INFORMATION about the reasons and consequences of system failures that have occurred in early January 2011, and the measures taken by management of the industry for their elimination and the warning of N.L. Kravtsov, N.A. Abdyrasulova INTRODUCTION In early January 2011 for two days in the power system of Kyrgyz Republic four accident occurred in high voltage networks of 220 kilovolts. According to news line, in January 5, 2011, at 18:28, on the southern section of power system accident occurred, which led to the shutdown of the main high-voltage transmission lines connecting the Kurpsai HES and substation in October substation near the village of Suzak (Jalal-Abad region) with the power system. After 7 minute of turn off, at 18:35 disconnected power line voltage of 220 kV "Crystal" - "Yulduz" connecting the substation "Crystal" with the Uzbek energy system. Рис.1. Схематичное местоположение аварий на карте воздушных линий электропередач Кыргызской Республики The other two accidents that occurred in January 8, 2011 in the northern part of Kyrgyzstan's energy system have led to the shutdown of the main transmission lines of 220 kilovolts, leaving 1.5 hours without electricity almost the entire northern part of the country and part of the AlmaAta region of Kazakhstan. All objects – are high voltage network of 220 kilovolts, which indicated where an accidents happened, are managed by JSC "National Power Network of Kyrgyzstan" (JSC "NPNK"), a schematic location indicated on the map of air transmission lines of KR (Fig. 1). 1. REASONS OF ACCIDENTS General statistics of the most common causes in violation in the work with electrical installations in JSC"NES Kyrgyzstan", driven by the director of the State Inspection on Energy and Gas, A.R.Tyumenbaev on board of the Ministry of Energy, shows the following: Figure 2. Overall statistics on the reasons for the failures of the objects JSC”NPNK" However, in these the total statistics do not specified percentage of the primary causes of failure of the insulators, switches and fall of supports. For example, if the causes of the fall of towers are the avalanche, car accident or a natural fall due to the rotting wooden supports of elements in the case of insulators - damaged suspension insulators, etc. According to the instructions of technical operation given in the general collection of the Rules of technical operation of electrical installations by consumers (ROEI), to detect possible violations in the air-lines of the organization, serving power transmission lines (in this case of JSC"NPNK"), should regularly carry out a number of diagnostic and prophylactic measures. During technical operations maintenance work should be carried out on protection of lines of elements from premature wear by removing the damage and faults identified in the inspections, tests and measurements. Moreover, in networks of electricity distribution networks (EDN) on the information from the State Inspection on energy and natural gas in recent years a trend of steady growth in the number of emergency power cutoffs. Among the main reasons for emergency power cutoffs in the networks of EDNs, called: lack of funding for maintenance and repairs electrical installations (planned and capital repairs), modernization, renovation and new construction; unsatisfactory performance of measures for maintenance and repairs electrical installations (planned and capital repairs). Low quality of technical maintenance of high-voltage networks and regulation of repair and maintenance work would turn to emergency disconnection caused by: not on time replaced rotten supporters, misalignment of supporters and traverse on the supporters; not enough clearance of the route for power transmission lines from growth of trees; insufficient operations of the wire waist of electricity transmission lines and replacement of defective insulators; water ingress in distribution systems, leading to short-circuit, and the lack of protection against short circuit; not fulfilled targets for the reconstruction of power transmission lines with the replacement of the wire to a larger cross section; not sufficient operations on removal of the power transmission lines from emergency sections, etc. Extracts from PTTE, chapter 2.3. Overhead 2.3.11. On examination of overhead should be checked: the fire state of power lines and electrical conductors 2.3.8. On the extraordinary overhead periodic examinations should and foundations, consoles; be • The status of power transmission lines ..., the state of wires and cables: there shouldn’t be organized. Periodic route, state inspections of overhead are breaks and fusion of individual wires, surges conducted on the schedule approved by the on wires and cables, ...; responsible body for the electrical equipment • The status of flexible bus systems; of the customer. Frequency of inspections of • The status of insulators: there shouldn’t be a each overhead for the entire length must be at breakage, burns, fractures, pollution ...; status least once a year. Specific dates within the of steel, the state arresters, switching limits prescribed by these Rules should be equipment for overhead and cable terminations determined by the responsible body for the on the slopes. electrical equipment of the Consumer based on 2.3.19. In overhead areas and bus systems, local conditions. 