Module -
10
Contents
1. Prevailing laws and regulations
-2
2. Chemical Disasters or Accidents
-3
3. Sources of the above disasters and accidents
-3
4. Types of major chemical/industrial hazards
-4
1.4 Fire
-4
4.2. Explosion
-7
4.3. Toxic release
- 10
5. Impacts zones:
- 11
6. Approach to reduce accidents or disasters
- 12
6.1. Prevention
- 13
6.2. Response
- 23
7. Glossary
- 33
8. Reference
- 34
District Collectors (DCs) are officers of the Indian Administrative Services and are the most
powerful government officials of the districts. They are entrusted the task of handling laws
and orders, revenue collection, taxation, the land use planning permissions and the handling
of natural and man-made emergencies.
Looking into the recent development in the area of disaster management the district collector is
the boss of all types of Disaster Management. What is his/her duty and how he/she takes
action are described in the present module. The module 15 also provides guidance to manage
disasters.
Through this module District Collectors will be in a position to understand the




Existing Acts and regulations
Disaster management cycle
Types of industrial hazards
Their roles and responsibilities in prevention and response mechanism
1. Prevailing laws and regulations
After Bhopal Gas Tragedy of Union Carbide India Ltd., Govt. of India enacted and
amended some laws to prevent and manage the Chemical (industrial) Disaster
Management.
The important laws are:
Manufacture, Storage and Import of Hazardous Chemical (MS and IHC) Rules, 1989;

Factories Act 1948 and subsequent amendments;

Central Motor Vehicles Rules (CMVR) 1989 and amendments;

Chemical Accidents (Emergency Planning, Preparedness and Response) Rules, 1996;

Public Liability Insurance (PLI) Act, 1991; and

Disaster Management (DM) Act 2005.
In addition to the above, the following guideline has also been made to prevent and manage
the referred disasters

NDMA Guidelines on Chemical (Industrial) Disaster Management 2007, the guidelines
are available at www.ndma.gov.in
The other related laws and regulations are listed in appendix I.
2. Chemical Disasters or Accidents
The following definitions have been adopted in various existing Indian laws.
“Chemical Accident” means an accident involving a fortuitous, or sudden or unintended
occurrence while handling any hazardous chemicals resulting in continuous, intermittent or
repeated exposure to death, or injury to, any person or damage to any property but does
not include an accident by reason only of war or radio-activity;
“Major Chemical Accident” means an occurrence including any particular major emission, fire
or explosion involving one or more hazardous chemicals and resulting from uncontrolled
developments in the course of industrial activity or transportation or due to natural events
leading to serious effects both immediate or delayed, inside or outside the installation likely to
cause substantial loss of life and property including adverse effects on the environment;
“Major Accident Hazards (MAH) Installations” means an isolated storage and industrial activity
at a site, handling (including transport through carrier or pipeline) of hazardous chemicals
equal to or, in excess of the threshold quantities specified in column 3 of Schedule 2 and 3
respectively of MS and IHC rules 1989.
3. Sources of the above disasters and accidents
The accidents as defined above in point 2. may happen to any one of the following
“industrial activity”
i.
carried out in an industrial installation referred to in Schedule 4, of MS and IHC rules
1989, involving or likely to involve one or more hazardous chemicals;
ii. on-site storage or on-site transport which is associated with that operation or process
as the case may be;
iii. isolated storage;
iv. pipelines;
Transportation of hazardous chemicals also cause the disasters due to accidents on road and
rail, the road accidents are important for him/her to take care as DC of the district, while rail
accidents need support of railways authorities.
4. Types of major chemical/industrial hazards
In addition to loss of life, the major consequences of chemical disasters include impact on
livestock, flora/fauna, the environment (air, soil and water) and losses to industry as shown in
Fig. 1. Chemical accidents may be categorised as a major accident or a disaster depending
upon the number of casualties, injuries, damage to the property or environment. A ‘major
accident’ is defined in the Manufacture, Storage and Import of Hazardous Chemicals (MS and
IHC) Rules, 1989, issued under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, whereas 'disaster' is
defined in the DM Act, 2005.
Fig-1
Major industrial hazards are generally associated with the potential for fire, explosion or
dispersion of toxic chemicals and usually involve the accidentally release of chemicals from
containment. Accidents involving major hazards could include:


Leakage of flammable material, mixing of material with air, formation of flammable
vapour cloud to a source of ignition, leading to a fire or an explosion affecting the site
and possibly a populated area.
Leakage of toxic material, formation of a toxic vapour cloud and drifting of the cloud,
affecting directly the site and possibly populated area.
Depending upon the state of released chemical, cause and on its consequences, the major
hazards in chemical process industry are classified as:

Fire

Explosion

Toxic release
For more details see Module-12 “Consequence Analysis: A Vital Need for Emergency
Planning”
4.1 Fire
The Fire is a process of burning that produces heat, light and often smoke and flame.
The effect of fire on the people takes the form of skin burn due to the exposure to thermal
radiation. The severity of the burns depends upon the intensity of the heat and exposure time.
In general terms the skin withstands heat energy of 10kW/m for approximately 8 seconds and
that of 30kW/m for 0.4 seconds before pain is felt. The effect of various heat radiation levels is
Radiation
2Level (kW/m )
37.5 Red zone
25
12.5 Orange
zone
10
4.7
4 Blue zone
1.6
Observed Effect
Sufficient to cause damage to process equipment
Minimum energy required to ignite wood at indefinitely long
exposures (non-piloted)
Minimum energy required for piloted ignition of wood, melting
of plastic
Pain threshold reached after 8 second; second degree burns
after 25 second
Accepted value to represent injury
Sufficient to cause pain to personnel if unable to reach cover
within 20 seconds; however blistering of the skin (second
degree burns) is likely.
Will cause no discomfort for long exposure
given in Table-1.
Table-1
Fire can take several different forms i.e.

