Neoliberalism Kritik
1NCs
Neolib K 1NC v s Cuba Terrorism K Aff
Neoliberalism is the defining crisis of the contemporary age- we are forced with
make a choice – to align ourselves with the forces of social devastation or the
mobilize a coherent challenge to the forces of radical privatization.
FRASER, 13
(Nancy, quails not needed but Henry A. and Louise Loeb Professor of Political and
Social Science at the New School, "A Triple Movement? Parsing the Politics of
Crisis after Polanyi," New Left Review 81, May/June, P 119-21)
In many respects, today’s
crisis resembles that of the 1930s, as described by Karl Polanyi in The Great Transformation.1 Now,
relentless push to extend and de-regulate markets is every- where wreaking havoc—
destroying the livelihoods of billions of people; fraying families, weakening communities and
rupturing soli- darities; trashing habitats and despoiling nature across the globe. Now, as then, attempts
to commodify nature, labour and money are destabilizing society and economy—witness the destructive
as then, a
effects of unregulated trading in biotechnology, carbon offsets and, of course, in financial derivatives; the impacts on child care, schooling, and
care of the elderly.
Now, as then, the result is a crisis in multiple dimensions—not only economic and
financial, but also ecological and social.
Moreover, our crisis seems to share a distinctive deep-structural logic with the one
Polanyi analysed. Both appear to be rooted in a common dynamic, which he called ‘fictitious commodification’. In both eras, ours and his,
free-market fundamentalists have sought to commodify all the necessary preconditions of
commodity production. Turning labour, nature and money into objects for sale on ‘self-regulating’
markets, they proposed to treat those fundamental bases of production and exchange as if they
could be commodities like any other. In fact, however, the project was self-contradictory. Like a tiger that bites its
own tail, neo- liberalism threatens now, just as its predecessor did then, to erode the very supports
on which capitalism depends . The outcome in both cases was entirely predictable: wholesale destabilization of the
economic system on the one hand, and of nature and society on the other. Given these structural similarities, it is no surprise that many analysts of
the present crisis are now returning to Polanyi’s magnum opus, nor that many speak of our time as a ‘second great transformation’, a ‘great
transformation redux’.2 Nevertheless, the
current conjuncture diverges in a crucial respect from that of the 1930s:
the first half of the 20th century, social
despite the structural similarities, the political response today is strikingly different. In
struggles surrounding the crisis formed what Polanyi called a ‘double movement’. As he saw it, political parties and social movements
coalesced around one side or the other of a simple fault-line. On one side stood political forces and
commercial interests that favoured deregulating markets and extending commodification; on the
other stood a broad-based, cross-class front, including urban workers and rural land- owners,
socialists and conservatives, that sought to ‘protect society’ from the ravages of the market. As the
crisis sharpened, moreover, the partisans of ‘social protection’ won the day. In contexts as divergent as New Deal America, Stalinist Russia,
fascist Europe and, later, in postwar social democracy, the political classes appeared to converge on at least this one point: left to themselves,
‘self-regulating’ markets in labour, nature and money would destroy society. Political regulation was needed to save it. Today, however, no
such consensus exists. Political elites are explicitly or implicitly neoliberal—outside Latin America
and China, at least. Committed first and foremost to protecting investors, virtually all of them—
including self-professed social democrats—demand ‘austerity’ and ‘deficit reduction’, despite the
threats such policies pose to economy, society and nature. Meanwhile, popular opposition fails to
coalesce around a solidaristic alternative, despite intense but ephemeral out- bursts, such as Occupy and
the indignados, whose protests generally lack programmatic content. Progressive social movements are longer-lived and
better institutionalized, to be sure; but they suffer from fragmentation and have not united in a
coherent counter-project to neoliberalism . All told, we lack a double movement in Polanyi’s sense.3 The result, therefore, is
a curious disjuncture. While today’s crisis appears to follow a Polanyian structural logic, grounded in the dynamics of fictitious commodification, it does not manifest a Polanyian political logic, figured by the double movement.
Lifting the embargo destroys the Cuban revolution, which is key to worldwide antineoliberal revolution.
Wenston & Woods ‘08
(Fred & Alan, Alan Woods is a Trotskyist political theorist and author. He is one of the leading
members of the International Marxist Tendency, as well as its British affiliate group Socialist
Appeal, Vultures hovering over Cuba after Fidel Castro steps down
http://www.cjournal.info/2008/02/20/vultures-hovering-over-cuba-after-fidel-castro-stepsdown/)
If the Cuban revolution were defeated, as happened in Russia, it would have a demoralizing effect
first of all on the workers, youth and peasants of the whole of South America, and even on a world
scale. On the other hand the regeneration of the Cuban revolution and the victory of the
Venezuelan revolution would completely transform the situation on a world scale.
Now there are important capitalist elements in Cuba. There is an increasing number of small
traders, the people who hold dollars, black marketeers, who are increasingly interwoven with the
party and the state. And that is the real threat to the Cuban revolution. A while back the
leadership took measures to restrict the growth of the dollar economy. That will no doubt have
an effect for a time, but in the long run it cannot stem the tide in the direction of a market
economy.
One of the main reasons for this is the increased participation of Cuba on world markets, which
they are compelled to do now with the collapse of the Soviet Union. They have no alternative.
We are not against that. In and of itself it would be a progressive development. The Bolsheviks
attempted to trade with the capitalists on the world market. Lenin and Trotsky actually offered
American capitalists the possibility for them to conduct business in places like Siberia: to open
up whole parts of Russia and lease it to them as concessions – rather it lease it to them to be
correct, not give it to them. And that was absolutely correct, as long as the Bolsheviks
maintained the firm control of the state. But the Bolshevik Revolution and the Soviet state in its
infancy was a direct threat, and therefore the American, British and French bourgeois would not
trade with them. They wanted to crush the Bolshevik revolution because it was a threat.
The Cuban revolution represents a threat to capitalism and imperialism because it gives an
example. Therefore the American imperialists at this stage they do not want to trade with Cuba,
they want to throttle Cuba; they want to destroy Cuba.
If the truth were to be told, the American ruling class are a little bit lacking in mental equipment. If
they were a bit more intelligent they would not blockade Cuba. On the contrary, they would
promote trade with Cuba . That would materially assist the bourgeois counter-revolutionary forces
inside Cuba. But because they are all a little bit thick – and the big boss in the White House is
exceptionally thick – they do the opposite of what is required, from their class point of view.
The affirmative’s obsession with the question of discourse destroys anti-neoliberalist
agency – the desire to reveal the “reality” of terror will end in the lacuna of the
impossibility to get beyond discourse. Only a radically materialist strategy can
confront the terrain of economic domination.
Cloud 2006
(Dana Cloud, associate professor of rhetoric, UT Austin, Dana L. Cloud (2006) The Matrix and
Critical Theory's Desertion of the Real, Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies, 3:4, 329354, DOI: 10.1080/14791420600984243)
Perry Anderson argues that, after World War II, “Western Marxism” began an “unending detour”
into a discursivist anti-humanism that paved the way for poststructuralist and post-Marxist
theory.1 Further demoralized by the defeats of 1968, an increasingly elite group of intellectuals
became detached from actual political practice during the long post-war boom in liberal democratic
societies. Disillusioned by Stalinism, they distanced themselves from the classical Marxist
tradition, which today is commonly denigrated as a deterministic, Euro-centric master narrative.2
Intriguingly, the popular 2002 film The Matrix and its sequels replicate the discursive detour in
consumable visual form. The trilogy The Matrix, Matrix: Reloaded, and Matrix: Revolutions
begins with a vision, albeit limited, of challenging ideology and oppression based on knowledge of
the real.3 However, the subsequent films take us down the rabbit hole of relativism and antihumanism, when the films’ heroes discover that there is no “outside” to the discursive discipline of
the Matrix. Early in the first film, Morpheus (Lawrence Fishburne), an underground social
movement leader, offers its protagonist, a hacker named Neo (Keanu Reeves), the red pill of
truth as an antidote to the illusion (represented by a blue pill) of a constructed social world.
This illusory world resembles that of early-21st-century capitalism, where people go to work and
engage in all the activities of daily life. Morpheus exposes Neo to the lie (or exposes the lie to
Neo) of his existence: In the real world outside of the Matrix, people's physical bodies serve as
organic batteries for sentient machines while their disembodied consciousnesses occupy “the
Matrix.”4 Exposed to what Morpheus names “the desert of the real,”5 Neo realizes that what he
thought was real was illusion; eventually he commits himself to resistance against the machines
on behalf of a captive humanity. By the end of the Matrix trilogy, however, illusion has blurred
with reality, and Neo's resistance turns out to be folly in an inescapable world of discursive
discipline. In the more optimistic first film, Neo's transformation from nighttime rebel to full-
time revolutionary requires his knowledge that the reality of human subjugation contradicts what
is “in the true” in the Matrix.6 Guided by Morpheus, he experiences the real world marked by
deprivation, struggle, and the life-sucking exploitation by the machines. He chooses to remain in
this reality of danger and desperation, because knowing what is real and what is not is the
condition of possibility for his freedom. The capacity, illustrated in the films, to distinguish
between ideological mystification and real relations of power is the subject of this article.
Of necessity, attention to the films here is curtailed in favor of my main purpose, namely to
narrate the trajectory of contemporary theory through the narrative of the films, rather than to
interpret the films through the lens of the theories.7 The films as metonym represent an uncanny
and cogent compression of the arc of critical theory over the last several decades. As the Russian
revolutionary Leon Trotsky argued in his writings on literature and art, cultural works (including
academic theories) are bound to the historical conditions of their production; we must attend to
their collective influence not as the vanguard of social change but as ideologies that may
legitimate and sustain existing social relations.8 Taken together, the films and contemporary
critical cultural and communication theory alike emerge out of an historical moment of political
and intellectual pessimism on the Left and express deep skepticism about the possibility of
mobilizing people against real oppression. Both narratives, one in popular culture and one in the
academy, risk perpetuating an ideology of resignation to existing social relations disguised as
critique and resistance.
The films offer two versions of the real. One is an experiential real, in which knowledge of the
material base of oppression contra mystification generates critical insight and the capacity for
action. The film also invokes a Lacanian Real, in which the psychic residue of the lack of wholeness
in the Symbolic and the experience of trauma leave persons/subjects uneasy.9 In the first film, for
example, Neo experiences vague unease with his daily life in the Matrix and begins to “hack”
into the computer-driven system. While he remains in the symbolic world of the Matrix, he is
incapable of fighting it in a systematic way, because his suspicions are quite literally groundless
until he is unplugged from ideology.
In contrast to a Lacanian perspective, this article defines reality as the site of lived experience , the
place where the embodied experience of labor generates contradictions with regard to knowledge
and consciousness.10 In capitalism, the division of society into classes and the divergent experiences
of members of those classes are real. This definition of the real is standpoint-based, resting on
fundamental and divergent interests in a particular society.11 Marxists are concerned with
epistemology, questions of what is true and what is false. But epistemological questions always beg
the ontological: true or false to what or whom? Although there is no permanent, essential, or
universally experienced reality, the category of reality is necessary to political judgment even as it
finds intelligibility, conscious meaning, and strategic import in discourse. As the Marxist theorist
Georg Lukács explains, lived experience is the dialectical springboard for the production of
oppositional truth and action.12 No matter how complex the process, dialectical materialism
asks, quite simply, for a “reality test” of political discourses and ideologies from the standpoint
of ordinary people.13
While film and theory alike proclaim the end of any such reality, this article advances an
argument for a classical Marxist understanding of the rhetorically mediated relationship between
reality and consciousness.14 Classical Marxism addresses the lacuna of agency in poststructuralist
and post-Marxist theory in ways that avoid the pitfalls of relativism and anti-humanism. To the
end of understanding this problem, the article first surveys theoretical conceptions of reality and
agency in structuralist and poststructuralist theory alongside their representations in The Matrix,
Matrix: Reloaded, and Matrix: Revolutions. While the first Matrix film begins to articulate a
dialectical, interested, and solidaristic version of agency, this vision, as in contemporary theory,
falls by the wayside as the heroes of the story conclude that there is no way out of the Matrix.
The films engagingly represent critical theory's retreat from notions of truth and reality as
sources of agency, and, as Ellen Meiksins Wood and others have argued, from class-based theory
and politics.15
The second major section of the essay explores the realist philosophy of classical Marxism,
particularly the rhetorically rich concepts of real class interests (rather than identities) and
solidarity among those who share real interests. These concepts provide bases for identification
and conjoint action across identity differences, avoiding the traps of identity essentialism, antihumanism, and naïve individualism. Interests and solidarity are the building blocks of a Marxist
rhetoric and of a realpolitik of class utterly necessary to challenging the oppression and exploitation
of capitalism today. This project has been devalued and dismissed in theories with anti-humanist
and nearly exclusively symbolic commitments that give away the ground for political
instrumentality. Even rhetorical theory, originally the study of practical interventionist politics, has
allowed agency to wither away in the shadow of structuralism and relativism.
Neoliberal violence is everywhere and nowhere – while the 1AC holds us in thrall of
supposed wars, the slow violence of neoliberalism infects every area of the globe,
producing billions of anonymous victims beyond the reach of our moral concern.
Di Leo and McClennen 2012
(Jeffrey R., Dean of the School of Arts and Sciences and Professor of English and Philosophy at
the University of Houston–Victoria; Sophia A. professor of international affairs and directs
Penn State's Center for Global Studies as well as its Latin American Studies program; Postscript
on Violence symploke, Volume 20, Numbers 1-2, 2012, pp. 241-250 (Article))
Violence is everywhere. It could be argued that we are in one of the most¶ violent eras in human
history. The scope of violence today is global and its¶ magnitude immense. It is seen in the death
counts from perpetual wars and¶ the injury reports from fierce protests; it is found in the oil-soaked
waters of¶ the Gulf of Mexico and the radiation-contaminated earth of Japan; it is heard¶ in the
screams of women subject to sexual violence and the children who¶ are the victims of predators. It is
in the blood we are served by televised¶ news and the brutal visions of an increasing violence-driven
entertainment¶ industry.¶ Though our various critical and cultural studies relate features of it, and¶
our social and physical sciences capture aspects of it, the violence in our world¶ is far too
overwhelming to contain. No study can capture it in its entirety and¶ no report can present us with
a complete set of data on it. For many, the¶ violence that surrounds and engulfs us is an
abomination and a threat, something¶ to be fought and eliminated; though for many more,
violence serves a¶ social and economic end—and is as American as apple pie. “Rooted in
everyday¶ institutional structures,” writes Henry Giroux, “violence has become the¶ toxic glue that
bonds Americans together while simultaneously preventing¶ them from expanding and building a
multiracial and multicultural democracy”¶ (2002, 231).¶ The “toxic glue” of violence is a threat to
individual and social well-being¶ as well as to democracy itself. One of the imperatives of critical
pedagogy¶ must be to reveal its manifestations—another must be to work toward its¶ elimination.
And progressive intellectuals must continue to utilize the public¶ sphere through print and social
media to bring about a better understanding¶ of the dangers of an increasingly violent world and to
work toward eliminating¶ the toxic glue of violence.¶ Violence is nowhere. While violence is
everywhere more apparent, it¶ is also everywhere ignored and hidden . The violence that is unseen
and¶ unknown must be engaged just as much as the violence that is seen and¶ known. While violent
video games and movies premised on the spectacle¶ of violence are not difficult to discern, they
often have the unintended consequence¶ of closing off consideration and understanding of other
forms of¶ violence, in particular the myriad types of violence that cannot be staged.¶ Much of the
violence that is unseen and unheard happens on a temporal¶ scale that is beyond the capacities of
our senses. Termed by Rob Nixon, “slow¶ violence,” it has been described by him as “a violence
that occurs gradually¶ and out of sight, a violence of delayed destruction that is dispersed across¶
time and space, an attritional violence that is typically not viewed as violence¶ at all” (Nixon 2). The
slow violence of “mass droughts in China, flooding in¶ Australia, food crises, super twisters,
earthquakes linked to geo-engineering,¶ arctic melt-off and so on” (Cohen 2012, i); “[C]limate
change, the thawing¶ cryosphere, toxic drift, biomagnifications, deforestation, the radioactive¶
aftermath of war, acidifying oceans, and a host of other slowly unfolding¶ environmental
catastrophes” (Nixon 2).¶ This was not the violence addressed by the theorists and critics of the¶
twentieth-century. Much of this violence unfolds over spans of time better¶ described as
geological rather than human. Or, better yet, over spans of time¶ from which “the human” is
viewed as but a passing moment. The theoretical¶ work here that is just beginning to take shape
promises to reframe the very¶ ways we think about history, time, and change.1¶ However, if the
exanthropic violence of climate change is the future of¶ theory, what of the anthropic violence
that has been the focus of much attention,¶ particularly since the rise of women’s studies, gender
studies, and ethnic¶ studies in the sixties and seventies? How are we doing here with forms of¶
violence that are visible and seen and felt by women, children, and the disenfranchised¶ across
the globe? Unfortunately, not well.¶ In today’s media-saturated world, violence is always visible
but rarely¶ felt. The prevalence of media violence is especially high in U.S. culture. Our¶
entertainment industry is adept at aestheticizing violence and transforming¶ the most violent and
morally extreme members of our society into culture¶ products suitable for mass consumption
and celebration. Take for example,¶ the serial killer Aileen Wournos, who paradoxically became
the object of¶ revulsion and attraction when presented to us by the American entertainment¶
industry. Many marveled at how the angelic Hollywood actor Charlize¶ Theron had been
transformed into the “monster” Wournos, and found themselves¶ comparing the “real” Theron to
the image of Wournos presented by¶ her in the film, Monster (2003). “She is my favorite of the
night,” said a fashion¶ editor from Glamour magazine commenting on Theron’s appearance at
the¶ Golden Globes that year, “[e]specially because you have the contrast of her¶ in that movie
and the way she looks tonight.”2 This entirely commonplace¶ comment reveals a semiotic
process wherein serial killing and its aesthetic¶ image become hopelessly intertwined, and
ultimately confused.¶ In the translation of serial killing to its performance and promotion, a¶
complex semiotic process creates multiple layers of signification concerning¶ the event and its
perpetrator. The result is both a greater understanding¶ (albeit a superficial one) of the killers and
the horrific events in which they¶ participated, and a growing sense of confusion between the
“real” and the¶ image. Carefully packaged, promoted and sanitized by the culture industry, ¶
American psychos such as Jeffrey Dahmer, Aileen Wournos and John Wayne¶ Gacy increasingly
become less despicable objects of moral revulsion, and¶ more objects of fascination and
entertainment. Their final entry into the sign¶ system of celebrity entertainment is signaled by
becoming household names¶ as readily recognizable as our sports, movie and television icons.
For the average¶ culturally literate American, naming three contemporary serial killers is¶ about as
challenging as naming three talk show hosts. However, the realness¶ of these killers and their
violent crimes gets buried under multiple layers of¶ signification. A “hyperreal”—and
“hypermoral”—image soon displaces any¶ remaining fragments of the reality of the horrific
events perpetrated by them.¶ The cultural celebration of violence though does not end with the
remediation¶ of increasingly macabre, sadistic, and cruel behavior. Rather, it creates¶ a culture
where violence has become a—if not “the”—standard form of entertainment,¶ and where our
children are targeted as major consumers of this¶ violence. From the hyper-real violence of many
of the video games played¶ by children to the scenes of fighting, killing, and torture found in
many of the¶ movies our children watch, there is no escaping the toxic glue of violence.¶ Even the
“G” rated Pixar family movie, Cars 2 (2011), featured two deaths¶ and one torture scene (a crime
syndicate tortures a car until it blows up).¶ How else can this be explained except as a primer on
violence for children?¶ It is not going to be a surprise to anyone familiar with the American film¶
industry that violence is one of its main commodities—and one that is internationally¶ consumed.
However, there is some reason to believe that more¶ people are beginning to understand the
negative impact of repeated cultural¶ consumption of violence. If nothing else, the tragic events
surrounding the¶ shooting of moviegoers in Aurora, Colorado this past summer facilitated this¶
discussion. However, the solution is not to be found in say banning The Dark¶ Knight Rises
(2012) from theaters because of its alleged connection to an act¶ of violence. This would be about
as effective as taking Sweet Tarts away from¶ children in an effort to stop tooth decay. Rather,
the solution is to be found¶ in understanding how making violence into a commodity connects
with a¶ broader and more pernicious neoliberal social and economic agenda. Once¶ this is
understood, then just as with eating candy, you can consume violence¶ at your own risk.¶
Neoliberal economic practices have increased biopolitical violence. The¶ devastating effects of
neoliberalism have been well documented. “Under¶ neoliberalism,” writes Henry Giroux,
“everything either is for sale or is plundered¶ for profit” (2004, xii). He continues:¶ Public lands
are looted by logging companies and corporate ranchers;¶ politicians willingly hand the public’s
airwaves over to broadcasters¶ and large corporate interests without a dime going into the¶ public
trust; Halliburton gives war profiteering a new meaning as¶ it is granted corporate contracts
without any competitive bidding¶ and then bilks the U.S. government for millions; the environment¶
is polluted and despoiled in the name of profit-making just as the¶ government passes legislation to
make it easier for corporations¶ to do so; public services are gutted in order to lower the taxes of¶
major corporations; schools increasingly resemble malls or jails,¶ and teachers, forced to raise
revenue for classroom materials,¶ increasingly function as circus barkers hawking everything
from¶ hamburgers to pizza parties—that is, when they are not reduced to¶ prepping students to get
higher test scores. (2004, xii-xiv)¶ When extreme free-market capitalism becomes the source of
values,¶ violence is given a reprieve from moral indignation . Democratic values as¶ well as basic
notions of human rights and economic justice are overlooked¶ when the market reveals profits to be
had—or losses to be avoided. As¶ neoliberalism widens the gulf between the rich and the poor, and
the enfranchised¶ and the disenfranchised, it also places at risk of violence the poor and¶ the
disenfranchised. Therefore, it should be no surprise that the devastation¶ of the environment and
the violation of human rights is often more extreme¶ in less affluent parts of the world.¶ Moreover,
the celebration of violence in the American entertainment¶ industry must be seen as an extension
of the neoliberal militaristic transformation¶ of the country. Arguably, the state of permanent war
of the United States¶ has benefited an entertainment industry which views increased militarization¶
as a marketing dream. Toys, games, videos, movies and clothing associated¶ with the military and
its values increase in times of war. The permanent¶ state of war in the United States thus provides
increasing opportunities for¶ corporations endlessly to exploit nationalistic jingoism and the
glorification¶ of violence. In light of neoliberalism and its economic Darwinism, the recent ¶
resurrection of Captain America—the defender of American “ideals”—is less¶ a nostalgic nod to
comic history’s past, than a market-driven embrace of our¶ increasingly militarized, violent, and
jingoistic culture.
Latin America is the nodal point for resistance to neoliberalism—ally yourself with
the forces of new political possibilities.
MACLEOD 2013 (ALAN, Thatcher and Chavez A Tale of Two Deaths; counterpunch
http://www.counterpunch.org/2013/04/12/a-tale-of-two-deaths/)
But Chavez was quick to distance the movement from previous failed attempts and from dogmatic
ideologies of the past: “We are not talking about copying models, I believe that copying models
was one of the great errors of the socialist attempts of the 20th century, following the handbook.
No, with this autonomy, with this diversity, with this force originating from every community, from
our people.” Today, more than 360 million Latin Americans live under left-wing governments
dubbed “the Pink Tide” by Western intellectuals (perhaps because they couldn’t stomach the
word “red”). They are not homogeneous, they range from the eco-socialism of Morales in Bolivia,
to Ecuador’s radical young economist, Correa to the Workers’ Party and Lula in Brazil, but basic
principles of equality and integration unite them. Critics claim a reliance on state leads to
corruption and inefficiency, and that enforced collective action is an attack on the pure liberty of
the individual. It is not by chance that an anti-neoliberal agenda has developed in Latin America. It
was in the “Empire’s Workshop” where Thatcher and Friedman’s ideas were first implemented.
After overthrowing President Allende, a democratic Marxist who stood for many of the same
things Chavez did, dictator General Pinochet invited protégés of Friedman and Hayek to Chile.
There, they had free reign to carry out their ideas, thanks to the General’s brutal suppression of
the population. The result was not dissimilar to the West today: soaring unemployment and
poverty, falling industrial production and purchasing power falling to just 40% of what it had
been in 1970, coupled with a rise in wealth and power of a small section at the top of society.
Hayek recommended Chile as a model for Thatcher to follow. She agreed Chile to be an
“economic miracle”, but lamented that Britain’s “democratic institutions and the need for a high
degree of consent” made “some of the measures” taken “quite unacceptable”. Likewise in
Venezuela, President Carlos Andres Perez, on instruction from Friedman’s students, imposed a
sweeping austerity “packet” on Venezuela, privatizing state-owned assets and removing price
controls on oil, plunging the population into poverty, to the point where ordinary Caracas residents
spent more than 25% of their income on bus fares (Jones, p116). This despite running on an anti-
neoliberal ticket, calling the bankers and economists “genocide workers in the pay of economic
totalitarianism” during his election campaign. Desperate Venezuelans began rioting for food, but
their protest soon became one against the system itself. The government acted quickly. The
military was called in, surrounded the poor quarters of the city, and commenced three days of
war against its inhabitants. The L.A. Times’ Bart Jones speaks of Red Cross workers being
gunned down in the street, “mass graves” being filled with “mutilated corpses”, “tied up corpses”
with “bullets in the back of their heads” and children being gunned down as the armies fired
indiscriminately into shanty towns (Jones, Hugo! pp. 121-124). Perhaps 3,000 were killed, a
similar number to the Tienanmen Square crackdown, in a country with a population more than
40 times smaller. So it was not in Seattle, but in Caracas where the first direct protest against
neoliberalism occurred. And it was the outrage at the brutal suppression of the people which
spurred Chavez onto the political stage. Latin America is ten to twenty years ahead of the West, in
economic terms. After decades of brutal neoliberal austerity, an alternative has emerged and fought
back. Similar ideas have begun to appear in the West, thanks to the Occupy Movement, which
swept America and Europe last year. Those in the West has much to learn from the region, even if
it is what not to do. The Guardian released a piece on the legacy of Margaret Thatcher. It showed
a 65% increase in British poverty, from 13 to 22% of the population. Inequality, as measured by
the GINI index, rose from .253 to .339. The planned destruction of the manufacturing industry
led to record high unemployment. The irony of Thatcherism is that her policies have left far
more people dependent on the welfare state than previously. In contrast, even Thatcher’s allies at
the World Bank admit that Chavez managed a 50% decrease in poverty, and a 65% decrease in
extreme poverty. Their figures show too that unemployment fell from 14.5% in 1999 to 7.6% in
2009. Venezuela’s inequality has dropped from .487 in 1998 to .392 in 2009. Today, it is the
most admired country in Latin America. A similar story is being played out in other Latin
American countries. For all this, Thatcher was remarkably successful in shifting the political
discourse to the right. Her policies of privileging business led to record corporate profits and
increased concentration of media ownership. Socialists like Tony Benn were pushed to one side
and Tony Blair became leader of a “New Labour”, largely indistinguishable from the
Conservatives. When asked what she thought was her greatest achievement was, Thatcher
responded “Tony Blair and New Labour”. Benn agreed, ruefully. The concentration of money
has led to the rightward shift of the media, too. The “free-market” has led to independent media
bought up or swamped by massive conglomerates. Media outlets are increasingly beholden to
corporations for advertising. Today, questioning neoliberalism is heresy, leading to even
supposedly left-of-centre newspapers wondering if we should be “worried by the rise of the
populist left in Latin America”. It is becoming increasingly hard to hide the successes of
countries of Latin America in solving age old problems by bucking the supposed iron rules of
neoliberal economics. But the media continues to try. The New York Times bemoans Chavez’s
“irresponsible handouts”, while the Washington Post insists he remains in power only by
“showering the poor with gifts”. What are these gifts? The Telegraph finally enlightens us:
“lavishing state funds” on projects like operations to restore sight to the blind and soup kitchens.
Such is the aversion to the state in Western intellectual culture that providing even basic food
and medicine, in accordance with the UN Declaration of Human Rights, are serious
transgressions on freedom. This has been lampooned by FAIR, in their article “Chavez Wasted
his Money on Healthcare When He Could Have Built Gigantic Skyscrapers”. Despite Thatcher
insisting that “there is no alternative”, Latin America is providing a model for a different future. A
silent battle for heaven and Earth is being waged. And we all must choose sides. Which one are you
on? Choose wisely, because the fate of the 21st century will be decided on which one of these
ideologies prevails.
Total rejection is key – the only way to produce real alternatives to neoliberalism is
to refuse the allure of half measures.
Werlhof 8
(Claudia von Werlhof. Werlhof is a professor at the Institute of Political Sciences at the
University of Innsbruck. “The Globalization of Neoliberalism, its Consequences and Some of its
Basic Alternatives.” 27 August 2008. Capitalism Nature Socialism. BA)
Still, euphoria would be out of place. An alternative to neoliberalism is not created through
analysis and protest alone but must be practiced. Opinions on how to do this differ. Some discuss
‘‘alternatives’’ that are none: a reform of the WTO; ‘‘control’’ of globalization through NGOs; a
return to Keynesianism; a restoration of ‘‘social market economy’’; or even a revival of
socialism. Such ideas ignore reality and trivialize the problem. Neoliberalism shows every day
that much more is at stake.
Neoliberalism is an apocalypse, a ‘‘revelation,’’ because the reality it creates makes it impossible
for neoliberalism to justify itself. Nor can we consider the corporations harmless ‘‘players.’’
There is no ambiguity. As a consequence, the perpetrators of neoliberal politics simply lie about
what is happening. The only good thing about neoliberalism is that it reveals the truth about
‘‘Western civilization’’ and ‘‘European values.’’ This means that people now have the chance to
draw the right conclusions about what is really needed.
What is really needed, of course, is nothing less than a different civilization. A different
economy alone, or a different society or culture will not suffice. We need a civilization that is the
exact opposite of neoliberalism and the patriarchal capitalist world system it is rooted in. The
logic of our alternative must be one that completely undermines the logic of neoliberalism.113
Neoliberalism has turned everything that would ensure a good life for all beings on this planet
upside down. Many people still have a hard time understanding that the horror we are
experiencing is indeed a reality*a reality willingly produced, maintained and justified by ‘‘our’’
politicians. But even if the alternative was half implemented*no more plundering, exploitation,
destruction, violence, war, coer- cion, mercilessness, accumulation, greed, corruption*we would
still be left with all the damage that the earth has already suffered.
Neolib K 1NC vs Mexico Starter Pack
The ideology of neoliberalism is on the retreat globally – the stark failure evident in
the 2008 financial collapse has legitimated the nascent alternatives to neoliberalism
developing across Latin America.
Bridsall and Fukuyama (lol) 2011
(Nancy; Center for Global Development's founding president.; Francis; prof of international
relations, Stanford university; The Post-Washington Consensus. Birdsall, Nancy, Fukuyama,
Francis, Foreign Affairs, 00157120, Mar/Apr2011, Vol. 90, Issue 2 The Post-Washington
Consensus)
THE LAST time a global depression originated in the United States, the impact was devastating not
only for the world economy but for world politics as well. The Great Depression set the stage for a
shift away from strict monetarism and laissez-faire policies toward Keynesian demand
management. More important, for many it delegitimized the capitalist system itself, paving the way
for the rise of radical and antiliberal movements around the world.
This time around, there has been no violent rejection of capitalism, even in the developing world. In
early 2009, at the height of the global financial panic, China and Russia, two formerly noncapitalist
states, made it clear to their domestic and foreign investors that they had no intention of
abandoning the capitalist model. No leader of a major developing country has backed away from
his or her commitment to free trade or the global capitalist system. Instead, the established
Western democracies are the ones that have highlighted the risks of relying too much on market-led
globalization and called for greater regulation of global finance.
Why has the reaction in developing countries been so much less extreme after this crisis than it was
after the Great Depression? For one, they blame the United States for it. Many in the developing
world agreed with Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva when he said, "This is a crisis
caused by people, white with blue eyes." If the global financial crisis put any development model
on trial, it was the free-market or neoliberal model, which emphasizes a small state, deregulation,
private ownership, and low taxes . Few developing countries consider themselves to have fully
adopted that model.
Indeed, for years before the crisis, they had been distancing themselves from it. The financial crises
of the late 1990s in East Asia and Latin America discredited many of the ideas associated with the
so-called Washington consensus, particularly that of unalloyed reliance on foreign capital. By
2008, most emerging-market countries had reduced their exposure to the foreign financial markets
by accumulating large foreign currency reserves and maintaining regulatory control of their
banking systems. These policies provided insulation from global economic volatility and were
vindicated by the impressive rebounds in the wake of the recent crisis: the emerging markets
have posted much better economic growth numbers than their counterparts in the developed
world.
Thus, the American version of capitalism is, if not in full disrepute, then at least no longer
dominant. In the next decade, emerging-market and low-income countries are likely to modify their
approach to economic policy further, trading the flexibility and efficiency associated with the freemarket model for domestic policies meant to ensure greater resilience in the face of competitive
pressures and global economic trauma. They will become less focused on the free flow of capital,
more concerned with minimizing social disruption through social safety net programs, and more
active in supporting domestic industries. And they will be even less inclined than before to defer
to the supposed expertise of the more developed countries , believing--correctly--that not only
economic but also intellectual power are becoming increasingly evenly distributed.
Unfortunately, the affirmative inaugurates a new era of neoliberal legitimation. We
will isolate several links 1 - Oil: The elevation of oil as the defining element of economic engagement is the
logic of neoliberalist domination - ruthless resource extraction and economic
competition becomes the basis of all human interaction.
Giroux 5 (Henry A. – Global Television Network Chair, Professor at McMaster University,
“The Terror of Neoliberalism: Rethinking the Significance of Cultural Politics”, Winter 2005,
JSTOR)
Fredric Jameson has argued in The Seeds of Time, it has now become easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism (1994,
xii). The breathless rhetoric
of the global victory of free-market rationality spewed forth by the mass media, rightwing intellectuals, and governments alike has found its material expression both in an all-out attack on
democratic values and in the growth of a range of social problems including: virulent and
persistent poverty, joblessness, inadequate health care, apartheid in the inner cities, and increasing
inequalities between the rich and the poor. Such problems appear to have been either removed from the inventory of public
discourse and social policy or factored into talk-show spectacles in which the public becomes merely a staging area for venting private interests
and emotions. Within
the discourse of neoliberalism that has taken hold of the public imagination, there is no way of
talking about what is fundamen tal to civic life, critical citizenship, and a substantive democracy . Neoliberalism offers
no critical vocabulary for speaking about political or social transformation as a democratic project. Nor is there a
language for either the ideal of public commitment or the notion of a social agency capa ble of challenging the basic assumptions of corporate
ideology as well as its social consequences. In its dubious appeals to universal laws, neutrality, and selective scientific research,
neoliberalism "eliminates the very possibility of critical thinking, without which democratic debate
becomes impossible" (Buck-Morss 2003, 65-66).This shift in rhetoric makes it possible for advocates of
neoliberalism to implement the most ruthless economic and political policies without having to open up such
actions to public debate and dialogue. Hence, neoliberal policies that promote the cutthroat downsizing of the workforce, the bleeding of social
services, the reduction of state governments to police precincts, the ongoing liquidation of job security, the increasing elimination of a decent
social wage, the creation of a society of low-skilled workers, and the emergence of a culture of permanent insecu rity and fear hide behind
appeals to common sense and allegedly immutable laws of nature. When and where such nakedly ideological appeals strain both reason and
imagination, religious faith is invoked to silence dissension. Society is no longer defended as a space in which to nurture the most fundamental
values and relations necessary to a democracy but has been recast as an ideological and political sphere "where religious fundamentalism comes
together with market fundamentalism to form the ideology of American supremacy" (Soros 2004, 10). Similarly, American imperial ambitions
are now legitimated by public relations intellectuals as part of the responsibilities of empire-building, which in turn is celebrated as either a
civilizing process for the rest of the globe or as simply a right bestowed upon the powerful. For instance, Ann Coulter speaks for many such
intellectuals when she recently argued, while giving a speech at Penn State University, that she had no trouble with the idea that the United States
We need oil . Of course, we consume most of
the world's oil; we do most of the world's production" (qtd. in Colella 2004,1). In this world-view, power,
money, and a debased appeal to pragmatism always trump social and economic justice . Hence, it is
not surprising for neo-conservatives to have joined hands with neoliberals and religious fundamentalists in
broadcasting to the world at large an American triumphalism in which the United States is arrogantly defined as "[t]he
greatest of all great powers in world history" (Frum and Pearle qtd. in Lapham 2004b, 8).2 But money, profits, and fear have
become powerful ideological elements not only in arguing for opening up new markets, but also for closing down the
possibility of dissent at home. In such a scenario, the police state is cele brated by religious evangelicals like John Ashcroft as a
invaded Iraq in order to seize its oil. As she put it, "Why not go to war just for oil?
foundation of human freedom. This becomes clear not only in the passage of repressive laws such as the USA Patriot Act but also in the work of
prominent neoconservatives such as David Frum and Richard Pearle who, without any irony intended, insist that "[a] free society is not an unpoliced society. A free society is a self-policed society" (qtd. in Lapham 2004b, 8). In what could only be defined as an Adam Smith joins George
Orwell in a religious cult in California scenario, markets have been elevated to the status of sacrosanct temples to be worshiped by eager
consumers while citizens-turned soldiers of the-Army-of-God are urged to spy on each other and dissent is increas ingly criminalized.3 Political
culture, if not the nature of politics itself, has undergone revo lutionary changes in the last two decades, reaching its most debased expres sion
under the administration of President George W. Bush. Within
this polit ical culture, not only is democracy subordinated
to the rule of the market, but corporate decisions are freed from territorial constraints and the demands of public obligations, just as
economics is disconnected from its social consequences. Power is increasingly removed from the dictates and control of nation states and politics
is largely relegated to the sphere of the local. Zygmunt Bauman captures brilliantly what is new about the relation ship among power, politics,
and the shredding of social obligations: The mobility acquired by "people who invest"?those with capital, with money which the investment
requires?means the new, indeed unprece dented ... disconnection of power from obligations: duties towards employ ees, but also towards the
younger and weaker, towards yet unborn genera tions and towards the self-reproduction of the living conditions of all; in short the freedom from
the duty to contribute to daily life and the perpet uation of the community. . . . Shedding the responsibility for the conse quences is the most
coveted and cherished gain which the new mobility brings to free-floating, locally unbound capital. (Bauman 1998, 9-10) Corporate power
increasingly frees itself from any political limitations just as it uses its power through the educational force of the dominant culture to put into
place an utterly privatized notion of agency in which it becomes difficult for young people and adults to imagine democracy as a public good, let
alone the transformative power of collective action. Once again, demo cratic politics has become ineffective, if not banal, as civic language is
impoverished and genuine spaces for democratic learning, debate, and dialogue such as schools, newspapers, popular culture, television
networks, and other public spheres are either underfunded, eliminated, privatized, or subject to corporate ownership.
Under the
aggressive politics and culture of neoliberalism , society is increasingly mobilized for the production
of violence against the poor, immigrants, dissenters, and others marginalized because of their age,
gender, race, ethnicity, and color. At the center of neoliberalism is a new form of politics in the United States, a
politics in which radical exclusion is the order of the day, and in which the primary questions no longer con cern
equality, justice, or freedom, but are now about the survival of the slickest in a culture marked by fear, surveillance, and economic deprivation.
This is a politics that hides its own ideology by eliminating the traces of its power in a rhetoric of normalization, populism, and the staging of
public spectacles. As Susan George points out, the question that currently seems to define neoliberal "democracy" is "Who has a right to live or
does not" (1999,para.34). Neoliberalism is not a neutral, technical, economic discourse that can be measured with the precision of a mathematical
formula or defended through an appeal to the rules of a presumptively unassailable science that conve niently leaves its own history behind. Nor
is it a paragon of economic ration ality that offers the best "route to optimum efficiency, rapid economic growth and innovation, and rising
prosperity for all who are willing to work hard and take advantage of available opportunities" (Kotz 2003, 16). On the contrary ,
neoliberalism is an ideology, a politics , and at times a fanaticism that subordinates the art of democratic politics to the
rapacious laws of a market economy that expands its reach to include all aspects of social life within the dictates and values of a market-driven
society. More important, it is an eco nomic and implicitly cultural theory?a historical and socially constructed ideology that needs to be made
visible, critically engaged, and shaken from the stranglehold of power it currently exercises over most of the command ing institutions of national
and global life. As such, neoliberalism makes it difficult for many people either to imagine a notion of individual and social
agency necessary for reclaiming a substantive democracy or to be able to theorize the economic, cultural, and political conditions necessary for
a viable global public sphere in which public institutions, spaces, and goods become valued as part of a
larger democratic struggle for a sustainable future and the downward distribution of wealth,
resources, and power.
2 – Hegemony - The desire for hegemonic stability is motivated not by great power
politics, but rather the endless need for wealth accumulation and control over the
flow of global capital, requiring endless violence.
Haug 2011
Wolfgang Fritz, former professor of philosophy at the Free University of Berlin, “Empire or
Imperialism” boundary 2 http://boundary2.dukejournals.org/content/38/2/1.short
The greatest contradiction, however—the historical dynamic of which has been only gradually
revealed, until the collapse of the “New Wall Street System” announced it with a world historical
thunderclap54—was held in store by the political economy of the superpower. It reminds us of
Hegel’s description of the Master-Servant dialectic. This is so because it is exactly at the point where it is
triumphant, and where its triumph is literally enjoyed in the form of consumption, that the reasons
for its unsustainability are located. The United States is a superpower only with regard to the
paradoxical price of its overconsumption. It borrowed the financial basis for its consumerism and
also for its military might from its vassals. “In this regard, of course, the Cold War provided the USA with a glorious
opportunity.”55 Indeed, as always, Marx’s phrase about competition applied: “One capitalist always strikes down many others” (Capital, 1:929).
However, at the same time, all capitalists feared expropriation by their common enemy, the Soviet Union. The
United States became
the stronghold and guarantor of global capital. With the disappearance of this threat, so too
disappeared the “commercial basis” of the paradigm. The spatiotemporally open-ended “war on
terror” was supposed to reconstitute it. Yet the asymmetrical nonstate and rhizomatic enemy of this
new constellation could not replace the old systemic antagonist, the second superpower in the balance of terror, the
USSR. Capital continued to flow into the United States, though it no longer came out of fear but to
do business—some of it rather wondrous business, which, as it seemed, could transform penury into
abundance. We will return to this. It is characteristic of capital that, under its reign, according to Marx’s dictum,
“everything seems pregnant with its contrary.”56 This peculiar historical pregnancy also applies to
the United States. As the competition agent of US capital on the world market and in the
international state system, the American state took possession of the role of the global aggregate
capitalist (Gesamtkapitalist). Against any rivals to its own domestic capitals’ interests, the United States
brandished their incomparable power. This was hegemony in the sense of the mainstream crude
power approach, “dictates of the hegemonic power”:57 simple preponderance and crushing
superiority by means of violence. Admittedly, the economic activities of transnational US capital allowed for still less national
specification than the world market activities in Rosa Luxemburg’s time, since their value creation chains were now above all transnational, that
is, organized on a border-crossing basis. To be sure, the United States remained the “container of power” that sheltered the headquarters of US
capital. However, the export successes of US capital operating from China were reflected in the US trade deficits, although the value creation
chains were manipulated in such a way as to realize in the United States the lion’s share of the surplus value produced in China. In order to
maintain its doubly advantageous position, US transnational capital must thus pursue the expansion of global trade relations and norms, which, in
the framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO), would result in a kind of global political-economic jurisdiction. Inasmuch as the US
state pursued and continues to pursue this standardization, it served and serves the interests of all transnational capital. Whenever this service,
which is provided to the collectivity of transnationally active capital, secures advantages for those who are more efficient competitors of US
capital, American politics then develops a schism. The
imperial state then claims the privilege of keeping the
unleashing of an unlimited world capitalism, its emancipation from national border regimes, within
the limits of its own interests. Unlimited free trade is something that applies to others, not to the United States. In this regard, the
WTO itself, which a short time ago was its instrument, became bothersome.
3 - Economic crisis - Its inevitable under the strictures of neoliberalism –ever
escalating military conflict is the only permanent solution to economic instability.
David Harvey , Professor of Anthropology at the Graduate Center of the City
University of New York, 2010 (The Enigma of Capital, and the crises of capitalism
224-228)
At times of crisis, the irrationality of capitalism becomes plain for all to see. Surplus capital and surplus labour
exist side by side with seemingly no way to put them hack together in the midst of immense human suffering and unmet needs. In midsummer of
2009, one third of the capital equipment in the United States stood idle, while some 17 per cent of the workforce were either unemployed,
enforced parttimers or discouraged workers. What could be more irrational than that? For
capital accumulation to return to 3
per cent compound growth will require a new basis for profit-making and surplus absorption. The
irrational way to do this in the past has been the rough the destruct on of the achievements of
preceding eras by way of war, the devaluation of assets, the degradation of productive capacity,
abandonment and other forms of 'creative destruction', The effects are felt not only throughout the world of commodity
production and exchange. Human lives are disrupted and even physically destroyed, whole careers and
lifetime achievements are put in jeopardy. deeply held beliefs are challenged, psyches wounded and~ respect for
human dignity is cast aside. Creative destruction is visited upon the good, the beautiful the bad and the ugly alike. Crises, we
may conclude, are the irrational rationalisers of an irrational system. Can capitalism survive the
present trauma? Yes. of course. But at what cost? This question masks another. Can the capitalist class reproduce its power
in the face of the raft of economic. social. political and geopolitical and environmental difficultiess? Again, the answer is a resounding ·Yes it
can: This
will however, require the mass of the people to give generously of the fruits of their labour to
those in power, to surrender many of their rights and their hard -won asset values (in everything
from housing to pension rights) and to suffer environmental degradations galore, to say nothing of
serial reductions in their living standards which will mean starvation for many of those already
struggling to survive at rock bottom. More than a little political repression, police violence and
militarised state control will be required to stifle the ensuing unrest. But there will also have to be wrenching and
painful shifts in the geographical and sectoral locus of capitalist class power. The capitalist class cannot, if history is any guide, maintain its
power without changing its character and moving accumulation on to a different trajectory and into new spaces (such as east Asia). Since much of
this is unpredictable and since the spaces of the global economy are so variable, then uncertainties as to outcomes are heightened at times of
crisis. All manner of localised possibilities arise for either nascent capitalists in some new space to seize opportunities to challenge older class
and territorial hegemonies (as when Silicon Valley replaced Detroit from the mid-1970s onwards in the United States) or for radical movements
to challenge the reproduction of an already destabilized and therefore weakened class power. To say that the capitalist class and capitalism can
survive is not to say that they are predestined to do so, nor that their future character is given. Crises are moments of paradox and possibility out
of which all manner of alternatives, including socialist and anti-capitalist ones, can spring, So what will happen this time around? If we are to get
back to 3 per cent growth, this will mean finding new and profitable global investment opportunities for $1.6 trillion in 2010, rising to closer to
$3 trillion by 2030. This contrasts with the $0.J5 trillion new investment needed in 1950 and the $042 trillion needed in 1.973 (the dollar figures
are inflation adjusted). Real problems of finding adequate outlets for surplus capital began to emerge after 1980, even with the opening up of
China and the collapse of the Soviet bloc. The difficulties were in part resolved by the creation of fictitious markets where speculation in asset
values could take off unchecked by any regulatory apparatus. Where will all this investment go now? Leaving
aside the
undisputable constraints in the relation to nature (with global warming of obvious paramount
importance), the other potential barriers of effective demand in the market place, of technologies
and of geographical geopolitical distributions are likely to be profound. Even supposing - which is unlikely - that
no serious active oppositions to continuous capital accumulation and further consolidation of class power materialise. What spaces are left in the
global economy for new spatial fixes for capital surplus absorption? China and the ex-Soviet bIoc have already been integrated. South and southeast Asia are filing up fast Africa is not yet fully integrated, but there is nowhere else with the capacity to absorb all the is surplus capital. What
new lines of production can be opened up to absorb growth? There
may be no effective long-term capitalist solutions
(apart from reversion to fictitious capital manipulations) to this crisis of capitalism . At some point
quantitative changes lead to qualitative shifts and we need to take seriously the idea that we may be at exactly such all inflexion point in the
history of capitalism. Questioning
the future of capitalism itself as an adequate social system ought,
therefore to be in the forefront of current debate. Yet there appears to be little appetite for such discussion, even as
conventional mantras regarding the perfectibility of humanity with the help of free markets and free trade, private properly and personal
responsibility and low taxes and minimalist state involvement in social provision sound increasingly hollow. A
crisis of legitimacy
looms. But legitimation crises typically unfold at a different pace and rhythm to stock market crises. It took. for example, three-e or four Years
for the stock: market crash Of 1929 to produce the massive social movements (both progressive and fascistic) that emerged after 1932 or so. The
intensity of the current pursuit by political power of ways to exit the present crisis measures the political fear of looming illegitimacy. The
existence of cracks in the ideological edifice does not mean it is utterly broken, Nor does it follow
that because something is clearly hollow people will immediately recognise it as such. As of now,
faith in the underlying presumptions of free market ideology have not eroded too much. There is no
indication that people in the advanced capitalist countries (apart from the usual malcontents) are looking for radical changes of lifestyle, although
many recognise that they may have to economise here or save money there. Those foreclosed upon in the United States (so preliminary surveys
tell us) typically blame themselves for their failure {sometimes through bad luck) to live up to the personal responsibilities of homeownership.
Where there is anger at bankers’ duplicity and populist outrage over their bonuses., there seems to be no movement in North America or Europe
to embrace radical and far-reaching changes. In the global south, Latin America in particular, the story is rather different How the politics will
play out in China and the rest of Asia, where growth continues and politics turns on different axes, is uncertain. The problem there is that growth
is continuing, though at a lower rate. The idea that the crisis had systemic origin is scarcely mooted in the mainstream media. Most of the
governmental moves so far in North America and Europe amount to the perpetuation of business as usual, which translates into support for the
capitalist class. The moral hazard' that was the immediate trigger for the financial failures is being taken to new heights in the bank bail-outs. The
actual practices of neoliberalism (as opposed to its utopian theory) always entailed blatant support for finance capital and capitalist elites (usually
on the grounds that financial institutions must be protected at all costs and that it is the duty of state power to create a good business climate for
solid profiteering). This has not fundamentally changed. Such practices are justified by appeal to the dubious proposition that a 'rising tide' of
capitalist endeavour will 'lift all boats: or that the benefits of compound growth. will magically ‘trickle down' (which it never does. except in the
Throughout much of the capitalist world, we have lived through
an astonishing period in which politics has been depoliticised and commodified. Only now, all the
state steps in to bail out the financiers, has it become dear to all that state and capital are more
tightly intertwined than ever both institutionally and personally. The ruling class, rather than the political class that
form of a few crumbs from the rich folks' table).
am as its surrogate. is now actually seen to rule.
4 –Biodiversity – Do not be fooled by supposed concern for the environment - The
invocation of biodiversity as a justification of foreign aid is part and parcel of the
neoliberalist agenda that accepts environmental protection only insofar as it does
not challenge the fundamental devastation wrought by capitalist accumulation.
Corson 2010
(Catherine; Assistant Professor of Environmental Studies, Mount Holyoke; Shifting
Environmental Governance in a Neoliberal World: US AID for Conservation Antipode Volume
42, Issue 3, pages 576–602, June 2010)
Changing Public–Private Non-profit Power Relations under Neoliberalism
The reduction of the state under neoliberalism,1 and the resulting reconfiguration of state, market,
and civil society relations, has shifted the landscape of twenty-first century environmental
governance, in particular opening up room for private actors to influence state policy. This article
explores how the rise of neoliberalism in the 1980s and its institutionalization in the 1990s
underpinned the formation of a dynamic alliance among members of the US Congress, the US
Agency for International Development (USAID), an evolving group of environmental nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)2 and the corporate sector around biodiversity conservation
funding. By focusing strictly on international biodiversity conservation this alliance—driven to a
great extent by non-elected agents who are perceived to represent civil society despite their
corporate partnerships—has been able to shape public foreign aid policy and in the process create
new spaces for capital expansion.¶ The arguments presented here forge new ground in academic
conversations about conservation and neoliberalism by illuminating the concrete practices within
US foreign aid through which new forms of environmental governance under neoliberalism are
produced. Specifically, they draw on the work of intellectuals who document the opportunities
for civil society groups provided by the downsizing of the neoliberal state (eg Castree 2008;
Peck and Tickell 2002) to address a lacuna in three interrelated bodies of literature. Together,
these works examine the neoliberalism of nature (eg Castree 2008; Heynen et al 2007), the
growth of the big international conservation NGOs (BINGOs)3 and their increasing corporate
linkages (eg Brockington, Duffy and Igoe 2008; Büscher and Whande 2007), and the
contemporary move in conservation away from engaging local actors (eg Brosius and Russell
2003; Dressler and Buscher 2008).¶ While these scholars unveil critical transformations in human–
environment relations taking place in the name of conservation under neoliberalism, they have
often elided the intricacies of the shifting and uneven power dynamics among state, market and
civil society organizations through which such changes have emerged. By focusing on the interorganizational relations entailed in US environmental foreign aid policy-making, this article helps
to launch critical engagement with policy issues related to nature's neoliberalization, as called for
by Castree (2007). At the same time, it responds to appeals for analysis of the micro-politics of
foreign aid donors (Cooper and Packard 1997; Watts 2001), and particularly the sponsors of
international conservation (King 2009), to advance an emerging scholarship that applies
ethnographic methods to elucidate the internal workings of conservation and development
funding institutions (eg Crewe and Harrison 1998; Lewis and Mosse 2006). In doing so, it
illustrates how collaboration among the public and non-profit sectors have both reflected and
contributed to a move within global environmentalism from an anti-capitalist stance in the 1960s
and 1970s to its twenty-first century embrace of the market.¶ Since the 1970s, environmental
NGOs have successfully lobbied the US Congress to support US foreign assistance for
environmental issues. In particular, a group of environmental advocacy organizations catalyzed
and shaped USAID's initial environment program. However, two interrelated transitions in the
relations among USAID, the US Congress, an evolving group of environmental NGOs and the
private sector—which have entailed both reactions to and the embracing of neoliberal ideology and
reforms — underpin the agency's contemporary emphasis on biodiversity conservation. The first
comprised congressional and Democratic administration efforts to direct USAID funding to
NGOs—moves that both resulted from and reacted to state privatization in the 1980s and 1990s.
The second encompassed NGO-mobilized efforts to protest against neoliberal reforms and protect
the environment, the most recent of which, ironically, has invoked neoliberal rhetoric toward this
aim .¶ To summarize briefly, in the context of the burgeoning interest in biodiversity in the
1980s, the Democratic Congress directed USAID to fund biodiversity conservation.4 At the
same time, in an effort to counter Reagan's privatization of state functions and associated turn to
private contractors, the Congress mandated the agency to support NGOs. As a result, USAID
funded conservation NGOs to implement its emergent biodiversity portfolio. Concurrently, many
of the environmental advocacy groups that had launched USAID's environmental portfolio in the
1970s shifted their advocacy efforts to fighting for domestic environmental issues and to
protesting World Bank projects. This move eventually left the growing conservation NGOs—
now with a special interest in preserving USAID's biodiversity funding—to take up the endeavor
to promote environmental foreign aid. The Clinton Administration's embrace of the global
environmental agenda, combined with continued privatization of government services and the
privileging of NGOs, then reinforced opportunities for the conservation NGOs to benefit from
USAID funding. In reaction to internal USAID budget pressures that threatened biodiversity
funding in the late 1990s, these NGOs launched a campaign to protect the funding. They
consolidated this campaign during the second Bush Administration when concurrent disregard
for environmental issues and massive foreign aid reforms again endangered biodiversity funding.
In the twenty-first century, the NGOs have attracted powerful corporate and bipartisan political
support behind USAID's biodiversity program.¶ Based on the analysis presented in this article, I
make three broad claims that offer important insights into the nature of modern neoliberal
conservation. First, throughout these transitions, conservation NGOs have capitalized on idealized
visions of themselves as representatives of a civil society operating to counter the force of private
interests thought to be behind environmental degradation. This vision has sustained their access
to policy-makers and influence on public policy despite the multinational corporate partnerships
that characterize the BINGOs’ twenty-first century operations.¶ Second, the strict focus on
international biodiversity has been fundamental to the development of an alliance among the
BINGOs, USAID, corporate leaders and members of the US Congress behind US environmental
foreign aid. By defining “the environment” as foreign biodiversity, to be protected in parks away
from competing economic and political interests and in foreign countries, the BINGOs and allied
partners have enticed US politicians and corporate leaders to support environmental foreign aid.
They have created an avenue through which they can become “environmentally friendly” without
confronting the environmental degradation caused by excessive resource consumption in the USA
or the foreign and domestic investments of US corporations.¶ These successful political strategies,
aimed at mobilizing funding for foreign environmental issues, have contributed to the process by
which environmentalism has become enrolled in the promotion of capitalist expansion . In fact, I
contend that the international biodiversity conservation agenda has created new symbolic and
material spaces for global capital expansion. First, it supplies a critical stamp of environmental
stewardship for corporate and political leaders. Second, not only does it carve out new physical
territories for capitalist accumulation through both the physical demarcation and enclosure of
common lands as protected areas, but also through the growing capitalist enterprise that is forming
around the concept of biodiversity conservation
The impact is endless violence - Neoliberal violence is everywhere and nowhere –
while the 1AC holds us in thrall of supposed wars, the slow violence of neoliberalism
infects every area of the globe, producing billions of anonymous victims beyond the
reach of our moral concern.
Di Leo and McClennen 2012
(Jeffrey R., Dean of the School of Arts and Sciences and Professor of English and Philosophy at
the University of Houston–Victoria; Sophia A. professor of international affairs and directs
Penn State's Center for Global Studies as well as its Latin American Studies program; Postscript
on Violence symploke, Volume 20, Numbers 1-2, 2012, pp. 241-250 (Article))
Violence is everywhere. It could be argued that we are in one of the most¶ violent eras in human
history. The scope of violence today is global and its¶ magnitude immense. It is seen in the death
counts from perpetual wars and¶ the injury reports from fierce protests; it is found in the oil-soaked
waters of¶ the Gulf of Mexico and the radiation-contaminated earth of Japan; it is heard¶ in the
screams of women subject to sexual violence and the children who¶ are the victims of predators. It is
in the blood we are served by televised¶ news and the brutal visions of an increasing violence-driven
entertainment¶ industry.¶ Though our various critical and cultural studies relate features of it, and¶
our social and physical sciences capture aspects of it, the violence in our world¶ is far too
overwhelming to contain. No study can capture it in its entirety and¶ no report can present us with
a complete set of data on it. For many, the¶ violence that surrounds and engulfs us is an
abomination and a threat, something¶ to be fought and eliminated; though for many more,
violence serves a¶ social and economic end—and is as American as apple pie. “Rooted in
everyday¶ institutional structures,” writes Henry Giroux, “violence has become the¶ toxic glue that
bonds Americans together while simultaneously preventing¶ them from expanding and building a
multiracial and multicultural democracy”¶ (2002, 231).¶ The “toxic glue” of violence is a threat to
individual and social well-being¶ as well as to democracy itself. One of the imperatives of critical
pedagogy¶ must be to reveal its manifestations—another must be to work toward its¶ elimination.
And progressive intellectuals must continue to utilize the public¶ sphere through print and social
media to bring about a better understanding¶ of the dangers of an increasingly violent world and to
work toward eliminating¶ the toxic glue of violence.¶ Violence is nowhere. While violence is
everywhere more apparent, it¶ is also everywhere ignored and hidden . The violence that is unseen
and¶ unknown must be engaged just as much as the violence that is seen and¶ known. While violent
video games and movies premised on the spectacle¶ of violence are not difficult to discern, they
often have the unintended consequence¶ of closing off consideration and understanding of other
forms of¶ violence, in particular the myriad types of violence that cannot be staged.¶ Much of the
violence that is unseen and unheard happens on a temporal¶ scale that is beyond the capacities of
our senses. Termed by Rob Nixon, “slow¶ violence,” it has been described by him as “a violence
that occurs gradually¶ and out of sight, a violence of delayed destruction that is dispersed across¶
time and space, an attritional violence that is typically not viewed as violence¶ at all” (Nixon 2). The
slow violence of “mass droughts in China, flooding in¶ Australia, food crises, super twisters,
earthquakes linked to geo-engineering,¶ arctic melt-off and so on” (Cohen 2012, i); “[C]limate
change, the thawing¶ cryosphere, toxic drift, biomagnifications, deforestation, the radioactive¶
aftermath of war, acidifying oceans, and a host of other slowly unfolding¶ environmental
catastrophes” (Nixon 2).¶ This was not the violence addressed by the theorists and critics of the¶
twentieth-century. Much of this violence unfolds over spans of time better¶ described as
geological rather than human. Or, better yet, over spans of time¶ from which “the human” is
viewed as but a passing moment. The theoretical¶ work here that is just beginning to take shape
promises to reframe the very¶ ways we think about history, time, and change.1¶ However, if the
exanthropic violence of climate change is the future of¶ theory, what of the anthropic violence
that has been the focus of much attention,¶ particularly since the rise of women’s studies, gender
studies, and ethnic¶ studies in the sixties and seventies? How are we doing here with forms of¶
violence that are visible and seen and felt by women, children, and the disenfranchised¶ across
the globe? Unfortunately, not well.¶ In today’s media-saturated world, violence is always visible
but rarely¶ felt. The prevalence of media violence is especially high in U.S. culture. Our¶
entertainment industry is adept at aestheticizing violence and transforming¶ the most violent and
morally extreme members of our society into culture¶ products suitable for mass consumption
and celebration. Take for example,¶ the serial killer Aileen Wournos, who paradoxically became
the object of¶ revulsion and attraction when presented to us by the American entertainment¶
industry. Many marveled at how the angelic Hollywood actor Charlize¶ Theron had been
transformed into the “monster” Wournos, and found themselves¶ comparing the “real” Theron to
the image of Wournos presented by¶ her in the film, Monster (2003). “She is my favorite of the
night,” said a fashion¶ editor from Glamour magazine commenting on Theron’s appearance at
the¶ Golden Globes that year, “[e]specially because you have the contrast of her¶ in that movie
and the way she looks tonight.”2 This entirely commonplace¶ comment reveals a semiotic
process wherein serial killing and its aesthetic¶ image become hopelessly intertwined, and
ultimately confused.¶ In the translation of serial killing to its performance and promotion, a¶
complex semiotic process creates multiple layers of signification concerning¶ the event and its
perpetrator. The result is both a greater understanding¶ (albeit a superficial one) of the killers and
the horrific events in which they¶ participated, and a growing sense of confusion between the
“real” and the¶ image. Carefully packaged, promoted and sanitized by the culture industry, ¶
American psychos such as Jeffrey Dahmer, Aileen Wournos and John Wayne¶ Gacy increasingly
become less despicable objects of moral revulsion, and¶ more objects of fascination and
entertainment. Their final entry into the sign¶ system of celebrity entertainment is signaled by
becoming household names¶ as readily recognizable as our sports, movie and television icons.
For the average¶ culturally literate American, naming three contemporary serial killers is¶ about as
challenging as naming three talk show hosts. However, the realness¶ of these killers and their
violent crimes gets buried under multiple layers of¶ signification. A “hyperreal”—and
“hypermoral”—image soon displaces any¶ remaining fragments of the reality of the horrific
events perpetrated by them.¶ The cultural celebration of violence though does not end with the
remediation¶ of increasingly macabre, sadistic, and cruel behavior. Rather, it creates¶ a culture
where violence has become a—if not “the”—standard form of entertainment,¶ and where our
children are targeted as major consumers of this¶ violence. From the hyper-real violence of many
of the video games played¶ by children to the scenes of fighting, killing, and torture found in
many of the¶ movies our children watch, there is no escaping the toxic glue of violence.¶ Even the
“G” rated Pixar family movie, Cars 2 (2011), featured two deaths¶ and one torture scene (a crime
syndicate tortures a car until it blows up).¶ How else can this be explained except as a primer on
violence for children?¶ It is not going to be a surprise to anyone familiar with the American film¶
industry that violence is one of its main commodities—and one that is internationally¶ consumed.
However, there is some reason to believe that more¶ people are beginning to understand the
negative impact of repeated cultural¶ consumption of violence. If nothing else, the tragic events
surrounding the¶ shooting of moviegoers in Aurora, Colorado this past summer facilitated this¶
discussion. However, the solution is not to be found in say banning The Dark¶ Knight Rises
(2012) from theaters because of its alleged connection to an act¶ of violence. This would be about
as effective as taking Sweet Tarts away from¶ children in an effort to stop tooth decay. Rather,
the solution is to be found¶ in understanding how making violence into a commodity connects
with a¶ broader and more pernicious neoliberal social and economic agenda. Once¶ this is
understood, then just as with eating candy, you can consume violence¶ at your own risk.¶
Neoliberal economic practices have increased biopolitical violence. The¶ devastating effects of
neoliberalism have been well documented. “Under¶ neoliberalism,” writes Henry Giroux,
“everything either is for sale or is plundered¶ for profit” (2004, xii). He continues:¶ Public lands
are looted by logging companies and corporate ranchers;¶ politicians willingly hand the public’s
airwaves over to broadcasters¶ and large corporate interests without a dime going into the¶ public
trust; Halliburton gives war profiteering a new meaning as¶ it is granted corporate contracts
without any competitive bidding¶ and then bilks the U.S. government for millions; the environment¶
is polluted and despoiled in the name of profit-making just as the¶ government passes legislation to
make it easier for corporations¶ to do so; public services are gutted in order to lower the taxes of¶
major corporations; schools increasingly resemble malls or jails,¶ and teachers, forced to raise
revenue for classroom materials,¶ increasingly function as circus barkers hawking everything
from¶ hamburgers to pizza parties—that is, when they are not reduced to¶ prepping students to get
higher test scores. (2004, xii-xiv)¶ When extreme free-market capitalism becomes the source of
values,¶ violence is given a reprieve from moral indignation . Democratic values as¶ well as basic
notions of human rights and economic justice are overlooked¶ when the market reveals profits to be
had—or losses to be avoided. As¶ neoliberalism widens the gulf between the rich and the poor, and
the enfranchised¶ and the disenfranchised, it also places at risk of violence the poor and¶ the
disenfranchised. Therefore, it should be no surprise that the devastation¶ of the environment and
the violation of human rights is often more extreme¶ in less affluent parts of the world.¶ Moreover,
the celebration of violence in the American entertainment¶ industry must be seen as an extension
of the neoliberal militaristic transformation¶ of the country. Arguably, the state of permanent war
of the United States¶ has benefited an entertainment industry which views increased militarization¶
as a marketing dream. Toys, games, videos, movies and clothing associated¶ with the military and
its values increase in times of war. The permanent¶ state of war in the United States thus provides
increasing opportunities for¶ corporations endlessly to exploit nationalistic jingoism and the
glorification¶ of violence. In light of neoliberalism and its economic Darwinism, the recent ¶
resurrection of Captain America—the defender of American “ideals”—is less¶ a nostalgic nod to
comic history’s past, than a market-driven embrace of our¶ increasingly militarized, violent, and
jingoistic culture.
Our alternative is democratic socialism – only a transfer of power from elites to the
people holds out the hope for political formations that can avoid the immanent
global suicide.
Robinson 08-American professor of sociology at the University of California, Santa Barbara, 2008, “Latin
America and Global Capitalism”, pgs107-108
They are likely to turn with more frequency to violent methods in defense of their
interests. These groups' resistance to change is likely to take increasingly extrainstitutional forms especially in those cases where the threat they face, beyond redistributive
reform, involves property relations. Recent anti-terrorism laws have been passed in most
Latin American countries that criminalize social protest, such as in El Salvador, where
terrorism is defined by such legislation as "any pressure on authorities to make certain
decisions" (COMPA, 2007). In the Venezuelan countryside and in Bolivia's eastern region
landlords have already organized armed paramilitary squads that have clashed with
peasants demanding agrarian reform. We cannot rule out military intervention and new coup
d'etats in countries such as Bolivia and Ecuador. In Colombia, upwards of four million people
have been violently uprooted from the countryside by state security forces and right-wing
paramilitary armies to make way for transnational agribusiness and mining concerns, while it
has been disclosed that such TNCs as Coca-Cola, Chiquita Brands International, and several
U.S.-based mining companies have regularly hired the paramilitary armies to block unionization
and eliminate dissent among their workers (Hylton, 2006). 3. GLOBAL ANTI-CAPITALIST
ALTERNATIVE A DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST PROJECT What configuration of social
and political forces could bring about a postcapitalist global order? It is an irony that the
crisis of global capitalism has followed in the wake of the crisis and collapse of the Left in
most countries around the world and the discrediting, until recently, of socialist ideology. In
Latin America a twenty-first-century neofascist project is taking place in Colombia while
right next door, in Venezuela, a twenty-first-century socialist project is under way. A
socialist alternative is not at odds with a struggle for global reformism, and in fact such an
alternative would most likely snowball out of efforts to bring about a reform of the system,
such as we may be seeing in Venezuela, and perhaps even in Bolivia and Ecuador. What is
crucial is for popular, radical, and socialist-oriented forces in the global justice movement
to put forward an alternative vision that goes beyond reformism and to have such a vision
achieve hegemony within any counter-hegemonic bloc to global capitalism. Redistributive
reform, it is worth reiterating, is not viable without structural changes that move a counterhegemonic bloc from challenging the "fairness" of the market to replacing the logic of the
market with a social logic. A democratic socialist alternative would require a renewal of
critical and radical thinking along with a capacity to operate as much on the cultural and
ideological as on the political terrain. More than ever before, political and economic
processes are globalized, as Levine (2005) observes, to the extent that they are
"culturized." Global accumulation is increasingly reliant on symbolic and cultural
exchanges that make possible the rapid circulation of commodities. But that alternative also
requires renovated political vehicles that provide the popular classes in civil society with
instruments for invading state structures. Moreover, no matter how unpopular with postmodernists, a global transformative project requires, as Boswell and Chase-Dunn argue, a new
universalism. The axis of an anti-capitalist and universalist struggle must be the new
global working class, with its rainbow and heavily female face, one that is transnationally
organized. I am convinced that if there can be no socialism without democracy in the
twenty-first century it is equally true that democracy is not possible without socialism. A
democratic socialism founded on a popular democracy is in my view the only real
alternative to disaster— to collective suicide .
Total rejection is key – the only way to produce real alternatives to neoliberalism is
to refuse the allure of half measures.
Werlhof 8
(Claudia von Werlhof. Werlhof is a professor at the Institute of Political Sciences at the
University of Innsbruck. “The Globalization of Neoliberalism, its Consequences and Some of its
Basic Alternatives.” 27 August 2008. Capitalism Nature Socialism. BA)
Still, euphoria would be out of place. An alternative to neoliberalism is not created through
analysis and protest alone but must be practiced. Opinions on how to do this differ. Some discuss
‘‘alternatives’’ that are none: a reform of the WTO; ‘‘control’’ of globalization through NGOs; a
return to Keynesianism; a restoration of ‘‘social market economy’’; or even a revival of
socialism. Such ideas ignore reality and trivialize the problem. Neoliberalism shows every day
that much more is at stake.
Neoliberalism is an apocalypse, a ‘‘revelation,’’ because the reality it creates makes it impossible
for neoliberalism to justify itself. Nor can we consider the corporations harmless ‘‘players.’’
There is no ambiguity. As a consequence, the perpetrators of neoliberal politics simply lie about
what is happening. The only good thing about neoliberalism is that it reveals the truth about
‘‘Western civilization’’ and ‘‘European values.’’ This means that people now have the chance to
draw the right conclusions about what is really needed.
What is really needed, of course, is nothing less than a different civilization. A different
economy alone, or a different society or culture will not suffice. We need a civilization that is the
exact opposite of neoliberalism and the patriarchal capitalist world system it is rooted in. The
logic of our alternative must be one that completely undermines the logic of neoliberalism.113
Neoliberalism has turned everything that would ensure a good life for all beings on this planet
upside down. Many people still have a hard time understanding that the horror we are
experiencing is indeed a reality*a reality willingly produced, maintained and justified by ‘‘our’’
politicians. But even if the alternative was half implemented*no more plundering, exploitation,
destruction, violence, war, coer- cion, mercilessness, accumulation, greed, corruption*we would
still be left with all the damage that the earth has already suffered.
Neolib K 1NC vs Sophomore Select
The strategy of the 1AC is that of the permitted Left – the frenetic call for social
stabilization coopts any more radical movement to address the neoliberal
coordinates that make market domination inevitable.
Robinson 8
William I., Professor of Sociology at the University of Santa Barbara, Latin
America and Global Capitalism: A Critical Globalization Perspective)
Nevertheless, it
is useful, we argue, to situate contemporary Latin American lefts theoretically along a
continuum between two ideal types: a radical Left, on the one hand, and an izquierda permitida, on
the other. This is the driving theme tying together the various theoretical and case-study chapters. Which currents of the
revitalization of Latin American radicalism represent a significant challenge to neoliberalism,
imperialism, and even potentially capitalism itself? Which, in other words, constitute a radical alternative? And
which components ofbthe same resurgence represent a transition to an izquierda permitida, or "authorized
Left"? Our use ofbthe term izquierda permitida draws on Charles Hale's theorization of the notion of indio permitido in the era of neoliberal
multiculturalism in Latin America. Hale used this term to describe the way in which neoliberal states in the 1990s adopted a
language of cultural recognition of indigenous people and even enacted modest reforms in the area
of indigenous rights; at the same time, these states set strict predetermined limits to the extent of
reform . Neoliberal multiculturalism in this way divided and domesticated indigenous movements
through selective co-optation . In particular, the era of the indio permitido has meant that cultural rights are to be
enjoyed on the implicit condition that indigenous movements will not challenge foundational
neoliberal economic policies. Indigenous movements that have submitted more or less to the framework of neoliberal
multiculturalism fall into Hale's category indio permitido, or "authorized Indian" (Hale 1996, 2002, 2004, 2006). Adapting this theoretical
framework to the context of the Latin American Left, the authors of this volume explore the varied experiences of the ostensibly left regimes,
political parties, and social movements of diiferent countries in terms of how closely they adhere to the notion of izquierda permitida and ask
The izquierda permitida
signals deep continuities with neoliberal capitalism and adapts easily to U.S. imperial strategies. In its
regime form, it seeks to divide and co-opt radical left social movements and parties. The radical Left, on
the other hand, offers fundamental challenges to empire, neoliberalism, and capitalism. The radical
Left works to overturn capitalist class rule and capitalist states in Latin America through the
activity and struggle of the popular classes and oppressed peoples themselves. It envisions a transition toward
whether they represent the mature realization or at least a potential transition toward, a more radical Left.
democratic social coordination of the economy and the construction of a development model in which human needs are prioritized above the
needs of capital. The
radical Left fights for communal ownership of economic and natural resources. It
pushes for worker and community control of workplaces and neighborhoods. The radical Left sees
liberal capitalist democracy as a limited expression of popular sovereignty and seeks instead to
expand democratic rule through all political, social, economic, and private spheres of life. It is antiimperialist, seeking the regional liberation of Latin America and the Caribbean and challenging the imperial pretensions of the American empire,
as well as those of its emergent rivals active in the region. This is quite distinct from earlier versions of state capitalism or nationalist populism in
Latin American twentieth-century history, which sought merely state ownership of the means of production in strategic economic sectors and
state allocation of resources. The radical Left described here is an ideal type, a vision of society toward which increasing numbers of Latin
Americans hope to transition out of existing capitalism through processes of struggle.
No new economic system drops from the
sky, Michael Lebowitz (2006: 61) points out. Rather than dropping from the sky or emerging pristine and complete from the conceptions of
intellectuals, new productive forces and relations of production emerge within and in opposition to the
existing society. One implication is that the new society can never be fully formed at the beginning. Initially, that new society must build
upon elements ofthe old society. The radical Left indigenous social movements that arose in Bolivia between 2000 and 2005, and the radical
socialist flanks of the Chavista movement in Venezuela, are arguably those social forces that most closely approximate the outlook of the radical
Left described above. Perhaps
the best analytical starting point for an understanding of the izquierda
permitida ideal type, the radical Left's antipode, is what Iorge Castaneda, a former leftist, describes approvingly as the
"reconstructed, formerly radical left."• The reconstructed governments of Chile under Michelle Bachelet
(until her recent electoral defeat to right-wing Sebastian Piflera), Uruguay under Tabarê Vazquez (and now Iosê Mujica), and Brazil under Lula
(and now Rouseff),
for example, stress "social policy-education, anti-poverty programs, health care,
housing- but within a more or less orthodox market framework."• When the parties of the izquierda permitida
have come to office in recent years, their "economic policies have been remarkably similar to those of [their neoliberal] predecessors"
(Castafleda, 2006: 35). As we have seen, in the final years of the 1990s and the outset of the 2000s, the region entered into a steep recession that
fundamentally brought into question the legitimacy of neoliberalism as a development model and gave birth to myriad social explosions and
popular struggles. The
paradigmatic political parties and regimes of the new izquierda permitida are one
expression of a reconstitution of neoliberalism in a new form. In terms of its economic program, the izquierda
permitida has been deeply influenced by the turn from classical structuralism to neostructuralism within the United Nations Economic
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). Over the course of the second half of the 1990s and early 2000s, neostructuralism
moved from the margins to the center of political influence in the region by challenging certain assumptions of the market dogmatism
characteristic of orthodox neoliberalism while rebuking simultaneously the core presuppositions of classical structuralism. Post-Pinochet Chile
became the poster child of neostructuralism throughout the 1990s. In this way it became a prototype for the izquierda permitida. Neostructuralism
was also deeply influential in the "Buenos Aires Consensus," which came out of a Iune 1999 convention of the Socialist International and
eventually became the model of political economy for Lula's Brazil, Kirchner's Argentina, Vazquez's Uruguay, and arguably the governments
formed recently by formerly guerrilla parties in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala (for a different view, see the chapter by Hêctor Perla Ir.,
Marco Mojica, and Iared Bibler in this volume). The
areas of conceptual innovation at the heart of
neostructuralism revolve around systemic competitiveness, technical progress, proactive labor
flexibility, and virtuous circles. In an effort to distinguish itself from orthodox neoliberalism,
neostructuralism in Latin America rejects the notion that markets and competition are the
exclusive channels for social and economic interaction, and replace the basic neoclassical notion of
comparative advantage with systemic competitiveness. By this, neostructuralists essentially mean
"that what compete[s] in the world market [are] not commodities per se but entire social systems"
(Leiva, 2008: 4). While granting that the market will remain the central organizing force in society, neostructuralists stress that the
competitiveness of the entire system depends upon effective and thoroughgoing state intervention in infrastructure (technology, energy,
transport), education, finance, labor-management relations, and the general relationships between public and private spheres in a way that
orthodox neoliberal theory cannot grasp (Leiva, 2008: 4). The proponents of this paradigm, Greig Charnock (2009: 67) points out, "reject the
market fundamentalism of the 1980s and early 1990s, represented by structural adjustment and shock therapy, and with these many of the
assumptions about what the untrammelled free market can achieve." They
call for a second generation of institutional
shifts in state policies. These shifts will require a greater role for state engineering. States must
fashion institutions that promote policy stability, adaptability, and coherence and coordination of
markets. The institutions must be of high quality and embody "public regardedness" rather than personalistic clientelism. Whereas
orthodox neoliberals in the 1970s and 1980s saw the state's basic function as lubricating the dynamism of the market through the protection of
property rights, contract enforcement, information collection, and strictly delimited social provision for the destitute, neostructuralism "assigns
the state an important auxiliary role in the search for international competitiveness," blending economic policy on various levels "with political
intervention to construct a broad social consensus" (Leiva, 2008: 9-10). The
state is to stimulate and enhance marketbased initiatives, selectively intervene in productive sectors of the economy, and supplement the
invisible hand of the market with nonmarket forms of social, political, and economic coordination.
Latin American neostructuralism sees modest and temporary state intervention as essential for
encouraging a larger share of manufactured and valued-added exports into a country's export
profile. Proponents of the izquierda permitida model emphasize the necessity of "a configuration of class forces that can induce a capitalist
class to accept a smaller share of the surplus in exchange for legitimacy, political and social peace, and high productivity." At the same time,
"the influential organizations of the economic elites must be convinced that subordinate classes will not threaten private property." The
orientation of the new izquierda permitida is to "pragmatically strive to reconcile liber1y, equity,
and community with the demands of a market economy" (Sandbrook, Edelman, Heller, and Teichman, 2006). The
restructuring of neoliberalism in the direction of an izquierda permitida may offer "an alternative that combines representative democracy with a
market economy and state initiatives to reduce inequalities and promote social citizenship" (Roberts, 2008: 87). The regimes of the izquierda
permitida introduce targeted antipoverty programs, subsidies for small- and mediumsized businesses, increases in royalty regimes for
multinational corporations operating in the natural-resource sectors, and joint private-public ventures between the state and foreign capital.
These changes do not signify any change in underlying social inequalities of the neoliberal class
system. They retain fiscal and monetary austerity, co-opt radical extra-parliamentary movements,
and pursue "social pacts"• between the ruling classes and the working class and the peasantry
predicated on keeping wages down.
Poverty assistance to displaced rural farmers is just a new means of exploiting
surplus populations. The plan is a reworking of development assistance in response
to the latest rounds of neoliberal dispossession. The aff does nothing but lubricate
the gears of capital.
Duffield, Professor Emeritus and former Director of the Global Insecurities Centre,
University of Bristol, ‘7
[Mark, Development, Security and Unending War Governing the World of People,
pg. 10-12
Accumulation by dispossession embodies the idea that capitalism ‘must perpetually have something
“outside of [sic] itself” in order to stabilise itself’ (Harvey 2003: 140). One example is the continuing relevance of Marx’s
notion of an industrial reserve army, that is, a floating population of cheap, unskilled labour, lacking protection and entitlements, that can be hired
and fired as business expands and contracts. For Harvey, such
an ‘outside’ can be either a pre-existing non-capitalist
territory, such as still existed in many regions of the world at the end of the nineteenth century, or a
sector or market within capitalism that has not been fully exploited or proletarianized. Additionally and
importantly, however, capitalism can ‘actually manufacture it’ (ibid.: 141). Through a combination of
mechanisms, accumulation by dispossession continues to shape the violent ¶ bouts of predation on
existing dispensations and accepted entitlements as a necessary requirement for renewed
accumulation. Within the underdeveloped world, many forms of primitive accumulation that would be
recognizable to Marx are still operating today: the dispossession of peasantries, the displacement of family farming
by international agribusiness, forced migration, new waves of proletarianization and reproletarianization, the wholesale
privatization of common property such as water, the suppression of indigenous forms of production and consumption and so on. At the same
time, however, and relating to the mass consumer societies of the developed world, certain aspects of primitive accumulation have been adapted
and expanded. The credit system and finance capital, for example, have opened up new zones of predation. Stock promotions, mergers and asset
stripping have accompanied the active promotion of high levels of debt peonage. Corporate fraud and dispossession through credit and stock
manipulation, including the raiding and decimation of pension funds by stock and corporate collapse ‘are all central features of what
contemporary capitalism is about’ (ibid.: 147). Indeed, the reversion to private hands of public entitlements won through political struggle, such
as a state pension, social welfare and national health care ‘has been the most egregious of all policies of dispossession pursued in the name of
neoliberal orthodoxy’ (ibid.: 148). New global mechanisms for dispossession have also opened up, for example regarding intellectual property
rights, patenting and the licensing of genetic material such as seed plasma. Biopiracy by international pharmaceutical companies and the pillaging
of the world’s genetic resources are rampant, creating means ofgovernance that ‘can now be used against whole populations whosepractices had
played a crucial role in the development of those materials’ (ibid.). The wholesale commodification of life, including its many natural and cultural
forms, histories and intellectual creativity, is currently under way. When coupled with the deepening international privatization of common goods
and entitlements such as land, water and public utilities, Harvey has argued that capitalism
has launched the world on ‘a new
wave of “enclosing the commons”’ (ibid.). From political economy one could argue that accumulation by
dispossession, in continually evoking a surplus population, not only provides development with an
object, it is one that is constantly being renewed. A superfluous and potentially dangerous waste-life
is continuously thrown off as markets are relentlessly made and remade in the endless search for
progress. This concern arising from political¶ economy is recognized by policy makers. Politicians
are fully aware, for example, that while globalization brings many benefits, if badly managed it can
exacerbate inequality and instability (Biccum 2005). This contemporary ambivalence towards
globalization returns development once more to its founding design of reconciling the need for
order with the challenges of progress. Because surplus life is continuously produced, development
also periodically reinvents itself. While the context, words and emphasis may change, the central meaning remains
the same. In terms of basic tenets this process, since 1949at least, has been well documented by William Easterly (Easterly 2002).
Following decolonization, when it vectored into an interstate relationship, development has
regularly reinvented itself within a limited set of axioms. Like penal reform, the endless rediscovery of
development has produced a ‘a monotonous critique’ (Foucault [1975]: 266) which, in this case, invariably calls
for an increase in aid spending, a renewed focus on poverty reduction, the delivery of more effective
aid, the necessity of better coordination between donors, aid agencies and recipients, the
importance of recipients being receptive to policy change and, not least, debt relief. The periodic
repackaging of these aims over the past half-century has been helped by development’s
organizational preference for limited agency competition, low public accountability, institutional
amnesia and a willingness to engage in obfuscation and spin control, allowing practitioners always
to describe aid efforts ‘as “new and improved”’ (Easterly 2002: 228).
The invocation of biodiversity as a justification of foreign aid is part and parcel of
the neoliberalist agenda that accepts environmental protection as long as it does not
challenge the fundamental devastation wrought by capitalist accumulation.
Corson 2010 (Catherine; Assistant Professor of Environmental Studies, Mount Holyoke;
Shifting Environmental Governance in a Neoliberal World: US AID for Conservation Antipode
Volume 42, Issue 3, pages 576–602, June 2010)
Changing Public–Private Non-profit Power Relations under Neoliberalism
The reduction of the state under neoliberalism,1 and the resulting reconfiguration of state, market,
and civil society relations, has shifted the landscape of twenty-first century environmental
governance, in particular opening up room for private actors to influence state policy. This article
explores how the rise of neoliberalism in the 1980s and its institutionalization in the 1990s
underpinned the formation of a dynamic alliance among members of the US Congress, the US
Agency for International Development (USAID), an evolving group of environmental nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)2 and the corporate sector around biodiversity conservation
funding. By focusing strictly on international biodiversity conservation this alliance—driven to a
great extent by non-elected agents who are perceived to represent civil society despite their
corporate partnerships—has been able to shape public foreign aid policy and in the process create
new spaces for capital expansion.¶ The arguments presented here forge new ground in academic
conversations about conservation and neoliberalism by illuminating the concrete practices within
US foreign aid through which new forms of environmental governance under neoliberalism are
produced. Specifically, they draw on the work of intellectuals who document the opportunities
for civil society groups provided by the downsizing of the neoliberal state (eg Castree 2008;
Peck and Tickell 2002) to address a lacuna in three interrelated bodies of literature. Together,
these works examine the neoliberalism of nature (eg Castree 2008; Heynen et al 2007), the
growth of the big international conservation NGOs (BINGOs)3 and their increasing corporate
linkages (eg Brockington, Duffy and Igoe 2008; Büscher and Whande 2007), and the
contemporary move in conservation away from engaging local actors (eg Brosius and Russell
2003; Dressler and Buscher 2008).¶ While these scholars unveil critical transformations in human–
environment relations taking place in the name of conservation under neoliberalism, they have
often elided the intricacies of the shifting and uneven power dynamics among state, market and
civil society organizations through which such changes have emerged. By focusing on the interorganizational relations entailed in US environmental foreign aid policy-making, this article helps
to launch critical engagement with policy issues related to nature's neoliberalization, as called for
by Castree (2007). At the same time, it responds to appeals for analysis of the micro-politics of
foreign aid donors (Cooper and Packard 1997; Watts 2001), and particularly the sponsors of
international conservation (King 2009), to advance an emerging scholarship that applies
ethnographic methods to elucidate the internal workings of conservation and development
funding institutions (eg Crewe and Harrison 1998; Lewis and Mosse 2006). In doing so, it
illustrates how collaboration among the public and non-profit sectors have both reflected and
contributed to a move within global environmentalism from an anti-capitalist stance in the 1960s
and 1970s to its twenty-first century embrace of the market.¶ Since the 1970s, environmental
NGOs have successfully lobbied the US Congress to support US foreign assistance for
environmental issues. In particular, a group of environmental advocacy organizations catalyzed
and shaped USAID's initial environment program. However, two interrelated transitions in the
relations among USAID, the US Congress, an evolving group of environmental NGOs and the
private sector—which have entailed both reactions to and the embracing of neoliberal ideology and
reforms — underpin the agency's contemporary emphasis on biodiversity conservation. The first
comprised congressional and Democratic administration efforts to direct USAID funding to
NGOs—moves that both resulted from and reacted to state privatization in the 1980s and 1990s.
The second encompassed NGO-mobilized efforts to protest against neoliberal reforms and protect
the environment, the most recent of which, ironically, has invoked neoliberal rhetoric toward this
aim .¶ To summarize briefly, in the context of the burgeoning interest in biodiversity in the
1980s, the Democratic Congress directed USAID to fund biodiversity conservation.4 At the
same time, in an effort to counter Reagan's privatization of state functions and associated turn to
private contractors, the Congress mandated the agency to support NGOs. As a result, USAID
funded conservation NGOs to implement its emergent biodiversity portfolio. Concurrently, many
of the environmental advocacy groups that had launched USAID's environmental portfolio in the
1970s shifted their advocacy efforts to fighting for domestic environmental issues and to
protesting World Bank projects. This move eventually left the growing conservation NGOs—
now with a special interest in preserving USAID's biodiversity funding—to take up the endeavor
to promote environmental foreign aid. The Clinton Administration's embrace of the global
environmental agenda, combined with continued privatization of government services and the
privileging of NGOs, then reinforced opportunities for the conservation NGOs to benefit from
USAID funding. In reaction to internal USAID budget pressures that threatened biodiversity
funding in the late 1990s, these NGOs launched a campaign to protect the funding. They
consolidated this campaign during the second Bush Administration when concurrent disregard
for environmental issues and massive foreign aid reforms again endangered biodiversity funding.
In the twenty-first century, the NGOs have attracted powerful corporate and bipartisan political
support behind USAID's biodiversity program.¶ Based on the analysis presented in this article, I
make three broad claims that offer important insights into the nature of modern neoliberal
conservation. First, throughout these transitions, conservation NGOs have capitalized on idealized
visions of themselves as representatives of a civil society operating to counter the force of private
interests thought to be behind environmental degradation. This vision has sustained their access
to policy-makers and influence on public policy despite the multinational corporate partnerships
that characterize the BINGOs’ twenty-first century operations.¶ Second, the strict focus on
international biodiversity has been fundamental to the development of an alliance among the
BINGOs, USAID, corporate leaders and members of the US Congress behind US environmental
foreign aid. By defining “the environment” as foreign biodiversity, to be protected in parks away
from competing economic and political interests and in foreign countries, the BINGOs and allied
partners have enticed US politicians and corporate leaders to support environmental foreign aid.
They have created an avenue through which they can become “environmentally friendly” without
confronting the environmental degradation caused by excessive resource consumption in the USA
or the foreign and domestic investments of US corporations.¶ These successful political strategies,
aimed at mobilizing funding for foreign environmental issues, have contributed to the process by
which environmentalism has become enrolled in the promotion of capitalist expansion . In fact, I
contend that the international biodiversity conservation agenda has created new symbolic and
material spaces for global capital expansion. First, it supplies a critical stamp of environmental
stewardship for corporate and political leaders. Second, not only does it carve out new physical
territories for capitalist accumulation through both the physical demarcation and enclosure of
common lands as protected areas, but also through the growing capitalist enterprise that is forming
around the concept of biodiversity conservation.
Neoliberal violence is everywhere and nowhere – while the 1AC holds us in thrall of
supposed wars, the slow violence of neoliberalism infects every area of the globe,
producing billions of anonymous victims beyond the reach of our moral concern.
Di Leo and McClennen 2012
(Jeffrey R., Dean of the School of Arts and Sciences and Professor of English and Philosophy at
the University of Houston–Victoria; Sophia A. professor of international affairs and directs
Penn State's Center for Global Studies as well as its Latin American Studies program; Postscript
on Violence symploke, Volume 20, Numbers 1-2, 2012, pp. 241-250 (Article))
Violence is everywhere. It could be argued that we are in one of the most¶ violent eras in human
history. The scope of violence today is global and its¶ magnitude immense. It is seen in the death
counts from perpetual wars and¶ the injury reports from fierce protests; it is found in the oil-soaked
waters of¶ the Gulf of Mexico and the radiation-contaminated earth of Japan; it is heard¶ in the
screams of women subject to sexual violence and the children who¶ are the victims of predators. It is
in the blood we are served by televised¶ news and the brutal visions of an increasing violence-driven
entertainment¶ industry.¶ Though our various critical and cultural studies relate features of it, and¶
our social and physical sciences capture aspects of it, the violence in our world¶ is far too
overwhelming to contain. No study can capture it in its entirety and¶ no report can present us with
a complete set of data on it. For many, the¶ violence that surrounds and engulfs us is an
abomination and a threat, something¶ to be fought and eliminated; though for many more,
violence serves a¶ social and economic end—and is as American as apple pie. “Rooted in
everyday¶ institutional structures,” writes Henry Giroux, “violence has become the¶ toxic glue that
bonds Americans together while simultaneously preventing¶ them from expanding and building a
multiracial and multicultural democracy”¶ (2002, 231).¶ The “toxic glue” of violence is a threat to
individual and social well-being¶ as well as to democracy itself. One of the imperatives of critical
pedagogy¶ must be to reveal its manifestations—another must be to work toward its¶ elimination.
And progressive intellectuals must continue to utilize the public¶ sphere through print and social
media to bring about a better understanding¶ of the dangers of an increasingly violent world and to
work toward eliminating¶ the toxic glue of violence.¶ Violence is nowhere. While violence is
everywhere more apparent, it¶ is also everywhere ignored and hidden . The violence that is unseen
and¶ unknown must be engaged just as much as the violence that is seen and¶ known. While violent
video games and movies premised on the spectacle¶ of violence are not difficult to discern, they
often have the unintended consequence¶ of closing off consideration and understanding of other
forms of¶ violence, in particular the myriad types of violence that cannot be staged.¶ Much of the
violence that is unseen and unheard happens on a temporal¶ scale that is beyond the capacities of
our senses. Termed by Rob Nixon, “slow¶ violence,” it has been described by him as “a violence
that occurs gradually¶ and out of sight, a violence of delayed destruction that is dispersed across¶
time and space, an attritional violence that is typically not viewed as violence¶ at all” (Nixon 2). The
slow violence of “mass droughts in China, flooding in¶ Australia, food crises, super twisters,
earthquakes linked to geo-engineering,¶ arctic melt-off and so on” (Cohen 2012, i); “[C]limate
change, the thawing¶ cryosphere, toxic drift, biomagnifications, deforestation, the radioactive¶
aftermath of war, acidifying oceans, and a host of other slowly unfolding¶ environmental
catastrophes” (Nixon 2).¶ This was not the violence addressed by the theorists and critics of the¶
twentieth-century. Much of this violence unfolds over spans of time better¶ described as
geological rather than human. Or, better yet, over spans of time¶ from which “the human” is
viewed as but a passing moment. The theoretical¶ work here that is just beginning to take shape
promises to reframe the very¶ ways we think about history, time, and change.1¶ However, if the
exanthropic violence of climate change is the future of¶ theory, what of the anthropic violence
that has been the focus of much attention,¶ particularly since the rise of women’s studies, gender
studies, and ethnic¶ studies in the sixties and seventies? How are we doing here with forms of¶
violence that are visible and seen and felt by women, children, and the disenfranchised¶ across
the globe? Unfortunately, not well.¶ In today’s media-saturated world, violence is always visible
but rarely¶ felt. The prevalence of media violence is especially high in U.S. culture. Our¶
entertainment industry is adept at aestheticizing violence and transforming¶ the most violent and
morally extreme members of our society into culture¶ products suitable for mass consumption
and celebration. Take for example,¶ the serial killer Aileen Wournos, who paradoxically became
the object of¶ revulsion and attraction when presented to us by the American entertainment¶
industry. Many marveled at how the angelic Hollywood actor Charlize¶ Theron had been
transformed into the “monster” Wournos, and found themselves¶ comparing the “real” Theron to
the image of Wournos presented by¶ her in the film, Monster (2003). “She is my favorite of the
night,” said a fashion¶ editor from Glamour magazine commenting on Theron’s appearance at
the¶ Golden Globes that year, “[e]specially because you have the contrast of her¶ in that movie
and the way she looks tonight.”2 This entirely commonplace¶ comment reveals a semiotic
process wherein serial killing and its aesthetic¶ image become hopelessly intertwined, and
ultimately confused.¶ In the translation of serial killing to its performance and promotion, a¶
complex semiotic process creates multiple layers of signification concerning¶ the event and its
perpetrator. The result is both a greater understanding¶ (albeit a superficial one) of the killers and
the horrific events in which they¶ participated, and a growing sense of confusion between the
“real” and the¶ image. Carefully packaged, promoted and sanitized by the culture industry, ¶
American psychos such as Jeffrey Dahmer, Aileen Wournos and John Wayne¶ Gacy increasingly
become less despicable objects of moral revulsion, and¶ more objects of fascination and
entertainment. Their final entry into the sign¶ system of celebrity entertainment is signaled by
becoming household names¶ as readily recognizable as our sports, movie and television icons.
For the average¶ culturally literate American, naming three contemporary serial killers is¶ about as
challenging as naming three talk show hosts. However, the realness¶ of these killers and their
violent crimes gets buried under multiple layers of¶ signification. A “hyperreal”—and
“hypermoral”—image soon displaces any¶ remaining fragments of the reality of the horrific
events perpetrated by them.¶ The cultural celebration of violence though does not end with the
remediation¶ of increasingly macabre, sadistic, and cruel behavior. Rather, it creates¶ a culture
where violence has become a—if not “the”—standard form of entertainment,¶ and where our
children are targeted as major consumers of this¶ violence. From the hyper-real violence of many
of the video games played¶ by children to the scenes of fighting, killing, and torture found in
many of the¶ movies our children watch, there is no escaping the toxic glue of violence.¶ Even the
“G” rated Pixar family movie, Cars 2 (2011), featured two deaths¶ and one torture scene (a crime
syndicate tortures a car until it blows up).¶ How else can this be explained except as a primer on
violence for children?¶ It is not going to be a surprise to anyone familiar with the American film¶
industry that violence is one of its main commodities—and one that is internationally¶ consumed.
However, there is some reason to believe that more¶ people are beginning to understand the
negative impact of repeated cultural¶ consumption of violence. If nothing else, the tragic events
surrounding the¶ shooting of moviegoers in Aurora, Colorado this past summer facilitated this¶
discussion. However, the solution is not to be found in say banning The Dark¶ Knight Rises
(2012) from theaters because of its alleged connection to an act¶ of violence. This would be about
as effective as taking Sweet Tarts away from¶ children in an effort to stop tooth decay. Rather,
the solution is to be found¶ in understanding how making violence into a commodity connects
with a¶ broader and more pernicious neoliberal social and economic agenda. Once¶ this is
understood, then just as with eating candy, you can consume violence¶ at your own risk.¶
Neoliberal economic practices have increased biopolitical violence. The¶ devastating effects of
neoliberalism have been well documented. “Under¶ neoliberalism,” writes Henry Giroux,
“everything either is for sale or is plundered¶ for profit” (2004, xii). He continues:¶ Public lands
are looted by logging companies and corporate ranchers;¶ politicians willingly hand the public’s
airwaves over to broadcasters¶ and large corporate interests without a dime going into the¶ public
trust; Halliburton gives war profiteering a new meaning as¶ it is granted corporate contracts
without any competitive bidding¶ and then bilks the U.S. government for millions; the environment¶
is polluted and despoiled in the name of profit-making just as the¶ government passes legislation to
make it easier for corporations¶ to do so; public services are gutted in order to lower the taxes of¶
major corporations; schools increasingly resemble malls or jails,¶ and teachers, forced to raise
revenue for classroom materials,¶ increasingly function as circus barkers hawking everything
from¶ hamburgers to pizza parties—that is, when they are not reduced to¶ prepping students to get
higher test scores. (2004, xii-xiv)¶ When extreme free-market capitalism becomes the source of
values,¶ violence is given a reprieve from moral indignation . Democratic values as¶ well as basic
notions of human rights and economic justice are overlooked¶ when the market reveals profits to be
had—or losses to be avoided. As¶ neoliberalism widens the gulf between the rich and the poor, and
the enfranchised¶ and the disenfranchised, it also places at risk of violence the poor and¶ the
disenfranchised. Therefore, it should be no surprise that the devastation¶ of the environment and
the violation of human rights is often more extreme¶ in less affluent parts of the world.¶ Moreover,
the celebration of violence in the American entertainment¶ industry must be seen as an extension
of the neoliberal militaristic transformation¶ of the country. Arguably, the state of permanent war
of the United States¶ has benefited an entertainment industry which views increased militarization¶
as a marketing dream. Toys, games, videos, movies and clothing associated¶ with the military and
its values increase in times of war. The permanent¶ state of war in the United States thus provides
increasing opportunities for¶ corporations endlessly to exploit nationalistic jingoism and the
glorification¶ of violence. In light of neoliberalism and its economic Darwinism, the recent ¶
resurrection of Captain America—the defender of American “ideals”—is less¶ a nostalgic nod to
comic history’s past, than a market-driven embrace of our¶ increasingly militarized, violent, and
jingoistic culture.
Total rejection is key – the only way to produce real alternatives to neoliberalism is
to refuse the allure of half measures.
Werlhof 8
(Claudia von Werlhof. Werlhof is a professor at the Institute of Political Sciences at the
University of Innsbruck. “The Globalization of Neoliberalism, its Consequences and Some of its
Basic Alternatives.” 27 August 2008. Capitalism Nature Socialism. BA)
Still, euphoria would be out of place. An alternative to neoliberalism is not created through
analysis and protest alone but must be practiced. Opinions on how to do this differ. Some discuss
‘‘alternatives’’ that are none: a reform of the WTO; ‘‘control’’ of globalization through NGOs; a
return to Keynesianism; a restoration of ‘‘social market economy’’; or even a revival of
socialism. Such ideas ignore reality and trivialize the problem. Neoliberalism shows every day
that much more is at stake.
