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Refocusing on Learning for Resilient Forest-based Communities
Ryan Bullock
Geography and Environmental Management
University of Waterloo
Derek Armitage
Geography and Environmental Studies and Cold Regions Research Centre
Wilfrid Laurier University
and
Bruce Mitchell
Geography and Environmental Management
University of Waterloo
1
Introduction
Collaborative and adaptive approaches foster social learning, bridge disconnects and
balance power relations. Such approaches provide opportunities for mutual learning and
understanding, joint problem solving, and outcomes acceptable to stakeholders with different
levels of technical expertise, training, interests, and ultimately, political motivations (Keen et al
2005; Susskind et al 2007). However, recent critiques of social learning in natural resource
management call for closer attention to how power relations can influence the production and
diffusion of knowledge and worldviews related to planning and management processes
(Armitage et al 2008; Wildemeersch 2007; Keen and Mahanty 2006; Sinclair and Diduck 2001).
What is learned among stakeholders with different levels of influence, and how learning
influences actions in a given “problem domain” (Gray 1989), are important questions in the
context of crisis situations in which emerging collaborations have the potential to increase
organizational and community resilience.
Resilient communities can purposefully affect and respond to change in order to endure
disturbance without fundamental changes to their overall structure and function (Walker and Salt
2006; Centre for Community Enterprise 2000). Learning is recognized as playing a central role
in enabling resilience, although the links between learning and resilience require more attention.
In this paper, we examine the relationship between social learning and resilience in forest-based
communities in crisis in northern Ontario, Canada. The focus on learning as a formative process
in emerging collaborations is significant because social framings influence how resource and
environmental problems, solutions, and actions are defined in the context of efforts to build
resilience in systems under significant social and ecological stress. In particular, we draw
attention to the role of a “shadow network” in facilitating social learning processes and linking
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diverse actors, and speculate on the implications for resilience in forest-based communities in
crisis. The outcomes of the analysis are illuminating for other crisis situations and contexts
where shadow networks may emerge or could be encouraged to build resilience.
The next section outlines the study setting—the forestry crisis in Northern Ontario—and
introduces the Northeast Superior Forest Community Corporation (NSFC) as a new collaborative
forum meant to bridge the gap between the local and senior levels of government. We then
discuss the relevance of frame analysis to social learning research and provide a contextualised
model of social learning that emphasizes the connections between power relations and the
production of common frames and learning in multi-stakeholder problem settings. The concept
of the “shadow network” (Gunderson 1999; Olsson et al 2006) provides a lens to examine the
emergence and potential role of the NSFC to address the conditions of stress/crisis and promote
community resilience. Social learning, conceptualized here as the production of social framings,
provides the basis for common meaning and the vision eventually adopted or imposed through
resource and environmental management organizations and institutions. We use frame analysis
(Gray 2003; 2007; Dewulf et al 2004) to present different explanations of the ongoing crisis and
to identify the perspectives guiding NSFC policies and practice. Our focus here is on the
perspectives held by those within the shadow network of municipal officials, consultants, and
academics that led to the emergence of the NSFC. We conclude by considering the generic
implications for power relations, social learning and shadow networks in relation to community
resilience.
3
The “Forestry Crisis” in Northern Ontario
The Northeast Superior Forest Community is a vernacular and functional region which
includes the communities of Chapleau, Dubreuilville, Hornpayne, Manitouwadge, Wawa, and
White River as well as eight First Nations communities: Brunswick House, Chapleau Cree,
Chapleau Ojibwe, Hornepayne, Michipicoten, Missinabie Cree, Pic Mobert and Pic River
(Figure 1). Located on the northeastern shore of Lake Superior in Northern Ontario, this roughly
60,000 km2 region straddles the boundary between the Eastern Great Lakes-St Lawrence Forest
and northern boreal forest region (Albert et al. 2006). The region is predominantly public Crown
land, nesting several heavily forest-dependent communities in what many participants refer to as
the “fibre basket”, indicating a local place identity based on forest resources and industry.
Figure 1. The Northeast Superior Forest Community, Northern Ontario, Canada
The vast natural resources located here have long been a source of wealth for the
Province of Ontario, mainly from forestry and mining. Northern Ontario’s boreal forest accounts
for 76 per cent of provincial forest land and is the backbone of the Ontario forest industry
(Province of Ontario 2008). For example, Northern Ontario is home to 16/33 of the province’s
4
pulp and paper mills. Moreover, Ontario’s 25 largest sawmills produce 80 per cent of the
province’s lumber and 22 of these are in Northern Ontario (Province of Ontario 2008).
Of nearly 800,000 people living in Northern Ontario, 26,000 people were directly
employed in Ontario’s forest products industry in 2005 (Robinson 2007). This represents 31 per
cent of the forest workers in Ontario. This figure has continually dwindled, however, due to a
downturn in the forest economy. Natural Resources Canada (NRCAN) (2007) reports that
Ontario has lost more forestry jobs than any region in Canada. In Ontario, between 2003 and
2007 about 8,000 direct jobs were lost in the forest sector through mill closures and temporary
layoffs. In Northern Ontario, about 2,200 direct jobs in forestry were lost between 2003 and
2005 (Minister’s Council of Forest Sector Competitiveness 2005), while others suggest this
number increased to 9,000 by fall 2007, representing a loss of $869 million to the northern
economy (NDP 2007).
