Evaluating the Impacts and Effectiveness of Targeted Sanctions
QUALITATIVE DATA BASE
This template is the basis of the qualitative data base on UN targeted sanctions. Please
complete all fields and analytical categories identified in the template in a concise manner,
but with sufficient background and documentation for controversial points. The core units of
analysis are sanctions episodes.
COUNTRY
Al-Qaida and Taliban
AUTHOR(S)
Sue Eckert, Tom Biersteker, Peter Romaniuk
1.
BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW
The withdrawal of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s did not bring an end to conflict in
Afghanistan.1 The victorious mujahidin factions went on to finally defeat the communist
government of Afghanistan in 1992 and subsequently fell into conflict with each other.
Dismayed at the ongoing chaos and brutality, a teacher from a religious school (“madrassa”)
near Kandahar, Mullah Mohammed Omar, began organizing students (“talibs”) to take up
arms with the goals of restoring order and imposing an austere version of Sharia law. The
Taliban as such emerged in 1994, mostly drawing upon students from madrassas based in
Pakistan, where some 3 million Afghans resided in refugee camps. Sensing that the Taliban
offered the best hope of achieving stability, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan provided support,
which also came from opium cultivation. As the Afghan civil war escalated, by 1996, the
Taliban had taken Kandahar, Jalalabad and Kabul.
After the defeat of the Soviets, Usama bin Laden initially returned to Saudi Arabia from
Afghanistan. He subsequently moved to Sudan in 1991, after protesting the stationing of US
troops in the Kingdom during the Gulf War that year (the Saudis responded by taking away
bin Laden’s passport and, in 1994, freezing his assets and revoking his citizenship). Bin
Laden had been urged to move to Sudan by Hasan al Turabi, leader of the National Islamic
Front. He used the initial period of his stay to maintain and extend the global network of
extremists that he had forged during the Afghan war. But by the mid 1990s, his relationship
with his hosts became more tenuous. The Sudanese leadership came under increasing
pressure both from neighbors and from the UN Security Council, which imposed sanctions
on Sudan in April 1996, relating to the presence of suspects – who had been helped by bin
Laden – wanted in connection with an attempt to assassinate Egyptian President, Hosni
1
This section draws upon: Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al Qaeda and the Road to 9/11 (New York:
Vintage, 2006); Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia (London:
I.B. Tauris, 2002) and; National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission
Report (2004).
1
Mubarak, in 1995.
In May 1996, bin Laden returned to Afghanistan, and established himself in Jalalabad. His
relationship with the Taliban was not initially harmonious and Mullah Omar had undertaken
to the Saudis to keep an eye on him. After bin Laden’s August 1996 fatwa, Omar insisted
that he relocate to Kandahar. Over time, however, bin Laden’s financial position began to
yield benefits for Omar and the Taliban and, in turn, bin Laden was able to build an
infrastructure for al-Qaida, including training camps. On 7 August 1998, following two
further fatwas, al-Qaida recorded its first direct operational success, with the bombings of the
US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam.
While different parts of the UN system were engaged in Afghanistan throughout the early
1990s (pursuing a settlement to the civil war, or in humanitarian roles),2 the Security Council
became more active in 1996. In February that year, in a Presidential Statement
(S/PRST/1996/6, 15 February 1996), the Council expressed concern about peace and stability
in the country. It noted the intensification of fighting around Kabul and called on combatants
to permit the delivery of humanitarian aid. Similarly, the statement called on all states to halt
arms sales to combatants in Afghanistan. The statement affirmed the role of the UN Special
Mission in Afghanistan (established by the Secretary General, at the request of the General
Assembly, in December 1993) in attempting to broker peace. It requested the safe release of
the crew of two Russian aircraft captured and detained in Kandahar. It called on states to
refrain from intervening in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. Further, the statement noted
that, “The Security Council is deeply concerned that the continued conflict in Afghanistan
provides fertile ground for terrorism, arms transfers and drug trafficking, which destabilize
the whole region and beyond. It calls on the leaders of the Afghan parties to put aside their
differences and to halt such activities.” A subsequent Presidential Statement
(S/PRST/1996/40, 30 September 1996) reiterated these broader concerns (but without a
direct reference to terrorism).
These statements were followed up by a resolution (adopted unanimously) in October 1996
(S/RES/1076, 22 October 1996), which again listed this broad range of concerns. The idea
for this resolution came out of a summit in Almaty attended by Russia, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.3 The Uzbeks indicated their support at this stage for a
more robust arms embargo.4 Pakistan expressed concern that the resolution, and the call to
limit arms sales to the Afghan factions, was not binding.5 Of course, others (including the
2
For a summary, see “Afghanistan and the United Nations,” http://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/afghan/unafghan-history.shtml, viewed 11 Jan 2011.
3
“Russia welcomes UN resolution on Afghanistan,” ITAR-TASS/BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 26
October 1996.
4
“Uzbekistan ready to apply ‘maximum effort’ for UN resolution,” Interfax news agency/BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts, 25 October 1996.
5
“Concern expressed over UN Security Council resolution on Afghanistan,” Radio Pakistan/BBC Summary of
Word Broadcasts, 24 October 1996.
2
ousted Afghan government) alleged significant Pakistani interference.6 Paragraph 5 of
S/RES/1076 reiterates that the “continuation of the conflict in Afghanistan provides a fertile
ground for terrorism and drug trafficking which destablize the region and beyond.”
On 7 August 1998 car bombs exploded outside of the US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and
Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, killing 224 and 11 people, respectively. Al Qaida would later claim
responsibility. The Security Council condemned these attacks – and international terrorism
generally – in S/RES/1189 (13 August 1998). Neither al Qaida nor Afghanistan are
mentioned specifically in the resolution.
Later in August 1998, the Security Council passed a further resolution on Afghanistan
(S/RES/1193, 28 August 1998; adopted unanimously). On this occasion, speakers in the
Council again described Afghanistan as a haven for terrorists more generally (S/PV.3291 and
S/PV.3291 (Resumption 1), both 28 August 1998). This resolution broadened and deepened
the list of grievances within the international community concerning Afghanistan. For
example, two Afghan employees of WFP and UNHCR had been attacked in Taliban-held
territory. The Iranian Consul-General in Mazar-e-Sharif had been captured. The Taliban
(mentioned by name for the first time in a Council resolution) were singled out for their
egregious behavior, especially in impeding humanitarian access. The term “international
peace and security” was used for the first time in the preamble.
On 7 November 1998, the United States’ Attorney for the Southern District of New York
issued an indictment for Usama bin Laden and Muhammad Atef (“Abu Hafs”) in connection
with the embassy bombings. For years prior to the bombings, the US had made known to the
Taliban that harboring bin Laden damaged their prospects of joining the international
community.7 After the bombings, these efforts intensified as the US maintained contact with
the Taliban to urge them to expel bin Laden.
S/RES/1214 (8 December 1998; passed unanimously) again directed a wide range grievances
towards the Taliban, including: their ongoing role in the Afghan conflict; sheltering
terrorists; drug cultivation; the deaths of the UN workers; the captured Iranian ConsulGeneral; grave breaches of humanitarian law; discrimination against women and girls and;
the failure to protect humanitarian workers. In addition, the resolution demands that the
Taliban “stop providing sanctuary and training for international terrorists and their
organizations, and that all Afghan factions cooperate with efforts to bring indicted terrorists
to justice” (para. 13). Bin Laden is not mentioned by name in the resolution.
The Taliban did not comply with S/RES/1214. US pressure on the Taliban to expel bin Laden
was ultimately unsuccessful, although their dialogue included discussion of a range of
6
“UN calls on states to end supply of arms to Afghanistan,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 22 October 1996.
US State Department Report, "U.S. Engagement with the Taliban on Usama Bin Laden," Secret, Circa July 16,
2001, 9 pp. Available at: http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB97/tal40.pdf. See also
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB97/index3.htm. Viewed 15 September 2011. As discussed in
Gretchen Peters (2009) Seeds of Terror: How Heroin is Bankrolling the Taliban and al Qaeda (New York:
Thomas Dunne Books/St. Martin’s Press), p.92.
7
3
alternative options for dealing with bin Laden, some raised by the Taliban (e.g. trial by
Muslim religious scholars, trial by the OIC, etc.).8 In this light, S/RES/1267 (15 October
1999; adopted unanimously) was designed to increase pressure on the Taliban to expel bin
Laden.