Neoliberalism is an apocalypse, a ‘‘revelation,’’ because the reality it creates makes it impossible
for neoliberalism to justify itself. Nor can we consider the corporations harmless ‘‘players.’’
There is no ambiguity. As a consequence, the perpetrators of neoliberal politics simply lie about
what is happening. The only good thing about neoliberalism is that it reveals the truth about
‘‘Western civilization’’ and ‘‘European values.’’ This means that people now have the chance to
draw the right conclusions about what is really needed.
What is really needed, of course, is nothing less than a different civilization. A different
economy alone, or a different society or culture will not suffice. We need a civilization that is the
exact opposite of neoliberalism and the patriarchal capitalist world system it is rooted in. The
logic of our alternative must be one that completely undermines the logic of neoliberalism.113
Neoliberalism has turned everything that would ensure a good life for all beings on this planet
upside down. Many people still have a hard time understanding that the horror we are
experiencing is indeed a reality*a reality willingly produced, maintained and justified by ‘‘our’’
politicians. But even if the alternative was half implemented*no more plundering, exploitation,
destruction, violence, war, coer- cion, mercilessness, accumulation, greed, corruption*we would
still be left with all the damage that the earth has already suffered.
Neolib K 1NC vs Survivors Mexico Aff
Be skeptical of the 1AC’s strategy to cultivate a permitted Left in Mexico. History
suggests that the decision to train and organize around dispute mechanisms works
in service of neoliberal interests. This risk of cooption should be at the forefront of
our concern.
Robinson 8
William I., Professor of Sociology at the University of Santa Barbara, Latin
America and Global Capitalism: A Critical Globalization Perspective)
Nevertheless, it
is useful, we argue, to situate contemporary Latin American lefts theoretically along a
continuum between two ideal types: a radical Left, on the one hand, and an izquierda permitida, on
the other. This is the driving theme tying together the various theoretical and case-study chapters. Which currents of the
revitalization of Latin American radicalism represent a significant challenge to neoliberalism,
imperialism, and even potentially capitalism itself? Which, in other words, constitute a radical alternative? And
which components ofbthe same resurgence represent a transition to an izquierda permitida, or "authorized
Left"? Our use ofbthe term izquierda permitida draws on Charles Hale's theorization of the notion of indio permitido in the era of neoliberal
multiculturalism in Latin America. Hale used this term to describe the way in which neoliberal states in the 1990s adopted a
language of cultural recognition of indigenous people and even enacted modest reforms in the area
of indigenous rights; at the same time, these states set strict predetermined limits to the extent of
reform . Neoliberal multiculturalism in this way divided and domesticated indigenous movements
through selective co-optation . In particular, the era of the indio permitido has meant that cultural rights are to be
enjoyed on the implicit condition that indigenous movements will not challenge foundational
neoliberal economic policies. Indigenous movements that have submitted more or less to the framework of neoliberal
multiculturalism fall into Hale's category indio permitido, or "authorized Indian" (Hale 1996, 2002, 2004, 2006). Adapting this theoretical
framework to the context of the Latin American Left, the authors of this volume explore the varied experiences of the ostensibly left regimes,
political parties, and social movements of diiferent countries in terms of how closely they adhere to the notion of izquierda permitida and ask
whether they represent the mature realization or at least a potential transition toward, a more radical Left. The
izquierda permitida
signals deep continuities with neoliberal capitalism and adapts easily to U.S. imperial strategies. In its
regime form, it seeks to divide and co-opt radical left social movements and parties. The radical Left, on
the other hand, offers fundamental challenges to empire, neoliberalism, and capitalism. The radical
Left works to overturn capitalist class rule and capitalist states in Latin America through the
activity and struggle of the popular classes and oppressed peoples themselves. It envisions a transition toward
democratic social coordination of the economy and the construction of a development model in which human needs are prioritized above the
needs of capital. The
radical Left fights for communal ownership of economic and natural resources. It
pushes for worker and community control of workplaces and neighborhoods. The radical Left sees
liberal capitalist democracy as a limited expression of popular sovereignty and seeks instead to
expand democratic rule through all political, social, economic, and private spheres of life. It is antiimperialist, seeking the regional liberation of Latin America and the Caribbean and challenging the imperial pretensions of the American empire,
as well as those of its emergent rivals active in the region. This is quite distinct from earlier versions of state capitalism or nationalist populism in
Latin American twentieth-century history, which sought merely state ownership of the means of production in strategic economic sectors and
state allocation of resources. The radical Left described here is an ideal type, a vision of society toward which increasing numbers of Latin
Americans hope to transition out of existing capitalism through processes of struggle.
No new economic system drops from the
sky, Michael Lebowitz (2006: 61) points out. Rather than dropping from the sky or emerging pristine and complete from the conceptions of
intellectuals, new productive forces and relations of production emerge within and in opposition to the
existing society. One implication is that the new society can never be fully formed at the beginning. Initially, that new society must build
upon elements ofthe old society. The radical Left indigenous social movements that arose in Bolivia between 2000 and 2005, and the radical
socialist flanks of the Chavista movement in Venezuela, are arguably those social forces that most closely approximate the outlook of the radical
Left described above. Perhaps
the best analytical starting point for an understanding of the izquierda
permitida ideal type, the radical Left's antipode, is what Iorge Castaneda, a former leftist, describes approvingly as the
"reconstructed, formerly radical left."• The reconstructed governments of Chile under Michelle Bachelet
(until her recent electoral defeat to right-wing Sebastian Piflera), Uruguay under Tabarê Vazquez (and now Iosê Mujica), and Brazil under Lula
(and now Rouseff),
for example, stress "social policy-education, anti-poverty programs, health care,
housing- but within a more or less orthodox market framework."• When the parties of the izquierda permitida
have come to office in recent years, their "economic policies have been remarkably similar to those of [their neoliberal] predecessors"
(Castafleda, 2006: 35). As we have seen, in the final years of the 1990s and the outset of the 2000s, the region entered into a steep recession that
fundamentally brought into question the legitimacy of neoliberalism as a development model and gave birth to myriad social explosions and
popular struggles. The
paradigmatic political parties and regimes of the new izquierda permitida are one
expression of a reconstitution of neoliberalism in a new form. In terms of its economic program, the izquierda
permitida has been deeply influenced by the turn from classical structuralism to neostructuralism within the United Nations Economic
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). Over the course of the second half of the 1990s and early 2000s, neostructuralism
moved from the margins to the center of political influence in the region by challenging certain assumptions of the market dogmatism
characteristic of orthodox neoliberalism while rebuking simultaneously the core presuppositions of classical structuralism. Post-Pinochet Chile
became the poster child of neostructuralism throughout the 1990s. In this way it became a prototype for the izquierda permitida. Neostructuralism
was also deeply influential in the "Buenos Aires Consensus," which came out of a Iune 1999 convention of the Socialist International and
eventually became the model of political economy for Lula's Brazil, Kirchner's Argentina, Vazquez's Uruguay, and arguably the governments
formed recently by formerly guerrilla parties in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala (for a different view, see the chapter by Hêctor Perla Ir.,
Marco Mojica, and Iared Bibler in this volume). The
areas of conceptual innovation at the heart of
neostructuralism revolve around systemic competitiveness, technical progress, proactive labor
flexibility, and virtuous circles. In an effort to distinguish itself from orthodox neoliberalism,
neostructuralism in Latin America rejects the notion that markets and competition are the
exclusive channels for social and economic interaction, and replace the basic neoclassical notion of
comparative advantage with systemic competitiveness. By this, neostructuralists essentially mean
"that what compete[s] in the world market [are] not commodities per se but entire social systems"
(Leiva, 2008: 4). While granting that the market will remain the central organizing force in society, neostructuralists stress that the
competitiveness of the entire system depends upon effective and thoroughgoing state intervention in infrastructure (technology, energy,
transport), education, finance, labor-management relations, and the general relationships between public and private spheres in a way that
orthodox neoliberal theory cannot grasp (Leiva, 2008: 4). The proponents of this paradigm, Greig Charnock (2009: 67) points out, "reject the
market fundamentalism of the 1980s and early 1990s, represented by structural adjustment and shock therapy, and with these many of the
assumptions about what the untrammelled free market can achieve." They
call for a second generation of institutional
shifts in state policies. These shifts will require a greater role for state engineering. States must
fashion institutions that promote policy stability, adaptability, and coherence and coordination of
markets. The institutions must be of high quality and embody "public regardedness" rather than personalistic clientelism. Whereas
orthodox neoliberals in the 1970s and 1980s saw the state's basic function as lubricating the dynamism of the market through the protection of
property rights, contract enforcement, information collection, and strictly delimited social provision for the destitute, neostructuralism "assigns
the state an important auxiliary role in the search for international competitiveness," blending economic policy on various levels "with political
intervention to construct a broad social consensus" (Leiva, 2008: 9-10). The
state is to stimulate and enhance marketbased initiatives, selectively intervene in productive sectors of the economy, and supplement the
invisible hand of the market with nonmarket forms of social, political, and economic coordination.
Latin American neostructuralism sees modest and temporary state intervention as essential for
encouraging a larger share of manufactured and valued-added exports into a country's export
profile. Proponents of the izquierda permitida model emphasize the necessity of "a configuration of class forces that can induce a capitalist
class to accept a smaller share of the surplus in exchange for legitimacy, political and social peace, and high productivity." At the same time,
"the influential organizations of the economic elites must be convinced that subordinate classes will not threaten private property." The
orientation of the new izquierda permitida is to "pragmatically strive to reconcile liber1y, equity,
and community with the demands of a market economy" (Sandbrook, Edelman, Heller, and Teichman, 2006). The
restructuring of neoliberalism in the direction of an izquierda permitida may offer "an alternative that combines representative democracy with a
market economy and state initiatives to reduce inequalities and promote social citizenship" (Roberts, 2008: 87). The regimes of the izquierda
permitida introduce targeted antipoverty programs, subsidies for small- and mediumsized businesses, increases in royalty regimes for
multinational corporations operating in the natural-resource sectors, and joint private-public ventures between the state and foreign capital.
These changes do not signify any change in underlying social inequalities of the neoliberal class
system. They retain fiscal and monetary austerity, co-opt radical extra-parliamentary movements,
and pursue "social pacts"• between the ruling classes and the working class and the peasantry
predicated on keeping wages down.
The assertion that more reliance on elite controlled mechanisms will provide
sufficient correction to past neoliberal practices is misguided. True democracy
emerges from continued radical resistance, not gradual constitutionalism.
KATZ 13
(Claudio, professor of economic history at the University of Buenos Aires, trans.
Leonard Morin, "Socialist Strategies in Latin America," The New Latin American
Left, 43-5)
The constitutional framework significantly alters the context of leftist activity, which for decades
had been directed against military tyrannies. The battle within the current system is not simple because the current
institutionalism renews bourgeois domination in multiple disguises. This plasticity disconcerted a generation of militants
prepared to fight against a very brutal but not very devious dictatorial enemy. Some activists were demoralized by these
difficulties and ended up accepting the accusations from the right. They began to flay themselves
for their former "under-estimation of democracy," forgetting that civil liberties were an
achievement of popular resistance (and not of a bourgeois party regime complicit with authoritarianism). The constitutional
framework induced other militants to proclaim the end of "revolutionary utopia" and the beginning of a new era of
gradual advances toward a postcapitalist future. They returned to the gradualist scheme and proposed to embark on the road to
socialism through an initial consensus with the oppressors. They advocated taking this path to gaining hegemony for the workers. But the
vast trajectory of social democracy has proved the unreality of this option. The dominant classes
do not give up power. They only co-opt partners to recreate the pillars of an oppression based on
private ownership of the big banks and corporations. They will never permit this control to be
corroded by the political or cultural weight of their antagonists. For this reason, any policy that indefinitely
postpones the anticapitalist goal ends up reinforcing oppression. Socialism requires preparing and
consummating anticapitalist ruptures. If one forgets this principle, the strategy of the Left lacks a
compass. But the confrontation with constitutionalism has also generated positive effects in recent years.
It has allowed, for example, debate on the left about the form that a genuine democracy under
socialism would adopt. This reflection introduced a significant change in the way of conceptualizing the anticapitalist perspective. In
the 1970s, democracy was a topic that the critics of the Soviet bureaucracy omitted or barely put forth. Now almost no one skirts this problem.
Socialism has ceased to be imagined as a prolongation of the tyranny that reigned in the Soviet Union and has currently begun to be perceived as
a regime of growing participation, representation, and popular control. But this future also depends on the immediate responses to
constitutionalism. Two
positions prevail on the left: one focus proposes winning space within the institutional
the other promotes parallel organs of people's power (Harnecker, 2000; Petras and Veltmeyer, 2005).
The first path argues for advancing by climbing from the local to the provincial levels to subsequently
structure, and
reach the national governments. It follows from the experiences of community administrations that the Brazilian Workers' Party (Partido dos
Trabalhadores) and the Broad Front (Frente Amplio) of Uruguay pursued in the early 1990s. It recognizes the bitter concessions granted to the
establishment during these administrations (business commitments and postponement of social improvements), but it construes the final outcome
as positive. Undeniably, this "municipal socialism” led to old activists turning into confidence men of capital. They
debated at city halls,
exhibited hostility toward the social movement, and ended up governing on behalf of the dominant classes.
First they moderated programs, then they called for responsibility, and finally they changed sides.
The participatory budget did not counteract this regression. Discussing how to distribute a local expenditure limited by the constraints of
neoliberal policy leads to imposing a self-adjustment upon the citizenry. Participatory
democracy only awakens radical
consciousness of the people when it resists and denounces the tyranny of capital. If it renounces this
goal, it turns into an instrument for preserving the established order. An opposite strategy to the
institutional path exists that encourages social mobilization and rejects electoral participation . It
the emergence of direct
options for people's power. It also questions the electoral traps that, in the Andean countries, have led to channeling resistance
denounces the corruption of the Workers' Party or the passivity of the Broad Front and advocates
through the system. This vision ignores the influence of the electoral arena and minimizes the negative consequences of abandoning it.
Citizenship, voting, and electoral rights are not just instruments of bourgeois manipulation.
They are also popular conquests
achieved against dictatorships, which under certain conditions allow one to take a stand against
the Right.
The US-Jordan FTA agreement cited as the model for the plan by their Robinson
evidence proves our point – Neoliberal promises work in service of elites and not the
people
Ny Times 06- “An ugly side of Free Trade: Sweatshops in Jordan”
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/03/business/worldbusiness/03clothing.html?pagewante
d=all
Propelled by a free trade agreement with the United States, apparel manufacturing is booming in
Jordan, its exports to America soaring twentyfold in the last five years.¶ But some foreign workers in Jordanian factories
that produce garments for Target, Wal-Mart and other American retailers are complaining of dismal
conditions — of 20-hour days, of not being paid for months and of being hit by supervisors and jailed when they complain.¶ An
advocacy group for workers contends that some apparel makers in Jordan, and some contractors that supply foreign
workers to them, have engaged in human trafficking. Workers from Bangladesh said they paid $1,000 to
$3,000 to work in Jordan, but when they arrived, their passports were confiscated, restricting their
ability to leave and tying them to jobs that often pay far less than promised and far less than the country's minimum wage.¶ "We used to
start at 8 in the morning, and we'd work until midnight, 1 or 2 a.m., seven days a week," said Nargis Akhter, a 25-year-old Bangladeshi who, in a
phone interview from Bangladesh, said she worked last year for the Paramount Garment factory outside Amman. "When we were in Bangladesh
they promised us we would receive $120 a month, but in the five months I was there I only got one month's salary — and that was just $50."¶
The advocacy group, the National Labor Committee, which is based in New York, found substandard conditions in
more than 25 of Jordan's roughly 100 garment factories and is set to release a report on its findings today. Its findings
were supported in interviews with current and former workers.¶ Such complaints have dogged the global apparel
industry for years, even as it has adopted measures intended to improve working conditions in
factories that produce clothing for American and European consumers. But the abusive conditions
that the guest workers described show how hard it is to control sweatshops as factories spring up in
new places, often without effective monitoring in place. In recent years , Jordan has become a magnet for apparel
manufacturers, helped by the privileged trade position that the United States has given it, first
because of its 1994 peace accord with Israel and then because of a free trade agreement signed
with Washington in 2001. ¶ Jordan's apparel industry, which exported $1.2 billion to the United States last year, employs tens of
thousands of guest workers, mainly from Bangladesh and China.¶ In interviews this week, five Bangladeshis who used to work in Jordanian
apparel factories and four who still do had similar tales of paying more than $1,000 to work in Jordan, of working 90 to 120 hours a week, of not
being paid the overtime guaranteed by Jordanian law, of sleeping 10 or 20 to a small dorm room. The National Labor Committee helped arrange
interviews with the Bangladeshi workers, who spoke through interpreters.¶ The largest retailer in the United States, Wal-Mart, and one of the
largest clothing makers, Jones Apparel, confirmed yesterday that they had discovered serious problems with the conditions at several major
Jordanian factories.¶ In addition, a factory monitor for a major American company confirmed that Jordanian factories routinely confiscated their
guest workers' passports, doctored wage and hour records and coached employees to lie to government and company inspectors about working
conditions. The monitor asked not to be identified because the company had not given authorization to speak publicly.¶ Beth Keck, a
spokeswoman for Wal-Mart, said the company did not own or manage factories, but tried to improve working conditions in Jordan and
elsewhere. "It is a continuous challenge, not just for Wal-Mart but for any company," she said, noting that the most commonly observed problems
included failure to pay proper wages, "egregious hours," and "use of false or insufficient books or documentation."¶ Charles Kernaghan,
executive director of the National Labor Committee, which has exposed mistreatment in factories
in Central America and China, said he was shocked by what he discovered in Jordan.¶ "These are
the worst conditions I've ever seen," he said. "You have people working 48 hours straight. You
have workers who were stripped of their passports, who don't have ID cards that allow them to go
out on the street. If they're stopped, they can be imprisoned or deported, so they're trapped, often
held under conditions of involuntary servitude."¶ Mr. Kernaghan said Bangladeshi workers had contacted his organization
to complain about working conditions in Jordan. He then traveled to Jordan and met quietly with dozens of workers. He said American
companies, despite their monitoring efforts, were often slow to uncover workplace abuses because
workers were coached to lie to them or were scared to speak out. Moreover, factories often send
work out to substandard subcontractors without notifying American retailers.¶ Several factory owners in
Jordan insisted that they treated their workers properly.¶ "Some people are always making allegations," said Karim Saifi, the owner of United
Garment Manufacturing, a factory near Amman that workers criticized for long hours and wage violations. "As far as we know, we follow all the
labor laws here. If we were not abiding by all of the local Jordan laws, we would not be able to operate."¶ Several foreign apparel workers said
that while their factories required them to stay until midnight, the Jordanian workers were usually allowed to leave at 4 p.m.¶ Two large industrial
zones outside Amman are thriving, having geared themselves to the American apparel market. They have attracted dozens of garment
manufacturers, some with 200 workers, some with 2,000, that say they produce clothes for J. C. Penney, Sears, Wal-Mart, Gap and Target.¶ "It
would be wrong to think that problems at a few places are representative of the 102 apparel factories in my country," said Yanal Beasha, Jordan's
trade representative in Washington.¶ Jordan's ambassador to the United States, Karim Kawar, said "If there are any violations of our labor laws,
we certainly take it seriously."¶ Mr. Beasha said Jordanian government inspectors monitor the working conditions in factories. But several guest
workers said factory managers hid abuses by coaching workers to lie. Mr. Beasha said the Jordanian government cared about the welfare of
foreign guest workers, noting that it enforced overtime laws and recently increased the minimum wage for citizens and guest workers.¶ But
Mohammed Z., who has worked for more than a year at the Paramount Garment Factory, said that even though he worked more than 100 hours a
week — normally from 7 to midnight seven days a week — the company refused to pay him overtime when he did not meet production targets.
He asked that his last name be withheld for fear of retribution.¶ Having paid $2,000 to work in Jordan, he said, in
an interview from
Amman, "I'm not earning enough to repay my loan or to support my wife and son."¶ Unhappy that
his passport has been confiscated, he said: "My identity has been taken by the company. I have no
freedom because I have no freedom to move to other places."¶ Mohammed Saiful Islam, 30, a Bangladeshi who
was production manager at Western Garment, said that several times the workers had to work until
4 a.m., then sleep on the factory's floor for a few hours, before resuming work at 8 a.m.¶ "The workers
got so exhausted they became sick," he said. "They could hardly stay awake at their machines."¶ Mr. Saiful, who is in the United States to
highlight poor working conditions in Jordan, pointed to a yellow and black fleece sweatshirt that he said his factory made. It had an Athletic
Works label made for Wal-Mart, selling for $9.48.¶ "Sometimes when companies sent in monitors, the workers were instructed what to say," Mr.
Saiful said.¶ Mohamed Irfan, who in a telephone interview from Jordan said he was Western's owner, said, "The workers get the minimum wage,
and all times, there is no problem in our factory."¶ Mohamed Kasim, Paramount's owner, said his factory also paid its workers properly. Mr.
Kasim and other factory managers said workers received free room and board and sometimes medical care.¶ But
several workers said
that when they were sick they did not receive medical care, but were instead punished and had
their pay docked.¶ Several Bangladeshis said there were terrible conditions at factories that made clothes for Wal-Mart and Jones
Apparel, which owns brands like Gloria Vanderbilt and Jones New York.¶ Ms. Keck, the Wal-Mart spokeswoman, said company inspectors
recently identified "serious violations" of its labor rules at three Jordanian factories. At Honorway Apparel Jordan, for example, which
manufactures sleepwear for Wal-Mart, inspectors found employees working off the clock, managers who refused to pay overtime and wages that
"could not be verified," Ms. Keck said. At the Ivory Garment Factory, which Wal-Mart ceased working with two years ago, inspectors found
"egregious working hours."¶ Joele Frank, a spokeswoman for Jones Apparel, said the company had also found "serious problems" at the Ivory
Garment Factory, which produces Gloria Vanderbilt clothing, and said it would "monitor the situation closely." A spokesman for Sears Holding,
said the company was investigating potential problems at Honorway, which produces clothes for Kmart, a division of Sears Holding.¶ A Kohl's
spokeswoman denied workers' accusations that clothing sold by the company was made at several Jordanian factories with poor conditions.
Target said it worked with only one factory that has come under criticism— Al Safa Garments, which Wal-Mart recently cited for labor
violations.¶ Many
retailers said their policy was, after discovering violations, to work with a factory to
improve conditions, rather than automatically withdraw their business. Wal-Mart says it gives
factories a year to fix serious problems, reinspecting them every 120 days.¶ "Our business with the factory is the
only leverage we have to push for improvement," Ms. Keck said.¶ After The New York Times asked about the accusations on Monday, Wal-Mart
dispatched two inspectors to Jordan.¶ Hazrat
Ali, 25, who worked from September 2004 to March 2005 at the
Al Shahaed factory, said he sometimes worked 48 hours in a row and received no pay for the six
months.¶ "If we asked for money, they hit us," he said.¶ Nasima Akhter, 30, said that the Western
factory gave its workers a half-glass of tea for breakfast and often rice and some rotten chicken for
lunch.¶ "In the four months I was in Jordan, they didn't pay us a single penny," she said. "When
we asked management for our money and for better food, they were very angry at us. We were put
in some sort of jail for four days without anything to eat. And then they forced us to go back to
Bangladesh."
Third, the affirmative’s organization plan is a dead end. Civil society is too easily
isolated and tokenized as it shields elites from direct confrontation.
Brand, 06
(Ulrish Brand, Brand has a PhD in Political Science at Goethe University Frankfurt/M, The
World Wide Web of Anti- Neoliberalism, page 236-237)
The ‘brave new world’ of neoliberalism has been battered by the crises of South East Asia and other countries, and by the protests in Seattle,
Genoa and else- where, even in the public opinion of Western countries. Hardly a politician or corporate executive can mount a public podium
without speaking of the problems and dangers of capitalist globalization, although as a rule they append the corollary that nevertheless ‘there is
no alternative’. This much is clear, however: while the critique of neoliberal globalization in general, and of certain actors in particular, is
enjoying increasing attention in the media, and networks like Attac use it quite cleverly, there are few changes to the general structural
transformations in train or in neoliberal power relations. It would, of course, be nonsensical to lay this at the feet of a new, and still developing
movement. It
is nevertheless necessary to register the dangers and dead-ends which may lie ahead. One of the chief
they may share the fate of the non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) which were so celebrated in the 1990s. They launched themselves into the
political fray with enormous effort and became ‘cosmopolitan ghosts’ (Drainville 2001: 15 ), focusing on a
dangers facing anti-neoliberal movements is surely that
consensus with dominant forces . In doing this, however, they increasingly became an alternative resource
for neoliberals in government as well as in international politics to be selectively resorted to as
actors with experience and profound knowledge of complicated political and socio-economic processes. Moreover, as ‘civil society’
actors they provided legitimacy for the prevailing developments particularly as, at least on the
‘soft issues’ of environment, development, human rights and women’s politics, ‘civil society’ sat at
the table. The handling of ‘hard’ military or economic matters would, on the other hand, con- tinue to be
shielded from possibly critical eyes.2 The relative failure of NGO involvement lay crucially in the lack of
far-reaching critical understanding of the upheavals of neoliberal globalization among activists.
This was to be especially clear in the debates and politics with regard to ‘sustainable development’
which were conducted more or less in isolation from the neoliberal transformation of society (Brand
and Go ̈rg 2005). In the medium term it became possible that the new protest movements (or parts thereof) would become a sort of
institutionalized bad conscience, with whom the powerful would meet amid high publicity, and which would always remind them to be conscious
of the losers and losses of globalization and to take (usually merely symbolic) action on these now and again.
Neoliberal violence is everywhere and nowhere – while the 1AC holds us in thrall of
supposed wars, the slow violence of neoliberalism infects every area of the globe,
producing billions of anonymous victims beyond the reach of our moral concern.
Di Leo and McClennen 2012
(Jeffrey R., Dean of the School of Arts and Sciences and Professor of English and Philosophy at
the University of Houston–Victoria; Sophia A. professor of international affairs and directs
Penn State's Center for Global Studies as well as its Latin American Studies program; Postscript
on Violence symploke, Volume 20, Numbers 1-2, 2012, pp. 241-250 (Article))
Violence is everywhere. It could be argued that we
are in one of the most¶ violent eras in human history. The scope
of violence today is global and its¶ magnitude immense. It is seen in the death counts from perpetual
wars and¶ the injury reports from fierce protests; it is found in the oil-soaked waters of¶ the Gulf of
Mexico and the radiation-contaminated earth of Japan; it is heard¶ in the screams of women subject
to sexual violence and the children who¶ are the victims of predators. It is in the blood we are served
by televised¶ news and the brutal visions of an increasing violence-driven entertainment¶ industry.¶
Though our various critical and cultural studies relate features of it, and ¶ our social and physical sciences capture aspects of it, the violence in our
world¶ is far too overwhelming to contain. No study can capture it in its entirety and ¶ no report can present us with a complete set of data on it.
For many, the¶ violence that surrounds and engulfs us is an abomination and a threat, something¶ to be fought and eliminated; though for many
more, violence serves a¶ social and economic end—and is as American as apple pie. “Rooted
in everyday¶ institutional
structures,” writes Henry Giroux, “violence has become the¶ toxic glue that bonds Americans
together while simultaneously preventing¶ them from expanding and building a multiracial and
multicultural democracy”¶ (2002, 231).¶ The “toxic glue” of violence is a threat to individual and social well-being¶ as well as to
democracy itself. One of the imperatives of critical pedagogy¶ must be to reveal its manifestations—
another must be to work toward its¶ elimination. And progressive intellectuals must continue to
utilize the public¶ sphere through print and social media to bring about a better understanding¶ of
the dangers of an increasingly violent world and to work toward eliminating¶ the toxic glue of
violence.¶ Violence is nowhere. While violence is everywhere more apparent, it¶ is also everywhere
ignored and hidden . The violence that is unseen and¶ unknown must be engaged just as much as the
violence that is seen and¶ known. While violent video games and movies premised on the spectacle¶ of
violence are not difficult to discern, they often have the unintended consequence¶ of closing off
consideration and understanding of other forms of¶ violence, in particular the myriad types of
violence that cannot be staged.¶ Much of the violence that is unseen and unheard happens on a
temporal¶ scale that is beyond the capacities of our senses. Termed by Rob Nixon, “slow¶ violence,” it has
been described by him as “a violence that occurs gradually¶ and out of sight, a violence of delayed
destruction that is dispersed across¶ time and space, an attritional violence that is typically not
viewed as violence¶ at all” (Nixon 2). The slow violence of “mass droughts in China, flooding in¶ Australia, food crises, super
twisters, earthquakes linked to geo-engineering,¶ arctic melt-off and so on” (Cohen 2012, i); “[C]limate change, the thawing¶ cryosphere, toxic
drift, biomagnifications, deforestation, the radioactive¶ aftermath of war, acidifying oceans, and a host of other slowly unfolding¶ environmental
catastrophes” (Nixon 2).¶ This
was not the violence addressed by the theorists and critics of the¶ twentiethcentury. Much of this violence unfolds over spans of time better¶ described as geological rather than human. Or, better yet, over spans of
time¶ from which “the human” is viewed as but a passing moment. The theoretical¶ work here that is just beginning to take shape promises to
reframe the very¶ ways we think about history, time, and change.1¶ However, if the exanthropic violence of climate change is the future of¶
theory, what of the anthropic violence that has been the focus of much attention, ¶ particularly since the rise of women’s studies, gender studies,
and ethnic¶ studies in the sixties and seventies? How are we doing here with forms of¶ violence that are visible and seen and felt by women,
children, and the disenfranchised¶ across the globe? Unfortunately, not well.¶ In today’s media-saturated world, violence is always visible but
rarely¶ felt. The prevalence of media violence is especially high in U.S. culture. Our¶ entertainment industry is adept at aestheticizing violence
and transforming¶ the most violent and morally extreme members of our society into culture¶ products suitable for mass consumption and
celebration. Take for example,¶ the serial killer Aileen Wournos, who paradoxically became the object of¶ revulsion and attraction when
presented to us by the American entertainment¶ industry. Many marveled at how the angelic Hollywood actor Charlize¶ Theron had been
transformed into the “monster” Wournos, and found themselves¶ comparing the “real” Theron to the image of Wournos presented by¶ her in the
film, Monster (2003). “She is my favorite of the night,” said a fashion ¶ editor from Glamour magazine commenting on Theron’s appearance at
the¶ Golden Globes that year, “[e]specially because you have the contrast of her¶ in that movie and the way she looks tonight.”2 This entirely
commonplace¶ comment reveals a semiotic process wherein serial killing and its aesthetic ¶ image become hopelessly intertwined, and ultimately
confused.¶ In the translation of serial killing to its performance and promotion, a ¶ complex semiotic process creates multiple layers of
signification concerning¶ the event and its perpetrator. The result is both a greater understanding¶ (albeit a superficial one) of the killers and the
horrific events in which they¶ participated, and a growing sense of confusion between the “real” and the¶ image. Carefully packaged, promoted
and sanitized by the culture industry,¶ American psychos such as Jeffrey Dahmer, Aileen Wournos and John Wayne¶ Gacy increasingly become
less despicable objects of moral revulsion, and¶ more objects of fascination and entertainment. Their final entry into the sign ¶ system of celebrity
entertainment is signaled by becoming household names¶ as readily recognizable as our sports, movie and television icons. For the average¶
culturally literate American, naming three contemporary serial killers is¶ about as challenging as naming three talk show hosts. However, the
realness¶ of these killers and their violent crimes gets buried under multiple layers of ¶ signification. A “hyperreal”—and “hypermoral”—image
soon displaces any¶ remaining fragments of the reality of the horrific events perpetrated by them. ¶ The cultural celebration of violence though
does not end with the remediation¶ of increasingly macabre, sadistic, and cruel behavior. Rather, it creates ¶ a culture where violence has become
a—if not “the”—standard form of entertainment,¶ and where our children are targeted as major consumers of this¶ violence. From the hyper-real
violence of many of the video games played¶ by children to the scenes of fighting, killing, and torture found in many of the¶ movies our children
watch, there is no escaping the toxic glue of violence.¶ Even the “G” rated Pixar family movie, Cars 2 (2011), featured two deaths ¶ and one
torture scene (a crime syndicate tortures a car until it blows up).¶ How else can this be explained except as a primer on violence for children?¶ It is
not going to be a surprise to anyone familiar with the American film ¶ industry that violence is one of its main commodities—and one that is
internationally¶ consumed. However, there is some reason to believe that more¶ people are beginning to understand the negative impact of
repeated cultural¶ consumption of violence. If nothing else, the tragic events surrounding the¶ shooting of moviegoers in Aurora, Colorado this
past summer facilitated this¶ discussion. However, the solution is not to be found in say banning The Dark¶ Knight Rises (2012) from theaters
because of its alleged connection to an act¶ of violence. This would be about as effective as taking Sweet Tarts away from ¶ children in an effort to
stop tooth decay. Rather, the solution is to be found¶ in understanding how making violence into a commodity connects with a ¶ broader and more
pernicious neoliberal social and economic agenda. Once¶ this is understood, then just as with eating candy, you can consume violence¶ at your
own risk.¶ Neoliberal
economic practices have increased biopolitical violence. The¶ devastating effects
of neoliberalism have been well documented. “Under¶ neoliberalism,” writes Henry Giroux,
“everything either is for sale or is plundered¶ for profit” (2004, xii). He continues:¶ Public lands are looted by logging
companies and corporate ranchers;¶ politicians willingly hand the public’s airwaves over to broadcasters¶ and large corporate interests without a
dime going into the¶ public trust; Halliburton
gives war profiteering a new meaning as¶ it is granted corporate
contracts without any competitive bidding¶ and then bilks the U.S. government for millions; the
environment¶ is polluted and despoiled in the name of profit-making just as the¶ government passes
legislation to make it easier for corporations¶ to do so; public services are gutted in order to lower the taxes of¶ major
corporations; schools increasingly resemble malls or jails,¶ and teachers, forced to raise revenue for classroom materials,¶ increasingly function as
circus barkers hawking everything from¶ hamburgers to pizza parties—that is, when they are not reduced to¶ prepping students to get higher test
scores. (2004, xii-xiv)¶ When
extreme free-market capitalism becomes the source of values,¶ violence is
given a reprieve from moral indignation . Democratic values as¶ well as basic notions of human
rights and economic justice are overlooked¶ when the market reveals profits to be had—or losses to
be avoided. As¶ neoliberalism widens the gulf between the rich and the poor, and the enfranchised¶
and the disenfranchised, it also places at risk of violence the poor and¶ the disenfranchised.
Therefore, it should be no surprise that the devastation¶ of the environment and the violation of
human rights is often more extreme¶ in less affluent parts of the world.¶ Moreover, the celebration of violence in
the American entertainment¶ industry must be seen as an extension of the neoliberal militaristic transformation ¶ of the country. Arguably, the
state of permanent war of the United States¶ has benefited an entertainment industry which views
increased militarization¶ as a marketing dream. Toys, games, videos, movies and clothing associated¶ with the military and
its values increase in times of war. The permanent¶ state of war in the United States thus provides increasing opportunities for¶ corporations
endlessly to exploit nationalistic jingoism and the glorification¶ of violence. In light of neoliberalism and its economic Darwinism, the recent ¶
resurrection of Captain America—the defender of American “ideals”—is less¶ a nostalgic nod to comic history’s past, than a market-driven
embrace of our¶ increasingly militarized, violent, and jingoistic culture.
Vote negative and do not allow elites to “clarify” their interests. Total rejection is
key – the only way to produce real alternatives to neoliberalism is to refuse the
allure of half measures.
Werlhof 8
(Claudia von Werlhof. Werlhof is a professor at the Institute of Political Sciences at
the University of Innsbruck. “The Globalization of Neoliberalism, its Consequences
and Some of its Basic Alternatives.” 27 August 2008. Capitalism Nature Socialism.
BA)
Still, euphoria would be out of place. An alternative to neoliberalism is not created through
analysis and protest alone but must be practiced. Opinions on how to do this differ. Some discuss
‘‘alternatives’’ that are none: a reform of the WTO; ‘‘control’’ of globalization through NGOs; a
return to Keynesianism; a restoration of ‘‘social market economy’’; or even a revival of
socialism. Such ideas ignore reality and trivialize the problem. Neoliberalism shows every day
that much more is at stake. Neoliberalism is an apocalypse, a ‘‘revelation,’’ because the reality it
creates makes it impossible for neoliberalism to justify itself. Nor can we consider the
corporations harmless ‘‘players.’’ There is no ambiguity. As a consequence, the perpetrators of
neoliberal politics simply lie about what is happening. The only good thing about neoliberalism
is that it reveals the truth about ‘‘Western civilization’’ and ‘‘European values.’’ This means that
people now have the chance to draw the right conclusions about what is really needed.
What is really needed, of course, is nothing less than a different civilization. A different
economy alone, or a different society or culture will not suffice. We need a civilization that is the
exact opposite of neoliberalism and the patriarchal capitalist world system it is rooted in. The
logic of our alternative must be one that completely undermines the logic of neoliberalism.113
Neoliberalism has turned everything that would ensure a good life for all beings on this planet
upside down. Many people still have a hard time understanding that the horror we are
experiencing is indeed a reality*a reality willingly produced, maintained and justified by ‘‘our’’
politicians. But even if the alternative was half implemented*no more plundering, exploitation,
destruction, violence, war, coercion, mercilessness, accumulation, greed, corruption*we would
still be left with all the damage that the earth has already suffered.
Neolib K vs. TRI Cuba Policy
1AC emboldens the “permitted Left” in Latin America. The frenetic call for social
stabilization selectively and tacitly directs radical potential back into the hands of
the neoliberal agenda and arrests the winds from the sails of structural
transformation.
Robinson 8
William I., Professor of Sociology at the University of Santa Barbara, Latin
America and Global Capitalism: A Critical Globalization Perspective)
Nevertheless, it
is useful, we argue, to situate contemporary Latin American lefts theoretically along a
continuum between two ideal types: a radical Left, on the one hand, and an izquierda permitida, on
the other. This is the driving theme tying together the various theoretical and case-study chapters. Which currents of the
revitalization of Latin American radicalism represent a significant challenge to neoliberalism,
imperialism, and even potentially capitalism itself? Which, in other words, constitute a radical alternative? And
which components of the same resurgence represent a transition to an izquierda permitida, or "authorized
Left"? Our use ofbthe term izquierda permitida draws on Charles Hale's theorization of the notion of indio permitido in the era of neoliberal
multiculturalism in Latin America. Hale used this term to describe the way in which neoliberal states in the 1990s adopted a
language of cultural recognition of indigenous people and even enacted modest reforms in the area
of indigenous rights; at the same time, these states set strict predetermined limits to the extent of
reform . Neoliberal multiculturalism in this way divided and domesticated indigenous movements
through selective co-optation . In particular, the era of the indio permitido has meant that cultural rights are to be
enjoyed on the implicit condition that indigenous movements will not challenge foundational
neoliberal economic policies. Indigenous movements that have submitted more or less to the framework of neoliberal
multiculturalism fall into Hale's category indio permitido, or "authorized Indian" (Hale 1996, 2002, 2004, 2006). Adapting this theoretical
framework to the context of the Latin American Left, the authors of this volume explore the varied experiences of the ostensibly left regimes,
political parties, and social movements of diiferent countries in terms of how closely they adhere to the notion of izquierda permitida and ask
whether they represent the mature realization or at least a potential transition toward, a more radical Left. The
izquierda permitida
signals deep continuities with neoliberal capitalism and adapts easily to U.S. imperial strategies. In its
regime form, it seeks to divide and co-opt radical left social movements and parties. The radical Left, on
the other hand, offers fundamental challenges to empire, neoliberalism, and capitalism. The radical
Left works to overturn capitalist class rule and capitalist states in Latin America through the
activity and struggle of the popular classes and oppressed peoples themselves. It envisions a transition toward
democratic social coordination of the economy and the construction of a development model in which human needs are prioritized above the
needs of capital. The
radical Left fights for communal ownership of economic and natural resources. It
pushes for worker and community control of workplaces and neighborhoods. The radical Left sees
liberal capitalist democracy as a limited expression of popular sovereignty and seeks instead to
expand democratic rule through all political, social, economic, and private spheres of life. It is antiimperialist, seeking the regional liberation of Latin America and the Caribbean and challenging the imperial pretensions of the American empire,
as well as those of its emergent rivals active in the region. This is quite distinct from earlier versions of state capitalism or nationalist populism in
Latin American twentieth-century history, which sought merely state ownership of the means of production in strategic economic sectors and
state allocation of resources. The radical Left described here is an ideal type, a vision of society toward which increasing numbers of Latin
Americans hope to transition out of existing capitalism through processes of struggle.
No new economic system drops from the
sky, Michael Lebowitz (2006: 61) points out. Rather than dropping from the sky or emerging pristine and complete from the conceptions of
intellectuals, new productive forces and relations of production emerge within and in opposition to the
existing society. One implication is that the new society can never be fully formed at the beginning. Initially, that new society must build
upon elements ofthe old society. The radical Left indigenous social movements that arose in Bolivia between 2000 and 2005, and the radical
socialist flanks of the Chavista movement in Venezuela, are arguably those social forces that most closely approximate the outlook of the radical
Left described above. Perhaps
the best analytical starting point for an understanding of the izquierda
permitida ideal type, the radical Left's antipode, is what Iorge Castaneda, a former leftist, describes approvingly as the
"reconstructed, formerly radical left."• The reconstructed governments of Chile under Michelle Bachelet
(until her recent electoral defeat to right-wing Sebastian Piflera), Uruguay under Tabarê Vazquez (and now Iosê Mujica), and Brazil under Lula
(and now Rouseff),
for example, stress "social policy-education, anti-poverty programs, health care,
housing- but within a more or less orthodox market framework."• When the parties of the izquierda permitida
have come to office in recent years, their "economic policies have been remarkably similar to those of [their neoliberal] predecessors"
(Castafleda, 2006: 35). As we have seen, in the final years of the 1990s and the outset of the 2000s, the region entered into a steep recession that
fundamentally brought into question the legitimacy of neoliberalism as a development model and gave birth to myriad social explosions and
popular struggles. The
paradigmatic political parties and regimes of the new izquierda permitida are one
expression of a reconstitution of neoliberalism in a new form. In terms of its economic program, the izquierda
permitida has been deeply influenced by the turn from classical structuralism to neostructuralism within the United Nations Economic
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). Over the course of the second half of the 1990s and early 2000s, neostructuralism
moved from the margins to the center of political influence in the region by challenging certain assumptions of the market dogmatism
characteristic of orthodox neoliberalism while rebuking simultaneously the core presuppositions of classical structuralism. Post-Pinochet Chile
became the poster child of neostructuralism throughout the 1990s. In this way it became a prototype for the izquierda permitida. Neostructuralism
was also deeply influential in the "Buenos Aires Consensus," which came out of a Iune 1999 convention of the Socialist International and
eventually became the model of political economy for Lula's Brazil, Kirchner's Argentina, Vazquez's Uruguay, and arguably the governments
formed recently by formerly guerrilla parties in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala (for a different view, see the chapter by Hêctor Perla Ir.,
Marco Mojica, and Iared Bibler in this volume). The
areas of conceptual innovation at the heart of
neostructuralism revolve around systemic competitiveness, technical progress, proactive labor
flexibility, and virtuous circles. In an effort to distinguish itself from orthodox neoliberalism,
neostructuralism in Latin America rejects the notion that markets and competition are the
exclusive channels for social and economic interaction, and replace the basic neoclassical notion of
comparative advantage with systemic competitiveness. By this, neostructuralists essentially mean
"that what compete[s] in the world market [are] not commodities per se but entire social systems"
(Leiva, 2008: 4). While granting that the market will remain the central organizing force in society, neostructuralists stress that the
competitiveness of the entire system depends upon effective and thoroughgoing state intervention in infrastructure (technology, energy,
transport), education, finance, labor-management relations, and the general relationships between public and private spheres in a way that
orthodox neoliberal theory cannot grasp (Leiva, 2008: 4). The proponents of this paradigm, Greig Charnock (2009: 67) points out, "reject the
market fundamentalism of the 1980s and early 1990s, represented by structural adjustment and shock therapy, and with these many of the
assumptions about what the untrammelled free market can achieve." They
call for a second generation of institutional
shifts in state policies. These shifts will require a greater role for state engineering. States must
fashion institutions that promote policy stability, adaptability, and coherence and coordination of
markets. The institutions must be of high quality and embody "public regardedness" rather than personalistic clientelism. Whereas
orthodox neoliberals in the 1970s and 1980s saw the state's basic function as lubricating the dynamism of the market through the protection of
property rights, contract enforcement, information collection, and strictly delimited social provision for the destitute, neostructuralism "assigns
the state an important auxiliary role in the search for international competitiveness," blending economic policy on various levels "with political
intervention to construct a broad social consensus" (Leiva, 2008: 9-10). The
state is to stimulate and enhance marketbased initiatives, selectively intervene in productive sectors of the economy, and supplement the
invisible hand of the market with nonmarket forms of social, political, and economic coordination.
Latin American neostructuralism sees modest and temporary state intervention as essential for
encouraging a larger share of manufactured and valued-added exports into a country's export
profile. Proponents of the izquierda permitida model emphasize the necessity of "a configuration of class forces that can induce a capitalist
class to accept a smaller share of the surplus in exchange for legitimacy, political and social peace, and high productivity." At the same time,
"the influential organizations of the economic elites must be convinced that subordinate classes will not threaten private property." The
orientation of the new izquierda permitida is to "pragmatically strive to reconcile liber1y, equity,
and community with the demands of a market economy" (Sandbrook, Edelman, Heller, and Teichman, 2006). The
restructuring of neoliberalism in the direction of an izquierda permitida may offer "an alternative that combines representative democracy with a
market economy and state initiatives to reduce inequalities and promote social citizenship" (Roberts, 2008: 87). The regimes of the izquierda
permitida introduce targeted antipoverty programs, subsidies for small- and mediumsized businesses, increases in royalty regimes for
multinational corporations operating in the natural-resource sectors, and joint private-public ventures between the state and foreign capital.
These changes do not signify any change in underlying social inequalities of the neoliberal class
system. They retain fiscal and monetary austerity, co-opt radical extra-parliamentary movements,
and pursue "social pacts"• between the ruling classes and the working class and the peasantry
predicated on keeping wages down.
Neoliberals are seeking to find opportunities to pry open Cuban markets –
Engagement is a code word for the death blow to the revolution.
Wenston & Woods ‘08
(Fred & Alan, Alan Woods is a Trotskyist political theorist and author. He is one of
the leading members of the International Marxist Tendency, as well as its British
affiliate group Socialist Appeal, Vultures hovering over Cuba after Fidel Castro
steps down http://www.cjournal.info/2008/02/20/vultures-hovering-over-cuba-afterfidel-castro-steps-down/)
They all pretend to be democrats when it comes to Cuba. In reality they are like vultures waiting
for the day they can get their beaks and claws into the flesh of Cuba . What they are after is the end
of the economic system brought into being by the Cuban revolution. They want capitalism to return
to Cuba. That is what they mean by “democracy”! Another fashionable term these days is “engagement”. While Bush sticks to his guns and
insists on the embargo being stepped up, the more intelligent bourgeois, both in the USA and Europe are
raising the need for “engagement”, i.e. on removing the embargo and opening up trade channels.
Does this wing of the bourgeois have different interests or aims? No, they simply understand better than Bush and his obtuse circle of friends that
the best way to re-introduce capitalism into Cuba is to lift the embargo, begin trading, flood Cuba
with cash and let the process unfold.¶ That is why it is even more disgusting when we hear some
reformist elements on the left advocating such “engagement”. What they are actually doing is
giving the bourgeois advice on how to remove this thorn in their side .¶ All this talk of democracy is
in fact a cover for the real aims of imperialism. Not so long ago the Financial Times was giving more sober advice. They
were suggesting a “Chinese road” for Cuba accompanied by a lifting of the US-sponsored embargo. The Chinese model would envisage an
opening up of Cuba to capitalism accompanied by a firm grip on state power at the top.
While the 1AC held us captivated with elite concerns, it also minimized and
obscured the horrific violence neoliberalism inflicts on billions of people everyday.
Have the courage to ignore the affirmatives inflated threat scenarios and concern
yourself with ending neoliberal exploitation, including the compelled march toward
extinction
Di Leo and McClennen 2012
(Jeffrey R., Dean of the School of Arts and Sciences and Professor of English and
Philosophy at the University of Houston–Victoria; Sophia A. professor of
international affairs and directs Penn State's Center for Global Studies as well as
its Latin American Studies program; Postscript on Violence symploke, Volume 20,
Numbers 1-2, 2012, pp. 241-250 (Article))
Violence is everywhere. It could be argued that we
are in one of the most¶ violent eras in human history. The
scope of violence today is global and its¶ magnitude immense . It is seen in the death counts from
perpetual wars and¶ the injury reports from fierce protests; it is found in the oil-soaked waters of¶
the Gulf of Mexico and the radiation-contaminated earth of Japan; it is heard¶ in the screams of
women subject to sexual violence and the children who¶ are the victims of predators. It is in the
blood we are served by televised¶ news and the brutal visions of an increasing violence-driven
entertainment¶ industry.¶ Though our various critical and cultural studies relate features of it, and¶ our social and physical sciences
capture aspects of it, the violence in our world¶ is far too overwhelming to contain. No study can capture it in its entirety and¶
no report can present us with a complete set of data on it. For many, the¶ violence that surrounds and engulfs us is an abomination and a threat,
something¶ to be fought and eliminated; though for many more, violence serves a¶ social and economic end—and is as American as apple pie.
in everyday¶ institutional structures,” writes Henry Giroux, “violence has become the¶ toxic
glue that bonds Americans together while simultaneously preventing¶ them from expanding and
building a multiracial and multicultural democracy”¶ (2002, 231).¶ The “toxic glue” of violence is a threat to individual
and social well-being¶ as well as to democracy itself. One of the imperatives of critical pedagogy¶ must be to reveal
its manifestations—another must be to work toward its¶ elimination. And progressive intellectuals
must continue to utilize the public¶ sphere through print and social media to bring about a better
understanding¶ of the dangers of an increasingly violent world and to work toward eliminating¶ the
toxic glue of violence.¶ Violence is nowhere. While violence is everywhere more apparent, it¶ is also
“Rooted
everywhere ignored and hidden . The violence that is unseen and¶ unknown must be engaged just as
much as the violence that is seen and¶ known. While violent video games and movies premised on the
spectacle¶ of violence are not difficult to discern, they often have the unintended consequence¶ of
closing off consideration and understanding of other forms of ¶ violence, in particular the myriad
types of violence that cannot be staged.¶ Much of the violence that is unseen and unheard happens
on a temporal¶ scale that is beyond the capacities of our senses. Termed by Rob Nixon, “slow¶ violence,” it has
been described by him as “a violence that occurs gradually¶ and out of sight, a violence of delayed
destruction that is dispersed across¶ time and space, an attritional violence that is typically not
viewed as violence¶ at all” (Nixon 2). The slow violence of “mass droughts in China, flooding in¶ Australia, food crises, super
twisters, earthquakes linked to geo-engineering,¶ arctic melt-off and so on” (Cohen 2012, i); “[C]limate change, the thawing¶ cryosphere, toxic
drift, biomagnifications, deforestation, the radioactive¶ aftermath of war, acidifying oceans, and a host of other slowly unfolding¶ environmental
catastrophes” (Nixon 2).¶ This
was not the violence addressed by the theorists and critics of the¶ twentiethcentury. Much of this violence unfolds over spans of time better¶ described as geological rather than human. Or, better yet, over spans of
time¶ from which “the human” is viewed as but a passing moment. The theoretical¶ work here that is just beginning to take shape promises to
reframe the very¶ ways we think about history, time, and change.1¶ However, if the exanthropic violence of climate change is the future of¶
theory, what of the anthropic violence that has been the focus of much attention,¶ particularly since the rise of women’s studies, gender studies,
and ethnic¶ studies in the sixties and seventies? How are we doing here with forms of¶ violence that are visible and seen and felt by women,
children, and the disenfranchised¶ across the globe? Unfortunately, not well.¶ In today’s media-saturated world, violence is always visible but
rarely¶ felt. The prevalence of media violence is especially high in U.S. culture. Our¶ entertainment industry is adept at aestheticizing violence
and transforming¶ the most violent and morally extreme members of our society into culture¶ products suitable for mass consumption and
celebration. Take for example,¶ the serial killer Aileen Wournos, who paradoxically became the object of¶ revulsion and attraction when
presented to us by the American entertainment¶ industry. Many marveled at how the angelic Hollywood actor Charlize¶ Theron had been
transformed into the “monster” Wournos, and found themselves¶ comparing the “real” Theron to the image of Wournos presented by¶ her in the
film, Monster (2003). “She is my favorite of the night,” said a fashion¶ editor from Glamour magazine commenting on Theron’s appearance at
the¶ Golden Globes that year, “[e]specially because you have the contrast of her¶ in that movie and the way she looks tonight.”2 This entirely
commonplace¶ comment reveals a semiotic process wherein serial killing and its aesthetic¶ image become hopelessly intertwined, and ultimately
confused.¶ In the translation of serial killing to its performance and promotion, a¶ complex semiotic process creates multiple layers of
signification concerning¶ the event and its perpetrator. The result is both a greater understanding¶ (albeit a superficial one) of the killers and the
horrific events in which they¶ participated, and a growing sense of confusion between the “real” and the¶ image. Carefully packaged, promoted
and sanitized by the culture industry,¶ American psychos such as Jeffrey Dahmer, Aileen Wournos and John Wayne¶ Gacy increasingly become
less despicable objects of moral revulsion, and¶ more objects of fascination and entertainment. Their final entry into the sign¶ system of celebrity
entertainment is signaled by becoming household names¶ as readily recognizable as our sports, movie and television icons. For the average¶
culturally literate American, naming three contemporary serial killers is¶ about as challenging as naming three talk show hosts. However, the
realness¶ of these killers and their violent crimes gets buried under multiple layers of¶ signification. A “hyperreal”—and “hypermoral”—image
soon displaces any¶ remaining fragments of the reality of the horrific events perpetrated by them.¶ The cultural celebration of violence though
does not end with the remediation¶ of increasingly macabre, sadistic, and cruel behavior. Rather, it creates¶ a culture where violence has become
a—if not “the”—standard form of entertainment,¶ and where our children are targeted as major consumers of this¶ violence. From the hyper-real
violence of many of the video games played¶ by children to the scenes of fighting, killing, and torture found in many of the¶ movies our children
watch, there is no escaping the toxic glue of violence.¶ Even the “G” rated Pixar family movie, Cars 2 (2011), featured two deaths¶ and one
torture scene (a crime syndicate tortures a car until it blows up).¶ How else can this be explained except as a primer on violence for children?¶ It
is not going to be a surprise to anyone familiar with the American film¶ industry that violence is one of its main commodities—and one that is
internationally¶ consumed. However, there is some reason to believe that more¶ people are beginning to understand the negative impact of
repeated cultural¶ consumption of violence. If nothing else, the tragic events surrounding the¶ shooting of moviegoers in Aurora, Colorado this
past summer facilitated this¶ discussion. However, the solution is not to be found in say banning The Dark¶ Knight Rises (2012) from theaters
because of its alleged connection to an act¶ of violence. This would be about as effective as taking Sweet Tarts away from¶ children in an effort
to stop tooth decay. Rather, the solution is to be found¶ in understanding how making violence into a commodity connects with a¶ broader and
more pernicious neoliberal social and economic agenda. Once¶ this is understood, then just as with eating candy, you can consume violence¶ at
your own risk.¶ Neoliberal
economic practices have increased biopolitical violence. The¶ devastating
effects of neoliberalism have been well documented. “Under¶ neoliberalism,” writes Henry Giroux,
“everything either is for sale or is plundered¶ for profit” (2004, xii). He continues:¶ Public lands are looted by logging
companies and corporate ranchers;¶ politicians willingly hand the public’s airwaves over to broadcasters¶ and large corporate interests without a
dime going into the¶ public trust; Halliburton
gives war profiteering a new meaning as¶ it is granted corporate
contracts without any competitive bidding¶ and then bilks the U.S. government for millions; the
environment¶ is polluted and despoiled in the name of profit-making just as the¶ government passes
legislation to make it easier for corporations¶ to do so; public services are gutted in order to lower the taxes of¶ major
corporations; schools increasingly resemble malls or jails,¶ and teachers, forced to raise revenue for classroom materials,¶ increasingly function
as circus barkers hawking everything from¶ hamburgers to pizza parties—that is, when they are not reduced to¶ prepping students to get higher
test scores. (2004, xii-xiv)¶ When
extreme free-market capitalism becomes the source of values,¶ violence is
given a reprieve from moral indignation . Democratic values as¶ well as basic notions of human
rights and economic justice are overlooked¶ when the market reveals profits to be had—or losses to
be avoided. As¶ neoliberalism widens the gulf between the rich and the poor, and the enfranchised¶
and the disenfranchised, it also places at risk of violence the poor and¶ the disenfranchised.
Therefore, it should be no surprise that the devastation¶ of the environment and the violation of
human rights is often more extreme¶ in less affluent parts of the world.¶ Moreover, the celebration of violence in
the American entertainment¶ industry must be seen as an extension of the neoliberal militaristic transformation¶ of the country. Arguably, the
state of permanent war of the United States¶ has benefited an entertainment industry which views
increased militarization¶ as a marketing dream. Toys, games, videos, movies and clothing associated¶ with the military and
its values increase in times of war. The permanent¶ state of war in the United States thus provides increasing opportunities for¶ corporations
endlessly to exploit nationalistic jingoism and the glorification¶ of violence. In light of neoliberalism and its economic Darwinism, the recent¶
resurrection of Captain America—the defender of American “ideals”—is less¶ a nostalgic nod to comic history’s past, than a market-driven
embrace of our¶ increasingly militarized, violent, and jingoistic culture.
LATIN AMERICA IS THE CENTRAL NODAL POINT FOR RESISTING THE
ONSLAUGHT OF NEOLIBERALISM. DATA, HISTORY, AND MOMENTUM
ARE ON THE SIDE OF TRUE TRANSFORMATION. IT REALLY IS A
CHOICE: REJECT THE AFFIRMATIVE.
MACLEOD 2013
(ALAN, noted theorist, Thatcher and Chavez A Tale of Two Deaths; counterpunch
http://www.counterpunch.org/2013/04/12/a-tale-of-two-deaths/)
But Chavez
was quick to distance the movement from previous failed attempts and from dogmatic
ideologies of the past: “We are not talking about copying models, I believe that copying models was one of the great errors of the
socialist attempts of the 20th century, following the handbook. No, with this autonomy, with this diversity, with this force originating from every
community, from our people.” Today,
more than 360 million Latin Americans live under left-wing
governments dubbed “the Pink Tide” by Western intellectuals (perhaps because they couldn’t
stomach the word “red”). They are not homogeneous, they range from the eco-socialism of Morales in Bolivia, to
Ecuador’s radical young economist, Correa to the Workers’ Party and Lula in Brazil, but basic principles of equality and
integration unite them. Critics claim a reliance on state leads to corruption and inefficiency, and that enforced collective action is an
attack on the pure liberty of the individual. It is not by chance that an anti-neoliberal agenda has developed in
Latin America. It was in the “Empire’s Workshop” where Thatcher and Friedman’s ideas were
first implemented. After overthrowing President Allende, a democratic Marxist who stood for many of the same things Chavez did,
dictator General Pinochet invited protégés of Friedman and Hayek to Chile. There, they had free reign to carry out their ideas, thanks to the
General’s brutal suppression of the population. The result was not dissimilar to the West today: soaring unemployment and poverty, falling
industrial production and purchasing power falling to just 40% of what it had been in 1970, coupled with a rise in wealth and power of a small
section at the top of society. Hayek recommended Chile as a model for Thatcher to follow. She agreed Chile to be an “economic miracle”, but
lamented that Britain’s “democratic institutions and the need for a high degree of consent” made “some of the measures” taken “quite
unacceptable”. Likewise in Venezuela, President Carlos Andres Perez, on instruction from Friedman’s students, imposed a sweeping austerity
“packet” on Venezuela, privatizing state-owned assets and removing price controls on oil, plunging the population into poverty, to the point
where ordinary Caracas residents spent more than 25% of their income on bus fares (Jones, p116). This despite running on an anti neoliberal
ticket, calling the bankers and economists “genocide workers in the pay of economic totalitarianism” during his election campaign. Desperate
Venezuelans began rioting for food, but their protest soon became one against the system itself. The government acted quickly. The military was
called in, surrounded the poor quarters of the city, and commenced three days of war against its inhabitants. The L.A. Times’ Bart Jones speaks
of Red Cross workers being gunned down in the street, “mass graves” being filled with “mutilated corpses”, “tied up corpses” with “bullets in the
back of their heads” and children being gunned down as the armies fired indiscriminately into shanty towns (Jones, Hugo! pp. 121-124). Perhaps
3,000 were killed, a similar number to the Tienanmen Square crackdown, in a country with a population more than 40 times smaller. So it
was
not in Seattle, but in Caracas where the first direct protest against neoliberalism occurred. And it
was the outrage at the brutal suppression of the people which spurred Chavez onto the political
stage . Latin America is ten to twenty years ahead of the West, in economic terms . After decades of
brutal neoliberal austerity, an alternative has emerged and fought back. Similar ideas have begun
to appear in the West, thanks to the Occupy Movement, which swept America and Europe last
year. Those in the West has much to learn from the region, even if it is what not to do. The Guardian
released a piece on the legacy of Margaret Thatcher. It showed a 65% increase in British poverty,
from 13 to 22% of the population. Inequality, as measured by the GINI index, rose from .253 to .339. The planned destruction of the
manufacturing industry led to record high unemployment. The irony of Thatcherism is that her policies have left far more people dependent on
the welfare state than previously. In contrast, even
Thatcher’s allies at the World Bank admit that Chavez
managed a 50% decrease in poverty, and a 65% decrease in extreme poverty. Their figures show too that
unemployment fell from 14.5% in 1999 to 7.6% in 2009. Venezuela’s inequality has dropped from .487 in 1998 to .392 in 2009. Today, it is the
most admired country in Latin America. A similar story is being played out in other Latin American countries. For all this, Thatcher
was
remarkably successful in shifting the political discourse to the right. Her policies of privileging
business led to record corporate profits and increased concentration of media ownership. Socialists
like Tony Benn were pushed to one side and Tony Blair became leader of a “New Labour”, largely indistinguishable
from the Conservatives. When asked what she thought was her greatest achievement was, Thatcher responded “Tony Blair and New
Labour”. Benn agreed, ruefully. The concentration of money has led to the rightward shift of the media, too.
The “free-market” has led to independent media bought up or swamped by massive conglomerates.
Media outlets are increasingly beholden to corporations for advertising. Today, questioning neoliberalism is heresy ,
leading to even supposedly left-of-centre newspapers wondering if we should be “worried by the
rise of the populist left in Latin America”. It is becoming increasingly hard to hide the successes of
countries of Latin America in solving age old problems by bucking the supposed iron rules of
neoliberal economics. But the media continues to try. The New York Times bemoans Chavez’s “irresponsible handouts”,
while the Washington Post insists he remains in power only by “showering the poor with gifts”. What are these gifts? The Telegraph finally
enlightens us: “lavishing state funds” on projects like operations to restore sight to the blind and soup kitchens. Such is the aversion to the state in
Western intellectual culture that providing even basic food and medicine, in accordance with the UN Declaration of Human Rights, are serious
transgressions on freedom. This has been lampooned by FAIR, in their article “Chavez Wasted his Money on Healthcare When He Could Have
Built Gigantic Skyscrapers”.
Despite Thatcher insisting that “there is no alternative”, Latin America is
providing a model for a different future. A silent battle for heaven and Earth is being waged. And
we all must choose sides. Which one are you on? Choose wisely, because the fate of the 21st
century will be decided on which one of these ideologies prevails.
The affirmatives assertion that democratic mechanism will provide sufficient
correction to past neoliberal practices is laughable. True democracy emerges from
radical resistance, not gradual constitutionalism.
KATZ 13
(Claudio, professor of economic history at the University of Buenos Aires, trans.
Leonard Morin, "Socialist Strategies in Latin America," The New Latin American
Left, 43-5)
The constitutional framework significantly alters the context of leftist activity, which for decades
had been directed against military tyrannies. The battle within the current system is not simple because the current
institutionalism renews bourgeois domination in multiple disguises. This plasticity disconcerted a generation of militants
prepared to fight against a very brutal but not very devious dictatorial enemy. Some activists were demoralized by these
difficulties and ended up accepting the accusations from the right. They began to flay themselves
for their former "under-estimation of democracy," forgetting that civil liberties were an
achievement of popular resistance (and not of a bourgeois party regime complicit with authoritarianism). The constitutional
framework induced other militants to proclaim the end of "revolutionary utopia" and the beginning of a new era of
gradual advances toward a postcapitalist future. They returned to the gradualist scheme and proposed to embark on the road to
socialism through an initial consensus with the oppressors. They advocated taking this path to gaining hegemony for the workers. But the
vast trajectory of social democracy has proved the unreality of this option. The dominant classes
do not give up power. They only co-opt partners to recreate the pillars of an oppression based on
private ownership of the big banks and corporations. They will never permit this control to be
corroded by the political or cultural weight of their antagonists. For this reason, any policy that indefinitely
postpones the anticapitalist goal ends up reinforcing oppression. Socialism requires preparing and
consummating anticapitalist ruptures. If one forgets this principle, the strategy of the Left lacks a
compass. But the confrontation with constitutionalism has also generated positive effects in recent years.
It has allowed, for example, debate on the left about the form that a genuine democracy under
socialism would adopt. This reflection introduced a significant change in the way of conceptualizing the anticapitalist perspective. In
the 1970s, democracy was a topic that the critics of the Soviet bureaucracy omitted or barely put forth. Now almost no one skirts this problem.
Socialism has ceased to be imagined as a prolongation of the tyranny that reigned in the Soviet Union and has currently begun to be perceived as
a regime of growing participation, representation, and popular control. But this future also depends on the immediate responses to
constitutionalism. Two
positions prevail on the left: one focus proposes winning space within the institutional
structure, and the other promotes parallel organs of people's power (Harnecker, 2000; Petras and Veltmeyer, 2005).
The first path argues for advancing by climbing from the local to the provincial levels to subsequently
reach the national governments. It follows from the experiences of community administrations that the Brazilian Workers' Party (Partido dos
Trabalhadores) and the Broad Front (Frente Amplio) of Uruguay pursued in the early 1990s. It recognizes the bitter concessions granted to the
establishment during these administrations (business commitments and postponement of social improvements), but it construes the final outcome
as positive. Undeniably, this "municipal socialism” led to old activists turning into confidence men of capital. They
debated at city halls,
exhibited hostility toward the social movement, and ended up governing on behalf of the dominant classes.
First they moderated programs, then they called for responsibility, and finally they changed sides.
The participatory budget did not counteract this regression. Discussing how to distribute a local expenditure limited by the constraints of
neoliberal policy leads to imposing a self-adjustment upon the citizenry. Participatory
democracy only awakens radical
consciousness of the people when it resists and denounces the tyranny of capital. If it renounces this
goal, it turns into an instrument for preserving the established order. An opposite strategy to the
institutional path exists that encourages social mobilization and rejects electoral participation . It
denounces the corruption of the Workers' Party or the passivity of the Broad Front and advocates the emergence of direct
options for people's power. It also questions the electoral traps that, in the Andean countries, have led to channeling resistance
through the system. This vision ignores the influence of the electoral arena and minimizes the negative consequences of abandoning it.
Citizenship, voting, and electoral rights are not just instruments of bourgeois manipulation.
They are also popular conquests
achieved against dictatorships, which under certain conditions allow one to take a stand against
the Right.
Total, unconditional, and unflinching rejection is required – the only way to
produce real alternatives to neoliberalism is to refuse the allure of half measures
and the propaganda of profit.
Werlhof 8
(Claudia von Werlhof. Werlhof is a professor at the Institute of Political Sciences at
the University of Innsbruck. “The Globalization of Neoliberalism, its Consequences
and Some of its Basic Alternatives.” 27 August 2008. Capitalism Nature Socialism.
BA)
Still, euphoria would be out of place.
An alternative to neoliberalism is not created through analysis and
protest alone but must be practiced. Opinions on how to do this differ. Some discuss ‘‘alternatives’’ that are
none: a reform of the WTO; ‘‘control’’ of globalization through NGOs; a return to
Keynesianism; a restoration of ‘‘social market economy’’; or even a revival of socialism. Such
ideas ignore reality and trivialize the problem. Neoliberalism shows every day that much more is
at stake. ¶ Neoliberalism is an apocalypse, a ‘‘revelation,’’ because the reality it creates makes it impossible for neoliberalism
to justify itself. Nor can we consider the corporations harmless ‘‘players.’’ There is no ambiguity. As a consequence, the perpetrators of
neoliberal politics simply lie about what is happening. The only good thing about neoliberalism is that it reveals the truth about ‘‘Western
civilization’’ and ‘‘European values.’’ This means that people now have the chance to draw the right conclusions about what is really needed. ¶
What is really needed, of course, is nothing less than a different civilization. A different economy
alone, or a different society or culture will not suffice. We need a civilization that is the exact
opposite of neoliberalism and the patriarchal capitalist world system it is rooted in. The logic of our alternative must
be one that completely undermines the logic of neoliberalism .113 ¶ Neoliberalism has turned everything that would
ensure a good life for all beings on this planet upside down. Many people still have a hard time understanding that the horror we are experiencing
is indeed a reality*a reality willingly produced, maintained and justified by ‘‘our’’ politicians. But even
if the alternative was half
implemented*no more plundering, exploitation, destruction, violence, war, coercion,
mercilessness, accumulation, greed, corruption*we would still be left with all the damage that
the earth has already suffered.
Neolib K vs. TRI Cuba K aff
First, the real experience of Cuba in the 20th century challenges the logic of the 1ac
and their penchant for performative politics over sustained struggle. Neoliberalism
is the cause of abuses that sustain the US position on rights. We need a politics
attentive to analysis and transformation, rather than unnecessary mystifications
justifying withdrawal.
Robinson 08-American professor of sociology at the University of California, Santa Barbara, 2008, “Latin
America and Global Capitalism”, pgs349-350
The objective limitations of projects of popular transformations at the level of the nationstate are apparent in Cuba. Despite the inevitable (and some not so inevitable) problems the Cuban revolution
has faced in its half century of existence Cuban society is perhaps the most egalitarian in the hemisphere
and certainly one of the most developed in terms of quality of life indicators. Cuba's efforts to transition from a capitalist to a
revolutionary socialist society ran up squarely against the limits—nay, the corrosive
influence—of global capitalism in the 1990’s and on. With no choice but to integrate into world
capitalist markets the Cuban government attempted to create a sort of dual economy: one
capitalist, linked to the global economy and driven by the law of value; the other socialist,
internal, driven by a social logic. Thus it promoted the tourist industry, created a parallel dollar economy where those with
access to foreign exchange could purchase scarce goods and services, relaxed controls on private money-making undertakings, and allowed,
In theory these measures were
innocuous, in the interests of popular majorities, perhaps necessary or even inevitable. The problem is that such reforms
were not enacted in the abstract but in the real world of global capitalism and its
penetration via these reforms into the structures of Cuban society and the fabric of social and cultural life. Cuba's integration
into global capitalism meant growing social inequalities. Those who had access to the
capitalist sector, whether in tourist jobs or other forms of association with foreign capital,
dollar remittances from family members abroad, the ability to set up a small business, and
so forth, inevitably acquired more resources and social privilege over those restricted to
the socialist sector. There is gravitation toward the capitalist sector, which could only be
suppressed by authoritarian means. It was not possible to insulate the socialist from the
capitalist sector. Moreover, those who acquire such privileges form a potential social base for a
political opposition to the revolution. Expanding social inequalities combined with the
increased availability of scarce goods, luxury items, and conspicuous consumption fuel
relative deprivation and social tensions. There were other pernicious influences, such as a
renewed racialization process (see Chapter 3), the reappearance of prostitution, largely servicing
tourists and other foreign visitors, and corruption. The distorting influence of the law of
value or capitalist logic over a system organized along a nonmarket social logic generated such
absurd paradoxes as doctors working as hotel waiters, university professors driving taxis,
and engineers running family kitchens. The Cuban experience underscores the catch-22 that
even encouraged, an expanding informal economy driven by local exchange values.
all efforts to challenge global capitalism must address: in an age when "de-linking" or withdrawal
from the system is not a viable option, how is transformation from within managed in such a way
as to not reproduce the very social and political forces that reproduce global capitalism? How to
supersede a system from which one cannot yet de-link, does not control, and cannot confront in its entirety? How to build a democratic
socialism in the midst of a global capitalist milieu from which there is no flight? If
the (capitalist) state as a class relation
is becoming transnationalized then any challenge to (global) capitalist state power must
involve a major transnational component . Struggles at the nation-state level are far from
futile. They remain central to the prospects for social justice and progressive social change.
The key point is that any such struggles must be part of a more expansive transnational counterhegemonic project, including transnational trade unionism, transnational social
movements, transnational political organizations, and so on—able to link the local to the
national, the regional, and the global. And they must strive to establish sets of
transnational institutions and practices that can place controls on global market and rein
in some of power of global capital. This is why permanent mobilization from below that
pressures the state to deepen its transformative project "at home" and its counterhegemonic transnational project "abroad" is so crucial.
Second, the 1AC is the logic of neoliberalism: privatizing activism, fetishizing the
risks of depoliticization, and expansive nostalgic analogies work in service of elite
interest. The affirmative imports the consumptive subject at the expanse of the
organizing activist.
Dean 09
(Jodi Dean is a professor of political science at Columbia University, Democracy and other
Neoliberal Fantasies: Communicative Capitalism and Left politics, Duke University Press, page
10)
When one’s opponent takes over one’s position, one is confronted with its realization, with its repercussions. This is what many of us don’t like;
this is what we want to avoid. So we say “No! That’s not it,” but because our enemy has taken over our language, our ideals, we’ve lost a
capacity to say what we want, even to know what we want. we can’t even dream some­ thing else. Zizek writes: “In a radical revolution, people
not only have to ‘realize their old (emancipatoryg etc.) dreams’; rather, they have to reinvent their very modes of dreaming.”18¶ Such a
reinvention is an enormous, perhaps impossible task . It’s not furthered, though, by the diagnosis
of “depoliticization ,” a diagnosis offered by political theorists the increased currency of which calls out for critique. If
depoliticization means anything, it is the retreat into coward- ice, the retroactive determination of
victory as defeat because of the left’s fundamental inability to accept responsibility for power and
to undertake the difficult task of reinventing our modes of dreaming . Depoliticization is a fantasy;
an excuse whereby the left says ‘We know collective action is possible theoretically but we don’t
believe we exist.” The _term marks the gap between the commitment to common approaches to
systemic problems constitutive of left thought for over two centuries and the isolating individualism
of consumption and entertainment-driven communicative¶ capitalism. The very diagnosis of
depoliticization functions fetishistically to prevent the left from confronting the truth of its victory .¶
This view of depoliticization as an excuse or fetish covering over a failure of responsibility however,
is not widely shared. On the contrary depoliticization and the correlative notions of post-politics,
de- democratization, and post democracy are offered as terms for designating what is specifically
new in the current political-economic condition. Over the past decades, a number of political theorists have attempted to
analyze the contemporary conjuncture as post-political or postdemocratic.”¶ Reversing the terms of the “end of ideology”
thesis offered by neoconservative (Francis Fulcuyama) and “third way” (Anthony Giddens) thinkers, these theorists
critically redescribe the orientation toward consensus, ad- ministration, and technocracy lauded as
benefits of the post- Cold War age. Several aspects of this redescription stand out, namely, the
primacy of the economy, the individual, and the police .¶ The current conjecture is post-political,
the argument goes, because the spread and intensification of neoliberal economic policies have sub-
jected states to the demands of corporations and the seemingly inevitable logic of the market. To
the extent that state authority is
increasingly less able to constrain corporate power, politics matters less . This inability of
democratic politics to produce viable solutions to_ social and economic problems, moreover,
r esonates with the celebration of the individual in communicative capitalism. The individualization of
politics into com­ modifiable “lifestyles” and opinions subsumes politics into consumption. That consumer choices may have, a
politics-fair trade, green, vegan, woman-owned-morphs into the sense that politics is nothing but
consumer choices, that is, individuated responses to individuated needs. Zygmunt Bauman makes the point
well:¶ being an individual de jure means having no one to blame for one’s own misery seeking causes
of one’s own defeats nowhere except in one’s own indolence and sloth, and looking for no other
remedies other than trying harder and harder still. With eyes focused on one’s own performance
and thus diverted from the social space where the contra- dictions of individual existence are
collectively produced, men and women are naturally tempted to reduce the complexity of their
predicament. Not that they find "biographic solutions” onerous and cumber­ some: there are, simply no “biographic solutions to systemic
contradictions,” and so the dearth of solutions at their disposal needs to be compensated for by imaginary ones .... There is therefore a
demand for individual pegs on which frightened individuals can collectively hang their individual
fears, if only for a brief moment.Ӧ with politics seemingly reduced to consumer choice, government
similarly contracts, now concerning itself with traumatized victims. Its role is less to ensure public
goods and solve collective problems than to address the personal issues of subjects. Accordingly, pollsters
assess individual preference and satisfaction, as if the polled were the same as the politicized¶ people. Finally insofar as the economy alone
cannot fulfill all the functions of government, one element of the state rises to the fore-security.¶ Thus, accompanying diminished political
influence on economic and social policy is the intensification and extension of the state as an agency of surveillance and control.¶ The neoliberal
capitalist economy; the fragile, consuming individual, and the surveilling, controlling state are aspects of the diagnosis of de- politicization well
worth emphasizing. Yet
post-politics, depoliticization, and de-democratization are inadequate to the task
of theorizing this con- juncture. The claim that states are decreasing in significance and impact because of the compulsions of the
market ignores the millions of dollars regularly spent in political campaigns. Business and market interests as well as corporate and financial
elites expend vast amounts of time and money on elections, candidates, lobbyists, and lawmakers in order to produce and direct a political climate
that suits their interests. Capitalizing
on left critiques of regulation and retreats from the state , neoliberals
move right in, deploying state power to further their interests. Similarly social conservatives in the United States
persistently fight across a broad spectrum of political fronts-including local school boards, statewide ballot initiatives, judicial appointments, and
mobilizations to amend the Constitution. The
left-wing lament regarding post-politics not only overlooks the
reality of politics on the ground but it cedes in advance key terrains of¶ activism and struggle. Not
recognizing these politicized sites as politicized sites, it fails to counter conservative initiatives with a coherent alternative.
Third, the affirmative SHOULD be concerned with the material effects of their
political demand. Neoliberal vultures would love the opportunity to stop circling
and feed on newly opened Cuban markets
Wenston & Woods ‘08
(Fred & Alan, Alan Woods is a Trotskyist political theorist and author. He is one of
the leading members of the International Marxist Tendency, as well as its British
affiliate group Socialist Appeal, Vultures hovering over Cuba after Fidel Castro
steps down http://www.cjournal.info/2008/02/20/vultures-hovering-over-cuba-afterfidel-castro-steps-down/)
They all pretend to be democrats when it comes to Cuba. In reality they are like vultures waiting
for the day they can get their beaks and claws into the flesh of Cuba . What they are after is the end
of the economic system brought into being by the Cuban revolution. They want capitalism to return
to Cuba. That is what they mean by “democracy”! Another fashionable term these days is “engagement”. While Bush sticks to his guns and
insists on the embargo being stepped up, the more intelligent bourgeois, both in the USA and Europe are
raising the need for “engagement”, i.e. on removing the embargo and opening up trade channels.
Does this wing of the bourgeois have different interests or aims? No, they simply understand better than Bush and his obtuse circle of friends that
the best way to re-introduce capitalism into Cuba is to lift the embargo, begin trading, flood Cuba
with cash and let the process unfold.¶ That is why it is even more disgusting when we hear some
reformist elements on the left advocating such “engagement”. What they are actually doing is
giving the bourgeois advice on how to remove this thorn in their side .¶ All this talk of democracy is
in fact a cover for the real aims of imperialism. Not so long ago the Financial Times was giving more sober advice. They
were suggesting a “Chinese road” for Cuba accompanied by a lifting of the US-sponsored embargo. The Chinese model would envisage an
opening up of Cuba to capitalism accompanied by a firm grip on state power at the top.
Neoliberal violence is everywhere and nowhere – while the 1AC holds us in thrall of
political theory, the slow violence of neoliberalism infects every area of the globe,
producing billions of anonymous victims beyond the reach of our moral concern.
Di Leo and McClennen 2012
(Jeffrey R., Dean of the School of Arts and Sciences and Professor of English and Philosophy at
the University of Houston–Victoria; Sophia A. professor of international affairs and directs
Penn State's Center for Global Studies as well as its Latin American Studies program; Postscript
on Violence symploke, Volume 20, Numbers 1-2, 2012, pp. 241-250 (Article))
Violence is everywhere. It could be argued that we
are in one of the most¶ violent eras in human history. The
scope of violence today is global and its¶ magnitude immense . It is seen in the death counts from
perpetual wars and¶ the injury reports from fierce protests; it is found in the oil-soaked waters of¶
the Gulf of Mexico and the radiation-contaminated earth of Japan; it is heard¶ in the screams of
women subject to sexual violence and the children who¶ are the victims of predators. It is in the
blood we are served by televised¶ news and the brutal visions of an increasing violence-driven
entertainment¶ industry.¶ Though our various critical and cultural studies relate features of it, and¶ our social and physical sciences
capture aspects of it, the violence in our world¶ is far too overwhelming to contain. No study can capture it in its entirety and¶
no report can present us with a complete set of data on it. For many, the¶ violence that surrounds and engulfs us is an abomination and a threat,
something¶ to be fought and eliminated; though for many more, violence serves a¶ social and economic end—and is as American as apple pie.
in everyday¶ institutional structures,” writes Henry Giroux, “violence has become the¶ toxic
glue that bonds Americans together while simultaneously preventing¶ them from expanding and
building a multiracial and multicultural democracy”¶ (2002, 231).¶ The “toxic glue” of violence is a threat to individual
and social well-being¶ as well as to democracy itself. One of the imperatives of critical pedagogy¶ must be to reveal
its manifestations—another must be to work toward its¶ elimination. And progressive intellectuals
must continue to utilize the public¶ sphere through print and social media to bring about a better
understanding¶ of the dangers of an increasingly violent world and to work toward eliminating¶ the
toxic glue of violence.¶ Violence is nowhere. While violence is everywhere more apparent, it¶ is also
“Rooted
everywhere ignored and hidden . The violence that is unseen and¶ unknown must be engaged just as
much as the violence that is seen and¶ known. While violent video games and movies premised on the
spectacle¶ of violence are not difficult to discern, they often have the unintended consequence¶ of
closing off consideration and understanding of other forms of¶ violence, in particular the myriad
types of violence that cannot be staged.¶ Much of the violence that is unseen and unheard happens
on a temporal¶ scale that is beyond the capacities of our senses. Termed by Rob Nixon, “slow¶ violence,” it has
been described by him as “a violence that occurs gradually¶ and out of sight, a violence of delayed
destruction that is dispersed across¶ time and space, an attritional violence that is typically not
viewed as violence¶ at all” (Nixon 2). The slow violence of “mass droughts in China, flooding in¶ Australia, food crises, super
twisters, earthquakes linked to geo-engineering,¶ arctic melt-off and so on” (Cohen 2012, i); “[C]limate change, the thawing¶ cryosphere, toxic
drift, biomagnifications, deforestation, the radioactive¶ aftermath of war, acidifying oceans, and a host of other slowly unfolding¶ environmental
catastrophes” (Nixon 2).¶ This
was not the violence addressed by the theorists and critics of the¶ twentiethcentury. Much of this violence unfolds over spans of time better¶ described as geological rather than human. Or, better yet, over spans of
time¶ from which “the human” is viewed as but a passing moment. The theoretical¶ work here that is just beginning to take shape promises to
reframe the very¶ ways we think about history, time, and change.1¶ However, if the exanthropic violence of climate change is the future of¶
theory, what of the anthropic violence that has been the focus of much attention,¶ particularly since the rise of women’s studies, gender studies,
and ethnic¶ studies in the sixties and seventies? How are we doing here with forms of¶ violence that are visible and seen and felt by women,
children, and the disenfranchised¶ across the globe? Unfortunately, not well.¶ In today’s media-saturated world, violence is always visible but
rarely¶ felt. The prevalence of media violence is especially high in U.S. culture. Our¶ entertainment industry is adept at aestheticizing violence
and transforming¶ the most violent and morally extreme members of our society into culture¶ products suitable for mass consumption and
celebration. Take for example,¶ the serial killer Aileen Wournos, who paradoxically became the object of¶ revulsion and attraction when
presented to us by the American entertainment¶ industry. Many marveled at how the angelic Hollywood actor Charlize¶ Theron had been
transformed into the “monster” Wournos, and found themselves¶ comparing the “real” Theron to the image of Wournos presented by¶ her in the
film, Monster (2003). “She is my favorite of the night,” said a fashion¶ editor from Glamour magazine commenting on Theron’s appearance at
the¶ Golden Globes that year, “[e]specially because you have the contrast of her¶ in that movie and the way she looks tonight.”2 This entirely
commonplace¶ comment reveals a semiotic process wherein serial killing and its aesthetic¶ image become hopelessly intertwined, and ultimately
confused.¶ In the translation of serial killing to its performance and promotion, a¶ complex semiotic process creates multiple layers of
signification concerning¶ the event and its perpetrator. The result is both a greater understanding¶ (albeit a superficial one) of the killers and the
horrific events in which they¶ participated, and a growing sense of confusion between the “real” and the¶ image. Carefully packaged, promoted
and sanitized by the culture industry,¶ American psychos such as Jeffrey Dahmer, Aileen Wournos and John Wayne¶ Gacy increasingly become
less despicable objects of moral revulsion, and¶ more objects of fascination and entertainment. Their final entry into the sign¶ system of celebrity
entertainment is signaled by becoming household names¶ as readily recognizable as our sports, movie and television icons. For the average¶
culturally literate American, naming three contemporary serial killers is¶ about as challenging as naming three talk show hosts. However, the
realness¶ of these killers and their violent crimes gets buried under multiple layers of¶ signification. A “hyperreal”—and “hypermoral”—image
soon displaces any¶ remaining fragments of the reality of the horrific events perpetrated by them.¶ The cultural celebration of violence though
does not end with the remediation¶ of increasingly macabre, sadistic, and cruel behavior. Rather, it creates¶ a culture where violence has become
a—if not “the”—standard form of entertainment,¶ and where our children are targeted as major consumers of this¶ violence. From the hyper-real
violence of many of the video games played¶ by children to the scenes of fighting, killing, and torture found in many of the¶ movies our children
watch, there is no escaping the toxic glue of violence.¶ Even the “G” rated Pixar family movie, Cars 2 (2011), featured two deaths¶ and one
torture scene (a crime syndicate tortures a car until it blows up).¶ How else can this be explained except as a primer on violence for children?¶ It
is not going to be a surprise to anyone familiar with the American film¶ industry that violence is one of its main commodities—and one that is
internationally¶ consumed. However, there is some reason to believe that more¶ people are beginning to understand the negative impact of
repeated cultural¶ consumption of violence. If nothing else, the tragic events surrounding the¶ shooting of moviegoers in Aurora, Colorado this
past summer facilitated this¶ discussion. However, the solution is not to be found in say banning The Dark¶ Knight Rises (2012) from theaters
because of its alleged connection to an act¶ of violence. This would be about as effective as taking Sweet Tarts away from¶ children in an effort
to stop tooth decay. Rather, the solution is to be found¶ in understanding how making violence into a commodity connects with a¶ broader and
more pernicious neoliberal social and economic agenda. Once¶ this is understood, then just as with eating candy, you can consume violence¶ at
your own risk.¶ Neoliberal
economic practices have increased biopolitical violence. The¶ devastating
effects of neoliberalism have been well documented. “Under¶ neoliberalism,” writes Henry Giroux,
“everything either is for sale or is plundered¶ for profit” (2004, xii). He continues:¶ Public lands are looted by logging
companies and corporate ranchers;¶ politicians willingly hand the public’s airwaves over to broadcasters¶ and large corporate interests without a
dime going into the¶ public trust; Halliburton
gives war profiteering a new meaning as¶ it is granted corporate
contracts without any competitive bidding¶ and then bilks the U.S. government for millions; the
environment¶ is polluted and despoiled in the name of profit-making just as the¶ government passes
legislation to make it easier for corporations¶ to do so; public services are gutted in order to lower the taxes of¶ major
corporations; schools increasingly resemble malls or jails,¶ and teachers, forced to raise revenue for classroom materials,¶ increasingly function
as circus barkers hawking everything from¶ hamburgers to pizza parties—that is, when they are not reduced to¶ prepping students to get higher
test scores. (2004, xii-xiv)¶ When
extreme free-market capitalism becomes the source of values,¶ violence is
given a reprieve from moral indignation . Democratic values as¶ well as basic notions of human
rights and economic justice are overlooked¶ when the market reveals profits to be had—or losses to
be avoided. As¶ neoliberalism widens the gulf between the rich and the poor, and the enfranchised¶
and the disenfranchised, it also places at risk of violence the poor and¶ the disenfranchised.
Therefore, it should be no surprise that the devastation¶ of the environment and the violation of
human rights is often more extreme¶ in less affluent parts of the world.¶ Moreover, the celebration of violence in
the American entertainment¶ industry must be seen as an extension of the neoliberal militaristic transformation¶ of the country. Arguably, the
state of permanent war of the United States¶ has benefited an entertainment industry which views
increased militarization¶ as a marketing dream. Toys, games, videos, movies and clothing associated¶ with the military and
its values increase in times of war. The permanent¶ state of war in the United States thus provides increasing opportunities for¶ corporations
endlessly to exploit nationalistic jingoism and the glorification¶ of violence. In light of neoliberalism and its economic Darwinism, the recent¶
resurrection of Captain America—the defender of American “ideals”—is less¶ a nostalgic nod to comic history’s past, than a market-driven
embrace of our¶ increasingly militarized, violent, and jingoistic culture.
Latin America is the nodal point and model for successful resistance. Have the
courage to support movements for collective organization and material change.
Unflinching rejection of neoliberal politics, in all its manifestations, is the most
preferable strategy.
MACLEOD 2013
(ALAN, social commentator, Thatcher and Chavez A Tale of Two Deaths;
counterpunch http://www.counterpunch.org/2013/04/12/a-tale-of-two-deaths/)
But Chavez
was quick to distance the movement from previous failed attempts and from dogmatic
ideologies of the past: “We are not talking about copying models, I believe that copying models was one of the great errors of the
socialist attempts of the 20th century, following the handbook. No, with this autonomy, with this diversity, with this force originating from every
community, from our people.” Today,
more than 360 million Latin Americans live under left-wing
governments dubbed “the Pink Tide” by Western intellectuals (perhaps because they couldn’t
stomach the word “red”). They are not homogeneous, they range from the eco-socialism of Morales in Bolivia, to
Ecuador’s radical young economist, Correa to the Workers’ Party and Lula in Brazil, but basic principles of equality and
integration unite them. Critics claim a reliance on state leads to corruption and inefficiency, and that enforced collective action is an
attack on the pure liberty of the individual. It is not by chance that an anti-neoliberal agenda has developed in
Latin America. It was in the “Empire’s Workshop” where Thatcher and Friedman’s ideas were
first implemented. After overthrowing President Allende, a democratic Marxist who stood for many of the same things Chavez did,
dictator General Pinochet invited protégés of Friedman and Hayek to Chile. There, they had free reign to carry out their ideas, thanks to the
General’s brutal suppression of the population. The result was not dissimilar to the West today: soaring unemployment and poverty, falling
industrial production and purchasing power falling to just 40% of what it had been in 1970, coupled with a rise in wealth and power of a small
section at the top of society. Hayek recommended Chile as a model for Thatcher to follow. She agreed Chile to be an “economic miracle”, but
lamented that Britain’s “democratic institutions and the need for a high degree of consent” made “some of the measures” taken “quite
unacceptable”. Likewise in Venezuela, President Carlos Andres Perez, on instruction from Friedman’s students, imposed a sweeping austerity
“packet” on Venezuela, privatizing state-owned assets and removing price controls on oil, plunging the population into poverty, to the point
where ordinary Caracas residents spent more than 25% of their income on bus fares (Jones, p116). This despite running on an anti neoliberal
ticket, calling the bankers and economists “genocide workers in the pay of economic totalitarianism” during his election campaign. Desperate
Venezuelans began rioting for food, but their protest soon became one against the system itself. The government acted quickly. The military was
called in, surrounded the poor quarters of the city, and commenced three days of war against its inhabitants. The L.A. Times’ Bart Jones speaks
of Red Cross workers being gunned down in the street, “mass graves” being filled with “mutilated corpses”, “tied up corpses” with “bullets in the
back of their heads” and children being gunned down as the armies fired indiscriminately into shanty towns (Jones, Hugo! pp. 121-124). Perhaps
3,000 were killed, a similar number to the Tienanmen Square crackdown, in a country with a population more than 40 times smaller. So it
was
not in Seattle, but in Caracas where the first direct protest against neoliberalism occurred. And it
was the outrage at the brutal suppression of the people which spurred Chavez onto the political
stage . Latin America is ten to twenty years ahead of the West, in economic terms . After decades of
brutal neoliberal austerity, an alternative has emerged and fought back. Similar ideas have begun
to appear in the West, thanks to the Occupy Movement, which swept America and Europe last
year. Those in the West has much to learn from the region, even if it is what not to do. The Guardian
released a piece on the legacy of Margaret Thatcher. It showed a 65% increase in British poverty,
from 13 to 22% of the population. Inequality, as measured by the GINI index, rose from .253 to .339. The planned destruction of the
manufacturing industry led to record high unemployment. The irony of Thatcherism is that her policies have left far more people dependent on
the welfare state than previously. In contrast, even
Thatcher’s allies at the World Bank admit that Chavez
managed a 50% decrease in poverty, and a 65% decrease in extreme poverty. Their figures show too that
unemployment fell from 14.5% in 1999 to 7.6% in 2009. Venezuela’s inequality has dropped from .487 in 1998 to .392 in 2009. Today, it is the
most admired country in Latin America. A similar story is being played out in other Latin American countries. For all this, Thatcher
was
remarkably successful in shifting the political discourse to the right. Her policies of privileging
business led to record corporate profits and increased concentration of media ownership. Socialists
like Tony Benn were pushed to one side and Tony Blair became leader of a “New Labour”, largely indistinguishable
from the Conservatives. When asked what she thought was her greatest achievement was, Thatcher responded “Tony Blair and New
Labour”. Benn agreed, ruefully. The concentration of money has led to the rightward shift of the media, too.
The “free-market” has led to independent media bought up or swamped by massive conglomerates.
Media outlets are increasingly beholden to corporations for advertising. Today, questioning neoliberalism is heresy ,
leading to even supposedly left-of-centre newspapers wondering if we should be “worried by the
rise of the populist left in Latin America”. It is becoming increasingly hard to hide the successes of
countries of Latin America in solving age old problems by bucking the supposed iron rules of
neoliberal economics. But the media continues to try. The New York Times bemoans Chavez’s “irresponsible handouts”,
while the Washington Post insists he remains in power only by “showering the poor with gifts”. What are these gifts? The Telegraph finally
enlightens us: “lavishing state funds” on projects like operations to restore sight to the blind and soup kitchens. Such is the aversion to the state in
Western intellectual culture that providing even basic food and medicine, in accordance with the UN Declaration of Human Rights, are serious
transgressions on freedom. This has been lampooned by FAIR, in their article “Chavez Wasted his Money on Healthcare When He Could Have
Built Gigantic Skyscrapers”.
Despite Thatcher insisting that “there is no alternative”, Latin America is
providing a model for a different future. A silent battle for heaven and Earth is being waged. And
we all must choose sides. Which one are you on? Choose wisely, because the fate of the 21st
century will be decided on which one of these ideologies prevails.
Using the debate space to analyze and connect to real world struggles and
organizing is a valuable contribution to the global struggle. Voting negative
establishes a competitive and preferable role for activism and education.
Giroux 2005
(Henry Giroux professor of English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University,
West Chester University, College Literature, 32.1, Winter 2005, pp. 1-19)
Fortunately, the
corporate capitalist fairytale of neoliberalism has been challenged all over the globe by
students, labor organizers, intellectuals, community activists, and a host of individuals and groups
unwilling to allow democracy to be bought and sold by multinational corporations, corporate swindlers,
international political institutions, and those government politicians who willingly align themselves with multinational, corporate interests and
rapacious profits. From
Seattle to Genoa, people engaged in popular resistance are collectively taking up
the challenge of neoliberalism and reviving both the meaning of resistance and the sites where it
takes place. Political culture is now global and resistance is amorphous, connecting students with workers, schoolteachers with parents, and
intellectuals with artists. Groups protesting the attack on farmers in India whose land is being destroyed by
the government in order to build dams now find themselves in alliance with young people resisting
sweatshop labor in New York City. Environmental activists are joining up with key sections of
organized labor as well as groups protesting Third World debt. The collapse of the neoliberal
showcase, Argentina, along with numerous corporate bankruptcies and scandals (notably including Enron),
reveals the cracks in neoliberal hegemony and domination. In addition, the multiple forms of resistance against
neoliberal capitalism are not limited by a version of identity politics focused exclusively on particularized rights and interests. On the contrary,
identity politics is affirmed within a broader crisis of political culture and democracy that connects the militarization of public life with the
collapse of the welfare state and the attack on civil liberties. Central
to these new movements is the notion that
neoliberalism has to be understood within a larger crisis of vision, meaning, education, and political
agency. Democracy in this view is not limited to the struggle over economic resources and power;
indeed, it also includes the creation of public spheres where individuals can be educated as political
agents equipped with the skills, capacities, and knowledge they need to perform as autonomous
political agents. I want to expand the reach- es of this debate by arguing that any struggle against neoliberalism must
address the discourse of political agency, civic education, and cultural politics as part of a broader
struggle over the relationship between democratization(the ongoing struggle for a substantive and inclusive democracy)
and the global public sphere.
Neolib K 1NC v Venezuela Oil
The recent global financial collapse has delegitimized the obsession with foreign
intervention into Latin American markets – the ideology of neoliberalism is on the
retreat.
Bridsall and Fukuyama (lol) 2011
(Nancy; Center for Global Development's founding president.; Francis; prof of international
relations, Stanford university; The Post-Washington Consensus. Birdsall, Nancy, Fukuyama,
Francis, Foreign Affairs, 00157120, Mar/Apr2011, Vol. 90, Issue 2 The Post-Washington
Consensus)
THE LAST time a global depression originated in the United States, the impact was devastating not
only for the world economy but for world politics as well
More important, for many it delegitimized the capitalist system itself, paving the way for
the rise of radical and antiliberal movements around the world ¶ This time around, there has been
no violent rejection of capitalism, even in the developing world. In early 2009, at the height of the
global financial panic, China and Russia, two formerly noncapitalist states, made it clear to their
domestic and foreign investors that they had no intention of abandoning the capitalist model
Instead, the established Western democracies are the ones
that have highlighted the risks of relying too much on market-led globalization and called for
greater regulation of global finance.¶ Why has the reaction in developing countries been so much
less extreme after this crisis
For one, they blame the United States for it.
If the global financial crisis put any development model
on trial, it was the free-market or neoliberal model, which emphasizes a small state, deregulation,
private ownership, and low taxes . Few developing countries consider themselves to have fully
. The Great Depression set the stage for a shift away from strict monetarism and laissez-faire policies toward Keynesian
demand management.
.
. No leader of a major
developing country has backed away from his or her commitment to free trade or the global capitalist system.
than it was after the Great Depression?
Many in the developing world agreed
with Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva when he said, "This is a crisis caused by people, white with blue eyes."
adopted that model.¶ Indeed, for years before the crisis, they had been distancing themselves from
it. The financial crises of the late 1990s in East Asia and Latin America discredited many of the
ideas associated with the so-called Washington consensus
By 2008, most
emerging-market countries had reduced their exposure to the foreign financial markets
, particularly that of unalloyed reliance on foreign capital.
by accumulating large foreign
currency reserves and maintaining regulatory control of their banking systems. These policies provided insulation from global economic volatility and were vindicated by the impressive rebounds in the wake of the recent crisis: the emerging markets have posted much better economic growth
Thus, the American version of capitalism is, if not in full disrepute, then at least
no longer dominant the next decade, emerging-market and low-income countries are likely to
modify their approach to economic policy further, trading the flexibility and efficiency associated
with the free-market model for domestic policies meant to ensure greater resilience in the face of
competitive pressures and global economic trauma
And they will be even less inclined than before to defer to the supposed
numbers than their counterparts in the developed world. ¶
. In
. They will become less focused on the free flow of capital, more concerned with minimizing social disruption through social safety net
programs, and more active in supporting domestic industries.
expertise of the more developed countries
, believing--correctly--that not only economic but also intellectual power are becoming increasingly evenly distributed. ¶
We have three primary links claims:
First, Oil
The prioritization of oil in politics in the logic of neoliberalism: ruthless resource
extraction and economic competition becomes the basis of all human interaction.