At the scale of the NSFC, communities are home to about 13,500 and 975 non-aboriginal
and aboriginal people, respectively (NSFC 2008). Forest dependence is perhaps most
dramatically illustrated by recent population decreases associated with several recent mill
closures (Table 1). Since 2001 the region’s population has declined by 14.4 per cent, compared
to a provincial increase of 6.6 per cent (Statistics Canada 2008). In 2004, three major forestry
employers (Domtar Forest Products in White River, Weyerhaeuser Oriented Strand Board in
Wawa, Dubreuil Forest Products in Dubreuilville) provided 721 well-paying jobs (Economic
Development Corporation of Wawa 2004). Due to the closure of these three facilities in late
2007 and early 2008, an estimated 900 jobs have been eliminated in the region (Table 2). These
simultaneous closures have an added impact in that these facilities were all located
approximately 100 kilometres from one another, where local people, families and economies are
5
closely intertwined. Participants referred to the “cardhouse” structure of their regional
economies and the fact that they never realized the level of interdependence of the neighbouring
forest–reliant communities.
Table 1. Population Decrease within NSFC communities, 2001-2006
Town
Chapleau
Dubreuilville
Hornpayne
Manitouwadge
Wawa
White River
% Pop. Decrease,
2001-06
-16.9%
-20.1%
-11.2%
-22.0%
-12.6%
-15.3%
2001 Pop.
2006 Pop.
2,832
967
1,362
2,949
3,668
993
2,354
773
1,209
2,300
3,204
841
Table 2. Recent forestry and mining closures affecting NSFC communities
Town
Chapleau
Dubreuilville
Hornpayne
Company/facility
Domtar Forest Products
Dubreuil Forest Products
Olav Haavaldsrud
Manitouwadge
Wawa
White River
Newmont Canada Ltd.
Domtar Forest Products
Domtar Forest Products
Date
Spring 2005
Winter 2008
Temporary lay-offs
(fire), July 2006 to
Spring 2008
Summer 2006
Fall 2007
Fall 2007
# Jobs lost
67
329
125
245
163
229
The NSFC communities have been particularly affected by widespread mill closures and
job loss, population decline due to the outmigration of skilled labour and youth, falling real
estate values and foreclosures, declining municipal tax bases, service loss and the literal
breakdown of entire communities. Positive feedbacks have contributed to this series of changes
considered typical of the ‘downward spiral’ experienced by extractive resource-dependent towns
with the loss of a primary industry (Beattie et al. 1981; Decter et al. 1989).
Historically, a provincial focus on industrial forestry and commodity exports, and the
lack of growth in secondary wood production, has led to replacement of labour with technology
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in the forest industry and ultimately growing unemployment and mill closures (Robinson 2007).
Despite Northern Ontario’s endowment of natural resources and high degree of community
dependence on resources, communities have little control over forest management activities.
While the productive forests eligible for management are almost entirely located in Northern
Ontario, forest management is controlled by the Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources (OMNR)
and forest industry through the Forest Licensing System (OMNR 2008). For example, 42 of 47
Sustainable Forest Licences are located in Northern Ontario. Robinson (2007) points out that
Ontario’s forest policies have been developed largely through collaboration with industry: “In
essence we have a classic case of regulatory capture, in which a regulator intended to act in the
public interest comes to be dominated by the vested interests of the existing incumbents in the
industry that it oversees.” The institutions of forest management and tenure have restricted the
flow of fibre in Northern Ontario to secondary manufacturing, resulting in regional
underdevelopment.
Regarding the ongoing crisis, numerous committees, working groups and task forces
consisting of representatives from industry, government, labour, communities, and academe (i.e.
Minister’s Council on Forest Sector Competitiveness 2005; Ontario Forestry Coalition 2006;
Northwestern Ontario Forest Council 2006; CEP/USW Task Force on Resource Dependent
Communities 2007; Northwestern Ontario Economic Facilitator Report 2008) typically focus on
several multi-scaled factors as having contributed to the problem:






falling US dollar;
increasing energy costs such as electricity and diesel;
access to wood supply;
declining markets for housing materials and newsprint;
US duties on Canadian softwood lumber;
Increasing global competition from low-cost producers.
7
Figure 2 illustrates the relationship among some key factors challenging the forest industry in
Northern Ontario, the combination of which caused a string of layoffs and closures in 2007/2008.
While trade disputes, the drop in the US housing market and falling US dollar have affected
demand for Canadian forest products, operating costs in Northern Ontario have been influenced
by the steady increase in regional diesel (47 per cent increase, 2003-2007) and electricity prices
(30 per cent increase, 2003-2006) (NRCAN 2006), transportation and wood supply issues.
Figure 2. Key economic factors contributing to the forestry crisis in Northern Ontario.
US housing starts
25
1.8
1.6
20
1.4
15
1
0.8
10
Millions
CAD dollars
1.2
0.6
0.4
5
0.2
0
0
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
Source data: US Home Builders Association 2008; Bank of Canada 2008; Ontario Ministry of Energy 2008.
