Aiding the Victims of Chaos:
Are we hurting them more than helping them?
Ashley Bourassa
Anthropology 350
Professor Zohra Beben
December 12, 2012
Abstract
The intent of this research paper is to examine the results of disaster aid provided to
victims following a disruptive event, examining the question of whether or not we are hurting
victims more than helping them. This will be ascertained through an analysis of social scientific
research presented in books, journals and newspaper articles over the past three decades. This
knowledge is crucial to add to the anthropogenic catalog in order for anthropologists and society
both to understand how to best help the victims of disasters during future events, as well as to
provide a framework for looking at previous relief efforts. The lessons learned from these past
events, as recognized through this paper, can be tailored into methods for better handling the
provision of future aid in manners which are less harmful to the victims of disasters; additionally,
anthropologists can learn where to target their future research from the obvious gaps in current
knowledge noted in this paper. For the purpose of this paper, the terms “aid” and “relief” may be
used interchangeably.
Introduction
Ben Wisner stated in his work At Risk that “Disasters are a complex mix of natural
hazards and human action.” We see disasters as events which require an ordered response, when
in fact disasters are disorderly. The current belief that disaster relief must be administered, by an
outside source, in order A, B, C, D, E needs to stop. Sometimes step E should really be step A,
while C and D could be left off altogether. Each disaster is different, and the cookie-cutter
response currently given simply isn’t working. It is obvious that a disaster must follow with
some type of aid. However, we need to determine the who, what, where, when and how of the
situation before administering the same one-size-fits-all bandage over every disaster.
"A focus on the long-term outcomes of relief and recovery efforts will provide some
measure to ensure aid is not undermining the long-term social, economic and political
recovery of affected populations." (Joakim 2008, pg. 20)
Ask just about anyone in America, and they can name a disaster, and they feel that
someone should help the victims. However, most people know little of what really happens once
the event ends and the recovery begins, especially when it comes to the end results. The largest
portion of disaster relief in the United States is provided by private insurance payments and only
provided to those who pay up front on the gamble they will need the payout (Peacock et. al.,
1997). Those who cannot afford such market-based coverage must rely on the generosity of
others who make donations to the many non-profit organizations that exist both in America and
worldwide (Rossi et. al, 1983). Research indicates that those who have suffered a disaster take
advantage of as much aid as they can to help them with the recovery process (Rossi et. al, 1983).
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How did disaster relief become what it is today? Hundreds of major disasters racked
America before the founding of the Federal Emergency Management Agency came into
existence, and yet the victims always found recovery by helping each other and relying on their
communities to rebuild in ways which usually alleviated future hazard risks (Dyson, 2006). Over
the years, organizations and mandates began to pop up that took the place of community-based
relief and made it federal-centric: the American Red Cross in 1881, the Tennessee Valley
Authority (flood relief) in 1934, the Disaster Relief Act of 1950, Department of Housing and
Urban Development in 1974, and lastly FEMA in 1979 (Dyson, 2006). Disaster victims soon
became refugees, with FEMA’s solution increasingly being to buy out homes after a disaster and
let the Red Cross provide immediate aid, while natural resilience is forgotten and a heavy
reliance on outside aid has come into play (Dyson, 2006).
This paper argues that current disaster relief efforts often do more to further harm victims
by leaving them with an increased vulnerability to additional disasters or detrimental life
situations. While we as outsiders think we are helping, those in the depths of a disaster are being
harmed more than if we had allowed them to depend on their communities for support and
demonstrate a natural resilience, as was the protocol in the days before a federal takeover of
disaster response.
Current research and literature demonstrates theoretical framework on reducing
vulnerability through the recovery process, however the execution of such methods simply hasn't
caught up to the knowledge of what needs to be done. (Joakim 2008, pg. 22) "Although large
amounts of money have been spent to rebuild after disaster events, "there is rarely any systematic
consideration of whether such lengthy projects actually achieve the goals for which they were
implemented" (Labadie, 2008: 576)" (Joakim 2008, pg. 22). There is a stark lack of research
specifically on the results of disaster aid, and in order to complete this project, I have had to
wade through dozens of books and articles that touched upon such topics, but never took the time
to fully flesh out these ideas.
In addition to the immediate losses suffered by disaster victims (such as loss of life or
home, injury) disaster victims also face an ongoing risk for other ailments (depression, poverty,
long-term illness) after the disaster ends (Rossi et. al, 1983). An increase in depression rates is
often seen in households that take longer to recover due to requirements that they follow new
rules on rebuilding (Rossi et. al, 1983). The displacement and loss experienced by disaster
survivors is often seen by victims as a “second disaster” in their lives (Crate & Nuttall, 2009). In
order to receive many types of aid provided, disaster victims must incur a substantial amount of
debt which leaves them further burdened for the future (Rossi et. al, 1983). It is therefore
important for aid provided to reflect these challenges and to recognize that to work properly aid
must provide help and not hinder those who have already undergone so much. Anthropologists
need to devote research to determining the results of relief, for the good of all victims of future
disasters which are unfortunately inevitable.
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"Many aspects of the social environment are easily recognized: people live in adverse
economic situations that oblige them to inhabit regions and places that are affected by
natural hazards, be they the flood plains of rivers, the slopes of volcanoes or earthquake
zones. However, there are many other less obvious political and economic factors that
underlie the impact of hazards. These involve the manner in which assets, income and
access to other resources, such as knowledge and information, are distributed between
different social groups, and various forms of discrimination that occur in the allocation
of welfare and social protection (including relief and resources for recovery). It is these
elements that link our analysis of disasters that are supposedly caused mainly by natural
hazards to broader patterns in society. These two aspects - the natural and the social cannot be separated from each other: to do so invites a failure to understand the
additional burden of natural hazards, and it is unhelpful in both understanding disasters
and doing something to prevent or mitigate them." (Wisner, 2004 pg 15)
I hope to add a new framework to anthropologic research on disaster relief, one which
considers the darker side of doing good. I feel that it is important to consider the long-arcing
results of action taken in the heat of the moment following emotion-filled events such as
disasters. It is my hope that through the research I have done in writing this paper that future
anthropologists will be inspired to take these ideas and further develop them into a plan for the
betterment of disaster relief.