Giroux 5 (Henry A. – Global Television Network Chair, Professor at McMaster University,
“The Terror of Neoliberalism: Rethinking the Significance of Cultural Politics”, Winter 2005,
JSTOR)
Fredric Jameson has argued in The Seeds of Time, it has now become easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism (1994,
xii). The breathless rhetoric
of the global victory of free-market rationality spewed forth by the mass media, rightwing intellectuals, and governments alike has found its material expression both in an all-out attack on
democratic values and in the growth of a range of social problems including: virulent and
persistent poverty, joblessness, inadequate health care, apartheid in the inner cities, and increasing
inequalities between the rich and the poor. Such problems appear to have been either removed from the inventory of public
discourse and social policy or factored into talk-show spectacles in which the public becomes merely a staging area for venting private interests
and emotions. Within
the discourse of neoliberalism that has taken hold of the public imagination, there is no way of
talking about what is fundamen tal to civic life, critical citizenship, and a substantive democracy . Neoliberalism offers
no critical vocabulary for speaking about political or social transformation as a democratic project. Nor is there a
language for either the ideal of public commitment or the notion of a social agency capa ble of challenging the basic assumptions of corporate
ideology as well as its social consequences. In its dubious appeals to universal laws, neutrality, and selective scientific research,
neoliberalism "eliminates the very possibility of critical thinking, without which democratic debate
becomes impossible" (Buck-Morss 2003, 65-66).This shift in rhetoric makes it possible for advocates of
neoliberalism to implement the most ruthless economic and political policies without having to open up such
actions to public debate and dialogue. Hence, neoliberal policies that promote the cutthroat downsizing of the workforce, the bleeding of social
services, the reduction of state governments to police precincts, the ongoing liquidation of job security, the increasing elimination of a decent
social wage, the creation of a society of low-skilled workers, and the emergence of a culture of permanent insecu rity and fear hide behind
appeals to common sense and allegedly immutable laws of nature. When and where such nakedly ideological appeals strain both reason and
imagination, religious faith is invoked to silence dissension. Society is no longer defended as a space in which to nurture the most fundamental
values and relations necessary to a democracy but has been recast as an ideological and political sphere "where religious fundamentalism comes
together with market fundamentalism to form the ideology of American supremacy" (Soros 2004, 10). Similarly, American imperial ambitions
are now legitimated by public relations intellectuals as part of the responsibilities of empire-building, which in turn is celebrated as either a
civilizing process for the rest of the globe or as simply a right bestowed upon the powerful. For instance, Ann Coulter speaks for many such
intellectuals when she recently argued, while giving a speech at Penn State University, that she had no trouble with the idea that the United States
We need oil . Of course, we consume most of
the world's oil; we do most of the world's production" (qtd. in Colella 2004,1). In this world-view, power,
money, and a debased appeal to pragmatism always trump social and economic justice . Hence, it is
not surprising for neo-conservatives to have joined hands with neoliberals and religious fundamentalists in
broadcasting to the world at large an American triumphalism in which the United States is arrogantly defined as "[t]he
greatest of all great powers in world history" (Frum and Pearle qtd. in Lapham 2004b, 8).2 But money, profits, and fear have
become powerful ideological elements not only in arguing for opening up new markets, but also for closing down the
possibility of dissent at home. In such a scenario, the police state is cele brated by religious evangelicals like John Ashcroft as a
invaded Iraq in order to seize its oil. As she put it, "Why not go to war just for oil?
foundation of human freedom. This becomes clear not only in the passage of repressive laws such as the USA Patriot Act but also in the work of
prominent neoconservatives such as David Frum and Richard Pearle who, without any irony intended, insist that "[a] free society is not an unpoliced society. A free society is a self-policed society" (qtd. in Lapham 2004b, 8). In what could only be defined as an Adam Smith joins George
Orwell in a religious cult in California scenario, markets have been elevated to the status of sacrosanct temples to be worshiped by eager
consumers while citizens-turned soldiers of the-Army-of-God are urged to spy on each other and dissent is increas ingly criminalized.3 Political
culture, if not the nature of politics itself, has undergone revo lutionary changes in the last two decades, reaching its most debased expres sion
under the administration of President George W. Bush. Within
this polit ical culture, not only is democracy subordinated
to the rule of the market, but corporate decisions are freed from territorial constraints and the demands of public obligations, just as
economics is disconnected from its social consequences. Power is increasingly removed from the dictates and control of nation states and politics
is largely relegated to the sphere of the local. Zygmunt Bauman captures brilliantly what is new about the relation ship among power, politics,
and the shredding of social obligations: The mobility acquired by "people who invest"?those with capital, with money which the investment
requires?means the new, indeed unprece dented ... disconnection of power from obligations: duties towards employ ees, but also towards the
younger and weaker, towards yet unborn genera tions and towards the self-reproduction of the living conditions of all; in short the freedom from
the duty to contribute to daily life and the perpet uation of the community. . . . Shedding the responsibility for the conse quences is the most
coveted and cherished gain which the new mobility brings to free-floating, locally unbound capital. (Bauman 1998, 9-10) Corporate power
increasingly frees itself from any political limitations just as it uses its power through the educational force of the dominant culture to put into
place an utterly privatized notion of agency in which it becomes difficult for young people and adults to imagine democracy as a public good, let
alone the transformative power of collective action. Once again, demo cratic politics has become ineffective, if not banal, as civic language is
impoverished and genuine spaces for democratic learning, debate, and dialogue such as schools, newspapers, popular culture, television
networks, and other public spheres are either underfunded, eliminated, privatized, or subject to corporate ownership .
Under the
aggressive politics and culture of neoliberalism , society is increasingly mobilized for the production
of violence against the poor, immigrants, dissenters, and others marginalized because of their age,
gender, race, ethnicity, and color. At the center of neoliberalism is a new form of politics in the United States, a
politics in which radical exclusion is the order of the day, and in which the primary questions no longer con cern
equality, justice, or freedom, but are now about the survival of the slickest in a culture marked by fear, surveillance, and economic deprivation.
This is a politics that hides its own ideology by eliminating the traces of its power in a rhetoric of normalization, populism, and the staging of
public spectacles. As Susan George points out, the question that currently seems to define neoliberal "democracy" is "Who has a right to live or
does not" (1999,para.34). Neoliberalism is not a neutral, technical, economic discourse that can be measured with the precision of a mathematical
formula or defended through an appeal to the rules of a presumptively unassailable science that conve niently leaves its own history behind. Nor
is it a paragon of economic ration ality that offers the best "route to optimum efficiency, rapid economic growth and innovation, and rising
prosperity for all who are willing to work hard and take advantage of available opportunities" (Kotz 2003, 16). On the contrary ,
neoliberalism is an ideology, a politics , and at times a fanaticism that subordinates the art of democratic politics to the
rapacious laws of a market economy that expands its reach to include all aspects of social life within the dictates and values of a market-driven
society. More important, it is an eco nomic and implicitly cultural theory?a historical and socially constructed ideology that needs to be made
visible, critically engaged, and shaken from the stranglehold of power it currently exercises over most of the command ing institutions of national
and global life. As such, neoliberalism makes it difficult for many people either to imagine a notion of individual and social
agency necessary for reclaiming a substantive democracy or to be able to theorize the economic, cultural, and political conditions necessary for
a viable global public sphere in which public institutions, spaces, and goods become valued as part of a
larger democratic struggle for a sustainable future and the downward distribution of wealth,
resources, and power.
Second: Criminal networks
Neoliberalism is the root cause of organized crime - Incentivizes participation
Harvey 7
(David, Distinguished Professor of Anthropology and Geography at the Graduate
Center of the City University of New York, “A Brief History of Neoliberalism”,
Oxford University Press, 2007. Pg. 171-172)
Neoliberalization has transformed the positionality of labour, of women, and of indigenous
groups in the social order by emphasizing that labour is a commodity like any other.
Stripped of the protective cover of lively democratic institutions and threatened with all
manner of social dislocations, a disposable workforce inevitably turns to other institutional
forms through which to construct social solidarities and express a collective will.
Everything from gangs and criminal cartels, narco-trafficking networks, minimafias and
favela bosses, through community, grassroots and non- governmental organizations, to
secular cults and religious sects proliferate. These are the alternative social forms that fill
the void left behind as state powers, political parties, and other institutional forms are
actively dismantled or simply wither away as centres of collective endeavour and of social
bonding. The marked turn to religion is in this regard of interest. Accounts of the sudden appearance and proliferation of religious sects in
the derelict rural regions of China, to say nothing of the emergence of Fulan Gong, are illustrative of this trend. 25 The rapid progress of
evangelical proselytizing in the chaotic informal economies that have burgeoned under neoliberalization in Latin America, and the revived and
in some instances newly constructed religious tribalism and fundamentalism that structure politics in much of Africa and the Middle East,
testify to the need to construct meaningful mechanisms of social solidarity. The progress of fundamentalist evangelical Christianity in the US
has some connection with proliferating job insecurities, the loss of other forms of social solidarity, and the hollowness of capitalist consumer
culture. In Thomas Frank’s account, the religious right took off in Kansas only at the end of the 1980s, after a decade or more of neoliberal
restructuring and deindustrialization. 26 Such connections may seem far-fetched. But if Polanyi is right and
the treatment of
labour as a commodity leads to social dislocation, then moves to rebuild diff erent social
networks to defend against such a threat become increasingly likely.
Third: Media Bombs
Representing Venezuela as a regional destabilizer is inaccurate and serves elite
interests
HARNECKER 10,
(Marta, Chilean psychologist and former student of Louis Althusser, trans. Janet
Duckworth, "Twenty-First Century Socialism," MONTHLY REVEIW 62:3, JulyAugust)
media play: they are instruments to “manufacture
consent,” which make it possible to “shepherd the bewildered herd.” According to Chomsky, propaganda is as necessary to bourgeois
I remind you of what Noam Chomsky has said about the role these
democracy as repression is to the totalitarian state.51 Therefore, bourgeois political parties can even accept a defeat at the polls as long as they
continue to control most of the mass media. The media, from the moment of such a defeat, work to win back the hearts and minds of those who
made the “mistake” of electing a leftist head of government. That is the reason why visceral reactions, such as those we have seen in a number of
countries, follow any measure taken by left governments to censure the media’s disinformation campaigns and efforts to incite violence, or to
create legal instruments that protect the people's right to receive accurate information. The powerful international media echo these reactions. For
today’s political battles are not won with atomic bombs but with “media bombs.” An example of
these media bombs is the campaign to make people think that Venezuela is engaged in an arms race
that threatens the region. Allusion to Venezuela’s recent weapons purchase from Russia buttresses
the allegation. However, if CIA data are consulted, it is clear that the situation is completely
different . Using these data, Belgian economist Eric Toussaint reports: Venezuelan military spending is the sixth highest in the region behind
that of Brazil, Argentina, Chile (a country with a much smaller population than Venezuela’s and considered to be a “model country”), Colombia,
and Mexico. In
relative terms, comparing military spending to GDP, the Venezuelan military budget is
the ninth largest in Latin America. Have people been able to read this in the most important
international papers? Absolutely not. What was reported in August 2009 is that Sweden had asked Venezuelan officials to
respond to a Colombian allegation that Venezuela was supplying arms to the FARC, and that Sweden had in effect told Colombia that SAAB
missiles found in a FARC camp had been supplied by Sweden to Venezuela. However, was anyone able to find an article reporting the detailed
and concise reply given by Hugo Chávez? The missiles in question had been stolen from a Venezuelan port in 1995, four years before Chávez
took over the presidency.52 It would seem that today the election of left candidates is better tolerated because these have fewer and fewer real
possibilities of modifying the existing situation.
The Impact
While the 1AC held us captivated with elite concerns, it also minimized and
obscured the horrific violence neoliberalism inflicts on billions of people everyday.
Have the courage to ignore the affirmatives inflated threat scenarios and concern
yourself with ending neoliberal exploitation, including the compelled march toward
extinction.
Di Leo and McClennen 2012
(Jeffrey R., Dean of the School of Arts and Sciences and Professor of English and
Philosophy at the University of Houston–Victoria; Sophia A. professor of
international affairs and directs Penn State's Center for Global Studies as well as
its Latin American Studies program; Postscript on Violencesymploke, Volume 20,
Numbers 1-2, 2012, pp. 241-250 (Article))
we are in one of the most¶ violent eras in human history. The scope of violence
today is global and its¶ magnitude immense It is seen in the death counts from perpetual wars and¶
the injury reports from fierce protests; it is found in the oil-soaked waters of¶ the Gulf of Mexico
and the radiation-contaminated earth of Japan; it is heard¶ in the screams of women subject to
sexual violence and the children who¶ are the victims of predators. It is in the blood we are served
by televised¶ news and the brutal visions of an increasing violence-driven entertainment¶ industry.¶
Violence is everywhere. It could be argued that
.
Though our various critical and cultural studies relate features of it, and¶ our social and physical sciences capture aspects of it, the violence in our world ¶ is far too overwhelming to contain. No study can capture it in its entirety and ¶ no report can present us with a complete set of data on it.
Rooted in everyday¶
institutional structures,” writes Henry Giroux, “violence has become the¶ toxic glue that bonds
Americans together while simultaneously preventing¶ them from expanding and building a
multiracial and multicultural democracy ¶
¶
¶
One of the
imperatives of critical pedagogy¶ must be to reveal its manifestations—another must be to work
toward its¶ elimination. progressive intellectuals must continue to utilize the public¶ sphere through
print and social media to bring about a better understanding¶ of the dangers of an increasingly
violent world and to work toward eliminating¶ the toxic glue of violence.¶ Violence is nowhere. While
violence is everywhere more apparent, it¶ is also everywhere ignored and hidden The violence that
is unseen and¶ unknown must be engaged just as much as the violence that is seen and¶ known.While
games
premised on the spectacle¶ of violence are not difficult to discern, they often have the
unintended consequence¶ of closing off consideration and understanding of other forms of ¶ violence,
in particular the myriad types of violence that cannot be staged ¶ Much of the violence that is unseen
and unheard happens on a temporal¶ scale that is beyond the capacities of our senses
slow¶
violence has been described as “a violence that occurs gradually¶ and out of sight, a violence of
delayed destruction that is dispersed across¶ time and space, an attritional violence that is typically
not viewed as violence¶ at all” (
¶
¶
¶
¶
¶
¶ This was not the
violence addressed by the theorists and critics of the¶ twentieth-century
¶
For many, the¶ violence that surrounds and engulfs us is an abomination and a threat, something¶ to be fought and eliminated; though for many more, violence serves a ¶ social and economic end—and is as American as apple pie. “
” (2002, 231). The “toxic glue” of violence is a threat to individual and social well-being as well as to democracy itself.
And
.
violent video
and movies
.
. Termed by Rob Nixon, “
,” it
by him
Nixon 2). The slow violence of “mass droughts in China, flooding in Australia, food crises, super twisters, earthquakes linked to geo-engineering, arctic melt-off and so on” (Cohen 2012, i);
“[C]limate change, the thawing cryosphere, toxic drift, biomagnifications, deforestation, the radioactive aftermath of war, acidifying oceans, and a host of other slowly unfolding environmental catastrophes” (Nixon 2).
. Much of this violence unfolds over spans of time better described as geological
rather than human. Or, better yet, over spans of time ¶ from which “the human” is viewed as but a passing moment. The theoretical ¶ work here that is just beginning to take shape promises to reframe the very¶ ways we think about history, time, and change.1¶ However, if the exanthropic
violence of climate change is the future of¶ theory, what of the anthropic violence that has been the focus of much attention, ¶particularly since the rise of women’s studies, gender studies, and ethnic ¶ studies in the sixties and seventies? How are we doing here with forms of ¶ violence that
are visible and seen and felt by women, children, and the disenfranchised¶ across the globe? Unfortunately, not well. ¶ In today’s media-saturated world, violence is always visible but rarely¶ felt. The prevalence of media violence is especially high in U.S. culture. Our ¶ entertainment
industry is adept at aestheticizing violence and transforming¶ the most violent and morally extreme members of our society into culture ¶ products suitable for mass consumption and celebration. Take for example, ¶the serial killer Aileen Wournos, who paradoxically became the object of ¶
revulsion and attraction when presented to us by the American entertainment ¶ industry. Many marveled at how the angelic Hollywood actor Charlize¶ Theron had been transformed into the “monster” Wournos, and found themselves ¶ comparing the “real” Theron to the image of Wournos
presented by¶ her in the film, Monster (2003). “She is my favorite of the night,” said a fashion ¶ editor from Glamour magazine commenting on Theron’s appearance at the¶ Golden Globes that year, “[e]specially because you have the contrast of her ¶ in that movie and the way she looks
tonight.”2 This entirely commonplace¶ comment reveals a semiotic process wherein serial killing and its aesthetic¶ image become hopelessly intertwined, and ultimately confused. ¶ In the translation of serial killing to its performance and promotion, a ¶ complex semiotic process creates
multiple layers of signification concerning¶ the event and its perpetrator. The result is both a greater understanding¶ (albeit a superficial one) of the killers and the horrific events in which they ¶ participated, and a growing sense of confusion between the “real” and the ¶ image. Carefully
packaged, promoted and sanitized by the culture industry, ¶American psychos such as Jeffrey Dahmer, Aileen Wournos and John Wayne ¶ Gacy increasingly become less despicable objects of moral revulsion, and ¶ more objects of fascination and entertainment. Their final entry into the
sign¶ system of celebrity entertainment is signaled by becoming household names ¶ as readily recognizable as our sports, movie and television icons. For the average¶ culturally literate American, naming three contemporary serial killers is¶ about as challenging as naming three talk show
hosts. However, the realness¶ of these killers and their violent crimes gets buried under multiple layers of ¶ signification. A “hyperreal”—and “hypermoral”—image soon displaces any¶ remaining fragments of the reality of the horrific events perpetrated by them. ¶ The cultural celebration
of violence though does not end with the remediation ¶ of increasingly macabre, sadistic, and cruel behavior. Rather, it creates¶ a culture where violence has become a—if not “the”—standard form of entertainment,¶and where our children are targeted as major consumers of this¶ violence.
From the hyper-real violence of many of the video games played¶ by children to the scenes of fighting, killing, and torture found in many of the¶ movies our children watch, there is no escaping the toxic glue of violence. ¶ Even the “G” rated Pixar family movie, Cars 2 (2011), featured two
deaths¶ and one torture scene (a crime syndicate tortures a car until it blows up). ¶ How else can this be explained except as a primer on violence for children? ¶ It is not going to be a surprise to anyone familiar with the American film ¶ industry that violence is one of its main commodities—
and one that is internationally¶ consumed. However, there is some reason to believe that more¶ people are beginning to understand the negative impact of repeated cultural ¶ consumption of violence. If nothing else, the tragic events surrounding the ¶ shooting of moviegoers in Aurora,
Colorado this past summer facilitated this¶ discussion. However, the solution is not to be found in say banning The Dark ¶ Knight Rises (2012) from theaters because of its alleged connection to an act ¶ of violence. This would be about as effective as taking Sweet Tarts away from¶ children
in an effort to stop tooth decay. Rather, the solution is to be found¶ in understanding how making violence into a commodity connects with a ¶ broader and more pernicious neoliberal social and economic agenda. Once ¶ this is understood, then just as with eating candy, you can consume
Neoliberal economic practices have increased biopolitical violence. The¶ devastating
effects of neoliberalism have been well documented. “Under¶ neoliberalism,” writes Henry Giroux,
“everything either is for sale or is plundered¶ for profit”
¶
¶
¶
¶
Halliburton gives war profiteering a new meaning as¶ it is
granted corporate contracts without any competitive bidding¶ and then bilks the U.S. government
for millions; the environment¶ is polluted and despoiled in the name of profit-making just as the¶
government passes legislation to make it easier for corporations¶ to do so;
¶
violence¶ at your own risk.¶
(2004, xii). He continues: Public lands are looted by logging companies and corporate ranchers;
politicians willingly hand
the public’s airwaves over to broadcasters and large corporate interests without a dime going into the public trust;
public services are gutted in order to lower the taxes of major corporations;
schools increasingly resemble malls or jails,¶ and teachers, forced to raise revenue for classroom materials, ¶ increasingly function as circus barkers hawking everything from ¶ hamburgers to pizza parties—that is, when they are not reduced to ¶ prepping students to get higher test scores.
(2004, xii-xiv) ¶
When extreme free-market capitalism becomes the source of values,¶ violence is given a
reprieve from moral indignation Democratic values as¶ well as basic notions of human rights and
economic justice are overlooked¶ when the market reveals profits to be had—or losses to be
avoided.As¶ neoliberalism widens the gulf between the rich and the poor, and the enfranchised¶ and
the disenfranchised, it also places at risk of violence the poor and¶ the disenfranchised. Therefore, it
should be no surprise that the devastation¶ of the environment and the violation of human rights is
often more extreme¶ in less affluent parts of the world.¶
¶
.
Moreover, the celebration of violence in the American entertainment industry must be seen as an extension of the neoliberal
the state of permanent war of the United States¶ has benefited an entertainment
industry which views increased militarization¶ as a marketing dream
¶
militaristic transformation¶ of the country. Arguably,
. Toys, games, videos, movies and clothing associated with the military and its values
increase in times of war. The permanent ¶ state of war in the United States thus provides increasing opportunities for ¶ corporations endlessly to exploit nationalistic jingoism and the glorification¶ of violence. In light of neoliberalism and its economic Darwinism, the recent ¶ resurrection of
Captain America—the defender of American “ideals”—is less¶ a nostalgic nod to comic history’s past, than a market-driven embrace of our¶ increasingly militarized, violent, and jingoistic culture. ¶
LATIN AMERICA IS THE CENTRAL NODAL POINT FOR RESISTING THE
ONSLAUGHT OF NEOLIBERALISM. DATA, HISTORY, AND MOMENTUM
ARE ON THE SIDE OF TRUE TRANSFORMATION. IT REALLY IS A
CHOICE: REJECT THE AFFIRMATIVE.
MACLEOD 2013
(ALAN, noted theorist, Thatcher and Chavez A Tale of Two Deaths; counterpunch
http://www.counterpunch.org/2013/04/12/a-tale-of-two-deaths/)
But Chavez
was quick to distance the movement from previous failed attempts and from dogmatic
ideologies of the past: “We are not talking about copying models, I believe that copying models was one of the great errors of the
socialist attempts of the 20th century, following the handbook. No, with this autonomy, with this diversity, with this force originating from every
community, from our people.” Today,
more than 360 million Latin Americans live under left-wing
governments dubbed “the Pink Tide” by Western intellectuals (perhaps because they couldn’t
stomach the word “red”). They are not homogeneous, they range from the eco-socialism of Morales in Bolivia, to
Ecuador’s radical young economist, Correa to the Workers’ Party and Lula in Brazil, but basic principles of equality and
integration unite them. Critics claim a reliance on state leads to corruption and inefficiency, and that enforced collective action is an
attack on the pure liberty of the individual. It is not by chance that an anti-neoliberal agenda has developed in
Latin America. It was in the “Empire’s Workshop” where Thatcher and Friedman’s ideas were
first implemented. After overthrowing President Allende, a democratic Marxist who stood for many of the same things Chavez did,
dictator General Pinochet invited protégés of Friedman and Hayek to Chile. There, they had free reign to carry out their ideas, thanks to the
General’s brutal suppression of the population. The result was not dissimilar to the West today: soaring unemployment and poverty, falling
industrial production and purchasing power falling to just 40% of what it had been in 1970, coupled with a rise in wealth and power of a small
section at the top of society. Hayek recommended Chile as a model for Thatcher to follow. She agreed Chile to be an “economic miracle”, but
lamented that Britain’s “democratic institutions and the need for a high degree of consent” made “some of the measures” taken “quite
unacceptable”. Likewise in Venezuela, President Carlos Andres Perez, on instruction from Friedman’s students, imposed a sweeping austerity
“packet” on Venezuela, privatizing state-owned assets and removing price controls on oil, plunging the population into poverty, to the point
where ordinary Caracas residents spent more than 25% of their income on bus fares (Jones, p116). This despite running on an anti neoliberal
ticket, calling the bankers and economists “genocide workers in the pay of economic totalitarianism” during his election campaign. Desperate
Venezuelans began rioting for food, but their protest soon became one against the system itself. The government acted quickly. The military was
called in, surrounded the poor quarters of the city, and commenced three days of war against its inhabitants. The L.A. Times’ Bart Jones speaks
of Red Cross workers being gunned down in the street, “mass graves” being filled with “mutilated corpses”, “tied up corpses” with “bullets in the
back of their heads” and children being gunned down as the armies fired indiscriminately into shanty towns (Jones, Hugo! pp. 121-124). Perhaps
it was
not in Seattle, but in Caracas where the first direct protest against neoliberalism occurred. And it
was the outrage at the brutal suppression of the people which spurred Chavez onto the political
stage . Latin America is ten to twenty years ahead of the West, in economic terms . After decades of
brutal neoliberal austerity, an alternative has emerged and fought back. Similar ideas have begun
to appear in the West, thanks to the Occupy Movement, which swept America and Europe last
year. Those in the West has much to learn from the region, even if it is what not to do. The Guardian
released a piece on the legacy of Margaret Thatcher. It showed a 65% increase in British poverty,
3,000 were killed, a similar number to the Tienanmen Square crackdown, in a country with a population more than 40 times smaller. So
from 13 to 22% of the population. Inequality, as measured by the GINI index, rose from .253 to .339. The planned destruction of the
manufacturing industry led to record high unemployment. The irony of Thatcherism is that her policies have left far more people dependent on
the welfare state than previously. In contrast, even
Thatcher’s allies at the World Bank admit that Chavez
managed a 50% decrease in poverty, and a 65% decrease in extreme poverty. Their figures show too that
unemployment fell from 14.5% in 1999 to 7.6% in 2009. Venezuela’s inequality has dropped from .487 in 1998 to .392 in 2009. Today, it is the
most admired country in Latin America. A similar story is being played out in other Latin American countries. For all this, Thatcher
was
remarkably successful in shifting the political discourse to the right. Her policies of privileging
business led to record corporate profits and increased concentration of media ownership. Socialists
like Tony Benn were pushed to one side and Tony Blair became leader of a “New Labour”, largely indistinguishable
from the Conservatives. When asked what she thought was her greatest achievement was, Thatcher responded “Tony Blair and New
Labour”. Benn agreed, ruefully. The concentration of money has led to the rightward shift of the media, too.
The “free-market” has led to independent media bought up or swamped by massive conglomerates.
Media outlets are increasingly beholden to corporations for advertising. Today, questioning neoliberalism is heresy ,
leading to even supposedly left-of-centre newspapers wondering if we should be “worried by the
rise of the populist left in Latin America”. It is becoming increasingly hard to hide the successes of
countries of Latin America in solving age old problems by bucking the supposed iron rules of
neoliberal economics. But the media continues to try. The New York Times bemoans Chavez’s “irresponsible handouts”,
while the Washington Post insists he remains in power only by “showering the poor with gifts”. What are these gifts? The Telegraph finally
enlightens us: “lavishing state funds” on projects like operations to restore sight to the blind and soup kitchens. Such is the aversion to the state in
Western intellectual culture that providing even basic food and medicine, in accordance with the UN Declaration of Human Rights, are serious
transgressions on freedom. This has been lampooned by FAIR, in their article “Chavez Wasted his Money on Healthcare When He Could Have
Built Gigantic Skyscrapers”.
Despite Thatcher insisting that “there is no alternative”, Latin America is
providing a model for a different future. A silent battle for heaven and Earth is being waged. And
we all must choose sides. Which one are you on? Choose wisely, because the fate of the 21st
century will be decided on which one of these ideologies prevails.
The affirmatives assertion that democratic mechanism will provide sufficient
correction to past neoliberal practices is laughable. True democracy emerges from
radical resistance, not gradual constitutionalism.
KATZ 13
(Claudio, professor of economic history at the University of Buenos Aires, trans.
Leonard Morin, "Socialist Strategies in Latin America," The New Latin American
Left, 43-5)
The constitutional framework significantly alters the context of leftist activity, which for decades
had been directed against military tyrannies. The battle within the current system is not simple because the current
institutionalism renews bourgeois domination in multiple disguises. This plasticity disconcerted a generation of militants
prepared to fight against a very brutal but not very devious dictatorial enemy. Some activists were demoralized by these
difficulties and ended up accepting the accusations from the right. They began to flay themselves
for their former "under-estimation of democracy," forgetting that civil liberties were an
achievement of popular resistance (and not of a bourgeois party regime complicit with authoritarianism). The constitutional
framework induced other militants to proclaim the end of "revolutionary utopia" and the beginning of a new era of
gradual advances toward a postcapitalist future. They returned to the gradualist scheme and proposed to embark on the road to
socialism through an initial consensus with the oppressors. They advocated taking this path to gaining hegemony for the workers. But the
vast trajectory of social democracy has proved the unreality of this option. The dominant classes
do not give up power. They only co-opt partners to recreate the pillars of an oppression based on
private ownership of the big banks and corporations. They will never permit this control to be
corroded by the political or cultural weight of their antagonists. For this reason, any policy that indefinitely
postpones the anticapitalist goal ends up reinforcing oppression. Socialism requires preparing and
consummating anticapitalist ruptures. If one forgets this principle, the strategy of the Left lacks a
compass. But the confrontation with constitutionalism has also generated positive effects in recent years.
It has allowed, for example, debate on the left about the form that a genuine democracy under
socialism would adopt. This reflection introduced a significant change in the way of conceptualizing the anticapitalist perspective. In
the 1970s, democracy was a topic that the critics of the Soviet bureaucracy omitted or barely put forth. Now almost no one skirts this problem.
Socialism has ceased to be imagined as a prolongation of the tyranny that reigned in the Soviet Union and has currently begun to be perceived as
a regime of growing participation, representation, and popular control. But this future also depends on the immediate responses to
constitutionalism. Two
positions prevail on the left: one focus proposes winning space within the institutional
the other promotes parallel organs of people's power (Harnecker, 2000; Petras and Veltmeyer, 2005).
The first path argues for advancing by climbing from the local to the provincial levels to subsequently
structure, and
reach the national governments. It follows from the experiences of community administrations that the Brazilian Workers' Party (Partido dos
Trabalhadores) and the Broad Front (Frente Amplio) of Uruguay pursued in the early 1990s. It recognizes the bitter concessions granted to the
establishment during these administrations (business commitments and postponement of social improvements), but it construes the final outcome
as positive. Undeniably, this "municipal socialism” led to old activists turning into confidence men of capital. They
debated at city halls,
exhibited hostility toward the social movement, and ended up governing on behalf of the dominant classes.
First they moderated programs, then they called for responsibility, and finally they changed sides.
The participatory budget did not counteract this regression. Discussing how to distribute a local expenditure limited by the constraints of
neoliberal policy leads to imposing a self-adjustment upon the citizenry. Participatory
democracy only awakens radical
consciousness of the people when it resists and denounces the tyranny of capital. If it renounces this
goal, it turns into an instrument for preserving the established order. An opposite strategy to the
institutional path exists that encourages social mobilization and rejects electoral participation . It
denounces the corruption of the Workers' Party or the passivity of the Broad Front and advocates the emergence of direct
options for people's power. It also questions the electoral traps that, in the Andean countries, have led to channeling resistance
through the system. This vision ignores the influence of the electoral arena and minimizes the negative consequences of abandoning it.
Citizenship, voting, and electoral rights are not just instruments of bourgeois manipulation.
They are also popular conquests
achieved against dictatorships, which under certain conditions allow one to take a stand against
the Right.
Total, unconditional, and unflinching rejection is required – the only way to
produce real alternatives to neoliberalism is to refuse the allure of half measures
and the propaganda of profit.
Werlhof 8
(Claudia von Werlhof. Werlhof is a professor at the Institute of Political Sciences at
the University of Innsbruck. “The Globalization of Neoliberalism, its Consequences
and Some of its Basic Alternatives.” 27 August 2008. Capitalism Nature Socialism.
BA)
Still, euphoria would be out of place.
An alternative to neoliberalism is not created through analysis and
protest alone but must be practiced. Opinions on how to do this differ. Some discuss ‘‘alternatives’’ that are
none: a reform of the WTO; ‘‘control’’ of globalization through NGOs; a return to
Keynesianism; a restoration of ‘‘social market economy’’; or even a revival of socialism. Such
ideas ignore reality and trivialize the problem. Neoliberalism shows every day that much more is
at stake. ¶ Neoliberalism is an apocalypse, a ‘‘revelation,’’ because the reality it creates makes it impossible for neoliberalism
to justify itself. Nor can we consider the corporations harmless ‘‘players.’’ There is no ambiguity. As a consequence, the perpetrators of
neoliberal politics simply lie about what is happening. The only good thing about neoliberalism is that it reveals the truth about ‘‘Western
civilization’’ and ‘‘European values.’’ This means that people now have the chance to draw the right conclusions about what is really needed. ¶
What is really needed, of course, is nothing less than a different civilization. A different economy
alone, or a different society or culture will not suffice. We need a civilization that is the exact
opposite of neoliberalism and the patriarchal capitalist world system it is rooted in. The logic of our alternative must
be one that completely undermines the logic of neoliberalism .113 ¶ Neoliberalism has turned everything that would
ensure a good life for all beings on this planet upside down. Many people still have a hard time understanding that the horror we are experiencing
is indeed a reality*a reality willingly produced, maintained and justified by ‘‘our’’ politicians. But even
if the alternative was half
implemented*no more plundering, exploitation, destruction, violence, war, coercion,
mercilessness, accumulation, greed, corruption*we would still be left with all the damage that
the earth has already suffered.
Theses
Thesis – Policy Version
The recent global financial collapse has delegitimized the obsession with foreign
intervention into Latin American markets – the ideology of neoliberalism is on the
retreat.
Bridsall and Fukuyama (lol) 2011
(Nancy; Center for Global Development's founding president.; Francis; prof of international
relations, Stanford university; The Post-Washington Consensus. Birdsall, Nancy, Fukuyama,
Francis, Foreign Affairs, 00157120, Mar/Apr2011, Vol. 90, Issue 2 The Post-Washington
Consensus)
THE LAST time a global depression originated in the United States, the impact was devastating not
only for the world economy but for world politics as well. The Great Depression set the stage for a
shift away from strict monetarism and laissez-faire policies toward Keynesian demand
management. More important, for many it delegitimized the capitalist system itself, paving the way
for the rise of radical and antiliberal movements around the world.
This time around, there has been no violent rejection of capitalism, even in the developing world. In
early 2009, at the height of the global financial panic, China and Russia, two formerly noncapitalist
states, made it clear to their domestic and foreign investors that they had no intention of
abandoning the capitalist model. No leader of a major developing country has backed away from
his or her commitment to free trade or the global capitalist system. Instead, the established
Western democracies are the ones that have highlighted the risks of relying too much on market-led
globalization and called for greater regulation of global finance.
Why has the reaction in developing countries been so much less extreme after this crisis than it was
after the Great Depression? For one, they blame the United States for it. Many in the developing
world agreed with Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva when he said, "This is a crisis
caused by people, white with blue eyes." If the global financial crisis put any development model
on trial, it was the free-market or neoliberal model, which emphasizes a small state, deregulation,
private ownership, and low taxes . Few developing countries consider themselves to have fully
adopted that model.
Indeed, for years before the crisis, they had been distancing themselves from it. The financial crises
of the late 1990s in East Asia and Latin America discredited many of the ideas associated with the
so-called Washington consensus, particularly that of unalloyed reliance on foreign capital. By
2008, most emerging-market countries had reduced their exposure to the foreign financial markets
by accumulating large foreign currency reserves and maintaining regulatory control of their
banking systems. These policies provided insulation from global economic volatility and were
vindicated by the impressive rebounds in the wake of the recent crisis: the emerging markets
have posted much better economic growth numbers than their counterparts in the developed
world.
Thus, the American version of capitalism is, if not in full disrepute, then at least no longer
dominant. In the next decade, emerging-market and low-income countries are likely to modify their
approach to economic policy further, trading the flexibility and efficiency associated with the freemarket model for domestic policies meant to ensure greater resilience in the face of competitive
pressures and global economic trauma. They will become less focused on the free flow of capital,
more concerned with minimizing social disruption through social safety net programs, and more
active in supporting domestic industries. And they will be even less inclined than before to defer
to the supposed expertise of the more developed countries , believing--correctly--that not only
economic but also intellectual power are becoming increasingly evenly distributed.
Thesis – Policy or K
Neoliberalism is the defining crisis of the contemporary age- we are forced with
make a choice – to align ourselves with the forces of social devastation or the
mobilize a coherent challenge to the forces of radical privatization.
FRASER, 13
(Nancy, quails not needed but Henry A. and Louise Loeb Professor of Political and
Social Science at the New School, "A Triple Movement? Parsing the Politics of
Crisis after Polanyi," New Left Review 81, May/June, P 119-21)
In many respects, today’s
crisis resembles that of the 1930s, as described by Karl Polanyi in The Great Transformation.1 Now,
relentless push to extend and de-regulate markets is every- where wreaking havoc—
destroying the livelihoods of billions of people; fraying families, weakening communities and
rupturing soli- darities; trashing habitats and despoiling nature across the globe. Now, as then, attempts
to commodify nature, labour and money are destabilizing society and economy—witness the destructive
as then, a
effects of unregulated trading in biotechnology, carbon offsets and, of course, in financial derivatives; the impacts on child care, schooling, and
care of the elderly.
Now, as then, the result is a crisis in multiple dimensions—not only economic and
financial, but also ecological and social.
Moreover, our crisis seems to share a distinctive deep-structural logic with the one
Polanyi analysed. Both appear to be rooted in a common dynamic, which he called ‘fictitious commodification’. In both eras, ours and his,
free-market fundamentalists have sought to commodify all the necessary preconditions of
commodity production. Turning labour, nature and money into objects for sale on ‘self-regulating’
markets, they proposed to treat those fundamental bases of production and exchange as if they
could be commodities like any other. In fact, however, the project was self-contradictory. Like a tiger that bites its
own tail, neo- liberalism threatens now, just as its predecessor did then, to erode the very supports
on which capitalism depends . The outcome in both cases was entirely predictable: wholesale destabilization of the
economic system on the one hand, and of nature and society on the other. Given these structural similarities, it is no surprise that many analysts of
the present crisis are now returning to Polanyi’s magnum opus, nor that many speak of our time as a ‘second great transformation’, a ‘great
transformation redux’.2 Nevertheless, the
current conjuncture diverges in a crucial respect from that of the 1930s:
the first half of the 20th century, social
despite the structural similarities, the political response today is strikingly different. In
struggles surrounding the crisis formed what Polanyi called a ‘double movement’. As he saw it, political parties and social movements
coalesced around one side or the other of a simple fault-line. On one side stood political forces and
commercial interests that favoured deregulating markets and extending commodification; on the
other stood a broad-based, cross-class front, including urban workers and rural land- owners,
socialists and conservatives, that sought to ‘protect society’ from the ravages of the market. As the
crisis sharpened, moreover, the partisans of ‘social protection’ won the day. In contexts as divergent as New Deal America, Stalinist Russia,
fascist Europe and, later, in postwar social democracy, the political classes appeared to converge on at least this one point: left to themselves,
‘self-regulating’ markets in labour, nature and money would destroy society. Political regulation was needed to save it. Today, however, no
such consensus exists. Political elites are explicitly or implicitly neoliberal—outside Latin America
and China, at least. Committed first and foremost to protecting investors, virtually all of them—
including self-professed social democrats—demand ‘austerity’ and ‘deficit reduction’, despite the
threats such policies pose to economy, society and nature. Meanwhile, popular opposition fails to
coalesce around a solidaristic alternative, despite intense but ephemeral out- bursts, such as Occupy and
the indignados, whose protests generally lack programmatic content. Progressive social movements are longer-lived and
better institutionalized, to be sure; but they suffer from fragmentation and have not united in a
coherent counter-project to neoliberalism . All told, we lack a double movement in Polanyi’s sense.3 The result, therefore, is
a curious disjuncture. While today’s crisis appears to follow a Polanyian structural logic, grounded in the dynamics of fictitious commodification, it does not manifest a Polanyian political logic, figured by the double movement.
Thesis - Hippies
The strategy of the 1AC is that of the permitted Left – the frenetic call for social
stabilization coopts any more radical movement to address the neoliberal
coordinates that make market domination inevitable.
Robinson 8
William I., Professor of Sociology at the University of Santa Barbara, Latin
America and Global Capitalism: A Critical Globalization Perspective)
Nevertheless, it
is useful, we argue, to situate contemporary Latin American lefts theoretically along a
continuum between two ideal types: a radical Left, on the one hand, and an izquierda permitida, on
the other. This is the driving theme tying together the various theoretical and case-study chapters. Which currents of the
revitalization of Latin American radicalism represent a significant challenge to neoliberalism,
imperialism, and even potentially capitalism itself? Which, in other words, constitute a radical alternative? And
which components ofbthe same resurgence represent a transition to an izquierda permitida, or "authorized
Left"? Our use ofbthe term izquierda permitida draws on Charles Hale's theorization of the notion of indio permitido in the era of neoliberal
multiculturalism in Latin America. Hale used this term to describe the way in which neoliberal states in the 1990s adopted a
language of cultural recognition of indigenous people and even enacted modest reforms in the area
of indigenous rights; at the same time, these states set strict predetermined limits to the extent of
reform . Neoliberal multiculturalism in this way divided and domesticated indigenous movements
through selective co-optation . In particular, the era of the indio permitido has meant that cultural rights are to be
enjoyed on the implicit condition that indigenous movements will not challenge foundational
neoliberal economic policies. Indigenous movements that have submitted more or less to the framework of neoliberal
multiculturalism fall into Hale's category indio permitido, or "authorized Indian" (Hale 1996, 2002, 2004, 2006). Adapting this theoretical
framework to the context of the Latin American Left, the authors of this volume explore the varied experiences of the ostensibly left regimes,
political parties, and social movements of diiferent countries in terms of how closely they adhere to the notion of izquierda permitida and ask
whether they represent the mature realization or at least a potential transition toward, a more radical Left. The
izquierda permitida
signals deep continuities with neoliberal capitalism and adapts easily to U.S. imperial strategies. In its
regime form, it seeks to divide and co-opt radical left social movements and parties. The radical Left, on
the other hand, offers fundamental challenges to empire, neoliberalism, and capitalism. The radical
Left works to overturn capitalist class rule and capitalist states in Latin America through the
activity and struggle of the popular classes and oppressed peoples themselves. It envisions a transition toward
democratic social coordination of the economy and the construction of a development model in which human needs are prioritized above the
needs of capital. The
radical Left fights for communal ownership of economic and natural resources. It
pushes for worker and community control of workplaces and neighborhoods. The radical Left sees
liberal capitalist democracy as a limited expression of popular sovereignty and seeks instead to
expand democratic rule through all political, social, economic, and private spheres of life. It is antiimperialist, seeking the regional liberation of Latin America and the Caribbean and challenging the imperial pretensions of the American empire,
as well as those of its emergent rivals active in the region. This is quite distinct from earlier versions of state capitalism or nationalist populism in
Latin American twentieth-century history, which sought merely state ownership of the means of production in strategic economic sectors and
state allocation of resources. The radical Left described here is an ideal type, a vision of society toward which increasing numbers of Latin
Americans hope to transition out of existing capitalism through processes of struggle.
No new economic system drops from the
sky, Michael Lebowitz (2006: 61) points out. Rather than dropping from the sky or emerging pristine and complete from the conceptions of
intellectuals, new productive forces and relations of production emerge within and in opposition to the
existing society. One implication is that the new society can never be fully formed at the beginning. Initially, that new society must build
upon elements ofthe old society. The radical Left indigenous social movements that arose in Bolivia between 2000 and 2005, and the radical
socialist flanks of the Chavista movement in Venezuela, are arguably those social forces that most closely approximate the outlook of the radical
Left described above. Perhaps
the best analytical starting point for an understanding of the izquierda
permitida ideal type, the radical Left's antipode, is what Iorge Castaneda, a former leftist, describes approvingly as the
"reconstructed, formerly radical left."• The reconstructed governments of Chile under Michelle Bachelet
(until her recent electoral defeat to right-wing Sebastian Piflera), Uruguay under Tabarê Vazquez (and now Iosê Mujica), and Brazil under Lula
(and now Rouseff),
for example, stress "social policy-education, anti-poverty programs, health care,
housing- but within a more or less orthodox market framework."• When the parties of the izquierda permitida
have come to office in recent years, their "economic policies have been remarkably similar to those of [their neoliberal] predecessors"
(Castafleda, 2006: 35). As we have seen, in the final years of the 1990s and the outset of the 2000s, the region entered into a steep recession that
fundamentally brought into question the legitimacy of neoliberalism as a development model and gave birth to myriad social explosions and
popular struggles. The
paradigmatic political parties and regimes of the new izquierda permitida are one
expression of a reconstitution of neoliberalism in a new form. In terms of its economic program, the izquierda
permitida has been deeply influenced by the turn from classical structuralism to neostructuralism within the United Nations Economic
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). Over the course of the second half of the 1990s and early 2000s, neostructuralism
moved from the margins to the center of political influence in the region by challenging certain assumptions of the market dogmatism
characteristic of orthodox neoliberalism while rebuking simultaneously the core presuppositions of classical structuralism. Post-Pinochet Chile
became the poster child of neostructuralism throughout the 1990s. In this way it became a prototype for the izquierda permitida. Neostructuralism
was also deeply influential in the "Buenos Aires Consensus," which came out of a Iune 1999 convention of the Socialist International and
eventually became the model of political economy for Lula's Brazil, Kirchner's Argentina, Vazquez's Uruguay, and arguably the governments
formed recently by formerly guerrilla parties in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala (for a different view, see the chapter by Hêctor Perla Ir.,
Marco Mojica, and Iared Bibler in this volume). The
areas of conceptual innovation at the heart of
neostructuralism revolve around systemic competitiveness, technical progress, proactive labor
flexibility, and virtuous circles. In an effort to distinguish itself from orthodox neoliberalism,
neostructuralism in Latin America rejects the notion that markets and competition are the
exclusive channels for social and economic interaction, and replace the basic neoclassical notion of
comparative advantage with systemic competitiveness. By this, neostructuralists essentially mean
"that what compete[s] in the world market [are] not commodities per se but entire social systems"
(Leiva, 2008: 4). While granting that the market will remain the central organizing force in society, neostructuralists stress that the
competitiveness of the entire system depends upon effective and thoroughgoing state intervention in infrastructure (technology, energy,
transport), education, finance, labor-management relations, and the general relationships between public and private spheres in a way that
orthodox neoliberal theory cannot grasp (Leiva, 2008: 4). The proponents of this paradigm, Greig Charnock (2009: 67) points out, "reject the
market fundamentalism of the 1980s and early 1990s, represented by structural adjustment and shock therapy, and with these many of the
assumptions about what the untrammelled free market can achieve." They
call for a second generation of institutional
shifts in state policies. These shifts will require a greater role for state engineering. States must
fashion institutions that promote policy stability, adaptability, and coherence and coordination of
markets. The institutions must be of high quality and embody "public regardedness" rather than personalistic clientelism. Whereas
orthodox neoliberals in the 1970s and 1980s saw the state's basic function as lubricating the dynamism of the market through the protection of
property rights, contract enforcement, information collection, and strictly delimited social provision for the destitute, neostructuralism "assigns
the state an important auxiliary role in the search for international competitiveness," blending economic policy on various levels "with political
intervention to construct a broad social consensus" (Leiva, 2008: 9-10). The
state is to stimulate and enhance marketbased initiatives, selectively intervene in productive sectors of the economy, and supplement the
invisible hand of the market with nonmarket forms of social, political, and economic coordination.
Latin American neostructuralism sees modest and temporary state intervention as essential for
encouraging a larger share of manufactured and valued-added exports into a country's export
profile. Proponents of the izquierda permitida model emphasize the necessity of "a configuration of class forces that can induce a capitalist
class to accept a smaller share of the surplus in exchange for legitimacy, political and social peace, and high productivity." At the same time,
"the influential organizations of the economic elites must be convinced that subordinate classes will not threaten private property." The
orientation of the new izquierda permitida is to "pragmatically strive to reconcile liber1y, equity,
and community with the demands of a market economy" (Sandbrook, Edelman, Heller, and Teichman, 2006). The
restructuring of neoliberalism in the direction of an izquierda permitida may offer "an alternative that combines representative democracy with a
market economy and state initiatives to reduce inequalities and promote social citizenship" (Roberts, 2008: 87). The regimes of the izquierda
permitida introduce targeted antipoverty programs, subsidies for small- and mediumsized businesses, increases in royalty regimes for
multinational corporations operating in the natural-resource sectors, and joint private-public ventures between the state and foreign capital.
These changes do not signify any change in underlying social inequalities of the neoliberal class
system. They retain fiscal and monetary austerity, co-opt radical extra-parliamentary movements,
and pursue "social pacts"• between the ruling classes and the working class and the peasantry
predicated on keeping wages down.
Links
Link – Aid
Poverty assistance to displaced rural farmers is just a new means of exploiting
surplus populations. The plan is a reworking of development assistance in response
to the latest rounds of neoliberal dispossession. The aff does nothing but lubricate
the gears of capital.
Duffield, Professor Emeritus and former Director of the Global Insecurities Centre,
University of Bristol, ‘7
[Mark, Development, Security and Unending War Governing the World of People,
pg. 10-12
Accumulation by dispossession embodies the idea that capitalism ‘must perpetually have something
“outside of [sic] itself” in order to stabilise itself’ (Harvey 2003: 140). One example is the continuing relevance of Marx’s
notion of an industrial reserve army, that is, a floating population of cheap, unskilled labour, lacking protection and entitlements, that can be hired
and fired as business expands and contracts. For Harvey, such
an ‘outside’ can be either a pre-existing non-capitalist
territory, such as still existed in many regions of the world at the end of the nineteenth century, or a
sector or market within capitalism that has not been fully exploited or proletarianized. Additionally and
importantly, however, capitalism can ‘actually manufacture it’ (ibid.: 141). Through a combination of
mechanisms, accumulation by dispossession continues to shape the violent ¶ bouts of predation on
existing dispensations and accepted entitlements as a necessary requirement for renewed
accumulation. Within the underdeveloped world, many forms of primitive accumulation that would be
recognizable to Marx are still operating today: the dispossession of peasantries, the displacement of family farming
by international agribusiness, forced migration, new waves of proletarianization and reproletarianization, the wholesale
privatization of common property such as water, the suppression of indigenous forms of production and consumption and so on. At the same
time, however, and relating to the mass consumer societies of the developed world, certain aspects of primitive accumulation have been adapted
and expanded. The credit system and finance capital, for example, have opened up new zones of predation. Stock promotions, mergers and asset
stripping have accompanied the active promotion of high levels of debt peonage. Corporate fraud and dispossession through credit and stock
manipulation, including the raiding and decimation of pension funds by stock and corporate collapse ‘are all central features of what
contemporary capitalism is about’ (ibid.: 147). Indeed, the reversion to private hands of public entitlements won through political struggle, such
as a state pension, social welfare and national health care ‘has been the most egregious of all policies of dispossession pursued in the name of
neoliberal orthodoxy’ (ibid.: 148). New global mechanisms for dispossession have also opened up, for example regarding intellectual property
rights, patenting and the licensing of genetic material such as seed plasma. Biopiracy by international pharmaceutical companies and the pillaging
of the world’s genetic resources are rampant, creating means ofgovernance that ‘can now be used against whole populations whosepractices had
played a crucial role in the development of those materials’ (ibid.). The wholesale commodification of life, including its many natural and cultural
forms, histories and intellectual creativity, is currently under way. When coupled with the deepening international privatization of common goods
and entitlements such as land, water and public utilities, Harvey has argued that capitalism
has launched the world on ‘a new
wave of “enclosing the commons”’ (ibid.). From political economy one could argue that accumulation by
dispossession, in continually evoking a surplus population, not only provides development with an
object, it is one that is constantly being renewed. A superfluous and potentially dangerous waste-life
is continuously thrown off as markets are relentlessly made and remade in the endless search for
progress. This concern arising from political¶ economy is recognized by policy makers. Politicians
are fully aware, for example, that while globalization brings many benefits, if badly managed it can
exacerbate inequality and instability (Biccum 2005). This contemporary ambivalence towards
globalization returns development once more to its founding design of reconciling the need for
order with the challenges of progress. Because surplus life is continuously produced, development
also periodically reinvents itself. While the context, words and emphasis may change, the central meaning remains
the same. In terms of basic tenets this process, since 1949at least, has been well documented by William Easterly (Easterly 2002).
Following decolonization, when it vectored into an interstate relationship, development has
regularly reinvented itself within a limited set of axioms. Like penal reform, the endless rediscovery of
development has produced a ‘a monotonous critique’ (Foucault [1975]: 266) which, in this case, invariably calls
for an increase in aid spending, a renewed focus on poverty reduction, the delivery of more effective
aid, the necessity of better coordination between donors, aid agencies and recipients, the
importance of recipients being receptive to policy change and, not least, debt relief. The periodic
repackaging of these aims over the past half-century has been helped by development’s
organizational preference for limited agency competition, low public accountability, institutional
amnesia and a willingness to engage in obfuscation and spin control, allowing practitioners always
to describe aid efforts ‘as “new and improved”’ (Easterly 2002: 228).
Link – Aid – Mexico Specific
Neoliberal reforms in Mexico created disincentives for the lower class to challenge
the state.
Holzner 7
(Claudio A. The Poverty of Democracy: Neoliberal Reforms and Political
Participation of the Poor in Mexico
Latin American Politics & Society, Volume 49, Number 2, Summer 2007, pp. 87122. University of Miami)
By transforming the basic functions of the state—what it does and for whom—neoliberal policies
changed the logic of political participa- tion in Mexico. On the one hand, the centralization of
policymaking, coupled with the retreat of the state from core activities since the 1990s, means that
the poor now have fewer and fewer incentives to target the state to fulfill their basic needs. On the
other hand, successive adminis- trations have dismantled Mexico’s elaborate welfare system,
leading many low-income Mexicans to the conclusion that politicians have turned their backs on
Mexico’s poor (Gutmann 2002). This has had harmful consequences for lower-class political
efficacy and engagement.¶ Macroeconomic reforms shape political behavior by restructuring the
relationship between citizens and the state in ways that create pow- erful incentives or
disincentives for becoming involved in politics. In Mexico, repeated austerity programs since the
1980s, which gutted fed- eral spending programs and eliminated subsidies for basic foodstuffs; a
decline in the spending and scope of rural development programs; and a general shrinking of
state budgets made the state less relevant for the poor.10 Other free market reforms, such as the
privatization of state- owned enterprises, the deregulation of the market for coffee and other cash
crops without agricultural extension services, and attempts to pri- vatize ejidos (a form of collective
property in rural areas), have rein- forced the perception among popular groups that the state
cannot or will not provide for them.¶ Central to this change in incentives was the government’s
shift away from comprehensive welfare, poverty alleviation, and rural develop- ment programs
to more limited programs that carefully target people on the basis of individual need. Grindle
(1986) has argued that rural devel- opment projects were core elements of the state’s strategy to
extend its presence as deeply as possible into the Mexican countryside. In reality, it was
precisely because of state-building efforts during the 1950s and 1960s and because of
comprehensive development programs like PIDER-COMPLAMAR, SAM, and CONASUPO in
the 1970s and 1980s that peasants had more and more incentives to target the state when seeking solutions to their material needs (see also Fox 1993). Similarly, Craig and Cornelius argue
that Recent reforms have dismantled this welfare system, eliminating many of the incentives the
poor had for engaging in political activity. The poverty alleviation initiatives of Ernesto Zedillo’s
administration (1994–2000) particularly signaled a retreat of the state from the lives of the poor.
A central characteristic of the new era of government-spon- sored poverty alleviation programs,
such as PROGRESA; its successor, Oportunidades; and agricultural subsidy programs like
PROCAMPO is that they target individuals on a strict need basis, using formulas for calculating the level of support that individuals and households receive. This rationalization of
public spending may be good economic policy because it insulates policymakers from political
pressures; but by elim- inating much of the discretionary power that parties, corporatist organizations, and politicians had in allocating benefits to their most loyal clients, it makes political
participation irrelevant, if not irrational. Per- haps even more damaging, the selective allocation of
social assistance often divides communities between those receiving assistance and those left out of
programs. This fragmentation of interests atomizes the rural and urban poor, places them in
competition with each other, and weak- ens their capacity for collective action (Kurtz 2004).¶ The
net effect of these changes has been to increase the cost of tar- geting the state while making it less
likely that political action will be successful. In the following interview excerpt, Norma explains
how her interactions with the CNC and government officials have changed over the past few
years. Notice that she places particular emphasis on decreasing benefits, declining access, and an
inability to use her posi- tion as a representative of the CNC to guarantee preferential treatment
for her group.
Link – Aid - ‘Small” Farmers
The Aff’s funds don’t actually go to poor farmers; most of the funds will go to midlevel farmers, who will use the money to buy out their neighbors and augment the
neoliberal system
Robinson 08-American professor of sociology at the University of California, Santa Barbara, 2008, “Latin
America and Global Capitalism”, pgs107-108
Just as there are local losers in NTAE industries, there are also winners. Local benefits include
new employment and income opportunities, access to new consumer goods, social and
productive infrastructure, and so on. But these benefits are very unevenly distributed. The NTAE
industry has benefited a class of medium-level producers and local investor groups, often -urbanbased. Many people in these groups have bought out their poorer neighbors thereby changing the
class structure. It is interesting to observe the local social groups often involved in the NTAE
industry. In the case of Central America or of Chile, for instance, local influence over the
industry is exercised largely through finances. Under the neoliberal program state banks
providing low-cost credit to peasant producers have been closed or restructured along market lines.
Most credit for NTAEs comes from private banks, from TNCs that provide commercial credits for
their contractors (or simply use their own capital for direct investment), and increasingly, from
investment houses in urban areas, known as financieras. These financieras function like
investment funds, where urban professionals and middle strata, along with capitalists, invest their
money in shares. Urban import-export groups, such as those that own foreign automobile or
computer dealerships, have entered NTAE production by organizing these fancieras, which
replace state credits that were established in the pre-globalization period of ISI and state-led
development (for these details, see Robinson, 2003).
Link - Biodiversity
Aid is primarily economic—environmental protections are constrained by market
forces.
Corson 2010 (Catherine; Assistant Professor of Environmental Studies, Mount Holyoke;
Shifting Environmental Governance in a Neoliberal World: US AID for Conservation Antipode
Volume 42, Issue 3, pages 576–602, June 2010)
In this context, articulating the economic importance of environmental issues became a critical
means of integrating environment issues into USAID's development agenda. Reports and letters
that informed the 1970s congressional amendments emphasized the need to protect the natural
resources upon which poor people in developing countries relied (Blake et al 1980; Scherr 1978).
However, as the program enlarged in the ensuing decades, the agency's environmental advocates
found that they needed to highlight environmental projects’ contributions to a country's overall
economic growth in order to mobilize political support. As one former senior USAID official
recounted:¶ Articulating the rationale for environment as an economic issue was an important part
of advancing the environmental agenda. We had to devise a rationale that was consistent with the
agency's mission, and AID's primary mission was economic development.¶ In an article in which
she described the emerging USAID environmental portfolio, influential USAID environmental
advisor Molly Kux highlights six “investment rationales” for foreign aid donors to invest in
environmental conservation, including maintaining ecosystem services; addressing the rural
populations’ economic aspirations; increasing nature-based tourism; protecting endangered
species; investigating natural economic products; building on indigenous conservation; and
promoting sustained yield harvesting (Kux 1991:298–299).¶ Her priority list reveals historical
roots of the contemporary faith in market-based conservation. These roots reflect strategic policy
designed to appeal to the constituent groups that support environmental foreign aid: politicians and
bureaucrats committed to economic development and, as I will show, congressional advocacy
organizations, who were primarily interested in species conservation. Nevertheless, the 1980s
tactic of embracing economic growth and sustainable development in order to access the
development agenda laid the groundwork for the later rise in market-based conservation
approaches and ultimately the process through which conservation became a conduit for
capitalist expansion.
The invocation of biodiversity as a justification of foreign aid is part and parcel of
the neoliberalist agenda that accepts environmental protection as long as it does not
challenge the fundamental devastation wrought by capitalist accumulation.
Corson 2010 (Catherine; Assistant Professor of Environmental Studies, Mount Holyoke;
Shifting Environmental Governance in a Neoliberal World: US AID for Conservation Antipode
Volume 42, Issue 3, pages 576–602, June 2010)
Changing Public–Private Non-profit Power Relations under Neoliberalism
The reduction of the state under neoliberalism,1 and the resulting reconfiguration of state, market,
and civil society relations, has shifted the landscape of twenty-first century environmental
governance, in particular opening up room for private actors to influence state policy. This article
explores how the rise of neoliberalism in the 1980s and its institutionalization in the 1990s
underpinned the formation of a dynamic alliance among members of the US Congress, the US
Agency for International Development (USAID), an evolving group of environmental nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)2 and the corporate sector around biodiversity conservation
funding. By focusing strictly on international biodiversity conservation this alliance—driven to a
great extent by non-elected agents who are perceived to represent civil society despite their
corporate partnerships—has been able to shape public foreign aid policy and in the process create
new spaces for capital expansion.¶ The arguments presented here forge new ground in academic
conversations about conservation and neoliberalism by illuminating the concrete practices within
US foreign aid through which new forms of environmental governance under neoliberalism are
produced. Specifically, they draw on the work of intellectuals who document the opportunities
for civil society groups provided by the downsizing of the neoliberal state (eg Castree 2008;
Peck and Tickell 2002) to address a lacuna in three interrelated bodies of literature. Together,
these works examine the neoliberalism of nature (eg Castree 2008; Heynen et al 2007), the
growth of the big international conservation NGOs (BINGOs)3 and their increasing corporate
linkages (eg Brockington, Duffy and Igoe 2008; Büscher and Whande 2007), and the
contemporary move in conservation away from engaging local actors (eg Brosius and Russell
2003; Dressler and Buscher 2008).¶ While these scholars unveil critical transformations in human–
environment relations taking place in the name of conservation under neoliberalism, they have
often elided the intricacies of the shifting and uneven power dynamics among state, market and
civil society organizations through which such changes have emerged. By focusing on the interorganizational relations entailed in US environmental foreign aid policy-making, this article helps
to launch critical engagement with policy issues related to nature's neoliberalization, as called for
by Castree (2007). At the same time, it responds to appeals for analysis of the micro-politics of
foreign aid donors (Cooper and Packard 1997; Watts 2001), and particularly the sponsors of
international conservation (King 2009), to advance an emerging scholarship that applies
ethnographic methods to elucidate the internal workings of conservation and development
funding institutions (eg Crewe and Harrison 1998; Lewis and Mosse 2006). In doing so, it
illustrates how collaboration among the public and non-profit sectors have both reflected and
contributed to a move within global environmentalism from an anti-capitalist stance in the 1960s
and 1970s to its twenty-first century embrace of the market.¶ Since the 1970s, environmental
NGOs have successfully lobbied the US Congress to support US foreign assistance for
environmental issues. In particular, a group of environmental advocacy organizations catalyzed
and shaped USAID's initial environment program. However, two interrelated transitions in the
relations among USAID, the US Congress, an evolving group of environmental NGOs and the
private sector—which have entailed both reactions to and the embracing of neoliberal ideology and
reforms — underpin the agency's contemporary emphasis on biodiversity conservation. The first
comprised congressional and Democratic administration efforts to direct USAID funding to
NGOs—moves that both resulted from and reacted to state privatization in the 1980s and 1990s.
The second encompassed NGO-mobilized efforts to protest against neoliberal reforms and protect
the environment, the most recent of which, ironically, has invoked neoliberal rhetoric toward this
aim .¶ To summarize briefly, in the context of the burgeoning interest in biodiversity in the
1980s, the Democratic Congress directed USAID to fund biodiversity conservation.4 At the
same time, in an effort to counter Reagan's privatization of state functions and associated turn to
private contractors, the Congress mandated the agency to support NGOs. As a result, USAID
funded conservation NGOs to implement its emergent biodiversity portfolio. Concurrently, many
of the environmental advocacy groups that had launched USAID's environmental portfolio in the
1970s shifted their advocacy efforts to fighting for domestic environmental issues and to
protesting World Bank projects. This move eventually left the growing conservation NGOs—
now with a special interest in preserving USAID's biodiversity funding—to take up the endeavor
to promote environmental foreign aid. The Clinton Administration's embrace of the global
environmental agenda, combined with continued privatization of government services and the
privileging of NGOs, then reinforced opportunities for the conservation NGOs to benefit from
USAID funding. In reaction to internal USAID budget pressures that threatened biodiversity
funding in the late 1990s, these NGOs launched a campaign to protect the funding. They
consolidated this campaign during the second Bush Administration when concurrent disregard
for environmental issues and massive foreign aid reforms again endangered biodiversity funding.
In the twenty-first century, the NGOs have attracted powerful corporate and bipartisan political
support behind USAID's biodiversity program.¶ Based on the analysis presented in this article, I
make three broad claims that offer important insights into the nature of modern neoliberal
conservation. First, throughout these transitions, conservation NGOs have capitalized on idealized
visions of themselves as representatives of a civil society operating to counter the force of private
interests thought to be behind environmental degradation. This vision has sustained their access
to policy-makers and influence on public policy despite the multinational corporate partnerships
that characterize the BINGOs’ twenty-first century operations.¶ Second, the strict focus on
international biodiversity has been fundamental to the development of an alliance among the
BINGOs, USAID, corporate leaders and members of the US Congress behind US environmental
foreign aid. By defining “the environment” as foreign biodiversity, to be protected in parks away
from competing economic and political interests and in foreign countries, the BINGOs and allied
partners have enticed US politicians and corporate leaders to support environmental foreign aid.
They have created an avenue through which they can become “environmentally friendly” without
confronting the environmental degradation caused by excessive resource consumption in the USA
or the foreign and domestic investments of US corporations.¶ These successful political strategies,
aimed at mobilizing funding for foreign environmental issues, have contributed to the process by
which environmentalism has become enrolled in the promotion of capitalist expansion . In fact, I
contend that the international biodiversity conservation agenda has created new symbolic and
material spaces for global capital expansion. First, it supplies a critical stamp of environmental
stewardship for corporate and political leaders. Second, not only does it carve out new physical
territories for capitalist accumulation through both the physical demarcation and enclosure of
common lands as protected areas, but also through the growing capitalist enterprise that is forming
around the concept of biodiversity conservation.
Environmental protection has become the conduit of capitalist expansion abroad
through mechanisms of foreign aid.
Corson 2010 (Catherine; Assistant Professor of Environmental Studies, Mount Holyoke;
Shifting Environmental Governance in a Neoliberal World: US AID for Conservation Antipode
Volume 42, Issue 3, pages 576–602, June 2010)
Thus, by the turn of the century, conservation organizations were expanding, while USAID had
shrunk. In the context of reforms that downsized the government and privatized government
services, USAID became more of a grants management organization, turning over much of the
project management to contractors and grantees. The convergence of the downsizing with
reiterated congressional backing of biodiversity meant that the agency was reducing its staff just as
Congress was requiring it to spend increasing amounts on biodiversity.17 At the same time,
Clinton Administration and congressional policies promoted the funding of NGOs to carry out
the agency's environmental agenda. With a vested interest in USAID's biodiversity program, the
conservation NGOs stepped up their congressional advocacy when its funding became threatened
in the late 1990s. In the context of the second Bush administration anti-environmentalism, they
further consolidated their collaboration.¶ Redefining Environmentalism after 9/11¶ The election of
George W. Bush in 2000 marked the ascension to power of a neo-conservative administration,
which, in the wake of the destruction of the World Trade Center in September 2001, explicitly
blurred the lines between foreign aid and military policy. In a major overhaul of foreign aid, the
Bush administration created a new foreign aid agency, the Millennium Challenge Account
(MCA), designed to assist countries that met US-determined standards for governance and
economic reform, the latter of which were solidly neoliberal in orientation (Mawdsley 2007;
MCC 2007). Ironically, while a key goal of the MCA was to separate foreign aid from foreign
policy (Nowels 2005), the administration tied USAID assistance more closely to foreign policy
and military interests, specifically through the 2002 National Security Strategy, which
emphasized development as one of three strategic areas of national security, and the 2004 white
paper, which aspired to promote anti-terrorism and make foreign aid more effective (The White
House 2002; USAID 2004). The administration's vision of foreign aid as a tool of national
security was closely connected to its belief in using foreign aid to promote US business abroad
(The White House 2002). Initiatives such as the Global Development Alliance (GDA) aimed to
leverage private sector funding for development, citing as justification the fact that:¶ In the 1970s,
70 percent of resource flows from the United States to the developing world were from official
development assistance and 30 percent were private. Today, 80 percent of resource flows from
the United States to the developing world are private and 20 percent are public (USAID 2003:3).¶
Finally, in 2006, Secretary of State Condeleezza Rice and the new USAID Administrator, Randall
Tobias initiated a major foreign aid reform, which moved USAID's policy office to the State
Department and classified all USAID programs into one of five categories: peace and security;
governing justly and democratically; investing in people; economic growth; and humanitarian
assistance.¶ While funds for foreign aid rose “at one of the fastest rates in the history of US aid-
giving, expanding by roughly 40 percent between 2001 and 2005” (Lancaster 2007:91), the
environment was not a Bush priority. The MCA basically ignored environmental issues until
NGOs pushed Congress to mandate that it add an environmental indicator as one of the
economic and governance standards that recipient countries had to meet. The 2006 reform placed
environmental programs as a subcategory under economic growth, with specific prioritization on
biodiversity conservation, natural resources and reducing pollution (US Department of State
2007). The Bush administration's relegation of environment to the economic growth portfolio
meant that USAID environment officials had to articulate environmental programs in terms of
their contribution to economic growth. Moreover, through the GDA, USAID became a linchpin in
the growing NGO–corporate conservation partnerships, which included, for example the
Sustainable Forest Products Global Alliance, a US$23 million initiative among the Home Depot,
Metafore, the US Forest Service and WWF-US. In this context, articulating the economic benefits
of conservation and reaching out to the private sector were necessary political moves to secure
USAID funds.¶ As in the Reagan revolution, the demotion of environmental issues catalyzed a
revived congressional–NGO partnership, which aimed to protect the environmental gains of the
previous two decades, but which focused this time primarily on biodiversity conservation. The
Appropriations Committee—with Senator Patrick Leahy and his foreign operations
subcommittee appropriations aide, Tim Rieser, as the key champions—began including
biodiversity conservation mandates in the appropriations bill itself.18 For FY 2002, the
committee set aside US$275 million for:¶ programs and activities which directly protect tropical
forests, biodiversity and endangered species, promote the sustainable use of natural resources,
and promote a wide range of clean energy and energy conservation activities (US Congress
2002).¶ By the next year, the appropriators had included US$145 million just for biodiversity
conservation (US Congress 2003) and by FY 2008, US$195 million for biodiversity (US
Congress 2007)—a substantial increase over the US$4 million mandate the appropriators had
started with in the 1980s.¶ Thus, while the revived campaign was a reaction to Bush reforms,
linkages between conservation and neoliberalism solidified. Under concurrent administration
reforms and congressional biodiversity mandates, USAID's environmental program was protected
through three avenues: its contribution to economic growth, private sector partnerships through
mechanisms like the GDA, and congressionally mandated biodiversity funds. Embracing the
private sector and emphasizing the economic value of conservation became necessary political
survival strategies. Nonetheless, as the next section describes, new NGO activities on Capitol
Hill catapulted these associations to a new level.¶ Creating the New Conservation Enterprise¶ The
beginning of the twenty-first century also witnessed a mounting collaboration among the four
large conservation NGOs: WWF-US, TNC, CI and Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS). In
2003, building on the mobilization started at the end of the Clinton administration to protect
biodiversity funds, the four joined forces under an entity called the International Conservation
Partnership (ICP). The ICP aimed to build widespread congressional support for conservation
through activities such as congressional briefings and lunches, jointly endorsed letters, and
overseas congressional trips to priority biodiversity sites.19 One of the ICP's primary activities
was the annual publication of an International Conservation Budget (ICB), which recommended
appropriations levels for the major US government-funded international biodiversity
conservation programs, including USAID's. Its successful circulation to members of congress
speaks for itself in that the amount legislated in the appropriations bills each year generally
reflected those promoted in the ICB. For example, for FY 2008, it recommended US$195 million
for USAID, which was the amount that the Appropriations Committee included for USAID later
that year (US Congress 2007).¶ The ICP also inspired the 2003 creation of a bipartisan House
International Conservation Caucus (ICC),20 which, with an eclectic membership of 150 ranging
from the far left to the far right, had become one of the largest bipartisan caucuses in the House
by the end of 2007. Representatives Hal Rogers, a Republican from Kentucky; John Tanner, a
Democrat from Tennessee; Ed Royce, a Republican from California; and Tom Udall, a Democrat
from New Mexico co-chaired the caucus (DePhillis 2007; ICC 2008). In 2005, a parallel caucus
was created in the Senate, and as of 2009, it was chaired by Senators Sam Brownback, a
Republican from Kansas; Dick Durbin, a Democrat from Illi¶ nois; Olympia Snowe, a Republican
from Maine; and Sheldon Whitehouse, a Democrat from Rhode Island.¶ The caucuses’ strict
focus on foreign environmental issues has underpinned their ability to bring together a bipartisan
coalition that includes a broad spectrum of political perspectives.21 First, organizing around
international biodiversity has enabled the coalition to continue to draw on reliable US public
concern about, and therefore congressional interest in, saving charismatic megafauna in other
countries. It has also allowed many congressional members to embrace environmentalism
without confronting domestic constituents. As one former USAID official said:¶ It is easier to do
biodiversity overseas than in this country because the conflicts don't involve constituencies of
Congress. When there are problems with local communities [overseas], they don't call up their
congressman.¶ As such, the caucuses have attracted individuals who might consider themselves
anti-environmentalist on domestic issues by providing a way, as one congressional aide told me, “to
be proactive when it comes to the environment without being labeled a traditional
environmentalist”. What has brought these diverse individuals together is, as an NGO
congressional liaison summarized, “They [the members] all like wildlife, and they have all at one
time or another visited international park sites abroad.” Here, NGO-organized trips for
congressional members and staff to biodiversity sites overseas have been important mechanisms to
mobilize congressional interest in funding international biodiversity conservation.22 Most
congressional staff I interviewed had been on overseas jaunts with one or more of the four ICP
partners.¶ In July 2006, the ICP formed the International Conservation Caucus Foundation
(ICCF), a separate 501C(3) organization, with the mission to support the ICC, and specifically to
provide “an educational forum on Capitol Hill, where we keep Members of Congress and their
staff constantly updated with information we synthesize from our base of NGO supporters on the
most pressing and timely issues in international conservation” (ICCF 2007b). To this end, the
ICCF has provided congressional briefings on topics such as WalMart's commitment to
sustainability, the USAID-funded Living in a Finite Environment program in Nambia, and the
ecosystem payments program in Costa Rica.¶ Initially funded by the BINGOs, the ICCF has since
attracted a number of corporate advisors and sponsors. The members of its advisory
“conservation council” have included corporate giants such as Exxon Mobil, International Paper,
and Unilever. In putting together this sponsorship, the ICCF has drawn on the corporate linkages
of some of its founding NGOs. Bailey (2006) reports that TNC's corporate associates and major
contributors at various times have included 3M, Shell Oil, General Motors, Ford Motor
Company, BP Exploration, MCI Telecommunications Company, MBNA America Bank, Enron
Corporation, Georgia-Pacific, Johnson and Johnson, Weyerhaeuser Company, Waste
Management Inc. Monsanto Company and Dow Chemical. Similarly, Chapin (2004:24) writes
that “some 1,900 corporate sponsors” donated a total of US$225 million to TNC in 2002, and
that “CI's website lists over 250 corporations, which donated approximately US$9 million to its
operations in 2003”. In 2008, these corporations included, among others, Anglo-American,
Chevron and Rio Tinto (CI 2008). Likewise, TNC has chapters at the state and country level,
many of which have powerful political and corporate ties.¶ The ICCF's Partners in Conservation
brochure showcases a number of public–private partnerships undertaken by the organization's
sponsors (ICCF 2007a). For example, it cites the Goldman Sachs and WCS partnership to protect
680,000 acres on the island of Tierra del Fuego, Chile and the American Forest & Paper
Association, Indonesia Ministry of Forestry, and CI partnership, entitled the Alliance to Combat
Illegal Logging, which uses remote sensing to monitor illegal logging. Other partnerships include
the WalMart and the National Fish and Wildlife Foundation Acres for America program, which
conserves 1 acre of critical wildlife habitat for every acre of land developed for an existing
WalMart facility or new one created in the United States, and ExxonMobil's support for the Save
The Tiger Fund, which, it boasts, “represents the largest single corporate commitment to saving a
species” (ICCF 2007a:20).¶ Perhaps most striking is the promotional material put out by the
ICCF, including the widely circulated invitations to the ICCF's annual galas. These galas provide
vehicles for colossal shifts of funds among US-based state, private and non-profit sectors in the
name of foreign conservation, and as such, contribute to a growing biodiversity conservation
enterprise. As colorful collages of corporate and conservation NGO logos, their invitations
provide striking symbols of the merging of conservation and capitalism. It is hard to identify
where conservation ends and capitalism begins. Attendance at such fundraising events costs, for
example in 2006, between US$1000 and 50,000. These galas have honored various celebrities,
including former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair, actor Harrison Ford and Chad Holliday,
Chairman and CEO of DuPont, for their contributions to international conservation. The 2006
and 2007 invitations boasted meals prepared by “Texas Cowboy Chef Tom Perini”, who was
“the Caterer to the President of the United States”.¶ Importantly, despite the organization's efforts
to increase government expenditures on biodiversity conservation, the ICCF invokes antigovernmental rhetoric to attract conservative and corporate members. For example, ICCF
president David Barron underscored the bipartisan nature of the foundation and its neoliberal
tenets at the ICCF's September 2006 inaugural gala. In a published letter to the gala attendees, he
stated (emphasis in original):¶ We are not advocating more government. Quite the contrary, we
are advocating private sector solutions … We are pro-development and pro-business. We are
pro-people, pro-wildlife and pro-wilderness.¶ The ICCF's outreach to conservative and corporate
leaders reflects, like the sustainable development agenda and the framing of environmental issues
in economic terms, a successful strategy designed to raise funds and awareness for environmental
conservation. Similar to sustainable development, international biodiversity conservation has
become a nucleus around which public and private organizations can find common interests. By
defining “the environment” as a foreign concern, the ICCF's high-profile effort has provided an
avenue for organizations and individuals who have been heretofore considered “antienvironmentalists” to appear environmental. By providing this stamp of environmental approval,
however, the biodiversity conservation movement has enabled global capital expansion.¶
Reconfiguring Environmental Governance around Biodiversity Conservation¶ In this article, I
have illustrated how dynamic power relations among environmental NGOs, USAID, the US
Congress and private corporations since the 1970s have both reflected and contributed to the
contemporary rise of neoliberal conservation. I argue that the ascent and hegemony of neoliberal
economic orthodoxy in the 1980s and 1990s established the conditions for two critical changes in
relations among these entities, in which the neoliberal state ceded the field of environmental
governance to NGOs, and NGOs in turn took up the cause. The resulting reconfiguration of
interests and power both led to the rise of biodiversity conservation within the USAID
environmental portfolio and has been reinforced by it.¶ These transformations have entailed
intertwined responses to and the embracing of neoliberal ideology and reforms. While NGOs
benefited from state privatization, the state's turn to NGOs also aimed to counter the privileged
position of the private sector in the privatization process. Similarly, while the environmental
advocacy organizations’ protest against the World Bank and Reagan administration policies
reflected a movement against neoliberal expansion, the more recent conservation NGO-driven
endeavor to protect biodiversity funding has invoked neoliberal rhetoric to attract bipartisan and
corporate support. In contrast to their 1970s predecessors, NGOs today have built their
arguments and legitimacy upon a neoliberal conception of governance.¶ The BINGOs have
attracted corporate and bipartisan support not just through neoliberal rhetoric, but also by
focusing strictly on international conservation. This emphasis has enabled politicians and
corporate leaders alike to become environmentalists without engaging in controversial
environmental issues or confronting anti-environmental constituents, and it holds together the
alliance among the NGOs, USAID, corporate leaders and members of the US Congress behind
environmental foreign aid.¶ As such, this agenda has both contributed to and been reproduced
through new forms of environmental governance, in which non-elected agents—both not-forprofit and private sector—have been able to shape public policy. Here, idealized visions of NGOs
as representing civil society has sustained their influence on policy formulation and
implementation. Despite the transformed composition of the environmental foreign aid lobby from
a loose alliance of environmental advocacy organizations into the contemporary coalition of large
conservation NGOs with bipartisan congressional ties and corporate support, the perception of
environmental NGOs as a countering force to anti-environmental corporations continues. While
advocating against state interference, the alliance has been able to direct public funding. In this
process, as the state has turned to private organizations to implement its work, it has in turn
become dependent on these entities not just to design and implement programs, but also to
mobilize political support for their existence.¶ Finally, the intertwining of conservation and
neoliberalism in Washington DC politics, through public/private/non-profit “partnerships”, has
facilitated capital accumulation in the United States, as well as created new spaces for capitalist
expansion overseas. The biodiversity conservation movement, with its expanding corporate
partnerships, has enabled capitalist expansion by not only supporting the enclosure of common
lands and exclusion of former resource users, but also by labeling otherwise exploitative
corporations as environmental stewards and by building a capitalist enterprise centered on
biodiversity conservation. In this enterprise, funds are shifted among government, private and
non-profit sectors; conservation organizations have grown into corporate-like entities; and annual
galas provide venues for exorbitant expenditures of wealth in the name of conservation.¶ In this
manner, neoliberal conservation has reinforced the separation of environmental concerns from
their broader political economic drivers. It has allowed for the conceptualization of environmental
goals without changes in existing political institutions, or distributions of economic power or
resources flows (Adams 1995; McAfee 1999; Redclift 1987), and in fact, it has reinforced these
institutions and resource flows. While there remains a hopeful nod to environmentalism as a
potential political movement in opposition to neoliberalism (McAfee 1999; McCarthy and
Prudham 2004), it is clear that, in the twenty-first century, an environmental movement, once
organized in opposition to economic growth, has instead become its conduit.
Be skeptical of their claims to radical environmentalism—mechanisms of foreign aid
are justified and routinized in neoliberal practices.
Corson 2010 (Catherine; Assistant Professor of Environmental Studies, Mount Holyoke;
Shifting Environmental Governance in a Neoliberal World: US AID for Conservation Antipode
Volume 42, Issue 3, pages 576–602, June 2010)
New Forms of Environmental Governance
With its ideological and material antipathy toward state regulation and influence, neoliberalism has
become manifest not only in deregulation, but also in re-regulation designed to create new
commodities and new governing structures that sustain neoliberalism. As states have faced cuts to
fiscal and administrative resources and functions under neoliberal reforms, there has been an
associated move toward public–private partnerships, which bring increasing influence by the
private and non-profit sectors on what was once state policy. This transition has diffused
environmental governance among states, individuals, NGOs, private companies, transnational
institutions and local communities. In particular, as the boundaries among the state, private sector
and non-profit worlds have become more porous under neoliberalism, certain NGOs have stepped
into the vacuum of state social provision (Büscher and Dressler 2007; Castree 2008; Ferguson and
Gupta 2002; Igoe and Brockington 2007; Jepson 2005; McCarthy and Prudham 2004; Peck and
Tickell 2002). They have become, as Harvey (2005:177) writes, “the Trojan horses of global
neoliberalism”.¶ Despite the recognition of these shifts, relatively little empirical work exists on
how this dispersed governance in the international development agenda has created new avenues
for the intertwining of capitalism and conservation. Through analysis of the everyday politics
among NGOs, branches of the state, and the private sector, this article uses the lens of USAID to
concurrently address this gap and respond to calls for ethnographic information about
conservation and development donors. In doing so, it links literature on the neoliberalization of
nature with critiques of conservation policy and practice, and it situates itself in three related
debates on neoliberalism, conservation and development.¶ The first of these examines the
neoliberalism of nature—seen in measures such as privatization and regulatory rollback,
commodification of nature, and new enclosures (for overviews see Castree 2008; Heynen et al
2007). For example, it analyzes the manifestation of neoliberal ideology in environmentalism,
evident in tradable emission permits, transferable fishing quotas, user fees for public goods and
utility privatization, as well as through corporations’ use of environmental discourses (eg
McAfee 1999; McCarthy and Prudham 2004). In biodiversity conservation specifically, hegemonic
practice now values nature based on its potential market price. The enclosure, commoditization,
and privatization of nature has resulted in an emphasis not just on ecotourism, but also on
mechanisms like direct payments and public–private partnerships to promote conservation, and
management of parks by private entities (Hutton, Adams and Murombedzi 2005; Igoe and
Brockington 2007; West and Brockington 2006). Adding a critical new dimension to this
literature, I explore how public and private entities, in their endeavor to mobilize funding for
environmental foreign aid, have embraced neoliberal ideology, and in turn, contributed to its
further expansion.¶ The second body of literature explores the entwined growth of the BINGOs
and their expanding corporate linkages. As conduits of conservation's commoditization, networks
of states, foreign aid donors, philanthropists, corporations and conservation organizations have
attracted escalating financial support for international conservation since the 1980s. In particular,
the BINGOs have turned to corporations and private sponsors to finance conservation (Bailey
2006; Büscher and Whande 2007; Chapin 2004; Dowie 2005). In the process, they have created
what I term a “conservation enterprise”, in which funds are shifted among public, private and nonprofit entities in the name of conservation, without ever being used “on-the-ground”. The analysis
presented below reveals how transformations in US foreign aid politics and policies have
contributed to the emergence of this conservation enterprise.¶ Accompanying the rise of big
conservation is a move within conservation away from engaging local actors. As protected area
networks spread across the globe, a third group of researchers continue to document new
enclosures of common lands under the guise of biodiversity conservation and the associated
displacement of local and indigenous peoples (Brockington, Duffy and Igoe 2008; Brockington,
Igoe and Schmidt-Soltau 2006; Chapin 2004). A subset of the aforementioned body of literature
looks at the relationship between neoliberal discourse, community conservation, and the
privatization and commercialization of conservation (Dressler and Buscher 2008; King 2009;
McCarthy 2005). As Igoe and Brockington (2007:446) aptly summarize:¶ neoliberalism's emphasis
on competition, along with its rolling back of state protection and the social contract, creates spaces
in which local people are not often able to compete effectively in the face of much more powerful
transnational interests.¶ At its extreme, the turn away from community conservation is evidenced
by the call for a return to exclusionary parks, or what critiques call “fortress conservation”, in
which local people are excluded, by force if necessary, from utilizing resources within park
boundaries (for an analysis, see Adams and Hutton 2007; Brechin et al 2002; Wilshusen et al
2002). Nevertheless, critiques have also contended that ecoregional and transboundary
approaches, which aim to extend conservation beyond parks to landscape scales, have
simultaneously furthered the influence of state agencies, international and national NGOs and
private companies in conservation and reduced investment in local communities (Brosius and
Russell 2003; Gezon 2000; Wolmer 2003). Ultimately, this scholarship illuminates how the
foreign aid donor politics about which I write manifest on-the-ground and in people's daily lives.
However, while these authors show the enclosures happening as a result of biodiversity
conservation, they have elided how such endeavors are embedded in and productive of powerladen relationships among financing organizations—a gap that I aim to fill.¶ Finally, as King
(2009) points out, there have been relatively few detailed empirical studies that uncover the
internal debates and politics of the organizations behind international conservation. I would add
to his critique that few studies explore the inter-organizational relationships that comprise the
international biodiversity conservation agenda. In attending to this omission, I join a nascent
group of researchers who use ethnographic analysis to investigate the micro-politics of foreign
aid donors (eg Bebbington and Kothari 2006; Crewe and Harrison 1998; Goldman 2005; Lewis
et al 2003; Lewis and Mosse 2006; Mosse 2005).¶ The findings presented here draw on a decade
of experience working in Washington, DC politics, particularly with USAID and the US Congress,
as well as on specific research, carried out between 2005 and 2008. In this regard, long-term
participant observation informed my appreciation of the political dynamics and bureaucratic
cultures analyzed here and fundamentally shaped the original research design, research process
and final analysis. The focused research then entailed the analysis of 30 years of USAID policy
and program documents related to environment and natural resources issues, as well as USAID
congressional presentations, congressional appropriations and authorization bills, hearing
records, and NGO lobbying material, for example.5 It was then supplemented with 70 keyinformant interviews with current and former staff from USAID, the US Congress, NGOs, other
lobby organizations, consultant groups, research institutions and universities. Interviewees were
chosen through a combination of snowball and targeted sampling, in which individuals were
chosen for their ability to provide critical information and/or to represent a range of perspectives
and organizations. In particular, I selected individuals who were personally pivotal in shaping the
environment program—such as those who directed lobbying efforts, wrote particular pieces of
legislation, or oversaw USAID's environment program—as well as individuals who could offer
extensive historical perspectives. Many of the interviewees were current or former senior officials
in these organizations, and as is typical in Washington, many of the interviewees had worked in
more than one relevant position and/or organization. Interview data were analyzed and
triangulated using content analysis software. However, in order to protect confidentiality, all
information is reported anonymously in that sources are identified only by general position and
interview dates are not disclosed.
Link – Bureaucracy (Survivors)
The aff’s faith in labor dispute mechanisms is emblematic of the desire for
bureaucratic management of all aspects of life- this destroys any movement towards
socialist self-governance.
HARNECKER 10,
(Marta, Chilean psychologist and former student of Louis Althusser, trans. Janet
Duckworth, "Twenty-First Century Socialism," MONTHLY REVEIW 62:3, JulyAugust)
One of the deviations that did the most damage in the historical experience of Soviet socialism
was bureaucratism. Bureaucratism destroys the people’s energy and creativity, and, as the people
are the real builders of the new society, it prevents the goal of twenty-first century socialism from
being reached. The goal is that women and men develop themselves completely through
revolutionary practice itself. Earlier, in discussing decentralization, we said that one cannot
attribute the existence of bureaucracy in the Soviet state simply to the legacy of the tsarist past; it is
more correct to say that it begins in the excessive centralization that existed in that state.
However, if excessive centralization inevitably leads to bureaucratism, this phenomenon can also
arise in state institutions, parties, and other kinds of public and private institutions. Moreover, if it
were only a matter of the red tape and being shunted around, all that would have to be done
would be to improve management methods, but that would not work. Where lies the root of this
disaster? It is related to a basic issue: how management in an institution is conceived of and
implemented. Do the top civil servants or cadres make the decisions—because they think they
are the only ones who have the expertise to do so—or is trust placed in the membership and the
organized people, in their energy and creativity? It was often said in the Soviet Union, devastated
by an imperialist war and a civil war, that progress could only come about if the workers and
peasants en masse were committed to work for the country’s reconstruction. But when workers
and peasants took these remarks seriously and tried to apply them by taking the initiative
(organizing, for example, a people’s cafeteria or a daycare center), their efforts were rejected by
the central authorities. This was done on various pretexts, but the bottom line was that the
authorities could not stand the fact that people had done things outside their control.
Bureaucratism is the direct negation of people’s autonomous activity. Any independent initiative,
any new thought is considered heresy, a violation of party discipline. The center must decide and
supervise each and every thing that is done. Nothing can be done if the order didn’t come from the
center.
Link – Critical Affs
The 1AC is the logic of neoliberalism- bemoaning the failure of state mechanisms
like the protection of rights abandons the terrain of activism to neoliberal forces.
The privatization of calls to action as reducible to performance in a debate round
ensures the end of radical political social change.
Dean 09
(Jodi Dean is a professor of political science at Columbia University, Democracy and other
Neoliberal Fantasies: Communicative Capitalism and Left politics, Duke University Press, page
10)
When one’s opponent takes over one’s position, one is confronted with its realization, with its
repercussions. This is what many of us don’t like; this is what we want to avoid. So we say “No!
That’s not it,” but because our enemy has taken over our language, our ideals, we’ve lost a
capacity to say what we want, even to know what we want. we can’t even dream some­ thing
else. Zizek writes: “In a radical revolution, people not only have to ‘realize their old
(emancipatoryg etc.) dreams’; rather, they have to rein­ vent their very modes of dreaming.”18¶
Such a reinvention is an enormous, perhaps impossible task. It’s not furthered, though, by the
diagnosis of “depoliticization,” a diagnosis of­ fered by political theorists the increased currency
of which calls out for critique. If depoliticization means anything, it is the retreat into coward- ice,
the retroactive determination of victory as defeat because of the left’s fundamental inability to
accept responsibility for power and to undertake the difficult task of reinventing our modes of
dreaming . Depoliticization is a fantasy; an excuse whereby the left says ‘We know collective action
is possible theoretically but we don’t believe we exist.” The _term marks the gap between the
commitment to common approaches to systemic problems constitutive of left thought for over two
centuries and the isolating individualism of consumption and entertainment-driven
communicative¶ capitalism. The very diagnosis of depoliticization functions fetishistically to
prevent the left from confronting the truth of its victory.¶ This view of depoliticization as an excuse
or fetish covering over a failure of responsibility however, is not widely shared. On the contrary
depoliticization and the correlative notions of post-politics, de- democratization, and post
democracy are offered as terms for designating what is specifically new in the current politicaleconomic condition. Over the past decades, a number of political theorists have attempted to
analyze the contemporary conjuncture as post-political or postdemocratic.Ӧ Reversing the terms
of the “end of ideology” thesis offered by neoconservative (Francis Fulcuyama) and “third way”
(Anthony Giddens) thinkers, these theorists critically redescribe the orientation toward consensus,
ad- ministration, and technocracy lauded as benefits of the post- Cold War age. Several aspects of
this redescription stand out, namely, the primacy of the economy, the individual, and the police .¶
The current conjecture is post-political, the argument goes, because the spread and intensification
of neoliberal economic policies have sub- jected states to the demands of corporations and the
seemingly inevitable logic of the market. To the extent that state authority is increasingly less able
to constrain corporate power, politics matters less . This inability of democratic politics to produce
viable solutions to_ social and economic problems, moreover, r esonates with the celebration of the
individual in communicative capitalism. The individualization of politics into com- modifiable
“lifestyles” and opinions subsumes politics into consumption. That consumer choices may have, a
politics-fair trade, green, vegan, woman-owned-morphs into the sense that politics is nothing but
consumer choices, that is, individuated responses to individuated needs. Zygmunt Bauman makes
the point well:¶ being an individual de jure means having no one to blame for one’s own misery
seeking causes of one’s own defeats nowhere except in one’s own indolence and sloth, and looking
for no other remedies other than trying harder and harder still. With eyes focused on one’s own
performance and thus diverted from the social space where the contra- dictions of individual
existence are collectively produced, men and women are naturally tempted to reduce the
complexity of their predicament. Not that they find "biographic solutions” onerous and cumber­
some: there are, simply no “biographic solutions to systemic contradictions,” and so the dearth of
solutions at their disposal needs to be compensated for by imaginary ones .... There is therefore a
demand for individual pegs on which frightened individuals can collectively hang their individual
fears, if only for a brief moment.Ӧ with politics seemingly reduced to consumer choice, government
similarly contracts, now concerning itself with traumatized victims. Its role is less to ensure public
goods and solve collective problems than to address the personal issues of subjects. Accordingly,
pollsters assess individual preference and satisfaction, as if the polled were the same as the
politicized¶ people. Finally insofar as the economy alone cannot fulfill all the functions of
government, one element of the state rises to the fore-security.¶ Thus, accompanying diminished
political influence on economic and social policy is the intensification and extension of the state
as an agency of surveillance and control.¶ The neoliberal capitalist economy; the fragile,
consuming individual, and the surveilling, controlling state are aspects of the diagnosis of depoliticization well worth emphasizing. Yet post-politics, depoliticization, and de-democratization
are inadequate to the task of theorizing this con- juncture. The claim that states are decreasing in
significance and impact because of the compulsions of the market ignores the millions of dollars
regularly spent in political campaigns. Business and market interests as well as corporate and
financial elites expend vast amounts of time and money on elections, candidates, lobbyists, and
lawmakers in order to produce and direct a political climate that suits their interests. Capitalizing
on left critiques of regulation and retreats from the state , neoliberals move right in, deploying state
power to further their interests. Similarly social conservatives in the United States persistently
fight across a broad spectrum of political fronts-including local school boards, statewide ballot
initiatives, judicial appointments, and mobilizations to amend the Constitution. The left-wing
lament regarding post-politics not only overlooks the reality of politics on the ground but it cedes in
advance key terrains of¶ activism and struggle. Not recognizing these politicized sites as
politicized sites, it fails to counter conservative initiatives with a coherent alternative.
The 1AC’s defeatist attitude towards building concrete alternatives participates in
the passive nihilism of modern consumerism. Their “bearing witness” is nothing
more than a facebook post that absolves them of responsibility for building concrete
alternatives.
Dean 09
(Jodi Dean is a professor of political science at Columbia University, Democracy and other
Neoliberal Fantasies: Communicative Capitalism and Left politics, Duke University Press, page
15)
The political, economic, and social changes associated with the decline of disciplinary society
obsolescence of Fordist production, and defeat of the Keynesian welfare state have been
accompanied by increased emphases on the singular, individual, and personal.“ Commodities are
no longer marketed to broad types-housewives, teenagers-but are individualized such that
consumers can specify the features they desire in a product: I 'll take a grande half-calf skinny
latte with extra foam: I'II design and order my own sports shoes; I’Il save television shows, edit
out the commercials, and watch them when it's convenient for me. Media, ever smaller and more
integrated, are not just many-to-many as early Internet enthusiasts emphasized, but me-to someto me. The rise of the consumer as producer hyped as Web. 2.0 and signaled by Facebook,
MySpace, and YouTube designates a shift in media such that increasing numbers of people present
their own artistic work (videos, photographing music, writing), express their own views, and star
in their own shows. They want-to make themselves known and visible -not just read or hear or
see others (one example: 93 percent of U.S. teenagers use the Internet; 39 percent of them post
their own art, stories, and video online).5 At the same time, the experience of consuming media
has become progressively more isolated-from large movie theaters, to the family home, to the
singular person strolling down the street wearing tiny headphones as she listens to the soundtrack
of her life or talks in a seeming¶ dementia into a barely visible mouthpiece. This isolation in turn
repeats the growing isolation of many American workers as companies streamline or “flexibilize”
their workforce, cutting or outsourcing jobs to freelance and temporary employees. lnsofar as too
many on the academic and¶ typing left have celebrated isolation as freedom and consumption as
creativity we have failed to counter the neoliberalization of the economy¶ Even worse-we have
failed to provide good reasons to support collective approaches to political, social, and economic
problems. It’s easier to let the market decide. Rather than accepting responsibility for this failure
and for our own enjoyment of the benefits and pleasures of networked, consumer-driven
entertainment and communications media, though, we continue to blame the other guys-
conservatives and neoconservatives, Republicans, main- stream Democrats, neoliberals, religious
fundamentalists. After all, casting blame is infinitely easier than envisioning alternatives to global
capitalism, combating climate change, or securing peace in the Middle East. As long as leftists see
ourselves as defeated victims, we can refrain from having to admit that we are short on ideas-or
that the ones we have seem unpopular, outmoded. Thus, we need a strong, united enemy. If the
right is weaker than we are prepared to admit, then our retreat, our cowardice, is all the more
shameful: We gave in, gave up, before we needed to. We actually didn't lose. It’s worse than that
we quit.¶
Link - Competitiveness
The idealization of competitiveness is the end logic of absolute labor exploitation –to
be competitive, we come to desire our own domination.
RAMONET 11
(Ignacio, Spanish editor of LeMonde, "Neoliberalism's Newest Product: The
Modern Slave Trace," Global Research, Aug 3,
http://www.globalresearch.ca/neoliberalism-s-newest-product-the-modern-slavetrade/25888)
Responsibility for this expansion of human trafficking lies largely with the current dominant
economic model. In effect, the form of neoliberal globalisation than has been imposed over the last
three decades through economic shock therapy has devastated the most fragile levels of society and
imposed extremely high social costs. It has created a fierce competition between labour and capital.
In the name of free trade, the major multinationals manufacture and sell their goods around the
world, producing where labour is cheapest and selling where the cost of living is highest. The new
capitalism has made competitiveness its primary engine and brought about a commodification of
labour and labourers . Globalisation, which offers remarkable opportunities to a lucky few, imposes on the rest, in Europe, a
ruthless and unmediated competition between EU salary workers, small businesses, and small farmers and their badly-paid,
exploited counterparts on the other side of the world. The result we now see clearly before us: social dumping on a planetary
scale . For employment the result is disastrous. For example, in France in the last twenty years this phenomenon has caused the elimination of
more than two million jobs in the industrial sector alone. Certain sectors in Europe where there is a chronic shortage of labour tend to use
undocumented workers, which in turn fuels the trafficking of more workers by clandestine networks that in many cases force them into slave
labour. Numerous reports clearly evidence the “sale” migrant farm workers. Despite
the many tools of international law
despite the proliferation of public statements by government officials
the public will to put an end to the practice is weak . In reality, the management of
available to combat these crimes, and
condemning them,
industry and construction and major agricultural exporters exert constant pressure on
governments to turn a blind eye to the trafficking of undocumented workers. Industry management has always supported mass
immigration because it depresses the price of labour. Reports by the European Commission and BUSINESSEUROPE (an association of
European industries and businesses) have called for more immigration for decades. But today’s
human traffickers are not the
only ones exploiting slave labour: now a form of “legal servitude” is being developed. For example,
last February in Italy Fiat served its workers with the following extortionate ultimatum: either
agree to work more, for less money, in worse conditions, or the company will shift operations to
Eastern Europe. Faced with the prospect of being fired and terrorised by the conditions in Eastern Europe, with its rock
bottom wages and no weekends off, 63 percent of the Fiat workers voted for their own exploitation. In Europe many
employers, taking advantage of the crisis and brutal fiscal adjustment policies being imposed, are trying to establish similar forms of “legal
servitude”. Thanks
to the tools made available by neoliberal globalisation, they threaten their workers
with savage competition from cheap labour in distant countries. If we are to avoid this form of
corrosive social regression, we will have to begin to question the current workings of globalisation –
and begin the process of deglobalisation.
Being competitive is the result of cheap labor and a volatile neoliberal system of
economics
Robinson 08-American professor of sociology at the University of California, Santa Barbara, 2008, “Latin
America and Global Capitalism”, pgs107-108
Nontraditional exports and services are the face of global capitalism in the region. They utilize the
region's comparative advantage in cheap labor as a basis for a "competitive" reinsertion into global
markets. The social and production relations of global capitalism—including the new capital-labor
relation based on informality, flexible and casualized labor, as discussed in Chapter i, and the
gendered nature of these relations—are evident in these new activities—in the maquiladoras,
agro-export platforms, new offices, commercial establishments, and tourist facilities that have
spread throughout Latin America. Yet these social and production relations also spread to older
economic sectors and to areas of social life not directly connected to the global economy, so that
the social relations and the culture of global capitalism are diffused throughout society . Existing
social relations are disarticulated and replaced by new sets of relations shaped by the
commercial, productive, and cultural processes of global society. It appears that Latin America
began a new cycle of capitalist development in the 1990s, following the lost decade of the 1980s,
as a new model of globalized accumulation took hold. I will argue, however, that this new cycle
exhibits deep structural and social contradictions and is politically unstable. A key underlying
theme of this book is that the problematic nature of the global system. First, in particular, the
model is highly dependent on attracting mobile and often volatile transnational finance and
investment capital, with a large component of financial speculation characteristic of the global
casino. Second, the new export boom, based on a set of nontraditional activities that constitute
regional participation in global production and distribution chains, is fragile as a consequence of
global market competition, overproduction, and the impermanent nature of production sequences
in the global economy. Third, the development model based on neoliberal integration into the
global economy does not require domestic market expansion or an inclusionary social base and is
therefore unable to couple the new accumulation potential with social reproduction. Fourth, the
social contradictions generated by the model have led to heightened social conflict, popular class
mobilization, the political instability of fragile polyarchic regimes, a new resistance politics , and the
breakdown of neoliberal hegemony. The key argument is that the model was thrown into an
economic crisis between 1999 and 2002, and then this crisis unleashed counter-hegemonic social
and political forces that discredited neoliberalism and brought about a new period of popular
struggle and change. This sweeping scenario is unpacked in this and the following three chapters.
