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The Failed State of Afghanistan: Introduction
Currently playing on the world stage is the Global War on Terror and of the many
actors involved in the production Afghanistan has a leading role. Afghanistan is a country
with a turbulent history. The cold war left the country in chaos and civil war that
eventually led to the rise of an oppressive regime that was based on extremism, called the
Taliban. Taliban relations with terrorism led to its own removal from power when
Afghanistan became the first front in the war on terror. While removing the Taliban from
power was seemingly a flawless act, it actually placed Afghanistan in a dire situation.
Although the Taliban was violent and oppressive, it was arguably a legitimate
government in the sense that it was able to impose its will over more than 90 percent of
the territory (Background 1). A legitimate government is an important part of the
structure of a state. Without a legitimate government, the functions of an effective state
are impossible to achieve, warlords and their militias break up the territory through
fighting, and narcotics production runs rampant. The acts of invading of Afghanistan and
deposing the Taliban were intended to liberate the Afghani citizens and vanquish the
terrorists, but one unwanted result has been the failure of the state.
The Global War on Terror has caused significant changes for the country, changes
that never would have occurred had it not been for the attacks by Al-Qaeda on the U.S.,
and the Taliban’s connection to that terrorist organization. Afghanistan is now currently
being reconstructed under the supervision of the U.S.-led coalition, the United Nations,
and the current Afghan government. Afghanistan’s supervised reconstruction will remain
a leading global issue until it is completed, as it remains a front in the terror war, is an
important opportunity for the United Nations to experiment with “peace building,” and
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provides implications for the future of democracy and perhaps stability in the Middle
East. The successful completion of constructing a new Afghanistan is therefore
paramount, and it is necessary to consider how to advance the process into the future. In
order to interpret the reconstruction process as it stands today, it is necessary to
understand the background that led to the failure of the state, and the reconstruction
process as it has progressed thus far.
Before the Terror War: Afghanistan Withering
Afghanistan’s Cold War and post-Cold War history includes many pertinent
events leading to its current status of a failed state; the state was in a weakened condition
even before the Global War on Terror. War, drug trade, human rights issues, and an
intimate link to terrorism mark Afghanistan’s recent history. A history that is politically
complex, with Islamic fundamentalists, warlords, and drug traffickers playing key roles.
During the mid-1990s, one group took control of Afghanistan and that was a
fundamentalist group called the Taliban. While the Taliban did implement some policies
restricting the drug trade in Afghanistan, the state of Afghanistan began to wither under
the regime between 1996 and 2001 (Rasanayagam 191). The Taliban, while able to
maintain military power over most of the state, showed its either unwillingness or
incompetence in maintaining the other attributes of a sovereign nation. The Taliban never
built the institutions needed to run a state, or assumed any responsibility for the welfare
of the Afghani citizens. Instead “they left [these tasks] to the international community of
UN agencies and NGOs funded by foreign donors (Rasanayagam 212).” Under the
Taliban, women were oppressed and there was continuous fighting between the regime
and the remnants of the Northern Alliance, freedom fighters who opposed the Taliban’s
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rule (Marsden 58). The relationship between Afghanistan and terrorism also blossomed
under the Taliban, and this relationship led Afghanistan to become the first front in the
war on terror when the terrorist organization it was harboring attacked the U.S. on
September 11, 2001. Ironically, the U.S. was partially responsible for both the rise of the
Taliban, and Afghanistan becoming a haven for terrorism.
Afghan History: Soviets then Terrorists
Between the years of 1980 and 1991, the United States had a vested interest in
Soviet occupied Afghanistan. It is well known that the U.S. made many contributions to
the Afghans fighting to rid the country of Soviet influence, through money and weapons.
A lesser-known U.S. contribution was freedom fighters in the form of the most radical
Muslims from around the world. This was a joint effort between the American CIA
(Central Intelligence Agency) and the Pakistan ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence), with
Saudi Arabia also contributing some radicals of their own; one being Osama bin Laden.