Flash Fire

Jet fire

Pool Fire

Secondary fire
a. Flash fire
A flash fire occurs when a cloud of flammable gas and air is ignited. The speed of burning is
function of the concentration of the flammable component in the cloud and also the wind
speed. Within a few second of ignition the flame spreads both upwind and downwind of the
ignition source. Initially the flame is contained with in the cloud due to premixed burning of the
regions within the flammable limits. Subsequently the flame extends in the form of a fire plume
above the cloud. The downwind edge of the flame starts to move towards the spill point after
consuming the flammable vapour downwind of the ignition source. The duration of this fire is
very short and the damage is caused by thermal radiation and oxygen depletion. Photo-1
shows the flash fire.
b. Jet Fire
A jet fire occurs when a flammable liquid or gas is ignited after its release from a pressurised,
punctured vessel or pipe. The pressure of release generates a long flame, which is stable
under most conditions. A flash flame may take the form of jet flame on reaching the spill point.
The duration of the jet fire is determined by the release rate and the capacity of the source.
Flame length increases directly with flow rate. Typically a pressurised release of 8kg/s would
have a length of 35m. The cross winds also affects the flame length. It is shown in Photo-2.
c. Pool fire
A pool fire occurs on ignition of an accumulation of liquid as a pool on the ground or on water or
on other liquid. A steadily burning fire is rapidly achieved as the flame sustain due to vapour
provided by evaporation of liquid by heat from the flames.
The maximum burning rate is function of the net heat of combustion and heat required for its
vaporisation. Generally heat radiation depends on the burning rate of flame and its diameters.
Photos 3a-3c show the pool fire.
Photo-3a Photo-3b
Big pool fire is very hazardous and disastrous to control. This type of fire is prominent in tank
farm areas and in bulk depots of petroleum products where petrol and diesel are stored. Jaipur
fire of the 2009 is the worst example of pool fire in Indian history where we lost petroleum
products of worth crores and human lives and property. District collectors have to audit such
bulk depots from disaster prevention angle and should be in the priority list of their
administration.
d. Secondary Fire
The secondary fire involves the combustion of flammable materials those are not directly
concerned with the process, and are some time present unnecessarily. For example:



Stored raw material and products, including packaging materials;
Combustible insulation of vessels, pipelines and electrical cables;
Combustible building material and linings.
Protection is by elimination or segregation of combustible materials, use of incombustible
materials of construction and insulation, and control of ignition sources. Careless or deliberate
actions may defeat in-built precautions.
4.2 Explosion
An explosion involves the production of a pressure discontinuity or blast wave resulting from a
rapid release of energy. A pressure disturbance is generated in to the surrounding medium. Air
becomes heated due to its compressibility and this leads to an increase in the velocity of
sound, causing the front of disturbance to steepen as it travels through the air. The loading and
hence the damage to the nearby targets are governed by the magnitude of and duration of
pressure waves. Missiles may be generated by an explosion and are capable of causing
severe damage to adjacent plant structures and people.
The explosion mainly occurs due to the rapid combustion of a flammable material but can be
brought about from the chemical reactions other than combustion, provided they release large
amount of energy (heat). Examples of these chemical reactions are Polymerisations, the
decomposition of unstable substances and exothermic interactions of many kinds.
Classification of Explosions:



Chemical Explosions
Physical Explosions
Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion (BLEVE)
a. Chemical Explosion
Chemical explosions in plant or in vessel can arise due to exothermic reactions occurring
internally. Such reactions may involve decomposition of unstable substances, polymerisation
of monomers, or combustion of fuel oxidant mixtures. Heating and increase of molecular
number can result in a rise in pressure to the bursting point of the vessel, and explosives
decompose so quickly that confinement and the development of pressure are self-imposed.
b. Physical Explosion
It occurs simply due to over pressure as in the case of steam boiler and air receiver explosions.
Fire is not necessarily a consequence. But fire involving stock, buildings and plant ancillaries
can cause physical explosions due to overheating followed by the overpressure in vessels and
also the fireballs if contents are flammable. One such case is termed as Boiling Liquid
Expanding Vapour Explosion (BLEVE). BELEVE is discussed in detail. It happens in
LPG/Propane storage facilities.
The effect of various pressure waves is given in Table-2.
Table-2
Pressure
(psig)
0.1
0.7 Blue zone
1.0
2
3 Orange zone
4
5 Red Zone
Damage by Blast
Breakage of small windows under strain
Minor damage to house structures
Partial demolition of houses, made uninhabitable
Partial collapse of walls and roofs of houses
Heavy machines in industrial building suffered little
damage; steel frame building distorted
Cladding of light industrial buildings ruptured
Wooden utility poles snapped; tall hydraulic press in
building slightly damaged
7
Loaded train wagons overturned
10
Probable total destruction of buildings; heavy
machines tools (7000 lb) moved and badly damaged
300
Limit of crater lip
c. Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion (BLEVE)
The BLEVE occurs when the catastrophic failure of a vessel containing flammable liquid
material in pressurized condition takes place. The visual effects of the BLEVE is shown in
Photo-4.
Photo-4
For a BLEVE situation following four conditions must be present:
i.
There must be a substance in liquid form. Most of the destructive BLEVEs that have
occurred have involved flammable liquids and liquefied flammable gases. BLEVE can
occur with any liquid, even with water. The only difference is that with non flammable
liquids there is no fireball. However, there will still be damaging effect including the
propagating of creaks in the structure of the container together with possibility of
subsequent failure and propulsion.
ii. The liquid must be in a container like sphere, bullet, and or road/rail tanker.
iii. The contained liquid must be at a temperature above its normal boiling point at
atmospheric pressure at the time container allows the pressure inside to build up above
atmospheric pressure, the fluid, in the container is able to remain in the liquid state,
even though its temperature is above of its normal boiling point. This increase in
pressure raises the boiling point of the contained liquid above its boiling point.
iv. There must be a failure of the container in order to have BLEVE. This container failure
can be due to following causes:
o
o
o
o
Flame impingement.
Internal structural weakness of the container
Failure of improperly designed SRV (safety relieve valve)
Impact from a mechanical cause such as a road accident, tanker derailment
allowing flammable liquid to flow out.
The physical force that causes the BLEVE is because of the large vapour expansion from the
liquid in the container. LPG will expand 250 times its volume when changing from liquid to
vapour and water will expand 1700 times its original volume.
BLEVE accounts for the following processes:
 heat transfer from flame to tank, from tank to the liquid and vapour phases, and
between liquid and vapour phases
 thermodynamics transformation within tank
 activation of pressure relief valve
 tank failure
 depressurisation of liquid on tank failure and missiles formation
The Hazards of BLEVE
A BLEVE poses the following hazards:





Fireball with thermal radiation with some rainout forming pool fires.
Hazard zone much larger as in pool fires
Missiles and major fragmentation.
Rocketing vessel parts.
Overpressure from minor shock waves.
The past experience has shown that whenever there is BLEVE; it is only the heat radiation of
the fireball and the over pressure, which do the offsite damages. The effects of both can be
well understood by the zones of the heat and over pressure generated by the BLEVE.
BLEVE is causing damage due to heat and pressure both so, it is most dangerous.
4.3 Toxic release
The prevailing wind speed and the weather conditions play the important role in
determining the dimensions of the toxic plume. To understand exposure limits and their
respective effects we can divide the affected area in to three zones of various concentration
levels. Table 3 describes the limits and effects.
Concentration
Level
Short -Term
Exposure Limit
(STEL) Blue
zone
Immediate
Danger to Life
and Health
(IDLH) Orange
zone
Lethal
Concentration
at 50%
mortality
(LC50) Red
zone
Fatal Level
Observed Effect
Maximum concentration of the substance
to which workers can be exposed for a
period up to 15 minutes without suffering
(a) intolerable Irritation (b) chronic or
irreversible tissue change (c) narcosis of
sufficient degree to increase accident
proneness, impair self rescue, or materially
reduce worker’s efficiency, provided that
not more than 04 excursion per day are
permitted, with at least 60 minutes
between exposure periods, and provided
that daily TLV is not exceeded. It should
not be used to evaluate the toxic exposure
up to 30 minutes.
An atmospheric concentration of any toxic,
corrosive or suffocating substance that
poses an immediate threat to life or would
cause irreversible or delayed adverse
health effects or would interfere with an
individual's ability to escape from a
dangerous atmosphere. If IDLH values are
exceeded, all unprotected people must
leave the area immediately, it is maximum
airborne concentration of a substance to
which a worker is exposed for as long as
30 minutes and still be able to escape
without loss of life.
LC stands for "Lethal Concentration". LC
values usually refer to the concentration of
a chemical in air but in environmental
studies it can also mean the concentration
of a chemical in water. For inhalation
experiments, the concentration of the
chemical in air that kills 50% of the test
animals in a given time (usually half to four
hours) is the LC50 value.
Death.
Table-3
5. Impact zones
The impact due to fire, blast and toxicity is important for emergency management. The highest,
medium and low vulnerable zones need to be demarcated to assess the areas of probable
damages as described above in Tables 1-3. In general the highest vulnerable zone, medium
and low vulnerable zones are depicted as red, orange and blue zones respectively.
District Collector (DC) should ask the MAH industries to show the impacts zones for various
level of damages due to fire, explosion and toxic release as shown in Fig 2:
Fig-2
6. Approach to reduce accidents or disasters
DC has to divide the following three sectors:
1. Industries and isolated storages: There are about 1700 Major Accident Hazard (MAH) units
in the various districts of the Country, as well as a large numbers of small and medium
enterprises who are storing, processing the hazardous chemicals as notified in the MS and
IH Chemical Rules. The challenge is to address areas where enforcement of provisions
laid out in the Factories Act 1948, Environment (Protection) Act 1986 and Disaster
Management Act 2005 for effective on-site as well as off-site emergency management
planning for both industry and local/state governments.
Isolated storages are also to be reviewed in details for on-site and off-site emergency
management preparedness.
2. Transportation of the chemicals by road: Huge quantities of hazardous chemicals are
being transported on various roads of the states. Therefore preparedness for any road
chemical accidents is another thrust area.
3. Pipelines: Petroleum products and some chemicals are being transported by pipelines.
Some time the pipeline is underground and some time is over ground.
Prevention and response are the two important components for disaster risk
management.
6.1 Prevention
a. Who comes under these responsibilities?
a. an industrial activity in which a hazardous chemical, which satisfies any of the criteria laid
down in Part-I of Schedule 1 or listed in Column 2 of Part-II of this Schedule is, or may be,
involved; and
b. isolated storage of a hazardous chemical listed in Schedule 2 in a quantity equal to or more
than the threshold quantity specified in column 3, thereof.
(a) and (b) both are the provisions of MS and IHC rules.
b. What occupier has to do as per MS and IHC rules?
An occupier who has control of an industrial activity (a) and (b) shall provide evidence to
show that he has,
a. identified the major accident hazards; and
b. taken adequate steps to
(i) prevent such major accidents and to limit their consequences to persons and the
environment;
(ii) provide to the persons working on the site with the information, training and
equipment including antidotes necessary to ensure their safety.
c. Preparation of on-site emergency plan (see Module-13)
(i) An occupier shall prepare and keep up-to-date an on-site emergency plan
containing details specified in Schedule-11 (appendix -II) and detailing how major
accidents will be dealt with on the site on which the industrial activity is carried on
and that plan shall include the name of the person who is responsible for safety on
the site and the names of those who are authorised to take action in accordance
with the plan in case of an emergency.
(ii) The occupier shall ensure that the emergency plan prepared in accordance with the
provisions takes into account any modification made in the industrial activity and
that every person on the site who is affected by the plan is informed of its relevant
provisions.
(iii) The occupier shall prepare the emergency plan required
a. in the case of new industrial activity, before that activity is commenced;
b. in the case of an existing industrial activity within 90 days of commencing into
operation of these rules.
(iv) The occupier shall ensure that a mock drill of the on-site emergency plan is
conducted every six months;
(v) A detailed report of the mock drill conducted under sub-rule (4) shall be made
immediately available to the concerned Authority.
For escape routes, assembly points and for further development, each industry should have
to plot the vulnerability zones for various scenarios like, fire, explosion and toxic releases as
shown in fig-2 in each of the industry.
Points of concern for occupiers:
 On-site emergency plans as per schedule 11 of MS and IHC rules 1989;

