State University Higher School of Economics
Philosophy of Mind:
Transcendentalism vs. Naturalism
Course Description (Program)
For Masters
Author: Gasparyan Diana, Associate Professor
Moscow, 2015
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Syllabus
Instructor Information
Associate Professor Diana Gasparyan
anaid6@yandex.ru
Text Information
1. Smith J., Sullivan P. 2011. Transcendental Philosophy and Naturalism. Oxford University Press
Inc., New York
2. The Philosophy of Mind, Second Edition, by Jaegwon Kim (Westview Press, ISBN:
0195118278)
3. Numerous reprints of additional course readings. Additional readings will either be photocopies
distributed in class or articles available in e-mail.
Relevant Websites:
Dave Chalmer’s Website: http://jamaica.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/index.html
Consciousness and Representationalism (Benj Hellie)
Representationalism and Antirepresentationalism —Kant, Davidson, & Rorty (Janos Boros)
The Defense of Qualia (Dr. Edmond Wright)
If I Only Had a Brain (Steve Grand of Cyberlife Research.)
Course Description and Objectives
This is an advanced graduate course and presupposes a graduate level course. Our purpose is to
discuss recent works in the general area of Transcendentalism and Naturalism. The readings listed
below are subject to change. There will be one 15 minute presentation by each registered student.
Requirements
Attendance and participation in class is required. Extremely active participation in class may result
in your final grade being higher than your base grade, while repeated absences or lack of
participation may result in your final grade being lower than your base grade. Graded assignments
for the course will include two in-class, closed-book exams and two 3-5 page argumentative papers,
each counting for 25% of your base grade.
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Plagiarism. Turning in work under your name that is not your own is an extremely serious
academic offense, and will be dealt with appropriately and severely (failing this class and possibly
University disciplinary action). If you use the words or ideas of others (including text posted on a
website), you must give them proper credit, in the form of a citation that clearly identifies the
source. Direct quotations should be placed in quotation marks. If you have questions about whether
an action you intend to take would constitute plagiarism, check with me beforehand.
Grading Policies:
Your grade in class will be determined by the following: reading discussion (40%), paper (30%),
presentation (30%).
Papers:
There will be one paper. You will be asked to write essay in response to very specific questions.
Your answers should draw from course material – readings and lectures-and should demonstrate a
thorough grasp of the material, both descriptively and critically. In other words, in addition to
understanding the ideas, you should be able to grasp the argumentative structure of these ideas and,
if asked, critique the accompanying arguments persuasively.
In addition, students will also be asked to choose a relevant article that's been published in a major
philosophy journal or anthology within the past five years, on which they are to write a brief (2-3
page) commentary to be presented in the class.
Parameters for suitable target articles: Your target article should…



have been published within the last 7 years,
in an established philosophy journal (i.e., one indexed in the Philosopher’s Index ) or
anthology,
and deal with one of the following topics:
o Intentionality and Mental Content
o Mental Causation
o Consciousness (The Hard Problem, Explanatory Gap, Knowledge Argument, Qualia)
o First-Person Authority and Privileged Access (Knowledge of one’s own mind)
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Course Guide
Forward
Remarkably brilliant results of the advancement of science that we witness today boggle our minds.
Unprecedented success achieved in Neuroengineering and robotics reinforces the scientists’ belief
that soon it would be possible to create our own kind and that this breakthrough is not so distant.
This gist seems to be very inspiring. In fact, we can attain to understand even today what exactly we
are expecting and hoping for in the anticipation of the future of humanity. To reach this goal, we
should determine which of the two opposing movements – naturalism and transcendentalism – is
more accurate. Depending on which movement of the two we select as the more adequate, we
would get a different idea about how far human intellectual power can extend.
Typically, a scientist bases his conclusions on the statement that it is only the matter of time for
anything unknown or hard to understand today to be learned and unveiled, i.e. that, which remains
unknown to us today, will be disclosed tomorrow, as knowledge lacks fundamental boundaries.
This standpoint is supported by the concept of naturalism.
In contrast, some philosophers and ultimately all philosophers-transcendentalists are usually more
cautious and skeptical in their assessment of the progress of knowledge. They believe that when it
comes to lack of knowledge or understanding, time is not always the problem. They maintain that
there might be fundamental areas of incomprehensibility, which are systemic in nature and
represent the reverse side of our knowledge.