This strategy served all three actors, it helped Pakistan further Islamic causes, it
contributed to the U.S. cold war policy by showing “the entire Muslim world fighting the
Soviet Union alongside the Afghans (Haleem 124),” and it helped Saudi dump some of
its extremists on another country. One unforeseen result of this strategy was the hatred
the extremists held for the Soviets being eventually transferred to the nations, which had
inserted them into Afghanistan.
During the years of war between Afghanistan’s freedom fighters and the Soviet
backed forces, both the Americans and Soviets had strengthened political movements that
had little indigenous support (Marsden 148). After the Soviets left and anarchy ensued,
these political movements failed to form any government and led to more fighting, this
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time between several of the left over factions. The early 1990s saw a period of civil war
in Afghanistan between competing factions/movements that had historically opposed
each other over nationalistic and religious issues (Johnson 2). American interest in
Afghanistan dwindled as Soviet influence had been eradicated by the beginning of the
decade, but Pakistan’s interest continued. The Taliban movement was directly related to
the Soviet occupation and subsequent withdrawal. The combined factors of Pakistan’s
remaining interest, and the post-Cold War condition of Afghanistan made the time ripe
for the ascent of the Taliban.
Pakistan wanted a government in place that would be friendly and one movement
that seemed to fit the bill was the Taliban (Haleem 125). Pakistan’s population includes
many people of the Pashtun ethnicity (the ethnic majority in Afghanistan), and believed
they would be able to open direct trading routes for trade with Central Asia by assisting a
Pashtun group in taking power in Afghanistan (Haleem 125). Pakistan helped the
Taliban, which was primarily Pashtun, take power in the mid-1990s. At the time, the U.S.
supported the Taliban’s regime through its allies, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, because the
Taliban seemed to bring stability to the chaotic Afghanistan, and shared American antiIranian sentiment. However, the U.S. miscalculated the true motives of the Taliban, and
when the Taliban captured Kabul, the capital city, in 1996 and established the Islamic
Emirate of Afghanistan, the U.S. did not recognize the true threat the Taliban posed. It
was not long, however, before the true goals of what was in fact a theocratic totalitarian
regime became evident. Even before Kabul was captured, the Taliban had marginalized
Pakistan’s influence, not allowing Pakistan to use the regime as a puppet, and had begun
to support terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda.
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The Taliban’s Intimacy with Terrorism
In September of 1996, before the capture of Kabul, Osama Bin Laden, a leader in
the terrorist organization Al-Qaeda, had become a supporter of the Taliban. Bin Laden
had recognized the potential for the Taliban to become the leading power in Afghanistan,
and donated a large amount of money (some $3,000,000 (U.S.)) toward the campaign to
take Kabul (Nojumi ). In the following years, Bin Laden would strengthen his ties with
the Taliban even more thorough finances, weapons, and through intermarriage with the
Taliban leader Mullah Muhammad Omar. It was during these years that Bin Laden was
able to set up training camps and coordinate his terrorist undertakings around the world in
the name of Al-Qaeda. The Taliban provided safe haven for terrorists through out the late
1990s, and this brought the story of the U.S., Pakistan, and the Cold War full circle. The
terrorists from Afghanistan began to wreak havoc in a diminishing Pakistan in the later
part of the decade, and terrorism born in Afghanistan found its way to United States soil.
The attack on the United States in 2001 marked the beginning of a new era for both the
world and Afghanistan. The relationship between the Taliban and Al-Qaeda/Osama Bin
Laden led to the expulsion of both from Afghanistan, and the failure of the state.