2. BEGINNING INCIDENT OR EVENT (of what prompted UNSC action in the first
place)
The SC’s initial statements and resolutions on Afghanistan were made in support of broader
UN and regional efforts to secure peace and stability, and the international community had a
long list of grievances against the Taliban. The Council’s concern about Afghanistan
escalated over time. But targeted sanctions were imposed as a result of the unwillingness of
the Taliban to turn over bin Laden, to allow him to be brought to justice.
3. GENERAL OBJECTIVE OF SANCTIONS (i.e., counter-terrorism (CT), nonproliferation (NP), conflict prevention (CP), human rights (HR), democracy promotion
(DP))
CT. Again, although the preamble to S/RES/1267 recalls the long list of grievances against
the Taliban, the operative paragraphs of the resolution (paras.2-4) make clear that the
sanctions were imposed to pressure the Taliban to expel bin Laden to appropriate authorities.
4. IDENTIFICATION OF EPISODES
Episode 1 – October 1999 – September 2001 (from UNSCR 1267 through UNSCR 1363);
the initial development of the 1267 sanctions regime, directed against the Taliban regime for
its refusal to turn over Usama bin Laden for prosecution associated with the 1998 US
Embassy bombings and to cease provision of sanctuary and training for terrorists.
Episode 2 – September 2001 – June 2005 (from UNSCR 1368 through UNSCR 1526); the
major expansion of the regime following the attacks of 11 September 2001 to include
individual financiers of terrorism, entity-managers/leaders designees of a number of groups
associated with al Qaida globally.
Episode 3 – July 2005 to the present (from UNSCR 1617 through UNSCR 1904 before the
adoption of resolutions 1988 & 1989 on 17 June 2011 which split the AQT sanctions regime
into 2 separate sanctions regimes); the period of the most significant procedural reforms at
the UN level, largely in response to legal challenges, groups of like-minded member states
and critics from the human rights community.
5. SANCTIONS TERMINATION?
Ongoing
6. REFLECTIONS (i.e. distinctive or unique aspects of the sanctions, potential lessons)
The 1267 regime is the longest-running, most high-profile targeted sanctions case in the
history of the UN. It has given rise to more litigation (at the national and regional levels) and
8
See the sources listed in fn.7.
4
has been more politically sensitive than any other case. Along with S/RES/1373 (28
September 2001), resolution 1267 was the first UN Security Council resolution to be
endorsed by the FATF (see SRIII and accompanying guidance).9
Moreover, the 1267 regime has played a critical and often precedent-setting role in terms of
the procedures for implementing and administering UN targeted sanctions. It has yielded the
largest number of designations (nearly one-half of the total of all UN targeted sanctions) and
has been responsible for the development of exemption procedures (UNSCR 1452), now
routinized in subsequent TS regimes. It also improved and made more transparent listing
procedures (UNSCRs 1617 & 1735), created a focal point within the UN Secretariat for
receipt of petitions from individuals challenging their designations (UNSCR 1730) that is
also used by other sanctions regimes, notably Liberia. Finally, it introduced a system of
periodic comprehensive reviews of all designees and narrative summaries of reasons for
listings (UNSCR 1822) and most significant, created for the first time a review mechanism
at the UN level, in the Office of the Ombudsperson although limited to just the AQT
sanctions regime (UNSCR 1904) as well as introduced time limits for holds placed by
Security Council members, thereby ending indefinte holds on Committee decisions.
While some human rights advocates have consistently criticized the 1267 regime (and the
listing and delisting procedures in particular) for failing to accord due process to listees,
scholars have also noted that the Council has shown unusual flexibility in responding to
these criticisms.10
7. TIMELINE (provide a general timeline for each case, identifying the origins, episodes,
and where relevant, the termination of the sanctions)
TIMELINE FOR COMMITTEE ACTIONS AND REFORMS
Date
Listing
10/1999
UNSCR 1267 imposes
financial sanctions and
aviation ban on the
Taliban and Taliban
aircraft as designated by
Committee
Delisting
Procedural
12/1999
Committee approves
list of Taliban aircraft
02/2000
Committee approves
exemptions on flight
ban for the Hajj
12/2000
UNSCR 1333 imposes
UNSCR 1333
9
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/document/9/0,3746,en_32250379_32236920_34032073_1_1_1_1,00.html. Viewed 16
September 2001.
For example, see Rosemary Foot, “The United Nations, Counter Terrorism and Human Rights: Institutional
Adaptation and Embedded Ideas,” Human Rights Quarterly, Vol.29 No. 2 (2007), pp. 489-514.
10
5
01/2001
12 month financial
sanctions on Usama bin
Laden and associates
(including al Qaida), arms
embargo, operations ban
on Taliban and Ariana
Afghan Airlines offices
and chemical ban on
acetic anhydride
establishes a
committee of experts
Committee issues first list
pursuant to UNSCR 1267
and 1333
Committee approves
procedures for
humanitarian aid
exemptions.
07/2001
UNSCR 1363 creates a
Monitoring Group
O1/2002
01/2002
UNSCR 1388
terminates financial
sanctions and aviation
ban on Ariana Afghan
Airlines
UNSCR 1390 establishes
Consolidated List,
expands listing of Usama
bin Laden, Al Qaida, the
Taliban and other groups
undertakings or entities
associated with them
08/2002
11/2002
12/2002
UNSCR 1390
introduces travel ban
and exemptions
contained therein;
imposes the 3
sanctions measures
indefinitely; requests
Committee to
cooperate with the
Counter-Terrorism
Committee (CTC)
Committee announces
delisting procedures
through the listed
individual’s or entity’s
government of
residence and/or
citizenship
Committee issues
Guidelines 9 Nov 2002
Committee issues
Guidelines
UNSCR 1452
introduces exemptions
to financial sanctions:
notification with 48 hrs.
NOP for basic
6
expenses; approval
process for
extraordinary expenses
01/2003
UNSCR 1455
emphasizes importance
of identifying information
04/2003
UNSCR 1455 requires
Committee to
communicate list to MS
every three months;
requests Committee to
provide Council with an
assessment of member
states implementation
of the measures
Committee revises
Guidelines; includes
new section on
updating lists.
01/2004
UNSCR 1526 requires
MS to include detailed
identifying information
and background
information
UNSCR 1526
establishes Analytical
Support & Sanctions
Monitoring Team (MT);
requests Committee to
provide Council with
another assessment of
member states
implementation of the
measures
07/2005
UNSCR 1617 requires
detailed statements of
case; articulates what
should be contained
within them; provides
“associated with” criteria
for those eligible for
designation
UNSCR 1617 requires
MS to inform target;
permits release of
information about
listing; again requests
Committee to provide
Council with an
assessment of member
states implementation
of the measures;
cooperation with
INTERPOL to provide
better tools for
implementation;
reiterated need for
Committee to
cooperate with the
CTC and with 1540
Committee and to
make joint briefings to
the Council
7
12/2005
Committee revises
Guidelines, makes
technical changes to
listing procedures
04/2006
Committee revises
Guidelines, makes
technical changes to
delisting procedures.
Committee revises
Guidelines; includes
new section on
exemptions; issuance
of INTERPOL-UNSC
Special Notices for
names on the
Consolidated List
Note Verbal dated 25
April 2006 sent to all
Member States to
inform them of the
procedures for the
removal of names of
deceased individuals
on the List, on a case
by case basis
08/2006
UNSCR 1699 allowed
for expansion of IUNSC Special Notices
to all other sanctions
committees
12/2006
UNSCR 1730 creates
a focal point
mechanism within the
Secretariat to receive
delisting requests not
sponsored by states;
available to listed in all
other sanctions
committees
12/2006
UNSCR 1735 elaborates
substantive content for
statements of case
(SOC), allows publicly
releasable portion of
information of SOC,
provides cover sheet for
listing submissions, and
creates a procedure to
improve deficiencies in
notification within 2
weeks of listing
Provides list of
considerations for
delistings
UNSCR 1735 extends
NOP from 48 hours to
3 working days; notes
Explanation of Terms
(EOT) paper on arms
embargo and intention
to provide similar EOTs
for assets freeze and
travel ban
06/2008
UNSCR 1822 makes
further improvements to
notification process,
reduces notification
Extends notification to
delistings; Review
process to consider
whether listings remain
Requires mandatory
statements of case,
narrative summaries
for all listed
8
period to 1 week; calls for
a full review of all
previous designations,
and makes
recommendations for
improving the
transparency of the
process, releasing
information to the targets
and the public about the
reasons for imposing
targeted measures by
posting narrative
summaries of reasons for
listing on the
Committee’s website
12/2008
12/2009
UNSCR 1904 reduces
notification period to 3
days; directs Committee
to amend Guidelines to
extend approval period
for consideration of new
listings; information in
SOC could be used for
narrative summaries
appropriate, annual
individuals/entities,
review of individuals
Mandatory notification
reported to be
of listing & delisting
deceased; all names to
be reviewed every 3
years
Standards and criteria
for delisting
promulgated in the
Guidelines, including
for deceased persons
Committee issues
extensive and detailed
new guidelines,
including changes to
exemption procedures
New delisting process
estblished; also
reduces notification
period to 3 days;
completion of
comprehensive review
by 30 June 2010;
6 monthly review of
individuals reported to
be deceased; all
names to be reviewed
every 3 years; annual
review of names
lacking identifiers for
effective
implemenation
Creates Office of the
Ombudsperson to
review individual
petitions and serve as
liaison between targets
and the Committee;
narrative summaries
now posted at same
time as listing;
encouraged States to
appoint national focal
point concerning
names on the List;
Committee approval
period for
consideration of new
listings was extended
to 10 days from 5 days
previously in its
Guidelines; MT
directed to provide
written report on
comprehensive review
of all names listed as
at 30 June 2010 (488
9
names); ended
indefinite holds on
Committee decisions;
encourages States and
IROs to inform
Committee of relevant
court decisions and
proceedings.