At the time, Immanuel Kant – the founding father of the transcendental movement, explained very
definitely what the limits of knowledge are, how they form and where they run.
However, the transcendental movement developed by Kant does not seem to be very popular these
days. Besides, relatively new terms, such as consciousness and sense, which Kant did not use in his
works, at least expressly, were introduced recently. Does it mean, though, that transcendentalism
should be appreciated only due to its historic value?
Program Structure and Objective
In this Program we will try to prove that naturalism, which represents today one of the most
powerful and successful systems of knowledge, is not without fault. When I say ‘fault’, I refer to the
limitations of the naturalistic paradigm in its attempt to give a complete description of the world.
Then, I would also attempt to explain why it is necessary to maintain the transcendentalist
movement, which, in turn, also claims to provide a complete description of the world, but does it
(and I will try to justify it) more effectively and successfully. Along the way, I will show that
philosophy of transcendentalism applies strategies that are completely different from the typical
methods of naturalism, and that this is the reason why transcendentalism achieves its goal more
efficiently than naturalism.
Then, we will attempt to elucidate where and why naturalism fails and to discuss what aspects
cannot be described using the naturalistic terminological apparatus.
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Key concepts
Here is the list of aspects:
1. Consciousness, i.e., phenomenal consciousness or qualia, in particular;
2. Liberty (free will);
3. Sense (understood as specific phenomena, a ‘third realm’ in Frege’s theory);
4. Subject and subjectivity.
These four phenomena are similar in that that they are not associated with the world of regular
objects and essences, they do not belong to it.
I would also attempt to show that the first three phenomena (consciousness, liberty and sense)
combined represent what is commonly referred to in philosophy as a Subject, as these three
phenomena are inherent in a Subject and any Subject features these three phenomena.
Our Program will focus on the following:
1. Show, based on the concepts of naturalism, that there are aspects, which cannot be
defined from the naturalistic platform;
2. Explain the reasons for that;
3. Propose definitions derived from the concepts of transcendentalism.
If to present the topic of my research, which I am going to substantiate, in a form of a
scheme or a bulleted list, it would look something like that:
1.
Consciousness, liberty, sense and subject are the phenomena, which we do not come
across when observing the world of physical objects and facts;
2.
Yet, based on some antireductionist arguments, which I will provide, we do not
consider these phenomena to be something illusory;
3.
If they are not illusions, but are not found in the world along with other physical
objects and facts, it can be assumed that their ontology differs from the ontology of objects;
4.
What is most important in their ontology is not their form of existence, but rather the
fact, that they represent some sort of ‘prerequisites for existence’ (i.e., structural
prerequisites) of the observed reality. However, they may either be tied to the subject itself
(Kantian transcendentalism), or be independent of it (transcendentalism of Plato). In any
case, they precondition the reality, and, therefore, the reality, as we experience it, is the
result and a product of such systemic prerequisites, which can never be observed as a part of
objective reality;
5.
To competently express this supposition, i.e., the idea that the prerequisites for the
existence of the world can never be observed in the world, we have to rely on
transcendentalism, not naturalism;
6.
If we assume the world order outlined in transcendentalism, we would be left with
issues, which ultimately cannot be resolved. Such issues will concern the above mentioned
prerequisites (systemic prerequisites) conditioning the existence of reality.
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Approaches
There can be two approaches applied to implement my research and achieve its goals.
Approach 1. To identify the core concepts of transcendentalism as a preferred system of
philosophy and contrast it with naturalism to show the limitations and the flaws of the latte.
Approach 2. To identify the core concepts of naturalism; contrast it with transcendentalism to show
that there are realms, which cannot be defined using the naturalistic approach and identify
transcendentalism as a preferred system of philosophy.
I opt for approach 2, because I would like philosophers-naturalists to also get interested in my
research. Since they often do not receive transcendentalism as a movement, because they
considered more elegant and epistemically optimistic naturalism to be flawless, I hope to attract
their attention, primarily through the demonstration of insufficiencies of naturalism.
Now, I should state my perception of the two movements. First, I will explain the reasons for such
movements as transcendentalism and naturalism to come into existence and why they are coined
‘movements’ in philosophy.
