and
participate in class discussion.
2. Near the midpoint of the semester I will ask you to write a synthesis paper that
summarizes and critiques the literature on political control of the bureaucracy.
3. Each of you will also write a 15-page research paper on some aspect of
bureaucratic life. My intention is to use some of class time most weeks to talk to
each of you individually about your papers. Students will present the products of
their research during the laST week of class. Your final paper is due Monday, April
33% Class Participation and Weekly Reaction Papers
33% Synthesis Paper
33% Research Paper
Incompletes are only given in rare and deserving cases and at the discretion of the
instructor. Student who believe that they will not be able to complete all the
requirements for the course in due time have to discuss an “I” (Incomplete) grade
with the instructor before the research paper is due. Students will have to sign an
“Incomplete Contract” (available at http://www.clas.ufl.edu/forms/) and complete
all their requirements by a set date. Students should be aware that “I” grades
become punitive after one term.
Honor Code: Academic honesty and integrity are fundamental values of the
University community. An academic honesty offense is defined as the act of lying,
cheating, or stealing academic information so that one gains academic advantage. In
the event that a student is found cheating or plagiarizing, s/he will receive a zero for
the assignment and will be reported to Student Judicial Affairs. For more
information, go to: http://www.dso.ufl.edu/studentguide/studentrights.php
Students with disabilities requesting classroom accommodation must first register
with the Dean of Students Office. The Dean of Students Office will provide
documentation to the student who must then provide this documentation to the
Instructor when requesting accommodation. Anyone with a disability should feel
free to see the professor during office hours to make the necessary arrangements.
Course Outline, Schedule, and Readings
January 8 -- Introduction to Course
January 15 -- The Rise of the Administrative Sector
Michael Nelson. 1982. "A Short Ironic History of American National Bureaucracy."
Journal of Politics. 44:747-778. e-journal
Daniel P. Carpenter. 2001. The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy. Princeton
University Press, Intro, Ch. 1,2, and). @
Steven Skownorek. 1981. Preface, Ch. 1 and Epilogue. Building a New American
State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 18771920. Cambridge University Press. @
Joseph Postell. 2012. “From Administrative State to Constitutional Government,”
Heritage Foundation online.
January 22 -- The Administrative Presidency
Richard Nathan. 1975. The Plot that Failed: Richard Nixon and the Administrative
Richard Waterman. 1989. Introduction, Ch. 1,2,5, Presidential Influence and the
Administrative State. University of Tennessee Press. @
David Hedge. March, 2013. "George W. Bush and Political Control of the
Bureaucracy," White House Studies. @
January 29-- Congressional Control and Oversight I
Terry M. Moe. 1985. “Control and Feedback in Economic Regulation: The Case
of the NLRB.” American Political Science Review 79 (December): 1094–1117. ejournal
B. Dan Wood and Richard W. Waterman. 1991. “The Dynamics of Political
Control of the Bureaucracy.” American Political Science Review. 85 (September):
801-28. e-journal
Daniel Carpenter. 1996. “Adaptive Signal Processing, Hierarchy, and Budgetary
Control in Federal Regulation.” American Political Science Review. 90 (June): 283-
302. e-journal
Barry Weingast and Mark Moran.1983. "Bureaucratic discretion or congressional
control? Regulatory policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission." Journal of
Political Economy 91(5): 765. e-journal
Charles R. Shipan. 2004. "Regulatory Regimes, Agency Actions, and the
Conditional Nature of Congressional Influence." American Political Science Review.
98 (August): 467-480. e-journal
Jason McDonald, 2010. "Limitation Riders and Congressional Influence over
Bureaucratic Policy Decisions."American Political Science Review. 104
(November): 766-782. e-journal
Recommended: Robert J. McGrath. 2013. “Legislatures, Courts, and Statutory
Control of the Bureaucracy Across the United States.” State Politics and Policy
Quarterly. 13:373. e-journal.
Highly Recommended: Larry Dodd and Richard Scott. 1986. Congress and the
Administrative State. McMillan Publishing.
February 5-- Congressional Control and Oversight II
Matthew D. McCubbins. 1999. “Abdication or Delegation? Congress, the
Bureaucracy, and the Delegation Dilemma.” Regulation, 22 (2) 30 -37. e-journal
Balla, Steven J. 1998. “Administrative Procedures and Political Control of the
Bureaucracy.” American Political Science Review 92 (September): 663-673. e-journal
David Hedge and Renee Johnson. 2002. “The Plot that Failed: The Republican
Revolution and Political Control of the Bureaucracy.” Journal of Public
Administration Research and Theory. 12 (3) 333-351. e-journal
Jason Webb Yackee and Susan Webb Yackee. 2010. “Administrative Procedures
and Bureaucratic Performance: Is Federal Rule-making “Ossified”? Journal of
Public Administration Research and Theory 20 (2): 261-282. e-journal
Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast. 1987.
"Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Control.” Journal of Law, Economics,
and Organization, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Fall): 243-277. e-journal
Matthew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwarz.1985. "Congressional Oversight
Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms." American Journal of Political
Science. 28(1): 165. e-journal
Balla, Steven J., and John R. Wright. 2001. “Interest Groups, Advisory
Committees, and Congressional Control of the Bureaucracy.” American Journal of
Political Science 45, (October): 799-812 e-journal
February 12 – Presidents, Congress, and Agency Design
David E. Lewis. 2003. Presidents and the Politics of Agency Design.
February 19 --The Courts and Bureaucracy
James Q. Wilson. 1989. Chapter 15 “Courts.” in Bureaucracy: What
Governments Do and Why They Do It. Basic Books. @
Kenneth Meier and John Bohte. 2007. “Judicial Controls on Bureaucratic Power,”
pp. 151-156. in Politics and the Bureaucracy: Policymaking in the Fourth Branch
of Government. Thompson Wadsworth. @
William Gormley. 1989. Chapter 3, "Due Process" in Taming the Bureaucracy
(Princeton University Press). @
Brandice Canes-Wrone. 2003. “Bureaucratic Decisions and the Composition of the
Lower Courts.” American Journal of Political Science. 47 (April) 205-214. e-journal
Joseph Smith. 2005. “Congress Opens the Courthouse Doors: Statutory Changes
Under the Clean Air Act.” Political Research Quarterly. 58 (March) 139-149. ejournal
Reginald Sheehan. 1990. “Administrative Agencies and the Court: A
Reexamination of the Impact of Agency Type on Decisional Outcomes.” Western
Political Quarterly. pp. 875-885. e-journal
March 12 -- Interest Groups and the Question of Capture
James Q. Wilson. 1989, Chapter 5, “Interest,” in Bureaucracy: Why Government
Agencies Do and Why They Do It. @
Richard Posner. 1974. "Theories of Economic Regulation." The Bell Journal of
Economics and Management Science. 5 (August): 335-358. e-journal
Jeffrey Cohen. 1986. The Dynamics of the “revolving door” on the
FCC.” American Journal of Political Science. e-journal
Gordon and Hafer. 2005. “Flexing Muscle: Corporate Political Expenditures as
Signals to Bureaucracy.” American Political Science Review. e-journal
Jason Webb Yackee and Susan Webb Yackee. 2006. “A Bias Towards Business?
Assessing Interest Group Influence on the U.S. Bureaucracy.” Journal of Politics,
Vol. 68, No. 1 (February): 128-139. e-journal
Terry Moe, 1989. "The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure." in Chubb and Peterson,
ed. Can Governments Govern? (Brookings, Washington, D:C) @
March 19 --Networks I – Federalism
Chubb, John, 1985. "The Political Economy of Federalism." American Political
Science Review. 79: 994-1015. e-journal
Scholz, J. T. & Wei, F.H. (1986). “Regulatory Enforcement in a Federalist
System.”American Political Science Review, 80, 1249-70. e-journal.
Hedge, D.M., Scicchitano, M.J., & Metz, P. (1991). “The Principal-agent Model and
Regulatory Federalism.” Western Political Quarterly, 44, 1055-1080. e-journal
Woods, Neal D. (2008). “Serving Two Masters? State Implementation of Federal
Regulatory Policy.” Public Administration Quarterly. 32, 571-595. e-journal
Bradbury, John C. (2006). “Regulatory Federalism and Workplace
Safety: Evidence from OSHA Enforcement.” Journal of Regulatory Economics. 29,
221-224. e-journal. 79: 994-1015. e-journal
Wilk, Eric M. and Charles M. Lamb (2010). “Federalism, Efficiency, and Civil
Rights Enforcement.” Political Research Quarterly. 1-13.
March 26 – Networks 2 - Private-Public Partnerships
Jonathon G.S. Koppell. 2003. Ch. 1-3. The Politics of Quasi-Government Hybrid
Organizations and the Dynamics of Bureaucratic Control. Cambridge University
Press. @
Christine A. Kelleher and Susan Webb Yackee. 2008. “A Political Consequence of
Contracting: Organized Interests and State Agency Decision Making.” Journal of
Public Administration Research and Theory. 19: 579-602.
April 2-- Work on Papers
April 9 – Work on Papers
April 16 – Student Presentations
April 23 – Reading Day (no class)
Monday, April 27 – Research Paper Due

POS 6476 – Hedge - Department of Political Science