EPISODES
On the following pages we provide a table for each episode you identified. Please complete
all fields and analytical categories identified in the template in a concise manner.
HOW MANY EPISODES DID YOU IDENTIFY? 3
EPISODE 1
August 1998 – September 2001
CONTEXT
The first episode was triggered by the continued failure of the Taliban to hand over to
appropriate authorities Usama bin Laden, who had been indicated in New York (on 4
November 1998) in connection with the August 1998 bombings of the US embassies in
Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. Subsequently, on 4 October 1999, the US representative to the
UN, Peter Burleigh, sent the Council a copy of the summary indictment, stating: “The United
States Government has repeatedly requested of Taliban representatives in various parts of the
world, before and after 4 November 1998, that the Taliban turn Usama bin Laden and
Muhammad Atef over to United States authorities and comply in general with the demand
contained in Security Council resolution 1214 (1998) of 8 December 1998 ‘that the Taliban
stop providing sanctuary and training for international terrorists ... and that all Afghan
factions cooperate with efforts to bring indicted terrorists to justice.’ Between August 1998
and 1999, the Taliban rejected over 20 requests from the United States to expel or turn over
Usama bin Laden and members of his terrorist organization to responsible authorities in a
country where he could be brought to justice.”11
11
S/1999/1021 (4 October 1999).
10
S/RES/1267 (15 October 1999; adopted unanimously) imposed targeted sanctions – a limited
aviation embargo and an asset freeze – on the Taliban. The resolution provided a one month
delay for the Taliban to comply. With no response, the sanctions went into effect on 14
November 1999. The Security Council Committee established under resolution 1267 (1999)
appointed its first Chairman (Ambassador Arnoldo Listre of Argentina) in January 2000 for
the year ending 31 December 2000 (the Vice Chairs were Mali and Ukraine).
Resolution 1267 was expanded by S/RES/1333 (19 December 2000; 13-0-2 (China and
Malaysia abstained)). The Council was concerned with the ongoing use of territory under
Taliban control for the training of terrorists and the provision of safe haven to UBL, as well
as the production of illicit drugs as financial support to the Taliban. Resolution 1333
extended the financial measures to UBL and his associates. It expanded the aviation ban, and
also imposed an arms embargo and an operations ban, deciding that states shall close all
Taliban and Ariana Afghan Airlines offices. The resolution imposed an embargo on the
chemical acetic anhydride (which is critical to convert morphine to heroin). A list of
“associates” (individuals, groups, entities that are associated with bin Laden and the Taliban)
was developed, and a mechanism (“committee of experts”) to monitor implementation
created.
The Committee of Experts subsequently published a report in May 2001 recommending,
inter alia, the creation of a sanctions monitoring mechanism for Afghanistan, i.e. an “Office
of Sanctions Monitoring and Coordination – Afghanistan,” with “sanctions enforcement
support teams” in each of the six neighboring states (Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan,
Tajikistan, China and Pakistan).12 This proposal was taken up in S/RES/1363 (30 July 2001;
adopted unanimously), which established a Monitoring Group in New York and a Sanctions
Enforcement Support Team of up to 15 experts, based in states neighboring Afghanistan. The
Teams were never deployed, although the Monitoring Group remained in place until it was
succeeded by the Monitoring Team in 2004.
UNSC DECISION MAKING
1267 was sponsored by the US, UK, Russia, Slovenia and Canada and was adopted
unanimously. However, both Malaysia and China expressed concerns in the Council that the
imposition of sanctions would have negative humanitarian consequences for the Afghan
populace.13
1333 was proposed by US, Russia, India, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan and was passed by a vote
of 13-0-2. This time Malaysia and China abstained, indicating opposition to terrorism but
expressing the view that sanctions would hurt innocent parties.
12
S/2001/511 (22 May 2001).
13
S/PV.4051 (15 October 1999).
11
1363 (proposed by Colombia, which chaired the sanctions committee) was adopted
unanimously. However, Pakistan (not a Council member) had made known its opposition to
the sanctions monitoring teams in the lead up to the debate on the resolution.14
POLITICAL WILL
The Taliban had few friends and there was consensus in the Council about the imposition of
sanctions. The Malaysian and Chinese abstentions on S/RES/1333 reflected concerns about
the perceived humanitarian effects of sanctions but S/RES/1363 subsequently passed
unanimously.
Beyond Council members, representatives of the “six plus two” group of states (this group
comprised Afghanistan’s neighbors Pakistan, Iran, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and
China, plus Russia and the US) spoke at some Council meetings on this issue. These states
were the focus of the Monitoring Group’s attention. At the 5 June 2001 debate about the
Group’s report there was some dissension between the Afghan and Pakistani representatives,
and Pakistan was clearly displeased with the report.15 But this was not repeated when the
Council voted on S/RES/1363 in July.
PURPOSE(S) (coerce, constrain, signal)
The sanctions were intended to coerce the Taliban to turn over bin Laden, to constrain bin
Laden and associated individuals and entities, and to signal that terrorism – and the sheltering
of terrorists – is unacceptable.
AUDIENCE[S] SIGNALLED
Beyond the targets of the sanctions (the Taliban, bin Laden, associated individuals and
entities) the Council can be interpreted as addressing a broader audience to establish the norm
that terrorism, and the sheltering of terrorists, are unacceptable.
TYPE OF TARGETED SANCTIONS (the design of the measures)
UNSCR 1267 imposed an indefinite aviation embargo and financial sanctions on the Taliban
regime unless UBL was turned over and the Afghan territories were no longer used as
terrorist camps; UNSCR 1333 expanded the aviation ban (closure of all Taliban and Ariana
Afghan Airlines offices) and the assets freeze (to UBL and individuals/entities “associated”
with him), as well as imposing an arms embargo and ban on the chemical acetic anhydride
(used to convert morphine to heroin) but only for 12 months.
COORDINATION WITHIN THE UN SYSTEM AND RELATED MULTILATERAL
INITIATIVES (with other UN Agencies, SRSGs, and UN Peacekeeping forces, if applicable
14
UN Press release SC/7069 (5 June 2001).
15
S/PV.4325 and S/PV.4325 (Resumption 1) (both 5 June 2001).
12
and with IAEA and multi-party talks, if relevant)
The sanctions occurred against the backdrop of a broader multilateral political effort to
broker peace among the Afghan factions. Within the UN, this effort was led by the United
Nations Special Mission to Afghanistan (UNSMA), created by the General Assembly in
1993. A review of UNSMA’s reporting during the period covered by this episode suggests
that the Afghan factions, and the Taliban in particular, were intransigent.16 This was
underscored by the Taliban’s response to the sanctions. For example, in his 20 November
2000 report to the GA and SC, the SG “deeply deplored” the Taliban’s failure to comply with
S/RES/1267 and noted the host of reasons given by the Taliban (lack of evidence linking bin
Laden to terrorism, norms of Pashtun hospitality, assertion that bin Laden should be tried in
Afghanistan, etc.) for failing to hand over bin Laden.17
Both the UNSMA reports, and the reports of the Monitoring Group,18 describe counternarcotics efforts that occurred alongside the imposition of the sanctions, including the efforts
of the “six plus two.” More generally, the reports of the Monitoring Group indicate that they
consulted with a range of other multilateral bodies in the course of their work, including
Interpol, the WCO and the (then) UNODCCP. There was also cooperation with ICAO and
IATA regarding the collection and freezing of funds from international airlines as payment
for air traffic control services to the aeronautical authority of Afghanistan which were subject
to the financial sanctions measure.19
INTERACTION WITH OTHER SANCTIONS REGIMES (Unilateral measures,
Regional organization measures)
The US had imposed sanctions on AQ from August 1998.20
RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER POLICY INSTRUMENTS (Use of force, covert actions,
tribunals, referral to ICC)
IMPLEMENTATION (assessing monitoring and enforcement)
The reports of the SG to the GA and SC on UNSMA’s activities, and other relevant documents, are archived
here: http://unama.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=4538.