Safety reports and audits as per Indian standards;

Regular mock drills and review of findings of the mock drills for the development of
better preparedness and response mechanisms.
c. Responsibilities of the Authorities
(1) It shall be the duty of the concerned authority as identified in column 2 of Schedule 5
(Table 4) to prepare and keep up-to-date an adequate offsite emergency plan
containing particulars specified in Schedule 12 (appendix -III) and detailing how
emergencies relating to a possible major accident on that site will be dealt with and in
preparing that plan the concerned authority shall consult the occupier, and such
other persons as it may deem necessary. See Module-14 for more details.
S.
No.
1
1
2
3
Authority(ies) with
legal backing
2
Ministry of Environment
and Forests under
Environment
(Protection) Act, 1986.
Chief Controller Imports
and Exports under
Import and Exports
(Control) Act, 1947.
Central Pollution Control
Board or State Pollution
Control Board [or
Committee] under
Environment
(Protection) Act, 1986 as
the case may be.
4
Chief Inspector of
Factories appointed
under the Factories Act,
1948.
5
Chief Inspector of Dock
Safety appointed under
the Dock Workers
(Safety, Health and
Welfare) Act, 1986.
Duties and corresponding Rule
3
1. Notification of hazardous
chemicals as per Rules 2(e)(i), 2(e) (ii)
and 2(e) (iii)
Import of hazardous chemicals as per Rule 1
(1) Enforcement of directions and procedures in respect of
isolated storage of hazardous chemicals, regarding
(i) Notification of major accidents as per Rules 5(1)
and 5(2)
(ii) Notification of sites as per Rules 7 to 9.
(iii) Safety reports in respect of isolated storages as
per Rule 10 to 12.
(iv) Preparation of on-site emergency plans as per
Rule 13.
(2) Import of hazardous chemicals and enforcement of
directions and procedures on import of hazardous
chemicals as per Rule 18.
Enforcement of directions and procedures in respect of
industrial installations and isolated storages covered under
the Factories Act, 1948, dealing with hazardous chemicals
and pipelines including inter-state pipelines regarding
(i) Notification of major accidents as per Rule 5(1)
and 5 (2).
(ii) Notification of sites as per Rules 7 to 9.
(iii) Safety reports as per Rules, 10 to 12.
(iv) Preparation of on-site emergency plans as per
Rule 13. Preparation of off-site emergency plans in
consultation with District Collector or District
Emergency Authority as per S. No. 9 of this
Schedule.
Enforcement of directions and procedures in respect of
industrial installations and isolated storages dealing with
hazardous chemicals and pipelines [inside a port covered
under the Dock Workers (Safety, Health and Welfare) Act,
1986] regarding
(i)
Notification of major accidents as per Rules
5(1) and 5(2).
(ii)
Notification of sites as per Rules 7 to 9. (iii)
(iii)
Safety reports as per Rules 10 to 12. (iv)
(iv)
Preparation of on-site emergency plans as per
Rule 13. (v)
(v)
Preparation of off-site emergency plans in
consultation with District Collector or District
Emergency Authority as per S. No.9 of this
Schedule.
S.
No.
1
6
Authority(ies) with
legal backing
2
Chief Inspector of
Mines appointed under
the Mines Act, 1952.
7
Atomic Energy
Regulatory Board
appointed under the
Atomic Energy Act,
1972.
8
Chief Controller of
Explosives appointed
under the Indian
Explosives Act and
Rules
9
District Collector or
District Emergency
Authority designated
by the State
Government.
Duties and corresponding Rule
3
Enforcement of directions and procedures in respect of
industrial installations and isolated storages dealing with
hazardous chemicals regarding
(i) Notification of major accidents as per Rules 5(1) and
5(2).
(ii) Notification of sites as per Rules 7 to 9.
(iii) Safety reports as per Rules 10 to 12.
(iv) Preparation of on-site emergency plans as per Rule 13.
(v) Preparation of off-site emergency plans in consultation
with District Collector or District Emergency Authority
as per S. No.9 of this Schedule.
Enforcement of directions and procedures regarding :
a) Notification of major accidents as per rule 5(1) and
5(2);
b) Approval and Notification of Sites as per rule 7;
c) Safety report and safety audit reports as per rule 10
to 12;
d) Acceptance of On-site Emergency plans as per rule
13 and
e) Assisting the District Collector in the preparation of
Off-site Emergency plans as per serial number 9 of
this Schedule.
Enforcement of directions and procedures as per the
provisions of:
(vi) The Explosives Act, 1884 (4 of 1884) and the rules
made there under, namely
a. The Gas Cylinders Rules, 1981;
b. The Static and Mobile Pressure Vessel (Unified)
Rules, 1981 &
c. The Explosive Rules, 1984.
(vii) The petroleum Act, 1934 (30 of 1934) and the Rules
made there under, namely:
a. The Petroleum Rules, 1976;
b. The Calcium Carbide Rules, 1987;
and in respect of industrial installation and isolated storages
dealing with hazardous chemicals and pipelines including
inter-state pipelines regarding :
a. Notification of major accident as per rule 5;
b. Approval and notification of the sites as per rule 7;
c. safety report and safety audit reports as per rules 10
to 12;
d. Acceptance of the On-site Emergency plans as per
rule 13;
e. Assisting the District Collector in the preparation of
Off-site Emergency plans.
in consultation with District Collector or District Emergency
Authority as per S. No. 9 of this Schedule.
Preparation of off-site emergency plans as per Rule 14 of MS
and IHC rules.
Table - 4
(2) For the purpose of enabling the concerned authority to prepare the emergency plan
required under sub-rule(1), the occupier shall provide the concerned authority with such
information relating to the industrial activity under his control as the concerned authority
may require, including the nature, extent and likely effects on the off-site of possible
major accidents and the authority shall provide the occupier with any information on the
off-site emergency plan which relates to his duties under rule 13.
(3) The concerned authority shall prepare its emergency plan required under sub-rule (1)
a. In the case of a new industrial activity, before that activity is commenced;
b. In the case of an existing industrial activity, within six months of coming into
operation to these rules.
(4) The concerned authority shall ensure that a rehearsal of the off-site emergency plan is
conducted at least once in a calendar year.
For escape routes, assembly points and for further development, each industrial area should
have to plot the vulnerability zones for various scenarios like, fire, explosion and toxic
releases as shown in Fig -2 in the cluster of industrial area/estates. These zones should be
used in totality for overall emergency preparedness.
d. Transportation of hazardous chemicals:
District Collector should monitor the following points of Central Motor Vehicle Rules (CMVR)
1989 to reduce the road disasters carrying chemicals. Moduole-2 on “Safety in Transportation
of Hazardous Substances by Road” provides an insight view on this aspect and advised to
refer the module for making better understanding.
Recommendations for Authorities
The primary concern regarding non-compliance by the consignors, transporters and drivers
is the lack of enforcement of the applicable legal requirements and also lack of awareness
amongst the stakeholders.
The implementation of the Rules 131 to 133 of CMVR, 1989, providing details of responsibility
of consignors, transporters and drivers of the goods carriage transporting HAZCHEM shall be
strengthened. Further, the states can also put additional restrictions in the permit condition
while granting permits to the transporters.
e) Training:
a) Comprehensive training of inspection staff issuing fitness certificates regarding design
codes, their requirement for the inherent safety of the container and the vehicle, etc.
b) Traffic policeman should be more stringent for HAZCHEM transporting tankers and
must see to it that these tankers do not violate any rules. Moreover, a traffic policeman
should not allow these tankers in crowded places/routes, for any reason whatsoever.
Traffic policeman could be allowed to penalise the driver in case of illegibility of the
emergency information panel and also if the class label is missing as per the provisions