If fact, these movements constituted systematic, methodologically sound ways to respond to such
traditional philosophical questions as:
1. What is knowledge?
2. What are we able to know?
3. How is it possible to be knowledgeable? I would expand the list of questions with two very
important ones, the significance of which I will explain:
4. Why do we know so much or why do we know many things, which we were not supposed to
know?
5. How does our knowledge correlate with reality?
Once we answer all the proposed questions and combine them to establish one sizy project, we can
clearly see that we have arrived at two movements in philosophy – naturalism and
transcendentalism. Thus, both of the movements are epistemic in nature, i.e. in general, they
represent two different approaches to the knowledge acquisition process. But, since any epistemic
approach always implies a specific ontology, these approaches, therefore, are also ontological. In
my study I will explain which ontology corresponds to either of the movements.
Now I would like to outline what my perception of each of the two programs is.
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Distinctive features of naturalism and transcendentalism
Distinctive features of naturalism in general form are as follows:
1. The reality is ontologically homogeneous;
2. The reality is governed by a single set of rules;
3. Any existing phenomena can be described using the same language;
4. It is an object language or the language of perspective spoken by a third party;
5. Ultimately, one can know everything. The limits are only quantitative. There are no
structural or systemic restrictions.
6. All conditions of reality that we observe are constituent parts of this very reality.
Therefore, all of reality can potentially be understood and described by applying a finite
number of consistent theories.
Distinctive features of transcendentalism in general form are as follows:
1. The reality is ontologically heterogeneous;
2. The reality is governed by at least two sets of rules;
3. It is impossible to use the same language to describe all existing phenomena;
4. This is not an object language, not the language which we use to describe objects of the
external world, but rather a language of perspective, spoken by the first person;
5. It is impossible to know everything; there are essentially ‘blind spots’ that are the result of
structural or systemic constraints;
6. The reality, which we see, does not include preconditions required for the existence of the
observed reality. That is why, they are perceived as something unreal, something, which one
can never acquire objective knowledge, i.e. theoretical knowledge about. But at the same
time, that, which cannot be pronounced (and that, which cannot be theorized) is: 1. the
closest (it is not taken outside, is not something sacred, does not constitute a secret, is not
transcendental, etc.); 2. represents a structural prerequisite for any being; structures the
entire reality.
Paragraphs five and six of the lists explain why naturalism is considered a system of epistemic
optimism, while transcendentalism, on the contrary, is viewed as the system of epistemic pessimism
(skepticism). It also explains why naturalism is more popular than transcendentalism. At the same
time, I want to show that the perception of knowledge, which such assessments rely on, has a
scientific nature. Naturalism is focused on science and on the standards of knowledge, which are
accepted among academicians. Transcendentalism concentrates more on philosophical
understanding; therefore, different criteria are used to measure success of these theories.
To avoid terminological confusion, we should make a note that the term ‘naturalism’ should not
necessarily be understood as physicalism. Even if some concept is not physicalistic, it can still be
naturalistic. Such, for example, is evolutionism. Similarly, transcendentalism should not necessarily
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be tied to the system of Kantian philosophy. Rather, it relates to such systems as correlationism
(which includes, for example, phenomenology) and conceptualism.
Though, phenomenology and transcendentalism are relatively similar systems, they have conceptual
differences. They are similar in their correlationism (understanding of the role of a subject), but
they are different because they use different approaches to what it means to ‘explain.’
Phenomenology believes that ‘to explain something’ means ‘to gain an insight of it.’
Transcendentalism states that ‘to explain something’ means ‘to understand how it is done’, ‘to be
able to disassemble an object and assemble it again.’ In this sense transcendentalism in its
interpretation of what it means ‘to explain something’ is closer to science, while phenomenology
completely denies this scientific interpretation. Thus, it turns out that phenomenology lacks that
idea of skepticism, which is largely present in the system of transcendentalism. This is due to the
fact that transcendentalists attempt to explain how something is done, but ones this attempt fails,
they become skeptical. For phenomenologists, on the contrary, it is enough to gain an insight of
some phenomenon. Therefore, they do not attain to solve fundamental philosophical problems (e.g.,
‘how consciousness and the body are related to each other,’ ‘how to correlate man’s freedom of will
with determinism in nature’), but rather occupy themselves with the development of prerequisites
for defining problems and their basic settings.