16
Report of the Secretary-General, “Report on the situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international
peace and security,” A/55/633-S/2000/1106 (20 November 2000), paras. 83 and 10.
17
18
In addition to S/2001/511 (22 May 2001), see S/2002/65 (15 January 2002).
19
Office of the UN Coordinator for Afghanistan (OCHA), Vulnerability and Humanitarian Implications of UN
Security Council Sanctions in Afghanistan (Islamabad, December 2000), p.29. Available at:
http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/sanctions/handbook/docs_handbook/OCHA%20%20Sanctions%20in%20Afghanistan.pdf. Viewed 19 September 2011.
From the US’ report pursuant to S/RES/1455 (2003): “Al Qaida has been designated pursuant to two separate
Executive Orders, E.O. 13224 and E.O. 12947, as amended by E.O. 13099 of August 20, 1998, and has been
designated as a “foreign terrorist organization” (FTO) pursuant to section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality
Act, as amended” (S/AC.37/2003/(1455)/26, 22 April 2003, p.5).
20
13
Until the attacks of 11 September 2001, there was little concerted focus on implementation of
1267 financial measures and little information available about actions by Member States.
The single Committee of Experts report prior to those attacks – in May 2001 (S/2001/511) –
focuses primarily on neighboring states, indicating that the Six neighboring states had
indicated that they will abide by the resolutions but noting that effectiveness of border
services varied and many were in need of capacity assistance. Moreover, the experts noted
that there was little support within the UN to assis Member States, recommending the
formation of an Office for Sanctions Monitoring & Coordination-Afghanistan. The
Committee only met twice from October 1999-December 2000, and it was not until April 12,
2000 that a Note Vebale was issued designating funds and other resources to be frozen. On 4
April 2001, the Chairman issued a report (S/2001/326) on measures taken by States in the
implementation of paragraphs 5, 8, 10 and 11 of resolution 1333 (2000), containing the
replies from 46 Member States. An addendum to the report, containing 20 additional replies,
was issued on 21 November 2001 (S/2001/326/Add.1), bringing to 64 the total number of
States that replied as at 31 October 2001. However, the Committee of Experts report noted
that “compliance with the measures ... has been less than adequate.” Most attention in 2000
and early 2001 focused on the aviation ban.
DIRECT IMPACTS
Beyond the Monitoring Group reports, the most complete description of the direct impacts of
sanctions is provided by the December 2000 OCHA report.21 That report confirms that the
impact of the financial sanctions was minimal. However, the aviation ban had a serious
impact on Ariana airlines and its staff. In 1999, Ariana flew only to Dubai, United Arab
Emirates, and Riyadh, Saudi Arabia; also, limited cargo flights continued into China's
western provinces. The 1267 sanctions reportedly forced the airline company to suspend
overseas operations. In November 2001, the airline was grounded completely. Most of the
Committee activities in 2000 and 2001 considered exemptions to the aviation ban.
INDIRECT IMPACTS
As above, beyond the Monitoring Group reports, the most complete description of the
indirect impacts of sanctions is provided by the December 2000 OCHA report.22 These
included a widespread perception among Afghans that the UN had set out to harm them and a
short-term deterioration in the operating environment for humanitarian agencies in Talibancontrolled areas.
EVASION
According to Peters, “Far from being hurt by the sanctions, the Taliban seemed to have a
steady supply of weapons and money.”23 Indeed, given that levels of implementation were so
low, “evasion” was effectively “business as usual,” with ongoing smuggling and trafficking
21
See footnote 19, above.
22
See footnote 19, above. Indirect impacts are discussed pp. 33-35 of the report.
23
Peters, Seeds of Terror, p.92.
14
activities (of weapons, narcotics, money, etc.). For example, in its May 2001 report, the
Monitoring Group cited World Bank data estimating that the “black economy” between
Afghanistan and Pakistan at the time was worth $2.5 billion annually, whereas UNODCCP
data suggested that smuggling between Afghanistan and it neighbors was worth $3-4 billion.24
Many observers, including the Monitoring Group, noted that Mullah Omar’s July 2000
“fatwa” against poppy cultivation had the effect of enriching the Taliban, as it drove up opium
prices tenfold (in the first quarter of 2001 compared to the previous year).25
The grounding of Ariana airlines, however, cut off an important supply route for the Taliban
and bin Laden,26 which they sought to replace. The Monitoring Group noted its (or anyone
else’s) inability to track illegal flights into and out of Afghanistan.27 It speculated that Victor
Bout may have been involved in embargo-busting to supply arms to the Taliban.28 Peters cites
evidence for this claim, including that Bout was the “silent partner” of Sheikh Abdullah bin
Zayed bin Saqr al Nahyan (former UAE Ambassador to the US and a member of Abu Dhabi’s
ruling family), who owned the Emirati charter Flying Dolphin, which was granted permission
fly humanitarian supplies into Afghanistan. According to Peters, intelligence officials
(including in the US) were aware that evasion was occurring on this scale. 29
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
The primary unintended consequence of the sanctions was to further “radicalize” the Taliban,
turning them inward and reducing the influence of relatively moderate voices within the
movement (a kind of “rally-round-the-flag” effect). From all accounts, the Taliban sought
international recognition for their “Islamic Emirate.”30 As a result, they saw the sanctions as
a slight from the international community and consistently claimed that the sanctions should
be lifted, especially the ban on Ariana airlines.31. On the day that S/RES/1267 went into
effect, they fired RPGs into the premises of the US embassy and a UN office in Kabul.32
Still, in the early months of the sanctions, the Taliban showed some small signs of softening
24
S/2001/511, para. 68.
S/2001/511, paras. 55-65. Gretchen Peters describes the ban as the “ultimate insider trading con” (Seeds of
Terror, p.94).
25
For example, the LA Times subsequently reported that, “With the Taliban’s blessing, bin Laden effectively
hijacked Ariana ... For four years ... Ariana’s passenger and charter flights ferried Islamic militants, arms, cash,
and opium through the UAE and Pakistan. Members of bin Laden’s al Qaida terrorist network provided false
Ariana identification that gave them free run of airports in the Middle East”: “Long before Sept 11, Bin Laden
Aircraft Flew Under the Radar,” Los Angeles Times, 18 November 2001.
26
27
S/2001/511, para. 28; see also S/2002/65, para. 21.
28
S/2002/65, para. 22.
29
Peters, Seeds of Terror, pp.90-92.
30
“Taleban demands it seat after latest victory,” The Scotsman, 7 September 2000.
For example, see “Afghan Taleban urge UN to lift sanctions from Afghan Ariana Airline,” BBC Monitoring
Worldwide (sourced from Radio Voice of Shariah, Kabul), 17 May 2001.
31
32
Peters, Seeds of Terror, p.90.
15
their line, permitting some women to work (nurses, doctors and UN staff) and even agreeing
to peace talks with their adversaries.33 But by March of 2001, when Mullah Omar ordered
that the buddhas of Bamiyan be dynamited, it seems they had given up on the West and,
according to several sources, sought to take measures to ensure their isolation. Unnamed UN
officials in May 2001 observed that the sanctions, “are actually helping the hard-liners,” with
others linking the sanctions to the hardening of the Taliban’s position and the destruction of
the buddhas.34 Noting this trend, some diplomats began to be concerned that the sanctions
were back-firing.35 With the escalation of sanctions measures (i.e. S/RES/1363), the Taliban
similarly escalated their provocative behavior, including by targeting humanitarian workers
and announcing that UN observers would be treated as “enemies.”36 In short, there is reason
to think that the increasingly extreme behavior of the Taliban over this period was linked to
the sanctions, which underscored to the Taliban that they would not be recognized as the
legitimate rulers of Afghanistan.