Body
Case Study: Centralia, PA
Centralia, Pennsylvania is a now-abandoned ghost town in Columbia County, roughly
one hundred miles northwest of Philadelphia (Rubinkam, 2010b). The town, built in 1841,
thrived until 1962, when trash burning at a dump pit set fire to the town’s underground mines,
starting a slow-burning fire that up until present time still burns, and has followed the coal veins
under what the government liaison agency Pennsylvania Department of Environmental
Protection (DEP) estimates to be four hundred fifty acres (Glover, 1998b; Rubinkam, 2010b). By
1993, the state and federal governments had spent $42 million to relocate residents and buy out
their properties under eminent domain (Rubinkam, 2010b). In 2010, residents filed a lawsuit with
the U.S. Middle District Court, claiming the government had committed “massive fraud” in
relocating them for the goal of acquiring mineral rights (Beauge, 2012; Rubinkam, 2010b).
Nearby towns remain unthreatened, because where the coal outcrop ends, so too will the fire
(Glover, 1998b).
The town of Centralia is small, but in its prime was home to over 1,000 residents residing
in about five hundred homes, and had five churches, seven saloons, a school, a bank, a post
office, a hotel, and a few stores (Glover, 1998b; Rubinkam, 2010b). After the abandonment
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procedures in Centralia began, the US Postal Service revoked the town’s zip code (Glover,
1998b). The dangers cited by the DEP have been sinkholes, poison gas, and fires spreading to
above ground (Beauge, 2012). The DEP returns each quarter to monitor the area for changes,
though they claim it is too dangerous to station anyone nearby permanently to keep an eye on the
site (Beauge, 2012; Glover, 1998b). Signs exist all around the town’s remains warning visitors of
a risk of sudden injury or death should they enter the area, but that doesn’t deter tourists or the
town’s former residents from coming back to visit (Glover, 1998b). Now having burned for 50
years, the fire has never harmed, killed, or sickened a resident (Glover, 1998b; Rubinkam,
2010b). By 1998, no flames were visible on the surface, and almost all the homes had remained
untouched by fire (Glover, 1998b). Air quality has remained the same as in densely-populated
Lancaster, PA (Beauge, 2012). A 2008 DEP study indicated that toxic gas emissions were not a
problem, and research documents presented during the 2010 court case clearly showed that the
fire was “almost out” and no longer a danger to any properties, as well as indicating that the
danger never was as serious as officials had made it out to be (Rubinkam, 2010b). DEP data also
shows that underground temperatures have drastically gone down since measurements began at
the start of the fire (Rubinkam, 2010b).
In 1993, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania began condemning any action taking
by Centralia residents to resist government buyouts (Beauge, 2012). Residents continued their
appeals to stay, beginning with a petition to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 1995, which was
shot down (Glover, 1998b). The Centralia residents took their case to court yet again in 2010,
with a petition stating there was no justification for the government taking their property, and
presenting the above data showing that the fire danger had been over exaggerated (Rubinkam,
2010b). The citizens all claim to want no money, just a freedom to stay in the homes their
ancestors built and the town they grew up in (Rubinkam, 2010b). Most residents of Centralia
believe that the demolition and relocation was an attempt on the part of the government to obtain
mineral rights to the 40 million tons of anthracite coal underneath the town, worth hundreds of
millions of dollars (Beauge, 2012; Glover, 1998b; Rubinkam, 2010b). Once the borough of
Centralia ceases to exist, the state will own the mineral rights, and have free reign to sell them to
any company it chooses (Rubinkam, 2010b). Perhaps coincidentally, the law firm the state
Department of Community and Economic Development hired to execute the evictions in
Centralia also transferred the Centralia real estate titles to a coal company of which operations
originate just outside the town (Wereschagin, 2010). In 2012, the court ruled that nothing
authorizes the property owners to object to the land being taken, because the purpose for the
taking no longer exists now that the mine fire ceases to be a threat (Beauge, 2012). Despite
various levels of PA courts ignoring the plea of most Centralia residents, a 2006 agreement
between the Department of Community and Economic Development and Centralia homeowners
Robert and Mary Netchel allowed the Netchels to keep their home, which lies in the middle of
the eminent domain area, other homes on each side having already been demolished (Rubinkam,
2010b). The Netchels have known ties to the law firm used both for the evictions and real estate
title turnovers (DeKok, 2010). Another important aspect to note is that data was presented in
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court indicating that the trash pit fire which started this entire incident in 1962 was intentionally
set, demonstrated by evidence that gasoline was poured over the trash (DeKok, 2010).
Quite the opposite story to Centralia exists in Fayette County, PA where the residents of
Youngstown have been dealing with the similarly-caused Percy Mine Fire for 45 years, and they
would give anything for a buyout (Glover, 1998a). In Youngstown, the government’s solution
was to plug the openings to the fire with an ash-based substance that easily becomes airborne and
is very harmful should it be inhaled (Glover, 1998a). The residents of Youngstown fear
contaminated groundwater and soil, as well as natural gas lines running near the mine fire
possibly exploding (Glover, 1998a). While the Office of Surface Mining data shows only a few
homes have been affected by the Percy Mine Fire, mortgage companies deny all sales in the area,
so none of the residents can sell their homes and leave, and property values are practically
worthless (Glover, 1998a). Youngstown residents have petitioned to either have the fire
extinguished, or to be bought out like Centralia was, but they no longer wish to be left to deal
with problems they feel aren’t theirs (Glover, 1998a).
When the Centralia fire first began in 1962, it could have been put out for a few thousand
dollars, but was blocked by bureaucratic measures and a lack of funding, giving it time to turn
into a much bigger problem (Rubinkam, 2010a). In 1983, a study was initiated by congress to
determine the cost of putting out the mine fire in Centralia, as well as other mine fires
nationwide. The results indicated that the cost to extinguish all underground mine fires
nationwide would be $663 million (Glover, 1998b). In 1985, work began to relocate residents,
and 540 homes and businesses were bought out by 1991 at a cost of $42 million (Glover, 1998b).