According to a NRCAN (2006) report on forest industry competitiveness, access to fibre
is a significant issue in Northern Ontario as “supply near the major mills is dwindling, drawing
the industry northward to stands that are more costly to harvest.” Moreover, as larger forest
companies rationalize their operations, a smaller number of “super mills” have emerged to
process fibre transported from further away where former mills are no longer operating.
8
Regional flows of wood fibre are being redirected as provincial policies regarding wood
processing were relaxed in 2005 to aid the struggling industry, allowing companies to transport
wood fibre to other areas for processing (City of Kenora 2005). This is obviously good for some
communities and bad for others. Still, the rising cost of transporting various forms of wood fibre
to distant processing facilities is calling this practice into question. Finally, an 80 year supply
shortage of softwood and poplar has also been forecast by the OMNR, presenting a significant
future challenge (ECO 2005). These related economic, demographic, ecological and policy
challenges are contributing to transition and what has been widely referred to as “the forestry
crisis” in Northern Ontario (NOSCP 2007; Woods 2007; Stewart 2005).
This view of the situation indicates that changing economic forces have driven the few
large companies that control most of the fibre supply in Northern Ontario to scale back
operations or close altogether. “Outside” forces rather than an inability to adapt are touted as the
Achilles heel of industry and this in turn has deeply affected forest-dependent communities.
While no doubt devastating, for local residents and forest stakeholders not willing to accept this
diagnosis entirely, the cause(s) of the problem is more pervasive, and the perceived solutions
involve wholesale changes to the structure of regional forest economies, cultures, and power
relations seen to limit community resilience.
In response to crisis, the six non-aboriginal towns in the NSFC submitted a collaborative
proposal to NRCAN in 2007, which was successful in landing one of 11 new sites designated
nationally for the Forest Communities Program. A main goal of the program is to “encourage
the development of knowledge, information tools and best practices to help forest communities
meet the challenges of transition in the forest sector” (NRCAN 2007). As illustrated below,
attention to this emerging collaboration or shadow network (Gunderson 1999; Olsson et al 2006)
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as an impetus for change illustrates how some are coping with conditions of stress through
collaboration and social learning as a way to foster resilience. This refocusing on learning is
significant as it is one of a few key ingredients needed to move social-ecological systems out of
crisis (Gunderson et al 2002).
Social learning, Frames and Framing
In this section, we provide a contextualized view of how power relations can influence
social learning processes and the social framings developed to guide action and outcomes in
collaborative problem domains. This leads to a discussion of the implications and importance of
shadow networks as alternative communicative forums and therefore a potential source of
change.
A focus on learning—defined here as the revision and expansion of an individual’s
“frames” used to ascribe meaning and interpret experience for understanding (Mezirow 1994;
Parson and Clark 1995)—reveals underlying processes and interactions among stakeholders that
influence the construction of collective understanding to guide collaborative action. Social
learning approaches to collaborative resource management and planning implicitly study the
convergence (or divergence) of individual and organizational frames and how common frames
are developed through “framing” and “reframing” (Gray 2004; 2003) (Figure 1). The
sociological perspective of social learning is concerned with learning processes within
organizations and societies (e.g. Argyris and Schön 1978; Dale 1989; Wynne 1992) and
“coordinated cognitive and normative adjustment” or group-level behavioural and moral change
(McCarthy 2006). A constructivist approach to social learning (e.g. Mezirow 1994; Argyris and
Schon 1978; Keen et al 2005) requires attention be paid to how people build shared meaning
10
through socially-constructed common frames, which in turn provide a basis for collective action
(see Schusler et al 2003; Argyris and Schön 1978; Gray 2004).
Figure 1. Conceptual Framework for the Study of Power Relations and Social Learning in
Collaborative Management
Stakeholders’ Frames
Power
Relations
Common Frameworks
(shared meaning)
Double-loop
learning
Routines
(action)
Experience
Culture
Single-loop
learning
Outcomes
Problem Domain (e.g. forestry crisis)
CONTEXT
Social learning theorists (Argyris and Schon 1978; Kim 1993) distinguish between two
modes of learning. Single-loop or instrumental learning is “concerned with changing skills,
practices, and actions” that affect outcomes (Keen et al 2005: 16). This supports ongoing pursuit
of current organizational policies and objectives, without changing basic values and norms
(Argyris and Schön 1978; Diduck et al 2005). Double-loop or conceptual learning results in
more fundamental changes to underlying values, norms, and objectives that in turn cause change
in strategies and action. Kim (1993) highlights the difference between using “know-how” and
“know-why” to influence the two aspects of “mental models” that guide action: 1) procedural
routines and 2) common frameworks—the latter of which is conceptually analogous with the
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frame concept. Altering frameworks through double-loop learning expands frameworks and
enables the “reframing” of problems in order to establish new routines for action. Collaboration
and an inclination for conceptual learning are thought to be necessary to produce new
frameworks, actions, and outcomes needed to facilitate transition during times of turbulence and
crisis.
However, there is also potential for frame conflicts as competing individuals and
organizations try to or do assert their dominance, which can create dysfunction. If collaborators
cannot, or will not, socially construct meaning, social learning cannot be realized. Those with
influence can affect what others, and therefore the organization or society, learns in terms of
what frames are adopted to represent reality. Competing discourses embody our social framings
of problems and solutions that shape and are shaped by certain knowledge, experience and
cultures.
