HSS – Opening Packet – Negative File
**OFFCASE STARTS HERE
Cplan Starts Here
Opening Note
Please note that the multi-color highlighting – on the next page – is not to be read
aloud any differently. It is a device for Hoya-Spartan opening lab discussions. The goal
of those discussions will be to make sure students understand each portion of this
topic-specific cplan.
1NC Text and Shell
Text:
The United States federal government should extend a “MEXUS Plan” for emergency
responses with Cuba, as well as increase drilling within the United States and its
territorial waters. The United States Department of the Treasury will not adversely
regulate or fine actions to protect drilling safety in Cuban territorial waters. The
United States Department of the Treasury will award licenses to firms with the
equipment and expertise to fight the effects of an oil spill to operate in Cuban waters.
The cplan solves:
First – Easing oil embargo causes appeasement. Cplan solves better
Sadowski ‘11
Richard Sadowski is a Class of 2012 J.D. candidate, at Hofstra University¶ School of Law, NY. Mr. Sadowski is also the Managing Editor of
Production of¶ the Journal of International Business and Law Vol. XI. “Cuban Offshore Drilling: Preparation and¶ Prevention within the
Framework of the United¶ States’ Embargo” – ¶ Sustainable Development Law & Policy¶ Volume 12; Issue 1 Fall 2011: Natural Resource
Conflicts Article 10 – http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1497&context=sdlp
Cuba plans to drill seven exploratory oil wells in the¶ Gulf of Mexico by 2014.1 Some
argue that the threat of¶ Cuban offshore oil
drilling will increase the embargo’s¶ costs and that U.S. oil companies will miss out on oil exploration¶
that will go to foreign countries.2 In response, some U.S. lawmakers¶ and U.S. oil lobbyists have advocated for an exception¶ to
the Cuban embargo permitting energy cooperation.3 Notwithstanding¶ these concerns, the long-standing Cuban
embargo is an¶ economic restriction with a significant purpose and should not¶ so easily be forsaken.¶ This
article argues that, despite the added pressure Cuba’s¶ offshore oil developments have placed on U.S. policy, the embargo’s¶ twin
goals of bringing democracy to the Cuban people¶ and ending their oppressive rule have not been met.
Thus, now¶ is not the time to lift or ease the embargo. The embargo itself¶ serves to restrict Cuba’s drilling efforts4 and
new legislation may¶ further hamper Cuba’s exploration.5 Additionally, the economic¶ concerns of the U.S. energy industry
do not warrant a change¶ in the U.S. foreign policy toward Cuba, and those concerns can¶ be better
met by tapping U.S. resources. Furthermore, fears of¶ a Cuban oil spill can be assuaged through less
drastic measures¶ such as an oil spill emergency response agreement with Cuba,¶ similar to the one that the
United States has enacted with Mexico.
Second – Waiving embargo enforcement for oil safety solves.
Stephens ‘11
et al, Sarah Stephens – Executive Director of the Center for Democracy in the Americas – “As Cuba plans to drill in the Gulf of Mexico, U.S.
policy poses needless risks to our national interest,” http://democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/Cuba_Drilling_and_US_Policy.pdf
Recommendations¶ Pursue Unilateral Actions¶ • The Obama administration should
aggressively and comprehensively¶ use its
existing licensing authority to ensure the right firms with the best¶ equipment and expertise are in
place to fight the effects of an oil spill.¶ • OFAC, the Treasury Department office that administers and enforces
trade¶ sanctions, should make it clear that efforts to protect safety during drilling¶ by U.S. entities will
not be met with negative regulatory consequences .¶ •The U.S. should ensure that comprehensive information-sharing
with the¶ Cuban government is standard operating procedure, conducted openly¶ where possible, and without impediments in areas such as
granting visas¶ for Cuban scientists and officials to visit here¶ Pursue Bilateral Activities and Agreements¶ •¶ The U.S. should enter direct
discussions with Cuba on energy and¶ environmental cooperation.¶ •¶ The
(such
U.S. should look to existing models for bilateral
as MEXUS) and¶ trilateral cooperation (as proposed by the National Commission on the¶ BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and
environmental¶ planning with Cuba.
Offshore Drilling) for
Third – Cuba says “yes” to a “Mexus” offer. It will solve.
Sadowski ‘11
Richard Sadowski is a Class of 2012 J.D. candidate, at Hofstra University¶ School of Law, NY. Mr. Sadowski is also the Managing Editor of
Production of¶ the Journal of International Business and Law Vol. XI. “Cuban Offshore Drilling: Preparation and¶ Prevention within the
Framework of the United¶ States’ Embargo” – ¶ Sustainable Development Law & Policy¶ Volume 12; Issue 1 Fall 2011: Natural Resource
Conflicts Article 10 – http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1497&context=sdlp
Further, spill
response planning can be implemented before¶ drilling begins. The United States currently has oil
spill response¶ agreements with Mexico67 and Canada,68 but not with Cuba.69¶ As the Deepwater Horizon spill
highlighted, planning for disaster¶ is essential. To achieve this goal, the United States can model a Cuban plan on
the Joint Contingency Plan between the United¶ Mexican States and the United States of America Regarding¶
Pollution of the Maritime Environment by Discharge of Hydrocarbons¶ or Other Hazardous Substances
(“MEXUS Plan”).70¶ That plan originates from an agreement between Mexico and¶ the United States signed on July 24, 1980, and
developed in¶ accordance with the International Convention on Oil Pollution¶ Preparedness, Response and Cooperation, adopted on
November¶ 30, 1990.71 The
Plan pre-designates on-scene coordinators, a¶ joint response team, response coordination
centers, rapid notification¶ protocols, and communications procedures for the event¶ of an oil disaster.72 The Plan has
triumphed in test simulations,¶ which validates its concepts.73¶ The United States must initiate the same level of planning¶ with
Cuba. Given the proximity of potential Cuban wells¶ to the Florida coast, the need for a contingency plan is clear.¶ Fortunately, the MEXUS
Plan provides a guiding framework¶ upon which the United States and Cuba can draw. Furthermore,¶ a
recent Congressional report indicates that Cuba is open to¶ certain bilateral agreements with the United
States, noting Raul¶ Castro’s willingness to engage with the United States where¶ mutual interests exist.74 Since an oil spill
agreement is of mutual¶ interest, both countries should work to draft and implement it.
Fourth – Revised licensing solves spills – assumes their “quick response” distinction.
Stephens ‘11
et al, Sarah Stephens – Executive Director of the Center for Democracy in the Americas – “As Cuba plans to drill in the Gulf of Mexico, U.S.
policy poses needless risks to our national interest,” http://democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/Cuba_Drilling_and_US_Policy.pdf
The Obama administration should use its existing authority now¶ to award licenses to firms and individuals with the
equipment and¶ expertise to fight the effects of an oil spill.¶ As Robert Muse and Jorge Piñon said last year, the
administration has regula¶ -¶ tory authority to provide licenses and promulgate new regulations for “any¶ conceivable response” to an
environmental problem in Cuba.¶ 83¶ While the Cuban Assets Control Regulations administered by OFAC¶ include a variety of prohibitions that
generally bar U.S. private sector participation, involvement or cooperation in connection with the exploration¶ or development of energy sector
resources associated with Cuba, or related¶ environmental concerns, OFAC
retains discretionary authority to license such¶
activities by U.S. persons where it is determined by the executive branch to¶ be consistent with U.S. national interests.
Such licensing determinations are¶ generally within the scope of the authority of the President of the United¶ States with respect to matters of
U.S. foreign policy and national security.¶ By
moving far beyond the meager licensing activity that has already¶
taken place, the Obama administration could ensure that the international¶ oil companies working with Cuba
have full access to U.S. technology and¶ personnel in order to prevent and/or manage a blowout.¶ Speed is
of the essence in dealing with oil spills. The rate of oil spreading,¶ the degradation of the compounds which may be burned, the
creation of¶ emulsions, and the arrival of storms are all time-sensitive variables that can¶ magnify the damage from a spill.¶ Rather than
subjecting an environmental response to lengthy delays,¶ this new approach to licensing would enable
helicopters and equipment¶ to reach the site of an environmental problem within twenty-four hours of¶
notification. A much more aggressive plan is needed in advance, replacing¶ the existing approach of providing licenses on an application-byapplication¶ basis, so action can take place unencumbered by any regulatory delays at¶ the onset of a crisis.
Fifth – Expanding US drilling solves just as well for dependency and doesn’t link to
politics.
Genaw ‘10
Jillian L. Genaw – J.D. Candidate, Indiana Univ. School of Law-Indianapolis – Indiana International & Comparative Law Review; Indiana
Internationsl & Comparative Law Review – 20 Ind. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 47 – lexis, lawrev section
As an alternate option to the United States' lifting its OCS Moratorium, policy
analysts have suggested that the United States
keep the Moratorium in place but lift the economic embargo against Cuba in order to enable the United
States to bid on the offshore blocs that Cuba plans to lease out to foreign nations. n225 While a discussion of the
economic embargo goes well beyond the scope of this Note, it is important to take notice that it is an option that has been placed on the table.