The Era of the Terror War: An Era of Change for Afghanistan
In 2001, the United States-led war on terror began. The falling of the World Trade
Center towers will become as historically significant a symbol as the end of the Cold
War; although, while the dismantling of the Soviet Union signified the end of an era, the
towers represent the beginning of an era. The age of the Global War on Terror began on
September 11, 2001. The weeks following the attacks saw the U.S. skillfully organize the
coordination of information and international support to prepare for the initial stages of
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the war. The two targets listed for the first campaign of the war, later named Operation
Enduring Freedom, were “the Al-Qaeda training camps and installations in Afghanistan
and the Taliban (Rasanayagam 252).” The U.S. decided to use lessons learned in
Operation Desert Storm and begin the offensive using air power to destroy the military
capacity of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. The second phase was a ground offensive run by
the U.S., but involving a combination of forces from Russia, Great Britain, and the
Northern Alliance (Rasanayagam 252). The Northern Alliance consisted of a barely
cohesive group of militant factions led by a smorgasbord of warlords. The campaign
began on 7 October 2001 and continues today. Operation Enduring Freedom saw the
Taliban’s political force virtually eliminated and Al-Qaeda’s withdrawal from the
country. Unfortunately, with the deposing of the Taliban, Afghanistan saw its, if not
legitimate at least dominant, government dissolve along with whatever sovereignty
existed under Taliban rule, and this further diminished the already withering state. The
ousting of the Taliban left a power vacuum that needed to be filled with a new
government, and a state in dire need of reconstruction.
State Building: Transition to a new Government
An interim government was established as a result of the December 2001
“Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment
of Permanent Government Institutions (also called the Bonn Agreement).” Bonn
Delegates chose Hamid Karzai to be the head of an interim government based in Kabul
(Johnson 3). The goal of democratic development was also introduced during this
conference, and a timetable, of four years, for the completion of the goals set by the
agreement was established. Bonn included provisions for the creation of loya jirgas
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(grand assemblies) both emergency and constitutional, and set other goals for the process
of re-construction. The emergency loya jirga was to elect a transitional government, and
the constitutional loya jirga would draft a constitution for the nationally elected
government. Such goals included, the United Nations playing a key role in the process,
National elections by 2004, the organization of an Afghan military, and the eventual
discharge of all aid when the re-construction was completed. Bonn outlined the process to
rebuild the state of Afghanistan.
The emergency loya jirga met in June 2002, and included 1,600 participants from
all regions of the country. The loya jirga selected the transitional government and elected
a president to head it. Hamid Karzai was elected and he appointed, and the loya jirga
approved of, a 111-member cabinet. The transitional government would also be run from
Kabul. Bonn called for a constitutional loya jirga to adopt a new constitution within 18
months of the selection of the transitional government (Johnson 9). The United Nations
saw the drafting of a constitution as a “fundamental state building exercise”, and from
December 2003 to January 2004, a 502-person loya jirga met and drafted a new Afghan
constitution (Johnson 9).
Under the new constitution, the Head of State and Head of Government is the
President. The President is eligible for two 5-year terms, and is elected by a majority of
the popular vote. There are now 34 recognized provinces in Afghanistan, Each province
is governed by provincial councils; council members are elected by a popular vote, and
they serve 4-year terms. A Supreme Court and bicameral legislature were also created.
The two chambers of the legislature include the Meshrano Jirga (upper house), and the
Wolesi Jirga (lower house). The lower house has the power to ratify treaties, propagate
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laws, and approve budgets. A fixed number of delegates from each of the 34 provinces
are to constitute the 249 member Wolesi Jirga (Komano 13). The upper has the power to
approve proposed laws and the budget. Both houses contain elected members from all 34
provinces, but the Meshrano Jirga has a mixture of appointed and elected members. The
Meshrano Jirga will consist of 102 members, one delegate from each provincial
assembly, one delicate to represent the district assemblies in each province, and 34
delegates appointed by the president (Komano 13). The power to impeach the president
was also included in the powers of the bicameral legislature.
The constitution made many provisions to affirm women’s equality under the new
government. The president is required to choose women for half of his appointees to the
House of Elders, and the House of People is supposed to include at least 68 women,
about 25 percent (Johnson 10). Under Taliban rule, Afghan women suffered under
oppression. Under the new government, it seems that women will not suffer, and will
actually play an important role in the new system. With the constitution for the new
system drafted, the next step was to elect the persons to fill the offices.