For this reason, scholars (Sinclair and Diduck 2001; Armitage et al 2008; Keen and
Mahanty 2006; Wildemeersch 2007) have increasingly stressed the need for more attention to the
influence of power relations, including the forms and sources of power, in social learning. Some
have considered how design of process, structure and function can contribute to collaborative
forums, techniques, “new” knowledge, and decisions that can recreate hegemonic power
relations (Maarleveld and Dangbegnon 1999; Schusler et al 2003; Quaghebeur et al 2004).
Attention must also be paid to the embeddedness of learning and decision-making processes
within political and institutional contexts, and how political economy influences learning
processes at the local scale to affect resource and environmental management outcomes
(Glasbergen 1996; Diduck et al 2005; Wildemeersch 2007). Limiting problem definitions,
dissent, participation and conflict, as well as opportunities for stakeholder discussion and
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reflection needed for learning, are examples of how those with influence can intervene
(Maarleveld and Dangbegnon 1999; Sinclair and Diduck 2001; Diduck and Mitchell 2003;
Quaghebeur et al 2004). Armitage et al (2008:11) remind us that “learning is neither value free
or politically neutral.”
A central theme in “critical” political ecology is the pluralism of perspectives on
environmental issues and that social, cultural, political, and economic contextual influences
shape perceptions, meanings, and discourses that in turn affect practices and outcomes (Peet and
Watts 1996; Escobar 1999; Forsyth 2003). In this way, struggle is as much about dominant
rationalities over meaning as it is about institutional control and material needs (Peet and Watts
1996). Accordingly, “exploring social framings means questioning how, when, and by whom
such terms were developed as a substitute for reality” (Forsyth 2003: 81). More recently,
researchers are illustrating how civil society organizations, governments, scientists, consultants,
First Nations and other resource users are involved in local struggles for control over
environmental knowledge and the ideologies and visions that will be imposed through resource
management institutions (e.g. Rikoon 2006; Robbins 2006; Reed and McIlveen 2006; Dengler
2007; Reed 2007).
Experts cannot always be viewed as neutral consultants and objective technicians
employed to advise stakeholders in situations of learning because they bring their own
disciplinary assumptions, tools and reputations to the problem domain, emanating from certain
cultures of learning. The potential bias and influence of scientists and professional resource
managers has raised concerns for their influence on research and management agendas in, for
example, wildlife management (Diduck et al 2005), parks and protected areas (Price 1996) and
forestry (Bullock 2006). Given the immediate need for solutions and sense of dependency often
13
induced by crisis, there is high potential to adopt, unchallenged, the problem definitions and
solutions of “the helpers”. This is especially important to consider with regard to the timing or
emergence of shadow networks during crisis and their potential importance during the formative
stages of evolving collaborations. The point here is not to challenge the contribution of experts
(policy, scientific, traditional knowledge or otherwise), but to underscore their position of
influence in situations of crisis and social learning.
The Nature of Shadow Networks
Gunderson (1999) and later Olsson et al (2006) discussed the importance of “shadow
networks” to the emergence of adaptive governance and new organizations during periods of
crisis and reorganization in social-ecological systems. But the concept has received little
scrutiny in terms of the implications of the characteristics and assumptions advanced to explain
their purpose and utility. Below we briefly unpack what is meant by a shadow network to
explore what is at once a useful, yet taken for granted, concept.
Gunderson (1999) first described shadow networks:
In cases of successful adaptive assessment and management, an informal network seems
always to emerge. That network of participants places emphasis on political
independence, out of the fray of regulation and implementation, places where formal
networks and many planning processes fail. The informal, out of the fray, shadow groups
seem to be where new ideas arise and flourish. It is these "skunkworks" who explore
flexible opportunities for resolving resource issues, devise alternative designs and tests of
policy, and create ways to foster social learning.
Moreover, shadow networks are self-organizing and informal groups of people that mobilize in
response to crisis (Gunderson 1999; Olsson et al 2006; Sendzimir et al 2008). They can be
emergent or pre-existing and can form slowly or rapidly. They can have variable form through
shifting membership consisting of people with different training and experience. Their purpose
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can also shift at any given time in that pre-existing networks can switch focus from problem to
problem as needed. Little expectation or organizational obligations make participants “free” to
experiment, innovate, openly discuss create and test policy alternatives.
Although these networks have no direct formal authority, members can hold significant
or high positions within other organizations (e.g. government, universities, non-government
organizations) and belong to several networks. Individuals can also return to their formal
organizational roles and operationalize lessons learned. Thus, shadow networks can be
incubators for innovation, where new and existing ideas are projected as new visions advanced
by loosely coupled, and sometimes unlikely, partners advocating for change. In a socialecological system, the presence of cross-scale shadow networks, which can be purposefully
“activated”, are considered a source of resilience (Olsson et al 2006). They can be constructed at
scales and include domains appropriate to address specific system challenges (e.g. regional
grouping to match a watershed scale). Table 3. summarizes some implications arising from the
above discussion.