While this fact was never compared in the court cases brought up by the residents, I feel that the
main reason for Centralia being bought out was a matter of cost: the bottom line is that it was
cheaper for the government to demolish the town than to fix the problem. The Abandoned Mine
Reclamation Fund is a trust established in 1977, to be used for mine cleanups across the country.
Instead of being used for its purpose, $3.5 billion of $4.7 billion of this money is being used to
help balance the federal budget (Glover, 1998). The state of Pennsylvania has only seen $21
million from the fund, while annually the Office of Surface Mining spends $3.5 million to $4
million to fix emergency mine problems in PA (Glover, 1998). Despite the trust money being
earmarked for such causes as extinguishing underground mine fires, congress must appropriate
each use of it, and they generally choose not to use the money for its original purpose (Glover,
1998). In addition to fighting a lack of funding for mine-related problems, Pennsylvania also has
a priority list managed by the DEP, which classifies the order in which mine fires get attention.
There seems to be little indication how they decide what should come first; a 1.5 acre fire under
Boyce Park made it to the top of the DEP’s priority list and was extinguished, despite being no
danger to any homes or people (Glover, 1998).
Whether the demolition of Centralia was a ploy to acquire mineral rights, or a decision to
sacrifice a small town to save money, the unfortunate reality appears to be that the residents of
Centralia have suffered needlessly in fear of a pseudo-disaster. Many elderly residents who were
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victims of the relocation suffered severe depression before their deaths, due to being separated
from their lifelong residences (Rubinkam, 2010a). Depression hasn’t been limited to senior
citizens; many of the town’s younger residents experienced severe distress upon seeing their
family homes they grew up in bulldozed for no reason (Rubinkam, 2010a). Several Centralia
business owners lost their life’s savings when the buyout didn’t compensate them enough for
their investments and they were unable to reopen in the areas they were relocated to
(Wereschagin, 2010). The majority of relocated residents of Centralia wound up relocated to
suburbs of Harrisburg, PA; in 2010, 81% were living on unemployment or in government-funded
row houses (Krygier, 1995; Wereschagin, 2010). Had the residents of Centralia been left alone,
and not provided so-called “aid” which resulted in their relocation, most if not all would still
reside in their family homes in the town. Their businesses would still be functioning, and they
would’ve never suffered substantial financial and emotional hardships.
Case Study: Hurricane Andrew
On August 24, 1992, a storm with winds as high as 200 mph known as Hurricane Andrew
made landfall over Dade County, Florida. Despite living in a hurricane-prone area, most officials
and residents of Dade County and surrounding areas weren’t adequately prepared for the wrath
of Andrew (Hughes, 2012). 43 people died during the hurricane, and 126,000 destroyed homes
left one hundred and eighty thousand people homeless; damages totaled $30 billion (Hughes,
2012). Many governmental failures aligned which prolonged the relief of the victims, but simply
put, "the recovery efforts of the local, state, and federal governments following the storm
prolonged the suffering of Andrew's victims" (Hughes, 2012).
While in 1992, hurricane prediction models weren’t nearly as accurate as they are now, it
was still apparent with advance warning that Hurricane Andrew would be making landfall over
the Florida peninsula (Hughes, 2012). However, despite the warnings, no one seriously prepared,
and the county, and even state, officials had been so reliant on their sense that federal aid was
coming every minute that they did little to prepare before the storm (Hughes, 2012). However no
one really knew what to do when they realized help was needed in the first place; then-governor
of Florida, Lawton Chiles, didn’t even know how to file a request for help, nor was he aware that
one had to ask before help would arrive (Hughes, 2012).
Prior to Hurricane Andrew’s landfall, heavy announcements were made that shelters
would be open area-wide to take in those whose homes were damaged or who had nowhere else
to go (Eyerdam, 1994). Unfortunately, at the same time that knowledge was being spread to the
general public about shelters, a contradictory message was going amongst the places being used
as shelters: that they could only accept people with specific psychiatric conditions, or those who
needed limited medical assistance for certain conditions or who needed proper administration of
perishable medications/oxygen (Eyerdam, 1994). According to Eyerdam (1994), once the storm
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started, many people were thus left with a situation of having declined evacuation thinking they
would later be able to seek shelter and instead finding themselves without a place to go. Many
non-English speaking tourists in town were faced with a similar problem; they had been evicted
from their hotel rooms and told to get out, but evictions didn’t occur until after the airports had
closed (Eyerdam, 1994). The tourists were bussed to shelters which wouldn’t take them in, so in
the end many wound up weathering the storm at airports which took a lot of damage (Eyerdam,
1994).
Blinded by the belief that federal help was coming and that it would be better than
anything anyone else could provide, local help went first ignored, then after it arrived, unused.
An article ran as far away as Seattle wondering why county residents weren’t helping each other,
when FEMA and the Red Cross clearly weren’t responding fast enough (Everett, 1992). After
Dade County emergency management coordinator Kathleen Hale made her famous “where are
the cavalry” a plea at a press conference, donations poured in on the third day following the
storm, leaving a bigger problem: how to handle the supplies provided by well-off locals. Local
emergency management was overwhelmed with the donations, and had no idea how to handle
storing, transporting, and distributing the much-needed goods. Food products sat around
spoiling, and those in need never made use of the donations, while a significant amount of the
helping hands that had arrived were needed to attempt to process the flood of goods (Hughes,
2012). Many people heard the cries for help and brought supplies to shelters, returning home
feeling as though they had done their part, and never realizing that the shelters they had left a
trunk full of diapers at didn’t even house a single child. The shelter staff was then left with piles
of supplies no one would ever use or devote time to sending them where they were needed
(Provenzo & Provenzo, 2002). Many citizens who wished to help simply didn’t know what was
appropriate to donate, bringing everything from soiled or overly sexual clothes to used
toothbrushes (Provenzo & Provenzo, 2002). Those who were left responsible for sorting through
such things as donated clothes often broke out in severe cases of contact dermatitis, due to the
horrible condition in which the clothes items donated were in (Eyerdam, 1994).