Let us start by looking more closely at what has been in fact an export boom in Latin America
from the 1980s and on, comparable to the export booms of earlier epochs, such as the late 1800s
and then again after World War II.
Link - Cuba
Cuba serves as an important symbol that neoliberalism isn’t the only option
Gonzalez ‘04
(Carmen, Teaches environmental law fundamental, international environmental law, and
international trade law at the University of Seattle, Trade Liberalization, Food Security, and the
Environment: The Neoliberal Threat to Sustainable Rural Development,
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1022&context=carmen_gonzalez)
Cuba is symbolically important because it demonstrates that there is an alternative to the dominant
export-oriented industrial agricultural model and that this alternative can boost agricultural
productivity, enhance food security, and protect the environment. However, the transformation of
Cuban agriculture was a response to the crisis of the Special Period and was made possible by
Cuba’s relative economic isolation. Once the U.S. embargo is lifted and Cuba is reintegrated into
the global trading system, Cuba, like every other developing country, will face intense pressure to
restructure its economy along neoliberal lines. The results could be devastating. It is therefore
important to recognize the neoliberal threat, to consider whether neoliberalism can ever be made
compatible with food security and ecological sustainability, and to explore alternative strategies for
sustainable rural development.
Integration of neoliberalism into Cuban policy resulted in the worst inequality and
corruption since the start of the Castro regime
Robinson 08-American professor of sociology at the University of California, Santa Barbara, 2008, “Latin
America and Global Capitalism”, pgs349-350
The objective limitations of projects of popular transformations at the level of the nationstate are apparent in Cuba. Despite the inevitable (and some not so inevitable) problems the
Cuban revolution has faced in its half century of existence Cuban society is perhaps the
most egalitarian in the hemisphere and certainly one of the most developed in terms of
quality of life indicators. Cuba's efforts to transition from a capitalist to a revolutionary
socialist society ran up squarely against the limits—nay, the corrosive influence—of global
capitalism in the 1990’s and on. With no choice but to integrate into world capitalist markets
the Cuban government attempted to create a sort of dual economy: one capitalist, linked to
the global economy and driven by the law of value; the other socialist, internal, driven by a
social logic. Thus it promoted the tourist industry, created a parallel dollar economy where those
with access to foreign exchange could purchase scarce goods and services, relaxed controls on
private money-making undertakings, and allowed, even encouraged, an expanding informal
economy driven by local exchange values. In theory these measures were innocuous, in the
interests of popular majorities, perhaps necessary or even inevitable. The problem is that
such reforms were not enacted in the abstract but in the real world of global capitalism
and its penetration via these reforms into the structures of Cuban society and the fabric of
social and cultural life. Cuba's integration into global capitalism meant growing social
inequalities. Those who had access to the capitalist sector, whether in tourist jobs or other
forms of association with foreign capital, dollar remittances from family members abroad,
the ability to set up a small business, and so forth, inevitably acquired more resources and
social privilege over those restricted to the socialist sector. There is gravitation toward the
capitalist sector, which could only be suppressed by authoritarian means. It was not
possible to insulate the socialist from the capitalist sector. Moreover, those who acquire
such privileges form a potential social base for a political opposition to the revolution.
Expanding social inequalities combined with the increased availability of scarce goods,
luxury items, and conspicuous consumption fuel relative deprivation and social tensions.
There were other pernicious influences, such as a renewed racialization process (see
Chapter 3), the reappearance of prostitution, largely servicing tourists and other foreign
visitors, and corruption. The distorting influence of the law of value or capitalist logic over
a system organized along a nonmarket social logic generated such absurd paradoxes as
doctors working as hotel waiters, university professors driving taxis, and engineers
running family kitchens. The Cuban experience underscores the catch-22 that all efforts
to challenge global capitalism must address: in an age when "de-linking" or withdrawal
from the system is not a viable option, how is transformation from within managed in such
a way as to not reproduce the very social and political forces that reproduce global
capitalism? How to supersede a system from which one cannot yet de-link, does not control,
and cannot confront in its entirety? How to build a democratic socialism in the midst of a global
capitalist milieu from which there is no flight? If the (capitalist) state as a class relation is
becoming transnationalized then any challenge to (global) capitalist state power must
involve a major transnational component. Struggles at the nation-state level are far from
futile. They remain central to the prospects for social justice and progressive social change.
The key point is that any such struggles must be part of a more expansive transnational
counter-hegemonic project, including transnational trade unionism, transnational social
movements, transnational political organizations, and so on—able to link the local to the
national, the regional, and the global. And they must strive to establish sets of
transnational institutions and practices that can place controls on global market and rein
in some of power of global capital. This is why permanent mobilization from below that
pressures the state to deepen its transformative project "at home" and its counterhegemonic transnational project "abroad" is so crucial.
Link – Cuba - Embargo
Neoliberals will use economic engagement as a tool to push capitalism on to Cuba
Wenston & Woods ‘08
(Fred & Alan, Alan Woods is a Trotskyist political theorist and author. He is one of the leading
members of the International Marxist Tendency, as well as its British affiliate group Socialist
Appeal, Vultures hovering over Cuba after Fidel Castro steps down
http://www.cjournal.info/2008/02/20/vultures-hovering-over-cuba-after-fidel-castro-stepsdown/)
They all pretend to be democrats when it comes to Cuba. In reality they are like vultures waiting
for the day they can get their beaks and claws into the flesh of Cuba. What they are after is the end
of the economic system brought into being by the Cuban revolution. They want capitalism to return
to Cuba. That is what they mean by “democracy”! Another fashionable term these days is
“engagement”. While Bush sticks to his guns and insists on the embargo being stepped up, the
more intelligent bourgeois, both in the USA and Europe are raising the need for “engagement”, i.e.
on removing the embargo and opening up trade channels. Does this wing of the bourgeois have
different interests or aims? No, they simply understand better than Bush and his obtuse circle of
friends that the best way to re-introduce capitalism into Cuba is to lift the embargo, begin trading,
flood Cuba with cash and let the process unfold.¶ That is why it is even more disgusting when we
hear some reformist elements on the left advocating such “engagement”. What they are actually
doing is giving the bourgeois advice on how to remove this thorn in their side.¶ All this talk of
democracy is in fact a cover for the real aims of imperialism. Not so long ago the Financial Times
was giving more sober advice. They were suggesting a “Chinese road” for Cuba accompanied by
a lifting of the US-sponsored embargo. The Chinese model would envisage an opening up of
Cuba to capitalism accompanied by a firm grip on state power at the top.
Maintaining the embargo is preferable to the influx of Us neoliberalism – their
impact claims are built on ideological lies.
Malott No date but it is after 2005,
(Curry Malott teaches at D’Youville College, NY, “Cuban education in Neo – Liberal times:
Social revolution and state capitalism, I don’t know the other information since I wasn’t the one
who got this online)
It can hardly be denied that Cuba’s achievements, most notably in the areas of education and
health care, have been a fundamental source of Cuban pride and support for their government,
despite the poverty suffered by most Cubans, which has largely been explained is the result of
external factors, as noted above. Cubans do not necessarily have to believe Castro (1999) that
neo-liberal global capitalists enter “third world” areas with tremendous tax breaks and ‘ ... pay
not more than 5 percent of the salary they must pay in their own countries ... ” leaving behind
nothing more than pollution, poverty and “meager wages” (p. 13), all they have to do, as many
do, is look at their neighboring countries to realize that life dominated by the insatiable appetite
for profits and personal gain of neo-liberal capitalism would have far graver consequences on their
lives than the US Embargo. For example, it is widely believed by Cubans that privatization would
almost instantly lead to illiteracy and a spike in infant mortality rates (Báez, 2004).¶ However,
Báez (2004) and other activist scholars are watching closely wondering if the pride of The
Revolution will eventually attract investment offers too good to turn down given the economic
hardships endured by the Cuban people as a result of US economic warfare/terrorism coupled
with the end of Soviet aid. Indeed, it has been noted on more than one occasion that the Cuban
people comprise the best-educated¶ and healthiest populations in Latin America increasing their
value as a commodity on the international market. Castro (1999) takes special care to note that
even during Cuba’s most financially desperate times, funding for their education and health care
programs were never cut, and gains in the health of the population were even realized. However,
because the state maintains high levels of education as a basic right, and because the economy is
set up around an externally controlled global market system based on the manufacture of
scarcity, the level of education among the population tends to exceed that which is needed in
employment. It is within this context of real material desperation among Cubans, in a context of
manufactured scarcity and marked by the fall of the USSR and appropriately dubbed the “Special
Period,” that we can begin to understand Cuba’s economic reform policies that have reprivatized certain segments of the Cuban economy, such as tourism, when Castro himself has
spent the majority of his time in office as a staunch opponent of private capitalism. For example,
expressing his indignation at the dehumanizing and destructive nature of capitalism Castro (1999)
laments, “ ... neo-liberal globalization wants to turn all countries ... into private property ... into a
huge free trade zone” (p. 13). But what role has the Cuban government and Castro himself played
in turning their country into a free trade zone in their engagements with private capitalists? After
the revolution the Cuban people, inspired by Castro’s moving speeches tapping into the
populations’ patriotism and legacy of imperial resistance, were enthusiastically energized to work
in the sugar cane fields striving to produce record breaking yields in order to support the pillars of
the revolution, such as education, for the emergence of what Ernesto “Che” Guevara called the
“new man,” which has been criticized for embracing traditional masculine values within
industrialism while ignoring feminist critiques of patriarchy. While the state has heavily relied on
the monopolization of agriculture to fund the social programs of the revolution, the state, having
had raised and guaranteed wages, found itself under increasing strain in 1968 when the world
market price for Sugar, Cuba’s primary export, fell to less than 2 cents per pound (Báez, 2004).
The crisis resulting from the reliance on a single export crop for national funding made it hard to
situate blame outside the country. As rations tightened and Cubans became disgruntled, footdragging and absenteeism increased in the sugar mills and factories. Cubans began more
regularly engaging in the black market, usually to satisfy food needs, which also hurt the
governments’ ability to accumulate capital. In an effort to¶ collect this money, dollar stores were
made available (discussed below). What have these changes looked like in practice?
Cuba would be forced into neoliberalization for needed debt relief
Gonzales ‘04
(Carmen, Teaches environmental law fundamental, international environmental law, and
international trade law at the University of Seattle, Trade Liberalization, Food Security, and the
Environment: The Neoliberal Threat to Sustainable Rural Development,
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1022&context=carmen_gonzalez)
One of the most significant decisions that Cuba will face after the lifting of the U.S. economic
embargo is whether to join the World Bank, the IMF, and the Inter-American Development Bank.
With an external debt of approximately $12 billion as well as an additional $15 billion to $20 billion
debt to Russia, Cuba might be tempted to avail itself of concessional loans and debt restructuring
assistance from the IMF and the World Bank in order to normalize relations with external
creditors and to obtain badly needed infusions of capital. Debt relief, however, will come at a very
high price. Cuba, like other developing countries, will be compelled to implement neoliberal
reforms pursuant to structural adjustment programs overseen by the World Bank and the IMF.
These programs will require Cuba to maximize the revenues available for debt service by slashing
social spending and vigorously promoting exports. In light of Cuba’s “comparative advantage” in
agricultural production, it is likely that structural adjustment will result in renewed emphasis on
sugar production or on the cultivation of non-traditional agricultural exports (such as flowers,
fruits, and vegetables). Cuba will be required to prioritize agricultural exports over domestic food
production, to drastically reduce subsidies and social safety nets (including agricultural subsidies
and food aid), to privatize state lands and government-owned enterprises, and to open its markets
to foreign competition. These reforms would be enacted in conjunction with pre-existing
commitments under the WTO Agreement on Agriculture to eliminate non-tariff barriers and
reduce tariffs, to phase out domestic subsidies, and to eliminate export subsidies. Cuba would also
be obligated under the SPS Agreement to permit the cultivation of genetically modified crops unless
Cuba could present strict scientific proof that such cultivation will harm human health or the
environment. Since such proof is unlikely given scientific uncertainty regarding the effects of
genetically modified organisms, it is likely that Cuba, like Argentina, would become a major
cultivator of genetically modified crops.
Lifting the embargo destroys the Cuban revolution, which is key to worldwide antineoliberal revolution.
Wenston & Woods ‘08
(Fred & Alan, Alan Woods is a Trotskyist political theorist and author. He is one of the leading
members of the International Marxist Tendency, as well as its British affiliate group Socialist
Appeal, Vultures hovering over Cuba after Fidel Castro steps down
http://www.cjournal.info/2008/02/20/vultures-hovering-over-cuba-after-fidel-castro-stepsdown/)
If the Cuban revolution were defeated, as happened in Russia, it would have a demoralizing effect
first of all on the workers, youth and peasants of the whole of South America, and even on a world
scale. On the other hand the regeneration of the Cuban revolution and the victory of the
Venezuelan revolution would completely transform the situation on a world scale.
Now there are important capitalist elements in Cuba. There is an increasing number of small
traders, the people who hold dollars, black marketeers, who are increasingly interwoven with the
party and the state. And that is the real threat to the Cuban revolution. A while back the
leadership took measures to restrict the growth of the dollar economy. That will no doubt have
an effect for a time, but in the long run it cannot stem the tide in the direction of a market
economy.
One of the main reasons for this is the increased participation of Cuba on world markets, which
they are compelled to do now with the collapse of the Soviet Union. They have no alternative.
We are not against that. In and of itself it would be a progressive development. The Bolsheviks
attempted to trade with the capitalists on the world market. Lenin and Trotsky actually offered
American capitalists the possibility for them to conduct business in places like Siberia: to open
up whole parts of Russia and lease it to them as concessions – rather it lease it to them to be
correct, not give it to them. And that was absolutely correct, as long as the Bolsheviks
maintained the firm control of the state. But the Bolshevik Revolution and the Soviet state in its
infancy was a direct threat, and therefore the American, British and French bourgeois would not
trade with them. They wanted to crush the Bolshevik revolution because it was a threat.
The Cuban revolution represents a threat to capitalism and imperialism because it gives an
example. Therefore the American imperialists at this stage they do not want to trade with Cuba,
they want to throttle Cuba; they want to destroy Cuba.
If the truth were to be told, the American ruling class are a little bit lacking in mental equipment. If
they were a bit more intelligent they would not blockade Cuba. On the contrary, they would
promote trade with Cuba . That would materially assist the bourgeois counter-revolutionary forces
inside Cuba. But because they are all a little bit thick – and the big boss in the White House is
exceptionally thick – they do the opposite of what is required, from their class point of view.
Keeping the Embargo in place is key to strengthen the movement versus
neoliberalism.
Dick Nichols 2005
Dick Nichols is a member of the National Executive of the DSP: “The Cuban ¶ Revolution¶ in the
Epoch of ¶ Neoliberal Globalisation¶ Defying Imperialism, ¶ Building the Alternative”, Pg 5
Why is this murderous economic war — implemented in opposition to a ¶ United Nations
General Assembly vote of 172-4, a majority of both houses of ¶ the US Congress, growing
sections of the Cuban-American population and ¶ even blockade administrators — being
intensified?¶ Appearances notwithstanding, the Bush’s decision to try for a “final ¶ solution”
against Cuba is quite rational from the point of view not only of his ¶ own ultraconservative
clique but of US imperialism as a whole.¶ This is not just because the longer Cuba survives in
our world of brutal ¶ neoliberalism and war the greater becomes its “threat of a good
example” and ¶ the greater the loss for Washington in the global battle of ideas (“the
contagion ¶ of our dreams”, as Cuban foreign minister Felipe Pérez Roque puts it).¶ It’s also
because the balance of forces over Cuba in world politics is ¶ turning against Washington and
the longer it waits the greater this shift will be. ¶ The Cuban and Venezuelan revolutions are
already showing big “gains from ¶ solidarity”, with Venezuela’s valuable economic contribution
to Cuba being ¶ matched by the vital contribution of Cuba’s doctors to programs bringing
health ¶ services to Venezuela’s poor and outcast. The experience of such gains helped
produce president Hugo Chavez’s massive victory in Venezuela’s August 2004 ¶ recall
referendum. At the same time the rise of mass struggles across Latin ¶ America (leading to
victories for left and centre-left forces in Brazil, Argentina, ¶ Uruguay and Bolivia) has greatly
reduced Cuba’s isolation.¶ The November 2004 decision of the Spanish Socialist Party
government to ¶ unfreeze its diplomatic relations with Havana also dealt Washington a blow
that ¶ could unravel the US’s anti-Cuba alliance with the European Union.
Link – Democracy
Despite the fallacy that in democracy everyone wins, existing democracies prove
that because of neoliberalism current democracy only benefits the wealthy
Dean 09
(Jodi Dean is a professor of political science at Columbia University, Democracy and other
Neoliberal Fantasies: Communicative Capitalism and Left politics, Duke University Press, page
87)
Real existing constitutional democracies privilege the Wealthy. As they install, extend, and protect
neoliberal capitalism, they exclude, exploit, and oppress the poor, all the While promising that
everybody wins. The present value of democracy relies on positing crucial determinants of our
lives and conditions outside the frame of contestation in a kind of “no go zone” These
suppositions regarding growth, investment, and profit are politically off -limits, so it’s no Wonder
that the Wealthy and privileged evoke democracy as a political ideal. It can’t hurt them. The
expansion and intensification of networked communications technologies that was sup- posed to
enhance democratic participation integrates and consolidates¶ communicative capitalism.
Nevertheless, the left continues to present our political hopes as aspirations to democracy¶ Despite
democracy's inability to represent justice in the Wake of political submission to a brutalized,
financialized, punishing global market, left political and cultural theorists appeal to arrangements
that can be filled in, substantialized, by fundamentalisms, nationalisms, populisms, and
conservatisms diametrically opposed to social justice and economic equality. Calling for democracy
leftists fail to emphasize the divisions necessary for politics, divisions that should lead us to organize
against the interests of corporations and their stockholders, against the values of fundamentalists
and individualists, and on behalf of collectivist arrangements designed to redistribute benefits and
opportunities more equitably. With this plea, leftists proceed as if democracy were the solution to
contemporary political problems rather than symptomatic of them, rather than the name of the
impasse in which we find ourselves.
Link- Development
Development is just a neoliberal phrase for creating ideal places for the investment
of transnational capital
Robinson 08-American professor of sociology at the University of California, Santa Barbara, 2008, “Latin
America and Global Capitalism”, pgs107-108
Neoliberal programs in Latin America have sought to create an optimal environment¶ for private
transnational capital to operate as the putative motor of development¶ and social welfare. As
transnational elites in Latin America set about¶ to integrate their countries into the global economy
they came to base "development"¶ on the virtually exclusive criteria of achieving maximum
internal profitability¶ as the condition sine qua non for attracting transnational capital: what ¶
Korzeniewicz and Smith (2000) call the low road to globalization. Profitability¶ in this regard
rested above all on the provision of cheap labor along with access¶ (often state subsidized) to the
region's copious natural resources and fertile¶ lands. New capital-labor relations have developed
out of a logic of accumulation¶ based on the provision to the global economy of an abundant
supply of cheap,¶ flexible, and disciplined labor as a "comparative advantage." In turn, the
availability¶ of a vast reserve army of cheap labor impedes growth in productivity and¶ reinforces
these particular conditions of profitability.¶ For neoliberal elites, successful integration into the
global economy became¶ predicated on the erosion of labor's income, the withdrawal of the social
wage,¶ the transfer of the costs of social reproduction from the public sector to individual¶ families,
a weakening of trade unions and workers movements, and the¶ suppression of popular political
demands. Hence, in the logic of global capitalism,¶ the cheapening of labor and its social
disenfranchisement by the neoliberal¶ state became conditions for "development ." The very drive
by local elites to¶ create conditions to attract transnational capital has been what thrusts Latin¶
American majorities into poverty and inequality. The contraction of domestic¶ markets, the growth
of the informal economy, and austerity programs, among¶ other components and effects of
capitalist globalization, have resulted in the¶ informalization of the workforce, mass under- and
unemployment, a compression¶ of real wages and a transfer of income from labor to capital.
Link- Discourse
Neoliberalism is highly creative and organized. Minor resistance doesn’t stand a
chance.
Fischer and Plehwe, 2013
(Karin Fischer and Dieter Plehwe, Fischer is a senior reporter at The Chronicle of Higher
Education, Dieter Plehwe is a Senior Fellow at the Social Science Research Centre Berlin and
the co-editor with Philip Mirowski of The Road from Mont Pelerin: The Making of the
Neoliberal Thought Collective. The “Pink Tide” and Neoliberal Civil Society Formation: Think
Tank Networks in Latin America, http://www.stateofnature.org/?p=6601)
How can we explain such resilience, or the comeback of neoliberal forces, leaders and recipes, in
spite of the dismal record with regard to human rights, economic viability and social welfare? Of
course the global division of labour and political power resulting from cross-border restructuring
has locked in legal and other constraints. The “new constitutionalism for disciplinary
neoliberalism” (Gill 1998) provides a certain amount of stability for the international economic
order. But without local support the quasi “ultra-imperialism” (Kautsky) of the present age
would implode in many countries, much like the Soviet empire in the late 1980s. Consequently
we have to look for local forces supporting neoliberal orientations, even if they do not generate a
lot of popular support in certain moments.
Neoliberalism is a comprehensive political and general ideological orientation, which has proven to
be well organized and highly creative in the past – at least with regard to exploiting the
contradictions of social liberalism, populism, and mixed or planned economies. Neoliberals have
been able to combine a strong normative core and political flexibility, a well-orchestrated high level
debate and a wide range of more or less pragmatic political projects. Compared to parochial
political movements, neoliberals drew particular strength from creating and maintaining strong
links across borders and from a new style of organization that relied to a greater extent on
organizational networks than competing political forces.
Link - Economy
Neoliberalism creates the fantasy that everyone is a winner while in reality
neoliberalism is driven on the idea of competition. This illusion lures countries and
individuals into the free market system and is used to reassure the unemployed only
to the effect that many become the losers of the system
Dean 09
(Jodi Dean is a professor of political science at Columbia University, Democracy and other
Neoliberal Fantasies: Communicative Capitalism and Left politics, Duke University Press, page
57)
We can see this closure at work in the slippage between ideas of competition and winning. On
the one hand, neoliberal thought emphasizes the necessity of competition. As George points out,
competition was Margaret Thatcher’s central value and faith in competition was the governing
precept of her destruction of the British public sector. George quotes Thatcher, “It is our job to
glory in inequality and see that talents and abilities are given vent and expression for the benefit
of us all.” On the other hand, even as neoliberalism emphasizes competition, it holds on to the
notion that everyone is a winner, a notion clearly at odds with competition because in competition
there are winners and losers. Thus, so-called Third World or “developing” countries are not told,
“Sorry, losers, that’s the breaks in a global economy.” Rather, they are promised that everyone will
win.” The Global Report on Human Settlements notes: “Conventional trade theories see increased
trade and a liberalized trade regime as purely beneficial; but, as in all chance, there are, in fact,
winners and losers. Those participating in the active, growing areas of the world economy or
receiving (unreliable) trickle-down effects benefit. Those who do not participate at best receive no
benefits, but, in fact, are usually losers, since capital tends to take flight from their countries or
their industries to move to more productive zones, reducing work opportunities and business
returns as currencies and wages fall or jobs disappear.” just as the Washington Consensus
promised the less-well-Developed countries that they would all benefit from free trade, so in the
United States are workers advised not to worry about the decline in manufacturing and rise of
outsourcing. New jobs will be created. With education, workers can be retrained. This same
promise that no one will lose reappears at the level of the local school. Kids today are taught that
everyone’s a winner. Everyone gets some kind of prize or ribbon just for showing up. In some U.S.
districts, schools no longer post grades or rankings out of fear of hurting the self-esteem of those
students near the bottom. Perhaps surprisingly, the emphasis on testing inherent in George W
Bush’s education policy No Child Left Behind, is not accompanied by a corresponding ranking of
students. Instead, schools and teachers are ranked and assessed-but not the students, because
everyone is a winner.
Engaging with Latin America through capitalism destroys the societies people live in
CANTERBURY 2004
(DENNIS C. Professor of Sociology at Eastern Connecticut State University, USA Development Alternatives to¶
Neoliberal Globalization:¶ Or Are There No Alternatives?¶ ¶ Department of Sociology, Anthropology and Social
Work,¶ Eastern Connecticut State University, Willimantic, CT 06226, USA¶ Review of Radical Political
Economics, Volume 36, No. 3, Summer 2004, 391-399)
The internationalization of capital, the process of drawing people into the global economy,¶ has
devastating effects on people. By separating consumption and production and¶ minimizing the
state’s ability to provide succor, the marketplace becomes a mechanism for¶ enslaving people
rather than liberating them. As international trade becomes more important,¶ policy can no longer
respond to local concerns for social welfare and the environment;¶ sustainable development, then,
becomes a popular cause around which civil society must¶ rally. This is crucial since it is unlikely
that the neoliberal model would build sustainable¶ communities—the logic of accumulation is
ecologically unsustainable and antithetical to¶ community development. Indeed, Barkin argues in
Transcending Neoliberalism that neoliberalism¶ exacerbates social class divisions and sharpens the
partitioning of society at all¶ levels. The program for international economic integration and
domestic public-sector austerity¶ associated with structural adjustment has constrained the
possibility for growth with¶ equity and the satisfaction of social needs (TN: 184).
Link – Neoliberalistic trade causes depletion of resources in other countries
Werlhof 2008
(Prof. Claudia von Werlhof is Professor at the Institute of Political Sciences, University of Innsbruck,
Austria. Global Research, February 01, The Consequences of Globalization and Neoliberal Policies. What
are the Alternatives? http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-consequences-of-globalization-and-neoliberalpolicies-what-are-the-alternatives/7973)
Today, everything on earth is turned into commodities, i.e. everything becomes an object of
“trade” and commercialization (which truly means “liquidation”: the transformation of all into
liquid money). In its neoliberal stage it is not enough for capitalism to globally pursue less costintensive and preferably “wageless” commodity production. The objective is to transform
everyone and everything into commodities (Wallerstein 1979), including life itself. We are
racing blindly towards the violent and absolute conclusion of this “mode of production”, namely
total capitalization/liquidation by “monetarization” (Genth 2006).¶ We are not only witnessing
perpetual praise of the market – we are witnessing what can be described as “market
fundamentalism”. People believe in the market as if it was a god. There seems to be a sense that
nothing could ever happen without it. Total global maximized accumulation of money/capital as
abstract wealth becomes the sole purpose of economic activity. A “free” world market for
everything has to be established – a world market that functions according to the interests of the
corporations and capitalist money. The installment of such a market proceeds with dazzling
speed. It creates new profit possibilities where they have not existed before, e.g. in Iraq, Eastern
Europe or China.¶ One thing remains generally overlooked: The abstract wealth created for
accumulation implies the destruction of nature as concrete wealth. The result is a “hole in the
ground” (Galtung), and next to it a garbage dump with used commodities, outdated machinery,
and money without value. However, once all concrete wealth (which today consists mainly of the
last natural resources) will be gone, abstract wealth will disappear as well. It will, in Marx’ words,
“evaporate”. The fact that abstract wealth is not real wealth will become obvious, and so will the
answer to the question which wealth modern economic activity has really created. In the end it is
nothing but monetary wealth (and even this mainly exists virtually or on accounts) that
constitutes a “monoculture” controlled by a tiny minority. Diversity is suffocated and millions of
people are left wondering how to survive. And really: how do you survive with neither resources
nor means of production nor money?
For thirty years, global and national economies have been guided by policies of neoliberal
deregulation, often known as the “Washington Consensus.” Neoliberalism has been disastrous for
workers in most countries, pitting workers against each other in a race to the bottom and making it all but
impossible to protect working class interests. There is now a growing consensus that the Washington
Consensus has been a failure.¶ There is also a growing global recognition that we are in the midst of
an unprecedented climate crisis. Ready or not, that crisis is affecting every nation, every locality, and
every worker. Its effects are already serious, and unless decisive global action is taken to counter it, they
will soon be catastrophic. Neoliberal deregulation, by dismantling the means for public steering of
society to meet social needs, has also made it nearly impossible to correct global climate crisis.¶
These twin realizations, the failure of neoliberalism and the climate crisis, will define the struggle for the
interests of poor and working people for the next century. At the same time, the necessity to counter
climate change may provide an opportunity to address the broader problems of neoliberal deregulation.¶
This article argues that it is only by rolling back neoliberalism that we can protect the rights of workers
globally and solve the crisis of climate change. In Part 1 we provide a short history of globalization. In
Part 2 we discuss the climate crisis and its effects on workers. In Part 3 describes proposals for a “global
green new deal” to create full employment through climate protection. Part 4 argues that a new global and
national regulatory regime is necessary both to counter both climate change and the race to the bottom.
Part 5 discussions the role of organized labor nationally and globally in bringing about such a
transformation.
Neoliberalism undermines national sovereignty, allows for countries to bypass
domestic laws in order to maximize profit for capitalist elitists.
MUZAFFAR, 2013
(CAHNDRA; President of the International Movement for a Just World (JUST); Trans Pacific
Partnership is a Threat To National Sovereignty; http://www.counterpunch.org/2013/03/06/thechavez-legacy/)
The negotiations — the 18th round of which will commence in Kota Kinabalu (Malaysia) on the 15th of
July 2013 — are shrouded in secrecy though representatives of major corporations such as Monsanto,
Walmart, Bank of America, JP Morgan, Cargill, Exxon-Mobil, and Chevron, among others, it is alleged, have
had full access to the draft and have been “suggesting amendments.” One of the issues that has caused grave
concern is a set of rules in the TPP which apparently would empower foreign corporations to bypass domestic
laws and courts and challenge government policies and regulations aimed at protecting the public interest via
tribunals linked to the World Bank and the UN. If this is true, it would be an affront to national sovereignty.¶
The TPP also prohibits governments and central banks from imposing capital controls or banning risky
financial products. Central banks would have diminished capacity to regulate the entry and exit of
speculative capital. Countries that are part of the TPP would be compelled to create an even more conducive
environment for casino capitalism. Given Malaysia’s relative success in developing regulatory mechanisms
during and after the 1998 Asian financial crisis, this aspect of the TPP would be particularly galling.¶ The
adverse impact of this trade pact upon national sovereignty and the economic wellbeing of countries such as
Malaysia is underscored by yet another provision which questions our procurement policies. Apart from
seeking to rectify economic imbalances, government procurement policies have also attempted to expedite
technology transfers to local industries, enhance export capabilities and curb foreign exchange outflows.
These are goals that do not conform to TPP objectives
Neoliberalism creates the ideology that in order to be a winner we must always
preform better to the extent that either we must loose what is must important in life
or we will be categorized as the other
Dean 09
(Jodi Dean is a professor of political science at Columbia University, Democracy and other
Neoliberal Fantasies: Communicative Capitalism and Left politics, Duke University Press, page
66)
Another version of the
over identified, overinvested free-marketer is the one who clearly delights in the
game, in the risk, the hunt, the thrill of the market. A key motif in market-porn, that is, in memoirs of life¶ in business, the
fascinating-repulsive market predator exposes the obscene supplement of the free market fantasy the violence or violation that ¶ underpins the
system.35 His
enjoyment depends on the other’s losing. He only Wins when others lose. According to
business memoir conventions, the predator ultimately has to lose in some domain-his business is
taken¶ over or collapses, he loses his family, or he loses his sense of self. This loss¶ is thus accompanied by
lessons, lessons now made available to everyone so we can avoid his mistakes and be ourselves Winners in the free market. ¶ I’ve been describing
free trade as a fantasy that occludes and sustains the brutality of neoliberal capitalism. Free trade establishes possibilities through which We
narrate our relation to enjoyment. Ziiek argues that What makes desire possible in contemporary conditions is the “despotic figure which stands
for the primary jouisseur,” the one who appropriates all enjoyment.36 My reading of the fantasy of free trade suggests otherwise. This fantasy provides a more complex organization of
enjoyment, one that promises that everyone wins, uses losses to reconfirm the necessity of strengthening the system so everyone wins, and perpetually displaces the thieves of enjoyment throughout the system as Wamings, exceptions,
and¶ contingencies.¶ The fantasy of free trade is but one of the fantasies animating neoliberal- ism as an ideological formation. The previous chapter considers fantasies linked to communication technologies, and there are still others
remain­ ing to be analyzed.” But important as the level of fantasy is for under­ standing how neoliberalism organizes enjoyment, the category of fantasy alone cannot explain the hold of neoliberalism. Thus, in this chapter, I’ve also
mentioned neoliberalism’s reliance on a religious supplement (specifi­ callyg some practices of evangelical Christianity) as well as its investment in its differences from and opposition to competing ideologies. Neo- liberalism has to
employ a variety of means to secure its dominance, as its understanding of the role of the state explicitly acknowledges.¶ Analyzing the changed functioning of the state under neoliberalism, Paul A. Passavant develops a compelling
account of neoliberal govern­ mentality.” A crucial element of this mode of governmentality is the consumer/ criminal doublet. In what follows, I link Passavant’s consumer/ criminal doublet to Zi:2ek’s idea of the decline of symbolic
efficiency in order to explain an additional aspect of neoliberalism as an ideological formation, namelyg how it produces the subjects it needs. Under neo- liberalism, the disciplined worker and consumer-citizen of the social wel- fare
state fragment into myriad, shifting, imaginary identities that con- verge around the strange attractors ofthe insatiable shopper (shopaholic) and incorrigible criminal.¶ THE DECLINE OF SYMBOLIC EFFICIENCY¶ In his critique of
risk society theory, Zi:2ek.introduces the idea of the decline of symbolic efficiency.” He draws from the later work of Lacan to describe a change in the functioning of the symbolic order. During the middle years of his teaching,
Lacan understood the symbolic order as the order of language and meaning. The symbolic is what counts as our everyday experience, our understanding of the role of names and offices, our expectations regarding references. We
might say that the symbolic here refers to what everybody knows. In his later work, Lacan introduces different modes in the operation of the symbolic. Hence, his four dis- courses-those of the master, hysteric, university; and analystare¶ Different forms of the social link established through language. By Semi-¶ nar XX, rather than presuming a symbolic order held in place by a master¶ signiiier, Lacan theorizes a symbolic space held together by fragile and¶
contingent knots of enjoyment (symptoms, quilting points)/"° In this later¶ version, Lacan emphasizes the ways the imaginarjg the symbolic, and the¶ Real are entangled in one another, rupturing, filling in, and covering over their own
excesses and lacks.¶ Zizek’s notion of a decline in symbolic efficiency continues the theori­ zation of this idea of a symbolic space permeated by enjoyment. He highlights our perpetual uncertainty our sense that we never really know
whether what we say registers with the other as what we mean as well as our sense that we are never quite sure what “everybody knows.” There is no ultimate guarantor of meaning, no recognized authority that stops our questioning
or assuages our doubts. For example, if we receive distressing medical news, we can-and are encouraged to-seek a second, third, and fourth opinion. Many of us will search for information on the Internet and explore alternative
remedies. But we rarely find firm, reassuring answers, answers in which we are completely coniident. There are myriad experts all offering their own specific advice-how can we choose among them? To take another example, how
can we know the truth about global warm-¶ ing? Some scientists, politicians, and journalists have called it a hoax and a conspiracy to undermine capitalism.” Other scientists, politicians, and journalists tell us that the first group
constitutes ia minority; there is clear evidence for global warming and a scientific consensus that humans are causing it. Then we might worry aren't minorities sometimes right? Hasn’t mainstream scientific opinion been dead wrong
in the past? In the face of fundamental disagreement, how can one determine whom to believe-¶ especially if we are already skeptical about the media, which some remind us is owned by corporations even as others emphasize its
pervasive left bias? I return to these problems of credibility and certainty in chapter 6. For now, I simply want to tag this fundamental uncertaintjg this fact that we cannot count on something like reality as the decline of symbolic
efficiency¶ The change in the status of realitjg of the symbolic order of language and meaning, has been noted by others besides Zizek-most directljg by the administration of George W Bush. .In an oft-cited article from the New York
Times Magazine, Ron Suskind relates a discussion he had with a¶ FREE TRADE 65¶ 'White House aide. The aide dismissed journalists as being part of the “reality-based community.” He continued, “That’s not the way the world
really works anymore .... We’re an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while you are studying that reality-judi- ciously as you will--we’ll act again, creating other new realities, which you can study too.”"'2¶
The decline of symbolic efficiency links to Michael Hardt’s and An­¶ tonio Negri’s account of the shift from disciplinary society to the society of¶ control.43 As Hardt and Negri explain, disciplinary logics worked pri-¶ marily within
the institutions of civil society to produce subjects. These¶ institutions-the nuclear family union, school, neighborhood-are now in¶ crisis. According to the zooo census, for example, less than a quarter of¶ Americans live in families
comprised of a married couple and chjldren.4“‘¶ Union membership has likewise declined such that in zoo6 only 12 percent¶ of workers were unionized and public sector employees were five times¶ more likely than private to belong
to a union.45 Hardt’s and Negri’s point¶ is that the old political subject, the citizen-subject of an autonomous¶ political sphere, the disciplined subject of civil society can no longer be said to exist.¶ The implications of this point are
broad. For just as the disciplined subject of civil society can no longer be said to exist, so is there a fragmen- tation among the identities mobilized politically in and as civil society. Throughout the latter half of the twentieth century
the categories of social inclusion and exclusion were politicized and mobilized.” Social movements organized along lines of race, sex, ethnicity and sexuality radically transformed everyday life as they sought to eliminate entrenched
hierarchies. As a result of the critical. work of these movements, as well as the accompanying decline of the welfare state and empowering of neo~ liberalism, racial, sexual, and ethnic identities are less fixed, less stable, less available
as determinate subject positions. The category “we” seems per­ manently to have been called into question and in its place are fluid, hybrid, and mobile imaginary identities (Hardt and Negri use the term singularities).¶ Emerging in
the context ofthe breakdown of determining social norms, the subjects inhabiting these identities are generally undisciplined, al- though subject to ever more controls. We might think here of changes in public schools away from
practices of discipline and normalization and toward searching, surveilling, and policing. Contemporary subjects in-¶ creasingly lack self-control, in part because they lack a strong sense of self¶ that arises through discipline, and, as I
detail below, look outside them-¶ selves for some authority to impose control. Extemal control-through¶ the direct or indirect use of force, through threats and fears, and through the mobilization and intensification of aEects and
desires-takes on more¶ of the work previously done by internalized control." In psychoanalytic terms, we can say that symbolic identity is increasingly -fragile, uncertain, and meaningless in the society of control. Imaginary identities
sustained by the promise and provision of enjoyment replace symbolic identities. And the multiplicity and adaptability of these identities does not mean that subjects are somehow freer or more liberated than they were under the
discipline ofthe welfare state. Rather, they come under different sets of controls, diEerent organizations of enjoyment.¶ Read together with I-Iardt and Negri, Zizek’s notion of the decline of symbolic efficiency clarifies an eEect of the
shift from a Keynesian to a neoliberal ideological formation. The
latter does not provide symbolic identities, sites from which we can see ourselves. Rather, it oEers in
their place new ways for me to imagine myself, an immense variety of lifestyles with which I can experiment. The variety of available identities
and the mutability which characterizes contemporary subjects’ relations to their identities, moreover, renders imaginary identity extremely
vulnerable. The frames of reference that give it meaning and value_shift and morph. Others who might challenge it can appear at any moment.
Their successes, their achievements, their capacities to enjoy can all too easily call mine into question--I could have had more; I could have been
better; I could have really enjoyed. We
thus encounter under neoliberalism a situation wherein “Symbolic
prohibitive norms are increasingly replaced by imaginary ideals (of social success, of bodily fitness _ . .).”48 These
imaginary ideals combine with ferocious superego figures who command subjects to enjoy (thereby effectively ensuring that we cannot) .49 So
neoliberal ideology does not produce its subjects by interpellating them into symbolically anchored identities (structured according to
conventions of gender, race, work, and national citizenship).5° Instead, it
enjoins subjects to develop our creative potential
and cultivate our individuality. Communicative capitalism’s circuits of entertainment and
consumption supply the ever new experiences and accessories We use to perform 'this selffashioning-I must be fit; I must be stylish; I must realize my dreams. I must because I can-everyone wins. If I don't, not only am I a loser but I am not a person at all; I am not part of
everyone. Neoliberal subjects are expected to, enjoined to, have a good time, have it all, be happy
fit, and fulfilled.
Neoliberalistic policies promote more expensive pharmaceutical drugs in order to
maximize profits for capitalist elitists, undermining measures taken in order to
better protect the people.
MUZAFFAR, 2013
(CAHNDRA; President of the International Movement for a Just World (JUST); Trans Pacific
Partnership is a Threat To National Sovereignty
http://www.counterpunch.org/2013/03/06/the-chavez-legacy/)
The TPP also allows pharmaceutical corporations to increase the price of medicines and to limit
consumer access to cheaper generic drugs. Monopoly patents would be better protected and the
purchase of generic drugs would be made more difficult. At the same time, by designating a whole
spectrum of policies, regulations and practices as “trade barriers” the proposed agreement
undermines some of the people oriented measures associated with different TPP countries. For
instance, the TPP, it is alleged, upbraids the Malaysian government for “requiring that slaughter
plants maintain dedicated halal facilities and ensure segregated transportation for halal and nonhalal products.Ӧ
Link – Economic Engagement
Engagement is a neoliberal strategy to create new markets for exploitation – It is the
central element of domination.
Robinson 8
William I., Professor of Sociology at the University of Santa Barbara, Latin
America and Global Capitalism: A Critical Globalization Perspective, p. 20-1)
By synchronizing each national economic environment to an integrated global economic
environment neoliberalism has served as the policy "grease" of global capitalism. To the extent
that the model has been implemented it has kept the gears of the system in sync with one
another. Greased by neoliberalism, global capitalism tears down all nonmarket structures that
have in the past placed limits on, or acted as a protective layer against, the accumulation of
capital. Deregulation made available new zones to resource exploitation, privatization opened up
to profit-making public and community spheres, ranging from health care and education to police
and prison systems. Nonmarket sphere of human activity - public spheres managed by states and
private spheres linked to community and family-are broken up, commodified, and transferred to
capital. As countries in the South integrate into global capitalism through neoliberal restructuring
they become "emerging markets" that provide new market segments, pools of labor, and
opportunities for transnational investors to unload excess capital, whether in productive or
financial investment. By prying open and making accessible to transnational capital every layer of
the social fabric, neoliberalism "dis-embeds" the global economy from global society, and the state
cedes to the market as the sole organizing power in the economic and social sphere.
Latin American governments are collectively organizing to successfully resist US
neoliberal agenda. Rejecting US economic engagement is a central element of this
strategy.
HARNECKER 10,
(Marta, Chilean psychologist and former student of Louis Althusser, trans. Janet
Duckworth, "Twenty-First Century Socialism," MONTHLY REVEIW 62:3, JulyAugust)
The map of Latin America has radically changed. A
new balance of forces makes it more difficult for the United
States to achieve its objectives in the region. At the same time, however, the attempts of the Empire to the North
to stop the forward march of our countries have increased. The United States no longer has the same freedom to
maneuver in our continent. Now it has to deal with rebel governments that have their own agendas, which
often clash with the White House’s agenda. Let us look at some of the indications of this. Meetings without the United
States: Latin American and Caribbean leaders began to meet without inviting the United States. The first South American
Summit took place in Brazil in 2000; two years later, there was another meeting in Ecuador; in 2004 it was in Peru. The following year, Brazil
hosted the first summit of the South American Community of Nations; in 2006 the second was held in Bolivia, during which the foundation was
laid for what became the
Union of South American Nations (UNASUR). UNASUR adopted its name in 2007 at the energy
summit held in Venezuela. In 2008, the treaty founding this organization was approved in Brazil. Closer Economic Relations with
China: Given China’s growing need for raw materials and the fact that Latin America has plenty of them, relations between the two have
become closer. China has become one of the main trading partners of countries such as Peru, Chile, and Brazil. It has
begun to form strategic alliances with several countries in the region, especially with Venezuela. According to a study by Diego
Sánchez Ancochea, an economics professor at Saint Anthony’s College, Oxford, between 2004 and 2005 China signed close to one
hundred agreements and public commitments with several South American countries, including a free
trade agreement with Chile in November 2005.4 Brazil’s exports to China increased from $382 million in 1990 to $6,830 million in 2005.
Argentina and Chile experienced similar increases, going from $241 million and $34 million in 1990 to $3,100 million and $3,200 million,
respectively, in 2004. China has become one of the biggest trading partners, not only of the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) countries,
but also of other South American countries. It is Peru’s second biggest trading partner, Chile and Brazil’s third, and Argentina and Uruguay’s
fourth. In recent years, the Chinese presence in our continent has grown. Alicia Bárcena, the executive secretary of the Economic Commission for
Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), acknowledged this on May 27, 2009, when she said that investments in the region “had grown
significantly,” especially in more measurable areas such as hydrocarbons, mining, and the automobile industry. The amount, however, is still
small compared to the large amounts the United States invests.6 Let us look at just two examples. On May 19, 2009, China and Brazil signed
thirteen agreements for cooperation in the energy field. China thus became Brazil’s biggest trading partner. A few days before ,
Lula had
suggested that the two countries should use their own currencies instead of the U.S. dollar for
trading purposes. [In two succeeding “BRIC” (Brazil, Russia, India, China) conferences, plans have advanced to conduct trade among
themselves without using the U.S. dollar.] In the last few months of 2009, trade and economic relations between China and Venezuela grew
closer. Agreements have been signed in agricultural, energy, and industrial areas. An agreement has also been
reached to increase the capital of the China-Venezuela Development Fund, doubling, to $12 billion, the amount originally decided. This is the
biggest credit given by China to any country since 1949. Sánchez Ancochea says that this has generated new resources and new opportunities for
Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela, and other Latin American countries. However, they also create serious risks and threats, including a steep rise in
the trade deficit with China, a reinforcement of “the traditional way Latin America, especially the Andean countries and those of the Southern
Cone, participate in the world economy,” and a heavy blow to labor intensive sectors, such as textiles. Thus, these agreements put the survival of
a large number of small and medium-size economies at risk of being edged out by the high relative productivity and low real wages in China.7
FTAA Turned Down; ALBA Created: The U.S. government was unable to accomplish its plan to
establish the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) in the whole of the American continent.8 As an alternative to the
FTAA, the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas, better known as ALBA, was created on December 14, 2004, with an accord between Cuba
and Venezuela.9 Since then, several Latin American countries have joined: Bolivia in 2006, Nicaragua in 2007, Honduras and Dominica in 2008,
and Antigua and Barbuda, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Ecuador in 2009. Faced with this situation, the White House has chosen to sign
bilateral treaties with some Latin American countries such as Chile, Uruguay, Peru, Colombia, and a group of Central American countries.
Link- Economic Engagement - Latin American
Economic engagement offered by neoliberalist states to failing foreign industries are
used to economically pillage weakened countries for Western gain
Harvey 7
(David, Distinguished Professor of Anthropology and Geography at the Graduate Center of the
City University of New York, “A Brief History of Neoliberalism”, Oxford University Press,
2007. Pg. 162-163)
The management and manipulation of crises. Beyond the speculative and often fraudulent froth
that characterizes much of neoliberal financial manipulation, there lies a deeper process that
entails the springing of ‘the debt trap’ as a primary means of accumulation by
dispossession. 13 Crisis creation, management, and manipulation on the world stage has
evolved into the fine art of deliberative redistribution of wealth from poor countries to the
rich. I documented the impact of Volcker’s interest rate increase on Mexico earlier. While
proclaiming its role as a noble leader organizing ‘bail-outs’ to keep global capital
accumulation on track, the US paved the way to pillage the Mexican economy. This was
what the US Treasury–Wall Street–IMF complex became expert at doing everywhere.
Greenspan at the Federal Reserve deployed the same Volcker tactic several times in the 1990s.
Debt crises in individual countries, uncommon during the 1960s, became very frequent
during the 1980s and 1990s. Hardly any developing country remained untouched, and in
some cases, as in Latin America, such crises became endemic. These debt crises were
orchestrated, managed, and controlled both to rationalize the system and to redistribute
assets. Since 1980, it has been calculated, ‘over fifty Marshall Plans (over $4.6 trillion) have
been sent by the peoples at the Periphery to their creditors in the Center’. ‘What a peculiar
world’, sighs Stiglitz, ‘in which the poor countries are in eff ect subsidizing the richest.’
What neoliberals call ‘confiscatory deflation’ is, furthermore, nothing other than
accumulation by dispossession. Wade and Veneroso capture the essence of this when they
write of the Asian crisis of 1997–8: Financial crises have always caused transfers of
ownership and power to those who keep their own assets intact and who are in a position to
create credit, and the Asian crisis is no exception . . . there is no doubt that Western and
Japanese corporations are the big winners . . . The combination of massive devaluations,
IMF-pushed financial liberalization, and IMF-facilitated recovery may even precipitate the
biggest peacetime transfer of assets from domestic to foreign owners in the past fifty years
anywhere in the world, dwarfing the transfers from domestic to US owners in Latin America in
the 1980s or in Mexico after 1994. One recalls the statement attributed to Andrew Mellon: ‘In a
depression assets return to their rightful owners.’
Link –Economic Engagement - Fiat
Economic authoritarianism is forced upon Latin American governments quickly
and confusingly, paving the way for aggressive neoliberalism.
Hardt 7
(Michael. Hardt is a literary theorist and a political philosopher credited with ‘The Communist
Manifesto of the 21st Century’ with his book Empire. “The Violence of Capital.” Neoliberalist
Review. Nov Dec 2007. p. 1-2.) BA
Klein’s primary aim is to unmask the ‘idyllic’ fable of the origins of neoliberalism and establish the fact that
these economic policies are never adopted democratically or peacefully. She also argues along the way that
despite widely heralded and accepted claims of success, such neoliberal policies have consistently failed, even
by their own economic criteria. In the process, what counts as shock gradually changes from military violence
and torture to other forms of disaster, some intended and others not. The pivotal historical shift in this story
comes with the economic shock imposed in Bolivia in 1985 by the newly elected government of Víctor Paz
Estenssoro, under the advice of Jeffrey Sachs who, as Friedman fades from the scene, becomes the primary
shock doctor in Klein’s narrative. No coup d’é tat provided the trauma here, although there were, of course,
relatively high levels of repression against opposing social sectors. Instead a secretly prepared economic
package was imposed by the administration all at once without any sort of public discussion. ‘Bolivia
provided a blueprint for a new, more palatable kind of authoritarianism’, Klein writes, ‘a civilian coup d’é tat,
one carried out by politicians and economists in business suits rather than soldiers in military uniforms’. Here
political rather than military violence accomplishes the tasks her model requires: disorient the population,
destabilize or destroy established social and economic relationships and institutions, and pave the way for
neoliberal transformation. In all of Klein’s examples of neoliberal shock therapy in subsequent years, from
China and Poland in 1989 to South Africa and Russia in the early 1990s, doses of military and political
violence combine to fill this role.
Link - Education
Under the neoliberal framework efforts to reduce poverty or improve education will
always be frustrated and the hegemonic neoliberal discourse will ensure failure
Davidson-Harden 8
(Adam has a PhD in Education from the University of Western Ontario and was a SSHRC
postdoctoral fellow in cultural and policy studies at the Faculty of Education. “Re-branding
Neoliberalism and Systemic Dilemmas in Social Development: The Case of Education and
School Fees in Latin American HIPCs” MW)
Globally, education continues to be a key source of hope and institutional potential for reducing
poverty and income inequality in poorer and wealthier nations alike. The 'big question' impugning
the BWIs in this regard concerns whether currently-ascendant neoliberal methods and strategies
for educational development and other types of social service provision adequately address this
role, or this hope, for education. The states of Latin America boast the highest regional levels of
within-country social inequality in the world. From the 'lost decade's impact to the acceleration
of structural adjustment in the 1990s, the legacy of hegemonic neoliberal policies has served to
entrench, sustain and exacerbate poverty and inequality, rather than ameliorate them. In order to
put progress (or lack of progress) toward core goals for educational development in heavily
indebted states in context, it is necessary to appreciate what I term the 'systemic dilemmas' of
neoliberal development strategies that envelop and constrain efforts to realize the goal of 'education
for all'. Once some of these central dynamics – revolving around debt, aid and conditionality as
mechanisms levered by the BWIs and richer donor countries – are understood as a limiting
framework for educational development, the frustration of reaching even modest goals (as those
embodied, for example, in the Millennium Development Goals or MDGs) can be better understood
as an ongoing set of tensions around the continuing pre-eminence of neoliberalism as a hegemonic
discourse in international development.
Link- Environment
The environment is being destroyed by neoliberalist practices
Harvey 7
(David, Distinguished Professor of Anthropology and Geography at the Graduate Center of the
City University of New York, “A Brief History of Neoliberalism”, Oxford University Press,
2007. Pg. 172-174)
Neoliberal state policies with respect to the environment have therefore been geographically
uneven and temporally unstable (depending on who holds the reins of state power, with the
Reagan and George W. Bush administrations being particularly retrograde in the US). The
environmental movement, furthermore, has grown in significance since the 1970s. It has often
exerted a restraining influence, depending on time and place. And in some instances capitalist
firms have discovered that increasing efficiency and improved environmental performance can
go hand in hand. Nevertheless, the general balance sheet on the environmental consequences
of neoliberalization is almost certainly negative. Serious though controversial efforts to create
indices of human well-being including the costs of environmental degradations suggest an
accelerating negative trend since 1970 or so. And there are enough specific examples of
environmental losses resulting from the unrestrained application of neoliberal principles to
give sustenance to such a general account. The accelerating destruction of tropical rain
forests since 1970 is a well-known example that has serious implications for climate change
and the loss of biodiversity. The era of neoliberalization also happens to be the era of the
fastest mass extinction of species in the Earth’s recent history. If we are entering the danger
zone of so transforming the global environment, particularly its climate, as to make the earth
unfit for human habitation, then further embrace of the neoliberal ethic and of neoliberalizing
practices will surely prove nothing short of deadly. The Bush administration’s approach to
environmental issues is usually to question the scientific evidence and do nothing (except cut
back on the resources for relevant scientific research). But his own research team reports that
the human contribution to global warming soared after 1970. The Pentagon also argues that
global warming might well in the long run be a more serious threat to the security of the US
than terrorism. 28 Interestingly, the two main culprits in the growth of carbon dioxide
emissions these last few years have been the powerhouses of the global economy, the US and
China (which increased its emissions by 45 per cent over the past decade). In the US,
substantial progress has been made in increasing energy efficiency in industry and residential
construction. The profligacy in this case largely derives from the kind of consumerism that
continues to encourage high-energy-consuming suburban and ex-urban sprawl and a culture
that opts to purchase gas-guzzling SUVs rather than the more energy-efficient cars that are
available. Increasing US dependency on imported oil has obvious geopolitical ramifications. In
the case of China, the rapidity of industrialization and of the growth of car ownership doubles
the pressure on energy consumption. China has moved from selfsufficiency in oil production in
the late 1980s to being the second largest global importer after the US. Here, too, the
geopolitical implications are rife as China scrambles to gain a foothold in the Sudan, central
Asia, and the Middle East to secure its oil supplies. But China also has vast rather low-grade coal
supplies with a high sulphur content. The use of these for power generation is creating major
environmental problems, particularly those that contribute 27 to global warming. Furthermore,
given the acute power shortages that now bedevil the Chinese economy, with brownouts and
blackouts common, there is no incentive whatsoever for local government to follow central
government mandates to close down inefficient and ‘dirty’ power stations. The astonishing
increase in car ownership and use, largely replacing the bicycle in large cities like Beijing in ten
years, has brought China the negative distinction of having sixteen of the twenty worst cities in
the world with respect to air quality. 29 The cognate effects on global warming are obvious.
As usually happens in phases of rapid industrialization, the failure to pay any mind to the
environmental consequences is having deleterious effects everywhere. The rivers are highly
polluted, water supplies are full of dangerous cancer-inducing chemicals, public health
provision is weak (as illustrated by the problems of SARS and the avian flu), and the rapid
conversion of land resources to urban uses or to create massive hydroelectric projects (as in the
Yangtze valley) all add up to a significant bundle of environmental problems that the central
government is only now beginning to address. China is not alone in this, for the rapid burst of
growth in India is also being accompanied by stressful environmental changes deriving from the
expansion of consumption as well as the increased pressure on natural resource exploitation.
Link- Fair Trade
Movements that emerge in the neoliberalist market towards Latin America
inevitably devolve into money-making schemes that increase profit margins and fail
to help the impoverished producers
McCook 8
(Stuart, Associate Dean of the College of Arts at the University of Guelph, “Coffee and Flowers:
Recent Research on Commodity Chains Neoliberalism, and Alternative Trade in Latin America”,
Project Muse, 2008, Pg. 271-272)
Jaffee’s Brewing Justice independently arrives at many of the same conclusions. Jaffee, a
sociologist, identifies an emergent “fair-trade paradox,” ultimately a struggle over the identity of
fair trade. Although these visions represent the extreme ends of a continuum, rather than simple
polar opposites, some advocates of fair trade see it as a movement committed to promoting
global social justice, whereas others see it as market. Like Fridell, however, Jaffee believes that
the critical change in fair-trade coffee took place when it moved into the mainstream, as fairtrade labeling allowed large coffee retailers to sell fair-trade coffee. This move, he argues, was
accompanied by a de-radicalization of fair trade. The mainstreaming of fair-trade coffee in the
past decade also coincided with one of the worst economic crises that the coffee industry has
experienced. The heart of Brewing Justice is a detailed empirical study of fair-trade and organic
coffee production by several small communities in the Mexican state of Oaxaca. Jaffee
systematically compares the fair-trade and organic growers of the Michiza cooperative
with their neighbors who produce conventional coffee. Several chapters ask the hard question:
what difference does fair trade make to producers? Jaffee’s answer can be summarized in the
words of one informant: “mejor, pero no muy bien que digamos” (“[the organization members]
are a little better off, but you wouldn’t say great” (236). On the basis of surveys of fifty-two
families, including conventional and fair-trade farmers, Jaffee finds that during times of
crisis, everyone was losing money. The net income of fair-trade households was not much
different from that of their conventional neighbors; the higher prices they received for their
coffee were largely offset by the additional wages they had to pay to produce it. These wages,
however, did diffuse the economic benefits of fair trade throughout the community. Fair-trade
households also seemed somewhat better able to manage the problems of food security and
migration that afflicted conventional farmers. Still, only 10 percent to 20 percent of coffee farmers
have decided to produce fair-trade, certified-organic coffee. Jaffee found that many farmers perceive
this specialty production as involving a lot of additional hard work for only minimal benefits. He
concludes bleakly that these farmers “remain impoverished, even if they are somewhat better off
than their conventional neighbors,” and that fair trade has not brought “an end to poverty: it
simply prevents further deterioration”
Link- Hegemony
US hegemony is the deadliest weapon of transnational capitalist to force neoliberal
reforms in target countries
Robinson 08-American professor of sociology at the University of California, Santa Barbara, 2008, “Latin
America and Global Capitalism”, pgs38-39
Interpreting the U.S. state as playing a leadership role on behalf of transnational capitalist interests
is a more satisfactory explanation than that of advancing "U.S." interests, as we will see when
applying the concepts of hegemony and world order to the study of Latin America. The U.S.
state has taken the lead in imposing a reorganization of world capitalism. But this does not mean
that U.S. interventionism seeks to defend "U.S." interests. As the most powerful component of the
TNS, the U.S. state apparatus defends the interests of transnational investors and the overall
system. The only military apparatus in the world capable of exercising global coercive authority
is the U.S. military. The beneficiaries of U.S. military action around the world are not "U.S." but
transnational capitalist groups. This is the underlying class relation between the TCC and the
U.S. national state. It is in this way that the United States played a key role in the globalization of
Latin America, more properly understood as U.S. tutelage of the region's restructuring and
integration into global capitalism on behalf of a transnational project than as a project of "U.S."
hegemony in rivalry with other core powers for influence in the hemisphere. If the world is not
divided into rival national economies and national capitals, do we still need a theory of
imperialism? In the post-World War II period, and drawing on the tradition established by Rosa
Luxembourg, Marxists and other critical political economists shifted the main focus in the study
of imperialism from the classical focus advanced by Lenin and Hilferding on rivalry among core
powers to the mechanisms of core capitalist penetration of Third World countries and the
appropriation of their surpluses. Imperialism in this sense referred to this exploitation and to the
use of state apparatuses by capitals emanating from the centers of the world system to facilitate this
economic relation through military, political, and cultural mechanisms. The relentless pressure for
outward expansion of capitalism and the distinct political, military, and cultural mechanisms that
facilitate that expansion and the appropriation of surpluses it generates is a structural imperative
built into capitalism. We need tools to conceptualize, analyze, and theorize how this
expansionary pressure built into the capitalist system manifests itself in the age of globalization.
The class relations of global capitalism are now so deeply internalized within every nation-state that
the classical image of imperialism as a relation of external domination is outdated. Failure to
comprehend this leads to such superficial and misleading conclusions as, for instance, that the
failure of popular projects to materialize under the rule of the Workers Party in Brazil or the
African National Congress in South Africa is a result of a "sell out" by the leaders of those
parties or simply because "imperialism" undercut their programs. Today, imperialism is not about
nations but about groups exercising the social power—through institutions—to control value
production, to appropriate surpluses, and to reproduce these arrangements. The challenge for
such a theoretical enterprise is to ask: how, and by whom in the world capitalist system, are
values produced (organized through what institutions), how are they appropriated (through what
institutions), and how are these processes changing through capitalist globalization? During the
five hundred years since the genesis of the world capitalist system, colonialism and imperialism
coercively incorporated zones and peoples into its fold. This historical process of "primitive
accumulation" is coming to a close. The end of the extensive enlargement of capitalism is the
end of the imperialist era of world capitalism. The system still conquers space, nature, and human
beings. It is dehumanizing, genocidal, suicidal, and maniacal. But with the exception of a few
remaining spaces—Iraq until recently, North Korea, etc.—the world has been brought into the
system over the past half millennium. The implacable logic of accumulation is now largely internal
to worldwide social relations and to the complex of fractious political institutions through which
ruling groups attempt to manage those relations. We need a theory of capitalist expansion: that is,
not only of the political processes and the institutions through which such expansion takes place,
but also of the class relations and spatial dynamics it involves.
“Peaceful” opportunities for neoliberalism are disappearing, so US hegemony is
being used to restructure space to increase accumulation, as shown by the war on
terror
Robinson 08-American professor of sociology at the University of California, Santa Barbara, 2008, “Latin
America and Global Capitalism”, pgs38-39
If neoliberalism was able to "peacefully" force open new areas for global capital in the 1980s and
the 1990s this was often accomplished through economic coercion alone, made possible by the
structural power of the global economy over individual countries. But this structural power
became less effective in the face of the three-pronged crisis mentioned above. Opportunities for
both intensive and extensive expansion began to dry up as privatizations ran their course, the
"socialist" countries became integrated, the consumption of high-income sectors worldwide
reached ceilings, spending through private credit expansion could not be sustained, and so on. The
space for "peaceful" expansion, both intensive and extensive, became ever more restricted.
Military aggression became an instrument for prying open new sectors and regions, for the
forcible restructuring of space in order to further accumulation. The train of neoliberalism became
latched on to military intervention and the threat of coercive sanctions as a locomotive for pulling
the moribund neoliberal program forward. The "war on terrorism" achieved a number of
objectives for a global capitalism beset by structural, political, and ideological crises. It provides
a seemingly endless military outlet for surplus capital, generated a colossal deficit that justifies the
ever-deeper dismantling of the Keynesian welfare state and locks neoliberal austerity in place, and
legitimates the creation of a police state to repress political dissent in the name of security. Yet
global capitalism will continue to be unstable and crisis-ridden. Global inequalities, wherever
their social dynamics are operative, lead to new social control systems and a politics of
exclusion. The "war on terrorism" provided a convenient cover for the transnational elite to
extend its drive to consolidate and defend the project of capitalist globalization with a new and
terrifying coercive dimension. The powers that be in the global capitalist order seemed intent on
organizing and institutionalizing a global police state following the September 2001 attack on the
World Trade Center. Could we witness the rise of a global fascism, a new war order, founded on
military spending and wars to contain the downtrodden and the un-repented and to seize new
territories, resources, and labor pools ? Conflict in global society is prone to occur at multiple
levels: between transnationally oriented elites and those with a more local, national or regional
orientation; between agents of global capitalism and popular forces; among competing groups
within the globalist bloc who may foment inter-state conflicts in pursuit of their particular
interests; and so on. The picture is further complicated by the instability wrought by the
breakdown of social order and the collapse of national state authority in many regions. In
particular, challenges to the global capitalist bloc may come from subordinate groups in
transnational civil society or from specific nation-states when these states are captured by
subordinate groups, such as in the case of Venezuela under the leadership of Hugo Chavez, as well
as from dominant groups who are less integrated into (or even opposed to) global capitalism,
such as, for example, the Baath Party / Iraq state elite prior to the 2003 U.S. invasion, sectors
among the Russian oligarchy, or Chinese economic and political elites. The U.S. government under
the George W. Bush presidency militarized social and economic contradictions, launching a
permanent war mobilization to try to stabilize the system through direct coercion. U.S.
interventionism and militarized globalization constituted less a campaign for U.S. hegemony
than a contradictory political response to the explosive crisis of global capitalism—to economic
stagnation, legitimation problems, and the rise of counter-hegemonic forces. The U.S. state has
attempted to play a leadership role on behalf of transnational capitalist interests, to act as
guarantor of global capitalism, both materially and symbolically, by deploying force and
threatening to apply coercion and sanctions against those who would transgress property rights,
close off any territory to transnational investors, or threaten to withdraw from the system. The
U.S. state has undertaken an unprecedented role in creating profitmaking opportunities for
transnational capital and pushing forward an accumulation process that left to its own devices (the
"free market") would likely ground to a halt.
Neoliberalistic policies are specifically political. They only serve to promote U.S.
hegemony in any given area. Refer to Malaysia as an example.
MUZAFFAR, 2013
(CAHNDRA; President of the International Movement for a Just World (JUST); Trans Pacific
Partnership is a Threat To National Sovereignty
http://www.counterpunch.org/2013/03/06/the-chavez-legacy/)
While some of the provisions of the TPP may be set aside at the behest of individual countries, it is
obvious that the US which is the driving force behind the pact is determined to use it as its vehicle
to strengthen its economic position in the Pacific region in the face of the rise of China. It explains
why China itself — economically the most dynamic nation in the region — has not been invited to
join the TPP. This is why it would be naïve to view the TPP as a mere economic and trade
arrangement. Its underlying motive is clearly political. It is a critical weapon in the US arsenal for
curbing and containing the emergence of a power which has the potential of shaping the future of
the entire Pacific in the decades to come.¶ The US will not allow this to happen. It knows that in
order to remain as the world’s sole superpower it has to ensure that it is at the helm of that one
region with the greatest economic viability and vitality. The US already has 320,000 troops in
the Pacific region. That is the military arm of Pacific Power. The TPP is designed to
secure the economic dimension of Pacific Power. As a nation committed to harmonious
relations among states, Malaysia should be extra cautious about participating in any
venture by any power, be it the United States or China, to enhance its hegemony over
the Pacific — a region whose very name signifies peace.
Hey Claire – Heg is Neolib… FYI
[Thx, Teddy]
MUELLER 11
(Julie L. "The IMF, Neoliberalism, and Hegemony," Global Society, 25:3, July, 378)
Today, one could argue that
neoliberalism has taken on a key role in the promotion of the transnational
hegemonic class. It promotes norms like free trade and the privatisation of assets, over competing ideas such
as nationalism and collectivism. However, there are moral, as well as economic, implications to this trend. One cannot deny that
certain social classes benefit from such policies while others suffer. Neoliberalism deems inequality
not only acceptable but also necessary for the system to function, and this value is reinforced
through the bilateral policies of states and through international organisations (IOs), such as the IMF. The main purpose of the
IMF, as noted on its website, is to “provide the global public good of financial stability.” A stable international financial system is defined as one
that provides an environment conducive to trade, and trade is viewed by proponents of neoliberalism as the engine of growth for all states.
However, stability
is too often defined in terms of the interests of the advanced industrial states, often
to the detriment of developing states. While the IMF has remained true to its stated mission in promoting policies that achieve
these goals, it is important to question the underlying assumptions of this approach to global economic stability. Surprisingly, while much
research has been done questioning the effectiveness of IMF policies, little has been written in the field of political economy addressing the
Fund’s underlying assumptions and how these came to dominate Fund policy making. Also, although many authors have been critical of the Fund
for its promotion of elite interests, there is little analysis of the cleavages within this class and the role the Fund plays in supporting one particular
segment of the economic elite. As arguably the most powerful international economic organisation, the Fund should be examined from a more
critical perspective.
Link- Human Rights
Neoliberalism causes massive human rights violations and prevents any stopping
them through a universal set of ideals that fails to account for specific situations
Harvey 7
(David, Distinguished Professor of Anthropology and Geography at the Graduate Center of the
City University of New York, “A Brief History of Neoliberalism”, Oxford University Press,
2007. Pg. 176-178)
The rise of opposition cast in terms of rights violations has been spectacular since 1980.
Before then, Chandler reports, a prominent journal such as Foreign Aff airs carried not a single
article on human rights. 33 Neoliberalism on Trial Human rights issues came to prominence after
1980 and positively boomed after the events in Tiananmen Square and the end of the Cold War
in 1989. This corresponds exactly with the trajectory of neoliberalization, and the two
movements are deeply implicated in each other. Undoubtedly, the neoliberal insistence upon
the individual as the foundational element in political economic life opens the door to
individual rights activism. But by focusing on those rights rather than on the creation or
recreation of substantive and open democratic governance structures, the opposition
cultivates methods that cannot escape the neoliberal frame. Neoliberal concern for the
individual trumps any social democratic concern for equality, democracy, and social
solidarities. The frequent appeal to legal action, furthermore, accepts the neoliberal
preference for appeal to judicial and executive rather than parliamentary powers. But it is
costly and time-consuming to go down legal paths, and the courts are in any case heavily
biased towards ruling class interests, given the typical class allegiance of the judiciary.
Legal decisions tend to favour rights of private property and the profit rate over rights of
equality and social justice. It is, Chandler concludes, ‘the liberal elite’s disillusionment with
ordinary people and the political process [that] leads them to focus more on the empowered
individual, taking their case to the judge who will listen and decide’. 34 Since most needy
individuals lack the financial resources to pursue their own rights, the only way in which
this ideal can be articulated is through the formation of advocacy groups. The rise of
advocacy groups and NGOs has, like rights discourses more generally, accompanied the
neoliberal turn and increased spectacularly since 1980 or so. The NGOs have in many instances
stepped into the vacuum in social provision left by the withdrawal of the state from such
activities. This amounts to privatization by NGO. In some instances this has helped accelerate
further state withdrawal from social provision. NGOs thereby function as ‘Trojan horses for
global neoliberalism’. 35 Furthermore, NGOs are not inherently democratic institutions. They
tend to be elitist, unaccountable (except to their donors), and by definition distant from
those they seek to protect or help, no matter how well meaning or progressive they may be.
They frequently conceal their agendas, and prefer direct negotiation with or influence over state
and class power. They often control their clientele rather than represent it. They claim and
presume to speak on behalf of those who cannot speak for themselves, even define the
interests of those they speak for (as if people are unable to do this for themselves). But the
legitimacy of their status is always open to doubt. When, for example, organizations agitate
successfully to ban child labour in production as a matter of universal human rights, they
may undermine economies where that labour is fundamental to family survival. Without
any viable economic alternative the children may be sold into prostitution instead (leaving
yet another advocacy group to pursue the eradication of that). The universality presupposed in
‘rights talk’ and the dedication of the NGOs and advocacy groups to universal principles
sits uneasily with the local particularities and daily practices of political and economic life
under the pressures of commodification and neoliberalization. But there is another reason
why this particular oppositional culture has gained so much traction in recent years.
Accumulation by dispossession entails a very diff erent set of practices from accumulation
through the expansion of wage labour in industry and agriculture. The latter, which
dominated processes of capital accumulation in the 1950s and 1960s, gave rise to an
oppositional culture (such as that embedded in trade unions and working-class political parties)
that produced embedded liberalism. Dispossession, on the other hand, is fragmented and
particular ––a privatization here, an environmental degradation there, a financial crisis of
indebtedness somewhere else. It is hard to oppose all of this specificity and particularity
without appeal to universal principles. Dispossession entails the loss of rights. Hence the
turn to a universalistic rhetoric of human rights, dignity, sustainable ecological practices,
environmental rights, and the like, as the basis for a unified oppositional politics.
Link – Investment – Debate Specific
Aligning debate with norms of investment neoliberalizes every aspect of our day to
day lives.
Harmes 01 (Adam, Professor of political science at the university of western Ontario, “mass Investment
culture”, new left review May-June 2001, Pages 21-22)
If the reality of a new era of ‘worker capitalism’ is not supported by the figures, how can we account for the
persistence of this myth—not just among policy-makers and the media but in the wider population? Part of the
answer must surely lie in the fact that, while the rise of mass investment has not given birth to a new
‘investor democracy’, it has ushered in a new investment culture, one that serves to
reinforce neoliberal ideology by naturalizing and depoliticizing the processes of global
finance, and by generating consent to its preferred policies. With the vast expansion of mutual funds
and private pension plans, the norms and practices of finance capital are becoming culturally
embedded in people’s everyday lives, in a way that a downturn in the stock market cannot destroy: when
stocks crash, investors simply make a temporary switch to bonds. Significantly, this emerging culture has
helped to create the perception that material benefits are accruing to broader layers
through the structures of neoliberalism. In contrast to the postwar era, where hegemony was constructed
primarily through productive capital and the state, consensus today is increasingly shaped through the vehicle of
finance capital, as the perceived gains of mutual-fund returns and the effects of investment culture reinforce both
positive and negative aspects of neoliberal ideology.
Link - Latin America Experts
Most ministers in Latin America have been taught neoliberalist ideologies in the
United State’s top-ranking economic schools.
Peters, 06
(Enrique Dussel Peters, Enrique Dussel Peters is Coordinator of the China/Mexico Studies
Center at the National Autonomous University of Mexico. The Mexican Economy since
NAFTA. Page 124)
The crises of ISI since the late 1960s, of Keynesianism, and of the welfare state, along with the
debt crisis of the 1980s, gave a new impetus to a new version of neoclassical, industrial and trade
literature. The crisis of the historic compromise that emerged as a result of the Depression of the
1930s and of World War II in most OECD nations not only weakened the respective states and
its institutions, but also specifically labor (Glyn et al. 1989). The emergence of export-oriented
industrialization (EOI) and of its particular applications varies according to the respective
country. Nevertheless, it is remarkable that at least since the middle of the 1980s most of the Latin
American countries have followed similar economic strategies based on stabilization and other
market-friendly economic reforms to fight populism and reduce the role of the state in the name of
economic effi- ciency. The specifics of the respective political systems, e.g. of authoritarian, fed-
eralist and/or democratic political systems among others, are significant, since they allow at least
for a different pace of implementation of the new policies, as well as for modifications or even
opposition to them, depending on the degree of negotiation between political sectors (Bresser
Pereira et al. 1993).
This new school of thought focused on the need for an export-oriented industrialization and a
radical departure from the ISI model of the relationship between the market and the state, i.e. EOI
became a theoretical and political response and alternative to ISI. EOI also became a significant
part of the so- called ‘Washington Consensus’ (Williamson 1992) since the 1980s.
However, EOI is not ‘external’ to developing countries. In addition to the crisis of ISI and of
corporatist sociopolitical structures since the late 1960s, most devel- oping nations have also
undergone significant ideological changes and experi- enced a shift in power between capital and
labor. Not only has EOI become mainstream economic theory in international trade and
development theory, but also many, if not most, government officials in Latin America have been
strongly influenced by this school of thought. Since the 1980s, most of the secretaries or ministers in
Latin America, through undergraduate or graduate studies in top- ranking US schools of
economics, have directly been inspired by EOI.
Link – Local Autonomy (Tri Lab)
Neoliberal multiculturism is a ruse designed to cover up the racial and class violence
put forth by neoliberalism
Robinson 08-American professor of sociology at the University of California, Santa Barbara, 2008, “Latin
America and Global Capitalism”, pgs
307-9
Compliance with the discipline of the capitalist market can be individual, but may be
equally effective as a collective response; if civil society organizations opt for development
models that reinforce the ideology of capitalist productive relations, they can embody and
advance the neoliberal project as collectivities and not individuals. As long as cultural
rights remain within these basic parameters, they contribute directly to the goal of neoliberal
self-governance; they reinforce its ideological tenets while meeting deeply felt needs; they
register dissent, while directing these collective political energies toward unthreatening
ends. (2006:75) As I have documented elsewhere (Robinson, 2003), the Mayan renaissance
unfolded alongside the penetration of global capitalism into the indigenous highlands and
the rapid development of the transnational model of accumulation through the establishment
of a market in land, commerce, rural and suburban maquiladora industries, nontraditional
agricultural exports, and transnational tourism. Local autonomy is not a viable alternative to
the national and transnational political system precisely because that system and the
neoliberal states that are its local brokers do not intend to allow local indigenous
communities to opt out of incorporation into global capitalism. The challenge facing the
indigenous movement became apparent to me during a June 2007 visit to El Cauca, one of the
indigenous heartlands in Colombia, invited by the Association of Indigenous Councils of North
Cauca. Colombia's indigenous struggle experienced a remarkable renaissance in recent
decades. The state was forced to approve a new constitution in 1991 that recognized not
only cultural rights but also indigenous rights to collective land and autonomous
administration of resources, and millions of acres of land have been reclaimed from
landlords. And while the indigenous are only 1 to 2 percent of the Colombian population,
they actually spearheaded the national popular mobilization against a free trade agreement
between Colombia and the United States. Indigenous identity, levels of internal
organization, and self-confidence seem to be at an all-time high. Yet more radical ideologies
and programs of struggle against neoliberalism and the neo-fascist Colombian state
competed with indigenista ideologies and projects, that is, what Hale terms neoliberal
multiculturalism. Even more importantly, the movement had reached an impasse in the face of
other burning matters, such as what types of alliances it should develop with other popular
sectors and whether it should seek to participate in national political struggle or limit itself to
protecting and extending local autonomy, and to what extend the indigenous could or should
provide leadership outside of their own communities. If the embrace by the TNS of
multiculturalism is a central component of the effort by the transnational elite to co-opt the
indigenous movement and construct a hegemonic order in the Americas, in the Gramscian
sense, it also exposes in my view the limits (if not the bankruptcy) of identity politics and the
pitfall of separating the analysis of race or ethnicity from that of class and from the critique
of (now globalized) capitalism. I agree with Hale that "as proponents of neoliberal
multiculturalism become ever more deeply invested in shaping cultural rights rather than denying
them, this shift helps explain the impasse that many indigenous rights movements now confront."
Recognition of indigenous cultural and ethnic rights from the state represented a cutting
edge of struggle so long as the state withheld those rights. But the moment when
"indigenous identity politics represented a frontal challenge to the state has passed, giving
way to a phase of much greater involvement of powerful actors in the formulation of
identity-based demands, intense negotiations from within powerful institutions, and
inevitably, greater internal dissention within the movements themselves" (2006:37). In
Hale's words, neoliberal multiculturalism has "the makings of a menacing political project,
informed by deepened knowledge of the [indigenous]. Recognition of certain [indigenous]
demands, often adopting the very 'language of contention' that indigenous activists
themselves deploy, generates a powerful capacity to punish those demands perceived as
militant, unyielding, or dangerous . . . the potential for fragmentation, cooptation, and
sheer perplexity is enormous" (2006:44-45). This is, in sum, a strategy for the hegemonic
incorporation rather than the previous coercive exclusion of indigenous populations. Slavoj
Zizek (1997) has pointed out that the Universal acquires concrete existence only when some
particular content starts to function as its stand-in, and that this link between the Universal
and the particular content which functions as its stand-in is contingent in that it is the
outcome of a political struggle for ideological hegemony. In order to be effective, "the ruling
ideology has to incorporate a series of features in which the exploited majority will be able
to recognize its authentic longings. In other words, each hegemonic universality has to
incorporate at least two particular contents, the authentic popular content as well as its
distortion by the relations of domination and exploitation" (Zizek, 1997:29). Zizek reminds
us of Etienne Balibar's reversal of Marx's classical formula: the ruling ideas are precisely
not directly the ideas of those who rule. Rather, these ideas incorporate a series of crucial
motifs and aspirations of the oppressed and rearticulate them in such a way that they
become compatible with the existing relations of domination. This is precisely what has
taken place with the transnational elite's embrace of multicultural indigenous rights; that
elite threw the ball back into the court of the indigenous. But the indigenous movement was
in the early twenty-first century part of an expansive counter-hegemony sweeping Latin America
as its fate became more than ever bound up with that of the popular majority. There is no reason
to assume that the "insurrectionary Indian" will not be able to prevail over the
"authorized Indian" and push the movement beyond its impasse.
Link – Global Warming
Link - Neoliberalism causes global warming
Werlhof 2008
(Prof. Claudia von Werlhof is Professor at the Institute of Political Sciences, University of Innsbruck,
Austria. Global Research, February 01, The Consequences of Globalization and Neoliberal Policies. What
are the Alternatives? http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-consequences-of-globalization-and-neoliberalpolicies-what-are-the-alternatives/7973)
It becomes obvious that neoliberalism marks not the end of colonialism but, to the contrary, the
colonization of the North. This new “colonization of the world” (Mies 2005) points back to the
beginnings of the “modern world system” in the “long 16th century” (Wallerstein 1979, Frank
2005, Mies 1986), when the conquering of the Americas, their exploitation and colonial
transformation allowed for the rise and “development” of Europe. The so-called “children’s
diseases” of modernity keep on haunting it, even in old age. They are, in fact, the main feature of
modernity’s latest stage. They are expanding instead of disappearing.¶ Where there is no South,
there is no North; where there is no periphery, there is no center; where there is no colony, there
is no – in any case no “Western” – civilization (Werlhof 2007a).¶ Austria is part of the world
system too. It is increasingly becoming a corporate colony (particularly of German corporations).
This, however, does not keep it from being an active colonizer itself, especially in the East
(Hofbauer 2003, Salzburger 2006).¶ Social, cultural, traditional and ecological considerations are
abandoned and give way to a mentality of plundering. All global resources that we still have –
natural resources, forests, water, genetic pools – have turned into objects of “utilization”. Rapid
ecological destruction through depletion is the consequence. If one makes more profit by cutting
down trees than by planting them, then there is no reason not to cut them (Lietaer 2006). Neither
the public nor the state interferes, despite global warming and the obvious fact that the clearing of
the few remaining rain forests will irreversibly destroy the earth’s climate – not to even speak of
the many other negative effects of such action (Raggam 2004). Climate, animal, plants, human
and general ecological rights are worth nothing compared to the interests of the corporations – no
matter that the rain forest is no renewable resource and that the entire earth’s ecosystem depends
on it. If greed – and the rationalism with which it is economically enforced – really was an
inherent anthropological trait, we would have never even reached this day.
Link: IMF
Neoliberalists use the façade of a financial safety net to spread the roots of neoliberalism
into countries. So in order for countries to get help, they must essential convert to
neoliberalism.
Weller and Singleton, 06
(Christian E. Weller and Laura Singleton, Dr. Christian E. Weller is a Senior Fellow at American
Progress and a professor of public policy at the McCormack Graduate School of Policy and
Global Studies at the University of Massachusetts, Boston. Laura Singleton: Behavioral Sciences
Collegium, BS, Mathematics, Davidson College, MBA, Harvard University, MS, PhD,
Management, Boston College. Peddling reform: the role of think tanks in shaping the neoliberal
policy agenda for the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. Page 74)
Additionally, the IMF could act as a stand-by lender to prevent financial panics or crises. To
qualify for short-term loans, countries would have to meet four conditions. First, the countries
would have to allow free entry of foreign financial institutions. Second, borrowers would have to
publish the maturity structure of their debts. Third, commercial banks would have to be
adequately capitalized. Finally, ‘a proper fiscal requirement’, as defined by the IMF, would have to
be realized ‘to assure that IMF resources would not be used to sustain irresponsible budget
priorities’ (Meltzer 2000).
The Commission’s majority also agreed that long-term lending for develop- ment assistance,
poverty reduction, and structural transformation would remain the purview of the World Bank
and the regional development banks. To achieve this goal, the majority argued that the banks
must be transformed from capital- intensive lending institutions ‘to sources of technical assistance,
providers of regional and global public goods, and facilitators of an increased flow of private sector
resources to the emerging countries’ (Meltzer 2000). Central to this para- digm shift would be the
gradual elimination of all resource transfers to countries with capital market access or an annual
per capita income greater than $4,000 over the subsequent five years. In addition, the banks
would limit assistance to countries with an annual per capita income greater than $2,500.
Link – Indigenous Adv
Indigenous peoples of Latin America are being oppressed by the neoliberalist order,
and the only way to free them is through a radical movement against the
neoliberalist capitalist expansion
Webber 7
(Jeffery, Professor of politics and international relations at Queen Mary University of London,
“Indigenous Struggle in Latin America: The Perilous Invisibility of Capital and Class”, Project
Muse, Fall 2007, Pg. 192)
The point of this introductory aside is to highlight the necessity of considering indigenous
struggles in contemporary Latin American within a greater system of domestic capitalist social
relations, class struggle, and an imperialist world order. We need to recognize the material
reality underpinning the ideology of neoliberal multiculturalism. The gains made by
indigenous peoples in achieving recognition by and selective incorporation into the state are
real; however, these should not be celebrated uncritically when the material well-being of
these same peoples has continued to deteriorate. Any meaningful emancipation of
indigenous peoples on the continent will bear fruit only through a combination of popular
class and antiracist struggles that tackles at one and the same time the devastations of
neoliberal capitalist expansion and the historical legacies of colonial and postcolonial
racism. Skepticism about what Marxism has to offer the discussion of indigenous struggle is
understandable, given that the tradition has sometimes been applied to the Latin American
context in crude and Eurocentric ways. I contend nevertheless that the best of historical
materialism can help us understand key dynamics and obstacles in indigenous struggles
and their relationships to class struggle. Similarly, the tendency of mainstream academe
(especially in North America) to ignore the Marxist tradition—in favor of postmodernism,
discursive analysis, and liberal institutionalism—has inhibited understanding of the
complexities of indigenous struggles. In a provocative introductory essay to a new, abridged
edition of Oliver Cromwell Cox’s 1948 classic Caste, Class, and Race, Adolph Reed, Jr. asks us
to “recognize that race is the product of social relations within history and political
economy” (2001). While none of the five books reviewed here in this essay roots itself in the
Marxist tradition, some recognize better than others that we treat indigenous struggles best
within a broader system of historical social relations.
Link - Integration
Greater integration into the global neoliberal market ensures the widening of
economic crisis and collapse of the global economy.
Ifediora 2009
(John O., Professor of Economics at the University of Wisconsin-Platteville, “The Global
Financial System And National Economies: A Conflation of Two Economic Doctrines”, May 46, 2009)
A Precise: For the first time since the great depression of the 1930s, developed nations, as a collectivity, have felt the full effect of the medicine they have been
prescribing to developing nations; and like the former recipients, they do not care much for it. The financial meltdown that began from the housing market bubble in
the US, and spread to the industrialized world in quick succession laid bare the fundamental weaknesses of free and unregulated capital market, and international
trade. Developing
nations, for now, have been spared the anguish, but for how long? But a decidedly
relevant question is why the current economic downturn is more remarkable in developed
economies, and less so for developing ones? Are we to assume that developing nations are relatively
immune from the current financial and economic crises as a result of prudent macroeconomic
policies they designed for their respective national economies or is it due to the infancy of their
financial sectors, and credit-market isolation from the industrialized world? In this paper, I intend to show that the
economic world order devised by developed nations and set in motion since the mid-1980s is based on two different economic platforms each designed to address the
respective needs of the world community of nations; one to accommodate macroeconomic policy needs of developed and donor nations, the other for developing ones,
and aid recipients. I propose to use two policy-initiatives devised by developed nations and their multinational surrogates to spur global economic integration, and
guide developing nations out of poverty to make my case. Specifically, my discussion would point to the neo-liberal policies of deregulation of capital markets, and
free international trade as advanced by rich nations, and implemented by the ‘Unholy Trinity’ of the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO as the source of past and
current global financial crises, and the primary reason for the abysmal economic realities extant in developing nations. Since the goals of sensible macroeconomic
policies (monetary and fiscal policies) are stability and growth, it would be shown that neo-liberal policies in this regard have been catastrophic, and need to be
modified, especially in light of current global financial and economic realities, and their impact on the economies of developing countries. At the outset, a brief review
of the current infrastructure of the global financial system is in order. The past thirty years of globalization effort by the developed world has seen incredible growth in
capital flows engendered by progressive deregulations of capital account transactions, the drive to boost global investment through a combined strategy of price
stability and high interest rate, and a strong agenda by the WTO to lift all remaining restrictions on foreign direct investment, and tariffs. On the upside, this neoliberal push for deregulation and liberalization of trade and capital flows have the capacity to enhance domestic growth in recipient countries through relatively easy
access to foreign funds that could be utilized to establish and expand the host country’s industrial capacity. But there is a catch; an
untargeted and free
flow of foreign capital could be a major source of financial crises that has the remarkable potential
to destabilize a national economy and impede economic growth. More on this in due course. For a better appreciation of
how trade deregulation and liberalization of capital accounts affect national economies and the global financial system, a brief look at the constituent parts of a
country’s balance of payment account is useful. A country’s Balance of Payment (BOP) account consists of two sub-accounts: current account, and capital account.
The current account primarily records recurring economic transactions, trade in goods and services, and fund transfers by migrants into the country; the capital
account on the other hand concerns itself with the country’s international exchanges of assets and liabilities, the flow of foreign direct investment (FDI), portfolio
investments, and loans. Of the two sub-accounts that make-up a country’s Balance of Payment Account, the capital account is arguably the primary source of
macroeconomic stability or dislocations attributable to the neo-liberal efforts at liberalization that the world has witnessed over the last three decades. I will return to
this point momentarily. The Role of the IMF, the World Bank, and Developed Countries in the current global Financial System When
developing
countries run into financial crises, as they often do, their usual port of call is the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), one of the Bretton Woods institutions formed by the allied powers (primarily the US and Britain) right after WWII. Then, its
primary mandate was to extend short-term financial credit and loans to a war-turn-Europe, and to countries emerging from colonial rule. Its counterpart, the World
Bank, was designed to assist in long-term infrastructure development and capacity building, and during a significant portion of the post-war years executed their
mandates reasonably well until the rise of neo-liberalism in the mid 1970s. It must be noted that before these Washington Institutions or more informally, the
‘Washington Consensus’ became fully embedded in the neo-liberal orthodoxy, there were no banking crises in the developing world between 1945 and 1971, and only
16 currency crises within the same period in contra-distinction to 17 banking crises, and 57 currency crises between 1973 and 1997 when the IMF began the hard push
much of what transpires
in the global financial system or the global economy for that matter, is determined by the activities
of rich industrialized countries. Collectively they produce on average 80% of the world’s total
production of goods and service, account for 70% of all international transactions, and control up
to 90% of all foreign direct investments (Ferguson, 2003). And since the richest ones amongst these
countries are the major contributors to the IMF and the World Bank, they also shape the rules by
which the global economy is run. Unfortunately, these rules of economic engagement are bifurcated: one set of rules that
embody keynesian activism for rich countries, and neo-liberal orthodoxy and free market for the
rest.
for capital account liberalization (Friedman, 2000). It should not come as a surprise, even to the disinterested observer, that
Link – Investment – Venezuela
Direct investment exists as a social force in foreign countries, and pressures them
into the neoliberal system
Empirics prove that restructuring and free movements of capital in Latin American
states leads to accommodation into the neoliberal system
Panitch and Gindin- Distinguished research professor of political science@ York University and editor of
the socialist register, Research director of Canadian UAW and chief economist of CAW, September-October 2005
[“Superintending Global Capital” pgs. 101-123]
Yet even as they closed the economic gap with the US, postwar Europe and Japan were
becoming ever more tightly penetrated, integrated and dependent on the American empire.
Crucial here was the changing nature of international capital flows. Whereas under the British
empire these had overwhelmingly taken the form of portfolio investment (e.g. lending to
governments for infrastructural development), the dominant capital flows were now direct foreign
investment, primarily from the US. This penetration and integration, often effected by us
multinationals with the full back-up of the us state, meant that American capital now existed as a
material social force inside a good many other social formations.10 This had a more profound
impact on social relations, property rights and labor relations than purely financial flows would
have done, and involved direct links with local banks, suppliers and buyers. Moreover, as with
trade dependence, the integrated production processes that multinational corporations spawned
had the effect of restraining protectionist impulses and reinforcing pressures for free trade. Thus,
beyond the Cold War political and military ties which were already shaping the range of options
under consideration, American direct investment brought in its train American legal and
consultancy firms, business schools, investment houses and accountants. The restructuring of
domestic class forces and institutions that accompanied all this was, in turn, reinforced by military
reliance on the us, not just for protection against Soviet or Chinese expansionism, but for the
security of their capitalists’ investments in much of the Third World.
Panitch and Gindin- Distinguished research professor of political science@ York University and editor of
the socialist register, Research director of Canadian UAW and chief economist of CAW, September-October 2005
[“Superintending Global Capital” pgs. 101-123]
Finally, accommodation by other capitalist states to the American imperial project was mediated
not only through the threat of Communism and the Cold War, but also through the quasiKeynesian form of international economic management adopted in 1945, the postwar welfarestate regimes, and the decolonization process in the Third World. All these modes of
accommodation entered into crisis by the 1970s, but no fundamental challenge to the American
empire emerged from the other advanced capitalist states, and those from popular anti-colonial
forces in the Third World were either defeated, co-opted or marginalized. The neoliberal turn in
the us, and its subsequent near-universalization, entailed the restructuring and opening of the
world’s states, including ex-Communist ones, to economic competition, the free movement of
capital and the deepening of capitalist social relations. Both financial markets and international
financial institutions played a crucial role in facilitating this and in reinforcing American imperial
power.
Link - Investment - Mexico
History is on our side: US investment offers are accepted by elites in target countries
to advance neoliberal projects – Mexico proves.
HARVEY 6
(David, distinguished professor of anthropology and geography at the Graduate
Center of CUNY, "On Neoliberalism: An Interview with David Harvey" Monthly
Review, June 19, http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2006/lilley190606.html)
[Citibank head] Walter Wriston came up with the following comment, that the safest place to invest the money is in countries, because countries
can't disappear -- you always know where they are. And so they started to make the money available to many countries like Argentina, Mexico,
Latin America was very popular, but also places like Poland even. They lent a lot of money to those countries. That worked out quite well for a
while, but then in 1982 there was this general fiscal crisis, particularly after Volcker had raised the interest rate. What this meant was that the
Mexicans who had borrowed money at 5 percent were now having to pay it back at 16 percent or 17 percent, and they found they couldn't do it.
Mexico was about to go bankrupt in 1982. That was the point at which neoliberalism kicked in.
The US, via the International Monetary Fund and the US Treasury, said: we'll bail you out, but we'll bail you out on condition
that you start to privatize and open up the country to foreign investment and start to adopt a neoliberal stance.
Initially the Mexicans really didn't do that very much, but by the time you get to 1988 they start to do it sort of big time. But here's the interesting
it's unreasonable to think that actually the US imposed neoliberalization on Mexico . What
happened was that the US was putting noeliberalizing pressures on Mexico and an elite inside of
Mexico seized the opportunity to say: yes, that's what we want. So it was a coalition between the
elite in Mexico and the US Treasury/IMF that put together the kind of neoliberalization package that
came to Mexico in the late 1980s. And actually if you look at the pattern, it's very rare for there to be a straight
imposition of neoliberalizing policies through the IMF or the US. It's nearly always an alliance
between an internal elite, as it had been in Chile, and US forces that put this thing together. And it's the internal elite who are as much
thing:
to blame for neoliberalization as the international institutions.
Link- Labor
Capitalist employers strip their workers of any power and in turn use them to
further their own interests
Harvey 7
(David, Distinguished Professor of Anthropology and Geography at the Graduate Center of the
City University of New York, “A Brief History of Neoliberalism”, Oxford University Press,
2007. Pg. 167-168)
Individuals enter the labour market as persons of character, as individuals embedded in
networks of social relations and socialized in various ways, as physical beings identifiable by
certain characteristics (such as phenotype and gender), as individuals who have accumulated
various skills (sometimes referred to as ‘human capital’) and tastes (sometime referred to as
‘cultural capital’), and as living beings endowed with dreams, desires, ambitions, hopes,
doubts, and fears. For capitalists, however, such individuals are a mere factor of
production, though not an undiff erentiated factor since employers require labour of certain
qualities, such as physical strength, skills, flexibility, docility, and the like, appropriate to certain
tasks. Workers are hired on contract, and in the neoliberal scheme of things short-term
contracts are preferred in order to maximize flexibility. Employers have historically used
diff erentiations within the labour pool to divide and rule. Segmented labour markets then
arise and distinctions of race, ethnicity, gender, and religion are frequently used, blatantly
or covertly, in ways that redound to the employers’ advantage. Conversely, workers may use
the social networks in which they are embedded to gain privileged access to certain lines of
employment. They typically seek to monopolize skills and, through collective action and the
creation of appropriate institutions, seek to regulate the labour market to protect their interests.
In this they are merely constructing that ‘protective covering of cultural institutions’ of
which Polanyi speaks. Neoliberalization seeks to strip away the protective coverings that
embedded liberalism allowed and occasionally nurtured. The general attack against labour
has been two-pronged. The powers of trade unions and other working-class institutions are
curbed or dismantled within a particular state (by violence if necessary). Flexible labour
markets are established. State withdrawal from social welfare provision and
technologically induced shifts in job structures that render large segments of the labour
force redundant complete the domination of capital over labour in the marketplace. The
individualized and relatively powerless worker then confronts a labour market in which
only short-term contracts are off ered on a customized basis. Security of tenure becomes a
thing of the past (Thatcher abolished it in universities, for example). A ‘personal responsibility
system’ (how apt Deng’s language was!) is substituted for social protections (pensions, health
care, protections against injury) that were formerly an obligation of employers and the state.
Individuals buy products in the markets that sell social protections instead. Individual
security is therefore a matter of individual choice tied to the aff ordability of financial
products embedded in risky financial markets. The second prong of attack entails
transformations in the spatial and temporal co-ordinates of the labour market. While too
much can be made of the ‘race to the bottom’ to find the cheapest and most docile labour
supplies, the geographical mobility of capital permits it to dominate a global labour force
whose own geographical mobility is constrained. Captive labour forces abound because
immigration is restricted. These barriers can be evaded only by illegal immigration (which
creates an easily exploitable labour force) or through short-term contracts that permit, for
example, Mexican labourers to work in Californian agribusiness only to be shamelessly
shipped back to Mexico when they get sick and even die from the pesticides to which they
are exposed.
Link – Labor - Mexico (Survivors)
Neoliberalism made Mexico dependent on American food exports, which in turn, hurt the
labor force so much that it created an influx of immigrants into the United States. The
immigrants are then subject to structural violence.
Otero, 2011
(Gerardo Otero, Dr. Gerardo Otero is Professor of Sociology at Simon Fraser University (SFU).
He is an Associate Member of the Latin American Studies Program and of the School of
International Studies at SFU, and an Adjunct Professor in the Development Studies Doctoral
Program at the Universidad Autónoma de Zacatecas, in Mexico. Journal of Poverty. Page 384386)
This article explores the way in which the U.S. economy has faced the crisis of the Fordist stage
of capitalism since the 1970s by focusing on a cheap- labor strategy to restore profitability. By
endorsing the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), U.S. officials ensured access to
an abundant supply of labor south of the border. For their part, Mexico’s political tech- nocrats
placed their bet for economic growth on the comparative advantage of cheap labor. This has been a
losing bet for the workers of both countries: Neoliberalism and Mexico’s integration into the North
American economy— without free labor mobility—have had a detrimental impact, particularly on
Mexico. The counterpart of its loss of food self-sufficiency by growing dependency on U.S.-grains
imports has been the loss of labor sovereignty. Defined as the ability of a nation to generate
employment with livable wages for the vast majority of the population, labor sovereignty has been a
casualty of Mexico’s economic integration with its northern neighbors. The most vis- ible result of
this loss has been substantially increased out-migration rates, with vast numbers of displaced
Mexican workers flowing into the United States in search for work, most often unauthorized or
undocumented.
More specifically, this article explores the relation between food self- sufficiency and labor
sovereignty in the midst of Mexico’s integration to its northern neighbors, especially to the U.S.
economy. It compares and contrasts food self-sufficiency in the three NAFTA countries around
produc- tion for the domestic market, per-capita calorie consumption, and overall food trade. The
main proposition is that food-self-sufficiency is a condition for a country to enjoy labor
sovereignty, as defined above. Of the three NAFTA nations, Mexico is the least self-sufficient, and
hence the one that expels the largest rate of migrants. Although Mexico’s exports of fruits and
vegetables to the United States and Canada increased substantially since the late 1980s, this
sector did not generate nearly enough employment to absorb bankrupted peasants. Therefore,
Mexico has become dependent on the importation of basic-subsistence grains, which used to be
produced by smallholder peasant farmers. Many peasants became redundant in the Mexican
economy, and their only way out, literally, has been to migrate to the United States or Canada.
Although most migrants to Canada (a small minority) enter that country as part of statesponsored guest worker pro- grams (Otero & Preibisch, 2010), the vast majority of migrants to
the United States do so as undocumented or unauthorized workers.
The presence of large masses of low-skill workers in the United States, authorized or not, raises
huge issues of labor rights, discrimination, and exclusion. It has been documented that there is an
inverse relation between numbers and rights (Ruhs & Martin, 2008): the more migrant workers
there are in rich countries, the fewer their rights are, and vice versa. The fact is that employer
demand for workers is “negatively sloped” with respect to labor costs, which means that more
rights for migrants typically means higher costs. In North America, the United States tends to
have much higher “numbers” than rights, whereas Canada tries to fit the Scandinavian model of
fewer numbers and more rights. But numbers of guest workers in Canada have started to outpace
the numbers of immigrants as permanent residents or citizens as of 2006, which raises the
question whether both of NAFTA’s rich countries are converging toward the numbers side of the
equation to the detriment of workers’ rights.