Thus, whether the shadow network evolves into a formalised legitimate authority or
inspires another organization to further develop ideas originally conceived by the shadow
network, the role of shadow networks and the influence of social learning in the production of
social framings of regional resource problems and solutions can be significant. Given their
iconoclastic role, there is potential for shadow networks to help confer resilience in socialecological systems hampered by failing policies and decision making. In such cases, new
directions can be set for “learning the way out” of problems and solutions produced by
conventional, and often dominant, thinking. In the analysis we examine the NSFC as a shadow
network and the social framings that led to actions intended to promote community resilience.
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Table 3. Implications of shadow networks

Shadow networks represent an alternative to the status quo considered by some to be responsible for
the failure(s) causing the crisis;

Since links can exist to those whom direct political agendas, depending on the extent of their
influence, shadow networks can be seen to also serve “other” interests;

The potential mix of individuals and organizations from different sectors and vocations implies
interdisciplinarity;

Those involved are problem solvers;

Members presumably have a common interest in solving “the problem”, but the question as to
personal motivations to participate remains: how do members value and/or benefit from participation
in these forums? (e.g. satisfaction of doing the right thing; simple enjoyment of learning and
interaction; promise of prestige with group affiliation; just for “sport”);

The emphasis on independence, together with the absence of formal authority and obligations,
provides flexibility, but a possible lack of accountability;

Shadow networks are considered a precursor for success with new organizations;

As a source of expertise, ideas, memory and communication, shadow networks are a resource;

The timing of their emergence during crisis positions them for a pivotal role in defining problems and
directions for setting alternative agendas.
Methods
The NSFC provides an ideal case to study stakeholder frames regarding the problem
definitions, solutions, and forms of power in an emerging social learning setting. An emerging
movement for increased local control of forest resources in Northern Ontario juxtaposes
dominant and marginalized stakeholders with historically uneven opportunities to steer forest
planning and management. The mix of experts, consultants, practitioners and lay people
provides further opportunity to assess power differentials.
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Our analysis uses discourse analysis to identify key frames and assess perspectives in
evolving debates (Rein and Schon 1994; Forsyth 2003; Lewicki et al 2003; Dewulf et al 2004;
Gray 2004) linked to the forestry crisis in Northern Ontario, with a focus on the Mayor’s Group
shadow network. We link individual perspectives up to the collective level to see what frames
emerge as dominant within a socially-constructed discourse related to the forest crisis. Problem
and solution frames are linked to collaborative decision making and actions implicitly intended
to build community resilience.
The results and analysis are based on the first phase of data collection and analysis from
ongoing research. A retrospective and current snapshot of forest stakeholder perspectives on key
forestry issues in the NSFC region is provided. Thirty-four semi-structured interviews were
conducted between June and August 2008 with former members of the Mayor’s Group as well as
representatives from forest industry, First Nations, municipal, provincial and federal
governments, forestry workers, remote tourism, academe, forestry consultants, non-government
environmental and community development organizations. Most (30/34) participants were longterm (+10 years) local residents. Following the approach used by Gray (2003), participants were
asked open-ended questions related to the nature of “the forestry problem” in Northern Ontario
and about possible solutions. Participants were also asked who they felt had the most influence
over forest resources in the NSFC region and what made certain actors powerful.
Reports, plans, and stakeholder websites related to the forestry crisis, as well as over 50
newspaper and trade magazine articles covering the forestry crisis between 2001 and September
2008 were reviewed. During the initial two month field work season, visits were made to
Aboriginal and non-aboriginal communities, operating and non-operating pulp and paper mills
17
and sawmills, and value-added wood manufacturing facilities. Triangulation of data sources was
used to achieve factual corroboration.
“The Mayor’s Group” and the Emergence of the NSFC Corporation
The Northeastern Superior Mayor’s Group emerged in February 2000 when the mayors
and other municipal representatives from the six towns began collaborating to develop
alternative solutions to common problems (NSFC 2008). This informal network was
superimposed on local government to view certain problems common to communities within the
region, and had links to local government organizations and resources that could be mobilized.
As well, links were developed to selected advisors and consultants (i.e. academics, media,
business) from sectors across Northern Ontario who were “plugged in” at various times to share
different perspectives.
Known locally as “the Mayor’s Group”, this voluntary association began to serve as a de
facto regional government, as the mayors began to coordinate their decision making and deal
collectively with senior government officials. The common view among those interviewed is
reflected by one member who pointed out: “we don’t have much power, the only power [we
have] is what we give ourselves” [SN1]. However, collaboration also added to the legitimacy
and capacity of the communities which, as was outlined in the NSFC Forest Communities
Program proposal, “are essentially postage stamps in the middle of a vast unorganized territory”
administered by the Province of Ontario (Albert et al 2006: 7).
Recognizing common service challenges associated with rural transition, they set out to
undertake projects thought necessary to maintain and improve services and infrastructure to
retain and attract residents and businesses and develop the regional economy. Through links
18
with formal governance structures both below and above them, achievements were made to
extend local cell phone service, maintain air services and local airports, attract healthcare
professionals, and establish broadband coverage throughout the region (Albert et al 2006: 4).
The initial focus was on realigning and improving services within the region to support
development.
In 2005, common challenges associated with Northern Ontario’s forestry crisis led the
Mayor’s Group to develop a shared economic strategy based on the ideas of consultants from the
Institute for Northern Ontario Research and Development at Laurentian University, Sudbury.