Seeing people in need following the disaster, and what a slow response was happening
with the federal government, many non-profit organizations made the journey down to Florida
by car to bring supplies and to help residents dig out of their destroyed homes. However, many
believed they would arrive in Dade County to a gathering of impoverished immigrant workers
who no longer had even a cardboard hut to live in, and were severely disappointed to find
middle-class white families who had lost their two-story family homes and boats; some turned
back, unwilling to help those they thought were too well off to benefit (Stone, 2012). The race
issue was further emphasized when a black church in Richmond Heights set up shelter and free
meals and clothes, only to remain empty for two weeks as white neighbors didn’t care to
intermingle no matter how needy they were (Provenzo & Provenzo, 2002). Another ethnographic
hindrance was related to the language barrier. It was assumed that all residents of Dade County
spoke English or had access to a translator, so all warning broadcasts before the storm and relief
[8]
information following the incident was broadcast in English. Many people were unable to
prepare or receive help because they got lost in translation and never received a message they
could understand (Peacock et. al., 1997). It wasn’t just organizations who wanted to help but
didn’t find the situation as they believed; those who had volunteered their time, including
firefighters and police officers from neighboring cities and states, ended up lost in the mass of
displaced residents and needing aid supplies themselves (Stone, 2012).
Because the destructive winds and storm surge of Hurricane Andrew were far greater
than building code had allowed for in southern Florida, many hospitals saw extensive damage,
and were unable to properly function in light of so many victims needing immediate treatment
(Provenzo & Provenzo, 2002). Field hospitals were set up by emergency responders from South
Carolina, who had experienced Hurricane Hugo and weren’t as flustered by the situation as the
locals. However, the climate of Dade County was more humid and swampy than even South
Carolinians had expected, and the storm surge had left even more areas underwater, making it
hard to find dry land to set up medical facilities (Provenzo & Provenzo, 2002). Patients with
open wounds were mixed in with those who had stomach upset, and no areas existed to
quarantine patients with contagious diseases such as meningitis. Without proper toilets, areas for
the gastrointestinal patients to relieve their symptoms were nonexistent. While the visiting
medical help had the best intentions, proper sanitation precautions weren’t followed, and
contagious diseases were spread as well as many wounds becoming infected due to improper
treatment for patients who had to then return to wherever they had taken refuge in an un-air
conditioned and water damaged location (Provenzo & Provenzo, 2002). Months later, reports
came back of patients who had presented with bleeding wounds that needed attention, who
received stitches and had their wounds bandaged up, only to later develop a nasty infection that
resulted in surgical procedures and even amputation of digits (Provenzo & Provenzo, 2002).
Medical care had not been better during the storm. Prior to Hurricane Andrew making landfall,
both the Dade County regional public hospital Jackson Memorial Hospital and a private
institution, Baptist Hospital, called in all of their pregnant mothers nearing delivery (Eyerdam,
1994). It was thought that they might deliver during the storm due to the barometric pressure
drop and be unable to get to help, so they were herded into the two hospitals along with all of
their families, soon “creating space, nutrition, waste disposal, sanitation and liability problems”
(Eyerdam, 1994). Once power went out, the hospitals were stranded without running water
(which was supplied by wells) or lights, as the backup generators placed on the rooftop in these
areas to avoid water damage from the swampy location had blown away from the storm’s 180
mph winds (Eyerdam, 1994). In addition to hospitals being left unable to function, they were also
being blown apart due to not meeting hurricane-proof building code, or in the case of Jackson
Memorial, having a good portion under construction (Eyerdam, 1994). Several cases of babies
delivered at home were reported during the storm, and Eyerdam’s 1994 account of the storm
hinted that perhaps they were better off than the mothers who had sought refuge at hospitals only
to deal with worse problems.
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In some neighborhoods, homes were devastated, but not completely flattened. Those
residents generally wished to stay in their homes, but local and visiting police forces herded them
off to tent cities set up nearby (Provenzo & Provenzo). Those who wound up in the tent cities, or
makeshift refugee camps, were worse off than if they had stayed in their damaged homes. Camps
with the capacity for 1,500 people wound up with closer to three thousand cramped in them, and
the camps quickly grew dirty and filled with the spread of disease (Provenzo & Provenzo).
Immigration officials frequented the camps and took the opportunity to round up illegal workers
and send them home, while homeowners faced different problems. Many returned back to what
was left of their homes only to find they had been looted and their surviving personal possessions
taken by those who sought profit out of the disaster (Provenzo & Provenzo, 2002). One month
after the hurricane, eight hundred people remained in a tent city by Homestead Air Field, many
who were either not allowed to leave as they were government dependents waiting on someone
to sort out where to put them, or now had nowhere to go because their homes had been bulldozed
while they were living in the tent cities and unable to say no to the cleanup process (Provenzo &
Provenzo, 2002).
When FEMA finally arrived on scene following Hurricane Andrew, victims who met
FEMA’s qualification standards were provided semi-permanent housing in the form of mobile
homes delivered either to their property or a trailer park (Peacock et. al., 1997). While most of
those denied a home by FEMA legitimately did not meet their criteria, others were denied
because they failed to meet nuclear family criteria of families with more than one head-ofhousehold living together (Peacock et. al., 1997). FEMA had expected only one application per
address, and were quite confused by the state of living many people in southern Florida had
grown to accept (Peacock et. al., 1997).