Even without a full discussion of this option, the main concerns with it can shed some light on its viability. As discussed in Part I of this Note, it
makes little sense for the United States to lift an economic embargo, which has been in place since 1962, just to lease
Cuban offshore drilling blocs that are so close to the U. S. coast that they would subject the United States to the same risks of
environmental degradation. n226 Granted, lifting the economic embargo on Cuba would be beneficial in other areas of [*76] trade, but if the
primary motive for lifting the embargo is offshore oil drilling related then it makes very little sense. n227
There are much more
accessible, less controversial avenues for allowing offshore drilling in the United States. By lifting the OCS
Moratorium the United States would achieve the same benefits as it would if it leased drilling blocs
from Cuba, but would also achieve greater control and oversight over the industry. n228¶ If the United States does not take action and lift
the OCS Moratorium, in combination with imposing the other recommended environmental and safety regulations, it will remain heavily
dependant on foreign nations for oil. Even more daunting, the United States will be forced to sit back and watch as Cuba and other nations reap
the economic benefits of a substantial supply of oil so close to its own coastline. After years of debate amongst extremists on both sides of the
political spectrum, the issue of offshore drilling in the OCS has been stagnated. In light of Cuba's plans to expand its oil program and with the
introduction of improved technology, the environmental arguments, once convincing against offshore drilling, are now weak. After all, lifting
the OCS Moratorium does not give oil companies free reign; American oil companies will be subject to strengthened technological and safety
regulations, more frequent inspections, and more severe sanctions in the event of non-compliance. Because there is little the United States can
do to prevent Cuba from leasing out offshore exploration blocs, located within forty-five miles of the U. S. coastline, it is wise for the United
States to be proactive. If offshore drilling is to be done so close to the United States, it should be done the United States' way. As discussed in
Part III of this Note, environmental policy in Cuba has historically lacked enforcement and the public has little knowledge of and appreciation
for the environmental risks associated with offshore drilling. n229 Thus, the regulations over offshore drilling imposed by the Cuban
government would likely be much less stringent than regulations imposed by the U. S. Government.¶ The
American public,
American businesses, and even some environmentalists have become increasingly supportive of
opening up the OCS for offshore oil drilling. n230 Drilling technology and methodology have made major advancements, and the
oil industry's reputation has become cleaner since the 1980s when the OCS Moratorium was first enacted.
The United States' economy would be stimulated by participation in offshore oil drilling. The benefits are growing,
and the risks have minimized. Thus, the optimal solution would be for the United States to lift the OCS Moratorium, with the directional [*77]
drilling method mandated where possible, increase the frequency of inspections, strengthen enforcement, make sanctions more severe, and
create an "oil legacy" fund in preparation for a transition into more sustainable energy development. n231 The United States should continue
to research other renewable, alternative energy sources as well. Taking
these steps will allow the United States to remain competitive
in the international marketplace, develop a self- sufficient energy sector, solve a political battle that has been looming for
years, and minimize any negative impact associated with Cuba's offshore exploration bloc leasing program.
Backline – Domestic Drilling solves.
( ) Domestic Drilling solves
Sadowski ‘11
Richard Sadowski is a Class of 2012 J.D. candidate, at Hofstra University¶ School of Law, NY. Mr. Sadowski is also the Managing Editor of
Production of¶ the Journal of International Business and Law Vol. XI. “Cuban Offshore Drilling: Preparation and¶ Prevention within the
Framework of the United¶ States’ Embargo” – ¶ Sustainable Development Law & Policy¶ Volume 12; Issue 1 Fall 2011: Natural Resource
Conflicts Article 10 – http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1497&context=sdlp
The United States Should First Utilize¶ U.S. Oil Resources¶ The United States’ thirst for oil should first be quenched¶ with local
resources before resorting to end the embargo. Allowing¶ U.S. companies access to Cuban offshore oil fields would¶
effectively allow those companies to drill for oil in waters closer¶ to the U.S. coast than laws currently
allow.75 J. Larry Nichols,¶ Chairman of Devon Energy, an independent U.S. oil and natural¶ gas producer, opined that “[w]hen U.S.
companies are not even¶ allowed to drill in the eastern half of the Gulf of Mexico, we¶ have a long way to go before we can think about
international¶ waters off the coast of Cuba.”76 If
access to oil is indeed the¶ main U.S. rationale behind lifting the
embargo, this need is best¶ met by first allowing companies to drill more extensively in U.S.¶ waters.77¶
Moreover, dependence on other countries for oil is not a¶ responsible option.78 Because the United States has the best oil¶ safety standards in
the world, it is most environmentally competent¶ to tap America’s own natural resources.79 Furthermore,¶ because drilling has yet to start,
there is time yet for Cuban¶ political change to occur.80 Not
only is there simply no pressing¶ need for Cuban oil, as
portrayed by U.S. oil lobbyists, but U.S.¶ resources offer a more attractive alternative.81
Cplan – solvency backlines
Non-enforcement/Waiver prong
( ) Waiving embargo for drilling safety solves.
Stephens ‘11
et al, Sarah Stephens – Executive Director of the Center for Democracy in the Americas – “As Cuba plans to drill in the Gulf of Mexico, U.S.
policy poses needless risks to our national interest,” http://democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/Cuba_Drilling_and_US_Policy.pdf
Energy policy and environmental protection are classic examples of¶ how the embargo is an abiding
threat to U.S. interests . It should no longer¶ be acceptable to base U.S. foreign policy on the illusion
that sanctions will¶ cause Cuba’s government to collapse, or to try to stop Cuba from developing¶ its oil resources.
Nor should this policy or the political dynamic that sustains¶ it prevent the U.S. from addressing both the challenges and benefits of Cuba¶
finding meaningful amounts of oil in the Gulf of Mexico. ¶ The path forward is clear. The Obama administration should use its¶
executive authority to guarantee that firms with the best equipment and¶ greatest expertise are licensed in advance to fight the effects of an
oil spill.¶ The
Treasury Department, which enforces Cuba sanctions , should make clear¶ to the private
sector that efforts to protect drilling safety will not be met with¶ adverse regulatory actions. The U.S.
government should commit to vigorous¶ information sharing with Cuba, and open direct negotiations with the
Cuban¶ government for environmental agreements modeled on cooperation that¶ already exists with our Canadian and
Mexican neighbors
( ) Non-enforcement solves drilling and safety
Stephens ‘11
et al, Sarah Stephens – Executive Director of the Center for Democracy in the Americas – “As Cuba plans to drill in the Gulf of Mexico, U.S.
policy poses needless risks to our national interest,” http://democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/Cuba_Drilling_and_US_Policy.pdf
OFAC should make clear that efforts to increase drilling will not be¶ met with negative regulatory
consequences.¶ While the Cubans are prepared at the managerial level and understand the¶ challenges, training
is very much needed at the operational level. IADC can¶ assist Cuba with its efforts to meet Safety Case
Guidelines for evaluating¶ health, safety, and environmental risks. IADC focuses¶ on rig safety and blow-out¶
prevention. It has worked on¶ hurricane procedures, moor¶ -¶ ing guidelines, and other¶ concerns with relevance to¶ drilling in the Gulf of
Mexico.¶ As one industry insider¶ told CDA, “The guys who¶ wear the hard hats and coveralls, and the people who manage them, need¶
operational deepwater
well control training because they don’t yet have the¶ experience drilling offshore
at these depths.”
( ) Non-enforcement prong solves in the context of oil
Stephens ‘11
et al, Sarah Stephens – Executive Director of the Center for Democracy in the Americas – “As Cuba plans to drill in the Gulf of Mexico, U.S.
policy poses needless risks to our national interest,” http://democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/Cuba_Drilling_and_US_Policy.pdf
Recommendations¶ Pursue Unilateral Actions¶ • The Obama administration should
aggressively and comprehensively¶ use its
existing licensing authority to ensure the right firms with the best¶ equipment and expertise are in
place to fight the effects of an oil spill.¶ • OFAC, the Treasury Department office that administers and enforces
trade¶ sanctions, should make it clear that efforts to protect safety during drilling¶ by U.S. entities will
not be met with negative regulatory consequences .¶ •The U.S. should ensure that comprehensive information-sharing
with the¶ Cuban government is standard operating procedure, conducted openly¶ where possible, and without impediments in areas such as
granting visas¶ for Cuban scientists and officials to visit here¶ Pursue Bilateral Activities and Agreements¶ •¶ The U.S. should enter direct
discussions with Cuba on energy and¶ environmental cooperation.¶ •¶ The
U.S. should look to existing models for bilateral
as MEXUS) and¶ trilateral cooperation (as proposed by the National Commission on the¶ BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and
Offshore Drilling) for environmental¶ planning with Cuba.
(such
( ) Non-enforcement prong solves in the context of oil
Stephens ‘11
et al, Sarah Stephens – Executive Director of the Center for Democracy in the Americas – “As Cuba plans to drill in the Gulf of Mexico, U.S.
policy poses needless risks to our national interest,” http://democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/Cuba_Drilling_and_US_Policy.pdf
Energy policy and environmental protection are classic examples of¶ how the embargo is an abiding
threat to U.S. interests . It should no longer¶ be acceptable to base U.S. foreign policy on the illusion
that sanctions will¶ cause Cuba’s government to collapse, or to try to stop Cuba from developing¶ its oil resources.