on the vehicle.
c) Comprehensive training of the traffic inspectors regarding the application of legal
requirements.
d) Training of inspectors regarding HAZCHEM as per the CMVR so as to make them
understand the consequences of non-compliance.
e) Elaborate training programmes for community leaders, panchayats, NGOs and other
identified prominent persons in the areas is necessary after a directory of information
(containing the names, addresses, telephone numbers, etc.) is prepared. A small
booklet in the vernacular on dos and don'ts for the local public should be brought out
f)
and circulated.
The Regional Transport Officer (RTO) should carry out the proper verification and
examination of the tankers/trucks before issuing a new license/permits.
Recommendations for MHA Units
MAH units are not only the recipients but also the consignors of HAZCHEM. It is in their
business interest that the goods dispatched, reach the destination safely, in time without any
problem en route. Their role is by far the most important in terms of improving the status of
implementing various legal requirements. Keeping this in mind, the following are the major
recommendations for the MAH units (consignors) of HAZCHEM:
i.
Check driver's license for its validity, provide a certificate to the effect that he has
successfully undergone the requisite training for transportation of hazardous goods
and endorse his license, authorising him to drive vehicles carrying HAZCHEM.
Check documents and inspect vehicles with check lists.
Implement vehicle entry, loading/unloading check list.
Check compatibility with material last transported with the one intended to be loaded.
Place appropriate fire extinguishers.
Provide separate earthing to tank and hoses.
Provide stop blocks to prevent rolling of vehicles. Loading/unloading operation to be
carried out under supervision.
Make the driver read the Transport Emergency Card (TREMCARD) while the
loading/unloading operation is carried out.
Seal and lock valves after loading. The Emergency Information Panel (EIP) should be
checked and if found inappropriate, new panels should be pasted on all three places.
Appropriate class labels should be pasted.
Communicate the route and scheduled halts to driver and transporter.
Do not allow unsafe transports to leave your site
Implement a computerised system for records. Although it may not be possible for all
the units to implement such computerised systems, alert security staff and proper
maintenance of records can easily achieve the objective. Train security staff in
checking the documents and vehicles.
Selection of transporters should be on the basis of their credibility rather than solely
on quotes.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.
vi.
vii.
viii.
ix.
x.
xi.
xii.
xiii.
Recommendations for Transporters
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.
vi.
vii.
Need to take a proactive role in keeping their vehicles fit, providing necessary fire
extinguishers, PPEs, antidotes, emergency kits, spark arrester and training to
drivers for safe transportation of hazardous goods.
Careful driver selection.
Vehicle maintenance, display of appropriate EIP and class label with proper
painting.
For transport of dangerous goods, the endeavour should be to find dedicated
transport tanker vehicles or at least for dedicated use of specific material only.
Inter changeability at times may cause mishaps/accidents (see Photo-5)
HAZCHEM should also be lettered in the vernacular for better understanding by
the public at large.
Ensure availability of all relevant documents and inform the driver of the chemical
being transported, associated hazards and safety precautions to be taken during
the journey.
Provide route map to the driver (finalised in consultation with the consignor) and a
timetable for each trip.
Photo-5 displaying two EIPs on one tanker, it is not clear whether the tanker is carrying
chemical -1 or chemical - 2. Such situation can only be avoided jointly by RTO, transport
contractor and consignor with proper enforcement of CMVR.
Photo-5
Recommendations for Drivers
Trained and experienced personnel of MAH units are not normally available at accident site en
route to transport. The response of driver, cleaner, public as teams is of very high significance.
Drivers on the other hand, are the weakest link in the entire process of HAZCHEM
transportation due to the lack of proper training, low level of education, lack of awareness of
the applicable legal requirements and a host of other factors such as rash driving, drinking
habits and tendency for pilferage to make a quick buck, etc. All the efforts of consignors,
transporters and authorities are diluted if the driver does not have safe driving habits, parks the
vehicle incorrectly and/ or leaves his vehicle unattended. The rules applicable to drivers for
improving the level of safety in HAZCHEM transportation as per Central Motor Vehicle Rules
(CMVR) are fairly comprehensive and proper enforcement can definitely bring about the
desired change.
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.
Drivers training and involvement in mock drills is necessary and must be initiated
on a priority basis.
The driver should be trained to maintain a record of inspection round the clock at
least every two hours, to check the pressure, temperature of the product to see
that no leaks are developed and to check the temperature of hubs and tyres or to
spot any other abnormality in the vehicle.
The drivers and cleaners should necessarily maintain and use PPEs to meet
specific requirements during chemical spills/ accidents.
Driver training efforts must be updated, specifically for non-petroleum tankers,
where training is lacking.
Though it is mandatory to keep fire extinguisher(s) and a first-aid box in the driver's
cabin, sufficient attention is not given in training the driver in their use. Even the
selection of the correct fire extinguisher for different types of fires is unknown to
the driver. The fire extinguishers should be related to the HAZCHEM being
transported, which makes dedicated use of the vehicle important.
DC should also review the following points:
i.
Narrow roads increase the traffic density, the travel time and also the accident
potential. Infrastructure in terms of proper roads and lights in population pockets
needs to be provided for safe HAZCHEM transportation.
ii.
The highway patrol should ensure the smooth flow of traffic on the highways and
highway rescue squads need to be set up at critical locations for rendering prompt
response during accidents.
iii.
Police awareness about the provisions under the CMVR requires a major initiative,
as it is poor. Police academies could be used for the purpose and special drives
aimed at police forces should be made.
iv.
The regulatory authorities, mainly the police, are not adequately aware of the
CMVR HAZCHEM provisions and are therefore not able to enforce the rules
sufficiently. This is necessary and must be accomplished on a mass basis.
v.
The HAZCHEM transported from a source unit to the ultimate destination will have
a dedicated consignment tracking system within and also be linked to fire, police
and emergency control rooms including medical services. The mechanism can be
worked out with the due diligence of all stakeholders and in consultation with all
authorities concerned.
vi.
Global Positioning System (GPS) type communication and information
management systems for HAZCHEM fleet tracking, monitoring and accident
management is recommended.
vii.
The Regional Transport Officer (RTO) should carry out the proper verification and
examination of the tankers/trucks before issuing a new license/permit.
6.2 Response
In brief the existing response mechanism is discussed in following paragraphs (see also
Module-15 “Industrial Disaster Response” for more details).
a. The Public Liability Insurance (PLI) Act and Rules and Amendment
It was drawn up to provide for public liability insurance for the purpose of providing
immediate relief to the persons affected by accident while handling any hazardous
substance.
Where death or injury to any person (other than a workman) or damage to any property has
resulted from an accident, the provisions of relief are as:





Reimbursement of medical expenses incurred up to a maximum of Rs. 12,500 in each
case.
For fatal accidents the relief will be Rs. 25,000 per person in addition to reimbursement
of medical expenses if any, incurred on the victim up to a maximum of Rs. 12,500.
For permanent total or permanent partial disability or other injury or sickness, the relief
will be (a) reimbursement of medical expenses incurred, if any, up to a maximum of Rs.
12,500 in each case and (b) cash relief on the basis of percentage of disablement as
certified by an authorised physician. The relief for total permanent disability will be Rs.
25,000.
For loss of wages due to temporary partial disability which reduces the earning capacity
of the victim, there will be a fixed monthly relief not exceeding Rs. 1,000 per month up
to a maximum of 3 months: provided the victim has been hospitalised for a period of
exceeding 3 days and is above 16 years of age.
Up to Rs. 6,000 depending on the actual damage, for any damage to private property.
Powers of Collector
The Collector may follow such summary procedure for conducting an inquiry on an application
for relief under the Act, as he thinks fit. The Collector shall have all the powers of a Civil Court
for the following purposes namely:

summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath;

requiring the discovery and production of documents;

receiving evidence on affidavits;

subject to the provisions of sections 123 and 124 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872,
requisitioning any public record or document or copy of such record or document from
any office;

issuing commissions for the examining of witness or documents; dismissing an
application for default or proceeding ex-parte;

setting aside any order of dismissal of any application for default or any order passed
by it ex-parte;

inherent powers of a civil court as served under section 151 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908.
Extent of Liability

Subject to the provision of sub-section (2A) of section 4 of the Act, the maximum
aggregate liability of the insurer to pay relief under an award to the several claimants
arising out of an accident shall not exceed rupees five crores and in case of more than
one accident during the currency of the policy or one year, whichever is less, shall not
exceed rupees fifteen crores in the aggregate.