Link – Labor Protections
It is neoliberalism, not lack of labor protections, that induces violent crime across
Latin America. The aff treats the symptom, whitewashing the cause of anonymizing
violence strengthen.
Portes and Hoffman 3
(Alejandro and Kelly, Professor of Sociology at Princeton University and PhD in sociology,
“LATIN AMERICAN CLASS STRUCTURES: Their Composition and Change during the
Neoliberal Era”, Latin American Research Review, February 2003, Pg. 66)
The contraction of formal employment and the growth of income inequality associated with
the neoliberal economic model have been associated with other less peaceful responses than
petty enterprise and invented self-employment. In the new free-for-all market promoted by the
dominant ideology, it is not surprising that some of the most disadvantaged members of
society would seek redress by ignoring the existing normative framework. Perceptions of
crime and civil insecurity have risen in response in most Latin American major cities. As an
ECLAC (2001, 208) report on the topic concludes: Latin America and the Caribbean have
experienced an increase in crime and violence. The situation is such that the mortality rate
associated with violent deeds has begun to affect the general mortality rate. Delinquency
has increased in all Latin American cities and is identified as a rising problem in all public
opinion surveys. A different Inter-American Development Bank report on the same subject:
Crime has become a staple feature of many cities in Latin America. Muggings, burglaries,
car jackings, and even homicides occur with alarming frequency and disarming impunity
in many urban centers throughout the region. (Gaviria and Pagés 1999, 3) In support of these
assertions, the latter report presents figures on the evolution of the homicide rate per 100,000
which are reproduced in table 7. They show a generalized increase in homicides for the region as
a whole, albeit with significant national differences. The regional homicide rate stood at 20 per
100,000 in 1995, which makes Latin America the most violent region of the world. The
regional figure is significantly affected by extraordinary rates in Colombia and El Salvador. The
countries of the Southern Cone plus Costa Rica still have low rates, but homicides have been on
the rise in the Andean region countries, particularly in Venezuela and also in Brazil.
Labor protections that do not reconfigure the neoliberal project act as ideological
supports, undermining attempts at true transformation.
Pollin 06
(Robert Pollin is a professor of economics at the University of Massachusetts, “Resurrection of
the rentier”, Oxford University Press,
<http://www.peri.umass.edu/fileadmin/pdf/other_publication_types/NLR28008.pdf>)
The underlying premise behind the mixed economy was straightforward. Keynes and likeminded reformers were not willing to give up on capital- ism, in particular two of its basic
features: that ownership and control of the economy’s means of production would remain
primarily in the hands of¶ private capitalists; and that most economic activity would be guided by
‘mar- ket forces’, that is, the dynamic combination of material self-seeking and competition.
More specifically, the driving force of the mixed economy, as with free-market capitalism, should
continue to be capitalists trying to make as much profit as they can. At the same time, Keynes was
clear that in main- taining a profit-driven marketplace, it was also imperative to introduce policy
interventions to counteract capitalism’s inherent tendencies—demonstrated to devastating effect
during the 1930s calamity—toward financial break- downs, depressions and mass
unemployment.¶ Keynes’s framework also showed how full employment and social wel- fare
interventions could be justified not simply on grounds of social uplift, but could also promote the
stability of capitalism. Thus, if workers are employed and can bring home decent paychecks, they
and their families will consequently spend more money, which in turn will expand markets and
create more profit opportunities for business. Unemployment insur- ance and other income support
policies correspondingly establish a stable floor on the overall level of market demand in the
economy. This enables businesses to assume that their customer base is not likely to evaporate in
the event of an economic downturn, bringing them to ruin.¶
Link – Labor Protections (Survivors 2NC)
The binding standards with Jordan have been proven as a complete failure, doing
nothing to stop the violent repression of the workers
Ny Times 06- “An ugly side of Free Trade: Sweatshops in Jordan”
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/03/business/worldbusiness/03clothing.html?pagewanted=all
Propelled by a free trade agreement with the United States, apparel manufacturing is booming in
Jordan, its exports to America soaring twentyfold in the last five years.¶ But some foreign
workers in Jordanian factories that produce garments for Target, Wal-Mart and other American
retailers are complaining of dismal conditions — of 20-hour days, of not being paid for months
and of being hit by supervisors and jailed when they complain.¶ An advocacy group for workers
contends that some apparel makers in Jordan, and some contractors that supply foreign workers
to them, have engaged in human trafficking. Workers from Bangladesh said they paid $1,000 to
$3,000 to work in Jordan, but when they arrived, their passports were confiscated, restricting their
ability to leave and tying them to jobs that often pay far less than promised and far less than the
country's minimum wage.¶ "We used to start at 8 in the morning, and we'd work until midnight, 1
or 2 a.m., seven days a week," said Nargis Akhter, a 25-year-old Bangladeshi who, in a phone
interview from Bangladesh, said she worked last year for the Paramount Garment factory outside
Amman. "When we were in Bangladesh they promised us we would receive $120 a month, but
in the five months I was there I only got one month's salary — and that was just $50."¶ The
advocacy group, the National Labor Committee, which is based in New York, found substandard
conditions in more than 25 of Jordan's roughly 100 garment factories and is set to release a report
on its findings today. Its findings were supported in interviews with current and former workers.¶
Such complaints have dogged the global apparel industry for years, even as it has adopted
measures intended to improve working conditions in factories that produce clothing for American
and European consumers. But the abusive conditions that the guest workers described show how
hard it is to control sweatshops as factories spring up in new places, often without effective
monitoring in place. In recent years , Jordan has become a magnet for apparel manufacturers,
helped by the privileged trade position that the United States has given it, first because of its 1994
peace accord with Israel and then because of a free trade agreement signed with Washington in
2001. ¶ Jordan's apparel industry, which exported $1.2 billion to the United States last year, employs tens of thousands of guest
workers, mainly from Bangladesh and China.¶ In interviews this week, five Bangladeshis who used to work in Jordanian apparel
factories and four who still do had similar tales of paying more than $1,000 to work in Jordan, of working 90 to 120 hours a
week, of not being paid the overtime guaranteed by Jordanian law, of sleeping 10 or 20 to a small dorm room. The National
Labor Committee helped arrange interviews with the Bangladeshi workers, who spoke through interpreters.¶ The largest retailer
in the United States, Wal-Mart, and one of the largest clothing makers, Jones Apparel, confirmed yesterday that they had
discovered serious problems with the conditions at several major Jordanian factories.¶ In addition, a factory monitor for a major
American company confirmed that Jordanian factories routinely confiscated their guest workers' passports, doctored wage and
hour records and coached employees to lie to government and company inspectors about working conditions. The monitor asked
not to be identified because the company had not given authorization to speak publicly.¶ Beth Keck, a spokeswoman for WalMart, said the company did not own or manage factories, but tried to improve working conditions in Jordan and elsewhere. "It is
a continuous challenge, not just for Wal-Mart but for any company," she said, noting that the most commonly observed problems
included failure to pay proper wages, "egregious hours," and "use of false or insufficient books or documentation."¶ Charles
Kernaghan, executive director of the National Labor Committee, which has exposed mistreatment in
factories in Central America and China, said he was shocked by what he discovered in Jordan.¶
"These are the worst conditions I've ever seen," he said. "You have people working 48 hours
straight. You have workers who were stripped of their passports, who don't have ID cards that
allow them to go out on the street. If they're stopped, they can be imprisoned or deported, so
they're trapped, often held under conditions of involuntary servitude."¶ Mr. Kernaghan said
Bangladeshi workers had contacted his organization to complain about working conditions in
Jordan. He then traveled to Jordan and met quietly with dozens of workers. He said American
companies, despite their monitoring efforts, were often slow to uncover workplace abuses because
workers were coached to lie to them or were scared to speak out. Moreover, factories often send
work out to substandard subcontractors without notifying American retailers.¶ Several factory
owners in Jordan insisted that they treated their workers properly.¶ "Some people are always
making allegations," said Karim Saifi, the owner of United Garment Manufacturing, a factory
near Amman that workers criticized for long hours and wage violations. "As far as we know, we
follow all the labor laws here. If we were not abiding by all of the local Jordan laws, we would
not be able to operate."¶ Several foreign apparel workers said that while their factories required
them to stay until midnight, the Jordanian workers were usually allowed to leave at 4 p.m.¶ Two
large industrial zones outside Amman are thriving, having geared themselves to the American
apparel market. They have attracted dozens of garment manufacturers, some with 200 workers,
some with 2,000, that say they produce clothes for J. C. Penney, Sears, Wal-Mart, Gap and
Target.¶ "It would be wrong to think that problems at a few places are representative of the 102
apparel factories in my country," said Yanal Beasha, Jordan's trade representative in
Washington.¶ Jordan's ambassador to the United States, Karim Kawar, said "If there are any
violations of our labor laws, we certainly take it seriously."¶ Mr. Beasha said Jordanian
government inspectors monitor the working conditions in factories. But several guest workers
said factory managers hid abuses by coaching workers to lie. Mr. Beasha said the Jordanian
government cared about the welfare of foreign guest workers, noting that it enforced overtime
laws and recently increased the minimum wage for citizens and guest workers.¶ But Mohammed
Z., who has worked for more than a year at the Paramount Garment Factory, said that even
though he worked more than 100 hours a week — normally from 7 to midnight seven days a
week — the company refused to pay him overtime when he did not meet production targets. He
asked that his last name be withheld for fear of retribution.¶ Having paid $2,000 to work in
Jordan, he said, in an interview from Amman, "I'm not earning enough to repay my loan or to
support my wife and son."¶ Unhappy that his passport has been confiscated, he said: "My identity
has been taken by the company. I have no freedom because I have no freedom to move to other
places."¶ Mohammed Saiful Islam, 30, a Bangladeshi who was production manager at Western
Garment, said that several times the workers had to work until 4 a.m., then sleep on the factory's
floor for a few hours, before resuming work at 8 a.m.¶ "The workers got so exhausted they became
sick," he said. "They could hardly stay awake at their machines."¶ Mr. Saiful, who is in the
United States to highlight poor working conditions in Jordan, pointed to a yellow and black
fleece sweatshirt that he said his factory made. It had an Athletic Works label made for WalMart, selling for $9.48.¶ "Sometimes when companies sent in monitors, the workers were
instructed what to say," Mr. Saiful said.¶ Mohamed Irfan, who in a telephone interview from
Jordan said he was Western's owner, said, "The workers get the minimum wage, and all times,
there is no problem in our factory."¶ Mohamed Kasim, Paramount's owner, said his factory also
paid its workers properly. Mr. Kasim and other factory managers said workers received free
room and board and sometimes medical care.¶ But several workers said that when they were sick
they did not receive medical care, but were instead punished and had their pay docked.¶ Several
Bangladeshis said there were terrible conditions at factories that made clothes for Wal-Mart and
Jones Apparel, which owns brands like Gloria Vanderbilt and Jones New York.¶ Ms. Keck, the
Wal-Mart spokeswoman, said company inspectors recently identified "serious violations" of its
labor rules at three Jordanian factories. At Honorway Apparel Jordan, for example, which
manufactures sleepwear for Wal-Mart, inspectors found employees working off the clock,
managers who refused to pay overtime and wages that "could not be verified," Ms. Keck said. At
the Ivory Garment Factory, which Wal-Mart ceased working with two years ago, inspectors
found "egregious working hours."¶ Joele Frank, a spokeswoman for Jones Apparel, said the
company had also found "serious problems" at the Ivory Garment Factory, which produces
Gloria Vanderbilt clothing, and said it would "monitor the situation closely." A spokesman for
Sears Holding, said the company was investigating potential problems at Honorway, which
produces clothes for Kmart, a division of Sears Holding.¶ A Kohl's spokeswoman denied workers'
accusations that clothing sold by the company was made at several Jordanian factories with poor
conditions. Target said it worked with only one factory that has come under criticism— Al Safa
Garments, which Wal-Mart recently cited for labor violations.¶ Many retailers said their policy
was, after discovering violations, to work with a factory to improve conditions, rather than
automatically withdraw their business. Wal-Mart says it gives factories a year to fix serious
problems, reinspecting them every 120 days.¶ "Our business with the factory is the only leverage
we have to push for improvement," Ms. Keck said.¶ After The New York Times asked about the
accusations on Monday, Wal-Mart dispatched two inspectors to Jordan.¶ Hazrat Ali, 25, who
worked from September 2004 to March 2005 at the Al Shahaed factory, said he sometimes worked
48 hours in a row and received no pay for the six months.¶ "If we asked for money, they hit us," he
said.¶ Nasima Akhter, 30, said that the Western factory gave its workers a half-glass of tea for
breakfast and often rice and some rotten chicken for lunch.¶ "In the four months I was in Jordan,
they didn't pay us a single penny," she said. "When we asked management for our money and for
better food, they were very angry at us. We were put in some sort of jail for four days without
anything to eat. And then they forced us to go back to Bangladesh."
Link: Latin America
Neoliberalism, once the primary economic model of Latin America, is now
encountering heavy resistance; socialist governments have emerged in the region
Simon Emir Sader July-August 2009
graduated in Philosophy by the University of São Paulo , master in political philosophy and a doctorate in
political science by the same institution. professor of politics at Unicamp . , directs the Public Policy
Laboratory (LPP) of the State University of Rio de Janeiro , where he is a professor of sociology. . He is
currently Professor Doctor of the University of the State of Rio de Janeiro, “Postneoliberalism in Latin
America”
Latin America was the first region to adopt neoliberalism as its hegemonic¶ model, as well as
the earliest to try to implant alternatives. It¶ went from being a region in which the model
was dominant to a territory¶ of hegemonic instability in which alternatives were sought.¶
Resistance to neoliberalism in countries like Brazil, Uruguay and¶ Mexico, among others, has
fostered the constitution of a significant¶ opposing force, which in many cases has halted the
full realisation of¶ neoliberal projects. However, while some political powers with their¶ roots
in these movements have begun to express resistance to neoliberalism¶ in the political arena,
they have not put postneoliberal policies¶ into practice. They have remained within the model,
tempering¶ it with compensatory social policies.¶ Four governments seek to locate
themselves outside of this model:¶ Cuba, Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador. They are
developing different¶ political models with distinct socio-economic structures, but they¶
share a tendency not to make economic-financial objectives central¶ and favour policies with
social objectives. They seek a strategy in¶ which economic concerns are subordinate to social
concerns, breaking¶ the hegemony of financial capital and market mechanisms.
Link - Loans
Foreign loans are used as catalyst to increase neoliberal power
Petras & Veltmeyer ‘02
(James Petras is a retired Bartle Professor of Sociology at Binghamton University in
Binghamton, Henry Veltmeyer is a professor of Sociology and International Development
Studies at Saint Mary's University, Age of Reverse Aid: Neo-liberalism as a Catalyst of
Regression)
The term 'foreign aid' is at best ambiguous, disguising more than it reveals, Bilateral and
commercial loans, as well as loans from the international financial institutions (IFIs), require the
payment of principal and interest. Even if interest rates on JFI loans are lower than those of the
commercial banks, the onerous repayment conditions have had a devastating impact on policy
making in developing countries, Jan Pronk's essay argues that aid is not the prime mover of
development but a catalyst. However, the fundamental question is: aid as a catalyst for what and
for whom? for an answer to this question we turn to what could be termed a politically 'realist'
approach to aid (Hayter, 1971, 1985; Magdofr,¶ 1969). In this approach the role of aid is examined
in its historical context, looking at how foreign aid is part of the arsenal of policy instruments used
by aspiring hegemonic states to conquer markets and promote the interests of their capitalist
classes against competitors and their nationalist and socialist opponents. The 'idealist' view, in
contrast, conceives of aid as a disinterested policy divorced from the 'interests' of the capitalist
class and guided by humanitarian concerns. Democratic values and economic well- being. More
often than not, idealists dissociate their discussion of aid from the historical-structural context in
which it is embedded and argue in terms of normative values and the degree of compliance \vith
those values by the recipient country,¶ There are two types of realist critics of the-'idealist'
approach. Market fundamentalists like Milton Friedman (1982) condemn foreign aid because it is
said to subsidize 'statism' and hinder market forces that are better-able to deal with economic and.
social problems. Some critics, on the other hand, argue that 'aid' from hegemonic countries
undermines Third World develoment by catalyzing structural changes that undermine popular
sovereignty, facilitate vast outflows of funds and undermine locally based productive units.¶ In the
following we adopt the realist perspective that foreign loans and grants are a catalyst of 'reverse
aid' - designed to benefit the donor countries, In the context of widespread 'implementation of a
neo-liberal model of capitalist development, aid has contributed towards what could be termed 'bad
governance' (neo-authoritarianism, large-scale chronic corruption and external subordination),
extending and deepening social inequal- ities, and generating conditions of global poverty; as well
as economic stagnation and volatility in the international flows of capital
Loans from neoliberalist developments lead to unstable economic policies and the
destruction of the environment.
Weller and Singleton, 06
(Christian E. Weller and Laura Singleton, Dr. Christian E. Weller is a Senior Fellow at American
Progress and a professor of public policy at the McCormack Graduate School of Policy and
Global Studies at the University of Massachusetts, Boston. Laura Singleton: Behavioral Sciences
Collegium, BS, Mathematics, Davidson College, MBA, Harvard University, MS, PhD,
Management, Boston College. Peddling reform: the role of think tanks in shaping the neoliberal
policy agenda for the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. Page 78)
More importantly, if foreign direct investment is given priority over domestic development in
creating viable financial markets, the need for international capital will continue, as large sectors of
the economy will remain underserved by financial institutions.7 Thus, developing economies will
have to continue to bor- row on international capital markets, which will likely result in export-led
growth strategies to repay international debts. These strategies, in turn, will encourage
environmentally harmful and unsustainable economic policies. Developing economies should
instead focus on strengthening their own financial institutions, which would reduce the need for
more international capital.
International loans and treaties globalize Latin American economies and open them up to neoliberalism
Babb ’13
(Sarah Babb, Professor Ph.D., Northwestern University, American Journal of Sociology, The
Rebirth of the Liberal Creed: Paths to Neoliberalism in Four Countries,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/367922)
Mexican liberalization proceeded in stages. The first was a period of structural adjustment
measures, conducted under the auspices of an IMF program, beginning in 1982. This period was
characterized by the imposition of fiscal and monetary austerity, and the beginnings of a gradual
and selective opening to free trade and other market mechanisms. The second period, which began
around 1985, was one of “structural reforms”—in other words, of recognizably “neoliberal”
policies. This phase was marked by a much more radical opening to free trade (see fig. 3), and the
imposition of a host of other liberalizing reforms associated with the administration of Carlos
Salinas (1988–94). The financial system was liberalized, and policy toward foreign investors was
modified such that foreign firms could acquire up to 100% ownership in publicly traded Mexican
firms (Moffett 1989, p. A11). Amendments to Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution effectively
ended Mexico’s revolutionary history of land reform and opened Mexican lands to purchase by
private investors, both domestic and foreign (Córdoba 1994, pp. 256–57). And in 1994, the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was put into effect, obligating Mexico to lower tariffs
and eliminate nontariff barriers on goods imported from the United States and Canada.¶ How did
Mexico undergo this radical turnaround from the free‐ spending “populism” of the 1970s to the
free‐ market capitalism of the 1990s? There is no doubt that international factors played a critical
role. In particular, the globalization of finance in the 1970s, and the consequent Third World debt
crisis, created a new set of constraints and opportunities for Mexican policy makers. This had two
outstanding consequences for Mexican policy: first, the internationalization and
professionalization of Mexican economic policy makers; second, the creation of significant
material incentives to pursue neoliberal policies.
Link - Localism
The affirmative is too local: It plays into the hands of elites and reaffirms the
structure of neoliberalism. The Alternative alone is preferable.
HARVEY 6
(David, distinguished professor of anthropology and geography at the Graduate
Center of CUNY, "On Neoliberalism: An Interview with David Harvey" Monthly
Review, June 19, http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2006/lilley190606.html)
DH: Yes, I
object very much to that angle of left thinking these days that says, let us just simply rely upon all the local,
specific movements here, there, and everywhere, to somehow or other generate a complete change in the world
without confronting state power .
I think this
plays into the hands of the neoliberal ethic, and I think it
plays into the hands of the neocon use of neoliberal tactics in its own pursuit of power.
I think that
it is
disempowering for the left to take that line of approach . But again I think we also do have to recognize -- and
this is what I really am concerned about in my book and elsewhere -- a tremendous diversity of struggles which are going on out
there: struggles against dam construction in India, or the struggles of the landless peasant movements in Brazil, the struggles going in Bolivia, the
struggles going on in Venezuela, the struggles going on in Sweden, the struggles going on in Paris right now. All of these struggles are very
I don't think it's a matter of saying to
people, forget your specific struggles and join the universal proletariat in motion; I don't think that's what it's
about at all. What we have to do is to find a way of politically uniting those struggles, and that's why I think
something like the concept of neoliberalism and its penchant for accumulation by dispossession
provide a kind of vocabulary to start to bring together those struggles around a more general kind
of theme. So that an Iowa farmer who's just lost his farm can understand how a Mexican peasant
feels, can understand how the struggles going on in China are parallel, so we start to see a certain unity in all of
specific and we have to acknowledge their diversity and appreciate their diversity.
the struggles, at the same time as we acknowledge their specificity.
Link- Maquiladoras
The localization of labor violence to a question of only US-Mexico labor relations
obscures the global violence of neoliberal labor coordination.
Harvey 7
(David, Distinguished Professor of Anthropology and Geography at the Graduate Center of the
City University of New York, “A Brief History of Neoliberalism”, Oxford University Press,
2007. Pg. 169-170)
Under neoliberalization, the figure of ‘the disposable worker’ emerges as prototypical upon
the world stage. 19 Accounts of the appalling conditions of labour and the despotic
conditions under which labourers work in the sweatshops of the world abound. In China,
the conditions under which migrant young women from rural areas work are nothing short
of appalling: ‘unbearably long hours, substandard food, cramped dorms, sadistic managers
who beat and sexually abuse them, and pay that arrives months late, or sometimes not at
all’. 20 In Indonesia, two young women recounted their experiences working for a
Singapore-based Levi-Strauss subcontractor as follows: We are regularly insulted, as a
matter of course. When the boss gets angry he calls the women dogs, pigs, sluts, all of which
we have to endure patiently without reacting. We work officially from seven in the morning
until three (salary less than $2 a day), but there is often compulsory overtime, sometimes––
especially if there is an urgent order to be delivered––until nine. However tired we are, we
are not allowed to go home. We may get an extra 200 rupiah (10 US cents) . . . We go on foot
to the factory from where we live. Inside it is very hot. The building has a metal roof, and there
is not much space for all the workers. It is very cramped. There are over 200 people working
there, mostly women, but there is only one toilet for the whole factory . . . when we come home
from work, we have no energy left to do anything but eat and sleep . . . Similar tales come from
the Mexican maquila factories, the Taiwanese- and Korean-operated manufacturing plants
in Honduras, South Africa, Malaysia, and Thailand. The health hazards, the exposure to a
wide range of toxic substances, and death on the job pass by unregulated and unremarked.
In Shanghai, the Taiwanese businessman who ran a textile warehouse ‘in which 61
workers, locked in the building, died in a fire’ in the aftermath of the fire’. received a
‘lenient’ two-year suspended sentence because he had ‘showed repentance’
and ‘cooperated in the aftermath of the fire’.
Link- Mexico
Now is a critical time for Leftist resistance in Mexico. Supporting parliamentary
change works in service of Rightist state interest. Movements will be pressured to
moderate
WEBBER and CARR 13
(Jeffery R., professor of politics at the University of London, and Barry, professor of
history at La Trobe University, The New Latin American Left Cracks in the
Empire, p. 23-4)
Mexico is also included in this column as an example where the Far Right maintains control over
the state apparatus, but where there are incipient signs of radical left activity form below . In
Richard Roman and Edur Velasco Arregui's chapter, we find that Mexico has been on a
significantly different political trajectory than many states in South America. Whereas in many
of the latter countries, according to Roman and Velasco Arregui, there have been national
reformist solutions to organic crises of neoliberal capitalism, in Mexico a similar set of crises has
instead led to the consolidation at the regime level of a new conservative-neoliberal power bloc. The
new bloc has triumphed in the last four presidential elections and has been able to transform
economy and society in such a way than many of the previously won social rights of citizenship have
been abolished. In a parallel transformation, the state has become ever more repressive,
militarized, and exclusionary. The general context that the radical social Left has had to confront,
then, has been one of an increasingly repressive state, democratic only insofar as it holds highly
construing elections. Neoliberalism has ravaged the lives of millions of working class and peasant
Mexicans, but emigration to the United States has provided a precarious and partial safety valve
against a potentially explosive urban and rural discontent. With the heart of the global economic
crisis centered in the Untied States, and especially in the sectors of the economy that had employed
many Mexicans, this safety valve may now be in question. While the political context facing the
racial social Left has thrown up severe obstacles, there have nonetheless been a string of popular
insurgencies in recent years. The ongoing struggles of the Zapatistas, the experience of the Oaxaca
Commune in 2006, and the mass antifraud movement of the same year are all part of this trend.
But specific explosions of extra-parliamentary resistance have not translated into sustained
victories for the popular classes, nor the formation of durable national organizations representing
left forces. At the same time, while the party Left made small inroads into the electoral process,
they have still consistently lost to the Far Right in presidential contests. While much of the
weakness of the Mexican Left can be explained by the repressive character of the neoliberal
state, there are also a set of internal weakness that cannot be sidestepped, suggest Roman and
Velasco Arregui. The Mexican political culture of patrimonial administration of government
subsided and the distinct lack of rank-and-file control over formally democratic institutions
throughout society are part of this scenario. The electoral Left is prone to co-optation and the
operation of its extra-parliamentary activity and alliances through the state subsides siphoned to
officially registered parties that play by the rules. The extra-parliamentary Left, meanwhile, has
often been subject to the same state-society pressures of clientism, as broad popular movements
attempt to make tangible gains for their members that rehire state action in return for moderation
of movement activist and compliance with wider state objectives. While this reservoir of
revolutionary tradition is a source of hope, the present situation presents formidable obstacles
standing in the way of left advance. The electoral and social Left, the Zapatista movement and
the Oaxaca Commune experience have been primarily regional. It appears that for the moment
the Left remains in a very weak position from which to mount offensive against the
conservative-neoliberal bloc presently in power.
Link - NAFTA
NAFTA has uniquely displaced hundreds of thousands of Mexican peasants, and
also lead to the trans-nationalization of Mexican factories and businesses
Robinson 08-American professor of sociology at the University of California, Santa Barbara, 2008, “Latin
America and Global Capitalism”, pgs107-108
In distinction to the typical pattern of EPZs, many of the maquiladora establishments along the
U.S.-Mexico border have a “twin plant” on the U.S. side supplying parts to be further processed
and/or receiving goods made on the Mexican side. This arrangement, in which the Mexican side
may offer lower wages, lax regulations, and other benefits, grew out of the particular way in which
the border region became a major nodal point of the global economy of the global economy on the
historical basis of the North American political economy. The twin plant on the U.S. side may be
owned or contracted by a TNC that is not headquartered in the United States, such as Sony, and
the operations on the Mexican side are often owned or run by Mexican and third country nationals
operating under outsourcing and subcontracting arrangements, so that the whole border economy
is a zone of transnational capital. NAFTA, in fact, encouraged TNCs from around the world to
attain a toehold in Mexico to enjoy privileged access to the North American Market . Far from a
case of the United States seeking to construct a western hemisphere bloc in competition with
Europe and Asia, the integration of Mexico into the North American political economy has had the
effect of accelerating not regionalization but trans-nationalization. While the majority of
maquiladoras are owned or outsourced by TNCs based in the United States, transnational capital
in the Mexican maquiladora industry originates from several dozen countries, among them Mexico
itself, Japan, Korea, China, Taiwan, Germany, France, Brazil, Holland, Sweden, and Dubai. In
the 1970s and 1980s, Mexican maquiladoras were concentrated along the border with the United
States, especially in the border cities of Tijuana, Ciudad Juárez, and Mexicali, connected with
“twin plants” across the border. But by the 1990s they were spreading south into central and even
southern Mexico- what Sklair (1993) refers to as the march to the interior- where wages are lower
and labor militancy and turnover is less. Puebla, Morelos, Guanajuato, the greater Mexico city
area, the Yucatán peninsula, and the west coast state of Jalisco, figured prominently as new
production sites. Investors took advantage of a huge new pool of peasant labor made available by
the opening of the Mexican market to U.S. agricultural surpluses and the breakup of communal
ejido lands under NAFTA and other neoliberal measures, such as the end of price supports and
state credit for small producers, all of which has resulted in the displacement of hundreds of
thousands of Mexican peasants . A part of these have migrated to the United States and elsewhere
outside of the country and another part has migrated to Mexican cities (Jones, 2001). By the turn
of the century, about one in every three maquiladora workers did not work in a border
municipality
Link – Oil (Venezuela Specific)
Removing capitalist ideologies from the oil industry in Venezuela has resulted in a
decade of unprecedented success
Robinson 08-American professor of sociology at the University of California, Santa Barbara, 2008, “Latin
America and Global Capitalism”, pgs327-329
Venezuela's ability to launch a transformative project while also sustaining its
participation in the global economy is clearly dependent to a significant degree on its oil
wealth. Venezuela is the world's fifth-largest producer of oil, a key global resource, with the
largest reserves of conventional oil (light and heavy crude) in the Western hemisphere and
the largest reserves of non-conventional oil (extra-heavy crude) in the world. This provided
the country the resources needed to undertake an internal revolutionary reorganization
but it also gave the Bolivarian state a significant international clout. High oil prices—the
price per barrel went from some $10 in 1999 to over $70 briefly in 2006—allowed the
government to finance a broad array of social programs and gave the revolution some
breathing room, as did the U.S. invasion and occupation against Iraq, which made it more
difficult for Washington to concentrate political, diplomatic, and material resources in
destabilization efforts elsewhere. On the other hand, the Chavistas have been able to break
foreign and local elite control over the oil industry and to democratize this source of
wealth, an experience that poses a powerful example for Bolivia, Ecuador, and Mexico—
countries that also have an abundance of energy resources. The struggle over oil in
Venezuela—and by extension over energy and other natural resources in Latin America—is
instructive of the complexities and contradictions that forces opposed to global capitalism
face when they are able to win, or at least influence, state policy, given the impossibility of
individual withdrawal from global capitalism. As the bourgeois order crumbled in
Venezuela during the 1990’s, and as it became increasingly likely that popular classes could
win state power, groups of state bureaucrats and private investors close to the state oil
company, PDVSA, began to set up subsidiaries abroad (such as the chain of Citgo
Petroleum Company and various refineries in the United States) in conjunction with
private transnational oil companies, including Exxon, Shell, and Gulf. The bureaucrats
and investors also began to transfer the country's oil wealth out of the country and into the
private sector accounts of transnational investors (among them Venezuelan nationals) via price
transfers between the company's headquarters in Caracas and this network of worldwide
subsidiaries (see, e.g., Lander 2003; Niemeyer, 2004; Mommer, 2003). Local and transnational
economic elites were able to bypass the state — wresting control over operations and policy
making from the Ministry of Energy and Mines, which became a rubber stamp for decisions
made by the company managers — in converting PDVSA into a transnational conglomerate
for the generation and private appropriation the country's principal source of wealth
(Mommer, 2003). PDVSA succeeded in reorienting public policies by opening up the oil
sector to direct foreign investment, increasing the amount of oil marketed internationally
in order to capture market shares at the expense of maintaining prices, disregarding
Venezuela's OPEC quota commitments, and reducing the tax rate, among other
machinations (see various entries in Lander, 2003). Such a circulation of oil-generated capital
only became possible in the globalization phase of capitalism. It was neoliberal structural
adjustment from 1989 and on — including liberalization, deregulation, the lifting of capital
and currency controls, tax breaks, and privatization — that facilitated this rechanneling of the
oil-generated surplus so that it would bypass local state circuits (Parker, 2005). The profits
generated by the PDVSA's increasingly abundant investments abroad were never repatriated
to the parent company and thus contributed nothing to the state. In 1991, fiscal income was
equivalent to 16 percent of GNP but declined to less than 10 percent during the course of
that decade and plummeted to less than five percent by 1998. It would seem at the time that
Chavez took power in 1999 that the popular classes, even as they won a foothold in the state,
were less able to utilize that state as an institutional lever to wrest wealth from a
transnationalized bourgeoisie. However, the Chavez government pursued an aggressive
strategy of wresting control back from the PDVSA managers and their backers. The
government reestablished control over the company by the Energy and Mines Ministry. It
reinvigorated Venezuela's role in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC),
playing a pivotal role in the successful reimposition of production quotas and consequent
rise in world market prices (this was before the U.S. Iraq war sent prices spiraling upward). In
2001, the government passed a Hydrocarbon Law that reduced taxes and increased
royalties because the latter was easier to calculate and less susceptible to evasion, price
transfer, and other manipulations than the former. Following the December 2002
production stoppage and lockout organized by the PDVSA executives with the backing of the
country's business associations and political opposition, the government replaced the PDVSA
management. It subsequently introduced measures to favor the participation of local small
and medium firms, worker cooperatives, and community organizations in the oil industry
and introduced PDVSA-financed social programs in oil-producing regions (Lander, 2003;
Parker, 2005). Macroeconomic policy under Chavez in the first few years of his presidency
was heterodox but hardly radical. Currency controls were put in place in 2002 but the
government continued to meet its foreign debt obligations, to avoid deficit spending, and to
maintain a foreign reserve surplus. Moreover, while mandating state intervention in the
economy and directly challenging neoliberalism the new constitution ratified the rights of
private property. Yet Chavez himself declared that if his children were starving he would not
think twice about committing theft and suggested that the plight of the poor takes priority
over the protection of private property (Ellner, 2001:24). The new constitution approved by
popular referendum in 1999 prohibited the privatization of public health, education, and
utilities, ensured state ownership of all mineral and hydrocarbon deposits and prohibited
their transfer or alienation, prohibited the patenting of genome of living beings, and
declared the right of indigenous peoples to collective ownership of their lands. In late 2001
Chavez also enacted a package of forty-nine laws with a radical socioeconomic content,
including agrarian reform, state control of oil ventures, state support for worker cooperatives and
the undoing of the earlier privatization of the social security system (Ellner, 2005:167-168).
During the period between Chavez' inauguration in January 1999 and the abortive coup in April
2002 two positions were in tension within the Chavez movement, according to Ellner. A "soft
line" faction led by Luis Miquilena, a longtime businessman and politician who occupied the
number two position in the Chavista movement during the government's first few years,
advocated a strategy of establishing MVR links with "progressive" capitalists and brought in
financial support for the movement from major Venezuelan and transnational economic groups
(Ellner, 2005:181). But Miquilena and several other prominent leaders defected to the opposition
in 2002, on the eve of the abortive coup, reflecting a shifting correlation of political forces in
favor of a "hard line," or elements more inclined to facilitate a deeper transformation of the
country's property structure and reconstitution of the political system.
Link - Oil
Empirics prove, US Venezuela oil investments can only serve one purpose: To
increase the oil power of the United States.
Giroux 5 (Henry A. – Global Television Network Chair, Professor at McMaster University,
“The Terror of Neoliberalism: Rethinking the Significance of Cultural Politics”, Winter 2005,
JSTOR)
When and where such nakedly ideological appeals strain both reason and imagination, religious
faith is invoked to silence dissension. Society is no longer defended as a space in which to nurture
the most fundamental values and relations necessary to a democracy but has been recast as an
ideological and political sphere “where religious fundamentalism comes together with market
fundamentalism to form the ideology of American supremacy” (Soros 2004, 10). Similarly,
American imperial ambitions are now legitimated by public relations intellectuals as part of the
responsibilities of empire-building, which in turn is celebrated as either a civilizing process for
the rest of the globe or as simply a right bestowed upon the powerful. For instance, Ann Coulter
speaks for many such intellectuals when she recently argued, while giving a speech at Penn State
University, that she had no trouble with the idea that the United States invaded Iraq in order to
seize its oil.As she put it, “Why not go to war just for oil? We need oil. Of course, we consume most
of the world’s oil; we do most of the world’s production” (qtd. in Colella 2004, 1). In this world-
view, power, money, and a debased appeal to pragmatism always trump social and economic
justice. Hence, it is not sur- prising for neo-conservatives to have joined hands with neoliberals
and religious fundamentalists in broadcasting to the world at large an American triumphalism in
which the United States is arrogantly defined as “[t]he greatest of all great powers in world
history” (Frum and Pearle qtd. in Lapham 2004b, 8).
Politics is the terrain of oil influence.
Leber 12 (Rebecca – Think Progress, “Three Ways Big Oil Spends Its Profits To Defend Oil
Subsidies And Defeat Clean Energy”, 10/24,
http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2012/10/24/1064231/three-ways-big-oil-spends-its-profits-todefend-oil-subsidies-and-defeat-clean-energy/)
Starting tomorrow, the
world’s largest oil companies — ExxonMobil, Shell, Chevron, BP, and
ConocoPhillips — will begin to announce their third-quarter profits for 2012. In the first half of 2012, these
companies — all ranked in the top 10 of Fortune 500 Global — earned over $60 billion. The oil industry reinvests
tens of millions of these dollars for political purposes, including nearly all political contributions to Republicans, lobbying,
and campaign ads. Through its enormous spending, these five and other Big Oil companies have fought to maintain $4 billion of their annual
subsidies, while seeking to undermine clean energy investments: $105 Million On Lobbying Since 2011, 90 Percent Of
Campaign Contributions To GOP: The big five companies have spent over $105 million on lobbying Congress since 2011, according to lobbying
disclosures through the third quarter. The biggest spenders were Shell ($25.7 million), Exxon ($25.4 million), and ConocoPhillips ($22.9
million). The five companies’ oil PACs have donated over $2.16 million to mostly Republican candidates this election cycle. Koch
Industries also spends big money to pressure Congress, with $16.2 million on lobbying and more than $1.3 million from
its PAC (the top oil and gas spender). In total, the oil and gas industry sends 90 percent of its near $50 million in
contributions to Republicans, far eclipsing their record spending in 2008. Misinformation Campaigns, Including Over $150 Million
In Election Ads: Over $150 million has been spent on TV ads promoting fossil fuel interests, particularly oil and coal, reports the New York
Times. In addition to traditional campaign donations, the oil industry has turned to outside groups running attack ads. Earlier this year, Americans
For Prosperity — founded and funded by the Koch brothers — launched a bogus ad claiming that clean energy stimulus dollars went overseas.
And the
oil lobby A merican P etroleum I nstitute has its own campaign promoting myths about oil production
and gas prices. For example, API chief Jack Gerard, rumored to be on Mitt Romney’s shortlist for a White House or agency appointment, claimed
that oil production on federal land is down. This is simply not true, since oil production is up 240 million barrels on federal lands and waters
under President Obama compared to the Bush administration. And oil companies hold 20 million acres of federal oil, gas leases in Gulf of
Mexico that remain unexplored or undeveloped. This is just one of the many myths Big Oil has pushed this campaign cycle.
Behind-The-Scenes Campaign To Defeat Clean Energy: Koch Industries and fossil fuel groups are mobilizing to defeat the extension of modest
tax incentives for wind energy, even though oil tax breaks are permanent. The American Energy Alliance, which has Koch ties, aims to make the
credit “so toxic” for Republicans it would be “impossible for John Boehner to sit at a table with Harry Reid.” The Koch-funded Americans For
the industry has argued its own century-old tax
breaks are necessary to maintain, despite years of record-breaking profits. Overall, these efforts to keep
their tax breaks while weakening public health safeguards from pollution have paid off in
Prosperity is also campaigning against wind energy. Meanwhile,
Congress and for Republican candidates. The House of Representatives is the most anti-environment in Congressional history, averaging at
least one anti-environment vote per day to eliminate or undermine pollution protections, many benefiting Big Oil. And the Romney/Ryan budget
plan would give the big five oil companies another $2.3 billion annual tax cut beyond existing loopholes.
The prioritization of oil in politics in the logic of neoliberalism: ruthless resource
extraction and economic competition becomes the basis of all human interaction.
Giroux 5 (Henry A. – Global Television Network Chair, Professor at McMaster University,
“The Terror of Neoliberalism: Rethinking the Significance of Cultural Politics”, Winter 2005,
JSTOR)
Fredric Jameson has argued in The Seeds of Time, it has now become easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism (1994,
xii). The breathless rhetoric
of the global victory of free-market rationality spewed forth by the mass media, rightwing intellectuals, and governments alike has found its material expression both in an all-out attack on
democratic values and in the growth of a range of social problems including: virulent and
persistent poverty, joblessness, inadequate health care, apartheid in the inner cities, and increasing
inequalities between the rich and the poor. Such problems appear to have been either removed from the inventory of public
discourse and social policy or factored into talk-show spectacles in which the public becomes merely a staging area for venting private interests
and emotions. Within
the discourse of neoliberalism that has taken hold of the public imagination, there is no way of
talking about what is fundamen tal to civic life, critical citizenship, and a substantive democracy . Neoliberalism offers
no critical vocabulary for speaking about political or social transformation as a democratic project. Nor is there a
language for either the ideal of public commitment or the notion of a social agency capa ble of challenging the basic assumptions of corporate
ideology as well as its social consequences. In its dubious appeals to universal laws, neutrality, and selective scientific research,
neoliberalism "eliminates the very possibility of critical thinking, without which democratic debate
becomes impossible" (Buck-Morss 2003, 65-66).This shift in rhetoric makes it possible for advocates of
neoliberalism to implement the most ruthless economic and political policies without having to open up such
actions to public debate and dialogue. Hence, neoliberal policies that promote the cutthroat downsizing of the workforce, the bleeding of social
services, the reduction of state governments to police precincts, the ongoing liquidation of job security, the increasing elimination of a decent
social wage, the creation of a society of low-skilled workers, and the emergence of a culture of permanent insecu rity and fear hide behind
appeals to common sense and allegedly immutable laws of nature. When and where such nakedly ideological appeals strain both reason and
imagination, religious faith is invoked to silence dissension. Society is no longer defended as a space in which to nurture the most fundamental
values and relations necessary to a democracy but has been recast as an ideological and political sphere "where religious fundamentalism comes
together with market fundamentalism to form the ideology of American supremacy" (Soros 2004, 10). Similarly, American imperial ambitions
are now legitimated by public relations intellectuals as part of the responsibilities of empire-building, which in turn is celebrated as either a
civilizing process for the rest of the globe or as simply a right bestowed upon the powerful. For instance, Ann Coulter speaks for many such
intellectuals when she recently argued, while giving a speech at Penn State University, that she had no trouble with the idea that the United States
We need oil . Of course, we consume most of
the world's oil; we do most of the world's production" (qtd. in Colella 2004,1). In this world-view, power,
money, and a debased appeal to pragmatism always trump social and economic justice . Hence, it is
not surprising for neo-conservatives to have joined hands with neoliberals and religious fundamentalists in
broadcasting to the world at large an American triumphalism in which the United States is arrogantly defined as "[t]he
greatest of all great powers in world history" (Frum and Pearle qtd. in Lapham 2004b, 8).2 But money, profits, and fear have
become powerful ideological elements not only in arguing for opening up new markets, but also for closing down the
possibility of dissent at home. In such a scenario, the police state is cele brated by religious evangelicals like John Ashcroft as a
invaded Iraq in order to seize its oil. As she put it, "Why not go to war just for oil?
foundation of human freedom. This becomes clear not only in the passage of repressive laws such as the USA Patriot Act but also in the work of
prominent neoconservatives such as David Frum and Richard Pearle who, without any irony intended, insist that "[a] free society is not an unpoliced society. A free society is a self-policed society" (qtd. in Lapham 2004b, 8). In what could only be defined as an Adam Smith joins George
Orwell in a religious cult in California scenario, markets have been elevated to the status of sacrosanct temples to be worshiped by eager
consumers while citizens-turned soldiers of the-Army-of-God are urged to spy on each other and dissent is increas ingly criminalized.3 Political
culture, if not the nature of politics itself, has undergone revo lutionary changes in the last two decades, reaching its most debased expres sion
under the administration of President George W. Bush. Within
this polit ical culture, not only is democracy subordinated
to the rule of the market, but corporate decisions are freed from territorial constraints and the demands of public obligations, just as
economics is disconnected from its social consequences. Power is increasingly removed from the dictates and control of nation states and politics
is largely relegated to the sphere of the local. Zygmunt Bauman captures brilliantly what is new about the relation ship among power, politics,
and the shredding of social obligations: The mobility acquired by "people who invest"?those with capital, with money which the investment
requires?means the new, indeed unprece dented ... disconnection of power from obligations: duties towards employ ees, but also towards the
younger and weaker, towards yet unborn genera tions and towards the self-reproduction of the living conditions of all; in short the freedom from
the duty to contribute to daily life and the perpet uation of the community. . . . Shedding the responsibility for the conse quences is the most
coveted and cherished gain which the new mobility brings to free-floating, locally unbound capital. (Bauman 1998, 9-10) Corporate power
increasingly frees itself from any political limitations just as it uses its power through the educational force of the dominant culture to put into
place an utterly privatized notion of agency in which it becomes difficult for young people and adults to imagine democracy as a public good, let
alone the transformative power of collective action. Once again, demo cratic politics has become ineffective, if not banal, as civic language is
impoverished and genuine spaces for democratic learning, debate, and dialogue such as schools, newspapers, popular culture, television
networks, and other public spheres are either underfunded, eliminated, privatized, or subject to corporate ownership .
Under the
aggressive politics and culture of neoliberalism , society is increasingly mobilized for the production
of violence against the poor, immigrants, dissenters, and others marginalized because of their age,
gender, race, ethnicity, and color. At the center of neoliberalism is a new form of politics in the United States, a
politics in which radical exclusion is the order of the day, and in which the primary questions no longer con cern
equality, justice, or freedom, but are now about the survival of the slickest in a culture marked by fear, surveillance, and economic deprivation.
This is a politics that hides its own ideology by eliminating the traces of its power in a rhetoric of normalization, populism, and the staging of
public spectacles. As Susan George points out, the question that currently seems to define neoliberal "democracy" is "Who has a right to live or
does not" (1999,para.34). Neoliberalism is not a neutral, technical, economic discourse that can be measured with the precision of a mathematical
formula or defended through an appeal to the rules of a presumptively unassailable science that conve niently leaves its own history behind. Nor
is it a paragon of economic ration ality that offers the best "route to optimum efficiency, rapid economic growth and innovation, and rising
prosperity for all who are willing to work hard and take advantage of available opportunities" (Kotz 2003, 16). On the contrary ,
neoliberalism is an ideology, a politics , and at times a fanaticism that subordinates the art of democratic politics to the
rapacious laws of a market economy that expands its reach to include all aspects of social life within the dictates and values of a market-driven
society. More important, it is an eco nomic and implicitly cultural theory?a historical and socially constructed ideology that needs to be made
visible, critically engaged, and shaken from the stranglehold of power it currently exercises over most of the command ing institutions of national
and global life. As such, neoliberalism makes it difficult for many people either to imagine a notion of individual and social
agency necessary for reclaiming a substantive democracy or to be able to theorize the economic, cultural, and political conditions necessary for
a viable global public sphere in which public institutions, spaces, and goods become valued as part of a
larger democratic struggle for a sustainable future and the downward distribution of wealth,
resources, and power.
The aff’s method of disaster capitalism is under the influence of Neoliberal interests
Robinson 08-American professor of sociology at the University of California, Santa Barbara, 2008, “Latin
America and Global Capitalism”, pgs38-39
It is true that¶ military, oil, and engineering/construction companies, many of them headquartered¶
in the United States, managed to secure their particular sectoral¶ interests through brazen
instrumentalization of the U.S. state under the Bush¶ presidency. However, these companies are
themselves transnational and their¶ interests are those not of "U.S. capital" in rivalry with other
countries but of¶ particular transnational clusters in the global economy. Transnational capitalists¶
are themselves aware of the role of the U.S. state in opening up new possibilities¶ for unloading
of surplus and created new investment opportunities.¶ "We're looking for places to invest around
the world," explained one former¶ executive of a Dutch-based oil exploration and engineering
company, and¶ then "you know, along comes Iraq" (as cited in Monthly Review, 2004:64).¶ The
"creative destruction" of war and natural and humanitarian disasters¶ generates new cycles of
accumulation through "reconstruction." The complex¶ consisting of military, energy, engineering,
and construction constitutes one¶ of those sectors of global capital that most benefits from the
creative destruction¶ of crises, wars, and natural and humanitarian disasters. Klein has
characterized¶ this new mechanism of accumulation as "disaster capitalism" (2005b), while Bello
observes that " post-disaster and post-conflict reconstruction planning¶ and implementation are
increasingly influenced by neo-liberal market¶ economics" and that the same set of actors are
"now dominant in both arenas:¶ the U.S. military-political command, the World Bank, corporate
contractors and¶ humanitarian and development NGOs" (Bello, 2oo6b:28i). In 2004 the U.S.¶
government created the "Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization."¶ The idea
was to utilize post-conflict and post-disaster reconstruction¶ to transform "the very social fabric of
a nation" along neoliberal lines, explained¶ one official (Klein, 2OO5b). "The rise of a predatory
form of disaster capitalism,"¶ in Klein's words, "uses the desperation and fear created by
catastrophe to engage¶ in radical social and economic engineering" (Klein, 2OO5b). In a sense
the¶ U.S. state became rentier insofar as the main dominant groups became increasingly¶
dependent on the extraction of rents through the conversion of public¶ into private resources.
These groups aggressively turned to the state to convert public resources into private profits by
way of disaster capitalism and publicly¶ funded but privately contracted reconstruction.¶ But more
importantly, the U.S. state mobilized the resources through war¶ and disaster capitalism to
generate new outlets for surplus and sustain global¶ accumulation. The $607 billion invested by the
U.S. state in war and "reconstruction"¶ in Iraq between 2002 and 2007 (Rosen, J., 2007) went to a
vast array¶ of investors and subcontractors that spanned the globe (Phinney, 2005).¶ Kuwaiti
Trading and Contracting, Alargan Trading of Kuwait, Gulf Catering¶ and Saudi Trading and
Construction Company were just some of the Middle¶ East-based companies that shared in the
bonanza, along with companies and¶ investor groups as far away as South Africa, Bosnia, the
Philippines, and India¶ (ibid.). The picture that emerges is one in which the U.S. state mobilizes
the¶ resources to feed a vast transnational network of profit making that passes¶ through countless
layers of outsourcing, subcontracting, alliances and collaborative¶ relations, benefiting
transnationally oriented capitalists from many¶ parts of the globe. The U.S. state is the pivotal gear
in a TNS machinery dedicated¶ to reproducing global capitalism.¶ Suffice it to conclude here with
the observation that the empire of global capital¶ has barely emerged and yet already faces deep
crisis. Globalization resolved¶ some problems for capital but the underlying laws of capitalism
remain in place¶ and continually assert themselves. The unfolding crisis in the world economy¶
may turn out to be neither a recurring business cycle nor the opening salvos of a¶ new
restructuring crisis. Hardly had the neoliberal model triumphed in the¶ 1980s and 1990s than it
began to appear moribund. The struggle for what will¶ take its place is now under way and is the
backdrop to the political upheavals that¶ began to rock Latin America in the early twenty-first
century. Neoliberalism may¶ prove to be a parenthesis between old nation-state accumulation
models and a¶ new global social structure of accumulation whose contours are not yet clear. The¶
global crisis is experienced in different forms in distinct countries and regions.¶ Let us now
examine in broad strokes how it has been manifest in Latin America.
The reliance on oil as a wealth creator is part and parcel of neoliberalist ideology.
Tapamor 7 (Edward – Writer for Resource Investor, “Peak Oil Passnotes: Neo-Liberalism's
Ultimate Failure Part 2”, 11/16, http://www.resourceinvestor.com/2007/11/16/peak-oilpassnotes-neoliberalisms-ultimate-failure)
We pointed out last week that this column does not put any faith in the
current system of economics loosely known as neo-
liberalism or "free markets". We have noted that despite its ideologically rigid application around the world for the last 25 years, it
has done nothing to create a supply cushion in oil markets. Instead what it has done is pass giant profits to the
most powerful organisations within the industry, privatising the profits and socialising the costs. One great
example at the moment is biofuels. The developed world, especially the U nited S tates, wants liquid fuel for transport. So a tax
has been placed on the entire world population as the transport-dependent U.S. and EU suck out available spare capacity in the agricultural
market by converting corn to ethanol. Basically land has been converted to growing corn in order to provide fuels for the states most dependent
on car travel. This has boosted food prices all around the globe, even for people who do not posses cars or have ever even travelled in one. What
is more amazing is that this event is not some kind of economic neo-liberal happening. Like much of free market thinking, it is in fact a myth.
Fifty percent of the revenues that U.S. farmers receive from growing corn for ethanol in fact do not come from anything as neo-liberal as sales
and marketing. No, 50% of the revenues come from subsidies, from the taxpayer, via the government. If you are a major industrial landowner, it
is a godsend. The
idea of investment to "create wealth" (another wacky neo-liberal idea - we can see you printing
the money supply, we are not blind) is thrown away as every taxpayer in the U.S. subsidises major industrial concerns.
Secondly comes the idea that war and global "full-spectrum dominance" can safeguard the United States. It is true that war provides liquidity for
economies as - once again -
taxpayer subsidies in the form of war budgets send wealth flooding up the chain to the
most powerful organisations and concerns on the planet. There is now little doubt that the United States, for example,
has spent around $1 trillion on the invasion and destruction of Iraq. Although we can argue over how much importance the region has in terms of
invasion-to-oil-and-gas-reserves, there is little doubt that securing the region for U.S. and EU "interests" was a prime motivator - maybe not all of
it but certainly a very important one. But if an economy was truly democratic - unlike any on the planet - then the U.S. could have spent that
money far more wisely. One trillion dollars would buy 11.77 billion barrels of oil at $85 per barrel. Of course it could also have been spent on
second generation biofuels - the ones ExxonMobil [NYSE:XOM] and Total [NYSE:TOT] are so keen on - or wind farms or solar power or
insulation for American homes. Instead the money has been part of the trickle-up, the process whereby money is passed from the weakest to the
richest, the real underlying motivation for neo-liberalism class war. As there are no democracies on the planet, only differing forms of oligarchy,
it is no surprise to see the Chinese state capitalists or the Russian state capitalists doing roughly similar versions of the same thing. Chinese per
capita consumption of oil is the same as that of the U.S. in 1904, yet we hear so often that - basically - it is the "fault" of China to create a
demand-led, geo-political peak oil. What this signals is that economies
need democratising, not placing in the hands of
either private or state oligarchies. But in the developed world instead what we do have is a moment
where modern economies - neo-liberal ones - are exposed as failures. Investment signals and market economics,
such as they are, cannot satisfy what is needed, a rise in demand led by the force feeding of capitalism-for-the-rich around the world for the last
50 years. The only possible respite for this is to have a recession - where prices drop, where the weakest are hurt the most and where, once again,
the richest and most powerful benefit by cherry picking assets from the disparate, profligate and downright unlucky. When peak oil bounces the
world into recession, as many in the oil industry believe it will, remember who told you first.
Link- Organized Crime
Neoliberalism forces those deemed disposable by the system into criminal networks
like gangs and cartels
Harvey 7
(David, Distinguished Professor of Anthropology and Geography at the Graduate Center of the
City University of New York, “A Brief History of Neoliberalism”, Oxford University Press,
2007. Pg. 171-172)
Neoliberalization has transformed the positionality of labour, of women, and of indigenous
groups in the social order by emphasizing that labour is a commodity like any other.
Stripped of the protective cover of lively democratic institutions and threatened with all
manner of social dislocations, a disposable workforce inevitably turns to other institutional
forms through which to construct social solidarities and express a collective will.
Everything from gangs and criminal cartels, narco-trafficking networks, minimafias and
favela bosses, through community, grassroots and non- governmental organizations, to
secular cults and religious sects proliferate. These are the alternative social forms that fill
the void left behind as state powers, political parties, and other institutional forms are
actively dismantled or simply wither away as centres of collective endeavour and of social
bonding. The marked turn to religion is in this regard of interest. Accounts of the sudden
appearance and proliferation of religious sects in the derelict rural regions of China, to say
nothing of the emergence of Fulan Gong, are illustrative of this trend. 25 The rapid progress of
evangelical proselytizing in the chaotic informal economies that have burgeoned under
neoliberalization in Latin America, and the revived and in some instances newly constructed
religious tribalism and fundamentalism that structure politics in much of Africa and the Middle
East, testify to the need to construct meaningful mechanisms of social solidarity. The progress of
fundamentalist evangelical Christianity in the US has some connection with proliferating job
insecurities, the loss of other forms of social solidarity, and the hollowness of capitalist consumer
culture. In Thomas Frank’s account, the religious right took off in Kansas only at the end of the
1980s, after a decade or more of neoliberal restructuring and deindustrialization. 26 Such
connections may seem far-fetched. But if Polanyi is right and the treatment of labour as a
commodity leads to social dislocation, then moves to rebuild diff erent social networks to
defend against such a threat become increasingly likely.
Link- Patriarchy
Neoliberalization returns women to the traditional patriarchal systems of the past
Harvey 7
(David, Distinguished Professor of Anthropology and Geography at the Graduate Center of the
City University of New York, “A Brief History of Neoliberalism”, Oxford University Press,
2007. Pg. 170)
Women, for the most part, and sometimes children, bear the brunt of this sort of degrading,
debilitating, and dangerous toil. The social consequences of neoliberalization are in fact
extreme. Accumulation by dispossession typically undermines whatever powers women
may have had within household production/ marketing systems and within traditional
social structures and relocates everything in male-dominated commodity and credit
markets. The paths of women’s liberation from traditional patriarchal controls in
developing countries lie either through degrading factory labour or through trading on
sexuality, which varies from respectable work as hostesses and waitresses to the sex trade
(one of the most lucrative of all contemporary industries in which a good deal of slavery is
involved). The loss of social protections in advanced capitalist countries has had
particularly negative eff ects on lower-class women, and in many of the ex-communist
countries of the Soviet bloc the loss of women’s rights through neoliberalization has been
nothing short of catastrophic.
Link - Poverty Reduction
Poverty reduction strategies are methods for neoliberal organizations to create
further dependency on neoliberalism [also at the end of the card- we must create a
counterneoliberal hegemonic discourse]
Davidson-Harden 8
(Adam has a PhD in Education from the University of Western Ontario and was a SSHRC
postdoctoral fellow in cultural and policy studies at the Faculty of Education. “Re-branding
Neoliberalism and Systemic Dilemmas in Social Development: The Case of Education and
School Fees in Latin American HIPCs” MW)
In addition to the argument that PRSPs [Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers] comprise a 'rebranding of neoliberalism', this paper will offer the additional contention that the mechanism of
the PRSP has been a significant instrument for the co-optation and accommodation of erstwhile
critics within the process of 'owning' country-based consultations on poverty reduction (embodying
an example of a type of 'inclusive neoliberalism' along the lines suggested by Craig and Porter,
2006), which embody a process of further entrenching a core set of neoliberal macroeconomic
conditions that northern banks require to facilitate capitalist accumulation for the few, under the
guise of seeking that panacea, economic growth along with its elusive promise of 'poverty
reduction'. In the continuing preference for the neoliberal ideological focus on market
mechanisms as preferred and more 'efficient' means of allocating public spending resources, IFIs
and donor governments continue to impose neoliberal policies in development strategies that
reverberate in social sectors such as education, while a dominant orientation toward loans as well
as bilateral aid belies deeper issues of neoliberalism's failure to lift countries in the global south out
of poverty through its dictates, as well as its success in entrenching this poverty as a factor in
ongoing relations of dependency. On the basis of an interrogation of these dynamics, which act as
systemic dilemmas affecting educational development Latin America's poorest and most heavily
indebted states, the author will argue that until neoliberalism's core conditions and normative
preference for 'marketized' modes of development are effectively challenged and alternatives are
acknowledged, progress toward the achievement of basic goals of equity of access to education
and other forms of social rights will continue to be frustrated in the Latin America's most
vulnerable states, and beyond. In the face of still-hegemonic neoliberalism, the struggle for
alternatives is a type of 'counter-hegemonic' struggle based in a discourse of human rights as well
as a strong role for states in social investment and development.
The movements of the twentieth century failed but neoliberalism is weaker now and
movements could overcome it
Petras and Veltmeyer 13
(James, Bartle Professor of Sociology at Binghamton University, Henry, professor of Sociology
and International Development Studies at Saint Mary's University, “Social Movements in Latin
America: Neoliberalism and Popular Resistance”, January 17, 2013, page 221-222 MW)
The implementation of IMF and World Bank policies of neoliberal¶ reform, and structural
adjustment to the requirements of the new¶ (neoliberal) imperial order, were only and made
possible by means of¶ a multipronged assault on the working class and the new semiproletariat¶ of
rural landless workers, disarticulating the forces of resistance and demobilizing the social
movements. On the other hand, the same¶ forces and policies that destroyed the social movements
of the l960s¶ and 1970s in conditions of capitalist exploitation and imperial rule¶ gave rise ro a new
wave of social movements that in the 1990s would¶ pose a serious challenge to the neoliberal world
order.¶ The imposition the imperial neoliberal model resulted in the¶ productive and social
transformation (agriculture and rural society,¶ separating millions of peasants and small farmers
from their¶ means of direct production, not only proletarianizing and uprooting¶ many of them
but also fueling new forms of resistance in the form of¶ popular sector social movements. To
counter the rise of this popular¶ resistance the World Bank , and other agents of the neoliberal
imperial¶ order designed and implemented a new counterinsurgency strategy¶ within the
framework of a postWashington consensus 011 the need¶ for a more pragmatic form of
neoliberalism a more inclusive form¶ of "development" and a new paradigm focused on the
"empowerment¶ of the poor," self-help, micro-projects and marker-assisted land¶ reforms.
Link - Relations
Poor relations make Latin Americans fight Neoliberalism
Vanderbush ‘09
(Walt, Ph.D., Northwestern University, 1993 M.A., Northwestern University, 1989 B.A., College
of Wooster, 1982, New Political Science, The Bush Administration Record in Latin America:
Sins of Omission and Commission)
The notion that the US periodically neglects Latin America is certainly not a new one. Scholars
observing US policy toward the region have described an historic “neglect-panic cycle” in which the
pattern is to largely ignore Latin America until some sort of crisis situation develops. While
conceding that past periods of “benign neglect” in the 1950s and 1970s were not necessarily so
benign, Howard Wiarda expected that the end of the Cold War was likely to usher in a new
period of benign neglect. After working in the Clinton administration during the 1990s, Robert
Pastor optimistically wrote in the preface to a second edition of his book on US – Latin
American relations that it might be possible in the 21st century to exit permanently from that
neglect-panic cycle and develop “a modern and respectful” relationship in its place. Instead,
many of those commenting on US – Latin American relations during the presidency of George W.
Bush have seen the time since September 11, 2001 as another period of US “disengagement with the
Latin American region.” As Jorge Castan ẽ da wrote at the end of 2008, the Bush administration
“concentrated all its energies and attention on al Qaeda and Iraq,” and in the process neglected
Latin America and the rest of the world. Without denying the impact of September 11 on US–
Latin American relations, or the resulting focus by the Bush administration on other parts of the
world, it is a mistake to see the current situation as largely the result of US neglect. First, the theme
of “neglect” does not give sufficient weight to the resourcefulness and activism by various
groups and leaders to challenge the US power in the region. Social groups have mobilized across
Latin America to oppose neoliberal economic policies that have exacerbated poverty and inequality,
and in places led to greater foreign control of Latin American resources, and the US is closely
associated with those practices and ideas. Second, I would argue that the policies the US did pursue
in the region had at least as great an impact on the changes over these two terms as did any failure
by the Bush administration to pay attention to Latin America. For Jorge Castan ̃eda, observing
from Mexico, it may have been a “forgotten relationship,” but in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Cuba,
the experience has been more adversarial than neglectful.
Link - Resources
Link – Neoliberalism destroys the planets natural commodities
Werlhof 2008
(Prof. Claudia von Werlhof is Professor at the Institute of Political Sciences, University of Innsbruck,
Austria. Global Research, February 01, The Consequences of Globalization and Neoliberal Policies. What
are the Alternatives? http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-consequences-of-globalization-and-neoliberalpolicies-what-are-the-alternatives/7973)
Neoliberalism has turned everything that would ensure a good life for all beings on this planet
upside down. Many people still have a hard time understanding that the horror we are
experiencing is indeed a reality – a reality willingly produced, maintained and justified by “our”
politicians. But even if the alternative got half-way on its feet – no more plundering, exploitation,
destruction, violence, war, coercion, mercilessness, accumulation, greed, corruption – we would
still be left with all the damage that the earth has already suffered.¶ The earth is not the paradise it
was (at least in many places) 500 years ago, 200 years ago or even 100 years ago. The devastation
has been incredible: large parts of our drinking water are disappearing mainly due to the melting
of the glaciers and polar caps; our climate has changed dramatically, causing turbulences and
catastrophes; our atmosphere is no longer protected against ultraviolet radiation (“ozone layer
problem”); many species of our fauna and flora are extinguished; most cultures and their
knowledge are destroyed; most natural resources exhausted. And all this happened within what
only comes to a nanosecond of the earth’s history.
Link – Rhetoric / AT: Perm
The Affirmative is the ULTIMATE example of neoliberal cooption – It steals the
ideas and concepts from the left and refashions them to advance capital interests.
We must continually draw a solid line in the sand and RESIST INCLUSION.
HARNECKER 10,
(Marta, Chilean psychologist and former student of Louis Althusser, trans. Janet
Duckworth, "Twenty-First Century Socialism," MONTHLY REVEIW 62:3, JulyAugust)
However, before continuing, I shall specify what I mean by the left. In the 1960s, there was a tendency to define the left not so much by the goal
it was pursuing, as by the means it used to reach that goal. The implicit goal was socialism, the means were the armed struggle or the institutional
struggle, and the left was branded revolutionary or reformist, according to which method it used. In the 1990s, the term “new left” was sometimes
used to refer to the left that had abandoned the armed struggle and joined the institutional struggle. At other times, this term was applied to the
“social left,” which is made up of a large number of diverse subjects, such as indigenous peoples, women, environmentalists, and human rights
activists.42 I would like to suggest a stricter definition that is derived from the goal pursued. If we adopt such a definition, we have to ask if the
objective is to give capitalism a facelift by making it more humane or if the goal is to build a society to replace capitalism. So I
give the
label “left” to the forces that struggle to build a society that is an alternative to the exploitative
capitalist system and its logic of profit, a society of workers organized by a humanist- and
solidarity-based logic whose aim is to satisfy human needs; a society free from material poverty and
from the spiritual poverty that capitalism engenders; and a society that does not issue decrees from
above but rather builds from below, with the people as protagonists. In other words, a socialist
society.43 These forces, therefore, will not be characterized solely by a struggle for equality that
manifests itself in a war on poverty—although this may be one of their most distinctive features— but also by their rejection of an
aberrant societal model based on exploitation and the logic of profit : the capitalist model. I should add,
nevertheless, something more. I fully agree with the Uruguayan researcher Beatriz Stolowicz who maintains: “One is not left just because one
says one is, but one is left because of what one does to achieve these necessary transformations and constructions. That is how one comes to be
left.”4 But why
is it so necessary to use the criterion of practice to decide who is on the left? Because—as I
right has
unscrupulously appropriated the left’s language, which is particularly obvious in the way it
formulates its programs.45 Words like “reforms,” “structural changes,” “concern over poverty,”
wrote in 1999 in The Left on the Threshold of the Twenty First Century: Making the Impossible Possible—the
and “transition” are today part of the right’s anti-human and oppressive language. As Franz
Hinkelammert says, “The key words of the opposition popular movements of the 1950s and 1960s have been transformed into the key words of
those who ruthlessly destroyed them.”46 He goes on to say, “The night, when all cats are grey, falls. Everyone is against privilege; all want
reforms and a structural change. Everyone is in favor of a preferential option for the poor.”47 Today—in
the midst of the crisis of
neoliberalism—this appropriation of the left’s language has reached the point where even
capitalists have adopted the left’s criticism of neoliberalism. The role of the market has begun to be challenged; there
is talk of the need for the regulatory power of the state. We have to acknowledge that, as Beatriz Stolowicz says, “In the sphere of
discourse, capitalist strategies are not dogmatic, they change their arguments, they criticize what
they used to propose when the negative effects of this cannot be hidden and could generate political
problems.” To win over adepts, “they show solidarity with the discontent over globalization” (as
Joseph Stiglitz called it). They join in the anti-globalization zeal, using the adjective “neoliberal” to qualify
it —neoliberal globalization—because of the decisive weight of finance capital as it continues to cause convulsions. Thus, “neoliberalism” is
now simply speculation, and the latter is blamed on the irresponsibility of “bad executives,” thus protecting the credibility of capital. The
suggestion began to be raised that neoliberalism must be overcome by counteracting financial
speculation with more productive investment. Capitalism thus presents itself as a kind of “neodevelopmentalism,” and is against both laissez-faire economics and populism.48
Link - Rights / Ngo’s
LIBERALIZING RESISTANCE – Sending people to the court ignores asymmetries
of power and funding. It also trades off with resources and efforts to create real
social transformation
HARVEY 6
(David, distinguished professor of anthropology and geography at the Graduate
Center of CUNY, "On Neoliberalism: An Interview with David Harvey" Monthly
Review, June 19, http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2006/lilley190606.html)
SL: Well, one
answer to that today on the left has been to use lawsuits.
You're critical of this kind of approach that
dominates much of the left and particularly emanates from non-governmental organizations or NGOs. I wonder if you can explain
your
critique both of the legalistic framework of universal human rights and of non-profits as the agents of change. DH:
I'm not against much of that, I think some of that is okay, but it has limited purchase because it's trying to fight
neoliberalism with neoliberalism's own tools . It's attempting to roll back a market ethic by a logic
of individual rights, when the market ethic is based on the logic of individual rights. When you start to
look at the details, what you find is that, first off, the NGOs are not democratic institutions. There are good NGOs and there
are bad NGOs, there is a vast array of NGOs doing very different things. The problem with the rights discourse is that as
soon as you get into the judicial world, you find yourself having to actually try to prove things
through the law, and the law is not exactly an unbiased institution. It has certain kinds of ways of
looking at private property and individuals and so on. For example, I think it's wonderful that in New York City, in
Rockefeller Center, there is this bronze plaque where Rockefeller writes his personal credo. And his personal credo says he believes in the
supreme worth of the individual. Well, all of us should know that legally
the corporation is an individual.
So maybe we should
so
when I go into court and I take on a corporation, there is an asymmetry of power in this whole
system. And this even works at the world level. For instance, if the state of Chad doesn't like the fact that the United States
go out there and say, do you realize that what Rockefeller means here is that he believes in the supreme worth of the corporation? And
is disobeying WTO rules in its subsidies to the cotton farms of this country, Chad has to mount a case against the United States, but in order to do
this, it needs at least a million dollars. But the budget of Chad is very small, so a million dollars out of the budget Chad is huge, whereas a
million dollars out of the budget of the US is almost nothing. So Chad cannot afford to actually mount a campaign against the United States in
the WTO and claim its rights under the WTO. This is the sort of problem we run into at all levels: as soon as you go into the legal system there is
an asymmetry of power and the like. While I'm not against some of those things that are going on through the pursuit of human rights, what I'm
saying is that there is limited purchase to that .
What we have to look at is construction of alternative forms of
social and political organization, social solidarities, and we have to really reevaluate what is meant
by democracy and what is really meant by freedom. I don't think the world is free if there's no healthcare. I don't think
the world is free if we have to pay immense amounts for what should be public education. I think the current questions are what is freedom, what
is democracy, how
social solidarities can be built -- those are the issues we should really be concentrating upon
in terms of left politics.
Link - Rights/Constitutionalism
Legal strategies to social change indefinitely postpones radical resistance to the
neoliberal order, shoring up rightist control. Only a rejection of legal methods of
change can created liberated politics.
KATZ 13
(Claudio, professor of economic history at the University of Buenos Aires, trans.
Leonard Morin, "Socialist Strategies in Latin America," The New Latin American
Left, 43-5)
The constitutional framework significantly alters the context of leftist activity, which for decades
had been directed against military tyrannies. The battle within the current system is not simple because the current
institutionalism renews bourgeois domination in multiple disguises. This plasticity disconcerted a generation of militants
prepared to fight against a very brutal but not very devious dictatorial enemy. Some activists were demoralized by these
difficulties and ended up accepting the accusations from the right. They began to flay themselves
for their former "under-estimation of democracy," forgetting that civil liberties were an
achievement of popular resistance (and not of a bourgeois party regime complicit with authoritarianism). The constitutional
framework induced other militants to proclaim the end of "revolutionary utopia" and the beginning of a new era of
gradual advances toward a postcapitalist future. They returned to the gradualist scheme and proposed to embark on the road to
socialism through an initial consensus with the oppressors. They advocated taking this path to gaining hegemony for the workers. But the
vast trajectory of social democracy has proved the unreality of this option. The dominant classes
do not give up power. They only co-opt partners to recreate the pillars of an oppression based on
private ownership of the big banks and corporations. They will never permit this control to be
corroded by the political or cultural weight of their antagonists. For this reason, any policy that indefinitely
postpones the anticapitalist goal ends up reinforcing oppression. Socialism requires preparing and
consummating anticapitalist ruptures. If one forgets this principle, the strategy of the Left lacks a
compass. But the confrontation with constitutionalism has also generated positive effects in recent years.
It has allowed, for example, debate on the left about the form that a genuine democracy under
socialism would adopt. This reflection introduced a significant change in the way of conceptualizing the anticapitalist perspective. In
the 1970s, democracy was a topic that the critics of the Soviet bureaucracy omitted or barely put forth. Now almost no one skirts this problem.
Socialism has ceased to be imagined as a prolongation of the tyranny that reigned in the Soviet Union and has currently begun to be perceived as
a regime of growing participation, representation, and popular control. But this future also depends on the immediate responses to
constitutionalism. Two
positions prevail on the left: one focus proposes winning space within the institutional
the other promotes parallel organs of people's power (Harnecker, 2000; Petras and Veltmeyer, 2005).
The first path argues for advancing by climbing from the local to the provincial levels to subsequently
structure, and
reach the national governments. It follows from the experiences of community administrations that the Brazilian Workers' Party (Partido dos
Trabalhadores) and the Broad Front (Frente Amplio) of Uruguay pursued in the early 1990s. It recognizes the bitter concessions granted to the
establishment during these administrations (business commitments and postponement of social improvements), but it construes the final outcome
as positive. Undeniably, this "municipal socialism” led to old activists turning into confidence men of capital. They
debated at city halls,
exhibited hostility toward the social movement, and ended up governing on behalf of the dominant classes.
First they moderated programs, then they called for responsibility, and finally they changed sides.
The participatory budget did not counteract this regression. Discussing how to distribute a local expenditure limited by the constraints of
neoliberal policy leads to imposing a self-adjustment upon the citizenry. Participatory
democracy only awakens radical
consciousness of the people when it resists and denounces the tyranny of capital. If it renounces this
goal, it turns into an instrument for preserving the established order. An opposite strategy to the
institutional path exists that encourages social mobilization and rejects electoral participation . It
the emergence of direct
options for people's power. It also questions the electoral traps that, in the Andean countries, have led to channeling resistance
denounces the corruption of the Workers' Party or the passivity of the Broad Front and advocates
through the system. This vision ignores the influence of the electoral arena and minimizes the negative consequences of abandoning it.
Citizenship, voting, and electoral rights are not just instruments of bourgeois manipulation.
They are also popular conquests
achieved against dictatorships, which under certain conditions allow one to take a stand against
the Right.
Reliance on governance for social transformation is a ruse – small symbolic
redistribution and labor protections will not translate into real emancipatory
politics
Santos 2005
(Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Professor of Sociology at the School of Economics, University of
Coimbra (Portugal); “Beyond Neoliberal Governance The
World Social Forum As Subaltern Cosmopolitan Politics And Legality” in Law and
Globalization from Below, edited Boaventura de Sousa Santos and Cesar A. Rodriguez-Garavito,
pg )
The litmus test for governance is therefore the extent to which it can
confront both the question of social redistribution and the question of
the recognition of difference. In light of what 1said above, I do not see
any potential for meaningful social redistribution being generated in
the governance matrix. Governance may better address the question of
recognition of difference than the question of social redistribution, but
even here the structural limitations of governance will surface.
This does not mean that governance arrangements will not bring
some benefits to the more disadvantaged groups within the circle of
partnership. Such benefits may even spill over to the excluded. But this
does not entail any potential for enabling popular participation or for
social redistribution as a matter of right . In other words, what is
beneficial does not determine, by itself, what is emancipatory. If the
population of the homeless is growing exponentially, it is a good thing
that homeowners allow them to take shelter in the porches of their
houses. It is better than nothing. But, because of its voluntary character,
redistribution is achieved under the logic of philanthropy. That
is, it does not occur in an enabling way, in recognition of both the right
to the benefit and the right to reclaim the effectiveness of the economic
right in an autonomous, participatory way,
The neoliberal market itself is an embodiment of democracy. Neoliberalism fears a
concentration of state power that could seize property and favors democracy so power is
dispersed among elites
Boetsch 5
(Leopoldo Rodriguez, Assistant Professor of Economics and International Studies, Department
of Economics, Portland State University,, PhD in Economics from the University of Texas at
Austin NEOLIBERALISM AND DEMOCRACY “Privredna Izgradnja” http://scindeksclanci.ceon.rs/data/pdf/0032-8979/2005/0032-89790502017B.pdf)
In an econometric study of the relationship between political freedom and¶ economic growth
Barro (1996, p. 6) finds: "some indication of a nonlinear relation¶ in which more democracy
raises growth when political freedoms are weak but¶ depresses growth when a moderate amount
of freedom has already been attained."¶ Barro (1996, p. 6) claims that the level of political freedom
existent in Mexico and¶ Taiwan in 1994 is optimal for capital accumulation because "further
expansions of¶ democracy create great pressure for social programs that redistribute wealth. These¶
programs dilute incentives for investment and work effort and are therefore adverse¶ for growth."
Barto's message is remarkably clear. Democracy must be contained in¶ order to favor capital
accumulation. He suggests that there exist scientific limits to¶ the degree of democracy that must be
allowed if economic growth and capital¶ accumulation is to take place. Echoing the findings of
Crozier et al. (1975), Barro¶ (1996) finds an "excess of democracy" counterproductive.¶ In order
to foster capital accumulation, neoliberalism establishes boundaries¶ within which democracy must
operate; giving rise to what I shall define as¶ "neoliberal democracy." In countries where
democracy has not been consolidated¶ social pressures to take democracy beyond the limits set by
the needs of capital¶ could lead to derailment of democratic governments and a return to
authoritarian¶ ~ rule.¶ A new question necessarily opens up. What degree of political freedom is to
be¶ found along side neoliberal democracy? The limits seem determined primarily by¶ what
neoliberalism considers the needs of capital accumulation. That is, economic¶ policy-making must
be kept out of reach of popular pressures, by legislation¶ whenever possible, or through the
creation of artificial barriers otherwise.¶ Legislation may guarantee an independent Central Bank,
strict observance of an¶ exchange rate policy, the reduction of union power, the sacrosanctity of
pri vate¶ property, a balanced budget, etc. Other barriers to popular participation may involve¶ a
reduction in the access provided to the representatives of popular groups to the¶ higher echelons of
policy-making, the placement of indirect forms of representative¶ selection -such as electoral
colleges or single-member districts- the criminalization¶ and harassment of social movements, etc.
Policy-making lies outside of politics ; in¶ the hands of a cadre of professionals, who convinced the
superiority of their¶ knowledge acquired by technical training are, as John Markoff (1996, p. 119)
notes¶ "open to violating the will of electorates or disagreeing with bureaucratic superiors."¶ In
order to keep legal and artificial barriers in place, neoliberal governments may¶ recur to further
reductions in political freedoms: such as the imposition of rules by¶ presidential decree, or the
curtailment of freedoms of speech, press and assembly.¶ The degree of democracy and political
freedom then becomes a function of the¶ needs of markets." Where pressures for redistribution are
high - representing a threat¶ to neoliberal principles of private property, market supremacy and
capital¶ accumulation- political freedoms will necessarily be curtailed to prevent democratic¶
impulses from launching at the throat of the neoliberal political order.¶ Neoliberal democracy
exhibits a primary concern with the protection of¶ economic freedoms, and a marked distaste for
open political participation. How do¶ these features compare to liberal democracy? An essential
characteristic in common¶ is the significance of private property as a basic right of individuals, and
the¶ freedoms associated with this right. The entire rational of neoliberalisrn, both as¶ economic and
political doctrine, evolves around this principle. However, liberal¶ democracy requires other
elements of individual liberty and rule of law - that at¶ times - run counter to the objectives of
neoliberalism. In the push to free society¶ from the coercive powers of politics, neoliberalism does
not hesitate in stepping¶ over individual rights, particularly an individual's political rights.¶ Given
that the driving force behind neoliberalism is the reestablishment of¶ capital accumulation on
sound grounds, and not the establishment of a regime¶ characterized by the rule of law and
political freedoms, it should not come as a¶ surprise that neoliberal democracies often fail the test
of liberal democracy.¶ Regardless of an ostensible contradiction in terms, Fareed Zakaria's
concept of¶ "illiberal" democracy applies well to several regimes that should be considered¶
neoliberal democracies. Zakaria (1997, p. 22) makes use of several regimes with¶ outstanding
neoliberal credentials: such as Menem's Argentina and Fujirnoris Peru¶ as examples of "illiberal"
democracies, defined as regimes that "routinely ignor[e]¶ constitutional limits on their power and
depriv[e] their citizens of basic rights and¶ freedoms." Zakaria (1997, p. 33) argues that rulers of
neoliberal democracies often¶ justify methods more closely associated with authoritarianism than
democracy on¶ the grounds "that they are desperately needed to enact tough economic reforms."¶
Does this mean that "illiberal" democracy is equivalent to neoliberal democracy? ¶ Zakaria (1997,
p. 34) would answer negatively, for he remains convinced that¶ successful economic reforms
require constitutional liberalism to "protect individual¶ rights and create a framework of law and
administration." Zakaria fails to recognize¶ that although neoliberal democracy requires the
protection of particular individual¶ rights, primarily private property and other economic freedoms
- other rights are¶ often trampled in order to increase the possibilities of success in economic
reforms.¶ Barro (1996, p. 7) contributes to the formulation of an alternative view. He¶ suggests
that "[cjountries with higher standards of living tend to approach higher¶ levels of democracy
over time." Consequently, different degrees of democracy may¶ be adequate for different levels
of economic development in order to further the¶ process of accumulation and foster economic
growth. Barro (1996, p. I I) adds:¶ The advanced Western countries would contribute more to the
welfare of poor¶ nations by exporting their economic systems, notably property rights and free¶
markets, rather than their political systems, which typically developed after¶ reasonable standards
of living had been attained.¶ In other words, it is not civil liberties at large that must be protected
in¶ developing nations, but rather those particular civil liberties that give rise to solid¶ capitalist
relations and markets working in the interests of a propertied class. Only¶ once the market has
acquired sufficient dominance and exerts control over society¶ can other individual rights, more
closely associated with political freedom, be¶ subject to expansion. Barro suggests that most
political rights must only be granted¶ to the population at large after the sphere of politics has been
sufficiently reduced to¶ guarantee the absolute supremacy of market relations of production and
distribution.¶ The significance of these ideas for neoliberal democracy cannot be overstated.¶
Neoliberalism may find liberal democracy acceptable under certain conditions, but¶ democracy
must be limited and diminished -even to a level that compromises the¶ principles of political
liberalism- when threats to neoliberal objectives arise from¶ democratic pressures.
Link: Sovereignty
Neoliberalist loans led to the loss of sovereignty of poorer countries.
Weller and Singleton, 06
(Christian E. Weller and Laura Singleton, Dr. Christian E. Weller is a Senior Fellow at American
Progress and a professor of public policy at the McCormack Graduate School of Policy and
Global Studies at the University of Massachusetts, Boston. Laura Singleton: Behavioral Sciences
Collegium, BS, Mathematics, Davidson College, MBA, Harvard University, MS, PhD,
Management, Boston College. Peddling reform: the role of think tanks in shaping the neoliberal
policy agenda for the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. Page 78-79)
There is an important subtext to the Commission’s proposed development stra- tegies, which
principally rely on the private sector to ameliorate the situation of the world’s poor. In particular,
the proposed development framework would lead to the further erosion of the national sovereignty
of poorer countries, a profound lack of confidence in the ability of a government to efficiently
provide basic goods and services for its people, and the subsidization of privatization of national
goods and services. Though the loss of sovereignty has been briefly touched upon above, it war-
rants closer analysis, as the Commission purports to be attempting to reestablish national
sovereignty. Indeed, in their analysis of the IMF, the Commission claims that the
[t]ransformation of the IMF into a source of long-term conditional loans has made poorer nations
increasingly dependent on the IMF and has given the IMF a degree of influence over member
countries’ policymaking that is unprecedented for a multilateral institution. Some agreements
between the IMF and its members specify scores of required policies as conditions for continued
funding. These programs have not ensured economic progress. They have undermined national
sovereignty and often hindered the devel- opment of responsible, democratic institutions that
correct their own mis- takes and respond to changes in external conditions.
Despite the fact that the Commission’s first of six guiding principles of IMF reform is
‘sovereignty – the desire to ensure that democratic processes and sovereign authority are
respected in both borrowing and lending countries’ (Meltzer 2000), the Commission did not
explain how its policy recommendations would improve the status quo. In lieu of eliminating the
source of the loss of national sovereignty – the forced implementation of predetermined neoliberal
policies, regardless of the country or situation – it appeared that the Commission had merely
masked it by requiring countries to pre-qualify for loans, in lieu of the current practice of
conditioning loans on specific criteria. Indeed, this policy change could potentially exacerbate the
loss of national sovereignty as countries would be forced to implement policies before they could
qualify for loans, rather than merely agree to implement policies as a condition of the loan.
In addition, the Commission’s World Bank restructuring program would facil- itate, and
functionally subsidize, the privatization of public goods and services in developing economies by
two principal means, thereby effectively overriding national development policies. First, the
Commission would have required countries with capital market access to seek funding for
development projects from these private sources rather than from a multinational entity, such as
the World Bank or IMF. Thus, countries would be forced to either borrow large sums of capital at
high interest rates, or to allow private corporations to enter the country and assume responsibility
for various functions previously under the government’s purview. Second, for countries that are
both poor enough and lack access to international capital markets, the World Bank would
essentially auction off the rights to certain goods and services to the lowest bidder – guaranteeing
payment by directly delivering the funds to the service provider. Furthermore, user fees would be
subsidized for the poorest countries, thereby assuring multinational corporations a certain return
on their investments, as long as the country remains poor.
Link – Terrorism
The war on terror is caused by neoliberal interests
Lafer ‘06
(Gordon Lafer, Gordon Lafer is a political economist and is an Associate Professor at the
University of Oregon’s Labor Education and Research Center, Neoliberalism by other means:
the “war on terror” at home and abroad,
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/0739314042000251306)
The takeover of Iraq is clearly driven by a mixture of motives: the president’s reelection strategy,
the lust for oil, the profits of contractors, the neoconservative ideology of administrators and the
neoliberal agenda described here. At times these motives converge, and at times they pull
against each other. Yet the task of political scientists must be to look at those crosscurrents of
motives and— without minimizing the complexity of the thing—do our best to answer the
question: so what really is going on here?¶ One broad strain of thought is that the war is essentially
the project of a neoconservative policy elite within the administration. As the Carnegie Endowment’s Joseph Cirincione puts it, the war suggests “a textbook case of how a small, organized
group can determine policy in a large nation, even when the majority of officials and experts
originally scorned their views.” There is no question that the neocons have been the most vocal
proponents of the war, and that they vigorously championed an invasion of Iraq for years before
9/11. Their zeal for this project has been relentless and unabashed. Their reasons for war were
never limited to weapons of mass destruction, but focused on the much grander goals of restoring
American virtue, igniting an “Islamic Reformation,” and establishing the US as the sole power
over the entire planet, forever—insti- tuting what the government calls its “single sustainable
model for national success” that is “right and true for every person, in every society.” Given the
depth of this conviction, and the breadth of influential positions occupied by neocons, this makes
it seem that the war was waged primarily for ideological rather than interested reasons.
America’s own neoliberalism is the root cause of terrorism against it
Beck ‘02
(Ulrich Beck, Professor of Sociology at the Ludwig-Maximilians-University Munich and holds a
professorship at Munich University and at the London School of Economics, The Silence of
Words and Political Dynamics in the World Risk Society†
,
http://logosonline.home.igc.org/beck.pdf)
Perhaps this caricature gives an idea about yesterday’s situation, which is no longer valid today.
The terrorist attacks and the anthrax scare raise a question that can no longer be swept under the
rug: Is the triumph of the economy already over? Will the primacy of politics be rediscovered?
Has neoliberalism’s apparently unstoppable victory suddenly been broken? In fact, the outbreak
of global terrorism resembles a Chernobyl of globalization. If with Chernobyl it was about taking
the exaltation of nuclear energy to its grave, with September 11 it is about bidding farewell to the
beatification of neoliberalism. The suicide bombers did not only uncover the vulnerability of
western civilization, but have also at the same time given a taste of the sort of conflicts that are
generated by economic globalization. In the world of global risks the mark of neoliberalism
rapidly loses its credibility to substitute the state and politics through economics.¶ The
privatization of airline security in the U.S. is particularly emblematic of the above point. Until
now there has been quite a bit of reluctance to discuss this because the tragedy of September 11
was homemade, in part. Moreover, the U.S.’s vulnerability certainly has something to do with its
political philosophy. America is a neoliberal nation through and through and is thus unwilling to
pay the price for public safety. When it is said and done it was long known that the U.S. was a
target for terrorist attacks. But in contrast to Europe, flight security was privatized and taken over
by miracle-working, highly flexible part-time workers whose wages are lower than those of fastfood workers, meaning approximately six dollars an hour. Persons that go through very few hours
of training and practice this profession for no more than six months occupy these important
security positions. Before restricting the basic rights of all citizens to ward against terrorism and
endangering democracy and an under rule of law state, efforts should be made toward making
flight security government run and more professional. This is just one example of the many other
improvements that could be made.¶ It is America’s neoliberal concept of itself—its government
penny-pinching on the one hand, and the triad of deregulation, liberalization and privatization on
the other—that contributes to America’s vulnerability to terrorism. The measure to which this
realization catches on will break the hegemonic power that neoliberalism has gained in shaping
its philosophy and actions in the past. In this sense the horrific pictures of New York contain a
message that has yet to be deciphered: a state, a country can become neoliberal to the point of
death.
Neoliberalist reactions to terrorism encourages it
Beck ‘02
(Ulrich Beck, Professor of Sociology at the Ludwig-Maximilians-University Munich and holds a
professorship at Munich University and at the London School of Economics, The Silence of
Words and Political Dynamics in the World Risk Society†
,
http://logosonline.home.igc.org/beck.pdf)
In times of crisis neoliberalism is left standing without a single political response. The approach of
increasing the dosage of bitter economic medicine even more radically when a breakdown is
pending or comes full-circle in order to rectify the problematic consequences of globalization is an
illusionary theory that only now begins to pay the price. On the contrary, terrorist threats make the
simple truths that the neoliberal triumph had suppressed known again: That the separation of the
world economy from politics is illusionary. There is no security without the state and public
service. Without taxation there is no government. Without taxation there is no education, no
affordable health care, no social security. Without taxation there is no democracy. Without the
public, democracy and civil society have no legitimacy. And without legitimacy there is also no
security. Thus it follows that without the shape and form of a legally regulated (meaning
recognized and not violent) national settlement of conflict in the future and above all on the
global level, there will also be no world economy in any form.
Link – Think Tanks
The spread of neo-liberalism in Latin America started with a few “think-tanks.” If
this system worked for neoliberalism, there is a strong possibility it would work in
reverse too.
Fischer and Plehwe, 2013
(Karin Fischer and Dieter Plehwe, Fischer is a senior reporter at The Chronicle of Higher
Education, Dieter Plehwe is a Senior Fellow at the Social Science Research Centre Berlin and
the co-editor with Philip Mirowski of The Road from Mont Pelerin: The Making of the
Neoliberal Thought Collective. The “Pink Tide” and Neoliberal Civil Society Formation: Think
Tank Networks in Latin America, http://www.stateofnature.org/?p=6601)
When Lula was elected president of Brazil for the first time in 2002, neoliberals in Latin America
feared the return of socialism. Lula’s re-election in 2006 and the electoral success of other left wing
parties in Latin America heightened such anxieties on the right. In response to the concerns about
the rising pink tide, Alejandro Chafuen wrote his article “Hope Amid Turmoil in Latin
America?” for Atlas Highlights (Chafuen 2006). Chávez, Morales and Castro are invoked to
express the frustration of the neoliberal right with the contemporary challenges. But in what
amounts to nothing less than a Gramscian analysis of social power relations from a right wing
perspective, Chafuen points to the comparable weakness of the neoliberal forces in Latin America
back in the 1970s: seven neoliberal think tanks only in 1975 compared to the number of 35 for
2005; only ten universities with neoliberal professors compared to his count of 40 today; five “freemarket” journals and magazines instead of twelve these days; plus seven radio and TV channels
supporting the neoliberal cause compared to none in 1975. Chafuen’s message to the adherents of
the Atlas network: Do not worry too much about the neo-socialist challenge, because you can
rely on a wide range of neoliberal capacities which will be very difficult to destroy.
The “think tank model” of politics becomes particularly relevant in times of crisis. Think tanks
provide a framework for debates on future strategies. Political leaders and intellectuals currently
out of favour in the electorate find shelter in think tanks after having lost public positions, and they
serve to recruit and train new personnel for the future. As Zibechi (2008) argues, representatives
of the traditional Right have been replaced by figures from civil society as a consequence of the
resurgence of the left. Transnational private organizations with links to local right-wing or
neoliberal think tanks and parties are carrying out a continent wide ideological (counter)
offensive. The hegemonic contest of the different Rights in Latin America consequently has to
be analyzed within the wider context of a “war of position” (Gramsci).
Link – Treaties
Economic treaties with the US are used to force neoliberalism into a foreign country
Shadlen ‘00
(Kenneth Shadlen, Associate Fellow at Institute of Latin American Studies, University of
London, Latin American Research Review, Neoliberalism, Corporatism, And Small Business
Political Activism In Contemporary Mexico,
http://lasa-2.univ.pitt.edu/LARR/prot/search/retrieve/?Vol=35&Num=2&Start=73)
Small industrialists have faced a new economic and political environment since the early 1980s,
when economic crisis and intense pressure from the international financial community obliged the
Mexican government to open the economy.16 Economic liberalization began in the wake of the 1982
debt crisis and continued throughout the decade (Lustig 1992). Mexico entered the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1986 and the following year unilaterally accelerated
the pace of trade liberalization by eliminating most quantitative import restrictions and lowering
the maximum tariff from 100 to 20 percent. By the early 1990s, import barriers had been reduced,
foreign investment deregulated, most state enterprises privatized, and Mexico was negotiating the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with the United States and Canada.¶ The major
changes in economic policy were accompanied by the emergence of a new alliance between the
state and business, in which a cohesive group of technocratic policy makers collaborated closely
with the top strata of the Mexican business community. Within the state, a closely knit group of
officials with extensive links to the international financial community came to control key aspects of
economic policy making (Maxfield 1991; Centeno and Maxfield 1992; Centeno 1994). In the
private sector, the peak representatives of the business community came under the control of the
most internationalized segment of Mexican capital, which was anxious to consolidate business
support for the new development strategy (Tirado and Luna 1995; Schneider 1997; Garrido and
Puga 1990).¶ Each feature of the new alliance diminished CANACINTRA's capacity to affect policy
making, as the increasingly technocratic nature of policy making and big business's monopoly of
the main channels of interest articulation devalued small industry's traditional points of access to
the state. These tendencies were evident in the two most important events of the period under
study: a series of tripartite economic pacts that served as the principal mechanism of economic
policy making after 1987, and NAFTA. Both featured intense collaboration between the state and
elite private-sector proponents of the neoliberal model. For example, when the economic pacts
were being formulated, business was chiefly represented by the peak-level Consejo Coordinador
Empresarial (CCE).17 Similarly, during the NAFTA consultations, business representation was
monopolized by the Coordinadora de Organismos Empresariales de Comercio Exterior
(COECE), a related organization created by the CCE to represent business on trade issues.18
Link – Venezuela “Instabilitiy”
MEDIA BOMB: Representing Venezuela as a regional destabilizer are not accurate
and work in service of elite interests
HARNECKER 10,
(Marta, Chilean psychologist and former student of Louis Althusser, trans. Janet
Duckworth, "Twenty-First Century Socialism," MONTHLY REVEIW 62:3, JulyAugust)
I remind you of what Noam Chomsky has said about the role these
media play: they are instruments to “manufacture
consent,” which make it possible to “shepherd the bewildered herd.” According to Chomsky, propaganda is as necessary to bourgeois
democracy as repression is to the totalitarian state.51 Therefore, bourgeois political parties can even accept a defeat at the polls as long as they
continue to control most of the mass media. The media, from the moment of such a defeat, work to win back the hearts and minds of those who
made the “mistake” of electing a leftist head of government. That is the reason why visceral reactions, such as those we have seen in a number of
countries, follow any measure taken by left governments to censure the media’s disinformation campaigns and efforts to incite violence, or to
create legal instruments that protect the people's right to receive accurate information. The powerful international media echo these reactions. For
today’s political battles are not won with atomic bombs but with “media bombs.” An example of
these media bombs is the campaign to make people think that Venezuela is engaged in an arms race
that threatens the region. Allusion to Venezuela’s recent weapons purchase from Russia buttresses
the allegation. However, if CIA data are consulted, it is clear that the situation is completely
different . Using these data, Belgian economist Eric Toussaint reports: Venezuelan military spending is the sixth highest in the region behind
that of Brazil, Argentina, Chile (a country with a much smaller population than Venezuela’s and considered to be a “model country”), Colombia,
and Mexico. In
relative terms, comparing military spending to GDP, the Venezuelan military budget is
the ninth largest in Latin America. Have people been able to read this in the most important
international papers? Absolutely not. What was reported in August 2009 is that Sweden had asked Venezuelan officials to
respond to a Colombian allegation that Venezuela was supplying arms to the FARC, and that Sweden had in effect told Colombia that SAAB
missiles found in a FARC camp had been supplied by Sweden to Venezuela. However, was anyone able to find an article reporting the detailed
and concise reply given by Hugo Chávez? The missiles in question had been stolen from a Venezuelan port in 1995, four years before Chávez
took over the presidency.52 It would seem that today the election of left candidates is better tolerated because these have fewer and fewer real
possibilities of modifying the existing situation.
Link - Venezuela Relations
Bad US – Venezuela relations prevents the spread of neoliberalism
Buxton ‘08
(Julia Buxton, B.Sc. (Economics), M.Sc. (Comparative Government), Ph.D. 'The Crisis of the
Venezuelan Party System' all at the London School of Economics, The Bolivarian Revolution As
Venezuela’s Post Crisis Alternative)
A second driver of radicalization, and one which accounts for the acquisition of anti-neoliberalism
initially in foreign rather than domestic policy, was the severe deterioration in Venezuelan-US
relations after President George Bush assumed office in 2000. The Republican government adopted
a phlegmatic view of the Venezuelan government, whose initiatives were seen to run against US
security interests. US support for the anti-Chávez opposition, expressed through official statements
and financial allocations channeled through USAID and the National Endowment for Democracy
(Gollinger 2006), led the Chávez administration to pursue foreign policy goals that would allow
Venezuela to insulate itself from, and deflect, US pressure. Anti-neoliberalism, oil financed regional
integration and anti-Americanism became the key tools for achieving this objective and they were
advanced in the Second Phase as US antipathy toward Venezuela – and the pursuit of destabilizing
strategies became pronounced. Moreover US efforts to punish Venezuelan ‘deviance’ through for
example a 2005 arms embargo, fuelled incentives to build multipolarism. Blocked from upgrading
its US supplied weaponry, Venezuela turned to China and Russia.
2NC Link Booster: Cooption
Bureaucratic cooption is the biggest empirical threat to successful Leftist
movements
NAZEMROAYA 13
(Mahdi Darius, research associate at the centre for research on globalization (CRG),
"The Pink Tide in Latin America: An Alliance Between Local Capital and
Socialism?" Strategic Culture Foundation, http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-pinktide-in-latin-america-an-alliance-between-local-capital-and-socialism/5333782)
Moreover, one of the threats to the leftist movements in Latin America is corruption and cooptation. Bureaucracy in this regards can be a threat. For example, some supporters of Venezuela
became uneasy around 2005. People like the Italian documentary maker Gabriel Muzio, who was
praised in Caracas for his earlier work on Venezuela and then condemned as a falsifier for his
later work (which the Venezuelan government itself funded), changed their positions on
Venezuela. They complained that they saw the idea of popular power being upset by a
concentration of power by the country’s bureaucracy.
2NC Booster: Masking
Always be skeptical of the state NAZEMROAYA 13
(Mahdi Darius, research associate at the centre for research on globalization (CRG),
"The Pink Tide in Latin America: An Alliance Between Local Capital and
Socialism?" Strategic Culture Foundation, http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-pinktide-in-latin-america-an-alliance-between-local-capital-and-socialism/5333782)
It should be clear that all
leftists are not really leftists. For example, the Chilean Socialists are committed to neo-liberal economics.
Although Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto’s Institutional Revolutionary Party is called a socialist party, it is doubtful
that Mexico will dramatically change its politics and policies aside from cosmetic changes. Even in
Venezuela questionable business deals are made with foreign companies, like the selling of the Deltana Platform
to Chevron-Texaco. Moreover, if leftists are protecting the status quo in their respective societies then they
are actually right-wing under the operationalized definition of “right” that was outlined earlier. Groups and individuals that have
actually present themselves as socialists or communists have been major supporters of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). For example,
before he even became Brazil’s president, the Marxist sociologist Fernando Henrique Cardoso was appointed as finance minister by President
Itamar Franco with the IMF becoming Cardoso’s most enthusiastic supporter after it had three different Brazilian finance ministers consecutively
fired. Cardoso pushed for neo-liberal de-regulation and the privatization of Brazil’s public sector. Like many other revolutionaries a lot of the
Marxist guerrillas in Brazil who fought against the military junta in their country have put away their fatigues and copies of Das Kapital for IMF
and World Bank economic manuals. This is why union boss Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva of the Brazilian Workers Party was renounced as traitor
and a lackey of the IMF and World Bank by the workers of the Occupied Factories Movement of Brazil after he became president. President
Dilma Rousseff, Lula’s successor and a former Marxist guerrilla, is continuing his policies. This is why there are those that pessimistically say
that you never know what to expect when you vote for the leftists in Latin America.