State Building: Electing the New Government
The Bonn Agreement called for, free and fair, elections within two years of the
emergency loya jirga, but several factors caused delays. Rather than having presidential,
provincial, and legislative elections on the same day, they were rescheduled for different
times. By June 2004, the two-year deadline, elections had not yet taken place, but the first
presidential elections were scheduled for October.9 October 2004. Eligible voters for the
elections were those over the age of 18, and out of the 11,350,000 registered voters
8,120,000 voted (Kamano 11). Hamid Karzai won the majority of the vote, and the
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presidential election over 17 other candidates (Rubin and Humayun 9). With 55.4 percent
of the vote, Karzai received much strong support from urban areas, but detailed analysis
of the election results shows that region support ran along ethnic lines (Kamano 11).
Nonetheless, the presidential election was a success in that the Taliban insurgents did not
sabotage it, and it would appear as though the people of Afghanistan were enthusiastic
about the new democratic process. There was a voter turn out rate of more than 70
percent. Legislative and Provincial elections were later held on 18 September 2005, with
women winning the proper proportions of seats in both houses of the legislature as
outlined by the constitution (Johnson 15).
Through these elections, Afghanistan established a legitimate government within
its own state, and took a step toward international recognition of its legitimacy. The UN
generally recognizes states with democratic constitutions, and sees elections as a
“principal benchmark” (Rubin 184). The United States recognizes legitimate
governments that are elected by “universal adult suffrage,” and, along with the UN, also
requires that states adhere to basic human rights standards (Rubin 184). With its new
constitution, and elected government, with women holding positions, Afghanistan is
certainly moving toward international legitimacy. However, Afghanistan has yet to
become internationally legitimate because it still lacks some of the key factors that make
an effective state, and continues to be a failed state.
Reconstruction Incomplete: New Government, but Still a Failed State
To say that early reconstruction processes were a failure would be a false
statement; however, in retrospect, several things could have received more consideration.
Explanation for why Afghanistan continues as a failed state can be found in some of the
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processes that took place immediately following the removal of the Taliban. The
emergency loya jirga and Bon Agreement created a transitional government based in
Kabul, and established an itinerary to develop a new permanent government; however,
neither provided plans for creating the institutions necessary for a new state to establish
the legitimacy of that government.
An effective state needs have a monopoly of the security institutions in its
territory; in other words, the state should be the dominant force of the land. While Bonn
did establish the goal to develop Afghan security and armed forces, it did not provide
provisions for achieving this goal. As a result, the forces that the Kabul government has
to enforce its power are not strong enough to control the land of Afghanistan; they are not
even strong enough to control Kabul. Assistance from international forces is required just
to keep order in Kabul, and despite this assistance, three election administrators from the
UN staff were taken hostage, in broad daylight, the same day the presidential election
results were announced. So while the Kabul government is legitimate, in the sense that
the people of the country elected it, it is suffering a crisis of penetration.
Without the development of strong forces that are under the control of the Kabul
government, Afghanistan will continue to be a failed state. The U.S.-led coalition and the
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) are currently developing the Afghanistan
National Army (ANA), but an Afghan army capable of controlling the entire state has yet
to materialize. For now, the international forces still do the majority of fighting, and this
presents another problem in itself. If the forces with the monopoly over security
institutions are not controlled by the Afghan government, then any progress toward
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establishing the new government’s rightful rule over the country is hollow, as the power
comes from outsiders not the government.
Bonn also neglected to address many of the problems that have continued to
plague the re-constructing of Afghanistan such as, the fighting between different ethnic
groups, the regional chieftains, referred to as “warlords”, and the resurgence of the opium
production (Johnson 2). The warlords who had helped run the Taliban out of the country
did not want to participate in the new Kabul government when it was established. The
warlords instead preferred to keep their autonomy; this decision has led to centerperiphery tensions, and thus, has greatly contributes to the crisis of penetration the new
government has been perpetually faced with.
The failure of Bonn to address the problem of the warlords has led the interim,
transitional, and elected governments, to contend with the influence of the warlords and
their powerbase. The warlords’ powerbases come from the regional militias they control,
and for many, the financing they gain through the production and trade of opium. The
opium production in Afghanistan has skyrocketed since the deposing of the Taliban:
The country is fast approaching narco-state status with its
opium crop and transport representing 35-60 percent of the
country’s licit GDP. Current estimates posit that
approximately 87 percent of the world’s heroin is produced
in Afghanistan (Johnson 1).