In awarding relief under the Act, the Collector shall ensure that the insurer's maximum
liability under the Insurance Policy does not exceed the limits stipulated in sub-rule (1).
Application format for compensation is given in appendix IV.
In addition to this: “Where a major accident occurs on a site or in a pipe line, the occupier shall
[within 48 hours] notify the concerned authority” as identified in Table -3 of that accident, and
furnish thereafter to the concerned authority.
District Collectors are advised to study all the relevant acts and rules as soon as possible to
understand the Chemical (industrial) disaster management issues.
b. National Disaster Response Force (NDRF)
For the purpose of specialised response to a threatening disaster situation or
disasters/emergencies both natural and man-made such as those of CBRN origin, the DM
Act, 2005 has mandated the constitution of a NDRF. The general superintendence, direction
and control of this force is vested in and exercised by the NDMA and the command and
supervision of the Force will vest in an officer to be appointed by the Central Government as
the Director General of NDRF. Presently, the NDRF comprises eight battalions. Two
additional battalions have been sanctioned by the Government and are in the process of
being formed. These battalions are located at strategic locations and will be deployed
proactively as required. NDRF units will maintain close liaison with the designated State
Governments/ UTs and will be available to them in the event of any serious threatening
disaster situation. While the handling of all natural disasters rests with all the NDRF battalions,
presently four of them have been equipped and trained to respond to situations arising out of
CBRN emergencies. In future, plans exist to train rest of the battalions also for CBRN
response. The NDRF units will also impart basic training to all the stakeholders identified by
the State Governments in their respective locations. Further, a National Academy will be set
up to provide training for trainers in DM and to meet related national and international
commitments. Presently the location and area of responsibility of the various NDRF battalions
in the country are as follows:
* Patna (Bihar) and Vijaywada (Andra Pradesh) have also been approved in principle to locate NDRF
battalions for natural disaster, and therefore, the area of responsibility will be readjusted once two NDRF
battalions are made functional.
c. State Disaster Response Force (SDRF)
States have to create response capabilities from within their existing resources. Each State
may aim at equipping and training a few companies in smaller states or one battalion
equivalent force in the case of bigger states. They will also include women members for
looking after the needs of women and children. NDRF battalions and their training institutions
will assist the States/UTs in this effort.
d. Emergency Operations Centre (EOC)
EOC is an offsite facility and is a combination of various line departments of Government and
other agencies whose services are generally required during incident response. These
officials will be able to take decisions on the spot under the guidance of Responsible Officer
(RO) and will be able to assist the RO in achieving the incident objectives. The EOC takes
stock of the emerging situation and assists the RO in mobilising the respective line
department's resources, with appropriate delegated authorities. It is today's need that each
district and state should have EOC with all needed information and should be modern and
should be like as Photo-6.
Photo-6
Location
Area of responsibility for natural disaster
Guwahati
Kolkata
Mundali
N.E. States
West Bengal, Bihar, Sikkim, Jharkhand
Orissa, Chhatisgarh, North Andra Pradesh, (
Srikakulam, Vizianagaram, Vishakhapatnam)
Tamil Nadu, Kerala, South Andra Pradesh,
Puduchery, A and N Islands, Lakshadweep
Maharashtra, Karnataka, Goa
Rajasthan, Gujrat, Madhya Pradesh, Dadra and
Nagar Haveli, Daman and Diu
Chandigarh, Punjab, J and K, Himachal Pradesh
U.P., Uttara Khand, Haryana, Delhi
Arakkonam
Pune
Gandhi Nagar
Bhatinda
Ghaziabad
Patna
Vijaywada* *
Area of responsibility for
CBRN emergency
Kolkata battalion
Arakkonam battalion
Pune battalion
Ghaziabad battalion
EOC should have:
a. One Sr. Administrative Officer as EOC in-charge having experience in disaster
management (DM) with required assistants;
b. Representation of all concerned line departments with authority to quickly mobilise their
resources;
c. Adequate space with proper infrastructure to accommodate the participating agencies and
departments;
d. Communication facilities with last mile connectivity;
e. A vehicle mounted with HF, VHF and satellite telephone for deployment in the affected site
to provide immediate connectivity with the headquarters and ICP;
f. A representative of central teams (NDRF, Armed Forces) whenever they are deployed to
integrate their resources, expertise and to resolve conflicts that may arise during the
response effort;
g. Provision and plan for dovetailing the NDRF, Armed Forces communication capabilities
with the local communication set up. There will be proper plan so that all are able to
connect with each other in case of large scale disasters or failure of the local
communication systems;
h. Map depicting affected site, resources deployed, facilities established like Incident
Command Post, Staging Area, Incident Base, Camp, Relief Camp, Helibase, Helipad, etc.
along with following should be in EOC:i. DM plans of all line departments;
ii. ii. DM plans of the State and the District;
iii. Directories with contact details of all emergency services and nodal officers;
iv. Connectivity with all District headquarters and police stations;
v. Database of NGOs working in different geographical areas;
vi. Demographic details of the State and Districts;
i. National Disaster Management Guidelines: Incident Response System
j. Socio-economic, demographic and land use planning;
k. Resource inventories of all line departments and connectivity with database of India
Disaster Resource Network (IDRN) India Disaster Knowledge Network (IDKN) and
Corporate Disaster Resource Network (CDRN);
Fig.-3
e. Indian Response System:
Management of every incident needs an action plan and proper briefing of all personnel. The
purpose of the action plan and briefing is to provide all concerned personnel with appropriate
directions for the various tasks in hand. Before taking up response activities, the District
Collector needs to take stock of the situation and availability and mobilisation of resources for
listing out the various tasks and to provide proper briefing to the responders.
For this, he will need to hold a proper briefing meeting at the beginning of each operational
period. At the end of the operational period, a debriefing meeting is equally important where he
will be able to again review whether the objectives were achieved or not and then decide what
further steps need to be taken in the next operational period. Both the briefing and debriefing
meetings are the basis on which the IAP (incident action plan) will be prepared and tasks
assigned. For the convenience of DC he/she should consult the National Disaster
Management Guidelines -Incident Response System and therefore response mechanism
should be followed accordingly. Fig-3 shows the steps for actions for response in an event of
disaster.
Appendix-I
List of relevant statutes on management of Hazardous substance









The Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 (amended 1991) and following Rules there
under:
o The Environment (Protection) Rules, 1986 (amended 2004).
o The Manufacture, Storage and Import of Hazardous Chemicals Rules, 1989
(amended, 1994 and 2000).
o The Hazardous Wastes (Management and Handling) Rules, 1989 (amended
2000 and 2003).
o The Environment Impact Assessment Notification, 2006.
o The Chemical Accidents (Emergency Planning, Preparedness and Response)
Rules, 1996.
o Bio-medical Wastes (Management and Handling) Rules, 1989.
The Factories Act, 1948 (amended 1987).
o State Factory Rules.
The Inflammable Substances Act, 1952.
The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (amended 2001).
o The Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 (amended 2005).
The Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991 (amended 1992).
o The Public Liability Insurance Rules, 1991 (amended 1993).
The Petroleum Act, 1934.
o The Petroleum Rules, 2002.
The Insecticide Act, 1968 (amended 200).
o The Insecticide Rules, 1971 (amended 1999).
The National Environment Tribunal Act, 1995.
The Explosives Act, 1884 (amended till 1983).
o The Gas Cylinder Rules, 2004
o The Static and Mobile Pressure Vessels (Unfired) Rules, 1981 (amended
2002).
o The Explosives Rules, 1983 (amended 2002).
Appendix-II Details to be furnished in the on-site emergency plan (see Module-13)
1. Name and address of the person furnishing the information.
2. Key personnel of the organisation and responsibilities assigned to them in case of an
emergency
3. Outside organisation if involved in assisting during on-site emergency: a) Type of
accidents b) Responsibility assigned
4. Details of liaison arrangement between the organisations.
5. Information on the preliminary hazard analysis: a) Type of accident b)System elements
or events that can lead to a major accident c)Hazards d) Safety relevant components
6. Details about the site: a) Location of dangerous substances. b) Seat of key personnel
c) Emergency control room
7. Description of hazardous chemicals at plant site: a) Chemicals (Quantities and
toxicological data) b) Transformation if any, which could occur. c) Purity of hazardous
chemicals.
8. Likely dangers to the plant.
9. Enumerate effects of: a) Stress and strain caused during normal operation: b) Fire and
explosion inside the plant and effect if any, of fire and explosion out side.
10. Details regarding:
i. Warning, alarm and safety and security systems.
ii. Alarm and hazard control plans inline with disaster control and hazard control
planning, ensuring the necessary technical and organisations precautions;
iii. Reliable measuring instruments, control units and servicing of such equipments.
iv. Precautions in designing of the foundation and load bearing parts of the building.
v. Continuous surveillance of operations.
vi. Maintenance and repair work according to the generally recognized rules of good
engineering practices.
11. Details of communication facilities available during emergency and those required for
an off-site emergency.
12. Details of fire fighting and other facilities available and those required for an off-site
emergency.
Appendix-III Details to be furnished in the off-site emergency plan (see Module-14)
1. The types of accidents and release to be taken into account.
2. Organisations involved including key personnel and responsibilities and liaison
arrangements between them.
3. Information about the site including likely locations of dangerous substances, personnel
and emergency control rooms.
4. Technical information such as chemical and physical characteristics and dangers of the
substances and plant.
5. Identify the facilities and transport routes.
6. Contact for further advice e.g. meteorological information, transport, temporary food and
accommodation, first aid and hospital services water and agricultural authorities.
7. Communication links including telephones, radios and standby methods.
8. Special equipment including fire fighting materials, damage control and repair items.
9. Details of emergency response procedures.
10. Notify the public.
11. Evacuation arrangements.
12. Arrangements for dealing with the press and other media interests.
13. Longer term clean up.
Appendix-IV Form of Application for Compensation
Shri/Shrimati/Kumari* _______________________________________________ Son
of/daughter of /Widow* of Shri ________________________________ who died/had
sustained injuries in an accident on _____________________________
___________________at ____________________________particulars in respect of
accident and other information are given below :
1
Name and Father's name of person injured/dead (husband's name in case of married
woman or widow)
2
Address of the person injured/dead.
3
Age______________________ Date of Birth ______________________
4
Sex of the person injured/dead:
5
Place, date and time of accident:
6
Occupation of the person injured/dead:
7
Nature of injuries sustained :
8
Name and Address of Police Station in whose jurisdiction accident took place or was
registered:
9
Name and Address of the Medical Officer/Practitioner who attended on the
injured/dead:
10
Name and address of the Claimant/claimants :
11
Relationship with the deceased :
12
Any other information that may be considered necessary or helpful in the disposal of
the claim :
I hereby swear and affirm that all the facts noted above are true to the best of my knowledge
and belief.
SIGNATURE OF THE CLAIMANT
7. Glossary
BLEVE:
CBRN:
CMRV:
EOC:
IAP:
ICP:
IDLH:
IRS:
NDRF:
SDRF:
STEL:
TLV:
UC:
Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion is a type of explosion.
Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear is a terminology used other
than war for CBRN types of disaster.
Central Motor Vehicle Rules (CMVR) is the Indian regulation for regulating
the safety during transportation of hazardous chemicals on road.
Emergency Operations Centre need to be established to monitor the steps
of all action required during disasters.
Incident Action Plan is a systematic plan to monitor the action.
Incident Command Post is a positional location of commanding the
activities.
Immediate Danger for Life and Health is a toxic limit to assess the damages
due to toxic emissions.
Incident Response System is systematic system of response of any
disaster during and after.
National Disaster Response Force is a force created by Govt of India to
enhance the response mechanism in disasters at national level.
State Disaster Response Force is a force created by States of India to
enhance the response mechanism in disasters in respective states.
Short -Term Exposure Limit is a toxic limit to assess the damages due to
toxic emissions.
Threshold level value.
Unified Command.
8. References
1. The Factories Act 1948 and Subsequent Amendments.
2. The Manufacture, Storage and Import Of Hazardous Chemical Rules, 1989.
3. Central Motor Vehicle Rules 1989 and Subsequent Amendments.
4. The Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991 and Subsequent Amendments.
5. The Chemical Accidents (Emergency Planning, Preparedness and Response) Rules,
1996.
6. Disaster Management Act 2005.
7. National Disaster Management - Chemical Disaster, 2007, - A Publication of The National
Disaster Management Authority, Government Of India.
8. National Disaster Management Guidelines -Incident Response System, 2010 - A
Publication of The National Disaster Management Authority, Government of India.
9. Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, Vol-1, Frank P. Less, Second edition 1996.