Acknowledging the existing and future role for forests in their communities, the Mayors set out
to “make the forest resources of the region work for the people who live in the six communities”
(Albert et al 2006: 3)—implying the need for a greater level of local control and benefits from
local forests than in the past. In developing and adopting a regional economic development
strategy, coordinating decision making, and sharing project revenues, the six communities were
increasing structures and functions for integrated problem solving. Through meetings and
discussions, they were also developing an alternative vision of the potential relationship between
forest resources and communities within their region.
Subsequently, NRCAN released a call for proposals for the Forest Communities Program
during the summer of 2006. Seeing an opportunity that matched their ongoing efforts, the
Mayors’ Group developed an application to the federal government based largely on consultant
work which resulted in successful designation and funding of $400,000 per year for five years to
establish research and programs aimed at generating economic opportunities, human capital, and
knowledge on how to do sustainable forest management. Notably, the application accepted by
the federal government stressed the perceived need for self reliance and cultural and institutional
19
reform, with the issues of tenure reform and the need to develop value-added processing at centre
stage on the first section of the proposal (Albert et al 2006: 3):
The strategy involves careful steps to develop a population capable of adding value to the
forest resources both before and after harvest, development of new training institutions,
and expansion of a development corporation specifically to promote non-timber forest
products. It involves coordinated political action, improved access to forest resources,
and experimentation with new tenure regimes. It calls for forest inventories in the hands
of the community itself, and it demands cultural change that only our community can
undertake.
Formally announced in July 2007, the Forest Communities Program is a follow-up to the
federal Model Forest Program. It is intended to “foster collaborative community efforts to help
communities take advantage of new economic opportunities from forest resources” (NRCAN
2007). This re-focussing on forest-based communities and knowledge development is intended
to increase local involvement through providing funding and networking opportunities for new
or existing community level organizations, which integrate public/private/civic perspectives
towards building resilience in forest-dependent communities.
NRCAN representatives commented that one of the main strengths of the application was
that it represented a group of collaborating communities with a unified vision, and that they had
support from local First Nations [NRCAN 1, 2]. The Mayor’s Group became the original board
of directors for the newly formed organization: the Northeast Superior Forest Community
Corporation. However, interviews with First Nations representatives indicated that at the time of
the NRCAN proposal, relations between the Mayors’ Group and First Nations were tenuous and
that the Mayors’ expression of interest to collaborate with First Nations was “tokenism” [FN 1,
2, 3].
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With no previous “member” involvement in the Mayors’ Group, local First Nations
developed their own group as a response to the perceived failings of “regional” policy making.
The Northeast Superior Regional Chiefs’ Forum was intended as a counterpart to critique the
NSFC Strategic Plan, and was initiated so that the NSFC might better reflect a legitimate
collaboration with First Nations. Unsatisfied with their exclusion from the NSFC decision
making, and seeing opportunity for more effective collaboration based on First Nations
traditional resource tenure and the capacity of non-aboriginal communities, First Nations
indicated that they would intervene in project plans unless the Mayors engaged them
appropriately. As of fall 2008, the 8 First Nations communities had selected one individual who
now jointly represents them as a NSFC voting board member.
With increasing focus and formalization, the NSFC is now pursuing project work on nontimber forest products, bioenergy, and capacity building needed to promote more meaningful
local involvement in the management and development of public forests in Northern Ontario.
The explicit goal of experimenting with new tenure regimes seems to have faded into the
background, although it is still implied as a necessity to pursuing other projects. Efforts so far
have focussed on developing the organizational capacity to manage and operate what is
essentially a funding institution that supports consultant-based feasibility research. The basic
idea is to develop a portfolio of feasibility studies in order to present business opportunities to
would-be investors and entrepreneurs, local or otherwise. Federal money provided to foster
community involvement in forestry solutions is mainly being channelled through local and nonlocal consultants who will do the front end work on studies intended to eventually provide
returns to the communities when business opportunities are implemented.
21
Given the need to secure a forest land base to implement their projects, NSFC will have
to develop partnerships with industry, First Nations and the OMNR to arrange in-kind or lease
agreements and alternative tenure policies. As of July 2008, interviews with OMNR
representatives revealed that they have not had ongoing communication with the “community
forest” [OMNR 1], indicating not only low involvement and awareness at the provincial level,
but that the OMNR characterises the nascent organization as something local and isolated from
the existing forestry policy arena. Given its early stage of development, it is too early to tell
which projects will come to fruition and what, if any, their contribution will be to sustaining the
communities on the Northeast Superior region. However, the projects being initiated originate
from alternative views of forestry problems and solutions—mainly the need for increased local
control, value-added manufacturing and development of non-timber forest products—rather than
mainstream concerns of conventional forest management planning. With the gradual
development of trust, a common vision and organizational memory, the shadow network has
engaged in double-loop social learning to question existing forest policies and economic
strategies and help “learn the way out”.
Defining the Problem: Diagnostic Frames
Diagnostic or problem definition frames point to peoples’ understanding of the problem
situation as well as what has caused the problem, and often target who is seen to be responsible
for the problem (Gray 2003). As illustrated above, a drive for self reliance and to “do things
differently” led to the formation of the shadow network that precipitated the NSFC. The
emergence of the Mayor’s Group and NSFC is linked to the efforts of collaborating individuals
who, questioning the apparent failures of policy and management, engaged in conceptual
learning to identify promising new paths.