INTEGRATING IMPACTS AND CONSEQS
EFFECTIVENESS
The financial sanctions and arms embargo were ineffective. The aviation ban imposed an
inconvenience on the Taliban and bin Laden but seems to have been circumvented quite
easily. Far from compelling the Taliban to expel bin Laden, it is likely that the sanctions had
the opposite effect, leading them to protect their troublesome guest against a common external
enemy, while implementing increasingly austere measures within Afghanistan over time.
EPISODE 2
September 2001 -- June 2005 (nearly 4 years)
CONTEXT
Following attacks against significant targets in the US on 11 September 2001, in which
thousands of lives were lost (not only of US citizens, but of nationals of nearly 100 different
countries), the UNSC passed several new resolutions which significantly enhanced UN
action against terrorism. UNSCR 1368 (September 2001) under the agenda title “Threats to
international peace and security” expressed strong condemnation of the attacks and paved
“Taleban allows a “small number” of women to work,” Deutsche-Presse Agentur, 3 November 1999; Barbara
Crossette, “Taliban and opposition forces are said to agree to peace talks,” The New York Times, 4 November
2000.
33
34
Geoffrey York, “If cornered, the Taliban regime will try to bite,” The Globe and Mail (Canada), 9 May 2001.
35
Anton La Guardia, “Pakistan put under pressure by Britain,” The Telegraph (London), 13 June 2001.
Amin Saikal, “Aid workers the latest pawns in Taliban’s cruel game,” The Sydney Morning Herald, 23 August
2001; “Afghan Taleban to treat UN observers as enemies – Pakistani paper,” BBC Monitoring Worldwide
(sourced from the Urdu-language paper Ausaf (Islamabad)) 6 August 2001.
36
16
the way for UNSCR 1373 which created the Counter-Terroism Committee (CTC). 3 other
resolutions all under the agenda title “Situation in Afghanistan” were also adopted in 2001,
including UNSCR 1386 adopted on 20 December 2001, which effectively authorized the use
of force and intervention by NATO forces against the Taliban government of Afghanistan for
its continued refusal to turn over Usama bin Laden and his associates, who had claimed
credit for the attacks of 11 September. UNSCR 1373, also passed under Chapter VII,
required all Member States to criminalize the provision of funds to individuals and groups
engaged in the commitment of acts of terrorism, approximating an act of global legislation on
the part of the UN Security Council. UNSCR 1390 was then adopted on 16 January 2002,
which established the Al-Qaida/Taliban sanctions regime by enhancing the existing 1267
regime. The previous financial sanctions imposed on the Taliban under paragraph 4(b) of
UNSCR 1267, the previous financial sanctions imposed on UBL and those associated with
him under paragraph 8(c) of UNSCR 1333, were made indefinite, merged and expanded
within the assest freeze measure under paragraph 1(a) of UNSCR 1390 (and which continued
under subsequent resolutions until the 1267 Committee was split in June 2011) to include all
individuals and entities associated with Al-Qaida, UBL and the Taliban, as designated by the
1267 Committee. An indefinite travel ban and arms embargo were also imposed under
paragraphs 1(b) and (c) of UNSCR 1390 (and subsequent resolutions). This became known
as the “Consolidated List” of individuals and entities against whom the 3 AQT sanctions
measures applied, wherever they were located.
UNSCR 1452 was then adopted on 20 December 2002 to provide humanitarian exemptions
to the assets freeze measure, UNSCRs 1455 adopted on 17 January 2003 and 1526 adopted
on 30 Janaury 2004, reiterated the AQT sanctions regime and the 3 measures imposed under
UNSCR 1390 (2002).
UNSC DECISION MAKING
The UN Security Council acted within days of the attacks on New York and Washington,
passing UNSCR 1368 and within two weeks, the more sweeping UNSCR 1373. There was
very little dissent, as all P-5 members (and many other UN Member States) recognized that
they each potentially faced acts of terrorism committed by groups with radical Islamist
sympathies. UNSCR 1390, passed in January of 2002 also rode on this tide of unanimous
support and significantly expanded the 1267 list which contained some members of the
Taliban leadership out of the total 143 Taliban names on the list at the time but, before 11
September, had only contained about 13 names in the Al-Qaida section, including Usama bin
Laden and 12 associates but which was expanded after 11 September to include financiers of
terrorist groups (44 names were added), and to what were defined as groups associated with
al Qaida (68 entities were added) notably JI in southeast Asia, Abu Sayeef in the Philippines
and later AQ in Iraq, AQ in the Islamic Maghreb, and AQ in the Arabian peninsula. The
1267 list rapidly grows rapidly to over 450 names during this episode (between 2001 to
2004).
POLITICAL WILL
The vote on all the UNSCRs passed in the weeks immediately following the attacks of 11
September was unanimous. There was a tremendous, unprecedented outpouring of sympathy
for the US across the globe (though some pockets of celebration in the Middle East, Asia and
East Africa). Virtually all of the designations recommended by the US during the year
17
following the attacks of 11 September went unchallenged and were accepted (sometimes
with little or no detailed information) by the 1267 Committee. The CTC established under
UNSCR 1373 introduced innovative reporting and monitoring procedures and its activities
were later institutionalized with the creation of the Counter Terrorism Executive Directorate
(CTED) in 2003 and 2004. Every UN Member State complied with the reporting
requirements and many were called before the CTC to explain lags in their policy
implementation. The Monitoring Group was replaced with a Monitoring Team during this
period, something that de-politicized and professionalized the monitoring of implementation
with 1267 provisions.
The degree of political will for expansive new counter-terrorism mechanisms during this
episode was extremely strong, though there was some evidence of reporting fatigue and a
growing challenge to the further expansion of the list toward the end of the episode (by late
2004 and early 2005).
PURPOSE(S) (coerce, constrain, signal)
Coerce -- few would deny the Council’s primary interest in coercing the Taliban to turn over
Usama bin Laden and associates, but after the overthrow of the Taliban regime in 2001, they
were no longer in a position to do so.
Constrain –The result was that the eventual principal purpose of the episode was to constrain
the ability of AQ and AQ affiliates or sympathizers to continue to support acts of terrorism
through the provision of finance, arms, or ease of transit.
Signal -- there was also a signalling component, particularly to financiers and potential
financiers of AQ-related terrorism. The 2001 to 2004 designations of 450 names, including a
number of Islamic charities, as well as prominent financiers of the Mujihideen during the
1980s and early 1990s, sent a powerful signal to potential supporters of AQ and AQ-related
groups globally. There was also an important domestic politics signalling component,
particularly in the US, where President Bush declared his intention to conduct a global war
on terrorism, including a “financial war on terrorism,” to “starve the terrorists of their
funding.”
AUDIENCE[S] SIGNALLED
1. Islamic charities and individual financiers of acts of terrorism -- about the costs of
engaging in the financing or support of terrorism
2. Formal sector financial institutions -- that they had to get serious about sanctions
enforcement, begin widespread use of name recognition software, and strengthen internal
compliance procedures
3. Domestic publics -- that something was being done to diminish the probability of
additional acts of terrorism
TYPE OF TARGETED SANCTIONS (the design of the measures)
1. Financial / Asset freeze
18
2. Travel ban
3. Arms Embargo
COORDINATION WITHIN THE UN SYSTEM AND RELATED MULTILATERAL
INITIA-TIVES (with other UN Agencies, SRSGs, and UN Peacekeeping forces, if
applicable and with IAEA and multi-party talks, if relevant)
The degree of internal cooperation within the UN system was limited at first, although every
agency tried to get on board with regard to support of the general CT agenda. CTED
coordinated assistance in training for implementation, but apprpriately with more of a focus
on national level implementation under UNSCR 1373. There is some evidence of friction and
lack of coordination between CTED and the 1267 Monitoring Team during this period
(particularly when the CTED was first being established).
The UNODC begins to get more involved, once it became clear that the closing down of
formal sector financial insitutions for terrorist financing was forcing groups engaged in
committing acts of terrorism underground and into criminal activities. The IMF and IBRD
also become engaged in countering the financing of terrorism (CFT) issues, drawing on their
expertise on AML provisions (attentive to the significant differences between AML and
CFT) although these were more relevant to the implementation of UNSCR 1373 as the 1267
assets freeze did not extend to AML activities or require proof of CFT as the assets freeze
measure applied to all designees by virture of their being listed.
With the passage of UNSCR 1540 in 2004, criminalizing the sale of materials for WMD
production to non-state actors, some coordination with the IAEA begins to emerge.