Impact – Mass Violence
Neoliberal violence is everywhere and nowhere – while the 1AC holds us in thrall of
supposed wars, the slow violence of neoliberalism infects every area of the globe,
producing billions of anonymous victims beyond the reach of our moral concern.
Di Leo and McClennen 2012
(Jeffrey R., Dean of the School of Arts and Sciences and Professor of English and Philosophy at
the University of Houston–Victoria; Sophia A. professor of international affairs and directs
Penn State's Center for Global Studies as well as its Latin American Studies program; Postscript
on Violence symploke, Volume 20, Numbers 1-2, 2012, pp. 241-250 (Article))
Violence is everywhere. It could be argued that we are in one of the most¶ violent eras in human
history. The scope of violence today is global and its¶ magnitude immense. It is seen in the death
counts from perpetual wars and¶ the injury reports from fierce protests; it is found in the oil-soaked
waters of¶ the Gulf of Mexico and the radiation-contaminated earth of Japan; it is heard¶ in the
screams of women subject to sexual violence and the children who¶ are the victims of predators. It is
in the blood we are served by televised¶ news and the brutal visions of an increasing violence-driven
entertainment¶ industry.¶ Though our various critical and cultural studies relate features of it, and¶
our social and physical sciences capture aspects of it, the violence in our world¶ is far too
overwhelming to contain. No study can capture it in its entirety and¶ no report can present us with
a complete set of data on it. For many, the¶ violence that surrounds and engulfs us is an
abomination and a threat, something¶ to be fought and eliminated; though for many more,
violence serves a¶ social and economic end—and is as American as apple pie. “Rooted in
everyday¶ institutional structures,” writes Henry Giroux, “violence has become the¶ toxic glue that
bonds Americans together while simultaneously preventing¶ them from expanding and building a
multiracial and multicultural democracy”¶ (2002, 231).¶ The “toxic glue” of violence is a threat to
individual and social well-being¶ as well as to democracy itself. One of the imperatives of critical
pedagogy¶ must be to reveal its manifestations—another must be to work toward its¶ elimination.
And progressive intellectuals must continue to utilize the public¶ sphere through print and social
media to bring about a better understanding¶ of the dangers of an increasingly violent world and to
work toward eliminating¶ the toxic glue of violence.¶ Violence is nowhere. While violence is
everywhere more apparent, it¶ is also everywhere ignored and hidden . The violence that is unseen
and¶ unknown must be engaged just as much as the violence that is seen and¶ known. While violent
video games and movies premised on the spectacle¶ of violence are not difficult to discern, they
often have the unintended consequence¶ of closing off consideration and understanding of other
forms of¶ violence, in particular the myriad types of violence that cannot be staged.¶ Much of the
violence that is unseen and unheard happens on a temporal¶ scale that is beyond the capacities of
our senses. Termed by Rob Nixon, “slow¶ violence,” it has been described by him as “a violence
that occurs gradually¶ and out of sight, a violence of delayed destruction that is dispersed across¶
time and space, an attritional violence that is typically not viewed as violence¶ at all” (Nixon 2). The
slow violence of “mass droughts in China, flooding in¶ Australia, food crises, super twisters,
earthquakes linked to geo-engineering,¶ arctic melt-off and so on” (Cohen 2012, i); “[C]limate
change, the thawing¶ cryosphere, toxic drift, biomagnifications, deforestation, the radioactive¶
aftermath of war, acidifying oceans, and a host of other slowly unfolding¶ environmental
catastrophes” (Nixon 2).¶ This was not the violence addressed by the theorists and critics of the¶
twentieth-century. Much of this violence unfolds over spans of time better¶ described as
geological rather than human. Or, better yet, over spans of time¶ from which “the human” is
viewed as but a passing moment. The theoretical¶ work here that is just beginning to take shape
promises to reframe the very¶ ways we think about history, time, and change.1¶ However, if the
exanthropic violence of climate change is the future of¶ theory, what of the anthropic violence
that has been the focus of much attention,¶ particularly since the rise of women’s studies, gender
studies, and ethnic¶ studies in the sixties and seventies? How are we doing here with forms of¶
violence that are visible and seen and felt by women, children, and the disenfranchised¶ across
the globe? Unfortunately, not well.¶ In today’s media-saturated world, violence is always visible
but rarely¶ felt. The prevalence of media violence is especially high in U.S. culture. Our¶
entertainment industry is adept at aestheticizing violence and transforming¶ the most violent and
morally extreme members of our society into culture¶ products suitable for mass consumption
and celebration. Take for example,¶ the serial killer Aileen Wournos, who paradoxically became
the object of¶ revulsion and attraction when presented to us by the American entertainment¶
industry. Many marveled at how the angelic Hollywood actor Charlize¶ Theron had been
transformed into the “monster” Wournos, and found themselves¶ comparing the “real” Theron to
the image of Wournos presented by¶ her in the film, Monster (2003). “She is my favorite of the
night,” said a fashion¶ editor from Glamour magazine commenting on Theron’s appearance at
the¶ Golden Globes that year, “[e]specially because you have the contrast of her¶ in that movie
and the way she looks tonight.”2 This entirely commonplace¶ comment reveals a semiotic
process wherein serial killing and its aesthetic¶ image become hopelessly intertwined, and
ultimately confused.¶ In the translation of serial killing to its performance and promotion, a¶
complex semiotic process creates multiple layers of signification concerning¶ the event and its
perpetrator. The result is both a greater understanding¶ (albeit a superficial one) of the killers and
the horrific events in which they¶ participated, and a growing sense of confusion between the
“real” and the¶ image. Carefully packaged, promoted and sanitized by the culture industry, ¶
American psychos such as Jeffrey Dahmer, Aileen Wournos and John Wayne¶ Gacy increasingly
become less despicable objects of moral revulsion, and¶ more objects of fascination and
entertainment. Their final entry into the sign¶ system of celebrity entertainment is signaled by
becoming household names¶ as readily recognizable as our sports, movie and television icons.
For the average¶ culturally literate American, naming three contemporary serial killers is¶ about as
challenging as naming three talk show hosts. However, the realness¶ of these killers and their
violent crimes gets buried under multiple layers of¶ signification. A “hyperreal”—and
“hypermoral”—image soon displaces any¶ remaining fragments of the reality of the horrific
events perpetrated by them.¶ The cultural celebration of violence though does not end with the
remediation¶ of increasingly macabre, sadistic, and cruel behavior. Rather, it creates¶ a culture
where violence has become a—if not “the”—standard form of entertainment,¶ and where our
children are targeted as major consumers of this¶ violence. From the hyper-real violence of many
of the video games played¶ by children to the scenes of fighting, killing, and torture found in
many of the¶ movies our children watch, there is no escaping the toxic glue of violence.¶ Even the
“G” rated Pixar family movie, Cars 2 (2011), featured two deaths¶ and one torture scene (a crime
syndicate tortures a car until it blows up).¶ How else can this be explained except as a primer on
violence for children?¶ It is not going to be a surprise to anyone familiar with the American film¶
industry that violence is one of its main commodities—and one that is internationally¶ consumed.
However, there is some reason to believe that more¶ people are beginning to understand the
negative impact of repeated cultural¶ consumption of violence. If nothing else, the tragic events
surrounding the¶ shooting of moviegoers in Aurora, Colorado this past summer facilitated this¶
discussion. However, the solution is not to be found in say banning The Dark¶ Knight Rises
(2012) from theaters because of its alleged connection to an act¶ of violence. This would be about
as effective as taking Sweet Tarts away from¶ children in an effort to stop tooth decay. Rather,
the solution is to be found¶ in understanding how making violence into a commodity connects
with a¶ broader and more pernicious neoliberal social and economic agenda. Once¶ this is
understood, then just as with eating candy, you can consume violence¶ at your own risk.¶
Neoliberal economic practices have increased biopolitical violence. The¶ devastating effects of
neoliberalism have been well documented. “Under¶ neoliberalism,” writes Henry Giroux,
“everything either is for sale or is plundered¶ for profit” (2004, xii). He continues:¶ Public lands
are looted by logging companies and corporate ranchers;¶ politicians willingly hand the public’s
airwaves over to broadcasters¶ and large corporate interests without a dime going into the¶ public
trust; Halliburton gives war profiteering a new meaning as¶ it is granted corporate contracts
without any competitive bidding¶ and then bilks the U.S. government for millions; the environment¶
is polluted and despoiled in the name of profit-making just as the¶ government passes legislation to
make it easier for corporations¶ to do so; public services are gutted in order to lower the taxes of¶
major corporations; schools increasingly resemble malls or jails,¶ and teachers, forced to raise
revenue for classroom materials,¶ increasingly function as circus barkers hawking everything
from¶ hamburgers to pizza parties—that is, when they are not reduced to¶ prepping students to get
higher test scores. (2004, xii-xiv)¶ When extreme free-market capitalism becomes the source of
values,¶ violence is given a reprieve from moral indignation . Democratic values as¶ well as basic
notions of human rights and economic justice are overlooked¶ when the market reveals profits to be
had—or losses to be avoided. As¶ neoliberalism widens the gulf between the rich and the poor, and
the enfranchised¶ and the disenfranchised, it also places at risk of violence the poor and¶ the
disenfranchised. Therefore, it should be no surprise that the devastation¶ of the environment and
the violation of human rights is often more extreme¶ in less affluent parts of the world.¶ Moreover,
the celebration of violence in the American entertainment¶ industry must be seen as an extension
of the neoliberal militaristic transformation¶ of the country. Arguably, the state of permanent war
of the United States¶ has benefited an entertainment industry which views increased militarization¶
as a marketing dream. Toys, games, videos, movies and clothing associated¶ with the military and
its values increase in times of war. The permanent¶ state of war in the United States thus provides
increasing opportunities for¶ corporations endlessly to exploit nationalistic jingoism and the
glorification¶ of violence. In light of neoliberalism and its economic Darwinism, the recent ¶
resurrection of Captain America—the defender of American “ideals”—is less¶ a nostalgic nod to
comic history’s past, than a market-driven embrace of our¶ increasingly militarized, violent, and
jingoistic culture.
Impact - Extinction
Empirically, neoliberalism is a disaster and will only accelerate the drive to
environmental extinction.
MACLEOD 2013 (ALAN, Thatcher and Chavez A Tale of Two Deaths; counterpunch
http://www.counterpunch.org/2013/04/12/a-tale-of-two-deaths/)
Hugo Chavez and Margaret Thatcher, two iconic statespeople of our age, representing
fundamentally opposing world views, have died. Their deaths have sparked passionate feelings,
for and against. Doubtless, history will remember them as two great figureheads in world
politics. Just as contrasting as their ideologies was the reaction to their deaths, from both the
media and the public. In a New York Times Obituary, Simon Romero described Chavez as
“astute and manipulative”, and accused him of “strutting about like a strongman”. In the UK, the
Guardian went on the offensive, claiming “the debate continued as to whether Chavez could
fairly be described as a dictator, but a democrat he most certainly was not”, seeing as he
“assidously fomented class hatred”. The Times’ reaction to Thatcher’s death could hardly have
been more different; “The world has lost one of the great champions of freedom and liberty”.
Praise was more muted in Britain, going down the “great and controversial figure” line. A
collection of front pages can be seen here. This contrasted with the reactions from the public
themselves. Across Venezuela there were mass public scenes of grief, with few openly revelling
in the death of the President. There was even a candlelight vigil for Chavez in London. A month
later, long-planned street parties erupted in towns and cities that residents claimed Thatcher had
destroyed. The two represent the two primary ideologies of the age: neoliberalism and 21st
century socialism. Thatcher’s neoliberalism, known by many names: free-market economics,
Reaganomics, the Washington Consensus, Neoconservatism, traces its philosophical roots to the
work of objectivist philosopher, Ayn Rand. In a 1959 interview Rand gave a summary of her
position. “Man’s highest moral purpose is the achievement of his own happiness…I challenge
the moral code of altruism, the precept that man’s moral duty is to live for others.” Going further,
she stated to a shocked interviewer that, “I consider helping others evil” and that “love should be
treated as a business deal.” Her ambitious goal was to revolutionize human relations. Shunned by
academia, she found an audience in the business community, where her central messages struck a
chord. Thatcher echoed Rand’s vision when she insisted that “there is no such thing as society, only
individuals”.Their philosophy was summed up in the three words by the movie, Wall Street: greed
is good. Rand’s effect on the business community was explored in Adam Curtis’ excellent
documentary trilogy, All Watched Over by Machines of Loving Grace. Neoliberalism’s
economic basis is in the work of Milton Friedman and Friedrich Hayek. Friedman was close to
both Thatcher and Ronald Reagan. Often discussed but rarely defined, for World Bank
economist John Williamson, its key features are: * Fiscal discipline * A redirection of public
expenditure priorities toward fields offering both high * economic returns and the potential to
improve income distribution, such as * primary health care, primary education, and infrastructure
* Tax reform (to lower marginal rates and broaden the tax base) * Interest rate liberalization * A
competitive exchange rate * Trade liberalization * Liberalization of inflows of foreign direct
investment * Privatization * Deregulation (to abolish barriers to entry and exit) * Secure property
rights. Critics argue that these policies have the effect of transferring control of the economy from
institutions which, in theory at least, have the well-being of society as their primary goal to entities
only concerned with profits. Under neoliberalism, humans have no inalienable rights, only what
they achieve on the markets. Thus, rights enshrined in the United Nations Charter, such as the
right to water, to healthcare and an adequate standard of living, are outdated, “a letter to Santa
Claus”, in the words of Jeane Kirkpatrick, former US Ambassador to the UN. While Rand is
scornful of religion and established morality, many socialists see it as a crucial part of their
beliefs. Tony Benn, former candidate for leader of the British Labour Party, Thatcher’s bête noir,
and vocal supporter of Chavez, states that his socialism comes from the book of Genesis: “When
Cain killed Abel and the Lord had a word with him about it, Cain said : “Am I my Brother’s
keeper?’. He was talking about equality. The idea that I have an equal responsibility for my
neighbour or my brother has reappeared in a whole range of different forms over the years – “an
injury to one is an injury to all, “united we stand, divided we fair, “love thy neighbour as
thyself.” Similarly, Chavez affirmed that “I am a Christian, I believe that Christ and the authentic
Christian tendencies have much to contribute to the 21st century socialist project”. Chavez
defined his 21st century socialism at the World Social Forum in 2006: “There is hardly any time
left: socialism or death, but real death— of the entire human species and of life on planet earth,
because capitalism is destroying the planet, capitalism is destroying life on earth, capitalism is
destroying the ecological equilibrium of the planet. The poles are melting, the seas are heating up,
the continents are sinking, forests and jungles are being destroyed, rivers and lakes are drying up;
the destructive development of the capitalist model is putting an end to life on earth. I believe it’s
now or never.”
Impact: Extinction
Neoliebralism results in economic destruction that ends in extinction
LOO 13
(Dennis, professor of sociology at California State Polytechnic, "Courting
Catastrophe: Neoliberalism's Threat" Invited Lecture at UC Riverside, posted May
3 on The Leftist Review, http://www.leftistreview.com/2013/05/03/courtingcatastrophe-neoliberalisms-threat/dennisloo/)
What is most problematic about globalization isn’t that it widens the gap between those with wealth
and those with far less, leaving people in want and creating unnecessary suffering and deaths, or
that it rips up the social fabric, or that it is precipitating and accelerating environmental
degradation and disasters, endangering the very planet that we live on, or any of the other profound troubles
that my book chronicles and analyzes. These problems are catastrophic on an epic scale – the demolition of
society. But to get a handle on what has been happening to us collectively, we have to first be clear about why it is
happening and what it is in its totality because if we don’t, we won’t be able to change course. We need to know where we are, how we got
here, and why it continues to be so difficult to change course, before we can have a chance to actually change course.
Impact- Extinction
Neoliberalization, if left unchecked, will lead to total societal breakdown
Harvey 7
(David, Distinguished Professor of Anthropology and Geography at the Graduate Center of the
City University of New York, “A Brief History of Neoliberalism”, Oxford University Press,
2007. Pg. 166-168)
Neoliberalization has unquestionably rolled back the bounds of commodification and
greatly extended the reach of legal contracts. It typically celebrates (as does much of
postmodern theory) ephemerality and the short-term contract––marriage, for example, is
understood as a short-term contractual arrangement rather than as a sacred and
unbreakable bond. The divide between neoliberals and neoconservatives partially reflects a
diff erence as to where the lines are drawn. The neoconservatives typically blame ‘liberals’,
‘Hollywood’, or even ‘postmodernists’ for what they see as the dissolution and immorality of
the social order, rather than the corporate capitalists (like Rupert Murdoch) who actually do
most of the damage by foisting all manner of sexually charged if not salacious material upon the
world and who continually flaunt their pervasive preference for short-term over long-term
commitments in their endless pursuit of profit. But there are far more serious issues here
than merely trying to protect some treasured object, some particular ritual or a preferred corner
of social life from the monetary calculus and the short-term contract. For at the heart of liberal
and neoliberal theory lies the necessity of constructing coherent markets for land, labour,
and money, and these, as Karl Polanyi pointed out, ‘are obviously not commodities . . . the
commodity description of labour, land, and money is entirely fictitious’. While capitalism
cannot function without such fictions, it does untold damage if it fails to acknowledge the
complex realities behind them. Polanyi, in one of his more famous passages, puts it this way:
To allow the market mechanism to be sole director of the fate of human beings and their
natural environment, indeed, even of the amount and use of purchasing power, would result in
the demolition of society. For the alleged commodity ‘labour power’ cannot be shoved
about, used indiscriminately, or even left unused, without aff ecting also the human individual
who happens to be the bearer of this peculiar commodity. In disposing of man’s labour
power the system would, incidentally, dispose of the physical, psychological, and moral
entity ‘man’ attached to that tag. Robbed of the protective covering of cultural institutions,
human beings would perish from the eff ects of social exposure; they would die as victims of
acute social dislocation through vice, perversion, crime and starvation. Nature would be
reduced to its elements, neighborhoods and landscapes defiled, rivers polluted, military
safety jeopardized, the power to produce food and raw materials destroyed. Finally, the
market administration of purchasing power would periodically liquidate business
enterprise, for shortages and surfeits of money would prove as disastrous to business as
floods and droughts in primitive society. 18 The damage wrought through the ‘floods and
droughts’ of fictitious capitals within the global credit system, be it in Indonesia, Argentina,
Mexico, or even within the US, testifies all too well to Polanyi’s final point. But his theses on
labour and land deserve further elaboration.
Impact – Nuclear War
Neoliberalism justifies preemptive nuclear war and necessitates eternal conflict
Werlhof 8
(Claudia von Werlhof. Werlhof is a professor at the Institute of Political Sciences at the
University of Innsbruck. “The Globalization of Neoliberalism, its Consequences and Some of its
Basic Alternatives.” 27 August 2008. Capitalism Nature Socialism. BA)
Neoliberalism and its ‘‘monetary totalitarianism’’ proves that the notion that capitalism and
democracy are one is a myth.37 Politicians of all parties have abandoned politics in favor of
economy, because the corporations dictate politics, and where corporate interests are concerned,
there is no place for democratic convention or community control. Public space disappears. The
‘‘res publica’’ turns into a ‘‘res privata,’’ or as we could say today a ‘‘res privata transnationale’’
(in its original Latin meaning, ‘‘privare’’ means ‘‘to deprive’’). Only those in power still have
rights. They give themselves the licenses they need, from the ‘‘license to plunder’’ to the
‘‘license to kill.’’38 Those who get in their way or challenge their ‘‘rights’’ are vilified,
criminalized, and to an increasing degree, defined as ‘‘terrorists,’’ or, in the case of defiant
governments, as ‘‘rogue states’’*a label that usually implies threatened or actual military attack,
as we can see in the cases of Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Iraq, and possibly Syria and Iran in
the near future. U.S. President George W. Bush has even pushed the idea of ‘‘preemptive’’
nuclear strikes should the U.S. feel endangered by weapons of mass destruction,39 a policy to
which the European Union did not object.40 Neoliberalism and war are two sides of the same
coin.41 So-called ‘‘free trade,’’ piracy, and war are ‘‘an inseparable three’’ perhaps more so
today than ever. War is considered not only ‘‘good for the economy,’’42 but it is its driving force
and can be understood as the ‘‘continuation of economy with other means.’’ War and economy
have become almost indistinguishable.43 Wars over resources44 especially oil and water*have
already begun, the Gulf Wars being the most obvious examples. Militarism once again appears
as the ‘‘executor of capital accumulation’’45* potentially everywhere and enduringly.
Impact – Violence, War, etc.
Neoliberalism makes criticism impossible and guarantees escalating violence,
warfare, and worldwide deprivation.
GIROUX 2012
(HENRY, professor of English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University; Neoliberalism's
Culture of Cruelty Authoritarian Politics in the Age of Casino Capitalism, Counterpunch,
http://www.counterpunch.org/2012/08/27/authoritarian-politics-in-the-age-of-casino-capitalism/)
The United States has entered a new historical era marked by a growing disinvestment in the
social state, public goods, and civic morality. Matters of politics, power, ideology, governance,
economics, and policy now translate unapologetically into a systemic disinvestment in institutions
and policies that further the breakdown of those public spheres which traditionally provided the
minimal conditions for social justice, dissent, and democratic expression. Neoliberalism, or what
might be called casino capitalism, has become the new normal. Unabashed in its claim to
financial power, self-regulation, and its survival of the fittest value system, neoliberalism not only
undercuts the formative culture necessary for producing critical citizens and the public spheres
that nourish them, it also facilitates the conditions for producing a bloated defense budget, the
prison-industrial complex, environmental degradation, and the emergence of “finance as a
criminalized, rogue industry.”[i] It is clear that an emergent authoritarianism haunts a defanged
democracy now shaped and structured largely by corporations. Money dominates politics, the gap
between the rich and poor is ballooning, urban spaces are becoming armed camps, militarism is
creeping into every facet of public life, and civil liberties are being shredded. Neoliberalism’s
policy of competition now dominates policies that define public spheres such as schools,
allowing them to stripped of a civic and democratic project and handed over to the logic of the
market. Regrettably, it is not democracy, but authoritarianism, that remains on the rise in the
United States as we move further into the 21st century.
The 2012 U.S. Presidential Election exists at a pivotal moment in this transformation away from
democracy, a moment in which formative cultural and political realms and forces – including the
rhetoric used by election candidates – appear saturated with celebrations of war and Social
Darwinism. Accordingly, the possibility of an even more authoritarian and ethically
dysfunctional leadership in the White House in 2013 has certainly caught the attention of a
number of liberals and other progressives in the United States. American politics in general and
the 2012 election in particular present a challenge to progressives, whose voices in recent years
have been increasingly excluded from both the mainstream media and the corridors of political
power. Instead, the media have played up the apocalyptic view of the Republican Party’s
fundamentalist warriors, who seem fixated on translating issues previously seen as nonreligious—such as sexual orientation, education, identity, and participation in public life—into
the language of a religious revival and militant crusade against evil.
How else to explain Republican Vice-Presidential nominee Paul Ryan’s claim that the struggle
for the future is a “fight of individualism versus collectivism,” with its nod to the McCarthyism
and cold war rhetoric of the 1950s. Or Rick Santorum’s assertion that “President Obama is
getting America hooked on ‘The narcotic of government dependency,’” promoting the view that
government has no responsibility to provide safety nets for the poor, disabled, sick, and elderly.
There is more at work here than simply a ramped up version of social Darwinism with its
savagely cruel ethic of “reward the rich, penalize the poor, [and] let everyone fend for
themselves,” [ii] there is also a full scale attack on the social contract, the welfare state,
economic equality, and any viable vestige of moral and social responsibility. The Romney-Ryan
appropriation of Ayn Rand’s ode to selfishness and self-interest is of particular importance
because it offers a glimpse of a ruthless form of extreme capitalism in which the poor are
considered “moochers,” viewed with contempt, and singled out to be punished. But this
theocratic economic fundamentalist ideology does more. It destroys any viable notion of the and
civic virtue in which the social contract and common good provide the basis for creating
meaningful social bonds and instilling in citizens a sense of social and civic responsibility. The
idea of public service is viewed with disdain just as the work of individuals, social groups, and
institutions that benefit the citizenry at large are held in contempt. As George Lakoff and Glenn
W. Smith point out, casino capitalism creates a culture of cruelty: “its horrific effects on
individuals-death, illness, suffering, greater poverty, and loss of opportunity, productive lives, and
money.”[iii] But it does more by crushing any viable notion of the common good and public life by
destroying “the bonds that hold us together.”[iv] Under casino capitalism, the spaces,
institutions, and values that constitute the public are now surrendered to powerful financial
forces and viewed simply as another market to be commodified, privatized and surrendered to
the demands of capital. With religious and market-driven zealots in charge, politics becomes an
extension of war; greed and self-interest trump any concern for the well-being of others; reason is
trumped by emotions rooted in absolutist certainty and militaristic aggression; and skepticism and
dissent are viewed as the work of Satan.
If the Republican candidacy race of 2012 is any indication, then political discourse in the United
States has not only moved to the right—it has been introducing totalitarian values and ideals into
the mainstream of public life. Religious fanaticism, consumer culture, and the warfare state
work in tandem with neoliberal economic forces to encourage privatization, corporate tax breaks,
growing income and wealth inequality, and the further merging of the financial and military
spheres in ways that diminish the authority and power of democratic governance.[v] Neoliberal
interests in freeing markets from social constraints, fueling competitiveness, destroying
education systems, producing atomized subjects, and loosening individuals from any sense of
social responsibility prepare the populace for a slow embrace of social Darwinism, state
terrorism, and the mentality of war—not least of all by destroying communal bonds,
dehumanizing the other, and pitting individuals against the communities they inhabit.
Impact – Social Collapse
Continuing with neoliberalism will lead to a collapse of global civilization and a
dystopian world
Robinson 08-American professor of sociology at the University of California, Santa Barbara, 2008, “Latin
America and Global Capitalism”, pgs358-9
Will there be a predatory degeneration of civilization if neither forces from above nor those
from below are able to bring about a resolution of crises and conflicts? Are we already seeing
this? There are many historical precedents in which a civilization collapses when it is
unable to resolve its internal contradictions. Chew has written extensively on recurrent
"dark ages" in human history: that is, periods when particular civilizations have reached
ecological exhaustion as a result of or resulting in chronic social and military conflict that
makes impossible systemic change that could avert collapse. Such periods have been
characterized by the collapse of centralized authority, a sharp regression in social
organization and the forces of production, the death of many, and a drastic reduction in
population levels (see, inter alia, Chew 2007). What makes such a prospect in our particular
historical times most frightening is that a civilizational collapse would now be global,
encompassing all of humanity, and the level of ecological destruction involved suggests
there may be no easy recovery, if indeed, any would be possible. Images of Hurricane
Katrina and its aftermath, of a global Blade Runner society, to evoke the dystopian
imagery of the 1982 Ridley Scott film, or more recently of the 2006 film Children of Men,
written and directed by Alfonso Cuaron, come to mind The possibility of such an outcome is
terrifying. But we would be foolish to dismiss it as a possibility rather than to take such
prospects as a dire warning for collective action against those social, political, and ideological
forces that prevent a change, to use William Greider's phrase (1997), in the "manic logic of
global capitalism." I am reminded of Zizek's chilling observation that "the true horror [of
global capitalism] does not reside in the particular content hidden beneath the universality
of global Capital, but rather in the fact that Capital is effectively an anonymous global
machine blindly running its course, that there is effectively no particular Secret Agent who
animates it" (1997:45)- This implies, however, that even if their command over resources
allows them to exercise a disproportionate influence over outcomes, ruling groups and the
powerful do not actually control their own—or collective outcomes. The future is not
predetermined; we are all its collective agents. As frightening as the current course of
events may seem, we should also recall that the crisis opens up tremendous new
possibilities for progressive change. It is at times of crisis rather than stability and equilibrium
in a system that the power of collective agencies to influence history is most felt. Whatever
humanity's future, we should keep our eyes on Latin America, as it will surely play a vital
role in what is to come.
Impact – Laundry List
Neoliberalism ensures elite control of the political process destroying the public
sphere and guaranteeing environmental destruction
Giroux 2005
(Henry Giroux professor of English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University, West Chester
University, College Literature, 32.1, Winter 2005, pp. 1-19)
Just as the world has seen a more virulent and brutal form of market capitalism, generally
referred to as neoliberalism, develop over the last thirty years, it has also seen “a new wave of
political activism [which] has coalesced around the simple idea that capitalism has gone too
far”(Harding 2001, para.28).Wedded to the belief that the market should be the organizing
principle for all political, social, and economic decisions, neoliberalism wages an incessant attack on
democracy, public goods, and non-commodi- fied values. Under neoliberalism everything either is
for sale or is plundered for profit. Public lands are looted by logging companies and corporate
ranch- ers; politicians willingly hand the public’s airwaves over to powerful broad- casters and
large corporate interests without a dime going into the public trust; Halliburton gives war
profiteering a new meaning as it is granted corporate contracts without any competitive bidding
and then bills the U.S. government for millions; the environment is polluted and despoiled in the
name of profit-making just as the government passes legislation to make it easier for corporations
to do so; public services are gutted in order to lower the taxes of major corporations; schools more
closely resemble either malls or jails, and teachers, forced to get revenue for their school by
adopting mar- ket values, increasingly function as circus barkers hawking everything from
hamburgers to pizza parties—that is, when they are not reduced to prepping students to take
standardized tests. As markets are touted as the driving force of everyday life, big government is
disparaged as either incompetent or threatening to individual freedom, suggesting that power
should reside in markets and corporations rather than in governments (except for their sup- port
for corporate interests and national security) and citizens. Citizenship has increasingly become a
function of consumerism and politics has been restructured as “corporations have been
increasingly freed from social con- trol through deregulation, privatization, and other neoliberal
measures” (Tabb 2003, 153).¶ Corporations more and more design not only the economic sphere
but also shape legislation and policy affecting all levels of government, and with limited opposition.
As corporate power lays siege to the political process, the benefits flow to the rich and the powerful.
Included in such benefits are reform policies that shift the burden of taxes from the rich to the
middle class, the working poor, and state governments as can be seen in the shift from taxes on
wealth (capital gains, dividends, and estate taxes) to a tax on work, principally in the form of a
regressive payroll tax (Collins, Hartman, Kraut, and Mota 2004). During the 2002-2004 fiscal
years, tax cuts delivered $197.3 billion in tax breaks to the wealthiest 1% of Americans (i.e.,
house-¶ holds making more than $337,000 a year) while state governments increased taxes to fill
a $200 billion budget deficit (Gonsalves 2004). Equally alarm- ing, a recent Congressional study
revealed that 63% of all corporations in 2000 paid no taxes while “[s]ix in ten corporations
reported no tax liabili- ty for the five years from 1996 through 2000, even though corporate profits were growing at record-breaking levels during that period” (Woodard 2004, para.11).
Turns Case
Impact: Aff no solvo
The affirmative fails: too many problems need to be diagnosed before any change
can take place
Kingstone 2006
(Peter R., Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Connecticut, Ph.D.
University of California, Berkeley, “After the Washington Consensus: The Limits to
Democratization and Development in Latin America”, Latin American Research Review,
Volume 41, Number 1, 2006, pp. 153-164 (Article)
Roughly two decades into the “dual-transition” of democratization and neoliberal economic reforms, neither process looks particularly robust. A
large number of Latin
American regimes appear stuck in a limbo of neither really regressing nor really
progressing from the status of relatively limited, disappointing democracies (with a small number
clearly regressing). The economic reform process has also yielded disappointing results, performing well below the promises and
expectations of its early advocates. Although economic reforms made some important contributions, particularly the virtual elimination of
inflation throughout the region, economic
performance has weakened dramatically in recent years. Perhaps
not surprisingly, the political base for continued economic reforms also appears to be shrinking in a
number of countries in the region. In many respects, this disappointing set of results does not come as a shock. While many were
optimistic about democratization and economic reforms early on, skeptics and cautionary analyses abounded regarding both processes.
Poverty, inequality, corruption, weak rule of law, weak institutions, clientelism, risk aversion
among domestic capitalists, inadequate financial markets (especially for small business), external
constraints, as well as undemocratic attitudes and behaviors all figure among the underlying
problems that undermine efforts to promote democracy or economic development. These problems are well
known and have been thoroughly discussed. As a result, the literature on Latin America abounds with excellent studies and diagnoses of a wide
array of aspects of the democratization and economic development process. But, we still do not seem to have a strong explanation for why this
complex of problems persists—and has persisted for so long— in Latin America. We
don’t have a consensus on what has
gone wrong in recent years (or even agreement on the extent to which things have gone wrong) and we certainly have little
agreement as to where Latin American governments can or should go from here.
Impact - Neolib fails – LA
Neoliberal alternatives in Latin America fail
Buxton ‘08
(Julia Buxton, B.Sc. (Economics), M.Sc. (Comparative Government), Ph.D. 'The Crisis of the
Venezuelan Party System' all at the London School of Economics, The Bolivarian Revolution As
Venezuela’s Post Crisis Alternative)
Venezuela has without doubt moved the furthest in laying the foundations of a neoliberal
alternative model but by 2007 it was evident that the survival and consolidation of the Bolivarian
process was contingent on addressing debilitating structural weaknesses and contradictions within
the model. The weaknesses identified show striking similarities to those experienced during the
Punto Fijo period. While Bolivarianism and Puntofijismo are posited as radically distinct, there are
strong elements of continuity. The first of these is weak institutions. The sclerosis and politicization
that characterized the Punto Fijo institutional framework was prevalent under the Bolivarian
system. In the Chávez period, these stemmed from factors that included: the low priority given to
institution building by the Chávez administration; the reliance on informal, parallel mechanisms
for policy and service delivery; partisanship in staffing state institutions and the failure to
develop effective checks and balances, the latter owing much to the heavy centralization around
the executive and the highly personalized nature of the Chávez presidency. In the absence of
effective, functioning institutions based on principles of meritocracy and accountability, the
Chávez government struggled to deliver its social policy agenda and to shift service provision
from an emphasis on quantity of provision to the more complex challenge of quality of
provision. Waste, inefficiency and corruption were serious problems by the time the government
was entering into the third phase and this in turn translated into mounting popular disaffection
with the government and diminishing faith in its capacity to deliver on policy pledges. ¶ A second
element of continuity was that of oil dependence and the pre-1990s model of oil financed state led
development. Although the Chávez government aimed to break with the Punto Fijo regime’s
debilitating reliance on the oil sector, by the third phase oil export revenues had actually increased
as a percentage of central government income and trade with the US had increased, despite
Chávez’s aims of diversifying commercial ties. More problematically, the same structural and
macroeconomic distortions that had been present during the Punto Fijo period continued into and
were arguably reinforced during the Bolivarian period. This was particularly problematic for the
Chavistas as it threatened to undermine the goals of the Bolivarian revolution. For example, the
overvaluation of the exchange rate undercut efforts to boost food sovereignty as the country
continued to suck in cheap imports. Crafting socialism in an oil boom was a complex economic
policy challenge, one that rising inflation and production shortages indicated the Chávez
government had not devised adequate tools for. However, on a note of difference, while boom
and bust conditions were a severe problem during the Punto Fijo phase, the prognosis for the
international oil price was one of sustainable price highs during the Bolivarian period. However,
the benefits to the Chavistas here was offset by serious concerns relating to underinvestment in
oil drilling and production capacities owing to diversion of oil profits into social spending. ¶ A
final element of continuity related to foreign policy. A much neglected aspect of the Punto Fijo
period was the consistent policy emphasis on Bolivarian principles of multipolarism, of supporting
progressive revolutionary movements (for example the Sandinistas in Nicaragua), of building a just
international order, promoting regional solutions to the conflict in Colombia and of building ties
with other oil producing nations. These were all central tenets of the Chávez administration, but
in the manifestly different conditions of the War on Terror and diminished US tolerance of
ideological deviance in its backyard. The danger Chávez faced going into the Third Phase was of
a major shift in the regional order; the ending of the presidency of his nemesis George Bush and
the weakening of centre left regional administration’s that helped to insulate Chávez and which
gave his Bolivarian experiment hemispheric traction. And while Chávez went further than his
predecessors in realizing the long-held vision of a multipolar world, basic inefficiencies in the
Bolivarian government, in delivering on commitments and following rhetoric through with actual
policy on the ground was a severe impediment to the consolidation of the changes the Bolivarian
government introduced through initiatives such as ALBA and Banco del Sur. ¶ Alongside
continuity between Puntofijismo and Bolivarianism there was also significant change. At the
elite level, the political left that was excluded from the founding Pact assumed control of the
country and in turn brought into politics those that fell out of the Puntofijo framework. There
was a redistribution of political and also economic power through the protagonistic democracy
model and the government’s social spending and development strategy. According to
government figures, by the end of 2007, unemployment was down to 6.3 per cent; the infant
mortality rate had fallen from 25.6 per 100,000 births in 1990 to 13.9; enrollment and completion in
basic, secondary, higher and further education all showed strong improvements over the decade of
the Bolivarian process and the number of people living in extreme poverty fell from 24 per cent in
1990 to 9.4 per cent. The external debt to GDP ratio was down to just 11.3 per cent and Venezuela
experienced double digit growth and a strengthening of its international reserve position. This was
also a period of strengthening political legitimacy. Poll surveys showed that Venezuelans had a
high level of confidence and trust in their participatory democracy, president and electoral
system – marking a strong change from the 1980s and 1990s (Escobar 2007; Latinbarometro
2006). Further to this, there was a growing body of evidence that the Missiones, the MTAs, the
CUTs and community councils had a transformative impact on traditionally marginalized and
excluded groups (Bravo-Escobar 2007; Encuentros 2005; Garcia-Guadilla 2007; Hellinger 2007;
Lacabana and Cariola 2005), with participation in these organizations improving perceptions of
individual efficacy, levels of interpersonal trust, connections to government, access to welfare
and social development. Ultimately the challenge facing the “Bolivarian alternative” lay in
institutionalizing these progressive and democratic changes introduced by the revolutionary
process and ensuring their survival beyond the presidency of the authoritative figure of Chávez.
This was a complex proposition in a period of conflict, evolution and transformation; persistent
shifts in the power bases around the government; eclecticism in policy direction; the high turnover
of personnel and ad hoc policy initiatives – all of which were key features, and weaknesses of the
Bolivarian alternative.
Impact –Biopolitical violence
Neoliberalism results in biopolitical violence.
Di Leo and McClennen 2012
(Jeffrey R., Dean of the School of Arts and Sciences and Professor of English and Philosophy at
the University of Houston–Victoria; Sophia A. professor of international affairs and directs
Penn State's Center for Global Studies as well as its Latin American Studies program; Postscript
on Violence symploke, Volume 20, Numbers 1-2, 2012, pp. 241-250 (Article))
As Giroux has explained, neoliberalism carries with it a profound¶ restructuring of the public
sphere and of the ideas about which humans can¶ legitimately form a part of civic life. The key,
though, is that this biopolitcal¶ ordering of life is viciously violent, since it determines which lives
are disposable¶ and which are to be protected: “to more fully understand this calamity¶ it is
important to grasp how the confluence of race and poverty has become¶ part of a new and more
insidious set of forces based on a revised set of biopolitical¶ commitments, which have largely given
up on the sanctity of human¶ life for those populations rendered ‘at risk’ by global neoliberal
economies¶ and, instead, have embraced an emergent security state founded on cultural¶
homogeneity” (Giroux 2006, 11).¶ Zygmunt Bauman has followed this trend in the case of refugee
populations¶ that have also been produced by the same neoliberal practices and¶ which also find
themselves forced into ghettos and camps where they are¶ cordoned off and contained. The number
of refugees recorded by the United¶ Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) has
grown disproportionately¶ from 2 million in 1975 to more than 27 million in 1995. Bauman¶
describes the lives of Palestinians who are born and die in camps, who never¶ know anything
other than camp life (143). He calls attention to the way that¶ this social fragmentation dismantles
the social commitment to togetherness,¶ to seeing ourselves as linked to others. Instead, these
camps become the basis¶ for the construction of “wasted” lives that offer nothing more than a
security¶ threat (143).
Impact – Classism
Neoliberalism leads to classism as it creates the ideology that the impoverished are
criminals who knife each other between welfare checks
Giroux 2005
(Henry Giroux professor of English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University, West Chester
University, College Literature, 32.1, Winter 2005, pp. 1-19)
Within the discourse of neoliberalism, democracy becomes synonymous with free markets, while
issues of equality, racial justice, and freedom are stripped of any substantive meaning and used to
disparage those who suffer systemic deprivation and chronic punishment. Individual misfortune,
like democracy itself, is now viewed as either excessive or in need of radical containment. The
media, largely consolidated through corporate power, routine- ly provide a platform for high
profile right-wing pundits and politicians to remind us either of how degenerate the poor have
become or to reinforce the central neoliberal tenet that all problems are private rather than social
in nature. Conservative columnist Ann Coulter captures the latter sentiment with her comment
that “[i]nstead of poor people with hope and possibility, we now have a permanent underclass of
aspiring criminals knifing one another between having illegitimate children and collecting welfare
checks” (qtd. in Bean 2003, para.3). Radio talk show host Michael Savage, too, exemplifies the
unabashed racism and fanaticism that emerge under a neoliberal regime in which ethics and
justice appear beside the point. For instance, Savage routinely refers to non-white countries as
“turd world nations,” homosexuality as a “perversion” and young children who are victims of
gunfire as “ghetto slime” (qtd. in Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting 2003, para.2, 6, 5).
Impact: Economic crisis
Neoliberal policies lead to widespread economic crises -empirics
Grahl 2001
(John, Professor of European Integration in the Human Resources Department at Middlesex
University, “The Sway of Finance?”, New Left Review, Pg. 148-149)
It was this finance-led turn to neoliberal policies at the beginning of the eighties that released
all the classic mechanisms of crisis. Recession and monetary restriction forced
reorganization of the productive system, while unemployment restored labour-market
discipline. In fact, argue Duménil and Lévy, the claims of labour soon ceased to be the main
barrier to profitable investment. Instead, the instability and the relatively poor growth-rates of
Western economies over the following decades are traced to policies imposed by finance
capital which, in practice, prolonged the crisis. The leap in interest rates after 1979
inhibited productive investment, despite the recovery in gross rates of profit. Deregulation of
capital flows on a world scale resulted in sharper and more frequent fluctuations of the
business cycle—‘disorders’ of neoliberalism triggering devastating disruptions in the
developing world, from the debt crisis in Mexico at the beginning of the period to the East
Asian crises at its close. As income was steadily transferred from producers to
shareholders, capitalism’s inherent tendency to reproduce and exacerbate inequalities and
injustice intensified.
Neoliberalism both exploits other countries by transferring their wealth to
developed countries, but it wrecks the neoliberal economies
Giroux 2005
(Henry Giroux professor of English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University, West Chester
University, College Literature, 32.1, Winter 2005, pp. 1-19)
Under neoliberal domestic restructuring and the foreign policy initiatives of the Washington
Consensus, which are motivated by an evangelical belief in free-market democracy at home and
open markets abroad, the United States in the last thirty years has witnessed the increasing
obliteration of those discourses, social forms, public institutions, and non-commercial values that
are central to the language of public commitment, democratically charged politics, and the common
good (Giroux 2003). Civic engagement now appears impotent as corporations privatize public
space and disconnect power from issues of equity, social justice, and civic responsibility. Financial
investments, market identities, and commercial values take precedence over human needs, public
responsibilities, and democratic relations (Martin 2002). Proceeding outside of democratic
accountability, neoliberalism has allowed a handful of private interests to control as much of social
life as possible in order to maximize their personal profit (Chomsky 1999).¶ Abroad, neoliberal
global policies have been used to pursue rapacious free-trade agreements and expand Western
financial and commercial interests through the heavy-handed policies of the World Bank, the
World Trade Organization (WTO), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in order to
manage and transfer resources and wealth from the poor and less developed nations to the richest
and most powerful nation-states and to the wealthy corporate defenders of capitalism. Third world
and semi-peripheral states of Latin America, Africa, and Asia have become client states of the
wealthy nations led by the United States. Loans made to the client states by banks and other
financial institutions have produced severe dislocations in “social welfare programs such as health
care, education, and laws establishing labor standards” (Aronowitz and Gautney 2003, xvi). For
example, the restrictions that the IMF and World Bank impose on countries as a condition for
granting loans—euphemistically referred to as a program of structural adjustment—not only
subject them to capitalist values and dire economic restrictions, but also undermine the very
possibility of an inclusive and substantive democracy. The results have been disastrous as evidenced
by the economic collapse of countries such as Argentina and Nigeria as well as by the fact that
“one third of the world’s labor force—more than a billion people—are unemployed or
underemployed” (Aronowitz 2003, 30). Tracking twenty-six countries that received loans from
theWorld Bank and the IMF, the Multinational Monitor spelled out the conditions that accompanied such loans:¶ [c]ivil service downsizing, privatization of government-owned enterprises
with layoffs required in advance of privatization and frequently following privatization;
[p]romotion of labor flexibility—regulatory changes to remove restrictions on the ability of
government and private employers to fire or lay off workers; [m]andated wage reductions,
minimum wage reduc- tions of containment, and spreading the wage gap between government
employees and managers; and [p]ension reforms, including privatization, that cut social security
benefits for workers. (Gray 2001, 7-8)¶ In the United States, neoliberal policies have created a huge
deficit projected at $5 trillion over the next decade due in part to President George Bush’s
exorbitant tax cuts for the wealthy (to the tune of an estimated $3 tril- lion if they are made
permanent). While the rich get tax cuts, 8.2 million people are out of work and 2.3 million have lost
their jobs since 2000; some have simply given up the unpromising task of looking for jobs.
Massive subsidies for the rich, coupled with the corporate frenzy for short-term profits at the
expense of any social considerations, translate into retrograde economic and social policies
celebrated by the advocates of neoliberalism, just as they refuse to address an income gap between
rich and poor that is not only the widest it has been since 1929, but also represents the most
unequal among all developed nations (Woodard 2004, para.42).
Impact- Environment
Neoliberalism justifies the destruction of all ecology in the name of profit
Werlhof 8
(Claudia von Werlhof. Werlhof is a professor at the Institute of Political Sciences at the
University of Innsbruck. “The Globalization of Neoliberalism, its Consequences and Some of its
Basic Alternatives.” 27 August 2008. Capitalism Nature Socialism. BA)
It becomes obvious that neoliberalism marks not the end of colonialism but, to the contrary, the
colonization of the North. This new ‘‘colonization of the world’’30 points back to the beginnings
of the ‘‘modern world system’’ in the ‘‘long 16th century,’’31 when the conquering of the
Americas, their exploitation and colonial transformation allowed for the rise and ‘‘development’’
of Europe.
Social, cultural, traditional and ecological considerations are abandoned and give way to a
mentality of plundering. All global resources that we still have*natural resources, forests, water,
genetic pools*have turned into objects of ‘‘utilization.’’ Rapid ecological destruction through
depletion is the consequence. If one makes more profit by cutting down trees than by planting
them, then under the prevailing economic logic, there is no reason not to cut them.32 Neither the
public nor the state interferes, despite global warming and the obvious fact that the clearing of
the few remaining rainforests will irreversibly destroy the earth’s climate, because the entire
earth’s ecosystem depends on them. Yet, the impact on global climate is only one of many
negative effects of deforestation.33 And as we move ever closer to the precipice of ecological
collapse, we would do well to acknowledge and defend the intrinsic value and rights of the
climate, animals, plants, humanity and the general ecology over and above the interests of the
corporations. But for that to happen, we have to turn the allegiance to the market on its head.
Neoliberalism allows for the use of violence and the destruction of the
environment if it allows the accumulation of profits or the prevention of
potential losses.
Di Leo and McClennen, 2012
(Jeffrey R. Di Leo and Sophia A. McCleennen, Di Leo is the Dean of the School of Arts and
Sciences and Professor of English and Philosophy at the University of Houston. McCleennen is
Professor of International Affairs and Comparative Literature at the Pennsylvania State
University. Postscript on Violence, Volume 20, Numbers 1-2, 2012, pp. 244 (Article))
Neoliberal economic practices have increased biopolitical violence. The devastating effects of
neoliberalism have been well documented. “Under neoliberalism,” writes Henry Giroux,
“everything either is for sale or is plun- dered for profit” (2004, xii). He continues:
Public lands are looted by logging companies and corporate ranch- ers; politicians willingly hand
the public’s airwaves over to broad- casters and large corporate interests without a dime going
into the public trust; Halliburton gives war profiteering a new meaning as it is granted corporate
contracts without any competitive bidding and then bilks the U.S. government for millions; the
environment is polluted and despoiled in the name of profit-making just as the government passes
legislation to make it easier for corporations to do so; public services are gutted in order to lower
the taxes of major corporations; schools increasingly resemble malls or jails, and teachers, forced to
raise revenue for classroom materials, increasingly function as circus barkers hawking everything
from hamburgers to pizza parties—that is, when they are not reduced to prepping students to get
higher test scores. (2004, xii-xiv)
When extreme free-market capitalism becomes the source of values, violence is given a reprieve
from moral indignation. Democratic values as well as basic notions of human rights and economic
justice are overlooked when the market reveals profits to be had—or losses to be avoided. As
neoliberalism widens the gulf between the rich and the poor, and the enfran- chised and the
disenfranchised, it also places at risk of violence the poor and the disenfranchised. Therefore, it
should be no surprise that the devastation of the environment and the violation of human rights is
often more extreme in less affluent parts of the world.
Neoliberalism is responsible for poverty, starvation, and massive amounts of
environmental degradation in Latin America
Petras and Veltmeyer 13
(James, Bartle Professor of Sociology at Binghamton University, Henry, professor of Sociology and International
Development Studies at Saint Mary's University, “Social Movements in Latin America: Neoliberalism and Popular
Resistance”, January 17, 2013, page 189)
The propensity of capitalism toward crisis is manifest not only at the level of finance and
production but also in the ecological foundation of the system. The process of capitalist
development unleashed by policies of neoliberal globalization over the past several decades, and the
current global crisis, have not only exacerbated widespread conditions of poverty and hunger,
pushing millions more into poverty, and jeopardized the livelihoods of millions of workers,
peasants, and small-scale producers, but also led to a serious degradation of the environment and
the ecosystem at the base of these livelihoods and economic activities. The same process, however,
has also led to wide spread and growing movements of resistance to the latest incursions of capital
and neoliberal policies. All over Latin America, particularly in countries with significant
populations and communities of indigenous people-Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, Guatemala, Mexicothere have emerged movements of local resistance. And, at the same time, there is a trend toward
the organization of this resistance and forming connections among these. Organizations across the
region. One of these connections, bringing together indigenous organizations in Bolivia,
Ecuador, Peru, Colombia, Chile, and Argentina, is the Coordinadora Andina de Organizaciones
lndigenas (CAOl), which in March 2010 announced a major congress of Andean indigenous
organizations to consider and concert collective response to the challenge of neoliberalism and
corporate capitalism to their way of life and to mother earth.
Impact – Environment -Farming
Neoliberalism leads to poor farming tactics that devastates the environment
Gonzalez ‘04
(Carmen, Teaches environmental law fundamental, international environmental law, and
international trade law at the University of Seattle, Trade Liberalization, Food Security, and the
Environment: The Neoliberal Threat to Sustainable Rural Development,
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1022&context=carmen_gonzalez)
The shift from domestic food cultivation to export production degraded the environment in the
developing world by promoting the expansion of monocultures and the extensive use of
agrochemicals. This, in turn, eroded crop genetic diversity, produced higher levels of pesticiderelated illness, and resulted in the contamination of ground and surface waters by pesticides and
fertilizers. The intensive irrigation schemes favored by structural adjustment programs often
caused excessive extraction of groundwater, thereby diverting scarce water resources from local
communities to large-scale farming operations and threatening to deplete local aquifers. Finally,
the decreasing ability to purchase agricultural inputs (due to the elimination of input subsidies
and credit) caused farmers to attempt to maintain existing levels of production by expanding the
land under cultivation, thereby accelerating deforestation and overtaxing and degrading marginal
lands.
Impact- Equality
Neoliberalism causes inequality in classes around the world. People are even poorer
than in 1990.
Hursh & Henderson ‘08
(David W. Hursh and Joseph A. Henderson; Warner Graduate School of Education and Human
Development, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY, USA; Contesting Global Neoliberalism
and Creating Alternative Futures; http://www.informaworld.com)
While the primary aim of neoliberalism is to restore corporate profitability over the¶ welfare of its
citizens, proponents claim that giving free reign to corporations and¶ unleashing individuals to
pursue their own economic self-interests is the best way¶ to ensure economic growth and, therefore,
to provide for an improved standard¶ of living for those in developed and developing countries and
for the poor worldwide. However, as Jomo (2007) and Berry and Serieux (2007) write, since the
rise¶ of globalization and neoliberalism in the 1970s, economic growth has slowed and¶ the ‘income
inequality has worsened in most countries in the world in recent¶ decades’ (Jomo, 2007, p. xix).
Even in the USA, long held up as the exemplar of¶ capitalist development, under neoliberalism
household income has grown only¶ because of the rise of two-worker households, men earn less
than their fathers did,¶ and, as measured by the Gini coefficient, income inequality has grown
(The¶ Economist, 2010).¶ We need to remember that countries and regions differ, and that the
population¶ of many countries, particularly those in Sub-Saharan Africa, are poorer. James¶
Ferguson, in Global Shadows: Africa in the Neoliberal World Order (2006), writes¶ that:¶ many of
the poorest African countries have put in place IMF-sponsored reforms¶ (chiefly, opening
markets and privatizing state assets) that were intended to produce a¶ flood of capital investment.
But the result for most has not been a boom in foreign¶ investment. More often, it has been a
collapse in basic institutions (including major¶ industries as well as social infrastructure such as
schools and health care) and an¶ explosion of official illegality. (p. 35)¶ Jomo and von Arnim
(2008) write that neoliberal globalization has had an especially¶ negative impact on Sub-Saharan
Africa, as these countries were not able to compete¶ in the newly opened markets. Further,
multinational corporations invested in¶ minerals, such as oil, which meant importing employees
from outside Africa, or in¶ agriculture, which undermined local farming (Ferguson, 2006).
Consequently, per¶ capita income declined during the last two decades of the previous century,¶
rebounded slightly at the beginning of this century, only to decline again. Likewise,¶ Davis
(2006), in Planet of Slums, describes that while some cities and countries, such¶ as Russia and
Moscow, have created a very wealthy oligarchy, overall poverty and¶ inequality has increased. He
cites the United Nations’ Human Development Report¶ 2004 (United Nations Development
Programme, 2004), that ‘in 46 countries people¶ are poorer than in 1990. In 25 countries more
people are hungry than a decade ago’¶ (Davis, 2006, p. 162). Jeff Faux (2006), in The Global Class
War, exposes the¶ increasing disparity within the USA, between the USA and other countries, and¶
within other countries. For example, the North American Free Trade Agreement¶ (NAFTA)
precipitated a crisis in the value of Mexico’s peso, leading to its¶ devaluation, fewer jobs, and
higher living costs, and an increase in the poverty¶ rate from 45.6% in 1994 to 50.3% in 2000.
Neoliberalist policies destroy education in favor of a privatized “cash cow”. Teaches
students to learn to the test instead of pursuing questions that make for a better
society.
Hursh & Henderson ‘08
(David W. Hursh and Joseph A. Henderson; Warner Graduate School of Education and Human
Development, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY, USA; Contesting Global Neoliberalism
and Creating Alternative Futures; http://www.informaworld.com)
Furthermore, where once states could rely on federal funding, they are now¶ coerced into
legislating changes that further Duncan’s goal of further privatizing¶ education. Race to the Top
requires that states permit and expand the number of¶ charter schools (publically funded and
privately operated schools), allow mayors in¶ cities to dissolve the elected school boards and take
over running districts themselves,¶ and tie teacher assessments and pay to students’ test scores on
standardized tests.¶ Consequently, while many who supported and voted for Obama may have
hoped¶ that he would rescind many of the worst features of the No Child Left Behind¶ (NCLB)
law, Obama and Duncan have exacerbated them. Furthermore, Democrats¶ are increasingly
linking not only with philanthropists, as described above, but also¶ with the corporate sector to
push for privatization through charter schools. In New¶ York, for example, the new Democratic
governor, Andrew Cuomo, is working closely¶ with wealthy financiers to more than double the
number of charter schools permitted¶ by law in New York State and, therefore, increasingly
evaluate teachers based on¶ students’ test scores, and weaken teachers unions (Gabriel & Medina,
2010).¶ The push for high-stakes standardized testing and charter schools continues in¶ spite of the
evidence that standardized testing has not improved student achievement, has narrowed the
curriculum, and has reduced the rate at which the¶ achievement gap was narrowing (Hursh, 2008;
Ravitch, 2010). Furthermore, except¶ for a few exemplary typically non-profit charter schools, for
the most part charter¶ schools do no better, and often do worse, than the public-administered
schools they¶ replace, at the cost of shifting control away from elected community boards to¶
privately appointed boards that do not hold public meetings (CREDO: Center for¶ Research on
Evaluation Outcomes, 2009).¶ Worse yet, the curriculum is often reduced to a narrow skills
approach focusing¶ on mathematics and literacy at a time when we need as educators and students
to¶ respond to more complex, interdisciplinary questions regarding how we are to live on¶ this
planet. Instead of learning to raise questions and engage in research, students are¶ focusing on
preparing for standardized exams (Hursh, 2008; Ravitch, 2010).¶ Contesting neoliberalism, asking
essential questions, and reinvigorating community¶ Contesting neoliberalism necessitates that we
situate neoliberal policies within the¶ larger neoliberal discourse promoting markets, competition,
individualism, and¶ privatization. Analysing education policies in the USA, whether the push for¶
mayoral control in Rochester, New York (see Duffy, 2010; Hedeen, 2010; Ramos,¶ 2010), school
reform policies under Renaissance 2010 in Chicago, or Race to the Top¶ under the Obama
administration, requires that we understand how reforms such as¶ using standardized testing are
presented as efficient, neutral responses to the problem¶ of raising student achievement, rather
than examining the root causes of student¶ failure, including lack of decent paying jobs and health
care, and under-funded¶ schools. Current policies reinforce neoliberalism and leave the status quo
intact.¶ Similarly, if we look at education in Sub-Saharan Africa, we must situate schools¶ within
the hollowing out of the state, and the lack of adequate funding for education¶ and other social
services such as health care. For example, in Uganda, as in several¶ other Sub-Saharan countries,
the global recession has contributed to drug shortages,¶ making it impossible to treat the growing
number of AIDS patients (McNeil, 2010).¶ Yet, under more social democratic policies the state
would play a larger role in¶ providing health care.¶ Furthermore, education is increasingly
contested, as the plutocracy promotes¶ education as a means of producing productive, rather than
critical, employees.¶ Schools are more often places where teachers and students learn what will be
on the¶ test rather than seeking answers to questions that cry out for answers, such as how to¶
develop a healthy, sustainable environment or communities where people are actually¶ valued for
who they are rather than what they contribute to the economy.¶ Instead, we must ask what kinds of
relations do we want to nurture, what kinds of¶ social relations, what kind of work do we want to
do, and what kinds of culture and¶ technologies do we want to create. These questions require that
we rethink schools so¶ that teachers and students can engage in real questions for which the answer
will¶ make a difference in the quality of our lives. These questions also require that we¶ rethink our
relationship to a specific kind of ‘free’ marketplace that is not, in fact,¶ inevitable. By
problematizing the idea of neoliberal marketization, we can begin to¶ construct new markets that
actually value commonly held resources and local¶ communities.¶
Impact – Food Shortage, Poverty
Neoliberalism causes food shortages in poverty in developing countries while
making itself richer
Gonzalez ‘04
(Carmen, Teaches environmental law fundamental, international environmental law, and
international trade law at the University of Seattle, Trade Liberalization, Food Security, and the
Environment: The Neoliberal Threat to Sustainable Rural Development,
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1022&context=carmen_gonzalez)
The neoliberal economic reforms of the last two decades exacerbated food insecurity in the
developing world by eliminating social safety nets, increasing poverty and inequality, reducing
domestic food production, and depressing export earnings. First, the slashing of social spending
under structural adjustment exacerbated food insecurity by producing massive reductions in the
entitlements of the poor. As government price controls and subsidies were removed, the cost of
basic necessities exceeded the means of many people in the developing world. This sparked food
riots (known as “IMF riots”) in numerous developing countries, including Morocco, Madagascar,
the Dominican Republic, Venezuela, Zambia, and, most recently, Argentina. Indeed, structural
adjustment inflicted such intense suffering, stirred such passionate opposition, and generated so
much adverse publicity that the World Bank and the IMF have recently renamed the program
“development policy support lending.” ¶ Second, the lowering of tariff barriers and the elimination
of non-tariff barriers in developing countries increased rural poverty and depressed domestic food
production by exposing developing country farmers to ruinous competition from industrialized
country producers. When the influx of cheap, subsidized food from the United States and the EU
depressed domestic food prices, wealthy farmers shifted from food production to the cultivation
of more lucrative export crops. However, poor farmers found their livelihoods threatened as
declining agricultural prices coincided with the withdrawal of agricultural subsidies, the reduction
of extension services, and the elimination of subsidized credit. Many farmers abandoned the land,
resulting in a concentration of land ownership in the hands of wealthier farmers. Domestic food
production on both large and small farms declined, and dependence on imported food increased.
Third, the emphasis on export production increased rural inequality by reinforcing the privileged
status of large farmers at the expense of smallholders. Large farmers generally had better access to
capital and credit with which to finance cash crop production and were provided with tax breaks,
subsidized credit, and other incentives to convert to export production. As cash crop production
increased land values, landowners raised rents, revoked peasant tenancy and sharecropping rights,
or simply evicted tenants in order to rent the land to more affluent farmers who could grow highvalue crops. These wealthy landowners also expanded their holdings by purchasing the plots of
smallholders who lacked the capital to produce for the export market and who found it
increasingly difficult to live off traditional food crop production. The net result was increasing
economic polarization in rural areas, with an ever-growing poor majority and an ever- wealthier
elite. Finally, the neoliberal reforms exacerbated food insecurity by depressing developing country
export earnings. Structural adjustment shifted investment to the export sector in order to generate
the revenue with which to service the foreign debt. However, as competing developing country
exports simultaneously glutted the market, the benefits of export expansion were almost completely
nullified by declining prices. In addition, the neoliberal reforms harmed developing countries by
requiring them to open their markets while permitting developed countries to maintain trade-
distorting subsidies and import-restrictive tariffs. According to a study released in 2003 by the
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), industrialized country subsidies and
protectionism displaced about $40 billion in net agricultural exports per year from developing
countries and cost developing countries approximately $24 billion per year in foregone agricultural
and agro-industrial income. This foregone income reverberated throughout the economy, as lost
agricultural revenues resulted in the depression of employment in farming and farming-related
activities and in reduced investment in the agricultural sector.
Neoliberalism in Latin America fails and it leads to poverty and starvation
Buxton ‘08
(Julia Buxton, B.Sc. (Economics), M.Sc. (Comparative Government), Ph.D. 'The Crisis of the
Venezuelan Party System' all at the London School of Economics, The Bolivarian Revolution As
Venezuela’s Post Crisis Alternative)
The stabilization and structural adjustment package that was introduced in 1989 and which was
known as El Paquete, aimed to reduce and reorder the state, and transform Venezuela into an
outward looking economy, with a diversified economic base. Its introduction in February 1989
triggered the Caracazo: “the most massive as well as the most violently suppressed urban protest in
Venezuelan history” (Coronil and Skurski 2005), as prices for food, fuel and transport were
liberalized. Over the following two years, interest and exchange rates were freed; the national
telecommunications agency and state airline (CANTV and VIASA) were privatized and private
sector partners were invited to participate in PDVSA operations in 1991 (through a circuitous
legislative initiative that went against the original nationalization legislation); $21 billion of
national debt was restructured and public spending was sharply reduced. The government laid
the legal framework for private welfare and pension provision and the trading of shares in
privately held companies on the Caracas stock exchange, the Bolsa de Valores de Caracas (Naim
1993). In foreign policy, the government sought to lock in these changes and ride the free market
and regionalist tide of the early 1990s by taking Venezuela into regional free trade agreements
and commercial associations. However the neoliberal experience was limited in comparison to
the orthodox shift in neighboring countries and El Paquete was not applied in a comprehensive
manner. There was no rationalization of the bloated, party dominated state or reform of the
income taxation structure. The privatization process was limited and not accompanied by the
introduction of adequate regulatory mechanisms. Moreover Andrés Pérez was not averse to
expansionary approaches when the oil price temporarily increased, a policy flux that led some
critics to argue that the problem was not neoliberalism, but its half-baked implementation (Naim
1993). The social consequences of the neoliberal shift were disastrous and particularly given the
collapse of the Punto Fijo welfare safety net. Falling real wages, which declined 53 per cent between
1982 and 1995, and volatile inflation (which soared to 89 per cent in 1989) exacerbated an existing
trend of rising poverty. There was no rapid or effective ‘trickle-down’ and government efforts to
target its limited anti-poverty initiatives were ineffectively administered by the sclerotic national
bureaucracy. By 1991, 69.8 per cent of households lived in general poverty - up from 58.9 per cent
in 1989. Of this figure 35.8 per cent were in critical poverty – an increase on the 26.9 per cent
recorded in 1989. Aside from rising poverty, orthodox policy approaches presaged a trend of
deepening inequality with the share of national income accruing to the richest 10 per cent of the
population rising from 30 per cent to 43 per cent between 1988 and 1991, while the share of the
poorest 10 per cent declined from 2.3 per cent to 1.8 per cent (Baptista 1991 cited in Coker 1999 p.
83). Food costs were particularly difficult for poorer sectors to cover, specifically after devaluation
in 1989, owing to Venezuela’s historical lack of food sovereignty and gross inequalities in land
distribution (with 70 per cent of agricultural holdings in the hands of just 3 per cent of
producers). Underscoring this, malnutrition related infant mortality rates doubled over the brief
two-year period of the initial economic adjustment, increasing from 29.7 deaths per 100,000 in 1988
to 60.2 deaths in 1990 (Coker 1999).
Impact - Human rights
Neoliberalism ensures market pressures will curtail rights claims.
Boetsch 5
(Leopoldo Rodriguez PhD in Economics from the University of Texas at Austin “Privredna
Izgradnja” http://scindeks-clanci.ceon.rs/data/pdf/0032-8979/2005/0032-89790502017B.pdf
MW)
A new question necessarily opens up. What degree of political freedom is to be found alongside
neoliberal democracy? The limits seem determined primarily by¶ what neoliberalism considers the
needs of capital accumulation. That is, economic¶ policy-making must be kept out of reach of
popular pressures, by legislation¶ whenever possible, or through the creation of artificial barriers
otherwise. Legislation may guarantee an independent Central Bank, strict observance of an¶
exchange rate policy, the reduction of union power, the sacrosanctity of private¶ property, a
balanced budget, etc. Other barriers to popular participation may involve¶ a reduction in the
access provided to the representatives of popular groups to the¶ higher echelons of policymaking, the placement of indirect forms of representative¶ selection -such as electoral colleges or
single-member districts- the criminalization¶ and harassment of social movements, etc. Policymaking lies outside of politics; in¶ the hands of a cadre of professionals, who convinced the
superiority of their¶ knowledge acquired by technical training are, as John Markoff (1996, p. 119)
notes¶ "open to violating the will of electorates or disagreeing with bureaucratic superiors."¶ In
order to keep legal and artificial barriers in place, neoliberal governments may¶ recur to further
reductions in political freedoms: such as the imposition of rules by¶ presidential decree, or the
curtailment of freedoms of speech, press and assembly.¶ The degree of democracy and political
freedom then becomes a function of the¶ needs of markets." Where pressures for redistribution are
high - representing a threat¶ to neoliberal principles of private property, market supremacy and
capital¶ accumulation- political freedoms will necessarily be curtailed to prevent democratic¶
impulses from launching at the throat of the neoliberal political order.
Impact – Imperialism
Neoliberalism fuels US modern imperialism
Panitch and Gindin- Distinguished research professor of political science@ York University and editor of
the socialist register, Research director of Canadian UAW and chief economist of CAW, September-October 2005
[“Superintending Global Capital” pgs. 101-123]
It is in the context of this integration that the Federal Reserve began to emerge as what the
Economist could call ‘in effect, the world’s central bank’, in terms of providing liquidity and
setting the baseline for global interest-rate changes.12 The origins of this development lay in the
growth of international finance during the Bretton Woods era itself, especially once Wall Street
had come to dominate the new Eurodollar market in London. It was on this basis that the first ‘big
bang’ of financial deregulation occurred in New York in the mid-70s, followed by the explosion of
both domestic and international financial markets when the Volcker Shock inaugurated the
neoliberal era proper. The response of the us as a capitalist state (representing finance to the end of
strengthening American capitalism) and as an imperial state (looking to imbricate finance in
meeting us global responsibilities) led to a painful restructuring of manufacturing in the American
economy. This restructuring, together with Wall Street’s increasingly deep financial markets,
brought the world’s savings to the us. At the same time, the growing international role of
American investment banks mediated corporate mergers throughout Europe and much of Asia,
further influencing their industrial and financial re-orientation. In short, the ‘mutual
embeddedness’ of Wall Street and the American state reinforced imperial capacities. The
development of the American empire has thus seen the extension, at the international level, of the
three dimensions of the capitalist state discussed earlier—economic, political, territorial—within
a specific historical form. As the domestic separation of the economic and political is extended
into the international domain, it becomes possible to think in terms of an ‘informal’ empire. As
other states, for the most part, take on liberal-democratic forms, and the us comes to oversee global
capitalism through these states, a unique type of imperial political rule emerges.
Impact – Prison industrial complex
Neoliberalism has caused a massive increase in incarceration rates by jailing anyone
who is not privileged by the benefits of class, color, and gender
Giroux 2005
(Henry Giroux professor of English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University, West Chester
University, College Literature, 32.1, Winter 2005, pp. 1-19)
The destruction of the welfare state has gone hand-in-hand with the emergence of a prisonindustrial complex and a new state that is largely used to regulate, control, contain, and punish
those who are not privileged by the benefits of class, color, and gender (Cole 1999). How else to
explain a nation- al prison population that has grown from 200,000 in 1973 to slightly over two
million in 2004, while “another 4.5 million are on probation and parole”(Calvi 2001, 40). More
specifically, neoliberalism has become complicitous with this transformation of the democratic
state into a national security state that repeatedly uses its military and political power to develop a
daunting police state and military-prison-education-industrial complex to punish workers, stifle
dissent, and undermine the political power of labor unions and progressive social movements (Lutz
2002).
Impact – Injustice and Racism
As injustices get in the way of the “greed cycle” of neoliberalism people are given
unjust punishments and a state of racism is created
Giroux 2005
(Henry Giroux professor of English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University, West Chester
University, College Literature, 32.1, Winter 2005, pp. 1-19)
With its debased belief that profit-making is the essence of democracy, and its definition of
citizenship as an energized plunge into consumerism, neoliberalism eliminates government
regulation of market forces, celebrates a ruthless competitive individualism, and places the
commanding political, cultural, and economic institutions of society in the hands of powerful
corporate interests, the privileged, and unrepentant religious bigots (Peters and Fitzsimons 2001).
Neoliberal global policies also further the broader cultural project of privatizing social services
through appeals to “personal responsibility as the proper functions of the state are narrowed, tax
and wage costs in the economy are cut, and more social costs are absorbed by civil society and
the family” (Duggan 2003, 16). As I have mentioned, though it is worth repeating, the hard
currency of human suffering permeates the social order as health-care costs rise, one out of five
children fall beneath the poverty line, and 43 million Americans bear the burden of lacking any
health insurance. As part of this larger cultural project fashioned under the sovereignty of
neoliberalism, human misery is largely defined as a function of personal choices and human
misfortune is viewed as the basis for criminalizing social problems. Misbehaving children are now
put in handcuffs and taken to police stations for violating dress codes. Mothers who test positive
for drugs in hospitals run the risk of having their children taken away by the police. Young, poor,
black men who lack employment are targeted by the criminal justice system and, instead of being
educated or trained for a job, often end up in jail. In fact, a report by United for a Fair Economy
states that “One of out three Black males born in 2001 will be imprisoned at some point in their
lifetime if current trends continue [and that] in 2000, there were at least 13 states in which there
were more African-American men in prison than in college” (Muhammad, et. al. 2004, 20-21).
Once released from prison, these young people are consigned to a civic purgatory in which they are
“denied the right to vote, parental rights, drivers’ licenses, student loans, and residency in public
housing—the only housing that marginal, jobless people can afford” (Staples 2004, 7). As
stipulated in the Welfare Reform Act of 1996, if convicted on a single drug felony, these youth
when released are further punished by a lifetime ban on food stamps and welfare eligibility. Such
policies are not only unjust and morally reprehensible, they are symptomatic of a society that has
relegated matters of equality and racial justice to the back burner of social concerns. In a market
society caught up in “the greed cycle” (Cassidy 2002), addressing persistent injustices gets in the
way of accumulating capital and the neoliberal and neoconservative revolution aimed at transforming democracy into a one party, corporate state.
Impact – Racism/Sexism
Neoliberalism exploits racism and sexism in order to minimize the backlash it
receives from trying to widen the gap between the elites and the rest of the country.
Michaels, 08
(Walter Benn Michaels, He is an American literary theorist, known as the author of Our
America: Nativism, Modernism and Pluralism (1995) and The Shape of the Signifier: 1967 to the
End of History (2004). New Left Review 52, page 34)
Why? Because it is exploitation, not discrimination, that is the primary producer of inequality
today. It is neoliberalism, not racism or sexism (or homophobia or ageism) that creates the
inequalities that matter most in American society; racism and sexism are just sorting devices . In
fact, one of the great discoveries of neoliberalism is that they are not very efficient sorting
devices, economically speaking. If, for example, you are looking to promote someone as Head of
Sales in your company and you are choosing between a straight white male and a black lesbian,
and the latter is in fact a better salesperson than the former, racism, sexism and homophobia may
tell you to choose the straight white male but capitalism tells you to go with the black lesbian.
Which is to say that, even though some capitalists may be racist, sexist and homophobic,
capitalism itself is not.
This is also why the real (albeit very partial) victories over racism and sexism represented by the
Clinton and Obama campaigns are not victories over neoliberalism but victories for neoliberalism:
victories for a commitment to justice that has no argument with inequality as long as its
beneficiaries are as racially and sexually diverse as its victims. That is the meaning of phrases like
the ‘glass ceiling’ and of every statistic showing how women make less than men or AfricanAmericans less than whites. It is not that the statistics are false; it is that making these markers
the privileged object of grievance entails thinking that, if only more women could crash through
the glass ceiling and earn the kind of money rich men make, or if only blacks were as well paid
as whites, America would be closer to a just society.
Impact - Structural Violence
Neoliberalism in Latin America has created endless structural, criminal and
political violence under authoritarian regimes governed by elite interests
Sanchez 6
[R Magaly is currently a Senior Researcher and Visiting Scholar at the Office of Population
Research, at Princeton University. She has been Professor of Urban Sociology at the Institute of
Urbanism at the Universidad Central de Venezuela. “Insecurity and Violence as a New Power
Relation in Latin America” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science http://ann.sagepub.com/content/606/1/178.full.pdf+html MW]
The social expression of violence in Latin America occurred in three historical
moments, each characterized by its own form of violence. First came structural¶ violence, the
rampant economic inequality, social exclusion, and persistent poverty¶ arising from the imposition
of neoliberal economic policies. In response came¶ two other kinds of collective violence, one
political and the other criminal. As the¶ urgency of circumstances facing middle- and working-class
people increased,¶ many turned to radical violence, leading to successive waves of strikes,
demonstrations,¶ and insurrections throughout the region. At the same time, the situation¶ of the
poor and the young deteriorated, and many of them turned to criminal¶ violence in the form of
youth gangs, criminal mafias, and drug cartels. If “unstable¶ social equilibrium” refers to the
tenuous stability under which the powerful negotiate¶ political compromises with diverse
interests to maintain social control, then¶ rising violence and growing insecurity suggest a new
“social disequilibrium” and¶ a progressive loss of control throughout Latin America. In the
region’s largest cities,¶ disorder and violence become part of daily life. This situation has created a
self-feeding cycle whereby neoliberal policies¶ generate high rates of inequality, exclusion, poverty,
and alienation, which yield a¶ rising tide of both radical and criminal violence, which triggers more
state coercion,¶ which, in turn, encourages more violent resistance from below. The end¶ result is a
militarized elite facing a mobilized and hostile population made up not¶ just of the urban poor and
unemployed but also disaffected technical, managerial,¶ and professional classes who have found
their living standards eroded by the¶ devaluation of wages and the accompanying decrease in
purchasing power.¶ Under these conditions of generalized discontent and instability, the
institutions¶ of democracy lose flexibility, and the paternalistic state of old reemerges to offer ¶
models of authoritarian repression and militarized violence to establish order.¶ Thus, a situation
marked by poverty and exclusion leads increasingly to urgent¶ circumstances and radicalized
responses, causing people and classes to interconnect¶ and integrate in multiple ways to oppose
the structural violence of the state.¶ Neoliberalism thus ends up producing more polarization and
less democracy¶ than the state-centered development models prominent in Latin America during¶
earlier periods (Portes and Hoffman 2003). Understanding popular violence as a¶ consequence of
structural violence focuses attention away from the repercussions¶ of violence toward its social
and economic causes. Rather than demanding harsher¶ and more repressive measures to “restore
law and order” and “punish lawbreakers,”¶ a structural perspective views the reform of the state
itself as the best means to¶ reduce violence and restore social stability; but it requires policy
makers to abandon¶ journalist dichotomies such as formality-informality, legality-illegality,
victim-attacker,¶ and criminal-citizen (Galtung 1998; Hernández 2002).
Impact – Authoritarianism
Empirically, neoliberal reforms necessitate the abandonment of democracy in
favor of authoritarianism
Weyland 4
(Kurt. Kurt Weyland is assistant professor of political science at Vanderbilt University in
Nashville, Tennessee. “Neoliberalism and Democracy in Latin America: A Mixed Record.”
Latin American Politics & Society, Volume 46, Number 1, Spring 2004 pp. 135-157)
How compatible are neoliberalism and democracy in Latin America? How do economic
adjustment and market reform affect political liberty and competitive civilian rule? This question
is highly relevant for the future of the region. The experience of First World countries might
suggest that democracy and the market system tend to go together; after all, no democracy has
existed in nations that did not have the basic con- tours of capitalism; namely, a large extent of
private ownership and competition as the main mechanism of economic coordination (Lindblom 1977, 161–69). Latin America’s experience, however, used to differ from this happy
convergence. Given the severe social inequality plaguing the region, political liberalism
historically tended to trigger calls for social redistribution and state interventionism; that is, for
significant deviations from economic liberalism. The free-market system, by contrast, used to be
an elitist project that was often associated with support for or acquiescence to authoritarian
political rule. During long stretches of Latin American history, therefore, a clear tension existed
between political democracy and economic liberalism (Sheahan 1987, chap. 12; Gibson 1992,
168–71). Furthermore, even if the free-market system—that is, the end product of neoliberal
reform—is compatible with democracy, the process of neoliberal reform might not be; after all, it
involves the forceful dismantling of the established development model, and may therefore
require a significant concentration of political power. Indeed, Latin America specialists used to
have strong concerns that neoliberalism would destroy democracy. These fears reflected the
experience of the 1980s, when many new democratic regimes in the region postponed economic
stabilization and structural adjustment. Governments in fragile, unconsolidated democracies
feared that neoliberal reforms, which impose high short-term costs on important, powerful
sectors and large segments of the population, would trigger social turmoil and political conflict
and thus endanger the survival of democracy.
By contrast, radical market reforms were pushed through in Chile, but by dictator Augusto
Pinochet with the force of arms. The received wisdom therefore used to claim that democracy
and neoliberalism were incompatible. Democracies would avoid painful structural adjustment;
and where external pressures—especially from the International Monetary Fund and the World
Bank—forced them to enact neoliberalism, they could do so only by resorting to repression, thus
turning into authoritarian regimes (Foxley 1983, 16, 102; Pion-Berlin 1983; Sheahan 1987, 319–
23; see also the discussion in Armijo et al. 1994).
Impact – Youth
Neoliberalism has its most proximate impact on us: our own life chances will be
degraded absent a unified challenge to the logic of the unrestrained market.
Giroux 2005
(Henry Giroux professor of English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University, West Chester
University, College Literature, 32.1, Winter 2005, pp. 1-19)
Neoliberalism has been particularly hard on young people. The incarceration rates have soared for
black and brown youth, who have become the targeted population in America’s ongoing and
intensified war on crime. By almost all measures ranging from health care to job opportunities to
getting a decent education, youth of color fare considerably worse than white youth. But all youth,
except those who are privileged by class and birth, are feeling the weight of an economic and
political system that no longer sees them as a social investment for the future. For example, as
Anya Kamenetz points out: Americans between the ages of 19 and 29 are now twice as likely to be
uninsured as either children or older adults. The unemployment rate for people aged 16 to 24 was
16.1 percent as of February 2004, versus 6 per- cent for the general population. An estimated
900,000 people in this age group gave up and left the work force between 2000 and 2002,
meaning a total of 6 million people in that range are dropouts, neither in school, working, nor in
the military. By some accounts the age group’s jobless rate is more than 80 percent. (Kamenetz
2004, para.11) For those students who cannot find work or decide to go directly on to college,
massive tuition increases over the past decade—over 47 percent at pub- lic four-year colleges—
prevent many working and middle-class youth from attending higher education, and those that do
are often saddled with enormous debt once they graduate. In addition, a spiraling national debt will
place a terrible burden on this generation of young people, and this debt will leave little money for
critical needs such as education, health care, the environment, and other crucial public provisions.
Moreover, as part of an ongoing effort to destroy public entitlements, the Bush administration
has reduced government services, income, and health care; implemented cuts in Medicare and
veterans’ benefits and trimmed back or eliminated funds for programs for children and for public
housing. All of these policies have had and continue to have a crippling affect on youth, disabling
any hopes not only for a better future, but also for a life that can rise above the hardships driven by
the constant pressure to simply survive. Youth are now viewed as a national burden, more despised
and feared than cherished and protected.
Alternatives
Alt - 21-Century Socialism
New socialism provides a democratic mechanism to challenge both neoliberal
capitalism and state control – this puts people over profit without falling into the
traps of historical socialisms.
KENNEMORE and WEEKS 11
(Amy, professor of latin american studies at UNC: Charlotte and Gregory, lecturer
in International Relations at Webster in Vienna, "Twenty-First Century SOcialism?
The Ellusive Search for a Post-Neolibwral Development Model in Bolivia and
Ecudaro," Bulletin of Latin AMerican Research, http://claspages.uncc.edu/gregory-weeks/files/2012/04/Kennemore-and-Weeks2.pdf)
The term ‘twenty-first-century socialism’ emerged in the 1990s, as resentment toward marketoriented policies grew across Latin America. The phrase itself is often attributed to Heinz
Dieterich, a German scholar of Marxism. It explicitly rejects the Soviet model of socialism,
seeing it not only as dictatorial and ultimately an economic failure but also rooted in a historical
context that is no longer relevant. Although often used in vague terms, twenty-first-century
socialism claims to build on the mistakes of both neoliberalism and twentieth-century socialism,
seeking to increase state regulation and power, but in a democratic manner that allocates resources
more efficiently and does not stifle innovation or personal choice (e.g. see Petras and Veltmeyer,
2009). Collectivism is therefore not a goal; instead the economic model aims to give individuals –
particularly the poor – freedom within a socialist system to assert themselves political and
economically (Harnecker, 2010). Furthermore, it promotes a transformation of historical social,
economic and political imbalances by re-founding traditional institutions that will better serve the
interests of the majority of the people over a privileged few (Irazabal ´ and Foley, 2010). Although
the market still exists, it can be contested and new alternatives developed (Harris, 2007). Unlike
Marxism–Leninism, then, twenty-first-century socialism does not completely reject capitalism;
instead, this new model rejects market policies imposed by any foreign source, seeking instead to
incorporate capitalism within a humanitarian rubric. To that end, the state also assumes control
over critical natural resources, and redistributes the revenue.
We must align ourselves with the socialist alternative in every instance – only
mobilization at every opportunity will spur the transformation forward.
FOSTER, 10
(John Bellamy, "Forward to Latin America and Twenty-First Century Socialism,"
MONTHLY REVEIW 62:3, July-August)
Harnecker argues strenuously against a narrow “workerist” view of revolution, and against all kinds of revolutionary isms: “vanguardism,
verticalism, authoritarianism,” excessive centralism, etc. Socialism for the twenty-first century, in her vision, is a revolution defined by its
commitment to protagonist democracy. In Venezuela the revolution has taken the form of a “peaceful armed transition,” i.e., peaceful but not
defenseless, as in the case of Allende’s Chile. It
is a process in which the object is constantly to push the
revolution forward by continually transferring ever more power to the people . The Bolivarian Revolution,
This is a real
struggle, one that can be won or lost, she tells us. It is rife with contradictions and “impossible
obstacles” that nonetheless need to be surmounted. The Bolivarian Revolution in Venezuela exists in the context of a
capitalist economy. It does not control the state as a whole, but simply part of the government . Its life, its very existence, thus
depends on the continual mobilization and the developing capacities of the population, the
multitude, the poor. Above all, Harnecker attunes us to the distinctiveness of this revolution, which is unlike any other, and yet which is
putting forth new principles and modalities of revolutionary change that may aid in the formation of similar struggles worldwide. Its
strength is its historical specificity, and it is out of this that its real universality arises. She tells us:
she explains, adamantly rejects representative democracy, choosing instead participatory or protagonist democracy.32
“Chávez—influenced by José Carlos Mariátegui—thinks that twenty-first century socialism cannot be a carbon copy of anything but has to be a
‘heroic creation.’ That is why he talks of a Bolivarian, Christian, Robinsonian [referring to Simón Rodríguez], Indoamerican socialism ,
a new
collective existence, equality, liberty, and real, complete democracy.” If the transition away from
capitalism is now an organic tendency of world history in our time, it also follows: “to each country,
its own transition.” In the end, what is needed, she concludes, is “a left that understands that, more important than what we have done in
the past, is what we will do together in the future to win our sovereignty—to build a society that makes possible the full development of all
human beings: the socialist society of the twenty-first century.”
Alt - Collectivities
Small collectivities are ideal to solving neoliberalism because it forms an acceptable
limit to interdependence of individuals
Wagner and Moreira 03- Writers on Latin American politics and society, “Toward a Quixotic Pragmatism:
The Case of the Zapatista Insurgence” 2003, pg. 8
This understanding of power may well stem from the political experience and organization of
relatively small collectivities, in which not only is the individuals’ dependence on the fate of the
group undeniably clear but so is the group’s dependence on the participation of its members. As
Marx has sufficiently stressed, however, capitalist economies survive on the same basic principle
of interdependence, although it is not immediately apparent and is in fact actively hidden by the
promotion of the illusion of individuals’ independence from each other. In this sense, the
experience of small collectivities foregrounds what is not accessible to experience in capitalist
societies, and the principle of ‘‘ordering with obedience’’ formulates the fundamental social and
economic interdependence of individuals for social contexts in which the collective itself has
become an abstraction. It also formulates the limits that this interdependence effectively sets to the
exercise of power, because, as it is clearer, again, in relatively small collectivities, a group’s
capacity to function as a group and to accomplish its aims cannot be guaranteed by force—the
power to do cannot systematically rely on the power to subjugate or repress. This differentiated
experience of power foregrounds a distinction that can fruitfully inform all political contexts,
namely, the distinction between the prescriptive and pragmatic senses of orders, rules, and
instructions. Not only can these two ‘‘orders’’ be dissociated— ordering is not necessarily
commanding—but the prescriptive instance of ordering, on which the ‘‘mere’’ organizational
instance may be thought to depend, is in fact subordinated to the latter. 8. The personal
endorsement of a collectivity’s decisions does not imply that each individual’s will or desire must
coincide with that of the others but rather that it must be exercised positively in the process of
deciding what there is to decide. As long as all participate in the elaboration of the terms of the
decision, the options that are posited can, by definition, be envisaged, if not preferred, by all.
There will doubtless be a moment of subordination—as opposed to subjugation, which implies
prescription, the use of force—of the individual to the collective will at the time of the final
decision, when decisions are actually taken, and after the options have been elaborated. But at
this point, once the dice have been thrown, the decision becomes one of the aspects of the future of
the collectivity, and as such it is up to the collectivity
Alt - Communal Councils
HARNECKER 10,
(Marta, Chilean psychologist and former student of Louis Althusser, trans. Janet
Duckworth, "Twenty-First Century Socialism," MONTHLY REVEIW 62:3, JulyAugust)
This would have never gone beyond mere talk if appropriate spaces had not been created where
participatory processes could take place freely and fully. For this reason, Chávez’s initiative to
create communal councils—which was followed some time later by his proposal for workers’
councils, student councils, and peasant councils—is an important step toward forming real
popular power and how this power should then be expressed in the communes. It is only if a
society based on worker self-management and the self-management of community residents is
created that the state will cease to be an instrument over and above the people, serving elites,
and will instead become a state whose cadres are the best of the working people. One of the most
revolutionary ideas of the Bolivarian government is that of promoting the creation of communal
councils, a form of autonomous organization at the grassroots level.98 These are territorial
organizations unprecedented in Latin America because of the small number of participants. They
number between two hundred and four hundred families in densely populated urban areas;
between fifty and one hundred families in rural areas; and an even smaller number of families in
isolated zones, mostly indigenous areas. The idea was to create small spaces that offered
maximum encouragement to citizen involvement and facilitated the protagonism of those
attending by putting them at their ease and helping them to speak without inhibition. This model
was arrived at after much debate and after looking closely at successful experiences of
community organization, such as the urban land committees (Comités de Tierra Urbana or
“CTU”), some two hundred families organizing to fight for the regulation of land ownership, and
health committees, some one hundred fifty families that form committees to offer support to
doctors in the most disadvantaged communities
Estimates indicate that in Venezuela, which has about twenty-six million inhabitants, there are
about fifty-two thousand communities. (These numbers are based on our understanding of
“community” as a group of families that live in a specific geographical space, who know each
other, can relate easily, can meet without needing to rely on transport, and who, of course, share
a common history, use the same public services, and share similar problems, both socioeconomic and those connected to urban development.) Each of these communities has to elect a
body that would act as a community government. The kind of democracy I propose is against
any imposition of solutions by force; instead it advocates winning over the hearts and minds of
the people to the project that we wish to build—in other words, obtaining hegemony in the
Gramscian sense and using that hegemony to build it. As Chávez says, hearts and minds are won
in practice by creating opportunities for people to begin to understand the project while they are
engaged in building it.99
Alt – Latin America
Latin America is the nodal point for resistance to neoliberalism—ally yourself with
the forces of new political possibilities.
MACLEOD 2013
(ALAN, social commentator, Thatcher and Chavez A Tale of Two Deaths;
counterpunch http://www.counterpunch.org/2013/04/12/a-tale-of-two-deaths/)
But Chavez
was quick to distance the movement from previous failed attempts and from dogmatic
ideologies of the past: “We are not talking about copying models, I believe that copying models was one of the great errors of the
socialist attempts of the 20th century, following the handbook. No, with this autonomy, with this diversity, with this force originating from every
community, from our people.” Today,
more than 360 million Latin Americans live under left-wing
governments dubbed “the Pink Tide” by Western intellectuals (perhaps because they couldn’t
stomach the word “red”). They are not homogeneous, they range from the eco-socialism of Morales in Bolivia, to
Ecuador’s radical young economist, Correa to the Workers’ Party and Lula in Brazil, but basic principles of equality and
integration unite them. Critics claim a reliance on state leads to corruption and inefficiency, and that enforced collective action is an
attack on the pure liberty of the individual. It is not by chance that an anti-neoliberal agenda has developed in
Latin America. It was in the “Empire’s Workshop” where Thatcher and Friedman’s ideas were
first implemented. After overthrowing President Allende, a democratic Marxist who stood for many of the same things Chavez did,
dictator General Pinochet invited protégés of Friedman and Hayek to Chile. There, they had free reign to carry out their ideas, thanks to the
General’s brutal suppression of the population. The result was not dissimilar to the West today: soaring unemployment and poverty, falling
industrial production and purchasing power falling to just 40% of what it had been in 1970, coupled with a rise in wealth and power of a small
section at the top of society. Hayek recommended Chile as a model for Thatcher to follow. She agreed Chile to be an “economic miracle”, but
lamented that Britain’s “democratic institutions and the need for a high degree of consent” made “some of the measures” taken “quite
unacceptable”. Likewise in Venezuela, President Carlos Andres Perez, on instruction from Friedman’s students, imposed a sweeping austerity
“packet” on Venezuela, privatizing state-owned assets and removing price controls on oil, plunging the population into poverty, to the point
where ordinary Caracas residents spent more than 25% of their income on bus fares (Jones, p116). This despite running on an anti neoliberal
ticket, calling the bankers and economists “genocide workers in the pay of economic totalitarianism” during his election campaign. Desperate
Venezuelans began rioting for food, but their protest soon became one against the system itself. The government acted quickly. The military was
called in, surrounded the poor quarters of the city, and commenced three days of war against its inhabitants. The L.A. Times’ Bart Jones speaks
of Red Cross workers being gunned down in the street, “mass graves” being filled with “mutilated corpses”, “tied up corpses” with “bullets in the
back of their heads” and children being gunned down as the armies fired indiscriminately into shanty towns (Jones, Hugo! pp. 121-124). Perhaps
3,000 were killed, a similar number to the Tienanmen Square crackdown, in a country with a population more than 40 times smaller. So it
was
not in Seattle, but in Caracas where the first direct protest against neoliberalism occurred. And it
was the outrage at the brutal suppression of the people which spurred Chavez onto the political
stage . Latin America is ten to twenty years ahead of the West, in economic terms . After decades of
brutal neoliberal austerity, an alternative has emerged and fought back. Similar ideas have begun
to appear in the West, thanks to the Occupy Movement, which swept America and Europe last
year. Those in the West has much to learn from the region, even if it is what not to do. The Guardian
released a piece on the legacy of Margaret Thatcher. It showed a 65% increase in British poverty,
from 13 to 22% of the population. Inequality, as measured by the GINI index, rose from .253 to .339. The planned destruction of the
manufacturing industry led to record high unemployment. The irony of Thatcherism is that her policies have left far more people dependent on
the welfare state than previously. In contrast, even
Thatcher’s allies at the World Bank admit that Chavez
managed a 50% decrease in poverty, and a 65% decrease in extreme poverty. Their figures show too that
unemployment fell from 14.5% in 1999 to 7.6% in 2009. Venezuela’s inequality has dropped from .487 in 1998 to .392 in 2009. Today, it is the
most admired country in Latin America. A similar story is being played out in other Latin American countries. For all this, Thatcher
was
remarkably successful in shifting the political discourse to the right. Her policies of privileging
business led to record corporate profits and increased concentration of media ownership. Socialists
like Tony Benn were pushed to one side and Tony Blair became leader of a “New Labour”, largely indistinguishable
from the Conservatives. When asked what she thought was her greatest achievement was, Thatcher responded “Tony Blair and New
Labour”. Benn agreed, ruefully. The concentration of money has led to the rightward shift of the media, too.
The “free-market” has led to independent media bought up or swamped by massive conglomerates.
Media outlets are increasingly beholden to corporations for advertising. Today, questioning neoliberalism is heresy ,
leading to even supposedly left-of-centre newspapers wondering if we should be “worried by the
rise of the populist left in Latin America”. It is becoming increasingly hard to hide the successes of
countries of Latin America in solving age old problems by bucking the supposed iron rules of
neoliberal economics. But the media continues to try. The New York Times bemoans Chavez’s “irresponsible handouts”,
while the Washington Post insists he remains in power only by “showering the poor with gifts”. What are these gifts? The Telegraph finally
enlightens us: “lavishing state funds” on projects like operations to restore sight to the blind and soup kitchens. Such is the aversion to the state in
Western intellectual culture that providing even basic food and medicine, in accordance with the UN Declaration of Human Rights, are serious
transgressions on freedom. This has been lampooned by FAIR, in their article “Chavez Wasted his Money on Healthcare When He Could Have
Built Gigantic Skyscrapers”.
Despite Thatcher insisting that “there is no alternative”, Latin America is
providing a model for a different future. A silent battle for heaven and Earth is being waged. And
we all must choose sides. Which one are you on? Choose wisely, because the fate of the 21st
century will be decided on which one of these ideologies prevails.
Alt – Participatory Democracy
Participatory Democracy is the alternative to neoliberalism; it best represents the
people
Michael Brie 2009
Professor, Philosopher, director of the Institute for Social Analysis of the Rosa Luxembourg
Foundation.1990-1994 Professor of Social Philosophy at the Faculty of Social Sciences at the
Humboldt University, subsequently visiting scientist in the research group "Transformation
processes in the new federal states" of the Max Planck Society at the Humboldt University and
the President of the Science Center for Social Research, Berlin 1997 to 1999 Scientific staff of
the Society for Social Scientific Research and Journalism mbH Berlin, “Ways out of the crisis
of neoliberalism”
The decisive condition for the emergence of a new economic order and way of life is the
struggle for the democratisation of democracy. Today, democracy, this great achievement of
the 20th century, has been debased to a mere facade of imperial claims to power, of the
implementation of the imperative of an unleashed capital valorisation and of the protection
of egotistical property claims. It has been transformed into an oligarchy of globally acting
elites. The alternative to this is participatory democracy, in particular as it is developed in the
context of the World Social Forum. The main features of a new participatory democracy are
above all four directions of development: first, it involves the production of a universal public
sphere, the assurance that all decisions are accessible to those who are affected by them, that
there is the obligation to listen to them, to confront their criteria and their critiques.
Second, democracy is only possible if it contributes to the development of the other in a way
based on solidarity. This is the case above all for those who today have been touched by war,
environmental destruction, failure of the state and lack of fundamental conditions for a
self-determined life. Third, democracy requires immediately communal, regional and firmbased codetermination with a right to veto if one’s own essential needs are at stake. Fourth,
democracy is only possible when people are not threatened by a lack of jobs, poverty in old
age, lack of basic goods for a self-determined life, or war. Only when these four conditions
are met is the delegation of power to others in any way responsible, for it is only then that it
is not transformed into one’s own lack of power. Many elements of this new solidarity
development have emerged in the existing society dominated by capital. The old welfare state
and all the other attempts to control capitalism since the latter half of the 19th century have
already contributed to this. These kinds of post-neoliberalism approaches based on solidarity
have also emerged in confrontation with neoliberalism. The social and political struggles
against capitalist globalisation on the local as well as the global level have also helped the
nuclei of a participatory democracy to emerge. People have begun once again to engage
politically; against all forms of resistance, they have developed elements for a mode of life
based on solidarity.
Alt - Rejection
Total rejection is key – the only way to produce real alternatives to neoliberalism is
to refuse the allure of half measures.
Werlhof 8
(Claudia von Werlhof. Werlhof is a professor at the Institute of Political Sciences at the
University of Innsbruck. “The Globalization of Neoliberalism, its Consequences and Some of its
Basic Alternatives.” 27 August 2008. Capitalism Nature Socialism. BA)
Still, euphoria would be out of place. An alternative to neoliberalism is not created through
analysis and protest alone but must be practiced. Opinions on how to do this differ. Some discuss
‘‘alternatives’’ that are none: a reform of the WTO; ‘‘control’’ of globalization through NGOs; a
return to Keynesianism; a restoration of ‘‘social market economy’’; or even a revival of
socialism. Such ideas ignore reality and trivialize the problem. Neoliberalism shows every day
that much more is at stake.
Neoliberalism is an apocalypse, a ‘‘revelation,’’ because the reality it creates makes it impossible
for neoliberalism to justify itself. Nor can we consider the corporations harmless ‘‘players.’’
There is no ambiguity. As a consequence, the perpetrators of neoliberal politics simply lie about
what is happening. The only good thing about neoliberalism is that it reveals the truth about
‘‘Western civilization’’ and ‘‘European values.’’ This means that people now have the chance to
draw the right conclusions about what is really needed.
What is really needed, of course, is nothing less than a different civilization. A different
economy alone, or a different society or culture will not suffice. We need a civilization that is the
exact opposite of neoliberalism and the patriarchal capitalist world system it is rooted in. The
logic of our alternative must be one that completely undermines the logic of neoliberalism.113
Neoliberalism has turned everything that would ensure a good life for all beings on this planet
upside down. Many people still have a hard time understanding that the horror we are
experiencing is indeed a reality*a reality willingly produced, maintained and justified by ‘‘our’’
politicians. But even if the alternative was half implemented*no more plundering, exploitation,
destruction, violence, war, coer- cion, mercilessness, accumulation, greed, corruption*we would
still be left with all the damage that the earth has already suffered.
Alt - Socialism
Socialism is the only alternative that can resolve the contradictions of capitalism and
the violence of imperialism
KATZ 13
(Claudio, professor of economic history at the University of Buenos Aires, trans.
Leonard Morin, "Socialist Strategies in Latin America," The New Latin American
Left, 34)
But since globalization is not in reality the end of history, every alternative remains open. What
we are witnessing is merely a new period of accumulation, sustained by recovery of the rate of
yield that the oppressed of every country pay. This regressive flow makes socialism an
immediate necessity as the sole popular response to the new stage. Only socialism can correct the
disorders created by the global expansion of capital in the current framework of financial
speculation and imperialist polarization.
Alt – Social Movements/Globalization from Below
The only way to truly change is through total rejection of capitalism trhough
globalization from below
Robinson 08-American professor of sociology at the University of California, Santa Barbara, 2008, “Latin
America and Global Capitalism”, pg342-3
As we saw, the indigenous and other social movements in Latin America, in distinction to
the old vertical models, have spearheaded a new model of horizontal networking and
organizational relations in a grassroots democratic processes from the bottom up. But at
some point popular movements must work out how the vertical and horizontal intersect. A
"long march" through civil society may be essential to transform social relations,
construct counter-hegemony from the ground up and assure popular control from below.