The rebuilding process following Hurricane Andrew was so chaotic that even pop culture
caught on; t-shirts began to crop up around Dade County that said “I survived Hurricane
Andrew, but the rebuilding is killing me!” (Provenzo & Provenzo, 2002) Many Dade County
residents experienced unexplainable feelings of sadness, depression. Local psychologists noticed
an influx of patients coming in experiencing new cases of anxiety, as well as previous patients
seeing their psychological symptoms worsen. Many of these patients were college students
forced to go back to class before they were ready, or workers required to return to duty before
they had taken care of their own personal crises (Provenzo & Provenzo, 2002). School-age
children were sent back to school as soon as possible after the storm, under the philosophy that it
would help them recover quicker, but the opposite was seen as they merely acted out in class or
cried a lot. Many kids who rode the bus were also exhausted due to as much as 2 hour school bus
rides to navigate around roads that had been destroyed or pick up students who had been
relocated to camps (Provenzo & Provenzo, 2002). Several cases of suicides related to trauma
from the storm cropped up, almost all of these cases were citizens who had at some point been
placed in the tent cities or worked providing aid in one (Provenzo & Provenzo, 2002).
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Dr. Robert Sheets, director of the National Hurricane Center in the 1990s, believes that
most of the damage seen during Hurricane Andrew can be attributed to poor construction
practices and a lack of hurricane protection measures such as shutters (Nese & Grenci, 1998).
While homes built in hurricane-prone areas now have legislation-mandated features such as steel
rebar reinforced walls set into concrete and standard shutters that can be closed over every
window in a matter of an hour, those rebuilt immediately following Hurricane Andrew were not
part of this ruling, and many fell victim yet again to the slew of storms that passed over Florida
during the 2004 season (Nese & Grenci, 1998). If Dade County residents had been encouraged to
move inland, or at the least rebuild better, the situation seen during Andrew would’ve never been
repeated. Habitat For Humanity and other smaller home building assistance NPOs helped build
homes in the area affected by Hurricane Andrew, however due to the amateur builders, these
homes often did not meet new hurricane proofing codes (Provenzo & Provenzo, 2002).
Following Hurricane Andrew, many people (most of whom had never lived through a
hurricane before) wanted to move away from Florida (Nese & Grenci, 1998). However, even
those who could afford to do so faced hindrances to their migration. Employees of the Dade
County Police Department were told that they could move as far as Broward County and
commute, however if they wished to leave Florida altogether, they would not receive good
recommendations to find employment elsewhere (Provenzo & Provenzo, 2002). Despite the fact
that 10,000 apartment homes had been destroyed, and the complex owners wished to rebuild, the
owners also wanted to make some of their money back. They kicked the residents out, but
wouldn’t return deposits or end contracts with the residents, forcing them to pay for as much as a
year after the storm for a home they would never return to (Provenzo & Provenzo, 2002). Those
on government subsidies were told if they left the county they had resided in before the storm,
they would lose all their funding, yet the government left five thousand people dependent on
government funding living outdoors more than three months after the storm (Provenzo &
Provenzo, 2002). Many people simply couldn’t afford to leave, because home values elsewhere
in the country weren’t as low as they were in Florida or they hadn’t insured their home for
enough value, making it hard on anyone who had a substantial amount paid into their home to
find an equivalent house outside of the area (Provenzo & Provenzo, 2002). Those who stayed
were required to rebuild above flood levels – unless, that is, they paid the government a modest
fee. In the end, the fee was cheaper than paying the elevation fee, which was always at least 5
digits in cost and never covered by flood or homeowner’s insurance. This meant that many
homes stayed where they were despite ongoing hazards, (Provenzo & Provenzo, 2002).
Overall, Hurricane Andrew was an unfortunate natural disaster that quickly turned into a
social disaster as it seemed that everything anyone did was the wrong thing. 20 years later, we
can merely look back and reminisce of the mistakes, learning how to change what went wrong.
We now know that preparation and a system for local relief would have done wonders to help the
situation. We have learned that people should not led race and other social issues taint the
provision of relief. We also learned that evacuating people to worse locations is a bad idea, and
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that amateur medical care can be very harmful. Most importantly, Hurricane Andrew should
have taught us that all but forcing people to stay in a hazardous area is a bad practice, and
rebuilding in a disaster zone isn’t always the best policy.
Case Study: Hurricane Katrina
The city of New Orleans was long vulnerable to a disaster on the grandest scale. Had the
eyewall of Hurricane Andrew landed 87 miles to the east of where it did on the Gulf Coast in
1992, deaths in New Orleans would have been in the thousands or higher (Nesse & Grenci,
1998). Despite that, it was not until the last week of August 2005 when Hurricane Katrina’s 175
mph winds, storm surge and rainfall attacked New Orleans and made it the costliest natural
disaster in US history. Many of us still remember what we saw on our televisions during the
following weeks, but I wish to examine the results of the aid provided after the storm clouds
receded.
Following the Hurricane Pam exercise in 2004, many city officials believed that FEMA
would actually arrive on scene prior to a major storm to help with the evacuation problem faced
by New Orleans and the large population without access to transport (Heerden & Bryan, 2006).
This left them unprepared for the reality of evacuation, where the people who lived where they
needed to get out the most were also unable to, and in turn would need rescue following the
levee breach (Heerden & Bryan, 2006). The mayor and other top officials knew the downsides to
relying on FEMA and the Red Cross to arrive, and shifted the expected response to rely more on
charitable donations of time and supplies to cover the needs (Heerden & Bryan, 2006). Yet the
Red Cross had failed to even set up shelters in areas safe from flooding, having declined to
examine 100-year flood maps that clearly indicated their shelters even outside New Orleans
would be filled with water at the level of predicted storm surge from Katrina (Reckdahl, 2007).
Once the National Guard mounted a response to Katrina, victims were pulled from their
homes or rooftops (in some cases, whether they wanted to be or not) and deposited on the I-10
overpass in Jefferson Parish, left for days without food or water, shade or toilets (Heerden &
Bryan, 2006). Those who tried to escape the human corrals such as this were stopped at gunpoint
and told to wait on their rescue (Heerden & Bryan, 2006). Two days after the storm, Mayor
Nagin ordered all of the police in New Orleans to halt any search & rescue activities and switch
to law enforcement, stopping the “looters, drug addicts, rapists and instigators of chaos”
(Heerden & Bryan, 2006). Following this, evacuees were held hostage by troops, police wasted
valuable time seeking out arrests instead of rescues, a curfew was initiated that prevented
medical care from reaching victims, and the media ran with the story turning it into a tale of fear
(Heerden & Bryan, 2006). The airline industry took this time of cancelled flights normally filled
with tourists to start Operation Air Care, providing air travel to people trapped in New Orleans
(Dyson, 2006). These people were removed from the Superdome and other refuges in New
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Orleans, to Houston and San Antonio’s similar structures, where the same situations with
crowding and sanitation resumed as the people were left stranded in arenas and convention halls
for as much as 9 months (Dyson, 2006).