In addition to coordinated activities within the UN, the G-8 offered technical assistance with
implementation, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) promulgated first 8 and then 9
special recommendations on CFT, the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units
increased its activities and information sharing on CFT issues, and the Wolfsberg Group of
major private financial institutions offered some internal guidelines for compliance in CFT
among its members. The relationships between the 1267 regime and FATF; the 1267 MT and
CTED/1540 experts, were further developed in Episode 3.
INTERACTION WITH OTHER SANCTIONS REGIMES (Unilateral measures,
Regional organization measures)
The US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) list has long
lists of specially designated nationals engaged in terrorism (SDTs) that are more extensive
than the UN list. After the attacks of 11 September, OFAC created a new list of SDGTs
(individuals or groups engaged in the commitment of acts of global terrorism). The EU also
maintains is own lists (through its autonomous sanctions measures), but the US lists tend to
be more extensive than the EU lists. One principal reason for this is continued disagreement
over the status of Palestinian groups like Hamas and Hezbollah. During the second episode,
however, the EU made some concessions to US concerns and added some affiliates of Hamas
and Hezbollah to the 1267 list. It is generally accurate to say that the US OFAC list tends to
be a predictor of expansions of the UN list (with successive UNSC resolutions) and was most
certainly drawn upon for additional names during the rapid expansion of the list during this
19
episode.
RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER POLICY INSTRUMENTS (Use of force, covert actions,
tribunals, referral to ICC)
Use of force against the Taliban was authorized by UNSCR 1386 (2001) in the wake of the
attacks in September of 2001. The threat of use of force was also certainly present prior to
the attacks of September 2001 and immediately following. The use of covert action was
aggressively utilized by the Bush Administration during this period, particularly with regard
to the use of renditions. There was no effort to make any referrals to the ICC, presumably
since the US was not a party to the treaty.
IMPLEMENTATION (assessing monitoring and enforcement)
Compliance with monitoring and reporting efforts at the UN level was impressive during this time
period. All 191 of the (then) UN members filed official reports to the 1373 Committee indicating how
they were implementing the terms of the resolution. Most countries reported multiple times (some
filed as many as six reports). More than 700 reports had been filed as of March 2007. A close reading
of the reports indicates that countries learned during the process, as the number of states reporting that
they were relying on AML measures to address CFT issues diminished dramatically in UN reporting.
This unusual level of compliance was a product of demand for the regime, the introduction of an
innovative reporting and monitoring scheme at the UN level, and a genuine attempt on the part of
most countries to be responsive to initiatives emanating from the US. The US at the time was widely
perceived as having been a victim of terrorism, and it developed the regime from a position of relative
moral authority.
There was also impressive evidence of serious implementation of new policies at the national level
during this time period. The Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force Second Report on
Terrorist Financing included an appendix that examined in detail the degree of implementation of
CFT measures in ten countries of the Islamic world.[i] The appendix illustrated the extent to which
countries had introduced legal changes, created new institutions (such as Financial Intelligence
Units), institutionalized communications to financial institutions, had actually identified and frozen
funds, and initiated prosecutions for violations. Like compliance with monitoring and reporting, the
national level implementation of measures necessary for the effective operation of the regime was a
product of demand for the regime, external monitoring, and political will.
From 2001 through 2004, most countries supported the 1267 regime and its expansion, particularly as
al-Qaida and al-Qaida-affiliated attacks spread throughout the world during this period: beyond
Tunisia and Indonesia to Kenya, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Iraq, Turkey, Spain, Egypt, Pakistan, and
the Philippines. More than 160 states requested and received capacity building assistance from the
CTC. Most participated in regional or global capacity building activities. The CTAG reported that it
provided more than 200 coordinated technical assistance programs to over 150 countries. However,
reports to the 1267 Committee was not as impressive. By the end of 2004, only 131 States had
submitted a report to the Committtee on the status of implementation of the AQT sanctions measures.
This was due in part to the fact that some States assumed that their reports to the CTC also satisfied
their obligation to report to the 1267 Committee.
At the same time, a certain amount of institutional overlap began to emerge. Both the CTED and the
G-8’s CTAG were engaged in facilitating technical capacity building assistance. The IMF and World
Bank’s country assessment exercise appeared to replicate some of the activities of the FATF. More
importantly, it was unclear to States precisely what was the role of the newly formed CTED in the
20
UN’s fight against global terrorism as opposed to the work of the 1267 Committee, as the only UNSC
committtee that monitored the implemenation of sanctions measures against individuals and entities
designated for their association with terrorists and terroist organizations.
At one level, institutional overlap and competition is indicative of the breadth and depth of the regime
during this phase. An overlapping web of institutions had been created to coordinate, deepen, and
strengthen CFT efforts globally, such as when the World Bank endorsed the FATF’s 9 special
recommendations on CFT as a basis for a global standard for Reports on the Observance of Standards
and Codes, or when the UN Security Council resolutions called on Member States to sign the
Terrorist Financing Convention. Institutional competition is not always healthy or productive,
however. Coordination within the UN between the CTED’s new institutional mandate and the
mandate of the 1267 Monitoring Team tended to be tentative, inconsistent, and incomplete, even
though they shared office space on the same floor of the same building. This led to confusion on the
part of some UN Member States about both compliance and reporting.
9Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force on Terrorist Financing, Appendix C: “A
Comparative Assessment of Saudi Arabia with other Countries of the Islamic World,” Prepared by the
Targeting Terrorist Finances Project, Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University,
June 2004.
DIRECT IMPACTS
Financial asset freeze: from 2001-2004, up to $125 million was reported frozen (2007 MT
report indicated $85 million was frozen by 36 countries - 95% of the total assets frozen were
attributable to actions of 9 states).
On the Taliban -- most of the $100m+ in assets frozen in the immediate aftermath of the
attacks of 11 September were Afghan government assets previously under Taliban control;
the Taliban were dispersed by forces of NATO and its allies in Afghanistan (the Northern
Alliance) and did not begin to accumulate-resources again until after they regained territorial
control in portions of the country. Not much evidence of direct effect on the Taliban, as they
were able to extract resources through imposing tariffs on relief agencies, extort (or tax) drug
productions, transfers, and kidnappings.
On al Qaida central -- only a small percentage of the assets frozen (around 10%) were under
AQ control; significantly, the last known transfer of funds from AQ central was for the Bali I
bombing in 2002; by 2004, AQ was complaining about its lack of access to financial
resources and inability to transfer funds; there is no evidence of the use of formal sector
financial institutions for the transfer of funds used in an act of terrorism since 2001
On Financiers of terrorism -- those who were designated and resident in Europe had their
assets frozen; interviews with the Somali Swedes and associates of the al Takwa group in
Switzerland suggest the effectiveness of the asset freeze; they denied their financing of AQ,
but maintained their basic cause was justified; the fact that a number of them pursued
litigation in European and American courts attests to the direct impact of the asset freeze; the
freezing of funds of selected charitable organizations reduced giving levels to Islamic
charities or closure of several NPOs (al Haramain, Barakaat group, BIF).
On related groups -- most of the acts of terrorism committed during this episode were located
21
in the developing world against relatively soft targets; there was a displacement of AQ and
AQ affiliated attacks away from North America and Europe (at least until March 2004) and
most of the related groups relied on raising their own funds, often from petty criminal
activities during the second episode
Travel ban
There is very little evidence of enforcement of the travel ban against principal targets in the
Afghanistan / Pakistan area, but few flagrant violations; Switzerland prevented travel by
designees residing in its territory
Arms embargo
Given the global scope of the arms embargo and the difficulty of enforcement, there appear
to be very few direct impacts of the arms ban; decentralized cells and affiliated groups need
only a small amount of weapons and explosive material is readily obtained, due to its
multiple uses
INDIRECT IMPACTS
There is evidence that donors to Islamic charities began to exercise greater due diligence in
their charitable giving once a number of prominent charities were designated. As the formal
sector became more regulated, it forced AQ into alternative methods to raise/move funds
making it more risky and costly, but also forcing activity underground and into self-financing
of AQ cells through criminal activities (credit card fraud, drugs, etc) and the movement of
cash. Greater focus on informal sectors led to registration/regulations of informal value
transfer systems. Reduced AQ support of the Taliban over this episode has also resulted in
the Taliban resorting to taxation and drugs.