Nor should this policy or the political dynamic that sustains¶ it prevent the U.S. from addressing both the challenges and benefits of Cuba¶
finding meaningful amounts of oil in the Gulf of Mexico. ¶ The path forward is clear. The Obama administration should use its¶
executive authority to guarantee that firms with the best equipment and¶ greatest expertise are licensed in advance to fight the effects of an
oil spill.¶ The
Treasury Department, which enforces Cuba sanctions , should make clear¶ to the private
sector that efforts to protect drilling safety will not be met with¶ adverse regulatory actions. The U.S.
government should commit to vigorous¶ information sharing with Cuba, and open direct negotiations with the
Cuban¶ government for environmental agreements modeled on cooperation that¶ already exists with our Canadian and
Mexican neighbors
MEXUS prong of the Cplan solves
MEXUS prong of the Cplan solves oil spills
Stephens ‘11
et al, Sarah Stephens – Executive Director of the Center for Democracy in the Americas – “As Cuba plans to drill in the Gulf of Mexico, U.S.
policy poses needless risks to our national interest,” http://democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/Cuba_Drilling_and_US_Policy.pdf
An agreement similar to the MEXUS plan should be negotiated with Cuba .¶ The International Association of
Drilling Contractors has put forward¶ a plan titled “One Gulf,” that starts with eliminating regulatory barriers¶ to a proper response contained in
the embargo against Cuba, and would¶ then establish common well control standards and safety training, and¶ provide for the sharing of spill
containment and cleanup technology.¶ 87¶ The IADC proposal
would formalize U.S., Mexico, and Cuba cooperation¶ to
address environmental issues. The National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill¶ and Offshore Drilling made a
similar recommendation: “It is in our¶ country’s national interest to negotiate now with these near neighbors¶ (Cuba
and Mexico) to agree on a common, rigorous set of standards, a¶ system for regulatory oversight, and the same operator
adherence to the¶ effective safety culture called for in this report, along with protocols to¶ cooperate on containment and response
strategies and preparedness in¶ the event of a spill.”
( ) Cuba would say “yes” to environmental cooperation
Stephens ‘11
et al, Sarah Stephens – Executive Director of the Center for Democracy in the Americas – “As Cuba plans to drill in the Gulf of Mexico, U.S.
policy poses needless risks to our national interest,” http://democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/Cuba_Drilling_and_US_Policy.pdf
Officials speaking to the CDA delegation at CITMA, the ministry with¶ environmental oversight, said that Cuba
would welcome cooperation with¶ the United States on energy and climate issues. They referred to earlier¶
environmental projects regarding sharks, turtles, dolphins, and migratory¶ birds. Referring to the BP spill, they said: “what is
going on (now) creates¶ new areas where we could do more work.”¶ 84¶ Lisa Margonelli recommends that the U.S.
and Cuba should talk about¶ standards for drilling and safety, protecting fisheries, and responses to¶ possible
damage during storms, all issues on which the U.S. and Cuba have¶ shared interests.¶ 8
Drilling solves Oil Dependency
( ) New study proves opening up more drilling would massively increase oil output
I.E.R. ‘11
[“New Oil Finds Around the Globe: Will the U.S. Capitalize on Its Oil Resources?” Institute for Energy Research, September 13,
http://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/2011/09/13/new-oil-finds-around-the-globe-will-the-u-s-capitalize-on-its-oil-resources/]
The API Study What could the oil industry achieve if restrictions on oil drilling in the United States were lessened? The
American
Petroleum Industry commissioned a study that assumed oil drilling would be allowed off the currently
prohibited areas of the East and West Coasts, in waters off Florida’s Gulf Coast, in Alaska’s Arctic National Wildlife Refuge,
and on most federal public land that is not a national park. It also assumed that it would get approval to build pipelines to accommodate a
doubling of Canadian oil sands production and the continuation of the tax policies currently in place for the oil industry.[xix]¶ The
API
commissioned the study from energy consultants Wood Mackenzie, who found that domestic
production of petroleum liquids would increase from 7.8 million barrels per day in 2010 to 9 million
barrels per day in 2030 under current policies due to increased production from shale oil and deepwater drilling. However, if the
industry could meet the assumptions of the study, domestic liquids production could reach 15.4
million barrels per day close to the 19 million barrels a day that we currently consume. That would create 1
million new jobs over the next seven years and 1.4 million by 2030. The industry already supports more than 9 million jobs throughout the
economy. The study indicates that the United States can come close to producing enough new oil and natural gas to displace all non-North
American imports within 15 years. More
than $800 billion in cumulative new government revenue could be
generated by 2030 and $127 billion by 2020 ‚Äì equal to about two and a half years’ worth of current federal spending on
roads. Most importantly, no new taxes or increased government spending is needed to accomplish the results of the study.[xx] ¶ Conclusion¶
Around the globe, countries are drilling for oil onshore, offshore, and in oil shale deposits. But the
United States is hampered by government rules and restrictions to developing its vast resources.
Without increasing taxes and without increasing government spending, the oil industry in the United
States could make us independent of non-North American oil imports. And in doing so, they could create jobs and
add billions of dollars to government revenues. Why don’t we take the challenge?
( ) Fracking solves – US will become largest oil producers in the world
Merrill and Schizer ‘13
[Thomas W. Merrill, Charles Evans Hughes Professor of Law, Columbia Law School and David M. Schizer, Dean and the Lucy G. Moses Professor
of Law, and Harvey R. Miller Professor of Law and Economics, Columbia Law School, “The Shale Oil and Gas Revolution, Hydraulic Fracturing,
and Water Contamination: A Regulatory Strategy,” 3/13, 2013,
http://www7.gsb.columbia.edu/richman/sites/default/files/files/Fracturing3_13.doc.pdf]
In November 2012, the International
Energy Agency, the world’s most respected energy forecaster,
predicted that the United States would become the world’s largest oil producer by 2020, overtaking
Saudi Arabia, and the world’s top natural gas producer by 2015, surpassing Russia.3 These predictions would have seemed wildly
improbable just a few years ago. They flow from a revolution in oil and gas production in the United States over the past decade, as energy
companies have learned to tap previously inaccessible oil and gas in shale and other impermeable rock
formations.4 To do so, they use “hydraulic fracturing” (“fracturing” or “fracking”), pumping fluid into shale at high pressure to crack
the rock and release gas and oil trapped inside. This “shale revolution” has created high-paying drilling jobs, revived
the petrochemicals industry, improved our balance of payments, enhanced our energy independence,
and enabled the United States to reduce greenhouse gas emissions over the past five years – the largest
reduction anywhere – by substituting natural gas for coal.
( ) Drilling solves – enough oil to last 100 years
Merrill and Schizer ‘13
[Thomas W. Merrill, Charles Evans Hughes Professor of Law, Columbia Law School and David M. Schizer, Dean and the Lucy G. Moses Professor
of Law, and Harvey R. Miller Professor of Law and Economics, Columbia Law School, “The Shale Oil and Gas Revolution, Hydraulic Fracturing,
and Water Contamination: A Regulatory Strategy,” 3/13, 2013,
http://www7.gsb.columbia.edu/richman/sites/default/files/files/Fracturing3_13.doc.pdf]
There is some question about the staying power of these new natural gas and oil reserves.30 For instance,
drilling costs for shale oil are high, so a global decline in prices could cause companies to reduce production.31 In addition, some experts
caution that fractured wells may not produce as long as conventional wells.32 Even so, estimates of
recoverable reserves have generally been increasing over time.33 It may well be, as President Obama
suggested in his 2012 State of the Union Address, that fracturing will generate 100 years of natural gas
supply for the United States at our current rate of consumption.34
Drilling solves quickly
( ) New tech means the cp solves quickly
Fox News ‘13
[Fox News, 3/8/13, “¶ 'Secret energy revolution' could hasten end to dependence on foreign oil,”
http://www.foxnews.com/science/2013/03/08/secret-energy-revolution-could-hasten-end-to-dependence-on-foreign-oil/#ixzz2W406KHfi]
A wealth of new technologies -- from underwater robots to 3-D scanners to nano-engineered
lubricants -- are transforming the energy exploration industry in ways that will hasten the end of
America’s reliance on Middle East oil. ¶ ¶ That’s the take on America’s “secret energy revolution,” according to a report in the
Washington Guardian. And the proof is in the balance sheets: According to the International Institute for
Strategic Studies, monthly imports of oil peaked in Sept. 2006 at 12.7 million barrels per day and has declined 40
percent since then, to 7.6 million barrels in Nov. 2012.¶ ¶ That’s partly due to falling demand, as the U.S. economy contracted and drivers with
smaller wallets balked at the high price of gas. Cars became more fuel efficient as well, often powered by batteries rather than gas. But it’s also
largely due to the increased production of oil on U.S. shores, the IISS said.¶ ¶ “Rising
production of liquid fuels in the United
States accounts for 60 percent of the fall in U.S. oil imports since 2006 and nearly 100 percent since
2010,” the group reported. If the trend continues, the U.S. could become oil independent in the coming
years, they added.¶ ¶ What’s led to such a surge? An assortment of new technologies and innovative
means to tap the oil trapped in shale rock formations, helping sip every last drop from deep wells
beneath U.S. soil. ¶ ¶ “Nanoengineered materials, underwater robots, side-scanning 3-D sonar, specially engineered lubricants, and
myriad other advances are opening up titanic new supplies of fossil fuels, many of them in unexpected places … perhaps most significantly,
North America,” wrote Vince Beiser in Pacific Standard.¶ ¶ The
problem for domestic oil has never been a lack of supply,
surprisingly. It’s been the inability to tap into that oil, Beiser noted. Fracking is the most high-profile means of doing
so, a method for pumping pressurized, specially treated mud into the dense shale formations that trap oil and gas. Fracking has brought with it
real environmental concerns, however, including charges that it increases the risk of earthquakes and pollutes ground water.¶ ¶ But
there’s
no doubt the process succeeds in getting fuel out of the ground. “Fracking is about as popular with the general public
as puppy kicking, but it’s very big business,” Beiser wrote. American shale gas production totaled 320 billion cubic feet in 2000; in 2011, the
number was 7.8 trillion.¶ ¶ That’s by no means the only innovation.¶ ¶ To
hit some of the deepest ocean wells, Houston’s
FMC Technologies wants to move oil production to the bottom of the ocean, with special undersea
robots built to survive the incredible pressure at those depths.¶ ¶ “We are not far from this vision. Maybe 15 years,” Paulo Couto, a vice
president of technology for FMC, told Pacific Standard. Other companies are using chemistry to tweak the mud shot down pipes into the
ground to lubricate the path for drills, and using new means to detect the pockets of oil that do lie nearby.¶ ¶ “The
dynamics of
abundant fuel supplies will be a catalyst for major geo-political shifts,” the Washington Guardian wrote.