Below we will observe four main problems of naturalism:
1. Failure to define ‘consciousness’;
2. Failure to define ‘sense’;
3. Failure to define ‘liberty’;
4. Failure to define ‘subject’.
Failure of Naturalism to Define ‘Consciousness’
According to physicalism (also referred to as materialism), consciousness is defined as a physical
process and can be completely reduced to the physical activity of the brain being the closest
material substrate. On the contrary, antiphysicalism speculates that consciousness cannot be
described as a physical process and, therefore, should be explained based on non-reductive
approach. It is important to understand that antiphysicalism is not the same as immaterialism, but
only points out that reductive approach is insufficient. In addition, antiphysicalism is not prepared
to undertake restoration of the substance dualism, which has not gained so many supporters in the
modern analytic philosophy. It would be easier to see the main difference between physicalism and
antiphysicalism if you take into account that both of these doctrines claim to be able to produce a
universal description of the world. In turn, physicalism insists on the adequacy and sufficiency of
description of the world in purely physical terms, i.e., it limits its description only to the physical
world, which lacks everything besides matter and its manifestations. Antiphysicalism, on the
contrary, supports the idea, that such a uniform picture of the world is, at least, inaccurate, and
points out that it is somewhat insufficient. If we restrict ourselves only to the vocabulary of
physicalists, we will end up building either an incomplete universe (a weak thesis, implying that
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some of the essences of the world remain uncovered by the description), or a distorted universe (a
strong thesis, proving that we do not account for the embeddedness of mental within the limitations
of subjective in the picture of the world, which we observe).
Epistemological and ontological aspects
We will base our course on the well-known aspects of consciousness, which have been thoroughly
worked out to date, and which restrict further reduction of consciousness. For convenience, they can
be divided into two groups – epistemological and ontological aspects:
Epistemological aspects are as follows:
1. the possession of ‘qualia.’ Suppose, I taste wine or contemplate over the painting by Van
Gogh Sunflowers, my brain and other bodily reactions can be thoroughly studied at this moment,
but the researcher cannot at the same time study how I experience the taste of wine or a pleasure
from the observation of a famous landscape. He can never enter the same qualitative state, which I
am in, yet, that would be the only way for the researcher to acquire it as an object. Thus, qualia is
such a means of experience, which is inseparable from somebody experiencing it. In this sense,
qualia is not quite an object, which normally continues to exist upon separation from the matter that
produced it;
2. a specific subjective epistemic access. Since, despite the apparent intuitive clarity of the
term ‘subjectivity’, it is still quite vague, it can be further clarified through such characteristics as
privacy, privileged access or first-person perspective. A group of these rather convenient concepts
is expected to explain the idea, which is not always obvious to the philosophers grounded on the
platform of reductionism, that man gains direct and immediate knowledge about his conscious
deeds. For example, I cannot doubt the fact that I am in pain or that I see a yellow spot on the wall.
Any doubt in this case may mean a new state of consciousness, but cannot cancel the preceding
state, because its genuineness is vivid, only as a fact of awareness. The statement of spontaneity can
be explained even easier – we do not deduct or induct our phenomenal states, ultimately, we do not
derive them from anywhere, therefore, the knowledge of them is not the result of some complex
intellectual work, and certainly is not the product of a conclusion. The reasoning such as ‘feeling of
pain accompanies every prick; I was pricked, therefore, I feel pain,’ would be somewhat bizarre.
Our feelings are self-sufficient; they do not need to be proven. Moreover, the immediacy of my
experiences can not be subjected to observation from the perspective of a third party. I am the only
one who can experience my own pain. It cannot be observed from aside in the same way as my
body, which is experiencing this pain, can be observed.
Ontological aspects point to a unique mode of existence of consciousness:
1. non-spatial nature of consciousness: a traditional definition of consciousness consists of
immaterial features, while such physical characteristics as length, density, weight, taste, color, etc.
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are not inherent in consciousness. Consciousness is not an object, and it cannot be defined through
the application of a set of measurements;
2. consciousness is intentional. The concept of intentionality in this case provides an
important theoretical criterion for the assessment of differences between the ways in which physical
and mental phenomena exist. If we assume that any conscious state (visualization) is always
subjective, then it can be interpreted as an object for which its ‘what’ coincides with its ‘how.’