EVASION
AQ changed its basic strategy away from serving as the base in physical terms (as a location
for training, financing, and directing attacks) to a virtual base, claiming credit for attacks
inspired by AQ or declared by their perpetrators as AQ-related; attacks are carried out by
related groups, and there is only limited evidence of direction from AQ during this period;
funds were raised by decentralized cells increasingly from criminal activities, rather than
direct solicitations and charities diversion
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
Decline in giving to Islamic charitable organizations (targeting of the Barakaat group of
companies – 34 were listed in 2001) shut down all remittances into Somalila, including
UN/humanitarian efforts)
Legal challenges, particularly in the courts of Europe, begin to challenge the legitimacy of
the instrument of targeted sanctions itself; corrosive effect of the perceived lack of fairness
Sweeping designation of any company with the name al-Barakaat in its title temporarily
closed down the remittance transfer system to Somalia, exacerbating an already difficult
situation there
22
The rapid development of the CFT regime resulted in an institutionalization of the instrument
of targeted financial sanctions (both in Member States and in their financial institutions) and
increased capacity to utilize financial sanctions for other purposes (see reference to this in the
Libya II case)
INTEGRATING IMPACTS AND CONSEQS
Intended consequences
Unintended consequences
Direct impacts
On Somali public
On listed firm
(al Barakaat)
(decline in transfer of
remittances to Somalia)
Indirect impacts
Increase in due diligence
regarding charitable giving
Decline in charitable giving
to Muslim charities globally
EFFECTIVENESS
Asset Freeze -- was effective during this episode
Taliban, AQ central and related groups were constrained in their access to resources and
traditional means of (formal sector) transfer; increasingly forced to use clandestine means to
raise funds for the commitment of acts of terrorism (both costlier and riskier); some argue
that driving them underground makes it more difficult to detect, but by forcing them into
criminal activity, there is an increased likelihood that traditional policing efforts will detect
some of their activities; their capacity has generally been degraded
Designated financiers had their assets frozen and appear to have changed their behavior (if
not their sentiments)
There is evidence of increased due diligence among donors to Islamic charities (concerned
that they might end up being designated)
Travel Ban -- of limited effectiveness for reasons cited above (difficulty of enforcement in
critical regions). Also the perceived “rush” to designate names (450 during this episode)
resulted in the designation of many names which lacked adequate identifiers for effective
implementation. This also affected effective implementation of the other 2 measures, in
particular the assets freeze measure.
Arms Embargo -- of limited effectiveness for reason cited above (difficulty of enforcement,
small number of traditional arms needed for commitment of acts of terrorism)
EPISODE 3
July 2005 – June 2011
CONTEXT
23
Episode 3 begins with the July 2005 adoption of UNSCR 1617, which initiated procedural
developments and transparency in the work of the 1267 Committee, including setting out for
the first time, the criteria for listing. This was followed by the December 2006 adoption of
UNSCR 1730, which as described in the first two paragraphs of the resolution, established a
focal point mechanism within the Secretariat (Security Council Subsidiary Organs Branch),
to receive de-listing requests and directed the relevant sanctions committees to revise their
guidelines accordingly. In this third episode, multiple resolutions including 1735 (2006),
1822 (2008) and 1904 (2009) focused primarily on addressing critiques of the 1267 regime
by providing comprehensive and regular reviews of the names on the Consolidated List,
more information regarding the basis for inclusion on the list, and advancing the due process
procedures to be fair and clear. It was also a period within which the UNSC encouraged
greater interaction and cooperation with relevant UN agencies and international organizations
to assist States in their implementation of the AQT sanctions measures.
UNSC DECISION MAKING
● UNSCR 1617 - adopted unanimously
● UNSCR 1699 - adopted unanimously
● UNSCR 1730 - adopted unanimously, sponsored by US and France
● UNSCR 1735 - adopted unanimously
● UNSCR 1806 - adopted unanimously
● UNSCR 1822 - adopted unanimously
● UNSCR 1904 - adopted unanimously
POLITICAL WILL
Views within the Security Council regarding reforms to ensure fair and clear procedures have
been mixed. Given that most legal challenges have come from European countries, the UK
and France have consistently supported reforms, strongly abetted by the EU elected UNSC
members like Denmark, Belgium and Austria, while Russia has reluctantly gone along after
the US indicated support. China has not taken an active role.
PURPOSE(S) (coerce, constrain, signal)
Principal purposes of sanctions: coerce, constrain, signal (with strong deterence factor)
AUDIENCE[S] SIGNALLED
While audiences noted previously ( Islamic charities, individual financiers of acts of
terrorism, and formal sector financial institutions) continued, most of the emphasis in this
episode focused on signalling selected national constituencies, in particular courts and due
process advocates, that the UN process was capable of reform through fair and clear
procedures.
TYPE OF TARGETED SANCTIONS (the design of the measures)
Type of targeted sanctions imposed (see previous episodes, as there were no new sanctions
imposed but rather changes in the processes of the Committee)
1. Asset freeze
2. Travel ban
24
3. Arms embargo
The sanctions in this episode continued to focus on freezing the assets of, preventing the
entry into or transit through their territories by, and preventing the direct or indirect supply,
sale and transfer of arms and military equipment to any individual or entity associated with
Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden and/or the Taliban as designated by the Committee.
COORDINATION WITHIN THE UN SYSTEM AND RELATED MULTILATERAL
INITIATIVES (with other UN Agencies, SRSGs, and UN Peacekeeping forces, if applicable
and with IAEA and multi-party talks, if relevant)
Internal cooperation was enhanced under UNSCR 1617 (2005) which provided for joint
briefings to the SC by the 1267 Committee, CTC and 1540 Committee Chairs. The resolution
also stressed the need for close cooperation (for example exchange of information and
coordinated visits) amongst the expert groups that assist these 3 Committees. This
cooperation was reinforced under the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force
(CTITF) set up by the UNSG in 2005 which coordinates the coherence of efforts of the UN
system and the 31 entities under its umbrella, including the 1267 MT, CTED and 1540 expert
group.
UNSCR 1617 also paved the way for closer cooperation between the 1267 Committee and
INTERPOL which resulted in the issuance of INTERPOL-UNSC Special Notices for all
names on the Consolidated List, which were made available to the public on INTERPOL’s
website as well as to national law enforcement authorities (MT 11th, p9). The Special
Notices are useful implementation tools as they contain information not provided on the list,
for example physical descriptions and photographs, where available. This was followed by
UNSCR 1699 (2006) which extended the same tools and cooperation with INTERPOL to all
the other sanctions committees. UNSCR 1617 also provided for enhanced cooperation with
the FATF regarding implementation of SR III, which has been revised, with the assistance of
the Monitoring Team, to bring it more in line with the AQT assets freeze measure.
UNSCR 1730 (2006) , established a focal point mechanism within the Secretariat, to receive
de-listing requests directly from listed parties, allowing them to bypass unhelpful States, and
thereby ensuring access to all sanctions committees.
UNSCR 1735 (2006) also provided that the Monitoring Team expand its cooperation with
FATF to FATF-style regional bodies, increase its cooperation with INTERPOL, ICAO,
IATA and WCO, in order to provide the Committee with better tools. The resolution also
reiterated the need for ongoing cooperation with the CTC and 1540 Committees and their
expert groups and continued the joint briefings to the UNSC.
UNSCR 1822 (2008) called for continued cooperation between the Committee, the
Government of Afghanistan and UNAMA, bearing in mind UNSCR 1806 (2008) – see
section below – better use of INTERPOL tools such as its 24/7 database and lost and stolen
passports database, enhanced cooperation with the UNODC (including through the
organization of subregional workshops with CTED and 1540 experts) and supported the
MT’s role as part of the UN CTITF (Annex 1 f).
UNSCR 1904 (2009) reiterated the call for cooperation between the Committee, the
Government of Afghanistan and UNAMA under UNSCR 1806 (2008) and the provisons
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regarding cooperation with INTERPOL, UNODC, CTED & 1540 expert groups and CTITF.
INTERACTION WITH OTHER SANCTIONS REGIMES (Unilateral measures,
Regional organization measures)
The Monitoring Team and the Somalia Expert Group jointly chaired the MT’s 4th regional
Meeting on Somalia in Entebbe, Uganda in November 2010 (MT’s 11th report – S/2011/245
paragraph 74). These regional meetings are organized to provide interaction and exchange of
information between the intelligence and security services of countries relevant tothe targeted
region. The Somalia/Eritrea Sanctions Committee also designated 2 individuals on 12 April
2010 who were already designees on the Consolidated List (Hassan Dahir AWEYS listed by
the 1267 Committee on 9 Nov 2001 and Hassan Abdullah Hersi AL-TURKI listed by the
1267 Committee on 6 July 2004).
RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER POLICY INSTRUMENTS (Use of force, covert actions,
tribunals, referral to ICC) Interrelationship of UN sanctions against the Taliban increasingly
a political issue as Afghans reestablish control and seek to dialogue with warring factions.