Yet no emancipation is possible without an alternative project, and no such project is
possible without addressing the matter of the power of dominant groups, the organization
of that power in the state (including coercive power), and the concomitant need to
disempower dominant groups by seizing the state from them, dismantling it, and
constructing alternative institutions. The current round of social and political struggle in
Latin America highlights the changing relation between social movements of the Left,
political parties, the state, and global capitalism. This in turn raises the issue of political
organizations that can mediate vertical links between political and civil society, that is, interface
between the popular forces on the one hand and state structures on the other? How can internally
democratic political instruments be developed to operate at the level of political society and
dispute state power without diluting the autonomous mobilization of social movements? The
potential for transformation will depend on the combination of independent pressure of
mass social movements from below on the state and also on the representatives and allies
of those movements taking over the state. The issue is how to assure that political
organizations are internally democratic. How can they serve as instruments of social movements
and popular class mobilization and not the reverse? The limitations of strict horizontalism
have become evident in Mexico in recent years with regard to the Zapatistas, for whom
horizontalism becomes a rigid principle rather than a general emancipatory practice, or in
Argentina with regard to the autonomist movement. The Zapatista model generated hope and
inspiration for millions throughout Latin America and the world in the 1990’s. The
January 1, 1994, uprising was an urgent and refreshing response to the capitulation by
many on the Left to the "TINA" ("there is no alternative") syndrome: the assertion that there
was simply no alternative to the new global capitalist order. The Zapatistas insisted on a
new of set non-hierarchal practices within their revolutionary movement and within the
communities under their influence, including absolute equality between men and women,
collective leadership, and taking directives from, rather than giving them to, the grassroots
base, leading by following and listening, and so on. Such non-hierarchal practices must be
at the very core of any emancipatory project. Yet they also hold strong appeal to the
anarchist currents that have spread among radical forces worldwide in the wake of the
collapse of "actually existing socialism" and the old statist-vanguardist Left, and that are
unwilling to deal with the wider political system and the state. These currents have a
strong influence in the global justice movement and the World Social Forum, as well as
among radicalized youth and middle classes in Mexico who provide a base for the
Zapatistas beyond Chiapas. But Zapatismo has not been able to draw in a mass working-class
base, and as a result it has experienced a declining political influence in Mexican society. It was
still in 2007 a force of counter-hegemony or even of hegemony in some communities inside
Chiapas, but the fact is that global capitalism made major headway within Chiapas itself
between 1994 and 2007 as the Zapatista movement has stagnated. This conundrum came to a
head with the Zapatistas' refusal as a matter of principle to engage with the campaign that the
PRD and Manuel Lopez Obrador waged for the presidency in the 2006 elections. As a result the
Zapatistas were ill prepared to throw their weight behind the mass struggles against the fraud
perpetrated by the Mexican state and its two ruling parties, the PRI and the PAN. If it is true, as
the Zapatistas observe, that there is no blueprint for revolution, then it is also true that
revolutionaries need to be able to shift strategies and tactics as history actually unfolds.
Alt – Social Movements - Latin American
A popular movement is key to succeed in the resistance against neoliberalism
Robinson 08-American professor of sociology at the University of California, Santa Barbara, 2008, “Latin
America and Global Capitalism”, pgs347-8
If the neoliberal national state is not a space for engaging in politics it is necessary to open new
political spaces that allow popular forces to challenge elites in that state? What is the possibility
of reconstituting national states? How can the popular classes assure the continued accumulation
of their autonomous power and at the same time seek to capture local state machineries and
transform them into instruments responsive to their interests? How can they undermine the
neoliberal national states and challenge the TNS without falling into a resistance grounded in
mere rebellion rather than in a coherent and viable alternative project? This means creating
imageries and projects that take the popular classes beyond their disruptive powers. Greater
webs of interdependence mean greater disruptive powers. Popular forces need to develop
constructive power as well, to go beyond the restraining influence of rules in activating
both disruptive and constructive powers. The objective potential for popular power has
actually increased in the globalization epoch. There is a new wider basis for intersubjectivities that have been fragmented at the national level by globalization and for a reterritorialization of space in new ways. New spaces are not necessarily transnational spaces.
However, popular forces that operate in these new local, national, and regional spaces must
link with transnational chains and networks, and moreover, are increasingly empowered
to do so by the very nature and dynamics of capitalist globalization. The challenge,
hence, is how to convert a reactive global resistance into a proactive global program. For
poor majorities a resolution to the crisis requires a
radical redistribution of wealth and
power, predicated on the construction of more authentic democratic structures that allow
for popular control over local and TNS institutions. The transformative possibilities that have
opened up in Latin America cannot be realized without an organized Left and a
democratic socialist program. Yet such possibilities will only end up frustrated by the old
vanguardist model of top-down change by command and the military fetishism of the
1960’s and 1970’s that converted armed struggle from the means to an end into an end
itself. No where is this more evident than in the "military hypertrophy" of the Colombian
Armed Revolutionary Forces (FARC), which sees independent political mobilization as a
threat to its own efforts to hegemonize resistance (Hylton, 2006). The transformative
moment of the early twenty-first century in Latin America will depend on the Left's ability
to learn the lessons of the previous era of revolution, especially the need to relinquish
vanguardism of party and state and to encourage, respect, and subordinate itself to the
autonomous mobilization from below of the popular classes and subordinate sectors.
Popular and progressive resistance competes with the spread of reactionary resistance to
global capitalism, ranging from religious fundamentalisms to racist and xenophobic rightwing populisms, which may well gain influence if a popular project is unable to cohere.
Moreover, we must not conflate neoliberalism with global capitalism. Precisely because the
neoliberal phase of global capitalism is coming to a close, resistance must move beyond the
critique of neoliberalism. The problem of the particular neoliberal model is in the end
symptomatic of the systemic problem of global capitalism. If it can be said that the "Washington
consensus" had cracked by the turn-of-century then what may replace neoliberalism in Latin
America and in global society depends not only on the struggle to oppose the neoliberal order
but also on the struggle to develop a viable alternative and to impose that alternative.
Movements succeed in Latin America- empirics prove
Webber 7
(Jeffery, Professor of politics and international relations at Queen Mary University of London,
“Indigenous Struggle in Latin America: The Perilous Invisibility of Capital and Class”, Project
Muse, Fall 2007, Pg. 194-195)
The framework developed in the introduction is unevenly employed in the rest of the volume.
Zamosc’s chapter on the Ecuadorian indigenous movement stands above the other
contributions. He develops a critique of new social movement theory and institutional
analysis, arguing that economic crisis and pressure from the International Monetary Fund led
to the imposition of neoliberal restructuring in Ecuador. This restructuring hit the popular
sectors with the bulk of the costs of the new economic model and exacerbated the economic
crisis. All traditional parties shared in the neoliberal project and rejected popular sector
interests, leading to what Zamosc calls a “crisis of representation.” At the same time, this
process generated a “crisis of legitimacy,” “as the state lost respect and authority because its
initiatives were viewed as unjust and inefficient” (140). The most important consequence of
this process were the massive street mobilizations led by indigenous organizations, especially
the Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador (CONAIE). The street mobilizations
clearly articulated a broad antineoliberal resistance that appealed to the popular sectors. In
Ecuador, attempts at imposing neoliberalism from above have been perpetually stymied
through street mobilization and class struggle: “what remains to be explained is precisely that
which, in recent times, appears as the most salient factor: the veto power of the masses that
go out to protest in the streets” (132). Zamosc’s chapter is an important reminder of the role of
class struggle in indigenous movements.
Alternatives – Now Key
Alt – Now is Key
Already people around the globe are revolting against neoliberalism, now is key to
transition away from the neoliberal system
Giroux 2005
(Henry Giroux professor of English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University, West Chester
University, College Literature, 32.1, Winter 2005, pp. 1-19)
Fortunately, the corporate capitalist fairytale of neoliberalism has been challenged all over the
globe by students, labor organizers, intellectuals, community activists, and a host of individuals and
groups unwilling to allow democracy to be bought and sold by multinational corporations,
corporate swindlers, international political institutions, and those government politicians who
willingly align themselves with multinational, corporate interests and rapacious profits. From
Seattle to Genoa, people engaged in popular resistance are collectively taking up the challenge of
neoliberalism and reviving both the meaning of resistance and the sites where it takes place.
Political culture is now global and resistance is amorphous, connecting students with workers,
schoolteachers with parents, and intellectuals with artists. Groups protesting the attack on
farmers in India whose land is being destroyed by the government in order to build dams now find
themselves in alliance with young people resisting sweatshop labor in New York City.
Environmental activists are joining up with key sections of organized labor as well as groups
protesting Third World debt. The collapse of the neoliberal showcase, Argentina, along with
numerous corporate bankruptcies and scandals (notably including Enron), reveals the cracks in
neoliberal hegemony and domination. In addition, the multiple forms of resistance against
neoliberal capitalism are not limited by a version of identity politics focused exclusively on
particularized rights and interests. On the contrary, identity politics is affirmed within a broader
crisis of political culture and democracy that connects the militarization of public life with the
collapse of the welfare state and the attack on civil liberties. Central to these new movements is
the notion that neoliberalism has to be understood within a larger crisis of vision, meaning,
education, and political agency. Democracy in this view is not limited to the struggle over economic
resources and power; indeed, it also includes the creation of public spheres where individuals can
be educated as political agents equipped with the skills, capacities, and knowledge they need to
perform as autonomous political agents. I want to expand the reach- es of this debate by arguing
that any struggle against neoliberalism must address the discourse of political agency, civic
education, and cultural politics as part of a broader struggle over the relationship between
democratization(the ongoing struggle for a substantive and inclusive democracy) and the global
public sphere.
Neoliberalism is a failing ideology; its opposition cannot be contained
Ana Esther Ceceña 2009
Degree : Economics , Faculty of Economics, UNAM. 1972¶ Mastery : Studies in International
Economic Relations , Faculty of Political and Social Sciences, UNAM¶ Doctorate : Third Cycle
Studies in International Economic Relations , University of Paris I-Sorbonne. 1975 (Studies)
National Autonomous¶ University of Mexico; Director of the¶ Observatorio Latinoamericano de
Geopolítica¶ and active in the Americas Demilitarisation¶ Campaign, “Postneoliberalism and its
bifurcations”
Neoliberalism met its definitive end with the crisis that erupted in 2008. There is no going
back. By itself, the market is self-destructive. It has to be supported and contained.
Capitalist society, arbitrated by the market, either plunders itself or becomes uncontained. It
lacks long-term perspectives. Both things have happened after 30 years of neoliberalism. The
voraciousness of the market took the appropriation of nature and the dispossession of
human beings to the extreme. Territories were ravaged by desertification and their
inhabitants driven out. People revolted, and ecological catastrophe, which had reached an
extreme point of irreversibility, started to manifest itself in a violent way. People rebelled
against the advance of capitalism, blocking the ways that were taking it towards even
greater appropriation. Armed insurgencies impeded access to the rainforest; civil revolts
put an end to the building of dams, to intensive mining, to the construction of heavy-load
roads, to the privatisation of oil and gas, and to the monopolisation of water. The market,
by itself, was not able to defeat those people who were already out of its reach because they
had been expelled; and from there, from the non-market, they were struggling for human
and natural life, for life’s essential elements, for another relationship with nature, for an
end to the pillaging. The end of neoliberalism begins when the extent of dispossession arouses the
fury of the people and compels them to burst onto the scene.
Latin America proves it doesn’t want Neoliberalism by shifting ideas and policies
towards the left.
Kaltwasser, 2011
(Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser holds a PhD from the Humboldt University of
Berlin (2008), has worked for the Chilean Bureau of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and was
a post-doctoral fellow at the Social Science Research Centre Berlin (WZB). Latin American Research
Review Vol. 46, page 227-228)
Although not all six books reviewed here use the term post-neoliberalism, they do assume that
Latin America is experiencing political change char- acterized by detachment from the principles of
the Washington Consen- sus, among other features. Many countries in the region are experimenting with ideas and policies linked to the left rather than to the right. In Governance after
Neoliberalism—which offers an overview in three chap- ters, followed by a series of single-case
studies—Grugel and Riggirozzi declare that their central question is “the extent to which genuinely
new and alternative models of governance are emerging in Latin America with respect to those
framed under neoliberalism” (3). In the same book, Cortés argues that, “[i]nstead of a new,
consolidated paradigm of social policy, we are witnessing the emergence of gradual and tentative
alternative ap- proaches to neoliberalism” (52).
Alt – Now key – Heg Decline
The current decline in US hegemony provides an opening for alternative futures to
emerge – recommitting to hegemony will guarantee economic warfare.
Oppenheim ‘07
(Michael, Professor of Geosciences and International Affairs in the Woodrow Wilson School and
the Department of Geosciences at Princeton, The End of Liberal Globalization,
http://wpj.sagepub.com/content/24/4/1.citation)
The liberal form of globalization that
has shaped the world over the past 60 years is in steep
decline. The reason for that decline—principally, the loss of American hegemony—is now coming
into focus, but what will replace the liberal form of global- ization remains unclear. The
globalization that we have come to know (and from which many have benefited greatly) has
encompassed faster and more frequent transnational interactions in trade, finance, technology,
and ideas, and it has widened the range of global players from diplomatic representatives and
firms to individuals, civil society groups, mid-level government officials, and terrorist
organizations. These actors have had a deepening influence on the conditions of life in communities
around the world, and on the policies and structures of states. The conventional wisdom views the
effects of these structural changes as strongly positive: more open political and economic
systems, increased prosperity, and mitigation of conflict. While it acknowledges negative
effects—income inequality, financial volatility, economic and physical insecurity—these are
considered surmount- able with improved national and global governance, and the continued
spread of markets. But the idea that liberal globalization is the only form of globalization is
erroneous. Many aspects of globalization—the rapid advance and diffusion of technology, the
proliferation of private transnational actors, the centrality of economic growth, and the
importance of the global economy in the aping of national economic policy—are well
established and probably irreversible. But that form of globalization—of progressively open
markets, non-discrimination in trade and investment, strong rule-based global in- stitutions, and
the spread of democratic politics—is in steep decline. And this decline will imperil the economic
and political benefits of growth, poverty alleviation, and relative peace among great powers,
which have characterized the post-World War II system. That decline is already underway, but
the shape of globalization that emerges after U.S. hegemony is less clear. The new globalization will
be—inevitably—more heterogeneous. Hopefully, it also still will be open and multilateral, and still
delivering robust growth and alleviating poverty. U.S. encouragement will be essential but not
sufficient for this vision, given the emerging multi- polar distribution of power. But if America
continues an anachronistic pursuit of primacy over this new order it will invite re- sistance, and will
accelerate a trend towards a mercantilist scramble for markets, capital, and resources among
powerful states and non-state actors.
Alt – now key - Venezuela
Venezuela is seeking to reject capitalism totally
Robinson 08-American professor of sociology at the University of California, Santa Barbara, 2008, “Latin
America and Global Capitalism”, pgs
335-6
The first of these pillars was what Chavez called the "mother of all revolutionary laws," or
a law allowing the presidency to pass certain measures by decree over an eighteen-month
period. "If the [earlier revolutionary] laws impacted on the economic and social scheme of the
country, these laws will have a much greater impact on the economic situation of the
country, which will include the nationalization of strategic layers of security, sovereignty,
and defense" (Chavez, 20073:68-69). The second was the socialist reform of the constitution.
Third was a mass extension of a popular educational system to raise the levels of
knowledge, consciousness, and ideological development of the population and to "demolish
the old values of capitalism and individualism" (ibid.:7o). The fourth and fifth pillars were
to be "a new geometry of power on the national map" and a "revolutionary explosion of
people's power, of communal power" from below (ibid.). Chavez envisioned a deepening of
the role of the Communal Councils and their conglomeration locally, regionally, and
nationally into a sort of alternative power structure from below, a Paris Commune on a
national scale: We must move toward the formation of a communal state and progressively
dismantle the old bourgeois state that is still alive and kicking as we put into place the
communal state, the socialist state, the Bolivarian state; a state with the ability to steer the
revolution. Almost all states came into existence to hold back revolutions, so this is our
challenge: to convert the old counterrevolutionary state into a revolutionary state. (Chavez,
20073:72) Here we arrive at the marrow of struggle among contending social forces in
Venezuela and the contradictions of the Bolivarian process points to broader quandaries for
popular alternatives to global capitalism in the twenty-first century. As the struggle for
hegemony in global civil society heats up the matter of the state, including national states and the
transnational institutions and forums through which they are connected, cannot be avoided. In
Venezuela the elite definitively lost its hegemony in civil society. While popular forces managed
to grab hold of the capitalist state in the form of the presidency, however, that state remained a
bastion of the elite and a major point of penetration by the agents and supporters of a global
capitalist order. Such a situation of disunity between civil and political society was not stable.
Either, on one hand, the old order would be able to contain the agency of the popular majority
and frustrate a socialist transformation of property relations, power structures, culture, values,
and ideology through a stranglehold over state institutions and the bourgeois ideological
production it would make possible; or, on the other hand, the popular classes and their agents and
leaders would have to match hegemony in civil society with the destruction of bourgeois state
power and the creation of new forms of revolutionary state power and ideological production.
Chavez himself emphasized the connection between the state and the ideological and
cultural struggle between the old order not yet dead and the new one trying to be born: We
have to dismantle the system of privileges. The old customs of capitalism, of the bourgeois
capitalist state, are truly obscene. Each one of us must become a motor for bringing down
the old bourgeois customs incrusted in the state, in society, in institutions. . . . No matter
how many political, economic, and social changes we make, if we are not able to demolish
the old customs, the obnoxious class distinctions, the obscene privileges, if we are unable to
do this and to generate a new culture of equality, solidarity, and brotherhood, then
everything will have been a waste of time. (2007^2-3) In late 2006 Chavez called for the
formation of a United Venezuelan Socialist Party, or PUSV in its Spanish acronym. The MVR
was by 2006 a mass party, with over a million members (Jorquera, 2005:84), and it was the main
political force in the pro-revolutionary camp, which involved an alliance of several Left political
organizations, including the Venezuelan Communist Party, Podemos, and Patria Para Todos
(PPT, or Homeland for All). Yet neither the MVR nor its allied parties were a statist party: that
is, parties fused with state structures. Such a fusion seemed impossible since the state in
Venezuela remained a battleground of contending social and political forces, even if under the
hegemony of Chavez and the Chavistas, especially after the abortive 2002 coup.
The space of student centered debate is the crucial nexus point for creating
alternatives to neoliberalism.
Giroux 5 (Henry A. – Global Television Network Chair, Professor at McMaster University,
“The Terror of Neoliberalism: Rethinking the Significance of Cultural Politics”, Winter 2005,
JSTOR)
Just as
the world has seen a more virulent and brutal form of market capitalism, generally referred to as
neoliberalism, develop over the last thir ty years, it has also seen "a new wave of political activism [which] has
coalesced around the simple idea that capitalism has gone too far" (Harding 2001, para.28). Wedded to the belief
that the market should be the organiz ing principle for all political, social, and economic decisions, neoliberalism wages an
incessant attack on democracy, public goods, and non-commodified values. Under neoliberalism everything
either is for sale or is plundered for profit. Public lands are looted by logging companies and corporate ranch ers; politicians
willingly hand the public's airwaves over to powerful broad casters and large corporate interests without a dime
going into the public trust; Halliburton gives war profiteering a new meaning as it is granted cor porate contracts without any competitive bidding
and then bills the U.S. government for millions; the
environment is polluted and despoiled in the name of profitmaking just as the government passes legislation to make it easier for corporations to do so; public services are gutted in order
to lower the taxes of major corporations; schools more closely resemble either malls or jails, and teachers, forced to get
revenue for their school by adopting mar ket values, increasingly function as circus barkers hawking everything from hamburgers to pizza
parties?that is, when they are not reduced to prepping students to take standardized tests. As markets are touted as the driving force of everyday
life, big government is disparaged as either incompetent or threatening to individual freedom, suggesting that power should reside in markets and
corporations rather than in governments (except for their sup port for corporate interests and national security) and citizens. Citizenship
has increasingly become a function of consumerism and politics has been restructured as
"corporations have been increasingly freed from social control through deregulation, privatization, and other
neoliberal measures" (Tabb 2003, 153). Corporations more and more design not only the economic sphere but also shape legislation and policy
affecting all levels of government, and with limited opposition. As corporate power lays siege to the political process, the benefits flow to the rich
and the powerful. Included in such benefits are reform policies that shift the burden of taxes from the rich to the middle class, the working poor,
and state governments as can be seen in the shift from taxes on wealth (capital gains, dividends, and estate taxes) to a tax on work, principally in
the form of a regressive payroll tax (Collins, Hartman, Kraut, and Mota 2004). During the 2002-2004 fiscal years, tax cuts delivered $197.3
billion in tax breaks to the wealthiest 1% of Americans (i.e., house Thisholds making more than $337,000 a year) while state governments
increased taxes to fill a $200 billion budget deficit (Gonsalves 2004). Equally alarm ing, a recent Congressional study revealed that 63% of all
corporations in 2000 paid no taxes while "[s]ix in ten corporations reported no tax liabili ty for the five years from 1996 through 2000, even
though corporate prof its were growing at record-breaking levels during that period" (Woodard 2004, para. 11). Fortunately, the
corporate capitalist fairytale of neoliberalism has been challenged all over the globe by students ,
intellectuals, com munity activists , and a host of individuals and groups unwilling to
allow democracy to be bought and sold by multinational corporations, corporate swindlers, international political
labor organizers,
institutions, and those government politicians who willingly align themselves with multinational, corporate interests and rapacious profits. From
Seattle to Genoa, people
neoliberalism and
engaged in popular resistance are collectively taking up the challenge of
reviving both the meaning of resistance and the sites where it takes place . Political
culture is now global and resistance is amorphous, connecting students with workers,
schoolteachers with parents, and intellectuals with artists. Groups protesting the attack on farmers in India whose land
is being destroyed by the government in order to build dams now find themselves in alliance with young people resisting sweatshop labor in New
York City. Environmental activists are joining up with key sections of organized labor as well as groups protesting Third World debt. The
collapse of the neoliberal showcase, Argentina, along with numerous corporate bankruptcies and scandals (notably including
Enron), reveals the cracks in neoliberal hegemony and domination . In addition, the multiple forms of
resistance against neoliberal capitalism are not limited by a version of identity politics focused
exclusively on particularized rights and interests. On the contrary, identity politics is affirmed within a
broader crisis of political culture and democracy that connects the militarization of public life with
the collapse of the welfare state and the attack on civil liberties . Central to these new movements is the notion that
neoliberalism has to be understood within a larger crisis of vision, meaning, education, and political agency. Democracy in this view is
not limited to the struggle over economic resources and power; indeed, it also includes the creation of
public spheres where individuals can be educated as political agents equipped with the skills,
capacities, and knowledge they need to perform as autonomous political agents . I want to expand the
reaches of this debate by arguing that any struggle against neoliberalism must address the discourse of political
agency, civic education, and cultural politics(the ongoing struggle for a substantive and inclusive democracy) and the global public
sphere . We live at a time when the conflation of private interests, empire build ing, and evangelical fundamentalism brings
into question the very nature, if not the existence, of the democratic process. Under the reign of
neoliberalism, capital and wealth have been largely distributed upwards, while civic virtue has been
undermined by a slavish celebration of the free market as the model for organizing all facets of everyday life (Henwood 2003). Political culture has been increasingly depoliticized as
collective life is organized around the modalities of privatization, deregulation, and commercialization. When the alleged champions of neoliberalism invoke politics, they substitute "ideological
certainty for reasonable doubt," and deplete "the national reserves of political intelligence" just as they endorse "the illusion that the future can be bought instead of earned" (Lapham 2004a,
9,11). Under attack is the social contract with its emphasis on enlarging the public good and expanding social provisions?such as access to adequate health care, housing, employment, public
transportation, and education? which provided both a safety net and a set of conditions upon which democracy could be experi enced and critical citizenship engaged. Politics has been further
depoliticized by a policy of anti-terrorism practiced by the Bush administration that mim ics the very terrorism it wishes to eliminate. Not only does a policy of all embracing anti-terrorism
exhausts itself in a discourse of moral absolutes and public acts of denunciation that remove politics from the realm of state power, it also strips community of democratic values by defining it
almost exclusively through attempts to stamp out what Michael Leeden, a former counter-terror expert in the Reagan administration, calls "corrupt habits of mind that are still lingering around,
somewhere"(qtd. in Valentine 2001, para.33). The appeal to moral absolutes and the constant mobilization of emergency time coded as a culture of fear configures politics in religious terms,
hiding its entanglement with particular ideologies and diverse rela tions of power. Politics becomes empty as it is reduced to following orders, shaming those who make power accountable, and
shutting down legitimate modes of dissent (Giroux 2004).
Critical reflection opens spaces of resistance by which we can reframe our
relationship to systems of power in a manner that enhances human agency and
threatens their existence
Giroux 6 (Henry A. – Global Television Network Chair, Professor at McMaster University,
“Academic Freedom under Fire: The Case for Critical Pedagogy”, Fall 2006, JSTOR)
What makes critical pedagogy so dangerous to Christian evangelicals, neoconservatives, and right-wing
nationalists in the United S tates is that central to its very definition is the task of educating students to
become critical agents actively questioning and negotiating the relationship between theory and
practice , critical analysis and common sense, and learning and social change. Critical pedagogy opens up a space where
students should be able to come to terms with their own power as critical agents; it provides a
sphere where the unconditional freedom to question and assert is central to the purpose of the
university, if not democracy itself (Derrida 2001, 233). And as a political and moral practice, pedagogy should "make evident the multiplici
ty and complexity of history," as a narrative to enter into critical dialogue with rather than accept unquestioningly. Similarly, such a
pedagogy should cultivate in students a healthy scepticism about power, a "willingness to temper
any reverence for authority with a sense of critical awareness" (Said 2001, 501). As a performative practice, pedagogy
should provide the conditions for students to be able to reflectively frame their own relationship to
the ongoing project of an unfinished democracy. It is precisely this relationship between democracy and
pedagogy that is so threatening to conservatives such as Horowitz. Pedagogy always represents a
commitment to the future, and it remains the task of educators to make sure that the future points the way to a more socially just
world, a world in which the discourses of critique and possibility in conjunction with the values of reason, freedom, and equal ity function to
alter, as part of a broader democratic project, the grounds upon which life is lived. This is hardly a prescription for political indoctrina tion, but it
is a project that gives education its most valued purpose and meaning, which in part is "to encourage
human agency,
not mold it in the manner of Pygmalion" (Aronowitz 1998, 10?11). It is also a position that threatens right-wing private
advocacy groups, neoconservative politicians, and conservative extremists because they
recognize that such a pedagogical
commitment goes to the very heart of what it means to address real inequalities of power at the social
level and to conceive of education as a project for democracy and critical citizenship while at the same time foregrounding a series of important
and often ignored questions such as: "Why do we [as edu cators] do what we do the way we do it"?W hose interests does higher edu cation serve?
How might it be possible to understand and engage the diverse contexts in which education takes place? In spite of the right-wing view that
equates indoctrination with any suggestion of politics, critical
pedagogy is not concerned simply with offering
students new ways to think critically and act with authority as agents in the classroom; it is also concerned to
provide students with the skills and knowledge necessary for them to expand their capacities to
both question deep-seated assumptions and myths that legitimate the most archaic and disempowering
social practices that structure every aspect of society and to take responsibility for intervening in
the world they inhabit. Education is not neutral, but that does not mean it is merely a form of indoctrination. On the contrary, as a
practice that attempts to expand the capacities necessary for human agency and hence the possibilities for democracy itself, the university must
nourish those pedagogical practices that promote "a concern with keeping the forever unexhausted and unfulfilled human potential open, fighting
back all attempts to foreclose and pre-empt the further unravelling of human possibilities, prodding human society to go on questioning itself and
critical pedagogy
forges both critique and agency through a language of scepticism and possibility and a culture of openness, debate,
preventing that questioning from ever stalling or being declared finished" (Bauman and Tester 2001, 4). In other words,
and engagement , all elements that are now at risk in the latest and most dangerous attack on
higher education.
Neoliberalism is crumbling – Only a leftist commitment to resist rightest
incorporation assures its failure is complete. Oil instability is key.
WEBBER and CARR 13
(Jeffery R., professor of politics at the University of London, and Barry, professor of
history at La Trobe University, The New Latin American Left Cracks in the
Empire, p.18)
The
financial crisis in the core of the world system was channeled to Latin America through slumping
external trade and export prices and declines in remittances (ECLAC, 2009). The fallout from the crisis has been
Latin America's biggest expansionary period in four decades, driven by the commodities boom, was interrupted by the onset of the crisis.
uneven in Latin America and the Caribbean, with Mexico and Central America being hardest hit due to the unique depth of their integration into
the US economy. However, if the world slump extends into protracted crisis, as some expect, South American economies will increasingly feel its
effects.
Venezuela, for example, is already weathering the contradictions thrown up by ongoing rentier
capitalism in a context of fluctuating international oil prices. Center-left regimes will come under
increasing pressure to shift back toward orthodox neoliberal austerity in an effort to displace the
costs of the crisis onto the popular and working classes. Whether this leads to the delegitimization of center-left
politics followed by a sharper turn to the left, will depend less on economics than on the politics of struggle
between left resistance from below and right-wing restoration from above, and the shifting balance
of class forces underlying these developments.
Venezuela found a viable alternative without prior planning
Buxton ‘08
(Julia Buxton, B.Sc. (Economics), M.Sc. (Comparative Government), Ph.D. 'The Crisis of the
Venezuelan Party System' all at the London School of Economics, The Bolivarian Revolution As
Venezuela’s Post Crisis Alternative)
Venezuela has produced the most well-known and controversial neoliberal alternative in South
America. Not since the Cuban revolution of 1959 has the tenets of the hemisphere’s political
economy been so fundamentally challenged as under Hugo Chávez’s Bolivarian Revolution.
Bolivarianism is a complete repudiation of the free trade, free market principles and policies that
shaped South America in the 1980s and 1990s; of the philosophical underpinnings of the neoliberal
model; and of the ‘agents’ of its adoption and institutionalization across the region – the United
States government, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In the political
and governance realm, Bolivarianism eschews liberal democracy and formal institutions, in favor
of routizined popular participation (termed protagonistic democracy) and informal, partisan and
personalized modes of state management. The end-goal of the Chávez administration is to create
Twenty First Century Socialism in Venezuela, which is to be realized through the transformation
of the state’s role in the national and global economy, and of the relationship between the state,
government and Venezuelan citizens. ¶ This chapter explores what appears to be a dramatic
change in paradigms of development and governance in Venezuela. It discusses the shift away
from orthodox economic policies that were pursued in the 1990s to the heterodox course of the
2000s and considers the accompanying changes in the political realm, outlining how the move away
from liberal democracy that had prevailed since 1958 to protagonistic democracy impacted on
modes of political representation and institutional structures. ¶ The chapter adjudges
Bolivarianism to be a truly transformative model, one that has the potential to represent a viable
neo-liberal alternative on account of two Venezuela-specific factors; the country’s unique status as
a major oil exporter and the pre-Chávez political and institutional legacy. These provide the
financial resources and created a political culture conducive to a radical reshaping of Venezuela’s
political economy and the embedding of Twenty First Century Socialism. However there are
serious obstacles to the delivery of Bolivarian policies and commitments, and this calls into
question the viability of the Revolution and prospects for its consolidation. These Venezuela
specific characteristics: oil wealth and popular antipathy to the pre-Chávez party and political
system, are also used to explain one of the great ironies of political developments in South America
– that Venezuela, a long standing democracy with a history of centrist government, should have
produced the most stridently anti-neoliberal administration on the Continent in the 2000s.
Venezuela had only fleeting exposure to economic orthodoxy, and even then (dated crudely from
1989-1992 during the Presidency of Carlos Andrés Pérez and 1994-1996 during the Rafael
Caldera administration) stabilization and structural adjustment measures were haphazardly
applied (Naim 1993). And yet this appears to have generated a powerful backlash that was
manifest in support for Chávez and the subsequent direction of, and popular support for, his
government. ¶ In order to understand the popular appeal of Chávez and his Bolivarian model, the
chapter approaches Bolivarianism as a response to Puntofijismo, Venezuela’s limited model of
democracy that prevailed from 1958 until Chávez’s election in 1998, and not neoliberalism.
Venezuela experienced a very specific, domestic configuration of crisis – profound popular
alienation from the Punto Fijo parties and political system. This did run congruent with brief
neoliberal experiments in Venezuela in the 1990s. However the crisis of Puntofijismo predated
the flirtation with orthodoxy and it persisted when heterodoxy was resumed in the late 1990s.
The influence of Puntofijismo over the structure and orientation of the Chávez government is
understood here in both historical and temporal terms. Not only is the legacy of Puntofijismo
important to an of understanding the Bolivarian revolution, the day to day actions of Punto Fijo
actors during the Chávez presidency proved to be a decisive influence over the direction taken by
the Chávez government. In respect of the latter point, attempts by the Puntofijista opposition to
remove Chávez from power forced a radicalization of the government, with the strong rise in the
international oil price financing a more expansive and revolutionary Bolivarian project than was
envisaged in 1998. As such, Venezuela’s Bolivarian post-crisis alternative emerged very much by
default and not design , and was premised on anti-Puntofijismo not anti-neoliberalism. ¶
Venezuela is rejecting neoliberalism now
Robinson 08-American professor of sociology at the University of California, Santa Barbara, 2008, “Latin
America and Global Capitalism”, pgs
351-2
To take the example of Venezuela, the oil and financial system is thoroughly integrated
into global capitalism. Venezuelan oil is sent to the global capitalist market, and the
country's reproduction passes through the global financial system—and it does so
inextricably. This means that global capitalism exercises a certain structural power
expressed in local political influence. Global capital has local representation everywhere and
translates into local pressure within each state in favor of global capital. Those groups
most closely tied to global capital—transnationally oriented business groups and state
managers, aspiring high-consumption sectors—seek to accumulate enough internal leverage
with which to quash a more radical transformative project. Indeed, in Venezuela, the
greatest threat to the revolution is not from the right-wing political opposition but that
parts of the revolutionary bloc will develop a deeper stake in defending global capitalism
over socialist transformation, that state managers will become bureaucratized as their own
reproduction will depend on deepening relations with global capital. In Venezuela's popular
parlance, "endogenous development" refers to an economic strategy of localized, inwardoriented, and integrative economic activity by self-organized communities that draws on
local and national resources, alongside (and apparently subordinated to) trade-related
activities, along the lines of what, years earlier, Samir Amin termed "autocentric
accumulation." Clearly an alternative economic model to neoliberalism—in Venezuela and
elsewhere—would have to emphasize such a community-centered integrative and selfsustaining economic orientation. Yet the Chavista leadership has also proposed not a
withdrawal from international trade and economic integration but an alternative
transnational development project: the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas, known by
its Spanish acronym, ALBA. Indeed, the debate about socialism in Venezuela seemed to be
centered on the question of how to build a popular economy that can also trade in the
international area. The ALBA envisions a regional economic development plan for Latin
America and the Caribbean involving solidarity with the weakest national economies so
that all can cooperate and benefit from regional exchange networks and development
projects. As part of this plan, the Venezuelan government introduced a Compensatory Fund for
Structural Convergence that includes subsidized Venezuelan oil and financing. The idea is to
transnationalize efforts at "endogenous development." The ALBA rejects the notion of
intellectual property rights and rejects any trade agreements that would undermine the
use of public policies to regulate the economy and redistribute wealth. Fundamental
change in a social order becomes possible when an organic crisis occurs. An organic crisis is
one in which the system faces a structural (objective) crisis and also a crisis of legitimacy or
hegemony (subjective). An organic crisis is not enough to bring about fundamental, progressive
change in a social order (indeed, it has in the past led to social breakdown, authoritarianism,
and fascism). A popular or revolutionary outcome to an organic crisis also requires that there be
a viable alternative that is in hegemonic ascendance: that is, an alternative to the existing order
that is viable and that is seen as viable and preferable by a majority of society. Global capitalism
was not experiencing an organic crisis in the early twenty-first century. Nonetheless, I believe
the prospects that such a crisis could develop were more palpably on the horizon at the
turn of the century than at any time since perhaps 1968. Seen from the viewpoint of
capital, neoliberalism resolved a series of problems in the accumulation process that had
built up in the epoch of Keynesian capitalism but fueled new crises of over-accumulation
and legitimacy. The model is not sustainable socially or politically. Its coming demise may
well turn out to be the end of Act I and the opening of Act II in the restructuring crisis that
began in the 1970’s. As in all historic processes, this act is unscripted.
Alternatives - Solvency
Alt Solves – Critique Key
The devotion of time to develop comprehensive alternatives to neoliberalism is
crucial
Quincy Saul 2011
Studied political economy, history and music at Hampshire College, graduating in 2010 Holds a graduate
certificate in labor studies from the City University of New York, “If Not Now, When?
Reflections on Socialism in the 21st Century”
‘‘The crisis,’’ wrote Antonio Gramsci in his prison notebooks, ‘‘consists precisely in the fact
that the old is dying and the new cannot be born.’’ The first half of Gramsci’s famous
formulation is every moment more apparent. Very few dare any longer to believe that the
current order of things is permanent or even stable. The second half, however, is more
complex. Why is it that the new cannot be born? There are many answers to this question,
and some of them involve vast economic and ecological developments on a global scale that
are beyond the control or comprehension of anyone*including the ruling classes. But there
is another reason why the new cannot be born: because we are not ready to create it. While
anticapitalist organizations all over the world have a more or less clear understanding of the
current world order and its systemic crises, they are far less prepared to explain in the necessary
detail the organization of a future world system, or, of equal importance, the prerogatives and
contours of an organized process of transition. It is in this sense that we can understand Georg
Lukac’s injunction that ‘‘[i]t is an ideological crisis which must be solved before a practical
solution to the world’s economic crisis can be found’’ (1968, 79). For these reasons, the
debates about the theory and practice of ‘‘21st century socialism,’’ particularly in Latin
America, have taken on immense relevancy for the world at large. Thus far, however, these
revolutionary processes in the global South have no serious partners in the global North.
There is an urgent need for these processes to develop in the centers of the world economy.
If material conditions are not yet ripe, the subjective work that lays the foundation for every
revolutionary process is long overdue. Toward this end, I have undertaken here a review of
Hannah Sell’s book Socialism in the 21st Century. Her work is doubly significant in that she is
the national secretary of a socialist party, and in that this party is, in my considered opinion, one
of the more ideologically and organizationally reliable international socialist parties in the world
today. Her work can thus be used as a reference point to understand the state of current socialist
thinking on this subject in the global North. The purpose of this review is to mobilize her book as
a point of departure for more engaged, strategic thinking about how a new alternative system
can actually be conceived, planned, and built, particularly in the United States. The
majority of Hannah Sell’s book is devoted to the critique of capitalism and the justification of the
idea of socialism. Her intended audience seems to be people who are on the fence about the
reformability of capitalism and the suitability of socialism as a replacement. There is a need for
this kind of work, and there is no fault in her devotion of time and energy to it. But there is a
definite need to move beyond it. This is my first and perhaps most important point: Those of us
who are already sympathetic to socialism do not need to read any more critiques of capitalism!
As Immanuel Wallerstein wrote in 2009, ‘‘[t]he crucial battle . . . in the middle run (next 1525 years) . . . is a battle not about capitalism, but about what will replace it as an historical
system’’ (Wallerstein 2009). We need to move forward; we need to devote our intellectual
production towards the creation of alternatives! Time is really running out! With this in
mind, I focus on the parts of Sell’s book that deal specifically with the construction of socialism.
These are mostly from the chapter ‘‘How Could Socialism Work?’’ She outlines socialist ideas
and demands with considerable clarity and persuasiveness, but her work leaves us with many
important and unavoidable questions. My purpose is not to engage in a debate over Sell’s book,
or to fuel the scourge of sectarianism on the Left*there is no time for that! The purpose is to
provoke revolutionaries to move beyond the critique of capitalism and to begin the real work of
building the alternative.
Alt Solves – Debate Key
This debate is crucial – We must link anti-imperialist struggles with criticms of
neoliberalism to fully support Leftist transition
KATZ 13
(Claudio, professor of economic history at the University of Buenos Aires, trans.
Leonard Morin, "Socialist Strategies in Latin America," The New Latin American
Left, p 31)
The Latin American Left is once again discussing the paths to socialism. The correlation of forces
has changed through popular action, the crisis of neoliberalism, and US imperialism's loss of
offensive capability. It is no longer relevant to juxtapose a revolutionary political period of the past
with a conservative present. The social weakness of the industrial working class does not impede
anticapitalist progress, which depends on the exploited and the oppressed uniting in common
struggle . What is crucial is the level of popular conscious. The latter has forged new antiliberal
and anti-imperialist convictions, but an anticapitalist link, which an open debate about twentyfirst-century socialism could foster, is still missing. The constitutional framework that replaced
the dictatorships does not impede the Left's development. But the Left must avoid institutional cooptation without turning its back on the electoral process. Electoral participation can be made
compatible with the promotion of people's power. Movements and parties fulfill a
complementary function since social struggle is not self-sufficient and partisan organization is
necessary. Yet it is essential to avoid sectarian posturing and to include immediate improvements
as part of the revolutionary agenda. This principle governs all socialist strategy.
Anti-neoliberalist movements can be more successful if we use this debate round as
a spring-board of public education. Movements in the past did not succeed because
there was not proper education on the subject.
Brand, 06
(Ulrish Brand, Brand has a PhD in Political Science at Goethe University Frankfurt/M, The
World Wide Web of Anti- Neoliberalism, page 236-237)
The ‘brave new world’ of neoliberalism has been battered by the crises of South East Asia and
other countries, and by the protests in Seattle, Genoa and else- where, even in the public opinion
of Western countries. Hardly a politician or corporate executive can mount a public podium
without speaking of the pro- blems and dangers of capitalist globalization, although as a rule they
append the corollary that nevertheless ‘there is no alternative’. This much is clear, however: while
the critique of neoliberal globalization in general, and of certain actors in particular, is enjoying
increasing attention in the media, and networks like Attac use it quite cleverly, there are few
changes to the general structural transforma- tions in train or in neoliberal power relations. It
would, of course, be nonsensical to lay this at the feet of a new, and still developing movement.
It is nevertheless necessary to register the dangers and dead-ends which may lie ahead.
One of the chief dangers facing anti-neoliberal movements is surely that they may share the fate
of the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) which were so celebrated in the 1990s. They
launched themselves into the political fray with enormous effort and became ‘cosmopolitan
ghosts’ (Drainville 2001: 15), focus- ing on a consensus with dominant forces. In doing this,
however, they increas- ingly became an alternative resource for neoliberals in government as
well as in international politics to be selectively resorted to as actors with experience and
profound knowledge of complicated political and socio-economic processes. Moreover, as ‘civil
society’ actors they provided legitimacy for the prevailing developments particularly as, at least
on the ‘soft issues’ of environment, devel- opment, human rights and women’s politics, ‘civil
society’ sat at the table. The handling of ‘hard’ military or economic matters would, on the other
hand, con- tinue to be shielded from possibly critical eyes.2 The relative failure of NGO
involvement lay crucially in the lack of far-reaching critical understanding of the upheavals of
neoliberal globalization among activists. This was to be especially clear in the debates and politics
with regard to ‘sustainable development’ which were conducted more or less in isolation from the
neoliberal transformation of society (Brand and Go ̈rg 2005). In the medium term it became
possible that the new protest movements (or parts thereof) would become a sort of institutionalized bad conscience, with whom the powerful would meet amid high publicity, and which
would always remind them to be conscious of the losers and losses
of globalization and to take (usually merely symbolic) action on these now and again.
ALT solves – discourse key
Changing discourse is the first step in revolting against Neoliberalism. It’s a key
step.
Hursh & Henderson ‘08
(David W. Hursh and Joseph A. Henderson; Warner Graduate School of Education and Human
Development, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY, USA; Contesting Global Neoliberalism
and Creating Alternative Futures; http://www.informaworld.com)
Contesting neoliberalism, then, needs to occur at three levels, the discursive, the¶ political, and the
pedagogical. First, we need to analyse the ways in which particular¶ discourses have become
dominant and the interconnections between what is¶ occurring at the local, national, and global
levels. Understanding events in Chicago,¶ Mexico, or Uganda requires that we examine how global
neoliberal discourses and¶ policies promote the withering away of the state except for its role in
promoting a¶ climate conducive to capital investment through low taxes, deregulation, and the¶
availability of finance capital.¶ Second, we need to examine and contest the way in which power has
been¶ concentrated in the hands of the corporate and political elite. In Chicago, under¶
Renaissance 2010, they have destroyed working-class neighbourhoods and replaced¶ them with
upscale housing and boutique schools (Lipman, in press). In New York¶ City, the mayor has
gained control over the city’s schools by secretly and unilaterally¶ choosing Cathleen Black, CEO
of a major media corporation, as the next¶ Chancellor, completely disempowering and
disenfranchising the public (Chen &¶ Barbaro, 2010).¶ In response to events in Chicago and New
York, parents, community youth¶ groups, and teachers are working, separately and together, to
resist school¶ privatization and the destruction of neighbourhoods. Possibilities for real
communitybased reform have increased with the election of the Caucus of Rank and File¶
Educators (CORE) to the Chicago Teachers Union on a platform of democratic¶ unionism and
opposition to privatization and Renaissance 2010. In New York City¶ parents and community
groups are organizing against the Cathleen Black’s¶ appointment as school Chancellor.¶ Third,
schools must engage students in raising the essential questions of our time,¶ whether these be about
climate change, environmental sustainability, or rebuilding¶ communities in a socially just way. We
need to develop a social democratic approach¶ to government, governance, and education that
promotes critical analysis and active¶ participation in creating an alternative to neoliberalism.¶
We must recognize the many pluralisms of society and reject the necessitarian approach
taken by defenders of neoliberalism in order to find a true alternative
Munck 3
(Ronaldo, Department of Sociology at Univerity of Liverpool, “Neoliberalism,
Necessitarianism and alternatives in Latin America: there is no alternative?”, Third World
Quarterly, 2003. Pg. 497-498)
There is much in Roberto Mangabeira Unger's wide-ranging political philosophy that could
help us to develop a more nuanced perspective on economic liberalism than the rather
'necessitarian' approach which I believe prevails. Against what he calls the 'mythical history' of
democracy, for example, Unger asks us to recognise how many of the economic and political
institutional arrangements of democracy are accidental or at least socially constructed. Against the
'deep-structure' theorists who find hidden causes for all political phenomena, he shows the
limitations of a 'structure fetishism' which denies that we can change our formative contexts.
Against all kinds of necessitarian assumptions lying behind much social and political analysis
(especially that influenced by traditional forms of Marxism) Unger aims 'to break loose from a
style of social understanding that allows us to explain ourselves and our societies only to the
extent we imagine ourselves helpless puppets of the social worlds we build and inhabit or of
the lawlike forces that have supposedly brought these worlds into being' (Unger, 1997: 7). But
history can be surprising and social (re)invention can occur even in the most unlikely of
circumstances. In an earlier debate around the 'impasse' in development theory there was also a
sense that much of the progressive or alternative development theorising was 'necessitarian'
and lacked the fluidity to pose real alternatives to the status quo (see Booth, 1985). Radical
development theory, like much radical analysis of neoliberal globalisation today, suffered
from what Unger calls the symptom of 'false necessity', with its heavy dose of determinism
and belief in law-like forces governing society. For Unger, on the contrary, 'the institutional
arrangements of contemporary society are the outcomes of many loosely connected sequences
of social and ideological conflict rather than of irreversible and determinate functional
imperatives, driving forward a succession of indivisible institutional systems' (Unger, 1998:
24). In a spirit of democratic experimentalism, taking us beyond the reform/revolution
dichotomy of the traditional left, we can explore the alternative pluralisms that always exist
within society and in the political arena. Applied to the struggle for a future beyond
neoliberalism, this range of ideas and theories may assist in a more productive set of
debates than those engaged in by the traditional 'critique' school.
Alt Solves - Extinction
A democratic socialism founded on popular democracy is the only alternative to
extinction
Robinson 08-American professor of sociology at the University of California, Santa Barbara, 2008, “Latin
America and Global Capitalism”, pgs107-108
They are likely to turn with more frequency to violent methods in defense of their
interests. These groups' resistance to change is likely to take increasingly extrainstitutional forms especially in those cases where the threat they face, beyond redistributive
reform, involves property relations. Recent anti-terrorism laws have been passed in most
Latin American countries that criminalize social protest, such as in El Salvador, where
terrorism is defined by such legislation as "any pressure on authorities to make certain
decisions" (COMPA, 2007). In the Venezuelan countryside and in Bolivia's eastern region
landlords have already organized armed paramilitary squads that have clashed with
peasants demanding agrarian reform. We cannot rule out military intervention and new coup
d'etats in countries such as Bolivia and Ecuador. In Colombia, upwards of four million people
have been violently uprooted from the countryside by state security forces and right-wing
paramilitary armies to make way for transnational agribusiness and mining concerns, while it
has been disclosed that such TNCs as Coca-Cola, Chiquita Brands International, and several
U.S.-based mining companies have regularly hired the paramilitary armies to block unionization
and eliminate dissent among their workers (Hylton, 2006). 3. GLOBAL ANTI-CAPITALIST
ALTERNATIVE A DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST PROJECT What configuration of social
and political forces could bring about a postcapitalist global order? It is an irony that the
crisis of global capitalism has followed in the wake of the crisis and collapse of the Left in
most countries around the world and the discrediting, until recently, of socialist ideology. In
Latin America a twenty-first-century neofascist project is taking place in Colombia while
right next door, in Venezuela, a twenty-first-century socialist project is under way. A
socialist alternative is not at odds with a struggle for global reformism, and in fact such an
alternative would most likely snowball out of efforts to bring about a reform of the system,
such as we may be seeing in Venezuela, and perhaps even in Bolivia and Ecuador. What is
crucial is for popular, radical, and socialist-oriented forces in the global justice movement
to put forward an alternative vision that goes beyond reformism and to have such a vision
achieve hegemony within any counter-hegemonic bloc to global capitalism. Redistributive
reform, it is worth reiterating, is not viable without structural changes that move a counterhegemonic bloc from challenging the "fairness" of the market to replacing the logic of the
market with a social logic. A democratic socialist alternative would require a renewal of
critical and radical thinking along with a capacity to operate as much on the cultural and
ideological as on the political terrain. More than ever before, political and economic
processes are globalized, as Levine (2005) observes, to the extent that they are
"culturized." Global accumulation is increasingly reliant on symbolic and cultural
exchanges that make possible the rapid circulation of commodities. But that alternative also
requires renovated political vehicles that provide the popular classes in civil society with
instruments for invading state structures. Moreover, no matter how unpopular with postmodernists, a global transformative project requires, as Boswell and Chase-Dunn argue, a new
universalism. The axis of an anti-capitalist and universalist struggle must be the new
global working class, with its rainbow and heavily female face, one that is transnationally
organized. I am convinced that if there can be no socialism without democracy in the
twenty-first century it is equally true that democracy is not possible without socialism. A
democratic socialism founded on a popular democracy is in my view the only real
alternative to disaster— to collective suicide .
Alt solves- Idears key
Alternative provides the key internal link to challenging the neoliberal order- status
quo failure is only because of a lack of ideas.
Fukuyama 2012
(Francis, prof of international relations at Stanford University, The Future of History. By:
Fukuyama, Francis, Foreign Affairs, 00157120, Jan/Feb2012, Vol. 91)
Something strange is going on in the world today. The global financial crisis that began in 2008 and
the ongoing crisis of the euro are both products of the model of lightly regulated financial
capitalism that emerged over the past three decades. Yet despite widespread anger at Wall Street
bailouts, there has been no great upsurge of left-wing American populism in response. It is
conceivable that the Occupy Wall Street movement will gain traction, but the most dynamic recent
populist movement to date has been the right-wing Tea Party, whose main target is the regulatory
state that seeks to protect ordinary people from financial speculators. Something similar is true in
Europe as well, where the left is anemic and right-wing populist parties are on the move.
There are several reasons for this lack of left-wing mobilization, but chief among them is a failure
in the realm of ideas . For the past generation, the ideological high ground on economic issues has
been held by a libertarian right. The left has not been able to make a plausible case for an agenda
other than a return to an unaffordable form of old-fashioned social democracy. This absence of a
plausible progressive counter-narrative is unhealthy, because competition is good for intellectual
debate just as it is for economic activity. And serious intellectual debate is urgently needed, since
the current form of globalized capitalism is eroding the middle-class social base on which liberal
democracy rests.
Alt Solves - Movements key
Neoliberalism must be rejected in every shape and form. Revolution demands
solidarity.
Harvey, 09
(David Harvey; Professor of anthropology and geography at the graduate center of the city
University of New York; Organizing for the anti-capitalist transition;
http://seminario10anosdepois.wordpress.com/)
A revolutionary politics that can grasp the nettle of endless compound capital
accumulation and eventually shut it down as the prime motor of human history
requires a sophisticated understanding of how social change occurs. The
failings of past endeavors to build a lasting socialism and communism have to
be avoided and lessons from that immensely complicated history must be
learned. Yet the absolute necessity for a coherent anti-capitalist revolutionary
movement must also be recognized. The fundamental aim of that movement is
to assume social command over both the production and distribution of
surpluses.
We urgently need an explicit revolutionary theory suited to our times. I propose
a "co-revolutionary theory" derived from an understanding of Marx's account of
how capitalism arose out of feudalism. Social change arises through the
dialectical unfolding of relations between seven moments within the body
politic of capitalism viewed as an ensemble or assemblage of activities and
practices:
a) technological and organizational forms of production, exchange, and
consumption
b) relations to nature
c) social relations between people
d) mental conceptions of the world, embracing knowledges and cultural
understandings and beliefs
e) labor processes and production of specific goods, geographies, services, or
affects
f) institutional, legal and governmental arrangements
g) the conduct of daily life that underpins social reproduction.
Each one of these moments is internally dynamic and internally marked by
tensions and contradictions (just think of mental conceptions of the world) but
all of them are co-dependent and co-evolve in relation to each other. The
transition to capitalism entailed a mutually supporting movement across all
seven moments. New technologies could not be identified and practices without
new mental conceptions of the world (including that of the relation to nature
and social relations). Social theorists have the habit of taking just one of these
moments and viewing it as the "silver bullet" that causes all change. They are all wrong.
It is the dialectical motion across all of these moments that really counts even
as there is uneven development in that motion.
When capitalism itself undergoes one of its phases of renewal, it does so
precisely by co-evolving all moments, obviously not without tensions, struggles,
fights, and contradictions. But consider how these seven moments were
configured around 1970 before the neoliberal surge and consider how they look
now, and you will see they have all changed in ways that re-define the operative
characteristics of capitalism viewed as a non-Hegelian totality.
An anti-capitalist political movement can start anywhere (in labor processes,
around mental conceptions, in the relation to nature, in social relations, in the
design of revolutionary technologies and organizational forms, out of daily life,
or through attempts to reform institutional and administrative structures
including the reconfiguration of state powers). The trick is to keep the political
movement moving from one moment to another in mutually reinforcing ways.
This was how capitalism arose out of feudalism and this is how something
radically different called communism, socialism, or whatever must arise out of
capitalism. Previous attempts to create a communist or socialist alternative
fatally failed to keep the dialectic between the different moments in motion and
failed to embrace the unpredictabilities and uncertainties in the dialectical
movement between them. Capitalism has survived precisely by keeping the
dialectical movement between the moments going and constructively embracing
the inevitable tensions, including crises.
Alt Solves - Agro-Movements key
The resurgence of indigenous struggles in Latin America is the best chance of
dismantling the neoliberal system
Robinson 08-American professor of sociology at the University of California, Santa Barbara, 2008, “Latin
America and Global Capitalism”, pgs107-108
Some have seen the newfound emphasis on indigenous—as distinct from¶ class (such as
peasant)—identity as a new identity politics and even as a "postmodern"¶ turn among the
indigenous and other Fourth World peoples. There is¶ indeed a newfound indigenous identity and
struggles around such cultural¶ rights as bilingual education and recognition of "pluricultural
nationality," or¶ the right to maintain ethnonational identities distinct from, although formative¶
of, multinational states. Indigenous struggles have forced discussion on constitutional¶
amendments in Ecuador, Bolivia, Mexico, Guatemala, Peru, Colombia,¶ and elsewhere to
recognize the multiethnic and pluricultural makeup of each¶ country as a new view of the nation
and the state emerges. These assessments¶ of a postmodern turn, however, are misleading, insofar
as alongside cultural¶ rights the resurgent indigenous struggles have revolved around militant sets
of¶ social, material, and political demands that go well beyond multiculturalism¶ and challenge the
very logic of global capitalism. By the twenty-first century it¶ had become clear to a new
generation of indigenous leaders that indigenous¶ discourse and organization proved to be a
powerful way to advance political and¶ material struggles than other forms of class-based
organizing. All of the major¶ indigenous struggles in Latin America, including those in Mexico,
Ecuador,¶ Bolivia, and Guatemala, have emphasized the links their between resurgent¶ struggle
and broader resistance to neoliberalism and capitalist globalization.¶ Central to the new indigenous
struggles are demands for political autonomy¶ from the neoliberal state and for land and territory.
Crucially, this demand is¶ ¶ not just for land but for territory; the right to continue collective forms
of land¶ ¶ ownership and in this way challenging head-on the capitalist form of property¶ and the
neoliberal logic of the spread of markets in land. They have also demanded¶ as part of political
autonomy and territorial control, control over resources,¶ such as land, lumber, and mining (as in
the case of the Mapuche in¶ Chile), oil and natural gas, as in Bolivia and Ecuador, and so forth. In
putting¶ forward these demands they have clashed head-on with capitalist globalization¶ and its
agents, including transnational energy, mining, and agribusiness corporations¶ and constitute a
frontal challenge to transnational corporate plunder in¶ ¶ Latin America.1¶ Indigenous struggles
spearhead popular class demands; these are struggles¶ against (transnational) capital and for a
transformation of property relations.¶ ¶ ¶ Ethnicity and class have fused in the new round of
indigenous resistance,¶ ¶ which has become a—perhaps the—leading edge of popular class
mobilization.¶ 2 The indigenous movement represents a threat to transnational capital¶ ¶ ¶ because
indigenous communities block access to land and natural resources¶ under indigenous
custodianship. Collective ownership of land and administration¶ of collective resources,
participatory democracy within indigenous communities,¶ a cosmology and value system that is
socialist—indeed, "primitive"¶ communist—in essence, are anti-theses of global capitalism. The
fundamental¶ ¶ indigenous notion of mother earth as something that cannot be "owned," much¶ ¶ ¶
less privatized, and which must be respected and sustained, is diametrically opposed¶ to global
capitalism's drive to commodify and plunder nature. Transnational¶ capital seeks to integrate
indigenous into the global market as dependent¶ workers and consumers, to convert their lands
into private property, and to make¶ the natural resources in their territories available for
transnational corporate¶ exploitation.¶ It is not that there is anything intrinsic in being
indigenous—as an historical¶ cultural identity and collective social experience—that makes the
indigenous¶ a threat in this way to global capitalism and leads indigenous communities¶ to
spearhead twenty-first-century resistance struggles. Rather, the very exclusion¶ and total social
control by oppressive colonial and post-colonial states that¶ the indigenous have experienced has
forced them to sustain and reproduce a¶ collective community existence in order to survive the past
500 years and that¶ now stands smack in the way of global capitalist expansion in Latin America.¶
If local paramilitary squads and oligarchs in Colombia, Mexico, and elsewhere¶ respond to this
indigenous threat with coercive terror, how has transnational¶ capital responded?¶ The very
success of the indigenous movement has led it into a set of quandaries.¶ Its achievements to date
in cultural and ethnic rights, in forcing the dominant¶ groups and society at large to recognize
those rights, indicate both the advances¶ and the limitations of the multicultural agenda and
underscore the limits of¶ what Charles Hale, in his excellent study, Mas Que Un India (2006),
terms the¶ India permitido. "The rise of a multicultural ethic among Latin American states¶ and
political-economic elites has been explained as the outcome of three powerful¶ forces of change,"
according to Hale: "grassroots and national mobilization¶ from below, with ample support from
'global' allies; neoliberal economic reforms,¶ which eliminated corporate constraints on indigenous
politics while accentuating¶ inequality and economic distress; and, finally, democratization, which¶
widened spaces of protest, and necessitated substantive responses from above"¶ (2006:219).¶ If at
first multiculturalism was a threat to the dominant order the transnational¶ elite was able in the
19905 to accommodate itself to the cultural and ethnic¶ demands of indigenous (and Afrodescendant) groups, such as bilingualism, so¶ long as these demands were not part of a more
expansive struggle against neoliberalism¶ and capitalist globalization. Indeed, transnational elites
and TNS agencies¶ such as the World Bank sought to neutralize such a struggle by raising as¶ its
own the banner of multiculturalism and by providing ample funding and other¶ forms of
assistance to indigenous organizations and NGOs focusing on multiculturalism¶ and its more
limited set of proposals. In this way, the transnational¶ elite appeared as a progressive, proindigenous force often at odds with local¶ elites and states that were resisting any change in the
racial/ethnic status quo,¶ while multiculturalism becomes the cultural counterpart to neoliberalism
in¶ the socioeconomic sphere and polyarchy in the political.¶ Hale refers to the type of indigenous
that the transnational elite sought to¶ support and promote as "el indio permitido," or the
permitted/allowed Indian,¶ whereas those challenging the neoliberal socioeconomic order is the
unauthorized¶ or "insurrectionary" Indian. "The Maya movement stands at an impasse,"¶ he
observes, focusing on Guatemala, where 60 percent or more of the population¶ is Mayan.
"Powerful institutions well beyond Guatemala are finding ways¶ to contain cultural rights activism
through appropriation rather than suppression,"¶ or what he terms neoliberal multiculturalism, a
project "located at higher,¶ more powerful levels of the global system." The World Bank, along
with its Latin¶ American counterpart, the Inter-American Development Bank, has championed¶
the notion of "development with identity," and devoted significant resources¶ to indigenous
organization, participation, and cultural rights. As Hale¶ observes:¶ The shift away from national
ideologies that promoted assimilation, toward endorsement¶ of cultural rights and intercultural
equality, has occurred with striking¶ uniformity across the region [Latin America], beginning in
the mid-igSos. This¶ shift has coincided with the ascendancy of economic policies and political
practices¶ grouped together by the omnibus term "neoliberalism.". . . Proponents of neoliberal¶
governance reshape the terrain of political struggle to their advantage, not be¶ denying indigenous
rights, but by the selective recognition of them. Far from being¶ exempt from the process of
[neoliberal] "subject formation," indigenous peoples¶ (and other protagonists of cultural rights)
are their principal targets. While indigenous¶ people engage in widespread and at times intense
resistance to the neoliberal¶ establishment, this flow of political activity does not stand outside or
immune to¶ processes of neoliberal subject formation. . . . In important respects, indigenous¶
cultural rights activism and neoliberal economics are neatly compatible. (Hale 2006:34-35,¶ my
emphasis)¶ It is no wonder, therefore, as Hale observes, that global institutions such as¶ the World
Bank support indigenous rights at the same time as they promote¶ policies that deepen indigenous
structural poverty, material deprivation, and¶ racial-ethnic inequalities. Indigenous forms of
collective land ownership, such¶ as the comunas in Ecuador, the aullus in Bolivia, the resguardos in
Colombia, or¶ the ejidos in Mexico, are a threat to global capitalism and have become the target¶
expanding support to—indigenous cultural and ethnic struggles and demands¶ for political
representation. Globalization breaks up non-capitalist forms of land¶ tenure and local community
structures and organizations. The 1991 agrarian¶ counter-reform in Mexico, which modified
Article 27 of the constitution and¶ eroded communal agrarian ejidos (collective lands), was
coupled with reforms¶ to Article 4 of the same constitution that for the first time recognized the
multiethnic¶ character of the Mexican nation. In that same year, the Agrarian Law¶ approved in
Ecuador eliminated from the constitution the definition of the social¶ function of land and water
and opened the door to the disappearance of¶ communal lands. A year later in Peru, the Land Law
privatized the land market¶ by reversing the constitutional inviolability of community-held lands.
Similarly,¶ in Amazonia the penetration by local and transnational investors—loggers,¶ cattle
ranchers, agribusiness, oil companies, etc.—facilitated by neoliberal reform¶ threatened
indigenous territorial autonomy.¶ Male's case study of Mayan struggle in Guatemalan is revealing.
Starting in¶ the late 19805, as the "Mayan effervescence" was taking off, an array of international ¶
organizations, from small NGOs to the World Bank, the governments of¶ Scandinavia, Western
Europe, and the United States made large-scale funding¶ available and pressured the Guatemalan
state to recognize indigenous cultural¶ rights as multiculturalism became the buzzword. In this
way transnational¶ forces were able to penetrate and influence the direction of Mayan civil
society¶ just as the latter was experiencing a renaissance in the wake of decades of severe¶
repression and civil war, and when the post-bellicose Maya political project¶ was not yet defined.
The 1995 peace accord signed between the government¶ and the URNG insurgent umbrella
organization included an Accord on Identity¶ and Rights of the Indigenous Peoples; declared
Guatemala a "multicultural,¶ pluri-ethnic, multi-lingual" nation; condemned the country's history
of racial¶ discrimination; and granted full language, culture-specific religious, clothing,¶
educational, and other cultural and ethnic rights to the indigenous majority. Yet¶ the very same
peace plan also included an Accord on Agrarian and Socio-¶ Economic Affairs that ratified the
neoliberal program for the country and proposed¶ solutions to land and other pressing
socioeconomic problems within¶ the logic of market forces. In this way, argues Hale, "Maya
cultural rights and¶ economic neoliberal restructuring converge to constitute a single political
project"¶ (2006:75).¶ It is important to note that the peace accord granted Mayan demands for
collective¶ self-administration of their internal affairs and collective holdings.
Alt Solves – multiclass alliance key
Multiclass alliances are crucial for effective resistance
Petras and Veltmeyer 2013
(James, Bartle Professor of Sociology at Binghamton University, Henry, professor of Sociology
and International Development Studies at Saint Mary's University, “Social Movements in Latin
America: Neoliberalism and Popular Resistance”, pg. 77-78, January 17, 2013)
It is possible to identify across Latin America a growing trend toward linkages among diverse organizations involved in the popular struggle."
The most important of these linkages brought together peasants, indigenous communities and workers - both urban and rural - within the same
organization (e.g., the CMS-Coordinadora de Movirnientos Sociales in Ecuador) but more often bringing them together in the limited nonorganizational form of a strategic or tactical alliance. The
importance of multiclass alliances to the popular struggle
cannot be overemphasized. The dynamics of these alliances are critical to an understanding the
nature and scope of political responses to neoliberal capitalist development in the region, and for
gauging the forces unleashed in the process of popular struggle against these conditions. For one thing,
horizontal links and alliances among organizations in the popular movement provide conditions for
coordinating and directing the accumulated and mobilized forces for change - for moving beyond
resistance and opposition to constructive revolutionary change and development. The agency for
this cannot be found in the state and certainly not the market, whether regulated or free or in
business associations. They have to be sought within the popular movement itself as well as civil
society. The question is whether alliances should be sought and constructed with the associational type of NCO in the middle-class sector of
this society or with class-based organizations-with a reconstituted labor movement. To this extent, the strategic turn of the popular movement
toward civil society is not necessarily misplaced. The
problem consists in the fact that for the NGOs this turn
toward strategic partnerships with civil society" conforms to a strategy pursued by the guardians
of the neoliberal world order, anxious to control and limit any dissent from its policy prescriptions,
to preserve capitalism from its opponents and enemies. A turn to class society for allies relates to
conditions that are real enough, the identification of a possible agency for change, and an
assessment of the social forces that can be mobilized for resistance and a democratic socialist
transformation.
Alt Solves – Praxis key
Alternative – The alternative against neoliberalism is a social movement through resistance
and protesting
Werlhof 2008
(Prof. Claudia von Werlhof is Professor at the Institute of Political Sciences, University of Innsbruck,
Austria. Global Research, February 01, The Consequences of Globalization and Neoliberal Policies. What
are the Alternatives? http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-consequences-of-globalization-and-neoliberalpolicies-what-are-the-alternatives/7973)
It seems ironic that the magistrate of Vienna invites us in November 2005 to discuss “Alternatives to
Neoliberal Globalization” when no one has even officially acknowledged a problem yet. Unsurprisingly,
the discussions do not go very far, even though the 300 people assembled here would have sure been
interested in hearing heartening ideas. They experience in their daily lives what neoliberal politics mean,
they search for an explanation and hope for change. None of this will come from those “at the top”,
however. So much is clear. Nothing positive ever comes from those “at the top”.¶ The real debate about
alternatives to neoliberal globalization began on the 1st of January 1994 with the uprising of well
organized Indios of the Southern Mexican jungle (Topitas 1994). Men, women and children of the
so-called “Zapatista National Liberation Army”, named after the Mexican peasant and successful leader
of the Mexican Revolution of 1910, Emiliano Zapata, occupied without force some central areas of the
state of Chiapas. They declared to fight Mexico’s integration into the neoliberal NAFTA, the North
American Free Trade Agreement, alongside the USA and Canada. NAFTA was inaugurated the same
day. One of the movement’s speakers, the now world famous “Subcommandante Marcos”, declared
that neoliberalism was a “world war waged by financial power against humanity” and an
expression of the worldwide crisis of capitalism, not its success. The Indios had decided not to be part
of this. They chose to resist. Their idea of an alternative life was clear and they practiced it despite
the hostility they received from the government and the military (Rodriguez 2005). Their
resistance was based on an indigenous version of “good governance”: direct democracy,
egalitarianism and a non-exploitative subsistence economy entrenched in local independence and a
respect for every individual’s dignity (Werlhof 2007 a) – a concept derived from pre-colonial experience,
from the so-called “deep Mexico”, a cultural and spiritual heritage maintained throughout centuries.¶ In
the North, it was not before 1997/98 that the social movement against neoliberalism gathered
momentum with the struggle against the ratification of the MAI. The movement’s first success was
the failure of the MAI due to France’s refusal to ratify it.¶ The movement then spread wide and fast
across the globe and mobilized a total of up to 15 million people for protests against the wars in
Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, and Iraq. In 2002 and 2003, the struggle focused on the “Stop GATS!”
campaign, led by international groups like Attac. Support was widespread. “Social Forums” began to
be organized and every year individuals, groups and organizations critical of neoliberal
globalization met regionally, nationally, continentally, and globally. The “World Social Forums”
gathered up to 100.000 people and more from all over the world under the motto: “Another world is
possible!Ӧ Activists also came together regularly at the summits of the WTO, the WEF (World Economic
Forum), the G8 or the World Bank. They managed to cause two WTO conferences, in Seattle and
Cancún, to fail, which dealt a strong blow to the organization (Shiva 2005).¶ Still, euphoria would be out
of place. An alternative to neoliberalism is not created through analysis and protest alone. An
alternative to neoliberalism has to be practiced. Opinions on how to do this differ. Some discuss
“alternatives” that are none: a reform of the WTO; a “control” of globalization through NGOs; a return to
Keynesianism; a restoration of “social market economy”; or even a revival of socialism. Such ideas
ignore reality and trivialize the problem. Much more is at stake – neoliberalism shows this every
day.¶ Neoliberalism is an apocalypse, a “revelation”. There is no way to deny this any longer. It is
impossible for neoliberalism to justify itself by the reality it creates. No one can be fooled anymore by
calling the corporations harmless “players” either. Things have become serious. There is no ambiguity.
As a consequence, the perpetrators of neoliberal politics simply lie about what is happening.¶
Alt Solves – Solidarity key
Support for an anti-neoliberalist policy is a prerequisite to actual change: support
from the intellectual left is the only hope for authentic and genuine progress
Petras and Veltmeyer 2013
(James, Bartle Professor of Sociology at Binghamton University, Henry, professor of Sociology
and International Development Studies at Saint Mary's University, “Social Movements in Latin
America: Neoliberalism and Popular Resistance”, pg. 6-8, January 17, 2013)
The third approach to social change has to do with the nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) involved in the project of international
cooperation and development. The dynamics of social change associated with this approach – local development within the framework of a “new
paradigm” (of “inclusive development”) are explored in chapter 6. The ostensible aim and central objective of this approach to social change is to
partner with governments and organizations of overseas development assistance to promote an improvement in the lives of the poor – to bring
about conditions that will sustain their livelihoods and alleviate their poverty – and to do so not through a change in the structure of economic and
political power, but through an empowerment of the poor. The approach is to build on the social capital of the poor themselves, seeking thereby
to bring about improvements in their lives within the local spaces available within the power structure. It is predicated on partnership with likeminded organizations in a shared project (the alleviation of poverty, sustainable livelihoods). Rather than directly confronting this structure in an
effort to change the existing distribution of power, the aim, and effect, is to empower the poor without having to disempower the rich. Under
conditions available across Latin America, and expressed in different ways in virtually every country, each of these three modalities of social
change and associated conceptions of power have their adherents. However, in
the specific conjuncture of conditions in
Latin America, the post-modernist perspective on the "new social movements" has proven to be
irrelevant. The most consequential and dynamic of the social movements at all directly or indirectly
engaged in the struggle for state power. As for the political dynamics of the struggle the issues are diverse, but the most
critical one turns on the relationship of the social movements to the state. This is the central theme of chapter 5,
which elaborates on the dynamics of resistance by the social movements mounted by the rural landless workers, the proletarianized and semiproletarianized peasants, and the indigenous communities of Chiapas, Ecuador, and Bolivia.:' Chapter 6 reviews the development project
advanced by the World Bank, the operational agencies of the United Nations, and other inter- national organizations. The strategic albeit unstated
aim of this project, implemented with the support and agency of NGOs formed and contracted to mediate between the donor (aid-giving)
organizations and the "aid" recipients among the poor, is to divert the poor from taking action in the form of social movements. The
primary concern of the social movements is to bring about social change by challenging economic
and political power in the form of direct collective action. In this connection, the concern of the
organizations that share this project is to offer the poor another option to adopt a less
confrontationist approach to social change; to seek an improvement in their social condition within
the local spaces of the power structure rather than challenging the holders of this power. The agency of
"development" in this context is to empower the poor-to capacitate them to act and take advantage of the opportunities provided by the system for
improving their lot. The context for the analysis' and discussion of the social movement matrix presented in chapters 3-5 was provided by the
"structural adjustment program," with reference to the imperialist policy of neoliberal globalization. In chapter 6 we turn to political
developments-and the strategic response of the social movements to neoliberalism-in the new, and somewhat changed if not entirely different
context of the new millennium; a generalized disenchantment with neoliberalism, the dominant target of the social movements; and, at the level
of the economy, the emergence of a primary commodities boom, a period of economic growth preceded and followed by the outbreak and
conditions of a systemic crisis. Under these conditions the most significant development was a turn in the political tide with the ascent of the
political class on the Left co state power-the emergence of a stream of center-left political regimes. The key questions posed by this developmentand taken up in chapter 6-are the significance and meaning of this phenomenon (the turn toward the Left in state power) and the relation of the
center-left to the social movements in the fight against neoliberalism and imperialism. The concern of chapter 7 is with the form taken by the
resistance co neoliberalism under conditions of a global crisis as they hit Latin America in 2008, and the form assumed by the social movements
under these conditions. Our argument in this respect is made in three parts: first, an examination of the social movements under conditions of the
1999-2002 crisis; second, a perspective on the social movements under conditions of the primary commodities boom from 2003 to 2008; and
third, an analysis of the social movements under conditions of the global crisis that hit Latin America in 2008, putting an end to a short-lived
primary commodities boom. As for the strategic responses made to the global crisis, we distinguish between the following: (1) the response of the
organizations and individuals that represent the class interests of global capital, the guardians of the neoliberal world order and capitalist system;
the strategic response of most governments in Latin America, which has been to insulate the economy from the ravages of global capitalism and
the financialization of production, and (2) the response of the social movements in the popular sector, which has been to question, oppose and
reject the neoliberal model and imperialist policies used to guide and inform the policy "Of most governments in the region. The book concludes
with an appraisal of the correlation of forces ranged in support and opposition to capitalism, neoliberalism, and imperialism. As we see it, the
turn to the political left in the new millennium has dampened, if not extinguished, the revolutionary
spirit awakened by the popular movements in the 1990s. At the level of state power, apart from
Cuba, the only regime that can be regarded as on the "Left" is that of President Chavez in
Venezuela. But revolutionary forces are building in a number of countries in the region. However,
they do have to contest the political space with emerging movements on the right. The prevailing situation of
economic and political crisis, like all crises, is generating opportunities and forces for change, but these forces cut in both directions, left and
right, and it is difficult to determine the likely or potential outcome of the existing precarious balance of class forces. However, it
is
incumbent on the intellectual and political Left to assess the situation and to provide support to the
forces of progressive change, particularly those on the revolutionary Left. They are the best hope
for genuine progress - a world beyond neoliberalism, beyond capitalism, beyond class exploitation,
and beyond imperialism.
Alt solves - oil
Belief in the inevitability of oil is false – oil is a crucial point of contestation for
challenging the function of the modern economy.
Juhasz 8 (Antonia – American oil and energy analyst, Investigative Journalism Fellow at the
Investigative Reporting Program, “The Tyranny of Oil”, pgs 18-22)
Nearly 75 percent of Americans believe that big business has too much influence over the federal government, according to a 2006 Gallup poll.
In fact, the only industry that Americans like less than Big Oil is the U.S. government.3 Many
people also believe that the power
of corporations over the U.S. government— especially that of Big Oil —is impenetrable. If history is a
guide, this simply is not true . One hundred years ago, mass movements of people across the U nited
S tates joined together to fundamentally rewrite the relationship between corporations, the government,
and the public. It was one of the most radical and transformative periods in U.S. history and a period to which our own time bears much
resemblance. Corporate executives were working hand in glove with elected officials to advance interests widely held to be contrary to the overall
economic health of the people and the nation, including waging wars for corporate profit and imperial expansion. In response, people
organized against unchecked and unprecedented corporate power in what is today known as the Populist or
Progressive Era. Ultimately, this era did not yield the more radical changes desired by some, but it did bring about regulation: specifically, the
first federal laws in the United States to protect labor and regulate corporate activity, and the financing of political campaigns. The Sherman
Antitrust Act was among these new regulatory tools to rein in the nation's "epidemic" of megacorpo-rations. Then,
as now, oil lay at
the heart of much of the struggle, while John D. Rockefeller's Standard Oil, like its largest descendant today—
ExxonMobil—reigned as the most formidable corporate power. Standard Oil's rise was part of a mass consolidation of
economic and political power into the hands of a few mega-corporations in the decades following the Civil War. In 1865 these
companies emerged from the war heavily supported by the U.S. government with tax breaks, subsidies , and
protection from both foreign and domestic competition. They were also free from government regulation—including the
absence of just about any worker rights and consumer protections. These policy choices were justified, their supporters contended, because the
companies needed unimpeded growth to match the expansion of the American economy. Unregulated, the corporation did what it does naturally:
whatever it could to enrich the bottom line. In
describing the tactics and practices used by Standard Oil, the
Interstate Commerce Commission, the first regulatory commission in U.S. history, did not mince words: " unjust
discrimination ," " intentional disregard of rights ," "unexcused," "illegal," "excessive," "extraordinary," "forbidden," so
obvious and palpable a discrimination that no discussion of it is necessary," "wholly indefensible," "patent and provoking discrimination for
which no rational excuse is suggested, "obnoxious," "absurd and inexcusable," " gross
disproportions and inequalities ," and
" the most unjust and injurious discrimination ." Rockefeller built Standard Oil into the first major industrial monopoly in the
United States and established the model that all others would seek to follow. Ida Tarbell writes in the introduction to her 1904 book The History
of the Standard Oil Company that Standard Oil "was the first in the field, and it has furnished the methods, the charter, and the traditions for its
followers. It is the most perfectly developed trust in existence; that is, it satisfies most nearly the trust ideal of entire control of the commodity in
which it deals."5 The New York State Senate concluded after its hallmark investigation of Standard Oil in 1888, "Its success has been the
incentive to the formation of all other trusts or combinations. It is the type of a system which has spread like a disease through the commercial
system of this country.'* Following Standard Oil's lead, the nation's largest companies merged and consolidated their own efforts by forming
trusts. A "trust" is a combination of corporations where a board of trustees holds the stock of each individual company and manages the business
of all. At the time, the word trust quickly became synonymous with any large corporation. The trusts gobbled up their smaller competitors and
forced out of business those that they could not buy. The
companies then used their size and economic clout to
influence political decision-making on their behalf. Again Rockefeller set the standard, perfecting the art of the political
contribution. As power was consolidated in the hands of a few great companies, the rights of workers,
farmers, consumers, and smaller businesses shrank accordingly. All across the country, people responded
with resistance , rebellion, and a demand for fundamental change, including new legal structures to support not only
their rights but also the nation's flagging democracy. Farmers, women and children factory workers, African-American railway workers,
longshoremen, suffragists, Anarchists, Communists, Socialists, Wobblies, and many other groups organized for change. On May 1, 1886,
350,000 workers at over 11,500 establishments all across the United States went on strike. In the course of that year, there were more than 1,400
strikes involving some half a million workers. By 1904, there were on average more than 4,000 strikes per year.7 The objectives of the strikers
sound almost trite today, as they are rights that most American citizens now take largely for granted: the eight-hour workday, the forty-hour
workweek, a minimum wage, worker safety, the right to form unions, compensation when injured on the job, and the right to work under legal
contracts enforcing mutual commitments between employers and workers. The 1890 Sherman Antitrust Act was designed to protect small
businesses—and thereby support the overall economy; to keep business within the realm of government regulation—and thereby protect workers
and consumers; and to keep businesses small enough so that economic clout did not become political clout— and thereby protect democracy. The
law would ultimately be used to bring down Standard Oil, and it remains the foundation of all U.S. antitrust policy today. However, from the
1980s until today, the original intent of the law has been all but forgotten, and the mergers of megacorporations, including the descendants of
Standard Oil, have been allowed to proceed virtually without restriction. At
the center of the Progressive and Populist
Movements were the "muckrakers," journalists who dug up the dirt and brought sunlight to shine on the
crimes committed by corporations and the politicians who supported them. While she hated the nomenclature, Ida Tarbell,
author, historian, and journalist, was one of the most influential muckrakers of her day. Her blistering sixteen-part, two-year-long expose of John
D. Rockefeller and his Standard Oil Company ran in McClure's Magazine from 1902 to 1904. When the series was released as a book in 1904,
one journal described it as "the most remarkable book of its kind ever written in this country." Daniel Yergin, in his landmark book The Prize:
The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power, describes TarbelPs book, saying "Arguably, it was the single most influential book on business ever
published in the United States."8 It was the nail in the coffin for the nation's most hated trust and its premier robber baron. As for Rockefeller,
Yergin describes him as "the single most important figure in shaping the oil industry."9 It is a common characterization and is undoubtedly true.
However, Rockefeller earned this and even greater acclaim despite the fact that neither he nor his company contributed to the discovery of oil. He
did not develop the technology to drill for oil, pump it out of the earth, turn crude into kerosene for lamps or gasoline for cars, or move it through
pipelines around the earth. On the contrary, Rockefeller did more than just about any other individual in history to undercut the efforts of those
who made these discoveries and to push them out of the oil business altogether. Nor did Rockefeller found the first oil company, introduce the
ideas of vertical or horizontal integration to the oil industry, or invent the concept of the corporate trust. Yet Rockefeller unquestionably deserves
Yergin's title, because he mastered the fine art of mass consolidation and achieving unprecedented profit with little regard for the human, social,
or broader economic costs of his actions. In
Rockefeller's words, "The growth of a large business is merely a
survival of the fittest."10 For more than a century, the direct descendants of Standard Oil, including
ExxonMobil, Chevron, and Conoco-Phillips, have dutifully followed Rockefeller's business model.
Yet all of Standard Oil's descendants should pay heed , for John D. Rockefeller personally sowed the seeds of his
own demise: a peoples' movement committed to, and ultimately successful in, breaking up the
Standard Oil Company.
2NC AT:
AT: Framework
The here and now is key: our pedagogical practices must be in line with the work of
social movements and activists.
GIROUX 2012
(HENRY, professor of English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University; Neoliberalism's
Culture of Cruelty Authoritarian Politics in the Age of Casino Capitalism, Counterpunch,
http://www.counterpunch.org/2012/08/27/authoritarian-politics-in-the-age-of-casino-capitalism/)
Yet, the current historical moment seems at an utter loss to create a massive social movement
capable of addressing the totalitarian nature and social costs of a religious and political
fundamentalism that is merging with an extreme market-fundamentalism. In this case, a
fundamentalism whose idea of freedom extends no further than personal financial gain and
endless consumption. Under such circumstances, progressives should focus their energies on
working with the Occupy movement and other social movements to develop a new language of
radical reform and to create new public spheres that will make possible the modes of critical
thought and engaged agency that are the very foundations of a truly participatory and radical
democracy. Such a project must work to develop vigorous educational programs, modes of public
communication, and communities that promote a culture of deliberation, public debate, and critical
exchange across a wide variety of cultural and institutional sites. Ultimately, it must focus on the
end goal of generating those formative cultures and public spheres that are the preconditions for
political engagement and vital for energizing democratic movements for social change—
movements willing to think beyond the limits of a savage global capitalism. Pedagogy in this
sense becomes central to any substantive notion of politics and must be viewed as a crucial element
of organized resistance and collective struggles. The deep regressive elements of neoliberalism
constitute both a pedagogical practice and a legitimating function for a deeply oppressive social
order. Pedagogical relations that make the power relations of casino capitalism disappear must be
uncovered and challenged. Under such circumstances, politics becomes transformative rather than
accommodating and aims at abolishing a capitalist system marked by massive economic, social, and
cultural inequalities. A politics that uncovers the harsh realities imposed by casino capitalism
should also work towards establishing a society in which matters of justice, equality, and
freedom are understood as the crucial foundation of a substantive democracy.
Rather than invest in electoral politics, it would be more worthwhile for progressives to develop
formative conditions that make a real democracy possible. As Angela Davis has suggested, this
means engaging “in difficult coalition-building processes, negotiating the recognition for which
communities and issues inevitably strive [and coming] together in a unity that is not simplistic and
oppressive, but complex and emancipatory, recognising, in June Jordan’s words that ‘we are the
ones we have been waiting for.’”[vi] Developing a broad-based social movement means finding a
common ground upon which challenging diverse forms of oppression, exploitation, and
exclusion can become part of a wider effort to create a radical democracy.
In part, this means reclaiming a discourse of ethics and morality, elaborating a new model of
democratic politics, and developing fresh analytical concepts for understanding and engaging the
concept of the social. One avenue for developing a critical and transformative politics might take
a cue from youth protesters the world over and develop new ways to challenge the corporate
values that shape American, and increasingly global, politics. It is especially crucial to provide
alternative values that challenge market-driven ideologies that equate freedom with radical
individualism, self-interest, hyper-competitiveness, privatization, and deregulation, while
undermining democratic social bonds, the public good, and the welfare state. Such actions can be
further addressed by recruiting young people, teachers, labor activists, religious leaders, and other
engaged citizens to become public intellectuals who are willing to use their skills and knowledge to
make visible how power works and to address important social and political issues. Of course, the
American public needs to do more than talk. It also needs to bring together educators, students,
workers, and anyone else interested in real democracy in order to create a social movement–a
well-organized movement capable of changing the power relations and vast economic
inequalities that have created the conditions for symbolic and systemic violence in American
society.
Addressing such challenges suggests that progressives will invariably need to take on the role of
educational activists. One option would be to create micro-spheres of public education that
further modes of critical learning and civic agency, and thus enable young people and others to
learn how to govern rather than be governed. This could be accomplished through a network of
free educational spaces developed among diverse faith communities and public schools, as well
as in secular and religious organizations affiliated with higher educational institutions. These new
educational spaces focused on cultivating both dialogue and action in the public interest can look to
past models in those institutions developed by socialists, labor unions, and civil rights activists in
the early twentieth century and later in the 1950s and 60s. Such schools represented oppositional
public spheres and functioned a democratic public spheres in the best educational sense and
ranged from the early networks of radical Sunday schools to the later Brookwood Labor College
and Highlander Folk School in Tennessee. Stanley Aronowitz rightly insists that the current
“system survives on the eclipse of the radical imagination, the absence of a viable political
opposition with roots in the general population, and the conformity of its intellectuals who, to a
large extent, are subjugated by their secure berths in the academy; less secure private sector
corporate jobs, and centrist and center-left media institutions.”[vii] At a time when critical
thought has been flattened, it becomes imperative to develop a discourse of critique and
possibility—one that recognizes that without an informed citizenry, collective struggle, and
dynamic social movements, hope for a viable democratic future will slip out of reach.
We must refuse their calls for accommodation – only reconfiguring the terms of
debate can challenge the neoliberal death drive.
GIROUX 2012
(HENRY, professor of English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University; Neoliberalism's
Culture of Cruelty Authoritarian Politics in the Age of Casino Capitalism, Counterpunch,
http://www.counterpunch.org/2012/08/27/authoritarian-politics-in-the-age-of-casino-capitalism/)
Totalitarian temptations now saturate the media and larger culture in the language of austerity as
political and economic orthodoxy. What we are witnessing in the United States is the normalization
of a politics that exterminates not only the welfare state, and the truth, but all those others who
bear the sins of the Enlightenment—that is, those who refuse a life free from doubt. Reason and
freedom have become enemies not merely to be mocked, but to be destroyed. And this is a war
whose totalitarian tendencies are evident in the assault on science, immigrants, women, the elderly,
the poor, people of color, and youth. What too often goes unsaid, particularly with the media’s
focus on inflammatory rhetoric, is that those who dominate politics and policymaking, whether
Democrats or Republicans, do so largely because of their disproportionate control of the nation’s
income and wealth. Increasingly, it appears these political elite choose to act in ways that sustain
their dominance through the systemic reproduction of an iniquitous social order. In other words,
big money and corporate power rule while electoral politics are rigged. The secrecy of the voting
booth becomes the ultimate expression of democracy, reducing politics to an individualized
purchase—a crude form of economic action. Any form of politics willing to invest in such
ritualistic pageantry only adds to the current dysfunctional nature of our social order, while
reinforcing a profound failure of political imagination. The issue should no longer be how to work
within the current electoral system, but how to dismantle it and construct a new political
landscape that is capable of making a claim on equity, justice, and democracy for all of its
inhabitants. Obama’s once inspiring call for hope has degenerated into a flight from
responsibility. The Obama administration has worked to extend the policies of the George W.
Bush administration by legitimating a range of foreign and domestic policies that have shredded
civil liberties, expanded the permanent warfare state, and increased the domestic reach of the
punitive surveillance state. And if Romney and his ideological cohorts, now viewed as the most
extremists faction of the Republican Party, come to power, surely the existing totalitarian and
anti-democratic tendencies at work in the United States will be dangerously intensified.
A catalogue of indicting evidence reveals the depth and breadth of the war being waged against
the social state, and particularly against young people. Beyond exposing the moral depravity of a
nation that fails to protect its young, such a war speaks to nothing less than a perverse death-wish,
a barely masked desire for self-annihilation—as the wilful destruction of an entire generation not
only transforms U.S. politics into pathology, but is sure to signal the death-knell for America’s
future. How much longer will the American public have to wait before the nightmare comes to
an end?
An awareness of the material and cultural elements that have produced these deeply antidemocratic conditions is important; however it is simply not enough. The collective response here
must include a refusal to enter the current political discourse of compromise and
accommodation—to think well beyond the discourse of facile concessions and to conduct struggles
on the mutually informed terrains of civic literacy, education, and power. A rejection of traditional
forms of political mobilization must be accompanied by a new political discourse, one that uncovers
the hidden practices of neoliberal domination while developing rigorous models for critical
reflection and fresh forms of intellectual and social engagement.
Discourse and education are key to a global alliance against the exploitation of
neoliberalism.
Cooper 11
(Charlie. University of Hull, England Review Essay: Neoliberalism, education and
strategies of resistance)
It is clear from the assessments set out in these books that neoliberal education systems have been
a source of great social harm. In particular, the analyses presented bear witness to the profoundly
harmful effects of neoliberalism on societal wellbeing – evidenced by widening inequalities; an
increasingly oppressed labour force; the erosion of democracy and critical thought; the breakdown
of social solidarities; the increasing surveillance and criminalisation of specific „dangerous‟ subcultures; and the increasing alienation of teachers and students from the learning process (leading
to rising health problems). At the same time, the public realm for critical dialogue has been
increasingly closed off by the actions of nation states – particularly through interventions aimed at
intensifying central-state control over education - compliant to the tightening grip of neoliberal
global organising. The consensus view expressed in these books is that resistance to the
neoliberal agenda will require a network of alliances comprising a range of issue-based social
movements and strategies, organised (as has been described) locally, nationally, regionally and
globally, and aided by ICT. There is also a consensus position on the basis of this resistance – i.e.
that a radical critical pedagogy rooted in Marxist analysis, applied to teaching, research and social
action, is the only viable option for arriving at a more just society. Alternative ways of seeing and
understanding the world, founded on postmodernist analyses, are discounted here as distractions
- sidetracking the masses from the real task which is discovering how the material basis of modern
life is rooted in the exploitation of labour’s use value and that the only solution to this is the
construction of an alternative socialist future.
We have an obligation to bear witness to the crimes of neoliberalism against the
global poor.
Bourdieu and Grass 2
(Pierre was a French sociologist, anthropologist, and philosopher. Gunter won the Nobel Prize
for Literature as a leftist novelist. “The Progressive Restoration: A Franco-German Dialogue”
New Left Review p 64-65 MW)
Bourdieu: Unfortunately, it’s not simply a question of countering a dominant¶ discourse that
preens itself as unanimous wisdom. To fight it¶ effectively, we need to be able to diffuse and
publicize a critical discourse.¶ For example, at this moment we are talking on and for television,¶ in
my case—and I imagine also in yours—with the aim of reaching a¶ public outside the circle of
intellectuals. I wanted to make some sort of¶ breach in this wall of silence—for it is more than just
a wall of money—¶ but here television is very ambiguous: it is at once the instrument that¶ allows
us to speak, and the one that silences us. We are perpetually¶ invaded and besieged by the
dominant discourse. The great majority of¶ journalists are often unknowing accomplices of this
discourse; breaking¶ out of its unanimity is very difficult. In France, anyone who is not¶ a highly
established name has virtually no access to the public realm.¶ Only consecrated figures can break
the circle, but alas they are typically¶ consecrated just because they are satisfied and silent, and to
ensure they¶ remain so. Very few use the symbolic capital their reputation affords¶ them to speak
out, and to make heard the voices of those who cannot¶ speak for themselves.
Framework - Epistemology DA
The knowledge production of the 1ac is based on neoliberal “expertism” and denies
ethical agency
Lander 2
[Edgardo Lander is professor of social sciences at the Universidad Central de Venezuela in
Caracas. “Nepantla: Views from South” p 245-248 Project Muse
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/nepantla/v003/3.2lander.html MW]
The naturalization of these processes of free circulation of investment and
trade, as criteria that dictate the terms under which all societies on the¶ planet necessarily must be
organized, is explicitly supported by the expertise¶ of those who speak in the name of specialized
knowledges, in this case of¶ economic science (a knowledge in the singular):¶ It is widely
recognized by economists and trade experts that¶ the WTO system contributes to development.
(WTO 1999b, 7)¶ The economic case for an open trading system based upon¶ multilaterally
agreed rules is simple enough and rests largely on¶ commercial common sense. But it is also
supported by evidence:¶ the experience of world trade and economic growth since the¶
SecondWorldWar. (8)¶ Economists agree that the greatest gains go to the country that¶ slashes its
own trade barriers. Readiness to open up to foreign¶ suppliers of consumer goods and of inputs to
production¶ improves choices as well as competition in price and services¶ offered. Protection that
gives special favours to one sector or¶ another of the economy distorts the way a country uses its
productive¶ resources. Removal or reduction of distortions allows¶ resources to be used more
efficiently. (WTO 1999a, 5)¶ Another manifestation of the “naturalization”/depoliticization of¶ the
issues at stake in international economic relations is the tendency to turn disagreements into
technical issues that can be resolved in an “objective”¶ and “impartial” manner by the relevant
specialists.¶ The Multilateral Agreement on Investment establishes that regulations¶ (including
environmental or health-related regulations) that can be¶ considered polemical from the point of
view of their scientific justification¶ may be submitted to a body of scientific experts for
consideration (OECD¶ 1998, 66). Similar practices are established in WTO agreements.¶ A
separate agreement on food safety and animal and plant¶ health standards (sanitary and
phytosanitary measures) sets out¶ the basic rules. It allows countries to set their own standards.¶
(WTO 1999b, 19)¶ Member countries are encouraged to use international standards,¶ guidelines
and recommendations where they exist. However,¶ members may use measures which result in
higher standards¶ if there is scientific justification. (ibid.)¶ What in these texts appears to be the
simple application of objective¶ scientific criteria in reality relates to extremely complex and
controversial¶ matters. This is the type of situation that arises when, whether on the basis¶ of
scientific evidence (on which consensus may or may not exist) or based on¶ specific preferences
on the part of the population, standards are established¶ that regulate, limit, or block the use of a
certain product or technological¶ process. This can be seen in the heated debate surrounding
foods derived¶ from genetically modified plants and animals. One well-known case illustrating¶
the application of WTO standards is the U.S. lawsuit involving the¶ European Union’s ban on the
sale—in E.U. territory—of beef treated with¶ growth hormones. The WTO ruled in favor of the
United States, categorizing¶ this ban as an unfair, protectionist practice that went against free¶
trade, forcing the European Union to either allow the importation of these¶ products or face
severe sanctions, in spite of the opposition of a great majority¶ of the continent’s population. The
opinion of a few experts, chosen¶ by the WTO authorities dealing with conflict resolution, thus
overruled¶ the democratically expressed wishes of the people of the European Union.¶ In this case
it was determined that the fear of consuming beef treated with¶ growth hormones lacked scientific
basis; inside the new world order defined¶ by the WTO, this preference was not one for which
people could¶ legitimately opt. The majority of the ethical and political confrontations having to
do with techno-scientific matters do not have a univocal scientific solution, and differences of
opinion and interpretation can continue indefinitely (Nelkin 1977, 1984). Generally, the issues at
stake cannot be resolved solely on the basis of experts’ opinions. People are being denied the
sovereign right to found their decisions on ethical choices or on particular cultural contexts. This
is an example of the growing authoritarianism of the global capitalist order, exposing the
population to the potentially harmful effects of certain techno-scientific processes against its
expressed will, merely because “specialists” consider that their opposition is based on nothing more
than prejudice. These are not issues that depend on the existence or absence of consensus in the
scientific community. In any case, as Hans Jonas (1984, 118) argues, human capacity to wield
power over nature is always greater than the predictability of this power’s long-range effects,
which, in case of doubt, calls for an ethics of responsibility.7 This ethical choice is denied when it is
assumed that, to make this type of decision it suffices to take into account the opinions of experts
and the rights of investors (Lander 1994). Beyond the internal controversies within Western,
techno-scientific communities lies the fact that in the thousands of conflicts occurring in the world
today between the interests of transnational capital and those of rural or indigenous people
concerning the use of the environment, there is generally also a conflict in the parties’ views of the
cosmos, an antagonism between different knowledge systems and different ways of conceiving the
relationships between culture and nature. Nevertheless—and this is a perfect expression of the
continual functioning of colonial mechanisms—in the new global capital order only one form of
knowledge is recognized: Western scientific knowledge. From this discourse of knowledge the
criteria and procedures are established by which all controversies are decided.
The unbiased evidence that the aff portrays is actually a ruse. Neoliberalists control
the flow of economic research and can manipulate it to further their own agendas.
Weller and Singleton, 06
(Christian E. Weller and Laura Singleton, Dr. Christian E. Weller is a Senior Fellow at American
Progress and a professor of public policy at the McCormack Graduate School of Policy and
Global Studies at the University of Massachusetts, Boston. Laura Singleton: Behavioral Sciences
Collegium, BS, Mathematics, Davidson College, MBA, Harvard University, MS, PhD,
Management, Boston College. Peddling reform: the role of think tanks in shaping the neoliberal
policy agenda for the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. Page 72-73)
A more academic research network that has aided the neoliberal cause to some degree, in
particular with respect to international economic issues, is the National Bureau of Economic
Research (NBER). The NBER was founded in 1920 to promote economic research. Theoretically,
‘the NBER is committed to undertaking and disseminating unbiased economic research among
public pol- icymakers, business professionals, and the academic community’. The NBER publishes
research faster than academic journals do, thereby largely determining what research will receive
wide attention. Although the NBER is nominally independent, it has received almost $10 million
from staunchly conservative foundations over the years (Media Transparency 2002).
Moreover, the NBER has played an important role in promoting neoliberal policies with respect to
international economic issues due to its president since 1977, Professor Martin Feldstein, an MPS
member who served as chairman of President Reagan’s Council of Economic Advisors. His
writings include strong criticisms of the World Bank and the IMF (for example: Feldstein 1999,
2002). As if to eliminate any notions of impartiality, one of Feldstein’s prote ́ge ́s, Richard
Clarida, reported that ‘[n]obody gets very involved in the Bureau without Marty wanting it to
happen’ (Media Transparency 2002). Moreover, Feldstein’s influ- ence extends easily into the
political realm. Much of President George W. Bush’s economic team studied under, or was
recommended by, Professor Feldstein. Among these are Lawrence Lindsey, R. Glen Hubbard,
Richard Clarida, Assis- tant Secretary of the Treasury for Economic Policy, and Paul O’Neill,
former Secretary of the Treasury. Indeed, Feldstein is generally credited as the father of ‘supplyside’ economics and helped to create President George W. Bush’s 2001 tax cut plan (Leonhardt
2002).
Aside from the use of think tanks and the media to advance the neoliberal policy agenda, several
well-endowed foundations enabled these institutions to conduct and promote their research. One of
the reasons the neoliberal network has been so successful is that it understands government policy
is based upon, and has subsequently developed, ‘a conveyer belt of thinkers, academics, and
activists’ (People for the American Way 2002: 4) to promote their agenda. Thus, foundations give
money to a variety of sources to promote its neoliberal philoso- phies. Among the various
recipients of conservative foundation funds are think tanks, which serve to package and
repackage conservative policy ideas, academics, who push the intellectual boundaries on various
issues, and graduate students, who form the next generation of conservative researchers. An
analysis of conservative foundations and American politics done by the People for the American
Way (2002) – a progressive advocacy and research group – emphasized the role of think tanks,
funded by conservative foundations, in conservative policy forma- tion. One journalist noted that
‘[W]ith increasing frequency, legislation, proposed and enacted, can be traced directly to thinktank position papers on such con- servative agenda items as welfare cuts, privatization of public
services, private options and parental choice in schools, deregulation of workplace safety, tax
limitations and other reductions in government, even selling of the national parks’ (People for
the American Way 2002).