‘Visualization’ is understood here not as something that is visualized, but as an act of visualization.
The fact that the ‘what’ and ‘how’ in mental objects coincide is a characteristic, which distinguishes
them from physical objects. The latter are identified in a completely different way: their ‘how’ and
‘what’ are not identical. We know that the essence of physical objects can differ from their
appearance. Moreover, if this assumption happens to be true, we can deduce that we are definitely
talking about nothing else, but an object. I do not identify the taste of an orange (how I perceive it)
with its chemical formula, yet, I believe that the taste (how I perceive it), is actually the only thing
that I really perceive.
In the course we will also mention the key arguments against physicalism. Although, we will not
consider them in detail, because many writings dedicated to their analyzes exist. However, we will
point out, yet another time, insufficiencies of physicalism, a branch, which stands out as a vivid
representative of the system of naturalism in the philosophy of mind, and we will try to justify
antiphysicalism by applying a combination of existing arguments, including my own.
Mind-body problem
Next, we’ll focus on another aspect – the problem of whether it is possible at all to solve the
mind-body problem? If we analyze the wording of this problem based on the Kantian terminology
related to the issue (he did not expressly expand on the subject, but we can try to reconstruct his
opinion), we would realize that the problem was stated using an erroneous (dogmatic) language and,
therefore, any attempts to resolve it would lead to a dead end. A solution to the problem of mindbody, according to the Kant’s teaching, lies beyond all possible experience, which serves as a proof
that the problem has no solution at all. A subject acquiring knowledge thinks in terms of objective
reality (the only reality he has ever experienced), unable to digress from the familiar ground.
Everything we have knowledge about was acquired through our experience, the experience, which
we were active participants of. The knowledge about the world does not come to us as some sort of
neutral material, rather we process (sensually and conceptually) external information and only then
digest it as an object of our knowledge. To find out how our mechanism of knowledge acquisition
functions, we would have to go beyond the order of things, given to us in experience, and that is
impossible. This limitation is objective in nature, because we can only acquire knowledge about
something other than ourselves. Similarly, since we have only our consciousness as an instrument
that can be used to acquire knowledge about our own consciousness, this task would, most
probably, be never implemented.
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Today we are armed with critical analysis of physicalism, which was conducted by such authors as
K. McGinn, N. Chomsky and J. Levy, whose theories might be considered skeptical.
Failure of Naturalism to Define ‘Liberty (Free Will)’
The fundamental for the entire history of philosophy debate concerning free will is based on the
following key arguments. From the point of view of common sense, the world is perceived as a
casual continuous flow of causes and effects. But, what is really important is that each individual
effect must be evoked by an adequate cause. For example, a fall of an apple from a tree, as a kind of
physical event, must have some physical reason, e.g., air oscillations, the weight of the fruit,
mechanical stress, etc. We cannot, without going into mysticism, indicate a non-physical cause of
this process. For example, we cannot say that the cause of the fall was some unrelated to the
physical world event X. That would be the same as to admit the existence of spirits in the world.
However, it would never cross our mind to say that the reason for the fall of an apple was the
apple’s own firm decision. If we consistently adhere to this point of view, we will come in the end
to the radical determinism, which will also have to be extended to man, but in this case man will
appear to be stripped of the ability to exercise his free will. Indeed, if everything has a reason, it is
easy to prove that universal and rigid determinism is true for all beings. Deterministic view of the
world implies that the physical world can be thought of in a non-contradictory way only if it is
assumed that the world is causally isolated. ‘Causal isolation’ means that the flow of cause and
effect must be first of all, continuous, and secondly – uniform.
However, if we do assume that a subject is endowed with free will, what arguments could be used
to support this assumption? If we continue exercising common sense, we would understand that all
physical events, resulting from human activities, cannot be explained only by referring to physical
causes. Physical causes are unarguably included in the causal chain, but do not exhaust it. For
example, if I get up and close the window, my behavior, as a physical body (getting up, moving,
changing location, etc.), can be described solely in terms of physics, but how can be described my
decision to close the window in this case? Ultimately, it can be attributed to the physical sensation
of cold experienced by my physical body, to the irritation of the nerve endings, which led to the
relevant stimulation of neurons in the brain. Would then such reasoning correspond to my decision
in the same rigid way, as in the case with boiling water, which, when fully heated, reaches the
temperature of one hundred degrees C? Could my decision, then, be described in the ‘language’ of
neurons? I doubt it. We are well aware that the same physical reactions can trigger different
decisions. In addition, the decision itself is not identical to the physical (neural) correlates,
accompanying it. Similarly, the most thorough monitoring of physical parameters of the body of
someone eating ice cream, will not result in the person conducting the experiment enjoying the taste
of ice cream, i.e., gaining access to the subjective experience of the studied individual. Then, what
in the physical world would be relevant to my particular decision? Strictly speaking, nothing. The
decision appears as a void interval, a gap in the chain of physical, objectively observed causes and
effects.