The regional warlords will no doubt continue to present immense problems in the
reconstruction of Afghanistan.
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Had the Bonn agreement considered incorporating the moderate Taliban into the
new system, rather than just hoping the group would dissolve on its own, the insurgency
may never have become an issue, but now it is too late. For now, the ISAF has the
responsibility of protecting the new Afghan government against the insurgents, and the
U.S.-led coalition has the responsibility of counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency.
During 2006, the security in Afghanistan began to deteriorate. In 2007, when there was a
troop surge in Iraq, another front in America’s war on terror, security was improved
there; however, with increased security in Iraq, the U.S. saw the situation in Afghanistan
continue to escalate (International 1). Subsequently, U.S. commanders in Afghanistan
have since been asking for more troops to fight a mounting insurgency. Although the
Taliban saw its political, and most of its military, power vanished in 2001, those
extremists who were left over regrouped, and even after seven years of war, the they have
yet to yield, and it is likely that they have been aided by Al-Qaeda. The war, it seems, is
bound to continue for many more years; some officials even say that it is fated to be
unsuccessful (We 7). Until a capable Afghan national army is built, these forces will
continue to be responsible for the security. Security, along with many other issues, is very
important in the reconstruction process.
In early 2006, following the end of the four-year period of the Bonn Agreement,
the London Conference on Afghanistan was held to address impediments to
reconstruction and confirm the commitment of the international community to the
process. A new five-year plan, called the Afghanistan Compact, was produced during the
London Conference, and, much like the Bonn Agreement, it established benchmarks to
further the efforts toward Afghanistan becoming an effective state (Rubin and Humayun
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1). The Afghanistan Compact attempts to tackle the things that Bonn had failed to
address, as well as other persisting problems plaguing the reconstruction process. The
compact aims to develop Afghanistan into an effective, independent, and legitimate state.
For Afghanistan to meet such lofty goals, the compact provides plans to improve
security, governance, develop the economy, reducing the narcotics industry, and
improving regional cooperation (Rubin and Humayun 10). With the Afghanistan
Compact, the international community reaffirmed its commitment to the state-building
process in Afghanistan, but in order for reconstruction to end successfully, those involved
will need to consider several critical factors as they progress.
The Future of Reconstruction
One of the immediate issues that must be addressed is the production and
trafficking of narcotics. It is one of the most, if not the most, significant problems
impeding the progress of Afghanistan (Stránsky 39). The narcotics economy funds the
Taliban, terrorists, and warlords; thus, fueling the violence and internal tensions within
the country. Afghanistan will not be able to eliminate the narcotics problem alone.
Narcotics issues affect the international community at large, and no one can solve the
problem alone. The solution of the narcotics problem in Afghanistan will only be found
through international support and cooperation. Any plan to fix the problem must realize
that the process will take some time. A long-term plan must be organized and the aid
from the international community must not be based on the condition of short termeradication of narcotics production, such a plan would impoverish the country and
undermine the reconstruction process in general (Rubin and Humayun 11). Many farmers
depend on the poppy crop for their livelihood, so the immediate destruction the entire
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crop would be a grave mistake. Instead, the solution would be to provide massive support
to the farmers in the coming years to wean them off the poppy crop and on to other crops,
and then to provide a market in which the new crops may be sold (Stránsky 39). The
issue of narcotics is one of many that will require the support and cooperation of the
international community to solve.
In order to solve any of the problems facing reconstruction the amount and type of
assistance provided by the international community must be taken into account. The
resources, support, and assistance provided must be carefully orchestrated to advance the
newly created Afghan institutions, and to provide the opportunity for Afghanistan’s
sovereignty to grow (Rubin and Humayun 11). Recognizing that it is neither time to
reduce the military presence of the U.S. coalition or UN forces, nor is it time to reduce
economic aide is also paramount. Reducing aid and military presence before
reconstruction is complete could have catastrophic effects on the future of the state.