In September 2005, President Bush pledged $60 billion to initiate “one of the largest
recovery efforts ever seen” in the nation (Koughan, 2007). While United States citizens believed
their tax dollars had gone to help poor victims of New Orleans find a home, few residents
actually saw any of that money, and those that did averaged about $2,300 only if they rebuilt in
specific areas that had been most badly destroyed (Koughan, 2007). The government was
essentially sanctioning those who stayed in areas that had a continued vulnerability to future
storms. Mayor Nagin rejected a highly restrictive plan that would prevent any rebuilding in areas
subject to similar flooding and catastrophe should another storm hit New Orleans (Koughan,
2007). Further confusion ensued as people attempting to rebuild couldn’t figure out how high off
the ground their homes needed to be to meet the criteria that did pass legislature, and FEMA,
which was responsible for supervising this protocol, was always giving a different answer that
resulted in much rebuilding being too low (Koughan, 2007). Those who rented faced even dire
straits, the cost of rent skyrocketed after so many buildings were destroyed, and rent subsidies
issued by FEMA weren’t nearly enough to cover what the recipients could find to live in
(Koughan, 2007).
Michael Dyson noted in Come Hell or High Water that the Italians didn’t rebuild Pompeii
at the foot of a volcano, so why does New Orleans keep persisting despite being as far as 20 feet
below sea level in some places? Energy companies have a stronger stake in how the Gulf Coast
is developed than do environmentalists, and this leads to conflicting issues of saving the barrier
islands and wetlands that protect Gulf cities or drilling for oil (Dyson, 2006). Too much pressure
exists to rebuild things as they were, where they were. "Other recovery research has also found
that local citizens exert tremendous pressure on local government to rebuild the community to its
pre-disaster form and that other forms of conflict arise from the distribution of relief and
recovery aid." (Joakim 2008, pg. 5) It is poised by Joakim (2008, pg. 18) that while policymakers
understand the need to rebuild in a way that reduces vulnerability, often they simply choose not
to in order to rebuild more quickly, cheaply, etc. This happened in New Orleans, with a blatant
disregard for the ongoing hazards resulting from putting victims of Katrina back where they
were. All of the land in southern Louisiana is relatively new, built up from sediment flowing
from the mouth of the Mississippi River; that was, until, the Mississippi was blocked off by
dams, canals and levees (Heerden & Bryan, 2006). Now the river cannot transport sediment to
where it is needed to continue building up the coastland, the system of annual river floods has
been altered, and the existing areas face subsidence: buildings are sinking further down in the
soft land they sit on while sea levels rise worldwide (Heerden & Bryan, 2006). The levees of
New Orleans had problems from their building by the Corps of Engineers. Scientists weren’t
consulted to determine if the levees would even work, construction was cut short to save money,
and every big rain storm proved over the years that the levees weren’t good enough (Heerden &
[13]
Bryan, 2006). Despite this knowledge, “New Orleans is doing everything it can to rebuild the
city exactly as it was” (Center for Public Integrity, 2007).
Hurricane Katrina brought with it many lessons that should have been learned during
Hurricane Andrew, such as relying on federal help to come is not the smartest move. Race issues
are sadly always emphasized during disasters, and yet society still hasn’t learned not to let that
happen. The dilemma of evacuation was also an issue, yet again, during Katrina as many people
were moved from one bad place to another and later left homeless. Similar to what happened in
Centralia, the money dedicated to relief was used for different purposes. Lastly, yet again, a city
that is all but doomed was once again erected in a zone of danger, with little thought to the future
vulnerability that would bring to its residents.
Case Study: Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Meltdown
The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear reactor meltdown was spurred by an earthquake and
following tsunami offshore of Japan on March 11, 2011. A series of protocols failed following
the natural disasters, and several of the nuclear reactors at the Fukushima Daiichi power plant
were unable to be kept cool, thus overheating and melting down. A significant amount of
radioactive material was released into the atmosphere, nearby land, and ocean. In 2012, the
Japanese parliament commissioned the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation
Committee (NAIIC) to launch a full investigation and compile their data into a report indicating
what went wrong.
While the cause and blame of the nuclear accident have been much debated, what is of
real concern for the purpose of my research is the response and aid provided to the victims.
According to the NAIIC, the Japanese government initially wished to hide the true severity of the
accident at Fukushima, which created a delay in reaction. When action finally was taken, many
people in the surrounding area were slow to react because government-sanctioned nuclear
accident protocols practiced and informed over the years had broadcast incorrect assumptions of
safety during an accident (NAIIC, 2012).
Having learned a lesson from the delay in Iodine administration following Chernobyl, the
Japanese government rather quickly issued a hearty dose of potassium iodine, but with it spread a
false sense of safety that no harm could come to anyone who took the medicine (NAIIC, 2012).
The distribution also at some point ran out, and many were given a placebo so as to prevent
panic, leaving them feeling safety from a precaution they didn’t even receive (NAIIC, 2012).
Despite the issuance of potassium iodine treatment, radiation exposure still occurred. Forty-five
percent of children in areas surrounding Fukushima Daiichi prior to the explosion now test
positive for thyroid radiation exposure, which is linked to cancer later in life (Onishi & Fackler,
2011).