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An alternative, that is offered to us in this case, looks pretty bleak: we either have to admit that free
will is illusory and, thus, declare man a puppet, or assume that cause and effect relationship can be
affected by some chaotic events and can distort cause and effect relationships, and in doing so,
disrupt their harmony and inviolability, which would undermine the principles of physics and all
other art and scientific disciplines.
Kant, in his turn, categorized this failure as an antinomy meaning that arguments, supporting both
perceptions, were equally valid, thus, making the task ever more complicated. His solution is very
well known: there is only one way to solve the problem: the two descriptions of the world –
deterministic and indeterministic, should be assigned to two worlds – the phenomenal (representing
the world of physical objects) and the noumenal (the world of non-physical events – acts of will or
consciousness of a subject). This decision is intended to reconcile the two statements. According to
the first statement, the subjectless natural world should be thought of as causally isolated
compilation of causes and effects. According to the second statement, a subject, endowed with
nonphysical consciousness, is capable of free action. The core idea of the Kant’s solution is that a
subject obeys deterministic laws as a corporeal being, but is exempt from them as a spiritual being.
In other words, his body is placed in the phenomenal world, but the spirit (consciousness) – in the
noumenal one. This assignment to different worlds means that a body, being a body among other
bodies, exists in accordance with the laws of determinism and is governed by them, while
consciousness remains absolutely free, however, not breaking the concept of causal isolation of the
world. This means that liberty, restricted by nothing and nobody, reigns in noumenal world, where
mental and moral lives of a subject evolve. In contrast, the phenomenal world, in which the subject
is presented as a physical being, is fully subjected to the laws of causality, and, therefore, lacks
liberty. The Kant’s solution seems to be very persuasive from the prospective of common sense and
of what we are accustomed to. Nobody really expects that the natural world and the world of
physical bodies are inherent in spontaneity. For example, apples do not fall down from the trees on
their own and do not shift away when we try to touch them. In turn, we know our inner worlds as
free worlds: I can put an apple to the right of me, but can also put it to the left. Neither of these two
decisions are determined by anything, and I acknowledge them as absolutely arbitrary. For example,
the lifting of my right arm is some sort of a physical event, which has been preceded by a physical
cause. It could be neural activity in my brain or the corresponding muscle tension. In the event
when I lift my right arm, a physicist (neuroscientist) seeks and finds the physical causes of this
event (certain state of neurons in the brain), while my decision to lift (or lower) the right (or left)
arm (or finger) is perceived elusive from the naturalistic point of view. My decision cannot be
found in the world of physical facts (in this part of my work, I plan to examine in detail the
arguments and counterarguments related to the famous experiment staged by Liebman as well as the
opinions of his opponents). Thus, in the physical world, the chain of causes and effects is never
interrupted, and the concept of the causal sequence always governs it. However, intuitively every
man lifting his right arm is well aware that it is not only the state of brain neurons that causes this
event. Rather, it is the causal constituent of a physical event – the lifting of an arm. Then, my
decision to lift the right arm, and not, say, the left arm, should then be the real cause. But what in
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the physical world can correspond to my decision? Nothing. This though must seem very strange.
Kant believed that since freedom of will is manifested only in the noumenal world, then,
consequently, nothing can violate the rigid determinism of physical objects, observed in our reality.
Therefore, any potential conflicts can be avoided.
I believe, however, that contradictions have not been eliminated in this discourse. Thus, I see my
main task in revealing the fact that the problem itself arises only when we try to solve it within the
framework of a single term base – the term base of science – hoping that such a solution can
actually be achieved. On the contrary, if it can be proved that the very situation, in which there is a
world where nature is deterministic, but the subject is free, is somehow connected to the
terminology, used by the subject to produce a description of the world, it can be assumed that the
task stated in this manner, cannot have an uncontroversial solution.