( ) The tech is all here – domestic drilling can reach self sufficiency within the decade
Klein ‘13
[Tammy Klein, Hart Energy Downstream Research Senior VP, 1/15/13, A Refined Strategy: To Market, To Market,
energy.nationaljournal.com/2013/01/should-america-exploit-energy.php]
Recent technological advancements
in the drilling of horizontal wells with multiple hydraulic fractures to
extract oil and gas from shale and other tight formations have fundamentally altered petroleum supplies in the U.S.
(and Canada). Production of these new, unconventional tight oils is growing rapidly. According to new
estimates in Hart Energy’s Global Crude, Refining & Clean Transportation Fuels Outlook study, U.S. tight oil production rose to
1.70 million barrels per day in the last quarter of 2012 and is expected to approach 4.0 million b/d by
2020.¶ The increased supply of tight oil and oil sands crude will displace crude oil imports into the U.S. Gulf and
Midcontinent by 2020. Considering the projected surplus production of U.S. refined products and the crude
oil supply-and-demand balance, North America will become self-sufficient with respect to petroleum sometime
between 2020 and 2025. Moreover, the growth in North American production will create the market need for
crude exports
by the end of this decade.¶ Those exports should be permitted and encouraged.¶ Recently,
(and crude pricing discounts), and
supplies of tight oil
low natural gas prices have bolstered the competitive position of U.S.
refiners. Contrary to popular belief, the refining industry has had a difficult time as a result of the economic downturn, spiking crude oil
prices and the impact of new fuel programs and other environmental regulations. Low crude and natural gas prices, coupled
with increased opportunities to export refined product, are sorely needed good news for an industry which has
struggled through in recent years.¶ The U.S. supply and demand of refined products has experienced dramatic
changes over the past three years . This country changed from being a net product importer of nearly 1.4 million b/d in 2007 to a
net exporter of 0.8 million b/d in 2011. Gasoline imports fell as a result of declining demand and increased
domestic supply provided by additional volumes of ethanol blended into the fuel. This shift in supply and demand will be magnified
further when new fuel economy standards take effect.¶ Our study forecasts that exports of refined product will expand through
2015, at least. Progress in legislative activity on energy issues this year is unlikely, but Congress should do what it can to remove all
barriers to accessing the export market. Let’s let the market – the experts as it were – determine how to best
utilize and rationalize our crude, natural gas and refined product supplies.
( ) Aff ev doesn’t assume super-fracking
Perry ‘12
[Mark J. Perry, Ph.D., professor of economics and finance in the School of Management at the Flint campus of The University of Michigan,
5/31/12, “President Obama’s Some-of-the-Above Energy Policy,” http://www.aei.org/article/president-obamas-some-of-the-above-energypolicy/]
And the
most recent Department of Energy estimates may not even yet include new oil and natural gas
reserves that have just recently increased significantly in importance in places like Eagle Ford Shale in
South Texas, the Green River Formation in Wyoming, Utah and Colorado, and the Mississippian Lime formation in south Kansas. And it also may
not yet account for new technological advances under development by oil companies known as
“super- fracking,” which will move drilling technology from fracking to super-fracking. This new wave of
innovation has the potential to significantly raise the efficiency of domestic drilling, and will extend
the current wave of fracking technology, leading to potentially huge increases in domestic oil and gas
production in the near future.¶ The key point here is that even the government’s own forecasts predict that renewable energy will continue to
play a relatively minor role as an energy source over the next several decades out to the year 2035. And traditional energy sources like oil,
gas and coal will continue to provide the overwhelming share (more than three-quarters) of the fuel
required to meet U.S. energy demand through for the next three decades at least.
Cplan not link to politics – Spill Coop Popular
( ) Spill Coop Prong of the is popular - Congress is worried about the spill issue.
Sullivan ‘13
[Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs, “Cuba: U.S. Policy and Issues for the 113th
Congress,” Congressional Research Service, 6/12/2013, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43024.pdf]
In the aftermath of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, some Members of¶ Congress
and others expressed concern about Cuba’s development of its deepwater petroleum¶ reserves so
close to the United States. They are concerned about oil spill risks and about the status¶ of disaster
preparedness and coordination with the United States in the event of an oil spill.¶ Dealing with these
challenges is made more diff¶ icult because of the long-standing poor state of¶ relations between Cuba and the United States. If an oil spill did
occur in the waters northwest of¶ Cuba, currents in the Florida Straits could carry the oil to U.S. waters and coastal areas in Florida, ¶ although a
number of factors would determine the¶ potential environmental impact. If
significant¶ amounts of oil did reach U.S.
waters, marine and coastal resources in southern Florida could be at¶ risk.
Spill coop is politically palpable – backlash is insignificant
CFR 12
[Captain Melissa Bert, USCG, 2011-2012 Military Fellow, U.S.Coast Guard, and Blake Clayton, Fellow for Energy and National Security,
“Addressing the Risk of a Cuban Oil Spill,” Council on Foreign Relations, March, 2012, http://www.cfr.org/cuba/addressing-risk-cuban-oilspill/p27515]
An oil well blowout in Cuban waters would almost certainly require a U.S. response. Without
changes in current U.S. law,
however, that response would undoubtedly come far more slowly than is desirable. The Coast Guard would
be barred from deploying highly experienced manpower, specially designed booms, skimming equipment and vessels, and dispersants. U.S.
offshore gas and oil companies would also be barred from using well-capping stacks, remotely operated submersibles, and other vital
technologies. Although a handful of U.S. spill responders hold licenses to work with Repsol, their licenses do not extend to well capping or relief
drilling. The result of a slow response to a Cuban oil spill would be greater, perhaps catastrophic, economic and environmental damage to
Florida and the Southeast.¶ Efforts
to rewrite current law and policy toward Cuba, and encouraging
cooperation with its government, could antagonize groups opposed to improved relations with the
Castro regime. They might protest any decision allowing U.S. federal agencies to assist Cuba or letting U.S. companies operate in Cuban
territory.¶ However, taking sensible steps to prepare for a potential accident at an oil well in Cuban waters
would not break new ground or materially alter broader U.S. policy toward Cuba. For years, Washington
has worked with Havana on issues of mutual concern. The United States routinely coordinates with
Cuba on search and rescue operations in the Straits of Florida as well as to combat illicit drug
trafficking and migrant smuggling. During the hurricane season, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
provides Cuba with information on Caribbean storms.¶ The recommendations proposed here are narrowly tailored to
the specific challenges that a Cuban oil spill poses to the United States. They would not help the Cuban
economy or military. What they would do is protect U.S. territory and property from a potential danger emanating from Cuba.¶ Cuba
will drill for oil in its territorial waters with or without the blessing of the United States. Defending against a potential oil spill requires a
modicum of advance coordination and preparation with the Cuban government, which need not go beyond spill-related matters. Without
taking these precautions, the United States risks a second Deepwater Horizon, this time from Cuba.
Drilling prong does not link to politics
( ) Drilling prong of the Counterplan’s does not link – its bipartisan
Russell ‘12
Barry Russell is President of the Independent Petroleum Association of America, August 15, 2012, “Energy Must Transcend Politics”,
http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2012/08/finding-the-sweet-spot-biparti.php#2238176
There have been glimpses of great leadership, examples when legislators have reached across the aisle to
construct and support common-sense legislation that encourages American energy production. Recent
legislation from Congress which would replace the Obama administration’s five-year offshore leasing plan and instead
increase access America’s abundant offshore oil and natural gas is one example of such bipartisanship. The
House passed legislation with support from 25 key Democrats. The support from Republicans and Democrats is
obviously not equal, but this bipartisan legislative victory demonstrates a commitment by the House of
Representatives to support the jobs, economic growth and national security over stubborn allegiance to
political party. The same is happening on the Senate side. Democratic Senators Jim Webb (VA), Mark
Warner (VA), and Mary Landrieu (LA) cosponsored the Senate’s legislation to expand offshore oil and natural gas
production with Republican Senators Lisa Murkowski (AK), John Hoeven (ND), and Jim Inhofe (OK). Senator Manchin (WV) is another
Democratic leader who consistently votes to promote responsible energy development.