22
All participants explained the current forestry crisis in terms of the many economic
factors (outlined above) affecting the existing industry, thereby acknowledging substantive facts
emanating from the dominant social framings of the problem provided by industry/government
reports and the media. However, rather than passively accepting this diagnosis and the
prescribed actions needed to fix the existing industry, shadow network members pressed to
identify more fundamental causes of the overall problem and, through double-loop learning,
developed their own nuanced understanding. A change in the vision and policies surrounding
forest tenure were deemed at the heart of the matter. At least three participants referred to tenure
as a taboo issue: “that nasty word called ‘tenure’” [SN2].
Citing the failure of provincial forest policy and the Crown tenure system, participants
underscored what they saw as the more fundamental aspects of the “real” problem, that is, a lack
of local control. This social framing of the problem explains the focus of the NSFC strategic
plan on projects for non-timber forest products, bioenergy and tenure innovation. The ideas were
conceived in an alternative forum and through double-loop learning modes intended to “do the
right thing” for communities. Now in operation, the routine is to award funding to NSFC
consultants who can use their “know how” for instrumental or single-loop learning on how to
“do the things right.”
Accordingly, while each side accepts some responsibility for its own shortcomings in
terms of capacity to deal with the problem, both shadow network members and those in industry
externalize the main causes of the problem. Shadow network members blame industry and
senior government for being inflexible and unaccountable to communities, while the forest
industry and labour groups (e.g. Ontario Forestry Coalition; CEP/USW) blame global forces as
23
well as federal and provincial governments for being unresponsive or not doing enough, bad
policy making, and “red tape”.
The Solutions: Prognostic Frames
Peoples’ prognostic or solution frames identify preferred strategies and tactics for solving
the problem, including who should be responsible to act (Gray 2003). The possible solutions
depend on how the problem is framed. Given that lack of local control was considered the root
of the problem, it is not surprising that all of those interviewed from the shadow network
believed that increased local control was a main part of the solution. More specifically,
participants suggested that increased local control could take on a variety of tenure forms, but
was mainly envisioned through municipal involvement or creating more opportunities for local
business and other stakeholders by securing timber allocations for specialized value-added
manufacturing rather than conventional large-scale commodity-based operations such as
dimensional lumber (sawmills).
Some were unsure about the benefits of total local control or forest ownership [SN2],
emphasizing instead the need for more meaningful collaboration between industry and
municipalities, and specifically, municipal involvement in Crown timber allocation processes.
Others were more absolute about the need to “wrestle control away from industry” [SN8].
Another member stated “See if it were me and I were a Mayor, I’d say ‘you’re God damn right I
want [forest tenure]’. Absolutely... but I’m not” [SN1]. Other members were more open to any
combination that would create conditions to have a viable forest economy [SN3, 6]. Whatever
the solution was, they believed that the onus was on the local people to make it happen because
industry and government were not seen to be motivated or support change [SN1, 3, 4, 8, 9]. This
24
shift away from the conventional thinking about and acceptance of industry-dominated forests
and communities is indicative of double-loop learning processes among network participants.
Network members said they had gained an appreciation for the complexity of forestry in
Northern Ontario and specifically in their region. Both aboriginal and non-aboriginal members
said they had learned that they had to work together with the other communities, instead of
competing with one another [SN 1, 2, 8, 9]. They expressed a preference and need for regional
stakeholders to collaborate in order to overcome what were seen as “northern problems” [SN 2,
4, 5, 9]. This call to “get everyone together” [SN5] was certainly not restricted to elites from
industry and government, but was intended to move the discussion into an accessible public
forum where diverse perspectives and ideas could be integrated into public policy.
In part, the emergence of the Mayor’s Group and the formation of the NSFC represent
such as forum. While mainstream debates among industry, labour and government entertained
instrumental learning solutions, such as how to lower energy prices and delivered wood costs
and how to tweak fibre flows to improve the competitiveness of existing industry, the shadow
network worked on how to diversify the forest economy through identification of new products
(e.g. non-timber forest products) and changing the culture of forest communities.
Power Frames
Raik et al (2008: 730) recently considered the concept of power in natural resource
management research to examine it as a nuanced concept with latent implications for practice
rather than an idea that is obvious and “inherently understandable”. Two main views of power
are portrayed: 1) the agent-centered view explains power on the basis of coercion and constraint,
or the ability of one actor to either cause certain behaviours or limit certain behaviours in
25
another. Coercive power can be exercised to force actors to do things they do not want to do.
Constraining power works to limit action through, for example, limiting discourse or dialogue to
prevent what could happen and “ensure inaction on issues” (Raik et al 2008: 733). 2) The
structural view considers power as separate from individuals, to instead emanate from social
structures that embody certain interests and, therefore, reproduce social structures that do not
represent the interests of the other. According to Raik et al (2008: 734) “The structural view
understands power as forces above and external to the individual (e.g., race, gender, class) that
operate unacknowledged to influence people and their behavior.” Both views of power are
relevant to how social learning and framing occur in the NSFC.