Failure of Naturalism to Determine ‘Sense’
Some of the modern analysts call the problem, which was first formulated by Frege in his, now
famous, article On Sense and Reference, ‘the puzzle of the identity’. This problem can be
represented as follows. Suppose that a and b are the names of the same object in the world. How
then can it be explained why we recognize the expression a = a and a = b as being two different
expressions? Apparently, expression a = a is a tautology and does not contain any new information,
besides stating the logical law of identity of the subject to itseself. The expression a = b is clearly
different from the previous one. It is intended to bring forth some new information about a worldly
subject. Moreover, if the difference between the expressions were reduced only to the difference
between the mathematical signs, then a = b would also lack informativity. The only thing that
would make a difference in such a situation would be the choice of signs, tied to the chosen
arbitrary system of signs. Frege concludes, that consequently, the informative novelty of the a = b
equation is in that that it displays a new method of mental interpretation, appreciation of a subject,
and that the subject a can be understood as the subject b. According to Frege, it is not the sign itself,
that encourages this mental interpretation, but a specific ‘medial’ element of the process of
knowledge acquisition – sense. But this element has a problematic nature. Primarily, because it
represents an ideal creation. It is not physical and, therefore, can be considered only within the
framework of a dualistic world view in the spirit of Plato’s idealism, where a separate world of
ideas exists. We also cannot define sense as meaning, and, therefore, cannot really formalize it.
Strictly speaking, sense is not an object, whether it’s a material sign or material meaning. It is the
ideal creation and, thus, it is extremely difficult to reduce it using the naturalistic grounds. It does
not come as a surprise then, that in the philosophy of language they try to reduce sense, just like
they try to reduce consciousness in the philosophy of mind. As is known, Russell did not take the
semantics of Frege. He thought that the problems like ‘the puzzle of the identity’ can be resolved by
applying a simple conceptual apparatus. To avoid the introduction of an ‘unnecessary entity’ –
sense, and, at the same time, solve Frege’s problem, Russell declared certain ‘descriptions’ – the
term he used to identify those structures which, according to Frege, assign a meaning to a subject
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using incomplete symbols. These symbols are actually do not bear semantic implications if used
outside of a particular context: ‘The core concept of the theory of descriptions is that some phrase
can contribute to the meaning of a sentence without having any meaning when used in isolation.’ In
a context, definite descriptions can take place of full-fledged symbols – proper names – and
‘directly,’ bypassing any medial structure, identify a subject. Thus, the ‘the puzzle of the identity’
has been transformed into a pseudo problem: the problem of informativity of the a = b equation
cannot be solved out of context, in isolation. Russell proposed a well-known proof of the ‘semantic
void’ of definite descriptions by stating that: ‘If ‘the author of Waverley’ meant something other
than ‘Scott’, then the statement ‘Scott is the author of Waverley’ would be a false statement, but it
is not. If ‘the author of Waverley’ meant ‘Scott’, then ‘Scott is the author of Waverley’ would be a
tautology, but it is not. Consequently, ‘the author of Waverley’ means neither ‘Scott'’, nor anything
else, i.e., ‘the author of Waverley’ does not mean anything.’
The proof contains a very intriguing sirculus vitiosus: having set the task to overcome the semantics
of Frege, Russell, himself, in a latent way, uses Frege’s distinction of sense – meaning in his
argument. Ultimately, this sort of criticism is well known. Such thinkers as W. Quine, P. Strosson,
A.White, etc., who shared Frege’s views to greater or lesser extent, resorted to it. If I understand
their logic correctly, they also agreed that Russell’s argumentation mistake lies in that that Russell,
in the process of his demonstration, uses the term ‘to mean’ to denote two different terms: in one
case he refers to the Frege’s ‘Sinn’, while in the other – ‘Bedeutung.’ The most succinct critical
argumentation against the Russell’s line of reasoning can be structured as follows. If ‘meaning’
denotes ‘Bedeutung’, then the first Russell’s sentence ‘Scott is the author of Waverley’ is really
false (since the two phrases in this case mean different objects), and Russell had no right to say
otherwise; at the same time, Russell’s second sentence, when he says that ‘Scott is the author of
Waverley,’ is not a tautology and is correct (since two phrases with the same ‘Bedeutung’, used to
form an elementary sentence, do not necessarily result in a tautology). If use ‘meaning’ in the sense
of the Frege’s ‘Sinn’, Russell is right in the first premise: the discussed sentence is actually not false
(since the two expressions with a different ‘Sinn’, used to form an elementary sentence do not
necessarily result in a false sentence), however, in his second premise, he has no right to say that the
sentence is not a tautology (since two phrases with the same ‘Sinn,’ used to form an elementary
sentence, produce a tautology). As a result, Russell’s proof may appear consistent only when
‘meaning’ denotes ‘Sinn’ in the first premise, while ‘Bedeutung’ in the second.