**Topicality Violations Start here
1NC Shell
A – Definition
Removing selective restrictions on specific goods isn’t “economic” because it doesn’t
broadly affect economic life
Davidsson 3 – Elias Davidsson, Human Rights Researcher and Activist, Reporter for the Arab American
News, Contributing Editor for Global Research, “The Mechanism of Economic Sanctions: Changing
Perceptions and Euphemisms”, November, www.aldeilis.net/english/attachments/2877_econsancdebate.pdf
“Economic sanctions”, a mode of coercion in international relations resuscitated in recent years, has prompted
renewed and lively scholarly interest in the subject. Why have such measures become so popular? One answer is that they
“constitute a means of exerting international influence that is more powerful than diplomatic mediation but lies below the threshold of military
intervention”[1]. Another answer is that “they engage comparatively less internal political resistance than other candidate strategies [...]. They
do not generate sombre processions of body bags bringing home the mortal remains of the sons and daughters of constituents”[2], in other
words, they cost little to the side imposing the sanctions. The notable predilection by the United States for economic sanctions [3], suggests
that such a tool is particularly useful for economically powerful states that are themselves relatively immune to such measures. This tool of
collective economic coercion, with antecedents such as siege warfare and blockade going back to biblical time [4], was used during most of the
20th Century, particularly in war situations. Although the United Nations Charter, drafted during the later stages of World War II, includes
provisions for the imposition of economic sanctions (Article 41), the Security Council - empowered to resort to this tool - only used it twice
between 1945 and 1990, against Rhodesia in 1966 and South Africa in 1977. In
our discussion we designate economic
sanctions as “ coordinated restrictions on trade and/or financial transactions intended to impair
economic life within a given territory”[5]. To the extent that measures intend to impair “economic life
within a given territory” through restrictions on trade and/or finance, they constitute, for our
purposes, economic sanctions. Selective or individualized measures, such as restrictions on specific
goods (arms, luxury items, some forms of travel), are therefore not considered as economic
sanctions . Symbolic economic deprivations, such as partial withholding of aid, do not amount to economic sanctions if their intended
effect is primarily to convey displeasure, rather than to affect the economy.
B – Plan violates. It solely lifts restrictions that pertain to a specific good – oil
C – Voter. They make the topic explode by allowing the Aff to tweak the embargo for
cigars or left-handed baseball pitchers. The topical version of the aff is to lift the
whole embargo or a large coordinated set of restrictions. Limits are vital to
preparation – which causes clash and depth of education.
1NC violation “Toward”
A – Interpretation.
“Toward” means “in the direction of” --- this is the commonly understood and
ordinary meaning
Campbell 13 – Tena Campbell, United States District Judge, “Econova, Inc., Plaintiff, v. DPS Utah,
Collier GROUP, and Kevin E. Collier, Defendants”, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2730, 1-4, Lexis
5. "Extending From Toward . . . ."
The disputed term "extending from toward the rotational axis to toward the peripheral wall" appears in claim 1 of the
'017 Patent. EcoNova's proposed construction is "the item so described has an extent along the direction from the rotational axis to the
peripheral wall." (Pl.'s Mem. at 22.) The Defendants' proposed construction is "extending from near the rotational axis to near the peripheral
wall." (See Defs.' Mem. at 22.)
EcoNova argues that the disputed phrase merely indicates a direction, and cites to the specification and prosecution history for support.
Defendants contend that the disputed phrase establishes both orientation and direction, arguing that "toward" in this context means "near."
The court disagrees with Defendants because their proposed construction is too far from the
ordinary meaning of the word "toward," is at odds with the intrinsic
[*25] evidence, and appears to import limitations from
the various embodiments in the specification. Instead, the court agrees with EcoNova that the phrase merely indicates a direction.
The word "toward" is a commonly understood term that indicates a direction , and the specification of the
'017 Patent supports this conclusion. The specification uses "toward" or "towards" thirty-nine times, many of which are unambiguously used to
indicate a direction. (See, e.g., '017 Patent col.15 ll.40—41 ("As a result of the applied centrifugal force, heavy component 241 flows toward
wall 92 at equator 97."); id. col.26 ll.39—41 ("As feed stream 506 travels within flow channels 502 toward transfer tubes 400, the stream is
subjected to tremendous centrifugal forces . . . .").)
Moreover, the prosecution history of the '017 Patent supports the conclusion that the disputed phrase merely indicates a direction. In the first
iteration of the '017 Patent, claim 1 had a dependent claim 5 that read "A separator as recited in claim 1, wherein the first tube is aligned with
or offset from the rotational axis." (See U.S. Patent Application, Initial Common Exhibits Ex. 9, at 175, Nov. 6, 2012, ECF No. 65-9.) The patent
[*26] examiner rejected claim 5 for indefiniteness because it was unclear how the first tube could extend "from the rotational axis to the
peripheral wall" (as required in independent claim 1), but also be aligned with the rotational axis (as required in dependent claim 5). (See Office
Action Summary, Initial Common Exhibits Ex. 9, at 55, Nov. 6, 2012, ECF No. 65-9.) In other words, the patent examiner treated the phrase
"extending from toward the rotational axis to toward the peripheral wall" as a direction, noting that it could not be "aligned" with the
rotational axis.
For the above reasons, the
wall" is
court's construction of "extending from toward the rotational axis to toward the peripheral
"the item so described has an extent along the direction from the rotational axis to the peripheral wall."
B – The Aff violates. Plan text permits non-Cuban firms to avoid the US embargo.
C – Voter. They make the topic explode by allowing the Aff to act to any nation in the
world and avoid debates that are centrally about the topic nations. Limits are vital to
prepared education. They also skew ground and topic-knowledge by making
advantage areas be about US-Spanish relations or multilateralism.
***Pink Tide/US Resolve Disad
1NC
1NC Shell
A - Issue-Specific Uniqueness. Post-Chavez, “pink tide” is dying. Shortage of oil profits
hurts the Leftist cause.
Panizza ‘13
Dr Francisco Panizza is the Head of the Latin America International Affairs Programme at LSE IDEAS. He is a Reader in the Department of
Government at the London School of Economics. “Latin America: Life after Chavez (and Lula)” – April 4th –
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/ideas/2013/04/latin-america-life-after-chavez-and-lula/
The death of Chávez and the succession of Lula by Dilma Rousseff in Brazil leaves a big vacuum in the Latin
American left.
Even if, as likely as it is, Nicolás Maduro wins the presidency in Venezuela in April, he is no Chávez and
have the resources that Chávez had to promote his petro-diplomacy.
will not
Three years into her first term in office,
Rousseff remains highly popular in Brazil and will be a strong candidate for re-election in 2014. But she does not have the same presence as
Lula in Latin America and her foreign policy priorities are rather different than those of her political mentor. Moreover, Venezuela
is in a
dire economic situation and Brazil’s economic growth has been lacklustre over the past two years.¶ The death of Chávez
and the absence of Lula from frontline regional politics do not mean that the Pink Tide is necessarily coming to
an end. But together with the retake of economic growth and the election of Peña Nieto in Mexico, the strong economic performance
of Colombia, Peru and Chile and the emergence of the Alianza Pacifico as an alternative to Mercosur, suggest the unfolding of a
much more complex and diverse process of regional change than encapsulated by the narrative of the rise of
the left.
Chavez’s goal of hurting US regional influence now stands in the cross-roads. Petrodollars will be important.
Menéndez ‘13
Fernando Menéndez is an economist and principal of the Cordoba Group International LLC, a strategic consulting firm – “Latin America without
Chávez” – The Commentator – March 14th – http://www.thecommentator.com/article/2932/latin_america_without_ch_vez
In all of the capitals of the Americas the atmosphere is one of waiting to see what unfolds. After all,
the devil you know is better than the one you don’t While most obituaries and assessments of Hugo Chávez have paid
attention to his personality, his revolutionary politics, or focused on a potential chavismo without Chávez, the prospects of a Latin
America without Chávez have only just begun to be explored.¶ For fourteen years, Hugo Chávez Frías promoted
a revolutionary transformation of Venezuelan society known alternatively as “socialism of the 21st century,” or the “Bolivarian
Revolution.” But it could also be argued that his enormous supply of petro-dollars served to reshape Latin
American relations. ¶ Chávez’s rhetoric sought to recapture Simón Bolívar’s vision of a united Latin American republic while tapping
into longstanding antagonism and resentment towards the United States, as a colossus of the north athwart to the Liberator’s dream. Through
projects such as the Bolivarian Alliance of the Americas (ALBA), Chávez
pursued a united anti-American front, whose
symbolism has had regional effects.¶ The Role Chávez Played¶ The anti-Yankee rhetoric, always a staple of Latin American
populism, had two powerful impacts. First, it helped to blunt American influence in the region. The once
predominant economic relationship between the U.S. and the American republics has been diminishing as inter-American trade alliances
reduce barriers and the EU and China, in cases like Brazil, play a larger trade role than the U.S.¶ Second, Chávez’s firebrand status coupled
with his petroleum-based
piggy bank, allowed the caudillo to act like a lightning rod for the rest of the region. Whether abetting
Iranian penetration in the Americas, propping up the Castro regime in Cuba, or giving aid and comfort to Colombia’s FARC
(Revolutionary Armed Forces), Chávez’s role as premier revolutionary helped draw fire from his allies and
others in the region. It is a role for which he was much admired, even among some ideological enemies, and for which he will be
missed.
B – Links:
First – Squo is starting to work. Lifting the embargo for oil reverses resolve.
