Paul MacDonald’s article pits two competing ideological foundations of Rational Choice Theory against each other. Instrumentalist-empiricism ascribes to the sentiment that theoretical assumptions are tools that can subsequently be empirically verified. The efficacy of this philosophy hinges on the testability and generalizability of its theoretical designs. Scientificrealism, on the other hand, posits that the instrumentalist-empiricism perspective was an incoherent dissatisfying method for explaining Rational Choice. Instead of relying heavily on theoretical assumptions, scientific-realists view theory as a statement regarding entities or processes which affect nature and social phenomena. Before divulging too much about these ideological approaches, MacDonald attempts to explain the specifics of the Rational Choice Theory. Ultimately, MacDonald defines RCT as “a theory of social behavior whose distinctive theoretical assumption is that actors in the theory behave according to the rationality assumption”. The rationality assumption is threefold in nature; it includes purposive action, consistent preferences, and utility maximization. Purposive action dictates that most social outcomes can be adequately explained by goal-oriented action; consistent preferences refers to the ranked of preferences that are not affected by independent alternatives; utility maximization can be explained by actors choosing a behavior that provides them with the most subjective expected utility. Evidence shows that human beings rarely behave purposively consistently, and with the goal of maximizing their expected utility. A critique of this chaotic idea is through the domain response. Doman response argues that people often act in rational ways and are coerced into doing so by social pressure to conform to what is considered appropriate. Another critique is called the as-if critique where it challenges what is considered rational thought. It contends that just because a framework is made by a theorist, does not mean humans are acting irrational if they do not follow it. Self-interest is another point of contention where theorists argue over whether people always act in self-interested ways. There are two camps on this issue: the thick-objectivist and the thin-subjectivist. Advocates of thin-subjectivist argue that actors are not required to behave exactly the same desire for everything, they should be able to have preference for things at different levels and be able to weigh the costs and benefits. In this case, people who collect and assign value to strange things are acting perfectly acceptably because they choose to assign that value to what they think is worth. So things like emotional satisfaction or immaterial satisfaction come into play. But the thick-objectivist conception argues that people have to have an interest for material things that will benefit them socially. It is then easy for theorists to extrapolate and make models of human behavior from this concept of self-interest.