[14]
Following the radiation leak, the government issued evacuation orders for much of the
area surrounding the plant (NAIIC, 2012). Unfortunately, the government provided few details to
the agrarian families about why they were evacuating, nor did they give direct instruction as to
where they should go, lead to a lot of confusion and many people evacuating to more
contaminated areas (NAIIC, 2012). The government also withheld information on how much
radiation was released, in a few instances allegedly reducing the readings as much as 3 decimal
points before broadcasting contamination levels to citizens (Jamail, 2011). A large group of
residents, including children, were evacuated to the north because the Japanese government had
given false information that the radioactive contamination spread into the atmosphere would be
blowing south with the wind (Onishi & Fackler, 2011). These reports were wrong, because the
radiation plume spread to the northwest, in fact directly over the town Tsushima, which was a
gathering area for evacuees only 20km outside the Fukushima Daiichi plant site (Onishi &
Fackler, 2011). In some areas, shelter-in-place orders were given, and residents were left in
locations with higher than acceptable radiation levels until April, seemingly forgotten about
(NAIIC, 2012). Other groups of people were forced to move multiple times, resulting in the
deaths of 60 elderly and sickly patients (NAIIC, 2012). Many evacuation orders were lifted far
sooner than they should have been, stopping monitoring of radiation levels and allowing people
to return to unsafe areas with little regard for if it was safe yet, and telling them protective
clothing is no longer needed (Gordon, 2011).
By April of 2011, evacuees were given prefabricated structures to live in as temporary
housing, but the government later decided these were unsightly and the areas were too cramped,
and chose to demolish the homes and send the residents back to wherever they had come from
(Onishi & Fackler, 2011). To help ease the minds of people forced to move back to radiation
contaminated areas, the government raised the legal exposure limit to radiation (including for
children) from one to twenty millisieverts per year, allowing them to live in areas that were
simply unsafe (Onishi & Fackler, 2011). Meanwhile, the Japanese Prime Minister was telling
people that they would never be able to return to their homes near Fukushima, which would be
demolished, as they will stay contaminated for many decades (McCurry, 2011). These
conflicting actions have created a large homeless community with little place to go in a cramped
island nation with limited land – over 150,000 people were evacuated at some point or another
following the nuclear disaster (NAIIC, 2012).
Most of the residents of the areas surrounding the Fukushima Daiichi plant were part of
an agrarian lifestyle prior to the disaster, many making a living off growing grain and produce,
farming cattle, or fishing. Now that the surrounding water, forest and topsoil are contaminated
for decades, these people have little other skill sets to provide for themselves, and are
unemployed (NAIIC, 2012). The government of Japan is not happy with this, and encourages the
evacuees of Fukushima to return to old activities, telling them that the land and water are safe
(NAIIC, 2012). They are left with little to do besides go against their moral conscience and
[15]
provide radiation-contaminated food to the rest of their country, or to disobey the government’s
orders and remain homeless and jobless (NAIIC, 2012).
Japanese culture itself has hindered the people’s resilience to the Fukushima Daiichi
disaster: it is against their nature and bringing up to question authority, be it the authority of a
parent or a government official (NAIIC, 2012). Only one lawsuit has been seen as a result of the
disaster, and it was unsuccessful in Japanese court (Onishi & Fackler, 2011). While it is well
known amongst the younger generation of Japan that eating the local food carries with it a high
risk of low-level radiation exposure, the elderly generations trust the government’s reassurances
that the food is safe and force meals made from local produce and fish upon their children, who
must oblige to please their elders (NAIIC, 2012).
The Japanese government, and the world as a whole, should look at the actions during the
nuclear disaster and realize that things like this should not happen in the modern age. A
government should never consider it acceptable to lie to its citizens or withhold crucial
information, for any reason. If evacuations are mandated, they should follow certain orders that
are specific and centered around avoiding the disaster zones instead of relocating people into
greater hazards. Any preventative therapy (such as the iodine) provided should only be instituted
with the honesty that it is not fully protective, and an evacuation or change in behavior should
still follow. Most important, if a government is faced with a situation where a former living area
is rendered unsafe, they should not say this while at the same time leaving the victims nowhere
else to go.
Conclusions
As we have seen through the case studies, more often than not aid becomes more of a
hindrance than a help to disaster victims. That is not to say immediate aid, such as rescue and
medical care, should not be provided. However, reforms must be made to how we look at
providing aid during disaster scenarios and a system of checks-and-balance would be useful.
Joakim (2008, pg. 16) believes that vulnerability reduction should be the backbone of
disaster recovery efforts. Actions must be calculated, especially during the permanent rebuilding
process, to ensure that they won’t instead increase vulnerability. "Through the actions taken
during the post-disaster recovery period, every action taken on account of one disaster must be
designed and managed also to reduce vulnerability of the future. In this way, vulnerability
reduction itself would be socially and environmentally sustainable development." (Joakim 2008,
pg. 11)
Aid has come a long way over the spectrum of time covered by the case studies, yet in
most ways, has not improved in regards to critical flaws that are the most harmful to already
suffering disaster victims. Many of the same mistakes made during Hurricane Andrew were
[16]
repeated following Hurricane Katrina, along with new flaws becoming apparent. Things learned
from Chernobyl were applied during Fukushima, but things still went wrong. Are we really
learning all that we should from our past disasters, and applying them to future events? In the
following, I will list my suggestions for the future of disaster relief actions.
Sociology and Relief
All of the case studies examined exhibited some form of prejudicial relief distribution based on
race, age, class, gender or location. This cannot continue to happen. All humans must be created
equal in the wake of a disaster, regardless of their skin color, genitalia, or where they set up their
home before the event. Society worldwide should be educated enough on sociology at this point
to understand that a time of need is the last time that prejudice should be coming into play.
Preparation before Response
In the case studies of both hurricanes, it was clearly seen that better preparation prior to landfall
would have made a world of difference when it came to the amount of relief required after the
storms subsided. Local preparation needs to become key – relying on a federal response too often
leaves your head below the water. Each city in America (if not the world) with inherent hazards
needs to have a plan to reduce vulnerability, prepare quickly enough when a warning happens,
and respond sufficiently on its own without waiting on federal help if a warning doesn’t come
first. A system should also be in place to properly collect and distribute local aid donations, so
that further mayhem isn’t created by an influx of charity. Additionally, a plan should be firmly
rooted that establishes how many incoming aid works can be accommodated, and where, so that
they aren’t merely added to the number of bodies that need care following a disaster. It would be
better to turn away those who wish to help because there is no room for them, than to have them
come and not be useful, only added to the list of victims.