Sadowski ‘11
Richard Sadowski is a Class of 2012 J.D. candidate, at Hofstra University¶ School of Law, NY. Mr. Sadowski is also the Managing Editor of
Production of¶ the Journal of International Business and Law Vol. XI. “Cuban Offshore Drilling: Preparation and¶ Prevention within the
Framework of the United¶ States’ Embargo” – ¶ Sustainable Development Law & Policy¶ Volume 12; Issue 1 Fall 2011: Natural Resource
Conflicts Article 10 – http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1497&context=sdlp
Since its inception, the Cuban embargo has ebbed and¶ flowed in severity and support. While the measure seems to be¶ increasingly
unpopular, it takes legitimate aim at a Cuban regime¶ characterized by intolerance and oppression. Though
embargo as a scapegoat upon which to blame Cuba’s¶ failures,94
the Castros¶ utilize the
recent changes suggest the
embargo is indeed close to¶ accomplishing its goals. 95 Despite this, critics, including U.S. oil¶
producers, want the embargo dropped.¶ Regardless of criticism , the embargo must remain in place¶
until its goals are met . Environmental fears can be effectively¶ countered through bilateral response
and preparation agreements¶ with Cuba. Also, economic and energy needs are more¶ properly addressed through drilling U.S.
resources. Ultimately,¶ with the aid of legislation such as Buchanan’s bill, the United¶ States should exercise its political and economic power to
pressure¶ foreign companies to avoid offshore drilling in Cuba. The¶ United States can dissuade foreign investment without compromising¶ the
embargo. It
appears an end to oppressive communist¶ rule in Cuba is nearing . Now is the time for the
United States to¶ both reject offshore drilling in Cuba and demonstrate resolve in¶ meeting the goals of
the economic embargo.
Second – Softening embargo while the Castros are in charge means profits to finance
“pink tide”.
Brookes ‘9
(Peter – Heritage council, Senior Fellow, Brookes is serving his third term as a congressionally appointed member of the U.S.-China Economic
and Security Review Commission. He previously served in the administration of President George W. Bush as deputy assistant secretary of
defense for Asian and Pacific affairs. In this post, he was responsible for U.S. defense policy for 38 countries and five bilateral defense alliances
in Asia, Brookes was a professional staff member with the House International Relations Committee. He also served with the CIA and the State
Department at the United Nations. In the private sector, he worked in the defense and intelligence industries. ¶ A decorated Navy veteran,
Brookes served on active duty in Latin America, Asia and the Middle East in aviation and intelligence billets, Brookes, now a retired Navy
commander, served as a reservist with the National Security Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, Naval Intelligence, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
and the Office of the Vice President, Brookes is pursuing a doctorate at Georgetown University. He is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy
(B.S.); the Defense Language Institute (Russian); the Naval War College; and the Johns Hopkins University (M.A.). He also has taught at the
National Defense University and studied German and Polish, National Security Affairs, “Keep the Embargo, O” – April 16 –
http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2009/04/keep-the-embargo-o)
Of course, the
big empanada is the US economic embargo against Cuba, in place since 1962, which
undoubtedly is the thing Havana most wants done away with -- without any concessions on Cuba's
part,
to --
of course.¶
Lifting the embargo won't normalize relations, but
instead
legitimize
-- and wave the white flag
Fidel 's 50-year fight against the Yanquis, further lionizing the dictator and encouraging the Latin American
Left .¶ Because the economy is nationalized , trade will pour plenty of cash into the Cuban national
coffers -- allowing Havana to suppress dissent at home and bolster its communist agenda abroad.¶ The
last thing we should do is to fill the pockets of a regime that'll use those profits to keep a jackboot on the neck of the
Cuban people. The political and human-rights situation in Cuba is grim enough already.¶ The police state controls the lives of 11 million Cubans
in what has become an island prison. The people enjoy none of the basic civil liberties -- no freedom of speech, press, assembly or association.¶
Security types monitor foreign journalists, restrict Internet access and foreign news and censor the domestic media. The regime holds more
than 200 political dissidents in jails that rats won't live in.¶ We also don't need a pumped-up Cuba that could become
a serious
menace to US interests in Latin America , the Caribbean -- or beyond . (The likes of China, Russia and Iran
might also look to partner with a revitalized Cuba.)¶ With an influx of resources , the Cuban regime
would surely team up with the rulers of nations like Venezuela, Nicaragua and Bolivia to advance
socialism and anti-Americanism
The embargo has stifled Havana's ambitions
ever since the Castros lost their Soviet sponsorship in the early 1990s. Anyone noticed the lack of trouble Cuba has caused
internationally since then? Contrast that with the 1980s some time.¶ Regrettably, 110 years after independence
from Spain (courtesy of Uncle Sam), Cuba still isn't free. Instead of utopia, it has become a dystopia at the hands of the Castro brothers.¶ The
US embargo remains a matter of principle -- and an appropriate response to Cuba's brutal repression
of its people. Giving in to evil only begets more of it. Haven't we learned that yet?¶ Until we see progress in
loosing the Cuban people from the yoke of the communist regime, we should hold firm onto the
leverage the embargo provides.
in the Western Hemisphere.¶
C- Impact
First – Castro-led pink tide causes US-Russia military confrontations.
Walser ‘8
(Ray Walser, Senior Policy Analyst for Latin America at the Heritage Foundation – Chávez, Venezuela, and Russia: A New Cuban Missile Crisis? –
WebMemo #2064 -- September 15th http://www.heritage.org/Research/LatinAmerica/wm2064.cfm)
Like his iconic mentor, Fidel Castro, Chávez thrives on mounting tensions and confrontation
with the U.S. It is through
confrontation that he attains political identity and larger-than-merited international standing. Like Fidel
Castro, Chávez aspires to build and lead an anti-U.S., anti-Western coalition. Unlike Castro , however,
Chávez is in possession of significant petro leum power
and has varied sources of international support. There
is
danger that Chávez, like Castro, will invite Russia to serve as a guarantor of Venezuela's security and
subsequently draw Russia , either willingly or unwillingly, into additional confrontations with the U.S.
At present, Venezuela represents the single most difficult
diplomatic and
security challenge facing the
U.S. in the immediate future . How the U.S. chooses to deal with this challenge will say much about the direction the next
Administration will take as it shapes its policy toward America's neighbors in the hemisphere.
Small US-Russia conflicts can escalate or cause nuclear miscalc.
Gottemoeller ‘8
(Rose Gottemoeller was sworn in as the United States Department of State's Assistant Secretary for Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance
on April 6, 2009. She was the chief negotiator of the follow on for the Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty otherwise known as the New Strategic
Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) with the Russian Federation. Since 2000, she had been with the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace – “U.S.-Russia Cooperation on Iran: Aftermath of the Summer War in Georgia,” Carnegie Moscow Center, August- July 2008. PLESE NOTE
– THIS CARD APPEARS IN A HOST OF CURRENT OPEN-SOURCE DEBATE DOCS AND THE URL THAT APPEARS ON THOSE CARDS MISDIRECTS TO A
DIFFERENT Gottemoeller ARTICLE. The website below redirects to her October article:
http://www.scribd.com/doc/13031239/RussianAmerican-Security-Relations-After-Georgia)
No holds barred, no rules—the
United States and Russia may be heading to a confrontation more unpredictable
and dangerous than any we have seen since the Cuban missile crisis . A confrontation today would be different—
the two countries are in constant and intense communication, unlike the situation in 1962—but if those exchanges provoke mutual
anger and recrimination, they have the potential to spark a dangerous crisis . This effect is especially dangerous because
both countries are in presidential transitions. Russia, whose government is riven by corruption, internal competition, and disorder, is
attempting an unprecedented tandem leadership arrangement. The United States is in the midst of its quadrennial election season, with both
political parties competing to show that their man is more skilled and tough on national security issues than his opponent. The
unpredictability of these two transitions
stokes the potential for misunderstanding and descent into crisis. We
must avoid such a crisis, because we have never succeeded in escaping the nuclear existential threat
that we each pose to the other. We never even came close to transforming the U.S.–Russian relationship into one that is closer to
that which the United States has with the United Kingdom or France. What if Russia had refused to confirm or deny that no
nuclear weapons were on the bombers it flew to Venezuela? Our nuclear weapons are still faced off
to launch on warning of an attack, and in a no-holds-barred confrontation between us, we could come close to
nuclear catastrophe before we knew it.
2NC-1NR backlines
***Neg block – a “must read” link extension
**Note: Also useful to address the Aff arg about “Elites crushing Left-movements
unless they’re more extreme.”
( ) ***Plan saves Cuban oil – which is key to Cuban growth, That growth will be vital
to successful funding of the “pink tide”.
Miller ‘11
Edward – Author and Frequent Contributor to Global Research Reports. He frequently reports on issues of global trade, energy, and agriculture.