At Permutation - Rejection
SAY NO TO THE PERMUTATION – THIS MOMENT REQUIRE A
COMMITMENT TO REVOLUTIONARY TRANSFORMATION NOT MILD
REFORM
WEBBER and CARR 13
(Jeffery R., professor of politics at the University of London, and Barry, professor of
history at La Trobe University, The New Latin American Left Cracks in the
Empire, p. 4)
The ultimate trajectory of the pink tide depends on the Left's capacities to counter right-wing
propositions and ongoing imperialist meddling in the sovereign affairs of Latin American nations;
just as crucial, though, will be the course of the battle between different currents within the Left
seeking to gain hegemony over the anti-neoliberal bloc. Latin America "has moved into an
historic conjuncture in which the struggle among social and political forces could push the new
resistance politics into mildly social democratic and populist outcomes," William I. Robinson
points out, "or into more fundamental, potentially revolutionary ones." Results "will depend
considerably on the configuration of class and social forces in each country and the extent to
which regional and global configurations of these forces open up new space and push such
governments in distinct directions" (2007: 148).
AT: PERMUATION - Retrofitting
Retrofitting: The permutation will inspiring confidence in neoliberalism and destroy
leftist gains. The choice is mutually exclusive.
HARNECKER 10,
(Marta, Chilean psychologist and former student of Louis Althusser, trans. Janet
Duckworth, "Twenty-First Century Socialism," MONTHLY REVEIW 62:3, JulyAugust)
Although most governments in the region still hold to its general tenets, very few defend the
neoliberal model. It lost legitimacy
once it showed itself to be incapable of solving the most pressing problems facing our countries . The
era of neoliberalism’s heyday on our subcontinent has been left behind. Although the “end of history” heralded by Francis Fukuyama is not yet
here, what does seem to have arrived is the end of neoliberalism. The
current global economic crisis is one of the factors
dealing it the coup de grâce. According to Brazilian sociologist Emir Sader, there is a “hegemonic crisis” in Latin America, in which
“the neoliberal model and the power bloc which leads it are worn down, weakened, and only manage to survive by implementing the model in a
toned-down form—for example Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay.”19 Given
this situation, there are only two paths: either
capitalism undergoes retrofitting or we move toward an alternative project not based on the logic of
profit but on a humanist, solidarity-based logic that works to satisfy human needs and makes
possible a kind of economic development in our region that will benefit not the elites, but the
overwhelming majority of our people. The inability of the neoliberal economic model to obtain positive economic results for our
peoples has also negatively affected the credibility of bourgeois democracy. People no longer have confidence in this form
of government, and they are less and less willing to accept the enormous gap between those who elect and
those who get elected.
AT: Perm – Mutually Exclusive
Neoliberalism destroys any chance of collective political struggle.
Comaroff 2k
(Jean, John L. Millennial Capitalism: First Thoughts on a Second Coming. Public
Culture, Volume 12, Number 2, Spring 2000, pp. 291-343. Duke University Press)
The paradox of class at the millennium, in sum, must be understood in these terms. Neoliberalism
aspires, in its ideology and practice, to intensify the abstrac- tions inherent in capitalism itself: to
separate labor power from its human con- text, to replace society with the market, to build a
universe out of aggregated transactions. While it can never fully succeed, its advance over the
“long” twen- tieth century has profoundly altered, if unevenly in space and time, the phenomenology of being in the world. Formative experiences—like the nature of work and the
reproduction of self, culture, and community—have shifted. Once-legible processes—the workings
of power, the distribution of wealth, the meaning of politics and national belonging—have become
opaque, even spectral. The con-tours of “society” blur, its organic solidarity disperses. Out of its
shadows emerges a more radically individuated sense of personhood, of a subject built up of
traits set against a universal backdrop of likeness and difference. In its place, to invert the old
Durkheimean telos, arise collectivities erected on a form of mechanical solidarity in which me is
generalized into we.¶ In this vocabulary, it is not just that the personal is political. The personal is
the only politics there is, the only politics with a tangible referent or emotional valence . By
extension, interpersonal relations—above all, sexuality, from the peccadillos of presidents to the
global specter of AIDS—come to stand, metonymically, for the inchoate forces that threaten the
world as we know it. It is in these privatized terms that action is organized, that the experience of
inequity and antagonism takes meaningful shape. In this sense, Jameson (1999: 47) is correct.
There is no autonomous discourse of class. Certainly not now, if ever. Oppositions of gender and
race, even if not in themselves explicit vehicles for that discourse, are frequently “reinvested” in
its practical dynamics and express its stark antagonisms. This is inevitable. Reigning
hegemonies, both popular and academic, may separate the construction of identity from the
antinomies of class. But the market has always made capital out of human dif- ference and
difference out of capital, cultivating exploitable categories of workers and consumers,
identifying pariahs, and seeking to silence enemies of established enterprise. As lived reality,
then, social class is a multiply refracted gestalt. Its contrasts are mobilized in a host of displaced
registers, its distinc- tions carried in a myriad of charged, locally modulated signs and objects—
from the canons of taste and desire to the niceties of language use, the subtle discriminations of
advertising to the carnal conflict of sport.¶ In short, as neoliberal conditions render ever more
obscure the rooting of inequality in structures of production, as work gives way to the mechanical
soli- darities of “identity” in constructing selfhood and social being, class comes to be understood, in
both popular and scholarly discourse, as yet another personal trait or lifestyle choice. Which is
why it, like citizenship, is measured increasingly by the capacity to transact and consume; why
politics is treated as a matter of indi- vidual or group entitlement; why social wrongs are
transposed into an issue of “rights”; why diffuse concerns about cultural integrity and communal
survival are vested in “private” anxieties about sexuality, procreation, or family values; why the
fetus, neoliberal subject par excellence, becomes the focus of a macabre nativity play, in which,
“vexed to nightmare by a rocking cradle,” moral antago- nists lock in mortal battle over the right
to life (Jean Comaroff 1997a; Berlant 1997). Analytically, of course, it is imperative for us not to
take these things at face value. The problem, rather, is to explain why, in the millennial age, class
has become displaced and refracted in the way that it has. Which is why, finally, its reduction, to
the mere “experience of inferiority,” as Jameson (1999: 47) would have it, is insufficient. The
concept of class so reduced captures neither the com- plex construction of contemporary experience
nor the crises of social reproduc- tion in which much of the world appears to be caught.
Globalization of capitalism can’t happen because to the inherent limited capacity of the nation-state.
Comaroff 2k
(Jean, John L. Millennial Capitalism: First Thoughts on a Second Coming. Public
Culture, Volume 12, Number 2, Spring 2000, pp. 291-343. Duke University Press)
This antithetical position has a nontrivial political dimension for its advocates, especially those
on the left. To the degree that globalization dissolves the sover- eign nation-state into a sea of
planetary economic forces and legal jurisdictions, it would appear to negate any real prospect of
progressive or proletarian politics— be they international or intranational—as they would have no
terrain on which to occur, no concrete object in terms of which to frame itself, no obvious target
against which to act (cf. Hirst and Thompson 1996: 1; Ahmad 1992: 317).40 We share the concern.
As it is, there is a strong argument to be made that neoliberal capitalism, in its millennial moment,
portends the death of politics by hiding its own ideological underpinnings in the dictates of
economic efficiency: in the fetishism of the free market, in the inexorable, expanding “needs” of
business, in the imperatives of science and technology. Or, if it does not conduce to the death of
politics, it tends to reduce them to the pursuit of pure interest, individual or collective—or to
struggles over issues (the environment, abortion, health care, child welfare, human rights) that,
important though they may be, are often, pace Jameson (1999: 47), dissociated from anything
beyond themselves. It is here that the analytic case for the sustained salience of the modernist
polity merges into the normative case for its desirability.¶ A parenthetic comment here. There are
those who would muddy the argument by pointing out that the notion of a strong nation-state has
always been some- thing of a fantasy. This on three grounds: the state, the nation, and the
hyphen. Recall, in respect of the first, Philip Abrams (1988: 75–77), for whom the state was
always “the distinctive collective misrepresentation of capitalist societies”: an “essentially
imaginative construction,” it was, at once, a “triumph of conceal- ment” and an ongoing
“ideological project.” Even more extreme is Ralph Miliband’s (1969: 49) famous claim that “the
‘state’ . . . does not, as such, exist.” Shades here of things written long ago. Philip Corrigan and
Derek Sayer (1985: 7) remind us that Marx (1967) believed the state to be “in an important sense
an illusion . . . : [it] is at most a message of domination—an ideological artifact attributing unity,
structure and independence to the disunited, structureless and dependent workings of the practice
of government.” For Weber (1946: 78), too, it was “a claim to legitimacy, a means by which
politically organized subjection is simultaneously accomplished and concealed, and it is constituted
in large part by the activities of institutions of government themselves” (Corrigan and Sayer, 1985:
7). A truly curious force of history, this: at once an illusion, a potent claim to authority, a cultural
artifact, a present absence and an absent presence, a prin- ciple of unity masking institutional
disarticulation. But nothing like the kind of essentialized “thing” that much of the current debate
treats either as alive or dead. Likewise the nation: the enormous literature on the topic—both
before and after Imagined Communities (Anderson 1983)—makes it abundantly clear that neither
at its dawn nor in its high modernist phase was this polity homogeneous, that even its European
exemplars were as different as they were alike. What is more, their capacity to regulate
boundaries and to control flows—of capital and cultural property, communications and currencies,
persons and information— was invariably incomplete in the face of transnational pressures and
incentives. So, too, was their hold over the loyalty of their citizens and subjects. Indeed, the
nation-state has always and everywhere been a work in progress, nowhere a fully realized
accomplishment. The same may be said, by extension, of its hyphen- nation: of the articulation of
state to nation. Polities across the planet vary hugely in both the extent to which, and the manner
in which, nation and state are con- joined in them, of which more shortly.
Neoliberalism requires the eradication of any alternative social programs – only in
moments of crisis of the neoliberal moment can alternatives emerge.
Sader 2008
(Emir Sader, directs the Public Policy Laboratory (LPP) of the State University of Rio de Janeiro
, where he is a professor of sociology. The Weakest Link? New Left Review 52, July-August
2008)
Neoliberalism in Latin America
The new century is off to a surprising start in Latin America. The continent that had been a
privileged territory for neoliberalism, where it was first applied—in Chile and Bolivia—rapidly
turned into the leading arena not only for resistance but for construction of alternatives to
neoliberalism. Two faces of the same coin: precisely by having been the laboratory for neoliberal
experiments, Latin America is now having to deal with their consequences. The 1990s and the
2000s have been two radically opposite decades. During the 90s, the neoliberal model was
imposed to varying degrees in virtually every country on the continent—with the exception of
Cuba. Clinton, who did not even cross the Rio Grande to sign the first North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), was forced not long after to approve a super-loan from Washington
when the first crisis of the new model broke out in Mexico. The US went on to press for a
hemisphere-wide Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), presenting this as the natural
outcome of the seamless extension of free-trade policies.
At an Americas summit meeting in Canada in 2000, Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez was the only
leader to vote against Clinton’s proposal for an FTAA, while Cardoso, Menem, Fujimori and
their colleagues fell meekly into line. On the occasion of his first Ibero-American Summit,
Chávez reported, Castro passed him a piece of paper on which he had written: ‘At last I’m not
the only devil around here.’ It was thus with some relief, too, that Chávez—himself elected
president of Venezuela in 1998—attended the investiture of Lula in Brasilia and Néstor Kirchner
in Buenos Aires in 2003, before moving on to that of Tabaré Vázquez in Montevideo in 2004,
that of Evo Morales in La Paz in 2006, and in 2007 those of Daniel Ortega in Managua and
Rafael Correa in Quito; followed in 2008 by Fernando Lugo in Asunción. Meanwhile the US
free-trade proposal that had been almost unanimously approved in 2000 was dead and buried by
2004. Since that date, Chávez himself has been re-elected, as was Lula in 2006; in April of this
year, Kirchner was succeeded by his wife, Cristina Fernández, and Lugo triumphed in Paraguay,
putting an end to more than sixty years of rule by the Colorado Party.
What is the meaning of this radical reversal, faster than any the continent has experienced before,
to give the largest number of progressive governments, whether left or centre-left, that it has seen
in its entire history? It is true that the continent displays the highest levels of inequality in the
world, an income gap aggravated by the neoliberal decade; and yet the hard blows that punished
past popular struggles, along with the solidity of the neoliberal establishment, made such a rapid
turn quite unexpected. In what follows we shall attempt to understand the conditions that
transformed Latin America into the weakest link in the neoliberal chain.
Imposing the model
A precondition for the privatization programmes imposed across successive Latin American
countries in the 1980s and 90s was the defeat and disarming of earlier movements of the left and
organized labour . During the decades of development the emphasis was on import-substitute
industrialization—in particular in Mexico, Argentina and Brazil, but also to a lesser extent in
Colombia, Peru, Chile, Uruguay and Costa Rica. These developments were underwritten by
broad politico-ideological projects that encouraged the strengthening of the working class and its
trade unions, backed by local party formations and democratic-national blocs, in a context of
nationalistic ideologies and identities. The potential this built up burst onto the political scene in
the 1960s as a radical force, when the long cycle of growth petered out in conflicts over workers’
rights, at a time when the Cuban example was pointing towards alternatives that transcended the
limits of capitalism and US imperial domination. The response to these struggles was an era of
military coups, first in Brazil and Bolivia in 1964, in Argentina in 1966 and 1976, and finally in
Uruguay and Chile in 1973.
The combined and closely related processes of military dictatorship and the application of
neoliberal models acted together to yield an extreme regression in the balance of power between
social classes. It would have been impossible to implement the wholesale sell-offs of national
industrial resources that unfolded most drastically in Chile, Uruguay and Argentina without first
crushing the people’s ability to defend their interests. These three countries had been remarkable
for their achievements, possessing advanced systems of social protection under states that
assumed a regulatory capacity and a role in expanding the domestic market, guaranteeing the
social welfare of the population, and providing public services. The most brutal repression they
had ever known was needed to clear the way for neoliberal policies that privatized state functions—
in the case of Argentina, transferring virtually all public resources into the hands of private
capital—and abolished hard-won social rights. In short, three of the most enlightened states on
the continent found themselves completely dismantled.
In the course of the 1990s, neoliberalism penetrated Latin America right across the political
spectrum. The programme was originally implemented by the far right, in Pinochet’s Chile. It
found other right-wing adepts—such as Alberto Fujimori in Peru—but also absorbed forces that
had historically been associated with nationalism: the PRI in Mexico; Peronism in Argentina
under Carlos Menem; in Bolivia, the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement—the party that had
headed the nationalist revolution of 1952 under Víctor Paz Estenssoro. After this, neoliberalism
moved on to social democracy, gaining the adherence of the Chilean Socialist Party, Venezuela’s
Acción Democrática, and the Brazilian Social-Democratic Party. It became a hegemonic system
across almost the entire territory of Latin America.
Nevertheless, the neoliberal model failed to consolidate the social forces necessary for its
stabilization, resulting in the early onset of crises that would check its course. The three largest
Latin American economies were the theatre for the most dramatic crises: Mexico in 1994, Brazil
in 1999 and Argentina in 2002; the programme crumbled without delivering on its promises. The
ravages of hyper-inflation were checked, but this was only achieved at tremendous cost. For a
decade or more, economic development was paralysed, the concentration of wealth grew greater
than ever before, public deficits spiralled and the mass of the population had their rights
expropriated, most notably in the domain of employment and labour relations. On top of this,
national debt expanded exponentially and regional economies became highly vulnerable,
helplessly exposed to attack from speculators, as these three countries each discovered to their
cost.
It was neoliberalism’s poor economic performance in Latin America that in many instances led to
the defeats of the governments that pioneered it. These include Alberto Fujimori in Peru,
Fernando Henrique Cardoso in Brazil, Menem in Argentina, Carlos Andrés Pérez in Venezuela
and Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada in Bolivia; also gone are the PRI in Mexico, the alternation of
the two traditional parties in Uruguay, and the politicians who tried to perpetuate neoliberalism
even beyond its collapse, including Fernando De la Rúa in Argentina, Lucio Gutiérrez in
Ecuador and Sánchez de Lozada in Bolivia. It is also important to note the isolation of those
leaders who struggle to keep it going, such as Felipe Calderón in Mexico, Michelle Bachelet in
Chile, Alan García in Peru, or Alfonso Uribe in Colombia. (Uribe, incidentally, lost recent local
elections revolving around issues of governance; his prestige derives from the uncompromising
deployment of ‘democratic security policies’ against ‘terrorism’, a position which earns him a
steady 80 per cent domestic support.) A growing number of presidents have been elected, or in
some cases re-elected, in response to the failure of the neoliberal economic model.
At: Perm – State Link
State-based strategies to challenge neoliberalism fail – grants credibility to
neoliberal expansion.
Robinson 8
William I., Professor of Sociology at the University of Santa Barbara, Latin
America and Global Capitalism: A Critical Globalization Perspective, p. 490-2)
These popular electoral victories- the so-called pink tide- were interpreted by many as a decisive turn to the Left in the region. But such an
interpretation is insufficient to understand the complexity of what has taken place.
The “turn to the Left” has demonstrated
the limits of parliamentary changes in the era of global capitalism as much as it also symbolizes
the end of the reigning neoliberal order. It is important not to paint the distinct “pink tide” experiences with a single brush.
The new leftist leaders all in one way or another came to power on the heels of mass popular
resistance to neoliberalism, but there is more that differentiates than unifies the distinct cases. On the one hand, the case of Brazil
was most indicative of mildly reformist thrust of many of the new Leftist government- and the most tragic for the popular
classes. Lula, denied the presidency in three previous electoral contests but victorious in 2002, took the vote only after his wing of the PT moved
sharply toward the political center. He forged a social base among middle-class voters and won over centrist and even conservative political
forces that did not endorse a left-wing program yet were unwilling to tolerate further neoliberal fallout. Lula promised not to default on the
country’s foreign debt and to maintain the previous government’s adjustment policies, thereby indicating that the real power was that of
transnational financial capital. Portending what was to come, almost as soon as he took office in 2003 he slashed the budgets for health and
educational in order to comply with dictates of the international monetary fund (IMF) that the government maintain a fiscal surplus. Other
pink tide governments attempted to expropriate popular power from below and undercut its
transformative potential along the lines of what Gramsci (borrowing from Croce) called transfromismo (Gramsci, 1971:58-59),
whereby actual and potential leaders and sectors from the subordinate groups are incorporated
into the dominant project in an effort to prevent the formation of counter-hegemony. This was the case with the presidency of
Lucío Gutiérrez, brought to power in Ecuador by a coalition of indigenous and popular movements, or under the presidency in
Argentina of Néstor Kirchner. Gutiérrez, a former army colonel, won the 2002 election with the support of that country’s powerful
indigenous and social movements after he promised to reverse the neoliberal program of his predecessors and implement popular reforms. But
from the start Gutiérrez was subject to pressure from transnational capital and the Ecuadorian elite to push him in the opposite direction. Upon
taking office he appointed several indigenous cabinet ministers as well as representatives of the local and transnational corporate community.
Within months, Gutiérrez capitulated to these conservative political forces in the tenuous governing coalition and reverted to an open neoliberal
program. In Argentina, Kirchner strongly criticized the neoliberal policies of his predecessors, yet his own program was limited to minor policy
modifications to favor domestic producers and consumers- among them, low interest rates, capital controls, price controls on public services, and
the restoration of some social welfare programs, alongside a clientalist co-optation of a portion of the piqueteros and other popular movements
(see below). In Nicaragua, Daniel Ortega and what remained of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) dressed with a Leftist
discourse what in the pre-neoliberal era would have been characterized as a routine attempt to establish a populist multi-class political alliance
under the hegemony of capital and state elites. In the years since the 1990 electoral defeat new Sandinista economic groups developed close
business and personal ties with transnationally oriented capitalist groups while the political leadership negotiated a heavily criticized pact to
divide up government power with the Liberals, one of the two historically dominant bourgeois oligarchic parties. While the FSLN retained a
mass, if dwindling, base among the country’s peasantry and urban poor, many leading Sandinistas grouped around Ortega had become successful
businessmen heavily invested in the new transnational model of accumulation, including in tourism, agro-industry, finances, importing-exporting,
and subcontracting for the maquiladoras. Their class interests impeded them from challenging transnational capital or organizing a transformative
project yet their legitimacy depended on sustaining a revolutionary discourse and undertaking redistributive reforms (Robinson, 2003). In a policy
document released shortly after taking office in 2007 the FSLN declared that its project rested on two planks, one political and the other
economic. The first, “citizen power councils,” were to incorporate local communities into the ‘struggle against drugs, narco-trafficking, gangs,
diseases, ignorance, degradation of the environment, and the denial of human rights” (FSLN, 2007:5). Absent was any reference to these councils
as politicized forums or vehicles for popular self-mobilization; they seemed to be conceived as instruments for a controlled incorporation from
above of grassroots communities into the state’s social control and administrative programs. The second plank, “economic associations for small
and medium producers,” called for “reorienting economic policies toward these sectors so as to link them up to the large-scale private sector”
(ibid): that is to incorporate these small-scale rural and urban producers via credits and technical assistance into the dominant transnational
circuits of accumulation through subcontracting and other ancillary activities. The document called for “respect for all forms of property,”
attracting transnational corporate investment, and an agro-industrial model of development. At the same time, however, the Sandinista program
included a re-nationalization of health and educational systems, greater social spending, progressive tax policies, and a literacy campaign, among
other popular welfare measures. Hence
what emerged in these cases was an elected progressive bloc in the
region committed to mild redistributive programs respectful of prevailing property relations and
unwilling or simply unable to challenge the global capitalist order. This was not very different from what had
informed the social democratic thinking that defined the Buenos Aires consensus. These new governments were
“progressive” insofar as they introduced limited redistribution and restored a minimal role for the
state, less in regulation accumulation than in administering its expansion in somewhat more
inclusionary ways. When we cut through the rhetoric, a number of these governments-such as the
Socialists in Chile or Kirchner and Lula- were able to push forward a new wave of capitalist globalization with
greater credibility than their orthodox neoliberal predecessors . Many Leftist parties, even when
they sustained an anti-neoliberal discourse, such as the PT in Brazil, the frente Amplio (Broad Front) government of Tabaré
Vásquez in Uruguay, and the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, abdicated earlier programs of fundamental structural change
in the social order itself. What stood out about a number of the pink tide governments is that (I) there has been no
significant redistribution of income or wealth, and indeed, inequality may still actually be increasing; and (2) there has been
no shift in basic property and class relations despite changes in political blocs, discourse in favor of the popular classes, and
mildly reformist or social welfare measures. In Argentina, for instance, the percentage of national income going to labor (through wages) and to
unemployed and pensioners (through social welfare subsidies and pensions) dropped from 32.5 in 2001, before the crisis exploded to 26.7 in 205.
In Brazil the wealthy grew in number by 11.3 percent in 2005 as inequality deepened (Zibechi, 2006). Moreover, programs to subsidize the
consumption of the poor and the unemployed, such as Zero Fome (Zero Hunger) and Bolsa Familia (Family Basket) programs in Brazil or social
welfare payments plans in Argentina and Uruguay, were financed by taxing not capital but formal sector workers and middle classes. It was
increasingly dubious whether viable redistributive strategies were possible without more fundamental changes in property relations. Would this
new social democratic tide amount to better local mangers of global capitalism than their orthodox neoliberal predecessors? How long could low
levels of redistribution hold back the tide of rebellion?
AT: perm - Bureaucracy
Bureaucratic mechanisms destroy social change.
LOO 13
(Dennis, professor of sociology at California State Polytechnic, "Courting
Catastrophe: Neoliberalism's Threat" Invited Lecture at UC Riverside, posted May
3 on The Leftist Review, http://www.leftistreview.com/2013/05/03/courtingcatastrophe-neoliberalisms-threat/dennisloo/)
Bureaucracies’ basic characteristics are a contributing factor to this picture. They perpetuate
inequalities by promoting subordination, secrecy and deception, and ultimately the concentration of
power and the attribution of privileges to elites. They also primarily “focus on process more than
on results.”
AT: Perm All Other Instances
Affirmative is key to the alternative. Change arises out of preexisting systems
Harvey, 09
(David Harvey; Professor of anthropology and geography at the graduate center of the city
University of New York; Organizing for the anti-capitalist transition;
http://seminario10anosdepois.wordpress.com/)
Change arises, of course, out of an existing state of affairs and it has to harness
the possibilities immanent within an existing situation. Since the existing
situation varies enormously from Nepal, to the Pacific regions of Bolivia, to the
deindustrializing cities of Michigan and the still booming cities of Mumbai and
Shanghai and the shaken but by no means destroyed financial centers of New
York and London, so all manner of experiments in social change in different
places and at different geographical scales are both likely and potentially
illuminating as ways to make (or not make) another world possible. And in each
instance it may seem as if one or other aspect of the existing situation holds the
key to a different political future. But the first rule for a global anti-capitalist
movement must be: never rely on the unfolding dynamics of one moment
without carefully calibrating how relations with all the others are adapting and
reverberating.
Feasible future possibilities arise out of the existing state of relations between
the different moments. Strategic political interventions within and across the
spheres can gradually move the social order onto a different developmental
path. This is what wise leaders and forward-looking institutions do all the time
in local situations, so there is no reason to think there is anything particularly
fantastic or utopian about acting in this way. The left has to look to build alliance between and
across those working in distinctive spheres.
AT: Survivor’s Permuatation
Vote for the alternative alone – We must resist a. the impetus to direct popular
movements and b. the division between democracy and socialism
HARNECKER 10,
(Marta, Chilean psychologist and former student of Louis Althusser, trans. Janet
Duckworth, "Twenty-First Century Socialism," MONTHLY REVEIW 62:3, JulyAugust)
The left matured, as well, in its relationship with the popular
movements when it understood that they must not be treated
simply as transmission belts for party decisions but must have increasing autonomy, so they can
develop their own agendas for struggle. The left also began to understand that its role is to
coordinate various agendas and not to elaborate one single agenda from above . It has come to see that its
role is to give orientation, to facilitate, and to march together with, but not to replace, movements, and that a
verticalist attitude that squashes people’s initiative must be eliminated . It now understands that it has to learn to
listen, to make correct diagnoses of the people’s state of mind, and to listen carefully to the solutions suggested by the people. The left has also
realized that, in order to help people to be, and to feel that they are, protagonists, it must move from the style of a verticalist military leader to one
of a popular educator, able to release the power of all the wisdom the people have stored up. In
reaching the conclusion to
abandon the workerist approach, which is only concerned with the working class, the left came to understand that the new
political instrument must respect the plurality of the new subject and take on the defense of all discriminated social
sectors: women, indigenous peoples, black people, young people, children, pensioners, people of diverse sexual orientations, people with
disabilities, and others. The left realized that the point is not to recruit for one’s political organization. Rather
than clasping to its bosom all the legitimate representatives of those who struggle for emancipation, the organization should be a body that
coordinates all their different lives into a single project. Finally, the left understood that democracy is one of the most beloved banners of the
people, and that the
struggle for democracy cannot be separated from the struggle for socialism because
it is only under socialism that democracy can develop fully.2 If we keep this history in mind, I think we can better
comprehend what has happened in Latin America in recent decades. Part one serves as an introduction to our discussion of twenty-first century
socialism.
AT :Pragmatism
Pragmatism destroys political agency
Santos and Garavito 2005
(Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Professor of Sociology at the School of Economics, University of
Coimbra (Portugal); and Cesar A. Rodriguez-Garavito Associate Professor of Law and founding
Director of the Program on Global Justice and Human Rights at the University of the Andes
(Bogota, Colombia). He is a founding member of the Center for Law, Justice, and Society
(Dejusticia) and an Affiliate Professor of the Law, Societies and Justice Program at the
University of Washington., “Law Politics, and the Subaltern in Counter-Hegemonic
Globalization” in Law and Globalization from Below, edited Boaventura de Sousa Santos and
Cesar A. Rodriguez-Garavito, pg 7-8)
However, the
kind of political action envisaged by the governance approach is a far cry from that of
counter-hegemonic globalization. Given its conception of power and its focus on problem solving,
the governance approach tends to bracket deep power asymmetries among actors (for instance, those
between capital and labor in global code of conduct systems) and to view the public sphere as a rather depoliticized
arena of collaboration among generic "stakeholders" (see RodrlguezGaravito 2005). In contrast to critical
theories of law that view contentious collective action by the excluded as a political requisite for the
attainment of meaningful legal transfonnations, "the Pragmatist ... relies on 'bootstrapping' - the
bracketing of self-interest and distributive claims in order to focus attention on common interests
and values," thus explicitly rejecting the "victim's perspective" (Simon 2003:26) that is central to
subaltern cosmopolitan politics and legality. As a result, the governance perspective's telling call for
participatory exercises in institutional imagination lacks a theory of political agency suited to the
task. By default or by design, those doing the imagining are the elites or members of the middle-class with
the economic and cultural capital to count as "stakeholders." Either way, the process is a top,down one
in which those at the bottom are either incorporated only once the institutional blueprint has been
fully laid out or are not incorporated at alL The post hoc inclusion of the excluded is illustrated by Unger's
otherwise powerful theory of democratic experimentalism: "if social alliances need institutional innovations to be sustained, institutional
innovations do not require preexisting social alliances. All they demand are party-political agents and institutional programs, having those class
or group alliances as a project - as a project rather than as a premise" (1996:137). The exclusion of those at the bottom from governance schemes
is candidly acknowledged by Simon: "pragmatist initiatives are likely to by-pass the most desperate and the most deviant. Pragmatism
supposes a measure of mutual accountability and engagement that may not be attractive to or
possible for everyone" (2003:23).
As it turns out, in the context of neoliberal globalization, the most desperate and marginalized – those
living in poverty and excluded from the benefits of social citizenship due to class, gender, racial, or
ethnic oppression - account for the immense majority of the world population. The challenge of
institutional imagination, therefore, cannot be met but by privileging the excluded as actors and
beneficiaries of new forms of global politics and legality. This is the strategy of counterhegemonic
globalization and its legal counterpart, subaltern cosmopolitan legality.
The alt doesn’t lack organization- it rejects the state-like organization your
pragmatism calls for under pragmatic approaches the movement fails
Graeber 2
(David is an American anthropologist and anarchist who is a Reader in Social Anthropology at Goldsmiths, University of London. Graeber has
been involved in social and political activism, including Occupy Wall Street, “The New Anarchists” New Left Review p 70 MW)
A constant complaint about the globalization movement in the progressive¶ press is that, while
tactically brilliant, it lacks any central theme or¶ coherent ideology. (This seems to be the left
equivalent of the corporate¶ media’s claims that we are a bunch of dumb kids touting a bundle of¶
completely unrelated causes—free Mumia, dump the debt, save the oldgrowth¶ forests.) Another
line of attack is that the movement is plagued¶ by a generic opposition to all forms of structure or
organization. It’s¶ distressing that, two years after Seattle, I should have to write this, but¶
someone obviously should: in North America especially, this is a movement¶ about reinventing
democracy. It is not opposed to organization. It¶ is about creating new forms of organization. It is
not lacking in ideology.¶ Those new forms of organization are its ideology. It is about creating and¶
enacting horizontal networks instead of top-down structures like states,¶ parties or corporations;
networks based on principles of decentralized,¶ non-hierarchical consensus democracy. Ultimately,
it aspires to be much¶ more than that, because ultimately it aspires to reinvent daily life as¶ whole.
But unlike many other forms of radicalism, it has first organized¶ itself in the political sphere—
mainly because this was a territory that¶ the powers that be (who have shifted all their heavy
artillery into the economic)¶ have largely abandoned.
The world of the alt doesn’t need to be explicitly stated that demand for specificity is
neoliberalist at its core
Graeber 2
(David is an American anthropologist and anarchist who is a Reader in Social Anthropology at Goldsmiths, University of London. Graeber has
been involved in social and political activism, including Occupy Wall Street, “The New Anarchists” New Left Review p 72 MW)
This is very much a work in progress, and creating a culture of¶ democracy among people who
have little experience of such things is¶ necessarily a painful and uneven business, full of all sorts
of stumblings¶ and false starts, but—as almost any police chief who has faced us on¶ the streets
can attest—direct democracy of this sort can be astoundingly¶ effective. And it is difficult to find
anyone who has fully participated in¶ such an action whose sense of human possibilities has not
been profoundly¶ transformed as a result. It’s one thing to say, ‘Another world is¶ possible’. It’s
another to experience it, however momentarily. Perhaps the¶ best way to start thinking about
these organizations—the Direct Action¶ Network, for example—is to see them as the diametrical
opposite of the¶ sectarian Marxist groups; or, for that matter, of the sectarian Anarchist¶ groups.6
Where the democratic-centralist ‘party’ puts its emphasis on¶ achieving a complete and correct
theoretical analysis, demands ideological¶ uniformity and tends to juxtapose the vision of an
egalitarian future¶ with extremely authoritarian forms of organization in the present, these¶
openly seek diversity. Debate always focuses on particular courses of¶ action; it’s taken for granted
that no one will ever convert anyone else¶ entirely to their point of view. The motto might be, ‘If
you are willing¶ to act like an anarchist now, your long-term vision is pretty much your¶ own
business’. Which seems only sensible: none of us know how far¶ these principles can actually take
us, or what a complex society based on¶ them would end up looking like. Their ideology, then, is
immanent in¶ the anti-authoritarian principles that underlie their practice, and one of¶ their more
explicit principles is that things should stay this way.
Drawing a plan here and now is not necessary; the only necessary course of action is
to de-deify profit
Quincy Saul 2011
Studied political economy, history and music at Hampshire College, graduating in 2010 Holds a graduate
certificate in labor studies from the City University of New York, “If Not Now, When?
Reflections on Socialism in the 21st Century”
Sell writes: ‘‘It would be necessary to draw up a plan, involving the whole of society, on
what industry needed to produce.’’ She insists, moreover, that everybody in society would be
able to participate in this decision-making process. Good. But many questions immediately arise:
How will the decision-making apparatus work? Who will administer it? Will we try to reform
touch-screen voting, move beyond electronic voting machines into deeper levels of technodemocracy, or go back to town meetings and paper ballots? Will socialists use the current
political architecture (capitol buildings, etc.)? Will pre-revolutionary politicians be allowed to
participate? Will the Congress and Senate be preserved? The White House? The Pentagon? And
what should the plan be? When will it be necessary to lay it out? How much time do we have?
How will antagonisms between different needs and desires be reconciled? Consensus on a
continental and inter-continental scale is impossible. What will the decision-making process be,
and how will it be conceived, created, and enforced? These are severe technical questions with
no easy answers. (How will we meet electricity needs after eliminating nuclear energy and
curtailing coal mining?) Who will write this plan? When will it begin? As the saying goes, if not
now, when? If not you, who? Anticipating this question, Sell writes: It is not possible or
necessary here and now*amid a society where profit is god and humanity is bent and
distorted under its endless dictates*to draw up a full or accurate picture of a socialist
society. Future generations, who will be more informed and knowledgeable than us [sic],
will do that.
AT: state Key
The prioritizing of the state before socialism dooms it to failureempirically proven Latin America.
Wallerstein, 02
(Immanuel Wallerstein, He is an American sociologist, historical social scientist, and world-
systems analyst. New Left Review 18, page 30-33)
What happened historically in these debates—and this is the fourth similarity—was that those
holding the ‘state-oriented’ position won out. The decisive argument in each case was that the
immediate source of real power was located in the state apparatus and that any attempt to ignore
its political centrality was doomed to failure, since the state would successfully suppress any thrust
towards anarchism or cultural nationalism. In the late nineteenth century, these groups enunciated
a so-called two-step strategy: first gain power within the state structure; then transform the world.
This was as true for the social as for the national movements. What happened historically in
these debates—and this is the fourth similarity—was that those holding the ‘state-oriented’
position won out. The decisive argument in each case was that the immediate source of real
power was located in the state apparatus and that any attempt to ignore its political centrality was
doomed to failure, since the state would successfully suppress any thrust towards anarchism or
cultural nationalism. In the late nineteenth century, these groups enunciated a so-called two-step
strategy: first gain power within the state structure; then transform the world. This was as true for
the social as for the national movements.
The fifth common feature is less obvious, but no less real. Socialist movements often included
nationalist rhetoric in their arguments, while nationalist discourse often had a social component.
The result was a greater blurring of the two positions than their proponents ever acknowledged.
It has frequently been remarked that socialist movements in Europe often functioned more
effectively as a force for national integration than either conservatives or the state itself; while
the Communist parties that came to power in China, Vietnam and Cuba were clearly serving as
movements of national liberation. There were two reasons for this. Firstly, the process of
mobilization forced both groups to try to draw increasingly broad sectors of the population into
their camps, and widening the scope of their rhetoric was helpful in this regard. But secondly, the
leaders of both movements often recognized subconsciously that they had a shared enemy in the
existing system—and that they therefore had more in common with each other than their public
pronouncements allowed.
The processes of popular mobilization deployed by the two kinds of movement were basically
quite similar. Both types started out, in most countries, as small groups, often composed of a
handful of intellectuals plus a few militants drawn from other strata. Those that succeeded did so
because they were able, by dint of long campaigns of education and organization, to secure
popular bases in concentric circles of militants, sympathizers and passive supporters. When the
outer circle of supporters grew large enough for the militants to operate, in Mao Zedong’s
phrase, like fish swimming in water, the movements became serious contenders for political
power. We should, of course, note too that groups calling themselves ‘social democratic’ tended
to be strong primarily in states located in the core zones of the world-economy, while those that
described themselves as movements of national liberation generally flourished in the semiperipheral and peripheral zones. The latter was largely true of Com- munist parties as well. The
reason seems obvious. Those in weaker zones saw that the struggle for equality hinged on their
ability to wrest control of the state structures from imperial powers, whether these exercised
direct or indirect rule. Those in the core zones were already in strong states. To make progress in
their struggle for equality, they needed to wrest power from their own dominant strata. But
precisely because these states were strong and wealthy, insurrection was an implausible tactic,
and these parties used the electoral route.
The seventh common feature is that both these movements struggled with the tension between
‘revolution’ and ‘reform’ as prime modes of transformation. Endless discourse has revolved
around this debate in both movements—but for both, in the end, it turned out to be based on a
misreading of reality. Revolutionaries were not in practice very revolutionary, and reformists not
always reformist. Certainly, the difference between the two approaches became more and more
unclear as the movements pursued their political trajectories. Revo- lutionaries had to make
many concessions in order to survive. Refor- mists learned that hypothetical legal paths to
change were often firmly blocked in practice and that it required force, or at least the threat of
force, to break through the barriers. So-called revolutionary movements usually came to power
as a consequence of the wartime destruction of the existing authorities rather than through their
own insurrectionary capacities. As the Bolsheviks were reported to have said in Russia, in 1917,
‘power was lying about in the streets’. Once installed, the movements sought to stay in power,
regardless of how they had got there; this often required sacrificing militancy, as well as
solidarity with their counterparts in other countries. The popular support for these movements
was initially just as great whether they won by the bullet or by the ballot—the same dancing in
the streets greeted their accession to power after a long period of struggle.
Finally, both movements had the problem of implementing the two- step strategy. Once ‘stage one’
was completed, and they had come to power, their followers expected them to fulfill the promise of
stage two: transforming the world. What they discovered, if they did not know it before, was that
state power was more limited than they had thought. Each state was constrained by being part of
an interstate system, in which no one nation’s sovereignty was absolute. The longer they stayed
in office, the more they seemed to postpone the realization of their promises; the cadres of a
militant mobilizing movement became the functionaries of a party in power. Their social
positions were transformed and so, inevitably, were their individual psychologies. What was known
in the Soviet Union as the Nomenklatura seemed to emerge, in some form, in every state in which
a movement took control—that is, a privileged caste of higher officials, with more power and more
real wealth than the rest of the population. At the same time, the ordinary workers were enjoined
to toil even harder and sacrifice ever more in the name of national development. The militant,
syndicalist tactics that had been the bread of the social movement became ‘counterrevolutionary’, highly discouraged and usually repressed, once it was in office.
AT: Alt worse than neolib
No risk of offense – the new socialism must be dedicated to democratic traditions
and socialist norms simultaneously.
Quincy Saul 2011
Studied political economy, history and music at Hampshire College, graduating in 2010 Holds a graduate
certificate in labor studies from the City University of New York, “If Not Now, When?
Reflections on Socialism in the 21st Century”
Sell writes that ‘‘a genuine socialist government would not be dictatorial,’’ and emphasizes
that socialism is defined by its democratic content. Both sides of the Cold War poisoned the
word socialism in the hearts and minds of millions, and it is important and essential to
tirelessly re-articulate that socialism must be thoroughly and profoundly democratic if it is
to be genuine. But while this is important when trying to convert non-socialists to ‘‘the cause,’’
it can also be disingenuous. What about the inevitability of conflict? Especially in First
World countries*where the bourgeoisie is large, entrenched and highly entitled, and where
capitalist life-worlds and false consciousness and consumerism have elevated insane,
unsustainable privileges to the status of real needs*a socialist revolution could not be
purely ‘‘democratic’’ in the strict sense of the term. Certain things must be non-negotiable
for socialists, like the reduction of consumerism and ecologically destructive industries.
There will be plenty of resistance, for instance, to the forced curtailment of mountaintop
removal, the dismantling of the prison industrial complex, and the opening of the U.S.Mexico border, and this resistance will have to be dealt with. How? What will the limits to
democracy be, who will define the criteria, and how will this be implemented? And as the saying
goes, with whose army? Though the 19th and 20th century idea of a ‘‘dictatorship of the
proletariat,’’ of a period of ‘‘emergency rule,’’ when the expropriators are expropriated,
must be revised for the 21st century, it cannot be dismissed or glossed over. There is no way
around answering these questions one way or another. If we are serious about democracy, we
must answer them collectively and transparently. If we don’t answer these questions,
someone else will answer them for us.
ALT Defense – 2NC**
Do not evaluate their generic alternative bad cards – Latin America provides an
entirely new context for thinking about popular resistance. Debate can resolve all
disadvantages to the alt.
KATZ 13
(Claudio, professor of economic history at the University of Buenos Aires, trans.
Leonard Morin, "Socialist Strategies in Latin America," The New Latin American
Left, 41)
In any case, it is evident that an impulse to reconstruct the emancipatory program has replaced the
climate of disappointment. The proscoalist stance of various popular movements confirms this
impetus. The big question to be answered at present is this: To what extent has this project been
assimilated by the new generations who led the rebellions of the last decade? These groups'
overwhelming rejection of privatization and deregulation (much stronger than that observed in
other regions, such as Eastern Europe) demonstrates the advance of antiliberal consciousness
wihtout the regressive components in terms of ethics or religion that prevail in the Arab world. In
Latin America, a framework conducive to a revival of leftist thought has developed because the
break with this tradition than one observes in various countries of Eastern Europe has not
occurred. Yet the anticapitalist nexus is the great missing link in the region , and this deficiency
has up to now inhibited the radicalization of popular consciousness. In this regard, open debate
about socialism in the twenty-first century can play a decisive role.
AT: No Alt
No alternative is capitalist propaganda
KATZ 13
(Claudio, professor of economic history at the University of Buenos Aires, trans.
Leonard Morin, "Socialist Strategies in Latin America," The New Latin American
Left, 39)
The difference of approach is instructive. While the dominant classes exhibit enormous flexibility
in confronting adversaries with different remedies (for example, increased state intervention), the
response of some socialists is timid. They only see obstacles to the popular project, while their
opponents attempt one model after another of capitalism. With idealized conceptions of the
industrial working class-as the sole architects of socialism- there will always be obstacles to
conceptualizing an anticapitalist agenda in the periphery. But if one abandons the narrow notion,
there is no reason to question the viability of this project on the basis of class definitions. The
assimilation of traditions of struggle is more important for an anticaptialist process than is the
hierarchy of the participating subjects. If the experiences of resistance are shared, the potential for
a revolutionary change increases. An example of such sharing was the conversion of Argentine
sexworkers into militants of a great movement of the unemployed. Another case was the
transformation fo the ex-miners in Bolivia into organizers of informal workers. The great
difference between the current period and that of 1960-1980 lie more on this plane of political
consciousness than in the realm of relationships of force or in the change of the popular subjects.
It is not the intensity of the social conflicts, the willingness of the oppressed to struggle, or the
capacity of the oppressors to control that has substantially changed, but the visibility of - and the
confidence in - a socialist model.
AT Alt is Utopian
Utopian alts good?
(Pierre was a French sociologist, anthropologist, and philosopher. Gunter won the Nobel Prize
for Literature as a leftist novelist. “The Progressive Restoration: A Franco-German Dialogue”
New Left Review p 64-65 MW)
Bourdieu: I feel you are a little too optimistic. I’m not sure, unfortunately,¶ that the problem can
be posed in these terms, since I think the¶ economic and political forces that currently weigh
down on Europe are¶ such that the legacy of the Enlightenment is in real danger. The French¶
historian Daniel Roche has just written a book in which he demonstrates¶ that the Enlightenment
tradition has very different meanings in France¶ and Germany: that Aufklärung doesn’t mean the
same as Lumières, even¶ though this would seem to have been one thing the two countries shared¶
to the full. But the difference is there, and it’s a significant obstacle¶ which we must overcome if
we are to resist the destruction of what we¶ associate more generally with the Enlightenment—
scientific and technological¶ progress, and control over that progress. We need to invent a¶ new
utopianism, rooted in contemporary social forces, for which—at the¶ risk of seeming to encourage
a return to antiquated political visions—it¶ will be necessary to create new kinds of movement.
Unions, as they¶ exist today, are archaic organizational forms; they must reform, transform,¶
redefine themselves, internationalize and rationalize themselves,¶ base themselves on the findings
of the social sciences, if they are to¶ fulfil their purposes.¶ Grass: What you are proposing is a
utopia. It would amount to a fundamental¶ reform of the union movement, and we know how
difficult it is to shift¶ that apparatus.¶ grass–bourdieu: Dialogue 77¶ Bourdieu: But a utopia in
which we have a part to play. For example,¶ social movements in France are a good deal less potent
now than they¶ were a few years ago. Traditionally, our movements have had a strongly¶
ouvrièriste outlook, very hostile to intellectuals, in part with good reason.¶ Today, since it is in
crisis, the social movement as a whole is more open,¶ more responsive to criticism, and becoming
much more thoughtful.¶ Suddenly, it is much readier to welcome new kinds of critique of our¶
society that encompass it as well. These critical, reflective social movements¶ are, in my opinion, the
future.
AT: Alt too vague
The specificity of previous movements distracted from the real problems of
neoliberalism
Harvey 7
(David, Distinguished Professor of Anthropology and Geography at the Graduate Center of the
City University of New York, “A Brief History of Neoliberalism”, Oxford University Press,
2007. Pg. 200)
The effect of such movements has been to shift the terrain of political organization away
from traditional political parties and labour organizing into a less focused political dynamic
of social action across the whole spectrum of civil society. What such movements lose in
focus they gain in terms of direct relevance to particular issues and constituencies. They
draw strength from being embedded in the nitty-gritty of daily life and struggle, but in so
doing they often find it hard to extract themselves from the local and the particular to
understand the macro-politics of what neoliberal accumulation by dispossession and its
relation to the restoration of class power was and is all about.
A2 Movements Don’t Solve
Movements are powerful instances of neoliberal resistance that can overcome the
neoliberal processes
Petras and Veltmeyer 13
(James, Bartle Professor of Sociology at Binghamton University, Henry, professor of Sociology
and International Development Studies at Saint Mary's University, “Social Movements in Latin
America: Neoliberalism and Popular Resistance”, January 17, 2013, page 218-219 MW)
Thesis No.5¶ The most dynamic forces of resistance in the 1990s-the popular¶ movements-were
formed by diverse organizations of landless or¶ near-landless rural workers ("peasants") and, in
some contexts, indigenous¶ communities. These social movements directly challenged the¶ power of
capital and the agency of contemporary imperialism, and in¶ Some contexts were able to make
substantial gains, slowing down and¶ diverting the capitalist development process.¶ Thesis No.6¶ The
dynamic forces of resistance mobilized by the social movements¶ under these conditions took three
divergent political forms:¶ (1) direct collective action against the neoliberal policies of the¶
governments; (2) use of the electoral mechanism of democratic¶ politics to contest national and
local elections, and (3) local development-¶ a nonconfrontational "no power" approach to social¶
change, to bring about change without seeking or taking state¶ power.¶ Thesis No.7¶ Changing
conditions in the new millennium have shifted the tide of¶ national politics, bringing to power the
political class of the Left,¶ and a demobilization of the social movements and their retreat from¶
the political arena. NGOs-not all of them by any means (some are¶ aligned with. and supportive
of the popular movement in their struggle¶ for substantial social change)-turned out to be a major
instrument¶ of this demobilization, the handmaiden of neoliberal globalization¶ (from global
capital to local development). The propensity of capitalism toward crisis, reflected in the
contemporary outbreak¶ of systemic crisis of global proportions, has generated¶ movements to the
Right as well as the Left, each seeking to mobilize¶ the forces of change released by the crisis .
AT: Transition Wars
Us attempts to undermine the emergence of alternatives to neoliberalism through
military interventions fail – do not be swayed by their hyped impact claims.
HARNECKER 10,
(Marta, Chilean psychologist and former student of Louis Althusser, trans. Janet
Duckworth, "Twenty-First Century Socialism," MONTHLY REVEIW 62:3, JulyAugust)
Although there has been some marked change in the balance of forces favoring left-wing and
progressive governments, this doesn’t mean the United States is a paper tiger. The loss of
ideological and political influence, plus a reduction of its economic power in the region, has been
made up for with increased influence on the media and growing military power. Today there are
twenty-three U.S. military bases across our subcontinent, and multilateral military exercises are
still held every year for the purpose of training troops in the region.21 The Fourth Fleet
[operating in the Caribbean and Central and South America] has been reactivated, and U.S.
intelligence networks have been extended in an effort to keep watch on and control the dynamics
of popular movements in the region.22 The empire is trying to prevent the emergence of national
forces that could clash with U.S. policies of domination and imposed servitude. There has been,
therefore, a huge increase in military aid to Colombia, its faithful ally and beach-head in the
region. And, to weaken any government that it does not directly control, the United States has
supported separatist movements in Bolivia (in the resourcerich eastern “Half Moon” states),
Ecuador, and Venezuela (in the oil-rich state of Zulia).23 Faced with the unstoppable advance of
left forces in Latin America, especially in the last two years, the Pentagon has decided to
implement “a plan to recolonize and discipline the whole continent.”24 It aims to stop and, as far
as possible, reverse the process of building a free and sovereign Latin America, set in motion by
Chávez. The Empire cannot accept that—in spite of the enormous economic, political, military, and
media power deployed in the region—Latin American countries are forging their own independent
agenda that runs counter to its designs
AT Chav. A dictator
Chavez was not a dictator- he was popular amongst all classes in Latin America
Robinson 08-American professor of sociology at the University of California, Santa Barbara, 2008, “Latin
America and Global Capitalism”, pgs333-4
The UNT was able to mobilize over a million workers to its May Day 2005 rally while the CTV
was barely able to muster a few thousand to its own activity, a sign of the radicalization of the
working class and the decline of the old business unionism that had emerged during the Punto
Fijo regimes. In late 2005 a law drafted by the UNT was put before the National Assembly on
worker co-management in enterprises. Popular sectors also organized into numerous local and
regional organizations, including community associations, students, women's, cultural, Christian
base groups, new trade unions, peasant associations, and so forth. As many visitors to Venezuela
have observed—I myself made four visits between 2004 and 2007—there has been a rapid
process of politicization and self-organization among the poor majority. The anti-neoliberal
discourse of the leadership is outpaced by the increasingly revolutionary discourse of
popular grassroots sectors that are developing an expanding class consciousness. Popular
sectors, while they may support Chavez and his government, are by no means blindly
subservient to the president and have often come out against Chavista leaders and state
officials. The image of an omnipotent Chavez crafting policy is misleading because it denies
the remarkable agency of the poor majority, who are well organized. It is their belligerence
that buoys Chavez at the helm of the state and their protagonism that has pushed the
process forward. The flourishing grassroots social movements, moreover, predate the Chavez
era, with genealogies in the diverse mass, trade union, and guerrilla struggles of the Punto Fijo
era. Rural and urban activists, indigenous and Afro-descendant groups, environmentalists, trade
unionists and others have taken the initiative repeatedly in protesting against aspects of
government policies that go against their interests. Most would agree that, at least up until 2006,
the Bolivarian revolution had managed to avoid state authoritarianism, thanks, in large
part, to the ongoing, autonomous mobilization of popular sectors, but also, I would suggest,
as a result of the disputed nature of the state and of the Chavez presidency's own efforts to
avoid bureaucratism and forge direct ties with popular sectors. Chavismo has opened up a
remarkable space for mobilization from below. Despite claims by Chavez' opponents it does
not seem to be the case that there is an authoritarian one-man rule. Personalistic accounts of
the Venezuelan revolution are simplistic (see, e.g., Ramirez, 2005). Chavez is genuinely
popular among the poor majority and some sectors of the middle classes, and is as well
immensely popular throughout Latin America. Historical processes of social change are the
product not of individuals but of collective social forces. These forces throw up individuals
whose personal attributes—charisma, brilliance, and foresight—are activated by historical
conjunctures. Moreover, as I will discuss in the next section, the discourse critical of Chavez is
somewhat contradictory.
AT: Gibson-Graham
Gibson-Graham is a neg author: only the hope of the alternative can break out of
the skepticism of the inevitability of neoliberalism.
DeMartino ‘13
(George, Professor and Co-Director, MA in Global, Finance, Trade and Economic Integration,
Ethical Engagement in a World beyond Control; Under Review, Rethinking Marxism)
Notably, the book (and other Gibson-Graham work of the past decade) turned a careful eye to the
question of how to cultivate an economic subject that could open up to the possibilities
associated with economic difference. Gibson-Graham explored abstractly in their theoretical
work and concretely in their community work the stubborn resistance to imaging and welcoming
opportunities to live differently. Even those harboring anger and resentment toward a capitalist
system that exploited and then discarded them for instance, workers rendered unemployed by
capital flight often refused to engage the idea of creating alternative enterprises under worker
control (Gibson-Graham 2003). Instead, they aspired to return to employment in the capitalist
sector that, they felt, had abused them. What is it about the human psyche, Gibson-Graham asked,
that so often prevents actors from recognizing, imagining and welcoming opportunities to live
differently? What bodily processes interrupt the capacity to grab hold of the chance to break free
from practices that are recognized as oppressive? And how in practice do we overcome the fear,
resignation, anger and resentment that block the exploration of alternative economic identities? In
A Postcapitalist Politics(2003) and other work Gibson- Graham explore the power of language
and theory, but also interpersonal encounter and collaboration, in confronting and overcoming
these obstacles. What they would came to serve as the chief practical vehicle for pursuing projects
of economic emancipation. The collective joins university and community-based researchers with
other community members in joint projects to inventory already existing alternative economic
practices and indigenous resources and capacities, and to imagine and pursue economic practices
and build economic institutions that defy traditional conceptions of just what economic forms are
and are not achievable and sustainable. A central goal is to proliferate economic formsto generate
a vibrant economic ecosystem populated by all sorts of economic species rather than to pursue a
pre-defined set of models of economic engagement. Implicit in the project is the need to inquire
into economic alternatives without judgment; to silence the reflexive skepticism that haunts the
Gibson-Graham 1996) of new and as-of-yet unimagined progeny. Of equal importance is the task
of promoting safe spaces within which economic agents who are marginalized and emptied of
aspiration regenerate themselves as vibrant economic subjects who recognize the potency of their
agency in making the world anew.
AT: Cap good
We are not a kritik of capitalism, but of neoliberalism – manifests differently in
Latin America.
Silva 09, Cambridge studies in contentious politics, “Challenging neoliberalism in Latin America” 2009, pgs. 2-3
Why did Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela develop episodes of anti-neoliberal
contention that ended in the fall of governments unabashedly committed to free-market
economics and the election of political leaders more interested in social equity? This book argues
that the construction of a contemporary version of what Karl Polanyi called market society
(Polanyi 2001) was the first of several necessary factors. Beginning in the 1980s and gathering
force and coherence in the 1990s, a wide array of neoliberal reforms provided the motive for
mobilization. They sought to build an entire new order that, as in market society, subordinated
politics and social welfare to the needs of an economy built on the logic of free-market
economics. Because neoliberal reforms simultaneously affected the economic, political, and
social sphere, they threatened a wide variety of popular sector and middle-class groups and
raised a gamut of grievances radiating from all three areas. It is crucial to underscore that
these episodes of anti-neoliberal mobilization in South America protested a specific kind of
capitalism, not capitalism in general. The dominant protest movements sought to reform
neoliberal capitalism, demanding a return to the mixed economy and a larger welfare role
for the state, rather than to replace it with an alternative “socialist” or other model.
AT: Cap Good – Efficiency
Privatization doesn’t solve political roadblocks or efficiency issues – these
arguments are empty justifications for neoliberalism
Medeiros 9
(Carlos. Political Scientist and Public Economist at the International Monetary Fund. “AssetStripping the State: Political Economy of Privatization in Latin America.” New Left Review. Jan
Feb 2009. P. 116 BA)
The other principal argument generically put forward for privatization centres on efficiency,
assuming that SOEs are intrinsically inefficient. The main thrust of this critique relates to
problems of competition and market structure. Andrew Glyn has argued, however, that in the
British case, there is no evidence of increased efficiency after privatization; higher productivity
was achieved during the rationalization that preceded state divestiture, but this was not
necessarily maintained thereafter— representing, in other words, ‘catch-up rather than a
permanent change of pace’.8 This observation challenges the general assumption that private
ownership in itself improves efficiency. Another strand of pro-privatization theory argues that,
while other solutions to the problem of efficiency may be possible, they remain politically
unviable due to strong resistance from the SOEs in question, colluding with vested interests;
privatization is offered as the simplest answer. But while this may be true in weak states, it is
certainly not the general case. Moreover, the phenomenon of ‘state capture’ by vested interests
has nothing to do with state-owned enterprise in itself; as Bob Rowthorn and Ha-Joon Chang
observe: ‘it is not only agents in the public sector who can block structural change but also
private-sector agents, because what matters here is political influence and not ownership per
se’.9 These theoretical weaknesses in the case for privatization should be borne in mind when
assessing the actual processes by which state divestitures were carried out worldwide. For in
practice, as we will see, the paths taken varied more widely than privatization theory would
generally be willing to acknowledge.
AT: Cap Good – Equality
Neoliberal reforms augment inequalities with no benefit except to the already
wealthy elites
Montero 5
(Alfred. Professor of Political Science at Carleton College. “From Democracy to Development:
The Political Economy of Post-Neoliberal Reform in Latin America.” Latin American Research
Review, Volume 40, Number 2, 2005, pp. 253-267. BA)
As Latin America begins its third decade of market-oriented reforms, it can look back on a most
inauspicious record. If the 1980s was the “lost decade,” then the legacy of the 1990s will most certainly be
the “difficult decade.” While the last ten years of neoliberal reforms did not generate the same degree of
collapse and crisis rendered by the exhaustion of import-substitution industrialization and the debt crisis
or the failed experience with heterodox shocks during the previous decade, it also did not produce an
assuring record of economic and social development. None of the most important problems of Latin
American development—persistent and deepening levels of inequality, a growing percentage of society
living below the poverty line, decaying infrastructure, poor access to even low-quality primary
education, rising criminality, inefficient production, inability to train and integrate semi- and skilled
workers into the formal labor force—to mention but a few, were addressed consistently or ameliorated to
a significant degree. To be sure, some of the chief concerns of economic re- formers in the 1980s are less
important than they once were: hyperinflation seems more and more to be only a bad memory now in
countries such as Brazil. Yet urban formal unemployment, precarious employment, and the eroding
competitiveness of Latin American economies have replaced price instability as the core causes of social
disparity in the world’s most unequal region. As globalization challenges Latin American countries to
make rapid adjustments to changes in external demand, capital flows, and international institutions, the
exigencies of democratic consolidation and deepening neoliberal reforms into a “second generation”
phase of structural adjustment create another layer of contradictions in the development model. Efforts to
improve market and production efficiency have done little to reverse the region’s in- equalities or the
widespread sentiment that the democratic political class is responsible for these problems and that the
institutions that maintain their rule (parties, parliaments, and elections) are therefore useless at best and
illegitimate at worst. A growing body of scholarship on neoliberal reform in Latin America has focused
attention on the poor performance of the post-neoliberal period. These works almost invariably find that,
contrary to the once- euphoric policy expectations that the neoliberal revolution was to bring the region’s
growth and employment performance, new market-friendly institutions have selectively improved the
lives of the already rich and skilled while making the lives of the growing ranks of the region’s
impoverished ever more parlous (Sheahan 1997; Portes and Hoffman 2003). Most telling, the multilateral
institutions and the supranational development agencies have joined academics and the policy-oriented
non- governmental community in a widening “new convergence” of ideas that criticizes the original
“Washington Consensus” of the 1980s and early 1990s and calls for the development of a “high road” to
development that links growth with greater equity and democracy (Korzeniewicz and Smith 2000).
AT: Neolib Inevitable
Claims of inevitability disguise the unnatural quality of neoliberalism,
allowing it to flourish
Heron 8
(Taitu. Manager of the Social Development and Gender Unit at the Planning Institute of Jamaica.
“Globalization, Neoliberalism and the Exercise of Human Agency.” 25 January 2008.
International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society, Vol. 20, No. ¼, The New Sociological
Imagination III pp. 85-101. Jstor. BA)
The Western universalism implicit in the neoliberal approach assumes that application of these
policies will amount to economic success in every country which undergoes neoliberal policy
reform. Rooted in neoclassical economics, neoliberal policies assumes that implemen-tation of
privatization, liberalization and deregulation will always guarantee very specific results
regardless of the social and cultural contexts within which they may be subjected to (Girvan
2000, p. 71). At another level, universalism may be a diplomatic mask which government
officials, IFI officials, statesmen and leading transnational elites of the G7 wear to disregard the
power dimensions involved in the politics of neoliberalism. As such, this could be argued as
aggressive-materialist agency aimed at protecting and maximizing the profits of a neoliberal
project, at the expense of mounting social exclusion of people; and further limiting more positive
expressions of human agency. This issue of social exclusion is important in understanding the
destructive nature of aggressive-materialist behaviour and how it can deprive persons of agency
and overburden others unnecessarily. These changes in the capitalist world economy have been
exercised by the power of governments and corporations, and far from being inevitable,
uncontrollable or positively integrating, they reflect concrete acts of human agency with specific
goals and interests to defend and uphold. This idea of governments as powerless to the forces of
modern capitalism/globalization serves only to mythologize the workings of the system itself.
What a policy has created another policy can alter. This assertion of inevitability, approaches
development in a very linear fashion, where each period is a culmination of the changes that
preceded it and therefore touted as a very 'natural' progression in the order of things (Weeks
1999). Any prior policy is now deemed anachronistic and irrelevant to the 'new'
times and more advanced stage of society that we are supposed to be living in. And we must ask
advanced for whom? And this leads us to ponder on the classism in such a materialist approach
that is by its very nature, devoid of seeing the history and the development of human society as
cyclical and transformative processes. We would do well to recall the triumphalist call of
imperial dominance of capital over labour in the nineteenth century, when its ideologues
proclaimed the dawning of a new era and that domination would be eternal. That period ended in
a devastating war among various European nations and the Russian Revolution (Weeks 1999).
The alternative is rational - Globalization can be prevented with new public policy
choices that combat the neoliberal market.
Hu-DeHart 3
(Evelyn. Globalization and Its Discontents: Exposing the Underside Frontiers: A
Journal of Women Studies, Volume 24, Number 2 & 3, 2003, pp. 244-260. University
of Nebraska Press)
Thus, it cannot be argued that globalization is natural and inevitable, and produces general
progress for all.¶ Rather, it should be made clear that globalization and the global finance sys- tem is
a “man-made artifact,” in the inimitable words of critic William Grei- der, one of the most
trenchant and lucid critics of corporate globalization. It is defined as, “a political regime devised
over many years by interested parties to serve their ends,” and if man made it, Greider concludes,
then man can very well undo it, “because nothing in nature or, for that matter, in economics requires the rest of us to accept a system that is so unjust and mindlessly de- structive.”46 In short,
globalization is not an inevitable force of history, “but rather the consequence of public policy
choices.”47 This is precisely what pro- testers in Chiapas and Seattle and on our campuses are
demanding of their governments and international organizations behind globalization, and of
their university administrators: Make different public policy choices. Societies and citizens must
act to counter the “destructive social convulsions” sown by the unregulated or deregulated market
forces of finance capital through so- called free trade, irresponsible investment, speculative lending,
and environ- mental degradation.48
AT: neolib Good
Globalization disproportionately benefits more powerful nations and promotes the
abuse of others for resources and labor.
Hu-DeHart 3
(Evelyn. Globalization and Its Discontents: Exposing the Underside Frontiers: A
Journal of Women Studies, Volume 24, Number 2 & 3, 2003, pp. 244-260. University
of Nebraska Press)
Increased trade spurred on by decreased regulation and removal of all bar- riers does not
necessarily produce better jobs.¶ If anything, removal of regulations only serves to increase the
power of the wealthier nations of the North over the poorer nations of the South, which of- ten feel
they have little choice but to go along with the dictates of the IMF, the World Bank, the WTO, and,
in our hemisphere, NAFTA, and the powerful governments that stand behind these global
organizations and policies. Thus, if unregulated, global free trade as we now know it will
disproportionately benefit the already wealthy nations to the great disadvantage of the poor nations, enabling a few corporations and individuals to become obscenely rich while furthering the
misery of the world’s multitudinous poor. Many new studies have demonstrated the growing gap
between and within nations, with the United States providing a notable example of both kinds of
inequalities.42 As some critics point out, contrary to the World Bank’s bald assertion that ac-
celerated globalization has produced greater world equality, far from lifting all boats, the rising
tide of globalization is “only lifting yachts”!43 Today, the world’s richest two hundred people
have more wealth than 41 percent of the world’s humanity.44 Increasing the world’s productive
capacities may be a good thing for all, but it must be accompanied by a broader distribution of
wealth.45¶
Corporate globalization exploits women and is a socially regressive system.
Hu-DeHart 3
(Evelyn. Globalization and Its Discontents: Exposing the Underside Frontiers: A
Journal of Women Studies, Volume 24, Number 2 & 3, 2003, pp. 244-260. University
of Nebraska Press)
Corporate-led globalization depends on intense exploitation of labor, espe- cially female labor,
exacerbated by the subcontracting system that answers to the logic of a race to the bottom of the
wage scale.¶ To win a contract, the subcontractor must submit the lowest bid, then squeezes the
workers to make his profit. Thus, Vietnamese workers in factories under contract to Nike and
similar U.S. transnational corporations do not even make a living wage, defined as enough to buy
three meals a day, let alone pay rent, health care, and support for a family.37 Subcontracting works
in a particularly oppressive way in the garment industry worldwide, whether in Asia, Mexico,
Central America, the Caribbean, or the United States itself. Thus, the antisweatshop movement
on college campuses correctly focuses its pressure on the manufacturers and not primarily on the
Asian subcontractors, because they understand that U.S. manufacturers pocket the lion’s share of
profits and call the shots.38¶ The biggest losers in this global assembly line are women — Latina and
Asian women—characterized as inherently, innately, and naturally suited for the kind of low-skill
labor in light manufacturing, whether in Third World export- processing factories or U.S.
electronic assembly plants and sweatshops. This “myth of nimble fingers”—a purely ideological
construct—is nothing less than rationalization for low wages, not to mention justification for the
perpet- uation of the notion of Third World women’s intellectual inferiority. It is not just the
gendered quality of the international division of labor that is so prob- lematic, but that the
gendered division is inferred and inscribed as a perma- nent hierarchy that is further reinforced by
race, class, and nationality differences, as well as denial of immigration and citizenship rights in the
case of the smuggled and undocumented.39¶ We are compelled to conclude that Third World
women in their home countries and after migration to the United States comprise one continuum in
the same gendered, transnational workforce that lies at the base of the ex- tremely exploitative and
oppressive global subcontracting system of produc- tion.40 Whether she works in a Nike plant
subcontracted to a Taiwanese factory owner in Indonesia or Vietnam, or as a contract worker in
an Asian-owned Saipan factory, or in an unregistered, unlicensed underground sweatshop in Los
Angeles operated by a Korean immigrant, or in a union shop in New York’s Chinatown owned
by a newly naturalized Chinese American, she may well be sewing the same style of garment for
the same manufacturer, affixing the same name-brand label on the same finished product. How
ironic it is that with all its “supposed modernity and wondrous technologies,” the “manic logic of
capitalism” has reproduced all the old barbarisms associated with early twen- tieth-century
capitalism.41
AT: Neolib /good – Latin America
Data is on our side—liberalization is associated with greater poverty, income
inequality, and economic instability throughout Latin America.
Hubber & Solt ‘4
(Evelyne & Frederick, Evelyne Huber: University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill Fred Solt: Rice
University, Successes and Failures of Neoliberalism)
Overall, the picture of progress in the areas of growth, stability, pov- erty, and democracy is not
particularly encouraging. Proponents of neoliberal reforms are quick to argue that the problem has
been insuffi- cient commitment to reforms. If governments had been less cautious, less intimidated
by political opposition, and instead more aggressive in pushing through a broad reform program,
the outcomes would have been better. In their view, bold actions by politically insulated technocrats, including shock therapies, are indicated to overcome resistance.¶ In order to subject these
claims to empirical scrutiny, we perform some simple comparisons. We compare countries that
ranked higher on neoliberal reforms in the mid-1990s to those that ranked lower, and we compare
more radical to more cautious reformers over the period of 1982 to 1995. We are using the best
available data on neoliberal reform in Latin America, the General Reform Index (GRI) constructed
by Morley et al. (1999). Unfortunately, the data for this index that are in the public do- main only
cover the years up to 1995. The GRI has five components: com- mercial, financial, capital
account, privatization, and tax reform.¶ The index confirms that all of the countries underwent
neoliberal re- forms in the years after the onset of the debt crisis; in fact the 1995 GRI scores for all
countries, except Jamaica (.767) and Venezuela (.667), ex- ceeded that of the most neoliberal
country of 1982, Uruguay (.776). We first divide the countries into two groups, those above the
median value of the GRI in 1995, and those below.¶ In order to better gauge the successes and
failures of radical, that is, fast and extensive, neoliberal reform processes, we then classify the
coun- tries on the basis of the extent of these reforms from 1982 to 1995, mea- sured as the
change in GRI scores. We further include a measure of the magnitude of any drastic reform
episodes their governments may have imposed during that period. We calculated the magnitude
of drastic¶ 154 Latin American Research Review¶ reform episodes for each country as its largest
one-year change on the GRI. Again, both classifications are simple dichotomies, above and below the median of the measure in question. The three classifications overlap considerably. Costa
Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Peru, and Paraguay are above the
median in all three classi- fications; Colombia, Honduras, Mexico, and Venezuela are
consistently below the median. Despite these similarities, the three classifications yield different
results that are useful for evaluating the claims made on behalf of neoliberal reform against its
actual record in Latin America. Results for our first two indicators, growth and volatility, are
shown in table 2. We divide the period into two sub-periods, 1982–89 and 1990– 98. We do this
in order to deal with the argument that an analysis of the whole period would lump together the
economic crises that preceded the reforms with the reform period itself and its aftermath. It could
be the case that the countries that suffered the worst crises then engaged in the most radical
reforms, and a bad economic performance over the en- tire period could be interpreted as a cause
rather than an effect of radi- cal neoliberal reforms. Table 2 shows that countries that had more
liberalized economies in 1995 suffered a somewhat bigger decline in GDP per capita between 1982
and 1989 but experienced clearly higher aver- age annual growth in GDP per capita between 1990
and 1998 (in con- stant dollars, adjusted for purchasing power parity). However, just as clearly,
countries that pursued more radical reform approaches suffered actually a somewhat lower
decline between 1982 and 1989 but then ex- perienced six times lower average annual growth
rates between 1990 and 1998 than countries that proceeded more cautiously. Countries that
imposed drastic reform episodes suffered a steeper decline in between 1982 and 1989, and between
1990 and 1998 grew by less than a quarter of the rate of countries that avoided them. This last
result could poten- tially be interpreted as lending some support to the alternative interpre- tation
that deeper economic crises were the causes of more radical reforms. However, one can just as
well argue that the drastic reform episodes aggravated the economic recessions. An examination of
growth rates in the period between 1973 and 1981 does not support the argu- ment that economies
with historically lower growth rates were forced into more radical reforms in the 1980s. Radical
reformers grew at an average of 1.15 percent in the period between 1973 and 1981, whereas the
more moderate reformers grew at an average annual rate of 1.51 percent—not a difference that
would lead to risky experiments. More- over, between 1973 and 1981 countries that imposed
radical reform epi- sodes in the 1980s grew at 1.77 percent per year, whereas countries that
avoided such episodes grew at 0.86 percent per year. These results sug- gest very strongly that
more liberalized economies did provide better conditions for economic growth between 1990 and
1998, but that radical approaches to liberalization have substantial costs in the form of de- pressed
growth rates. When we turn to volatility, the picture is very consistent; more liberal- ization is
associated with greater volatility. Following the Inter-American Development Bank (1995), we
measure volatility in per capita income us- ing the standard deviation of annual growth. In
countries with more liber- alized economies as of 1995, the average standard deviation in annual
growth was 5.7 percent in the period between 1990 and 1998, compared to 3.6 percent for countries
with less liberalized economies.¶ The more radical reformers had the same degree of volatility, 5.7
per- cent, and the more cautious reformers, the lower rate of 4.1 percent. Fi- nally, countries that
imposed radical reform episodes in the period between 1982 and 1998 had a volatility of 5.5
percent between 1990 and 1998, and countries that avoided drastic reform episodes, 4.2 percent.
Our results, then, indicate that both the speed of neoliberal reforms and a higher achieved level of
reforms have costs in the form of higher vola- tility. Arguably, this is a result of the combination
of the liberalization of capital markets and trade, an argument we will come back to below.¶ 1.
For this analysis, we had to correct two data points for Colombia (drawn from the World Bank’s
World Development Indicator’s CD-ROM) that clearly lacked face valid- ity. We thank Kurt
Weyland for pointing out this deficiency in a previous draft.¶ 156 Latin American Research
Review¶ Our attempt to gauge the performance of more and less liberalized economies and of
more and less radical reformers in the areas of pov- erty and inequality is somewhat hampered by
the availability of data that are comparable over time and across countries. Income inequality
data for Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Uruguay are un- available; for the remaining
countries, data for the closest available year was used. Poverty data at the national level for
Bolivia and Uruguay are unavailable. Ideally, one would want poverty data for the period before
the onset of the reforms, to measure change, but problems of compara- bility are serious.
Nevertheless, even with restricted data availability, the picture emerging from table 3 is clear and
consistent.¶ Higher levels of liberalization and more radical processes of liberal- ization are
associated with higher levels of inequality and poverty. The changes in inequality are impressive:
The countries with the more liber- alized economies as of 1995 started out around 1982 with
lower levels of inequality than the countries with the less liberalized economies as of 1995, but
the two sets of countries switched position, with the more lib- eralized economies ending up with
higher levels of inequality around 1995 than the less liberalized economies. Looking at the process
of re- form, we see that the more radical reformers started out and ended up with lower levels of
inequality than the more moderate reformers, as both sets of countries saw an increase in
inequality. However, the gap between the two sets of countries narrowed considerably, as the
more radical reformers increased their Gini index twice as much as the more moderate reformers.
The greatest costs in terms of inequality were in- curred by drastic reform episodes; countries that
had more drastic re- form episodes increased their Gini index nine times more than countries that
avoided them. There is no doubt, then, that higher levels of neoliberalism and more aggressive
tactics of liberalization are associated with rising inequality.
Neoliberalists cannot even follow their own true ideologues of creating dynamic
growth and prosperity. Instead, they obstruct capital development and promote
deindustrialization.
Michl, 2011
(Thomas Michl, Director of the Colgate London Economics Study Group, and PhD New School
for Social Research, New Left Review 70, page 122)
Neoliberal ideologues promised a more efficient allocation of capi- tal that would generate dynamic
growth and prosperity. For a brief period in the 1990s, a temporary wave of investment in
information technology appeared to make this plausible; but that washed back out over a decade
ago. Contemporary capitalism suffers from a chronic shortage of invest- ment and misallocations of
capital on a global scale. The financial system, far from facilitating real growth—a role that banks
did play, in previous stages of capitalism—actually obstructs capital development and promotes
the deindustrialization of the advanced-capitalist core. Nowhere was this more evident than in the
run-up to the Great Recession. Along a key tectonic- plate boundary, the internal stresses
presented themselves in the abysmally low business investment rate during the 2001–07
recovery. During this period, Greenspan and Bernanke were desperately trying to prevent the us
from following Japan into a deflation trap. But despite their near-zero real interest rates, an
investment-led recovery eluded them, even though prof- its, relative to either income or capital,
were strong. In manufacturing, the capital stock actually shrank for the first time since the
Depression, stark evidence of deindustrialization. Instead, the Federal Reserve got an unsustainable construction-led expansion and a house-price bubble fed by capital inflows from the
Pacific rim, channelled through a shadow-banking system ensorcelled by structured finance and
securitization.
AT: Realism
Realism fails to describe the world created by neoliberal globalization.
Santos and Garavito 2005
(Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Professor of Sociology at the School of Economics, University of
Coimbra (Portugal); and Cesar A. Rodriguez-Garavito Associate Professor of Law and founding
Director of the Program on Global Justice and Human Rights at the University of the Andes
(Bogota, Colombia). He is a founding member of the Center for Law, Justice, and Society
(Dejusticia) and an Affiliate Professor of the Law, Societies and Justice Program at the
University of Washington., “Law Politics, and the Subaltern in Counter-Hegemonic
Globalization” in Law and Globalization from Below, edited Boaventura de Sousa Santos and
Cesar A. Rodriguez-Garavito, pg 9-10)
For the present purposes, what is particularly relevant about this line of work are its epistemological tenets and its conception of hegemony,
which stand in explicit contrast with those of subaltern cosmopolitan legality. Studies
of global legal hegemony aim at a
"more realist understanding of the production of the new international economic and political
order" (Dezalay and Garth 2002b:315). Such a realist perspective is explicitly built on a twofold critique of
approaches such as ours that seek to expose and underscore the potential of counter-hegemonic
forms of political and legal action. On the one hand, it draws a sharp (and, as we will see,
problematic) distinction between description and prescription and confines proper scholarship to
the former. On the other hand, it is keen on highlighting the links between hegemonic and counterhegemonic actors - for instance, between philanthropic foundations in the North and human rights
organizations in the South as well as tensions and contradictions within transnational activist coalitions. From this viewpoint, such
links and tensions reveal that, far from "happily coexisting in this effort to work together to produce new and emancipatory global norms"
(Dezalay and Garth 2002b:318), NGOs and other actors of counter-hegemonic globalization are part and parcel of the elites benefiting from
neoliberal globalization and thus contribute to the construction of new global orthodoxies through programs to export US legal institutions and
expertise.
We offer a response to these criticisms in laying out the epistemological and political tenets of subaltern cosmopolitan legality
in the next section. For the purposes of this section, a brief discussion of the limitations and tensions of the hegemony approach is in order. First,
despite its call for realist descriptions, the reality grasped with its analytical lenses is a highly
partial one. Since its entry point of choice into global legal processes is the world of transnational
elites, the description it offers is as revealing as it is limited. Missing from this top-down picture are the
myriad local, non-English speaking actors from grassroots organizations to community leaders who, albeit oftentimes working in alliance with transnational NGOs and progressive elites, mobilize
popular resistance to neoliberal legality while remaining as local as ever. From Bolivian peasants resisting the
privatization of water services to indigenous peoples around the world resisting corporate biopiracy, these subaltern actors are a critical part of
processes whereby global legal rules are defined, as the current contestation over the regulation of water provision and property rights on
traditional knowledge bear witness (Rajagopal 2003).
AFF
Framework - Economic Focus Good
Our methodology also applies to their criticism’s methodology—a failure to incorporate
the fundamental laws of economics is an improper examination of epistemological and
ontological concerns. Prioritize economic rationality when evaluating solvency evidence.
Boettke 3 – Professor of Economics at George Mason University (Peter, “Economics as Ideology: Keynes, Laski, Hayek and the Creation
of Contemporary Politics”, Compte rendu de l’ouvrage, accessed 7/20/12)//BZ
In fact, economic
history is a long record of government policies that failed because they were
designed with a bold disregard for the laws of economics. It is impossible to understand the history of
economic thought if one does not pay attention to the fact that economics as such is a challenge
to the conceit of those in power. An economist can never be a favorite of autocrats and
demagogues. With them he is always the mischief-maker, and the more they are inwardly
convinced that his objections are well founded, the more they hate him. Ludwig von Mises Is this statement
of Mises one of ideology or science? The politically correct answer would be that this is just another example of Mises’s excessive ideological
commitment to laissez faire. But as with much in modern intellectual life, the
desire not to offend produces polite but
flawed argument at the expense of the harsh truth of the matter. The choice of economic policy
may be a matter of democratic decision making, but the consequences of economic policy on
human well-being certainly is not. And once we recognize that, then the analysis of the development of economic doctrine and
evolution of political economy in the 20th century looks totally different. The breakdown of the Keynesian consensus in the
1970s, the collapse of communism in the 1980s and the wide-spread reco-gnition of the failure of
development planning in the 1990s, point 21st century political economy in a direction that would be
a radical departure from the path it was set on at the beginning of the 20th, when an almost blind-faith in the ability
of democratic government to correct social ills captured the imagination of the intellectual elites.
The lesson of the 20th century for political economy should be one of humility and restraint. The fatal
conceit of the 20th century which sought to unleash the power of the government elites to do “good” in
the name of the masses must give way to a contemporary version of the 18th and 19th century project of constraining
the power of the state and its elites, and unleashing the productive potential of the masses. “The
curious task of economics,” Hayek has written, “is to demonstrate to men how little they really know
about what they imagine they can design.” [(1988, p. 76]. But if economic science doesn’t exist
independently from the democratic will of the citizens, then such a task is not just curious, but
absurd. Enter Kenneth Hoover’s Economics as Ideology. At one level this is a fascinating book, dealing with an important subject, and
approaching it in a unique way. The role of ideology in science, and how different thinkers of the past can
shape the contemporary political climate is indeed a worthy subject of serious study. Moreover,
the attempt to explain how the personal biographies of thinkers shape their own identity and thus ideology is also important. Unfortunately, there
is also the problem of truth in scientific discovery. All the good will in the world doesn’t matter if the theory advocated is simply in conflict with
reality. William Easterly, for example, in dealing with the post-WWII era efforts to orchestrate economic development in the 3rd world refers to
the “cartel of good intentions.” (2002) One of the first principles of political economy is that intentions
do not equal results - this
is true for the central mystery of political economy (how individuals pursuing their own interests, and only their own
interests, can within certain institutional environments generate outcomes which are socially desirable) and for the central tragedy
(how individuals can in striving to promote the public good generate unintended undesirable consequences). There are systemic
forces that are in operation in political economy and they exist independent of the wishful
thinking of participants in the political-economic nexus. Hoover doesn’t appear to recognize this fundamental point in
political economy and thus his effort to understand the development of modern political economy is flawed from the start. Let me focus on my
criticism first and then I will end highlighting aspects which I think the reader can benefit from in reading his book nevertheless. First, the
selection of subjects is bizarre from the beginning if
we are going to talk about economic science and its relation
to public policy debates. Certainly Keynes and Hayek belong, but Laski has no claim whatsoever to being an original thinker in
economics. He was a political theorists and political activist and had little to nothing to say about technical economics. Keynes and
Hayek, however, were first and foremost skilled technical economists who utilized the knowledge they had
gleaned from technical economics to make policy relevant contributions. In short, it is on the basis of
sound economic reasoning that they were able to make policy relevant arguments to their
contemporaries. But except for a paragraph here or there, the technical economics of Keynes and Hayek are passed over in this book to
focus instead on their political affiliations and political influence (Keynes with the democratic center, Hayek with the hard right - Laski is given
the hard left) and we
are treated to asserted arguments about how personal psychology impacted their
position. We are treated to these figures as political theorists or rather political icons of
movements that identified with them. This enables Hoover’s choice of thinkers to have some coherence, though the reason for
both Keynes’s and Hayek’s influence are going to get inadequate treatment as a consequence. Second, Hoover is only apparently asking a
question about the evolution of ideas and ideological influence. But a reader can sense from the second paragraph of the preface where Hoover’s
sympathies personally lay on the policy questions of the day. He laments that the ideological pendulum has swung too far to the right and then he
states plainly that “On a moment’s reflection, it is clear that governments do good things, as well as bad. And markets likewise are Janus-faced,
sometimes provident, other times the wastrel.” (p. xi) In other words, Hoover has an answer to his question before he asks it. Political
economy is to serve as a means for human betterment within the context of democratic
deliberation among citizens. These deliberations must be rational and not prone to ideological
excess if they are going to generate understanding among citizens of “the need for a complex
interweaving of institutions, processes, and constitutional safeguards so that the excesses of any
one institution may be limited, while its virtues are brought to the service of society.” (p. 270) Who,
the reader must ask, could ever be against limiting abuse and encouraging virtue? Nobody can be against the exercising of
wisdom, courage and public spiritedness in making political decisions. But in Hoover’s treatment both Laski
and Hayek are going to be found wanting in this regard because ideological theorizing in their name can be abused by politicians on the left and
right - as Hoover argues we have seen - and thus only Keynes is left to rationally mediate between the two extremes of socialism and
libertarianism. Overly
to Hoover.
ideological thinking is what causes problems in democratic deliberation, according
Permutation
Plan is a prerequisite to the alternative- only global integration of Latin American
models of economics can disseminate challenges to neoliberalism.
Sader 2008
(Emir Sader, directs the Public Policy Laboratory (LPP) of the State University of Rio de
Janeiro, where he is a professor of sociology. The Weakest Link? New Left Review 52, JulyAugust 2008)
None of this, of course, suffices to build a political and military counterweight to the US. At best
the continent is resisting, and working on its own forms of integration, in a region whose economic
clout has been much diminished by the de-industrializing effects of the economic opening-up
enforced by neoliberalism. The founding in May 2008 of Unasur, a project for the integration of
all the countries of South America, and the proposal for a South American Defence Council—
both initiatives US-free—point toward a new space and model for continental integration; though
Colombia’s formal participation complicates matters, since Uribe has decided to allow the US to
establish a military base on its territory.
The importance of the region as a whole derives from its energy resources, primarily oil, and from
its exports of cash crops, soya in particular. But domestic markets are becoming more attractive as
their capacity for consumption increases, while regional integration reinforces political
negotiating muscle, as has been seen in the dealings of the G-20 with the WTO. The process of
breaking with the neoliberal model and founding alternative spaces for trade, such as ALBA, has
turned the continent into an indispensable reference in any debate around the alternatives to
neoliberalism. It is partly for these reasons that Chávez’s leadership has become celebrated
beyond continental borders. Yet one of the more vulnerable aspects of post-neoliberal processes is
their global isolation ; in the absence of other allies Venezuela has been forced to cultivate any
governments that are in conflict with the US, such as those of Russia, Iran, Belarus and China. In
addition, the Latin American countries that have made concrete moves to break with the model are
not the most developed, relatively speaking; their greatest economic asset is to be able to count on
Venezuela’s oil.
On the ideological plane, Latin America is better placed to table issues for debate: the plurinational, pluri-ethnic state; the notion of 21st-century socialism; alternative formulas for regional
integration such as ALBA. But there are few platforms for disseminating the new ideas, raising
them against the pensée unique and its theories, incessantly propounded by the mass media. Latin
American critical thought, which can boast a long tradition of far-sighted interpretations and
theoretical innovations, is faced with fresh challenges in response to issues such as the new
nationalism, indigenous peoples, the new model of accumulation, processes of socialization and demarketization, and the historical and political future of the continent. In some countries—most
importantly Bolivia—the experiments under way are accompanied by a rich process of reflection
and theoretical elaboration. In others, there is a considerable dissociation, not to say
contradiction, between much of the intelligentsia and the process the rest of the country is
embarked on: the most striking example is Venezuela. In countries with a strong universitybased intelligentsia such as Brazil, Argentina and Mexico, a significant part of the educated elite
will not commit itself to participating in the principal areas of social and political struggle, even
if it maintains a high standard of intellectual elaboration. The existing theoretical potential may
play an important role in the construction of post-neoliberal models.
Utopian alternatives to neoliberalism fail to be sustainable, only pragmatic solutions
can solve.
Weyland 07 (Kurt Gerhard, “Latin America’s Political Economy of the Possible: beyond good revolutionaries and freemarketeers (review)”, Latin American politics & society volume 49 Number 2, page 1-2)
Placing the recent wave of market reforms in historical perspective, Santiso develops a message of great
theoretical and practical relevance. He sees Latin America’s development as a series of quests for
utopian solutions to the region’s severe and longstanding problems. In his view, this search for
perfection, undertaken both by “good revolutionaries” from the left and “free-marketeers” from the right, has been a
recipe for failure. The imposition of rigid, dogmatic blueprints on a complex, messy reality has
been unsuccessful time and time again. The attempt to maximize some goals inevitably entails the neglect
of others, and the resulting imbalances and tensions make these radical experiments
unsustainable. Utopian efforts can destroy existing structures but fail at the patient
rebuilding of a solid institutional framework, which is indispensable for guaranteeing the
credibility and long-term horizon required for successful development. Therefore, Santiso
highlights and celebrates the effort of a number of Latin American countries, especially Chile and Brazil, to
enact and administer the new market model in a pragmatic, prudent fashion. In his interpretation, the Concertación
governments in Chile and the Cardoso and Lula da Silva administrations in Brazil have pursued an eclectic
approach, combining macroeconomic stability with equity enhancing social programs. They have usefully
unleashed market forces in productive sectors by privatizing public enterprises, but have
guided the newly empowered business sector with stable institutional 201 rules and prudent regulations. By
reconstructing consensual institutions, they have created a firm domestic foundation for
their development efforts. In Santiso’s view, this pragmatic approach holds the greatest
promise for Latin America’s development. By stopping the pendulum swing between radical proposals
from the left and right, the region attains the stability required for balanced economic and social
progress. As Mexico, Colombia, and several other countries move in the direction traced by Chile
and Brazil, the author sees the prospects as fairly good. But resurgent neopopulism in Argentina
and especially Venezuela poses a threat. Attacking “neoliberalism,” at least rhetorically, it seeks to revive
elements of the state-interventionist economic nationalism that predated the market reform wave. Santiso condemns
such a return to the past as unpromising, and his book serves as a warning against these siren calls, which have
found considerable resonance in the region and among its academic observers.
Evaluate the permutation in reasonable revolutionary terms: Only the affirmative
can create space for disparate interests to join together in solidarity
HARNECKER 10,
(Marta, Chilean psychologist and former student of Louis Althusser, trans. Janet
Duckworth, "Twenty-First Century Socialism," MONTHLY REVEIW 62:3, JulyAugust)
We need a left that realizes that being radical does not consist of raising the most militant slogan
or carrying out the most extreme actions—with which only a few agree, and which scare off the
majority—but rather in being capable of creating spaces for the broadest possible sectors to meet
and join forces in struggle. The realization that there are many of us in the same struggle is what
makes us strong; it is what radicalizes us. We need a left that understands that we must obtain
hegemony, that is to say, that we have to convince instead of imposing. We need a left that
understands that, more important than what we have done in the past, is what we will do together
in the future to win our sovereignty—to build a society that makes possible the full development
of all human beings: the socialist society of the twenty-first century.
Alternative fails without spiral structure. Aff. is key to rally around.
Harvey, 09
(David Harvey; Professor of anthropology and geography at the graduate center of the city
University of New York; Organizing for the anti-capitalist transition;
http://seminario10anosdepois.wordpress.com/)
The central problem is that in aggregate there is no resolute and sufficiently
unified anti-capitalist movement that can adequately challenge the reproduction
of the capitalist class and the perpetuation of its power on the world stage.
Neither is there any obvious way to attack the bastions of privilege for capitalist
elites or to curb their inordinate money power and military might. While
openings exist towards some alternative social order, no one really knows where
or what it is.
Lenin's famous question "what is to be done?" cannot be answered, to be sure,
without some sense of who it is might do it where. But a global anti-capitalist
movement is unlikely to emerge without some animating vision of what is to be
done and why. A double blockage exists: the lack of an alternative vision
prevents the formation of an oppositional movement, while the absence of such
a movement precludes the articulation of an alternative. How, then, can this
blockage be transcended? The relation between the vision of what is to be done
and why and the formation of a political movement across particular places to
do it has to be turned into a spiral. Each has to reinforce the other if anything is
actually to get done. Otherwise potential opposition will be forever locked down
into a closed circle that frustrates all prospects for constructive change, leaving
us vulnerable to perpetual future crises of capitalism with increasingly deadly
results. Lenin's question demands an answer.
Perm – Solves Pedagogy
Combining strategies to the economy is key to critical engagement and flexible
strategies for change—creates new scholarly possibilities
ELLNER, 13
(Steve, professor of economic history and political science at Universidad de Oriente
in Puerto La Cruz, Venezuela, "Latin America's Radical Left in Power:
Complexities and Challenges in the Twenty-First Century,"
http://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/9270)
TFCLARL – twenty first century Latin American radical leftists
In short, the relatively novel and complex dimensions of the TFCLARL experiences in power, in addition to contradicting the simplistic twoleft thesis, have major implications particularly for leftist strategy. The
trial-and-error approach embraced by the
TFCLARL, for instance, is conducive to the rejection of dogmatic positions based on preconceived
blueprints. In addition , the TFCLARL’s acceptance of heterogeneity in the absence of both
vanguardism and the prioritization of one social agent over others points in the direction of a
strategy that synthesizes different and at times conflicting interests and visions. Finally, the
TFCLARL’s tendency of rejection of dogmatism, celebration of diversity and eclecticism are
ingredients that lend themselves to rich debate on the left as well as rewarding scholarly inquiry.
AFF PERMUTATION: KATZ
Katz concludes affirmative – Need to combine socialist vision with constitutional
reform
KATZ 13
(Claudio, professor of economic history at the University of Buenos Aires, trans.
Leonard Morin, "Socialist Strategies in Latin America," The New Latin American
Left, 45)
If elections were pure trickery, they would not have been able to fulfill the progressive role that
they have played, for example, in Venezuela. It is vital to denounce the circumscribed character that civil
rights have under a social system governed by profit. But democratic advances must be broadened
and not disdained. They constitute the basis of a future regime of social equality that will grant substantial
in the constitutional framework fosters the political
practices necessary for the future socialist democracy. Rejecting electoral participation is as
pernicious on a tactical level (isolation) as it is in terms of strategy (preparing this socialist future).
In the face of the false dilemma of accepting or ignoring the rules of constitutionalism , there is a
content to the formal mechanisms of democracy. Participation
third viable path: to combine direct action with electoral participation. With this approach, the expressions of
people's power which any revolutionary process requires-would be made compatible with the maturation of socialist consciousness, which to a
certain extent takes place in the constitutional arena.
AFF: AT Pragmatism Bad
Their pragmatism bad arguments relies on a false and paralyzing notion of how
politics function- Evaluate plan on its merits, not its ideology
NAZEMROAYA 13
(Mahdi Darius, research associate at the centre for research on globalization (CRG),
"The Pink Tide in Latin America: An Alliance Between Local Capital and
Socialism?" Strategic Culture Foundation, http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-pinktide-in-latin-america-an-alliance-between-local-capital-and-socialism/5333782)
When looking at this question caution against oversimplification and romanticization is needed. A case in point
about this oversimplification and romanticization is that Paraguay’s President Fernando Luga was praised as a steward by the leftists, even
though he had to politically work as a centrist. Linked to this, there is also an important question about what right-wing and left-wing really
mean. Do
governments, groups, and movements that call or consider themselves right-wing or leftwing really fit into such categories?In this context, the terms “left” and “right” need to be operationalized before any discussion
can move forward. For purposes of discussion, the “left” would best be operationalized or defined as a political position that advocates reform or,
in its radical form, revolution. Its proponents describe it as a position aimed at reducing or ending social inequality whereas its critics view it as
either utopian or destabilizing. On the other hand, the “right” would best be operationalized or defined as a conservative and reactionary political
position. Its proponents describe it as traditional and a safeguard of stability whereas its critics and opponents say that it supports social
hierarchies that maintain societal inequality. Socio-politically, the terms “left” and “right” originate in the upheavals of the French Revolution.
The French Estates-General of the Bourbon monarchy and its revolutionary predecessor, the French National Assembly, became divided between
those groups that supported the Bourbon monarchy, clergy, and “old regime” and those groups that opposed them in favour of revolution and
republicanism. The supporters of the “old regime” would sit to the right of the legislative president or speaker in the legislative chamber whereas
those groups that supported change and a “new regime” would sit to the left. It is also important to note that the “right” emerged as a reaction to
the formation of the calls for change from the “left.” A Plethora of “Lefts” in Latin America. It should be pointed out that contrary
to the
highly simplistic dualism portrayed by the US government and most leftists about the
categorization of Latin America into “left” or “right” is overly simplistic. Things are actually not clear-cut. This
means that the above operationalized definitions of “right” and “left” are essentially ideal-types. The leftist governments and movements of Latin
America are an eclectic bunch.
Thinking of them all in terms of one-size-fits-all is naive and ignores the
history and local circumstances/variables that have constructed and influenced each one. In short, each
one has its own identity. At least at the grassroots level, they want local agency, relatively more inclusive societies, and a reduction of the
influential role of Latin America’s comprador elite oligarchs.
Aff – AT: Reform/Permitted Left
Their link arguments are based on a false dichotomy of leftist struggles- reject their
attempt to forge a pure movement of appropriately radical leftism.
ELLNER, 13
(Steve, professor of economic history and political science at Universidad de Oriente
in Puerto La Cruz, Venezuela, "Latin America's Radical Left in Power:
Complexities and Challenges in the Twenty-First Century,"
http://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/9270)
The focus on the complexity of the twenty-first century left and the heterogeneity of its following is
diametrically opposed to the simplistic concept of populism embodied in the “two-left thesis”
formulated by intellectuals such as Jorge Castañeda and Mario Vargas Llosa. Their arguments are used by the U.S. State
Department as part of the effort to isolate Latin American governments perceived to be “antiAmerican.”
The two-left thesis classifies the TFCLARL as the “bad left” or “populist left,” which it contrasts with the allegedly
responsible policies of the
“good left,” namely moderates such as Lula. The bad left is distinguished by its
radical rhetoric, intransigence and confrontational tactics. Examples include López Obrador, who created a shadow
cabinet to protest the alleged fraud of the 2006 presidential elections, and Ollanta Humala (at the time of his first presidential bid in 2006), who,
according to Castañeda, attempted to “invade” Chile in what was really a peaceful symbolic protest in April 2007 to draw attention to Peru’s
border claims (Castañeda, 2008: 232). The
two-left thesis emphasizes personal ambition, style and discourse and in doing so
completely passes over the complex array of groups that form part of the twenty-first century left and the difficult
decisions that have been thrust upon it as a result of its commitment to the pacific road to power.
TFCLARL movements, due to their pronounced internal diversity and contradictions, are even more complex, as is repeatedly recognized by
Latin American leftist theoreticians (Boron, 2008: 126; Dussel, 2008: 72). Thus, for instance, they are committed (and have taken steps) to
overcoming their organizational shortcoming and promoting participatory democracy while in many cases retaining the strong executive powers
of an all-powerful líder máximo. Furthermore, while lacking the blueprints for long-term change of orthodox Marxism, twenty-first century
leftists have defined themselves as socialists and have debated different socialist options, unlike the more ideologically vague classical populism
of the 1930s and 1940s. Indeed, their ideological vagueness may be a logical response to the vacuum created by the collapse of the Soviet Union,
or in the words of Laclau “a precondition to constructing relevant political meaning” (Laclau, 2005: 17-18). In short
the political
agenda that lies behind the two-left thesis rules out a nuanced analysis of non-Communist
transformational movements in Latin America both in the twentieth century and the present and is
at odds with rich scholarly writing that demonstrates their complex and dynamic nature.
AFF – Plan not Key to Neolib
Latin America Not key – neoliberalism failing structurally globally now.
DOSSAN APRIL 22, 2013
(SAMEER is Advocacy Coordinator, Reshaping Global Power with ActionAid International, a global anti-poverty organization. As an activist,
Sameer has campaigned against neoliberal policies since 1996 in the U.S., Canada, India and the Philippines. Views expressed here do not
necessarily represent those of ActionAid International. The Icelandic Canary¶ Four Signs Neoliberalism is (Almost) Dead
http://www.counterpunch.org/2013/04/22/four-signs-neoliberalism-is-almost-dead/¶ )
The basic premise of neoliberalism – that “free markets” lead to better growth, higher prosperity
and even more equality – was always fiction. As Cambridge economist Ha-Joon Chang has
repeatedly pointed out, there is no such thing as a free market. Nor is there any example of a
¶
country that has developed by following the neoliberal tenets of privatization, liberalization and
budget cuts. Instead countries have traditionally used some mix of subsidies, tariffs, and debtfinanced investment to prop up industries and shift comparative advantage to higher-end goods.¶
Despite the history, neoliberals argue that markets alone should determine things like wages, and
that corporations and their owners should be able to operate however they like. Developed
countries that adopted neoliberal tenets post-1980 saw wages stagnate almost as quickly as
corporate profits skyrocketed.¶ In the developing world it was much worse. Africa suffered two
decades of economic stagnation as a direct result of being forced to follow these policies, with
Latin Americans and Asians doing not much better. The past decade has seen some
improvement, but the global community is still well behind where it should be in terms of
eradicating things like hunger and preventable disease.¶ But the neoliberal era may finally be
nearing its long-awaited end. Here’s why.¶ 1) The IMF has admitted that budget cuts are not always
the answer.¶ The IMF has for over three decades forced countries to restructure their economies to
be in line with neoliberal tenets. In particular, they have forced indebted countries to cut budgets
before they can borrow from capital markets to pay off creditors. The phrases bureaucrats and
politicians invented to sell this ideology are by now clichés. “Governments can’t spend more than
they earn,” “We all need to tighten our belts,” etc. etc. By cutting government spending, the story
goes, countries make room for increased private sector spending, and the economy grows.¶
Though earlier IMF studies had come to similar conclusions, it wasn’t until January 2013 that the
IMF’s chief economist published what amounts to a “mea culpa”. Turns out that decreasing
public investment is actually a pretty good way to hurt prospects for economic growth rather than
increase them. Oops.¶ And there’s another twist in the story. For the last few years, decision
makers have been citing a paper by Harvard economists that ostensibly highlights the dangers of
countries borrowing too much in order to finance public expenditures. The paper specifically
suggested a cutoff – when the debt hits 90% of GDP – beyond which economies wou