Selections from Berger It is my position that modernity has plunged religion into a very specific crisis, characterized by secularity, to be sure, but characterized more importantly by pluralism. In the pluralistic situation, for reasons that are readily visible to historical and social-scientific observation, that authority of all religious traditions tends to be undermined. (xi) Human life and thought is always situated in history. (5) Put differently, anyone today is not only situated in the modern world but is also situated within the structures of modern consciousness. (7) Modernity is then perceived as a great relativizing cauldron. But modernity itself is a relative phenomenon; it is one moment in the historical movements of human consciousness – not its pinnacle, or its culmination, or its end. (10) …modern consciousness entails a movement from fate to choice. (11) …the institutional pluralization of modernity had to carry in its wake a fragmentation and ipso facto a weakening of every conceivable belief and value dependent upon social support…Put differently, in the modern situation certainty is hard to come by. (19) The individual who reflects inevitably becomes more conscious of himself. That is, he turns his attention from the objectively given outside world to his own subjectivity. As he does this, two things happen simultaneously: The outside world becomes more questionable, and his own inner world becomes more complex. Both of these things are unmistakable features of modern man. (22) …there is a close connection between secularization and the pluralization of plausibility structures… (26) If the typical condition of the premodern man is one of religious certainty, it follows that that of modern man is one of religious doubt. (27) For premodern man, heresy is a possibility – usually a rather remote one; for modern man, heresy typically becomes a necessity. (28) …heresy, once the occupation of marginal and eccentric types, has become a much more general condition; indeed, heresy has become universalized. (31) …open-mindedness tends to be linked to open-endedness, and this frustrates the deep religious hunger for certainty. (63) The Deductive Possibility The neo-orthodox imagination conjures up characters who confront the “word of God” in an empirically accessible realm. But concrete human beings do not exist in such a realm. Rather, they exist as troubled Swiss pastors, French-speaking Arabs who also want to be Muslims, American college students with access to paperback editions of the Tibetan book of the dead, ex-Jews and neo-Hindus, and all the rest of us in the grip of pluralism. That is the realm in which religious experience and religious reflection Selections from Berger empirically occur. To deny it is to deny the reality of our world. The denial of reality is always a bad place to begin. (87) The Reductive Possibility At the opposite pole of a spectrum of possible responses is a mind that perceives the tradition as no longer affirmable except by way of a comprehensive translation into the categories of modern consciousness. Here the perception is the precise opposite of the orthodox or neo-orthodox one: Everything has happened. (97) History brings forth and dissolves one structure of consciousness after another. Each one is to be taken seriously and looked at in terms of its possible insights. In this respect, modern consciousness is one among many historically available structures – no more, no less…In this as in many other matters, historical understanding and the sociology of knowledge conspire to produce a healthy skepticism about the taken-for-granted certainties of any age, one’s own included. (120) The Inductive Possibility The term “induction” is used here in its most common sense – arguing from empirical evidence. This means two things: taking human experience as the starting point of religious reflection, and using the methods of the historian to uncover those human experiences that have become embodied in the various religious traditions. (127) Schleiermacher…defines revelation as “every original and new disclosure of the universe and its innermost life to man.” It should be noted that implicit in this definition is the plurality of revelations, thus immediately challenging the “once and for all” self-understanding of every kind of orthodoxy…The multiplicity of religious forms is the natural consequence of the core experience of religion. But this does not mean that all forms are equally valid or should be regarded only as interim manifestations of the divine….But now Schleiermacher must deal with the obvious question of how one is to assess the validity of any particular religious form… (131) The core of the inductive model is, quite simply, the assertion that a specific type of human experience defines the phenomenon called religion. (136) …if there is a heretical imperative, why go for one heresy rather than another? (149) There is no better phrase than “mellow certainty” to describe the fundamental attitude of liberal theology at its best… (153) Contestation means an open-minded encounter with other religious possibilities on the level of their truth claims. Put differently, one seriously engages another religion if one is open, at least hypothetically, to the proposition that this other religion is true. Put differently again, to enter into interreligious contestation is to be prepared to change one’s own view of reality. (167) …once this contestation is entered, it is unlikely that its participants will remain unchanged. (168) Selections from Berger The old agenda of liberal theology was the contestation with modernity. That agenda has exhausted itself. The much more pressing agenda today is the contestation with the fullness of human religious possibilities. (183)