2.3.9. subject to intensive pollution, should be Extraordinary inspections of applied special or reinforced insulation, and if overhead lines or sections should be carried necessary, should be cleaned up (washing) out during the formation of ice on wires and insulation, replacement of contaminated cables, when the wires dance during ice insulators. movement and river flooding, fires in the area 03.02.21. On the overhead voltage is above of overhead track, after heavy storms, 1000 V, subject of intensive icing should be to hurricanes and other natural disasters, and melt by electric shock. after turning off the overhead relay protection and unsuccessful automatic reopen, and after a successful re-inclusion - as needed.. To investigate the reasons and consequences of accidents on 5 and 8 of January were created two commissions, chaired by the Vice Minister of Energy of Kyrgyz Republic Kalmambetova A.I., and the director of the State Inspection on Energy and Gas under the Ministry of Energy Tyumenbaeva A.R. Commission concluded that the cause of accidents in 3 cases was the breaking elements (plumes) of high voltage transmission lines, due to their damage in the joints. Below is a brief background on each of the accidents with photographs taken during the investigation commission. a) Turn off the OL-220 kW "Complex of HES-October" The reason for the first of the accident served as a break of plume phase "B" pillar № 123 high-voltage power lines (transmission lines) from the substation HPP Kurpsai "October." b) Turn off the DV-220 kW "Crystal Yulduz" According to the Commission, the eventual cause of the accident was the destruction of an intermediary unit-type of ARM-16-1 on the power lines from the substation "Crystal" to the substation "Yulduz." c) Accident on anchor supporter PS-110/35/10 kV "Central" The cause of the accident was burned down wire AC 330/43 on the output of the tension clamp WE-240-R-1969 to anchor a support number 285. d) The accident at the substation PS-220/110/10 kV "Home" According to the commission the cause of disconnection was a damage of the Coupling capacitor on substation 220/110/10 kV "Home", located on the overhead line 220 kV "Shu» ¸ phase - "A". Coupling capacitor has crashed as a result of improper maintenance of electrical equipment. It should be emphasized that all the accidents occurred due to violations of the rules of repair and preventive maintenance of staff of JSC "NPNK." And because of the weakened elements of the line equipment (of small cost) were not replaced on time or brought into compliance with the requirements of the regulations, the preliminary damages only to the power system of Kyrgyzstan, amounted to nearly one million soms. 2. CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS AND THEIR ELIMINATION According to information received from the State Inspection on Energy and Gas, an accident, which occurred on 5th January, 2011 in the southern part of the power system, resulted disabling Kurpsai HES and Kambarata hydroelectric station-2, which was stopped because of issuance of the amount of power 475 MW from these power plants. Then, in order to avoid damage on other plants of the cascade of Toktogul HES plant, the generators were turned off in another two HESon Tashkumyr and Shamaldysay. Totally in Kyrgyzstan on 5th January, 2011 48 stations was off, covering 17-20% of consumers of Kyrgyz Republic according to the former General Director of JSC "NPNK" R.Mamyrova. Due to lack of power in the energy system of Kyrgyzstan the load has increased dramatically on the main transmission line voltage of 500 kV "Agadyr-South Kazakhstan SDPP " (Kazakhstan), which automatically disconnected due to overload, and the northern part of Kyrgyzstan, as well as Zhambyl and Alma-Ata region more than 2 hours were left without electricity. During this time, consumers haven’t received about 806 thousand kWh of electricity. Accident that occurred on 8 January, 2011 in the northern part of Kyrgyzstan's energy system have led to the disabling of the main transmission lines of 220 kilovolts, as well as "GlavnayaAlmaty", leaving 1.5 hours without electricity almost the entire northern part of the country and part of the Alma-Ata region of Kazakhstan. In this case the Bishkek thermal power station was forced to reduce capacity by 134 MW (more than 2 times), and consumers have not received more than 120 thousand kWh of electricity. The information obtained from the commissions of inquiry is summarized in Table 1. Table 1. Turn off the Duration Reasons power disabled MW hours 475 ≈ 2,2 of Electricity deficiency capacity Cost, thousan thousand d kWh som 806 564,2 Accidents 5.01.2011 Disabling the generators of Kurpsai HES and Kambarata hydroelectric station-2 Disabling Tashkumyr Shamaldysay HES and Disconnecting the line 500 kV "Agadyr-South Kazakhstan GRES" Аварии 8.01.2011 г. Disconnecting power transmission lines 220 "Glavnaya kV 1.2," "Glavnaya-Shu," "Glavnaay" - "Almaty" 134 1,5 120 84,0 926 648,2 Reduction of production of HES in city of Bishkek Total Thus, the total cost of electrical energy that is not supplied to consumers only in Kyrgyz Republic amounted to almost 648.2 thousand soms. In both cases, the damage caused by termination of power production of enterprises, account of social and economic impact and moral harm brought to power disabled customers are not counted. 3. PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS Report on the results of commissions of inquiry into the causes and consequences of accidents, was presented at a meeting of the Board of the Ministry of Energy, which held on February 18, 2011. As shown above, the causes of accidents were violation of the rules of repair and preventive maintenance by the staff of JSC "NPNK." Resolution of the Board of the Ministry of Energy proposed to the Board to dismiss the general director of JSC "National Power Network of Kyrgyzstan ", and his deputies. The report of the State Inspection on Energy and Gas, represented on Collegiums, provided for in the number of planned measures to reduce the accident rate for 2011: development of a database for each energy company, including information on the availability and status of power equipment; development of measures to improve safety and reduce accidents in electricity networks; introduction of modern computer programs that tests knowledge of the rules for Electrical Installation, their technical exploitation, safety methods, etc. Analysis of the list of these and other activities which are necessary to implement and reduce the accident rate in the network, shows that besides low quality of maintenance of electrical equipment in high voltage power transmission lines and distribution networks and management of the RENs and "NPNK", there is also a low level of regulation and monitoring of these companies. In addition, of course, is necessary to consider a wide range of existing problems such as poor staff training, the development of corruption schemes in the energy sector, etc. 4. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DISCUSSION Serious accidents have occurred in early January of this year, giving signals about the actual status of the energy industry of Kyrgyz Republic. Facts indicate the feasibility of taking urgent and effective measures for renovation of the energy system of the republic and the restoration of a reliable, high-quality and uninterrupted power supply for all consumers. The results of investigation of the causes of accidents show that most accidents occur because of the negligence of staff and low level of management in electric power enterprises. The complexity of the problems of the energy sector must be taken into consideration, and it is needed to recognize that it cannot be limited only by replacement of management companies, the urgent implementation of other measures needed to prevent possible recurrence of accidents in the near future. Therefore, the working group has prepared the following recommendations: a) To the Ministry of Energy: together with the management of energy companies and the State Inspection on Energy and Gas analyze and eliminate the causes that led to breakdowns in the energy system in Kyrgyzstan, including the system of 5 and 8 January 2011; recommend to the Board of Directors of the energy companies to adopt comprehensive measures to eliminate the causes of accidents in the power equipment, including monitoring the level of training manuals and staff services, maintenance and repair, as well as suspension from work individuals ignoring the procedural requirements; organize the work of its own staff and subordinate services directed to the proper execution by energy enterprises and companies work on a reliable, uninterrupted and quality power supply to consumers; request the State Inspection on Energy and Gas to implement the control of performance of activities designed to remove the causes of accidents in the energy system of Kyrgyzstan. b) To the management of energy companies: • immediately develop and implement a plan and take measures of strict implementation of procedural works of technical equipment of systems, power generation, transmission and distribution of electricity and heat; • solve problems of outfit of staff with technical facilities of diagnosis and the movement for effective monitoring of the equipment of electrical networks Sources: 1. Messages from news lines Agency "Kabar" and News Agency «24.kg» based on a press conference 6, 9 January 2011; 2. Report of Tyumenbaeva A.R, director of the State Inspection on Energy and Gas under the Ministry of Energy of Kyrgyz Republic "On traffic accidents and violations in the energy companies by end of 2010 and objectives for reduction on 2011"; 3. Rules of technical operation of electrical installations consumers (RTOEI), approved by Decree of Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation of 13.01.2003g.; 4. Rules for Electrical Installation: All applicable sections of RB-RB-6, and 7. 5th edition (with rev. And add., As of June 1, 2006.). - Novosibirsk: Sib. Univ. Press, 2006. - 854s., IL. 5. Draft Decree of the Board of the Ministry of Energy of the Kyrgyz Republic February 18, 2011.