Drawing conclusions from this controversy, we can deduce that the Frege’s ‘Sinn’ is not an
‘unnecessary entity’, which Russell was going to remove from the logical-linguistic analysis in
accordance with the principle of ‘Occam’s Razor’ and the desired solution of ‘the puzzle of the
identity’ cannot be discovered without more complex, but adequate to the linguistic facts, Frege’s
semantics.
But to preserve the essence of the term ‘sense’, renunciation of the naturalistic vocabulary would be
required. It turns out that senses do not belong to the world on the same grounds as meanings.
Sense, for example, can be defined as a perfect integral content of a sign, which is not reducible to
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the sum of meanings of its constituent parts, but defines these meanings itself. In any case, it
behaves in the same way as liberty and consciousness – they cannot be found as objects in the midst
of other objects. We will try to show that sense represents yet another transcendental structure – it is
inherent in all mental work, but cannot be grasped objectively.
Failure of Naturalism to Define ‘Subject’
In this part we will show that all three of the above-mentioned phenomena: consciousness, sense
and liberty, in fact, constitute what we used to call in the philosophical tradition a subject
(subjectivity). However, their arrangement implies that they coexist inseparably. Logically, they
imply each other’s existence. For example, to understand consciousness, one should know what
sense is – we are then conscious, when we can grasp certain sense. By the same token, sense
implies consciousness. Sense is, generally speaking, a method of understanding a meaning. It is not
just the method of handling the given meaning, but this is how meaning is understood and
understanding is a mode of consciousness. Similarly, liberty presupposes meaning, as well as a
subject in general. I want to show that simple spontaneity (e.g., accidental fall of a brick or random
behavior of quantum) is not identical to liberty. Meaningless indeterminacy is a coincidence and not
liberty. Liberty implies will, and, therefore, a willful decision, which, in turn, refers to
understanding, i.e. to sense, and this chain implies subjectivity. I can also try to show that
consciousness, at least as an act of understanding, requires liberty – understanding implies the
transition from ignorance to knowledge; however, ignorance should remain a real possibility: if the
transition from one to the other is strictly determined, we cannot talk about consciousness because
this is how artificial intelligence would work. Equally, the ability to generate creative ideas and
solutions is the result of liberty inherent in the work of consciousness. Interestingly, sense also
implies liberty, because there should be some creative choice in how to set meanings – if meanings
are connected rigidly to their methods by giveness, the latter, in turn, can no longer be considered
the methods of giveness and also become meanings. Correlation between these concepts can be
represented schematically:
Consciousness → Liberty → Sense
Sense → Consciousness → Liberty
Liberty → Consciousness → Sense
Соnclusion
The essence of transcendentalist premise is such, that we do not create ourselves in the same way
we create objects in this world (e.g., airplanes, medicine or computers), and, therefore, we remain
nontransparent for ourselves, then, what we are, cannot be a theory or a subject of positive
knowledge. The idea of skepticism, infused in transcendentalism, where skepticism is somewhat
different from regular skepticism, which generally indicates the limitations of knowledge, is rooted
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here. Transcendentalism is more differentiated in its skepticism and this idea does not contradict the
Kant’s approach: it specifies which areas are not subjects of positive knowledge, and which areas
are. In this course we intend to:
1. Once again define the procedure for distinguishing one type of knowledge from the other;
2. Specify some new domains (consciousness, sense), which were not covered by Kant, but
which seem to fall within the epistemic framework;
3. Show the criteria, which can be used to accurately distinguish knowledge, relevant to
naturalism as well as irrelevant to it.
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