"Preparedness of the un-thought might be viewed broadly as any composite of three
formations: the camouflaging of things, or the keeping of things on hand but held out of
view; the repurposing of objects, or the keeping of things in view but not at hand; and the
vague indeterminacy of everyday practices, or the keeping of preparedness on hand but
held out of mind. In short, to bring the un-thought into the thought is a call to be alert to
the ways in which concealments are laid on the everyday of things, concepts, and
concealment itself. If the work of preparedness is, by definition, work done in advance of
the disaster, then the work of preparedness of the un-thought moves preparedness back
still further, prior to the distinction that rends disaster and the everyday from one
another." (Sayre, 2011)
Intentional vs. Unintentional Mistakes
The intentions of any organization, government or private, providing so-called relief need to be
examined before they are allowed to take drastic measures. If the state organizations responsible
[17]
for removing Centralians from their homes had been supervised by a watchdog group of some
type, hundreds of families would not now be living in poverty and battling depression. If
someone had been monitoring the Japanese government, information would not have been
withheld to save face while sacrificing the future health of hundreds of thousands of citizens.
While inciting panic is always a risk, it is better to be open and honest with the victims about the
dangers they face so that they can respond with their eyes wide open instead of being blindsided
by later knowledge and left to wonder what they would have done if only they had known.
When & Where to Rebuild
Sometimes a disaster is a random event that wasn’t even tied into a known vulnerability (9/11 for
example). However, in most of the case studies I have presented, there were known hazards in
the communities that became victims. Once one event has indicated that an area has severe
vulnerability, it should be seen as an opportunity to relocate the entire community. Relocation is
hard on disaster victims, and the feeling of uprooting from their community being dissolved is
long lasting (Crate & Nuttall, 2009). However, after living through a disaster many people feel as
though they have already lost their community, and this could be seen as a perfect time to
relocate without putting additional stress on the community. Following displacement, people
need to reestablish their lives as quickly as possible to regain a sense of structure in their lives
(Crate & Nuttall, 2009). Instead of allowing them to return to the demolished communities and
reestablish only to later become uprooted again, they should initially be allowed to reestablish in
a safer locale.
Following Hurricane Andrew it was thought that the southern Florida area affected could be
“built back better.” However, according to Joaquim, "it is found that although many
governmental and aid organizations have adopted the term 'building back better' to define the
reconstruction and recovery activities, defining what building back better encompasses has been
difficult and poorly researched." If building back better becomes building back worse, or
building back just for the sake of it, nothing has been accomplished. Leaving an area barren is
better than building a community that grows only to be taken out a second time by the same type
of disaster. It has oft been said, if you build it they will come. When a city is there waiting,
people will fill it up. Don’t lead them blindly into hazards. The days of paying victims to stay
where they are, continually resurrecting cities that nature wants to suck back into the earth, and
trying everything possible to prevent relocation should have ended at the dawn of the industrial
era.
Don’t Overlook Natural Resilience
Humans have been dealing with climate change for centuries, and have always managed to fall
back on adaptability as a coping mechanism (Crate & Nuttall, 2009). Resilience is the mirror
image of vulnerability, and explains how civilizations have survived chaotic events and not
collapsed. (Crate & Nuttall, 2009). When the victims of a disaster have their resilience
[18]
undermined, it creates a sense of helplessness that prevents their ability to recover mentally from
what they have gone through (Crate & Nuttall, 2009). Joakim suggests that policymakers often
overlook a community's built in resilience, feeling that they are incapable of rebuilding without
some outside help. This leads to an increased likelihood of ignoring hazards (2008, pg. 20). "In
terms of vulnerability reduction, an understanding of the local context is required to ensure that
recovery efforts are addressing the root causes of vulnerability within the community as well as
engaging in effective strategies for recovery that have long-term sustainability." (Joakim 2008,
pg. 21) Officials at the federal and local levels should provide what is necessary for the
immediate, but particularly when it comes to long-term rebuilding, allow the community to feel
out what it needs on its own without imposing impractical overly-restrictive mandates.
Proper Use of Allocated Funds
Money reserved for disaster aid should be used for what it was intended for. Padding the federal
budget with the grant money intended to restore abandoned mines in Pennsylvania is wrong, as is
money from Katrina never making it to the hands of victims. Many disaster victims lose their
entire existences during a disaster, and reestablishing is costly. They need all of the help that they
can get, especially those who cannot afford to buy into the market-based relief system. The
government should always look into cutting other areas before taking money away from disaster
relief, which is cutting one’s nose off to spite their face.
Stop Untrained Medical Care
During Hurricane Andrew, many people became sick from receiving medical care from
untrained practitioners. This care was mostly provided in non-urgent situations. Had everyone
just waited until the storm subsided, it would have prevented many infections and amputations
that later occurred because of the procedures performed in unsanitary conditions. Protocol should
be in place indicating that non-lifesaving medical care should not be performed by untrained
persons in unsanitary conditions. A cut can wait to be stitched up, allowed to scab over on its
own, rather than immediately being sealed by someone without any medical training that knows
nothing about how to prevent the spread of infection in an already more unsanitary than usual
environment.
Calling Anthropologists: More Research, Please
It is crucial for anthropologists and sociologists to devote more time to studying the implications
of disaster relief. Society relies on social scientists to educate on necessary structural changes.
Right now, there is little solid research on the after-effects of disaster aid. Bits and pieces remain
scattered here and there in existing literature, but no one has devoted a full work to the topic. It
would be helpful to alleviate future disaster response failures if research providing a clear
framework existed.
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Overall, it is important to remember that we cannot simply stop providing disaster relief.
We need to change how we look at the provision, and after making some fundamental reforms to
the execution of relief provision in wake of a disaster, resume with a new outlook. In our
increasingly chaotic world, disasters will remain inevitable. All that we can do is continue
learning how to best prepare for and respond to events we can do little to prevent with the
attitude that every lesson learned is another life saved.
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