Removal from the 1267 Consolidated List has moved center-stage in discussions. Taking
note of this, the SC in UNSCR 1806 adopted on 20 March 2008, called for cooperation
between the Afghan Government, UNAMA, neighbouring and regional partners, with the
1267 Committee against the Taliban, Al-Qaida and other extremist groups in promoting
peace and prosperity in Afghanistan.
IMPLEMENTATION (assessing monitoring and enforcement)
The Monitoring Team established under UNSCR 1526 (2004) and extended by subsequent
resolutions [UNSCR 1617 (2005), UNSCR 1735 (2006), UNSCR 1822 (2008) and UNSCR
1904 (2009)] continues to assess and evaluate implementation of the sanctions. The Team
provides reports to the Committee on issues affecting implementation of the sanctions
measures and has submitted 11 such reports to-date.
The combined effect of UNSCRs 1617, 1735, 1822 and 1904 have led to the provision of
documents such as statements of case, cover sheet for listing submissions and narrative
summaries of reasons for listing, which serve to provide Member States with as much
information as possible on each list entry.These processes do not exist in the other sanctions
regimes.
UNSCR 1617 also sets out the “asociated with” criteria for listing (paragraph 2) and UNSCR
1735 provides the considerations for delisting (paragraph 14).
Though not all the mandated reviews under UNSCRs 1822 and 1904 have taken place (due
to time constraints), a comprehensive review of 488 names on the list has led to the removal
of 45 names (14 individuals and 21 entities associated with Al-Qaida and 10 individuals
associated with the Taliban). In addition, as a result of the deceased persons review under
UNSCR 1904, 11 names were removed (6 individuals associated with Al-Qaida and 5
individuals associated with the Taliban). The review process has also provided information
that will result in more than 400 updates to the names on the list, which may resolve some of
the problems related to lack of adequate identifiers for effective implementation by Member
States. In addition, other reviews have been provided (defunct entities, entries lacking
identifiers for effective implementation, entries not reviewed in the past 3 years) which are
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aimed at ensuring that the list is as updated as possible and that the listings remain
appropriate. These reviews also do not exist in the other sanctions regimes.
Finally, the Office of the Ombudsperson was created under the AQT sanctions regime to
assist the Committee in its consideration of delisting requests. This office was established in
UNSCR 1904. This new process allows for information gathering and dialogue between the
listed parties and an independent office, in collating the relevant and necessary information
for each delisting request.
DIRECT IMPACTS
The asset freeze is generally considered to have had the greatest impact. AQ has largely
been cut off from the formal financial sector, with cross-border funding of AQ operations
more difficult.
Indications in 2011 AQ magazine, Inspire, that AQAP is suffering from shortage of funds
and is in need of revenue. 11th Monitoring Team Report points to the difficulty that public
figures and senior government officials encounter due to the listing. (MT 11th Report, p 10)
The Committee is currently considering de-listing proposals for over a third of all listed
Taliban. This signals a success for the sanctions regime indicating that a significant number
of Taliban have apparently changed their behaviour. (MT 11th Report, p 11)
To Do: examine reports of information seized from bin Laden’s compound (e.g.: “The
documents show that Anbar Province AQI was self-financing, contrary to speculation that it
could only function with international donations. The group was so profitable that it sent
revenue to associates in other provinces of Iraq and perhaps further afield. The group raised
millions of dollars annually from simple theft and resale of such high-ticket items as cars,
generators, and electrical cable. Roadside shakedowns garnered more money and goods,
including even a truckload of pajamas. A central unit of AQI's hierarchy required operatives
to keep records of even the smallest outlay and to turn over their "take" to upper-level leaders
who made spending decisions.
Attacks by AQI carried recurring overhead costs. These included salaries for operatives, safe
houses, transportation, weapons, and a crude form of life insurance for the wounded or for
families of those killed. In contrast, most civilian households in Anbar lacked any form of
insurance.” http://sitrep.globalsecurity.org/articles/110527763-glimpse-of-bin-ladentechnique.htm?sms_ss=email&at_xt=4de279c1753389ff%2C0
MT (11th) Report also states that the “travel ban has increased in impact” as states take
action to increase their border security
INDIRECT IMPACTS
The removal of their names from the Consolidated List is one of the key demands of the
Taliban, suggesting that the sanctions and the creation of the Consolidated List is having an
indirect impact in the Afghan political negotiations and peace process. (Perhaps under
unintended consequences as well?)
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EVASION
Transfer of assets through alternative banking methods and greater use of fraudalent, forged
or lost/stolen travel documents to allow for travel.
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
While most of the legal challenges relate to designations made in the immediate aftermath of
9/11, the perceptions that UNSC sanctions do not adequately protect individual rights or
afford due process has had an overall corrosive effect on the legitimacy of the targeted
sanctions instrument. Court challenges persist and will likely continue since the Security
Council is unlikely to take further action in June 2011 to strengthen a UN review mechanism
beyond some procedural changes and possibly extending the scope of the Ombudsperson’s
mandate. However, the AQT sanctions regime still has the lead over all other sanctions
regimes in terms of transparency and enhanced Committee processes for listing and delisting.
INTEGRATING IMPACTS AND CONSEQS
To be done...
EFFECTIVENESS
Asset Freeze -- moderately effective during this episode
Taliban, AQ central and related groups were constrained in their access to resources and
traditional means of (formal sector) transfer; increasingly forced to use clandestine means
to raise funds for the commitment of acts of terrorism (both costlier and riskier); some
argue that driving them underground makes it more difficult to detect, but by forcing
them into criminal activity, there is an increased likelihood that traditional policing efforts
will detect some of their activities; their capacity has generally been degraded
Designated financiers had their assets frozen and appear to have changed their behavior
(if not their sentiments)
There is evidence of increased due diligence among donors to Islamic charities
(concerned that they might end up being designated)
There have been few results to point to in assets frozen or individuals stopped at the border
(MT 11th Report, p 9)
Key impact of the sanctions is likely to be as a deterrent, particularly on potential
financiers of Al-Qaida or the Taliban, for whom the consequences of sanctions can be
acute. (MT 11th Report, p 9)
On the basis of 3 objectives to:
1)
Coerce/change behavior, the assets freeze was NOT effective against the Taliban
(did not hand over UBL, or AQ or AQ Associated groups, although the sanctions did
force the use of alternative means to raise and move funds. Sanctions therefore not
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generally viewed as effective in changing AQ/AQA behavior to give up terrorism.
However, the increased focus on delisting of Taliban names has appeared to have led to
some change of behaviour on the part of non-hard core Taliban as evidenced in their
increased cooperation with the Government of Afghanistan and participation in the peace
process.
2)
Constrain access to funds, assets freeze generally not effective against the Taliban
(because they have rebounded, re-secured territory, and ingeniously found ways to
support themselves), but has been effective in denying AQ/AQA access to formal sector
financial institutions and other resources (evidence of
to suggest
reduction in funds from deep pocket donors, charities), which has had a
preventive/deterrent effect overall. Evidence of disruption of plots from financial
intelligence)
3)
Signal Stigmatize-isolate, assets freeze has been effective in demonstrating
international community’s resolve against funding terrorism (message sent to donors to
exercise due diligence in making sure that their charitable gifts are not diverted for the
commitment of acts of terrorism - intentional signal to prompt self-regulatory behavior.)
Travel Ban -- of limited effectiveness , with significant difficulty enforcing in critical
regions. Travel ban primarily serves symbolic purposes, as there appear to be little
evidence of implementation (many border officials do not have access to updated names
and information of designees, listed individuals have used forged, altered or false travel
documents, and inadequate identifiers continue to be reported as problematic by national
officials).
Arms Embargo -- limited implementation (global embargo, not delimited territorially)and
effectiveness (difficulty of enforcement, small number of traditional arms needed for
commitment of acts of terrorism, and lack of arms has not been critical factor). MT 11th
report, however, notes partial success in that it has helped to ensure that listed parties
operate below their full military potential. (p 23)
ADD TABLES FOR EPISODES IF NECESSARY……
ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND MATERIAL
In the following box you may add background or reference material that is too generic for inclusion
elsewhere in the template.
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