He holds degrees in philosophy and law from the University of Auckland. “Cuba's Offshore Oil & the US Blockade” – Nov 06, 11 – Geopolitical
Monitor – http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/cubas-offshore-oil-the-us-blockade-4524/
With the announcement of 2.9% economic growth from the Cuban Minister for Foreign Trade and Investment and sugar production bouncing
back after recent hurricane destruction, it would appear that the Cuban star is again rising. While commentators cannot agree whether Raul
Castro’s economic reforms push the country toward the free market or a form of libertarian socialism, it
is clear that the flow of
petrodollars will have a significant impact on the country’s future, for better or worse. The nation’s resilience in the
face of hardship, and at times direct threat, remains unquestioned, and Cuba could indeed be heading towards a period of
hitherto unknown economic prosperity.¶ Regardless of the embargo, the contribution of this prosperity to the
Latin American and Caribbean communities at large, in particular the other ALBA -TCP countries (Venezuela,
Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Dominica, Antigua and Barbuda, and St Vincent and the Grenadines) could
also prove significant. This bloc has presented a united front against Northern imperialism, and trade
between these nations has increased massively over the past few years, undermining traditional mercantilist
relations while providing a credible alternative to the neoliberal model of development. While far from perfect,
Cuba has blazed a trail of resistance that has stood the test of time and endured the heady wilderness of political alienation, both
during the Cold War and after the Wall came down. Despite its resurgence after uniting with other Latin American
‘pink-tide’ governments through ALBA -TCP, many Cubans feel trapped on the island, prisoners of a communist
fiefdom run for the enrichment of central government officials. With
luck, the development of these oil reserves
accordance with adequate environmental standards and contingency procedures
in
will alleviate this sense, providing them
with renewed vigour to continue the Cuban social revolution .
(Note: “ALBA” as referenced in this card means the following – this fyi is from wikipedia:
The Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (Spanish: Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de
Nuestra América, or ALBA) is an international cooperation organization based on the idea of the social,
political and economic integration of the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean. It is associated
with socialist and social democratic governments and is an attempt at regional economic integration
based on a vision of social welfare, bartering and mutual economic aid. The member nations are Antigua
and Barbuda, Bolivia, Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and
Venezuela.)
A-to “Chavez death permanently killed the pink tide”
( ) Not “too unique” – by itself, Chavez’s death doesn’t kill pink tide
Shaheen ‘13
(Salman Shaheen – Editor of International Tax Review magazine and Co-Editor of The Third Estate.
He has written for the Times of India, New Statesman, New Internationalist, Evening Standard, Globalist, and Petroleum Economist and has
award-winning reports that have been picked up by the Times, the Telegraph, the Observer and the Financial Times. “Hugo Chavez: The
revolution is bigger than one man” – March 7, 2013 – http://salmanshaheen.com/hugo-chavez-the-revolution-is-bigger-than-one-man/)
But the
revolution is far bigger than one man. Chavez’s death leaves a vacuum in personality, but not in
politics. The people he inspired, the people he taught to learn their constitution, the people he raised onto his shoulders so that
they could see what could be achieved with their collective endeavours will not forget the progress they have made in the last
14 years. Nor will they be willing to go quietly back to America’s yard and offer themselves up to the ravages of the failed
neoliberal policies that brought them so much misery.¶ “Whenever death may surprise us, let it be welcome if our battle cry has reached even
one receptive ear and another hand reaches out to take up our arms,” another flawed left-wing icon once said.¶ And Chavez’s battle cry
to the poor has reached millions of receptive ears, not just in Venezuela, but across Latin America as a pink tide
sweeps a continent finally willing to stand up for itself.¶ Venezuela now stands at a crossroads, but Chavez’s death is not the end of
the revolution. It was always far bigger than him.
Uniqueness – Pink Tide will die in squo
( ) Chavez’s pink tide revolution’s dying in the squo. Maduro lacks the charisma to
save.
Stone ‘13
Salem-News.com writer Ralph E. Stone is a graduate of both Middlebury College and Suffolk Law School. Ralph served the Federal Trade
Commission as an Attorney specializing in Consumer and Antitrust Law. Over the years, Ralph has traveled extensively. “Does Hugo Chavez's
Death Mean The End Of His Bolivarian Revolution?” – Salem-News.com – http://www.salem-news.com/articles/march122013/chavez-bolivarrs.php
On March 5, 2013, Hugo Rafael Chávez Frias, the president of Venezuela, died of a massive heart attack and his cancer was very
Was his dream of a "Bolivarian Revolution" buried with him?¶ ¶ Chávez envisioned a
modern day Bolivarian Revolution, a Latin American political block with a socialist bent as an alternative to U.S. hegemony.
To this end, Chávez was generous with his foreign aid to Latin America and the Caribbean in an effort to blunt
U.S.-backed economic policies in Latin America. His efforts garnered some support among the growing number of
Latin America’s left-leaning governments.¶ ¶ Chávez often spoke under a portrait of "The Liberator," quoted his words
¶
advanced when he died.
frequently, and linked himself to this legendary figure to gain popular support for his programs both at home and abroad. Chávez also renamed
Venezuela the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, and said he was creating a socialist system based on Bolivar's ideals.¶ ¶ However, Chávez spent
so much time on the international stage that he neglected the problems on the home front such as government corruption, inefficiency, and
mismanagement; the deteriorating health and education programs; the troubled economy; crime; human rights violations; and media
censorship. And many Venezuelans feared that the “socialist revolutionary” was slowly morphing into a president-for-life. Just who is this
Simón Bolivar anyway?¶ ¶ Simón Bolivar was born in Caracas, Venezuela in 1783. At age 16, he was sent abroad to continue his education in
Spain and France where he was introduced to the progressive works of Rousseau and Voltaire. He married Spaniard Maria Teresa and returned
to Venezuela. Maria Teresa died 8 months later of yellow fever. He never married again but had many lovers, including Manuela Saenz
affectionately known as Manuleta, whom he met in 1822 and who was with him until a few days before he died. After Maria Teresa's death, he
returned to France and met with the leaders of the French Revolution. Bolivar then traveled to the United States to witness the U.S. after the
American Revolution. He returned to Caracas filled with revolutionary ideas and quickly joined pro-independence groups. Bolivar's military
career began under Francisco de Miranda. When Miranda was captured by the Spanish in 1812, Bolivar took command.¶ ¶ Over the next
decade, Bolivar commanded the independence forces in numerous battles, including the key battle of Carabobo, which brought independence
for Venezuela. Bolivar also brought independence from Spanish rule to the entire northwest of South America, creating the Gran Colombia in
what today comprises Venezuela, Colombia, Panama, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia. Because his central government could not govern such a large
land mass with its racial and regional differences, his Gran Colombia lasted just a decade. Disillusioned and in bad health, Bolivar resigned the
presidency of Gran Colombia in early 1830. He died in December 1830 at age 47, in Santa Marta, Colombia, while on his way to Europe.
Ironically, the newly independent Venezuela banned Bolivar from his homeland for twelve years until 1842, when his remains were finally
brought from Santa Marta to Caracas and entombed in the "catedral." In 1876, his remains were transferred to the "Panteon Nacional."¶ ¶ ¶ In
2007 and 2008, my wife and I traveled to Venezuela. (My wife Judi is Venezuelan and speaks Spanish fluently.) We were cautioned never to
show disrespect for Bolivar. During our brief stays in Caracas, Venezuela's capital city, we did a mini-tour of Bolivariana, which began at the
Plaza Bolivar. Every Venezuelan city has a Plaza Bolivar. The federal district (Caracas) and the capital cities of Venezuela's twenty-two states
such as Merida, Coro, Barinas, Guanare -- capital cities we visited -- have a statue of Bolivar on a horse. Other major cities have a statue of
Bolivar unhorsed and smaller towns have a bust of Bolivar in their Plaza Bolivar.¶ ¶ We visited Bolivar's birthplace ("Casa Natal de Bolivar"), the
Bolivar museum ("Museo Bolivariana") next door where I was asked to remove my cap out of respect, the nearby cathedral where he was
baptized and where his wife and family lie, and the "Panteon Nacional" containing his body -- until he was recently exhumed -- and those of
other eminent Venezuelans.¶ ¶ In 2009, we took a road trip along the coast from Cartagena, Colombia, to visit Quinta de San Pedro Alejandrino,
the hacienda where Bolivar spent his last days before he died. Spaniard Joaquin de Mier, the owner of the hacienda and a supporter of
Colombia’s independence, invited Bolivar to stay and rest until his departure for Europe. The hacienda grounds contain a massive central
structure ("Altar de la Patria"), the Museo Bolivariana, and a 22-hectare garden.¶ ¶ If
Chávez had lived, would his "Bolivarian
Revolution" have succeeded? We will never know. It is doubtful, however, that either Nicolás Maduro, Chávez's chosen
successor, or Venezuelan opposition leader Henrique Capriles, have the charisma or international presence to pick up
the baton and carry it to the finish line. But Chávez has planted the seed.
Petrodollars were vital to Chavez’s regional strategy – plan revives this with
charismatic Cuban leadership.
Santos ‘13
Tamara Santos – South America Editor at The World Outline¶ Tamara has earned a BA in International Relations from La Salle University, Rio de
Janeiro and a MA in Conflict Resolution in Divided Societies from King’s College, London. The World Outline – “The future of Chavismo and its
foreign friends (Part I)” – May 1, 2013 – http://theworldoutline.com/2013/05/future-chavismo-foreign-friends-part-1/
Pertaining to close neighbours, Bolivia
and Ecuador are an example of the financial and logistic assistance provided
by Chavez to developing countries regionally, which included social, economic, infrastructure and military programmes that
fostered development in these countries. With the creation of the PetroCaribe, Chavez exported oil to countries that could not
afford the market value in a partnership that included low prices and long-term payments deals, which benefited Honduras, Haiti, Suriname, El
Salvador, among others. These
policies were a pragmatic tool to encourage and sustain other left-oriented
governments in the region to become allies.¶ The Kirchner-Chavez Alliance was a determinant factor in the
Latin American Leftist Movement, where Chavez represented a promising partner helping Argentina with their debt, as well as in
the “Malvinas/Falklands” issue with the United Kingdom. Chavez even called the UK an imperialist country that should return conquered
territory.¶ On the Argentinean side, its pressure for Venezuela to join Mercosur was crucial, since Argentina pushed Venezuelan entrance
without signing the Asunción Treaty in an period that Paraguay was suspended temporarily after the attempt of an illegal coup in 2012.