Participants were asked who they thought had the most power or influence over Crown
forests in the Northeast Superior region and how that power was gained. Interviews revealed
that most people, whether part of the shadow network or wider community of stakeholders,
considered either the forest industry or provincial government to have the most power, followed
by First Nations. The sources of power most often identified were the legal authority of the
provincial government and of First Nations, with the latter’s rights being recognized by the
Supreme Court decisions: “Aboriginal people have pre-existing inherent rights to the land that
they grant to the Crown, not the other way around” [SN8]. However, the view that industry had
the capacity to unduly influence due to its political affiliation and capital/resources seemed
always to arise:
In terms of forestry I think that companies still have way too much influence. They hold
the [Sustainable Forest Licences]. They’re the ones who hold the factories and the assets.
They’re the ones who employ the people. MNR has influence of course, but then again
it’s the forestry companies who are contributing to the campaigns. [SN1]
26
Nearly all shadow network participants believed that industry had too much power. This frame
was linked closely with problem and solution frames for tenure reform and support for
alternative wood uses, which were thought to be constrained by current institutional
arrangements. Indeed, legal authority and sheer resources suggest a capacity to influence
through coercion or forced action, but the ability to constrain potential actions was more
important. Specifically, the ability of industry to control government forest policy agendas and
ensure inaction was a central observation among those who perceived the need for tenure reform.
Legal authority and resources were stated as the dominant sources of power at work in
forest management and policy in the NSFC. The municipalities and federal government were
not seen as powerful actors relative to the OMNR and industry. The view was that
municipalities were powerless because industry and government did not consult them or ignored
them altogether [SN 1, 2] (again an example of power as constraint). Shadow network members
did not consider themselves to have much influence on the only agenda that really mattered (i.e.
forestry). Ironically, participants overlooked the fact that the federal government had endorsed
their unconventional project plans by providing considerable funding and that this helped create
a collaborative forum right in the shadow of the region’s traditionally dominant stakeholders (i.e.
forest industry and OMNR). However, they gained power through their individual affiliations as
well as their association with one another and aboriginal communities, and with the federal
government which supported their vision for local control—relationships that served to subvert
the power of conventional forest management structures by creating new structures and learning
agendas. So even though the newly formed NSFC had no formal authority, it was not
necessarily powerless and in fact was a source of resilience.
27
Changing power dynamics within the shadow network also led to the eventual
downgrading of relationships with consultant members. Once a formal organization was
established and backed with federal funding, municipal representatives took on more of a
leadership role and consultants and other “resources” were sidelined due to potential conflicts of
interest and the perceived need to maintain complete local control over the organization.
Moreover, the Mayor’s Group continues to meet in its original form, with the NSFC as a standalone corporation with hired management and staff.
Conclusions
We have presented evidence for the relationships between social learning and resilience
in forest-based communities in crisis in Northern Ontario, Canada. We have also provided an
examination of the shadow network that contributed to the successful establishment of the NSFC
and present an analysis of shadow network members’ frames to view shadow networks as a
source of learning and community resilience in crisis situations.
Still at an early stage of development, there is no way of knowing what the long-term
outcomes will be. However, local framings of the problem and solutions are guiding the
development of NSFC projects. The potential for the NSFC to cause significant change depends
to a large extent on its success in tenure innovations and the demonstrated returns of new
projects that in turn stimulate further consideration for tenure reform in other parts of the policy
community. A challenge for the NSFC is to get project ideas for bioenergy, non-timber forest
products, carbon credit trading and the bigger issue of tenure reform on to the provincial agenda.
This means overcoming the constraining power of agents who seek to preserve the status quo.
An important next step will be to generate active ties with the provincial government beyond
what has been done thus far.
28
Another implication for power relations, shadow networks and learning in this setting is
that certain forms of power overtake others. Power derived from legal authority and resources or
the possession of capital was given high regard at the expense of personality/charisma, expertise,
and even force. This has much to do with the venue and participants involved in conventional
debates and learning about the forestry crisis. But it also shows that the power to ensure inaction
by constraining the scope of dialogue (and therefore learning) through narrowly defining
problems and solutions for the forestry crisis, is as important as—or more important than—the
power to coerce action. The NSFC is instead focussing on the development of human capital
(i.e. people and skills) and forms of power it does have to empower communities and create
participatory capacity for regional development.
The emergence of the shadow network effectively created a space for discussion among
individuals from different backgrounds who together constructed a more complete view of their
shared problems. This took forestry debates away from the usual topics expected from
conventional power brokers such as the provincial government, labour groups, and forest
companies. This is in keeping with the role of the shadow network as incubators for ideas
intended to respond to the failings of policies (Gunderson 1999; Olsson et al 2006). Moreover,
social framings of problems and solutions reflect learning and outcomes that incorporate new
integrative frames. As frames can have sponsors or advocates (Dale 1989), this shadow network
was able to entertain and encourage ideas about tenure reform to take hold as a way to encourage
regional development. This emerging collaboration enabled the community to affect changes in
how regional services were provided and later how forest problems were defined to develop and
implement solutions. As an informal arrangement geared to problem solving and engaging in, at
critical times, conceptual or “double-loop” learning, and by re-framing the forestry crisis
29
according to community concerns, the pre-existing shadow network has been a source of
resilience for communities in the NSFC.
30
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