Methodical implementation of the aide and support of the international community over
the next phase of reconstruction will be very important. To ensure Afghanistan will not
fall apart once the direct support of the international community is gone, a few critical
missions must be completed. The international actors supporting the reconstruction must
be willing to provide the means to develop Afghanistan’s economy, continue aiding the
establishment of the new government, and try to integrate the new Afghanistan into the
region (Rubin and Humayun 10).
The building of a successful state will require the growth of a successful
economy. A stronger economy will be crucial in providing the finances needed to help
Afghanistan take over security, improve governance, tackle narcotics and build a justice
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system (Rubin and Humayun 11). Therefore, a developed economy will also be important
in the process of the new Afghan government establishing legitimacy, and stability in the
state.
Those supporting the process of legitimizing the new government must be sure to
provide the funding and aide required for the necessary institutions until the Afghan
economy is built up. Funding will be needed to build police, and security forces. The
Afghan National Army will require funding as well as training. Government institutions
will also require much aide, until established as legitimate the revenue the government
receives to fund its institutions, through taxation, will be limited because of the crisis of
penetration. Finances through trade will also be scarce until the economy is developed
and the government is established as legitimate.
One final issue that must be resolved before a reconstructed Afghanistan would be
safe and secure in the Middle East, is the integration of the new state into the region.
Ethnic, political, and economic tensions will leave Afghanistan fending for itself in the
middle of an unfriendly region if steps are not taken to assure its successful reintegration
once it becomes an independent state again. The relationship between Pakistan and
Afghanistan will be most important in this integration process. Years of conflict over
trade, ethnic, and border issues have lead to a sour relationship between Pakistan and
Afghanistan (Rubin and Humayun 10). Most recently, Pakistan and Afghanistan forces
clashed when, in spring of 2007, Pakistan constructed a fence along the two countries
contiguous border. The international community must work to resolve the issues between
the two neighboring countries so that Afghanistan can have an ally, or at least one less
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enemy, in the region. Before the aforementioned missions are completed, it is unlikely
that the reconstruction process will be completed successfully.
An Austere Present but Hope for the Future
A failed state is one in which the national government cannot control its own
territory. Afghanistan became a failed state the day that Operation Enduring Freedom
started. Once the Taliban was removed, Afghanistan lost the things that make a state a
state; such as sovereignty, legitimate government, and independence. While historic
achievements have been made in the years since the war began, it has to be
acknowledged that Afghanistan has yet to become an effective state. Afghanistan remains
less than sovereign, and the problem of establishing legitimacy for the new government
persists.
Currently, Kabul is aided by international forces in establishing its legitimacy,
and so even if the crisis of penetration is solved, Afghanistan’s sovereignty could at best
be considered limited. The states sovereignty would be limited because, in order to
receive the aide of international forces, Afghanistan has had to give up certain rights to
the supranational entities, and foreign nations that supply it. Until Afghanistan is able to
establish its new government as legitimate by means of its own institutions, the state will
be unable to attain true sovereignty and independence. In 2011, when the Afghanistan
Compact has run its course, it will once again be time for all those involved to convene
and evaluate the progress of reconstruction, as well as revise the blueprints for the new
Afghanistan. By that time, the Afghanistan project will certainly not be complete, but,
optimistically, the country will still be headed toward a rebirth, as it is now.
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In 2011, the global community will again have to decide whether to continue its
commitment to rebuilding Afghanistan. It would be nonsensical not to recommit because,
when reconstruction of the state is finally completed, Afghanistan may become an
effective democratic state in the Middle East, and perhaps provide a platform to bring
stabilization to the region. The success of a democratic Afghanistan would greatly help in
promoting democratic movements in other states of the region. If democracy becomes
popular among Middle Eastern nations then stabilization would necessarily follow
because ideally democracies do not go to war with other democracies. Democracy and
stabilization are lofty ideas in the Middle East; ideas that are presently grounded by the
fact that reconstruction of Afghanistan remains ongoing and problematic. If such ideas
ever take flight, it will not be in the near future, but that is not say they will never be
actualized. With perseverance from the global community, the building of a new state of
Afghanistan will one day be successful, and perhaps peace in the region will follow.
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