Chavez’s policies also represented an active front against American influence in the region, where Latin America would no longer be the
American “back yard”, a discourse used by both countries to appeal for popular votes. ¶ Chavez discourse combined important values from
Socialism, the Bolivarian Revolution, the Leftist Movement, the non-aligned movement, from the legacy left by Che Guevara, and it was
extremely anti-neoliberal. This mix of ideologies positioned him as the leader to promote economic
distribution and regional development.
A-to “Embargo already weakened now”
Even if ineffective, should keep embargo in place.
Sadowski ‘11
Richard Sadowski is a Class of 2012 J.D. candidate, at Hofstra University¶ School of Law, NY. Mr. Sadowski is also the Managing Editor of
Production of¶ the Journal of International Business and Law Vol. XI. “Cuban Offshore Drilling: Preparation and¶ Prevention within the
Framework of the United¶ States’ Embargo” – ¶ Sustainable Development Law & Policy¶ Volume 12; Issue 1 Fall 2011: Natural Resource
Conflicts Article 10 – http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1497&context=sdlp
Many critics of the embargo complain that the policy is¶ inherently ineffective and actually exacts a human
toll.52 They¶ note that many of the societal ills of the Cuban people are¶ furthered by the embargo’s economic impacts on Cuba. 53 For¶
instance, the American Association for World Health’s yearlong¶ study of Cuba concluded that the embargo itself has led to increased suffering
and death in Cuba, a condition that has¶ been aggravated by the passage of the Helms-Burton Act.54¶ The study found that “the declining
availability of foodstuffs,¶ medicines and such basic medical supplies as replacement parts¶ for 30-year-old X-ray machines is taking a tragic
human toll.”55¶ Further, they argue that the opposition of the Cuban people to¶ the embargo is ignored.56 Opponents view the embargo as a
hypocritical¶ U.S. policy that allows enthusiastic trade with China, a¶ communist nation where political oppression is at least as great¶ as in
Cuba.57 These criticisms put further demands on the United¶ States to end the embargo in the interest of human rights.58¶ Dealing with
Cuba’s Oil Plans without¶ Compromising the Embargo¶ The Embargo is Still Necessary¶ Despite
calls for its revocation, the
embargo’s purpose is as¶ important now as when it was enacted. Cuba is still an oppressive¶ country.59
Cubans may not leave the country without permission¶ and still lack fundamental freedoms of expression.60 José¶ Miguel
Vivanco, the director of Americas division at Human¶ Rights Watch, notes that as “Cuba’s draconian laws and sham¶ trials remain in place, [the
country] continue[s] to restock the¶ prison cells with new generations of innocent Cubans who dare¶ to exercise their basic rights.”61
Moreover, a recent proposal by¶ the Cuban Communist Party makes clear that there will be no¶ change in the country’s oppressive one-party
political system.62¶ In doing so, the lengthy document declares “[o]nly socialism¶ is capable of overcoming the current difficulties and
preserving¶ the victories of the revolution.”63 Cuba’s
treatment of its¶ own citizens is a situation the United States
cannot ignore. The¶ embargo’s twin goals of backing democracy and ending oppressive¶ rule have not
been met. Until they are, the embargo must¶ remain in place.
A-to “Loosening embargo to Cuba boosts the US cause in the region”
( ) Neg Link outweighs the Aff Turn. No guarantee plan solves relations, but it
definitely sends the wrong signal.
National Review ‘9
(Editorial Staff, Editorial section – NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE – April 21 – http://www.nationalreview.com/node/227336/print)
As for Cuba, Obama himself continues to support the U.S. embargo. So do we. No, it has not toppled the
Castro dictatorship, but it is a tool. Cuba will only liberalize when its rulers decide to liberalize. If and
when they do, the embargo should be lifted. Until then, we see no reason to reward the Cuban
government with a massive unilateral concession.¶ We realize that farm-state politicians are eager for their constituents to
gain access to the Cuban market. Their desire to end U.S. sanctions has nothing to do with Cuban freedom. Many of our libertarian friends
argue that ditching the embargo would spur a loosening of Cuba’s economic and political controls. We wish it were that easy. Thus far, trading
with the rest of the world has not persuaded Havana to hold free elections, release political prisoners, or even adopt Chinese-style economic
reforms. What about “flooding” the island with American tourists? European and Canadian tourists have been swarming Cuba’s beaches and
hotels for many years now. This has done nothing to ease political repression.¶ Would
lifting the embargo improve our image
in Latin America? Perhaps, on balance, it would. But that alone is not a compelling reason to lift
sanctions . Our Cuba policy should be designed to increase freedom for Cubans, not to curry favor
among Latin governments that have neglected their democratic brethren in Castro’s island gulag.
A-to “Latin American ties won’t cause US-Russia conflicts”
( ) Russian expansionism in Latin America causes miscalc
Orozco ‘8
Jose Orozco, Correspondent for Christian Science Monitor, 9-12-2008, “Cold war echo: Russian military maneuvers with Venezuela,”
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2008/0912/p01s05-woam.html
The last time a Russian Navy ship plied the azure waters of the Caribbean for major joint maneuvers
with an anti-US country was during the cold war.¶ But in a move out of Cuban leader Fidel Castro's historical playbook,
Venezuela's Hugo Chávez announced this week that his nation will host four Russian warships and 1,000 troops in November for joint military
exercises.¶ That was followed Wednesday by the arrival in Venezuela of two Russian long-range bombers.¶ Although
Latin American
leaders so far have shrugged off the moves as another act of bravado in Mr. Chávez's push against what he calls
"Yankee hegemony," some diplomats and US officials see the potential for real trouble .¶ The US typically ignores
the leftist leader's angry tirades, and is playing down the news.¶ Still, an extensive military relationship between
Venezuela and Russia could heighten tensions and signal the start of a new regional cold war. ¶ "This is
a risky step that could provoke the US," says retired Navy Vice Admiral and former Vice Minister of Defense Rafael Huizi Clavier.
" Any incident, any error, could bring problems ." This week, Russia announced that it will send a naval squadron, including
the nuclear-powered missile cruiser Peter the Great, as well as long-range patrol planes for the upcoming joint exercises with Venezuela.
( ) Enhanced Cuba-Russia ties can serve as a flashpoint between the US and Russia.
Richter ‘8
Paul Richter, staff writer, 9-1-2008, “Moscow-Havana ties worry U.S.” LA Times, http://articles.latimes.com/2008/sep/01/world/fg-usrussia1
But at a time when Russia has intervened forcefully in Georgia and is extending the global reach of its rebuilt military, some senior officials fear
it may not be only bluster.¶ Russia "has strategic ties to Cuba again, or at least, that's where they're going," a senior U.S. official said recently,
speaking, like others, on condition of anonymity because of the sensitive implications of the assessments.¶ The officials said they doubted the
Russians would risk stationing nuclear bombers on Cuba. But some
believe that Moscow might seek to restore its onceenergetic intelligence cooperation with Havana, and to resume limited military cooperation, possibly
including refueling stops for aircraft and warships.¶ In the current environment, such contacts would make U.S. officials
uneasy, serving as a reminder of a military relationship between Havana and Moscow that stretched from
the Cuban Revolution in 1959 until a weakened, post-Soviet Russia finally closed a massive electronic intelligence complex in Lourdes near
Havana in 2001.¶ One senior military officer said a
return of Russian ships or planes could force additional U.S.
deployments in the region. But the Bush administration and Pentagon declined to comment publicly on the implications.¶ "It is
very Cold War retro," said a government official. "The topic could be reminiscent of the Cuban missile crisis,
and that is a chapter that people don't want to revisit."¶ The Russian Defense Ministry dismissed a report in the
newspaper Izvestia in July that quoted an unidentified Russian official as saying the government intended to begin basing Tupolev Tu-160
Blackjack and Tupolev Tu-95 Bear nuclear bombers in Cuba.¶ However, the report was taken seriously enough in Washington that Gen.
Norton A. Schwartz, the new Air Force chief of staff, said
during his Senate confirmation hearing at the time that
sending the bombers would cross a "red line in the sand."
( ) Latin America is capable of being a flashpoint in US-Russia Relations
Shaidle ‘8
(Kathy Shaidle – author of the published book The Tyranny of Nice. She is formerly of CBC News, Toronto Star and Catholic New Times
magazine, where won the Canadian Church Press award for best national columnist. Has written for major magazines and daily papers in
Canada and the US and currently coordinates FiveFeetofFury.com – Front Page Magazine -- November 21, 2008
http://frontpagemag.com/articles/Read.aspx?GUID=09F4497B-2550-4FA1-8DDA-401382BFC4B9)
Alliances among America’s enemies have been accelerating at an unprecedented rate. As reported by FrontPage throughout
this year, Russia, Cuba and Venezuela have recently signed numerous economic and military agreements. Now, at
the end of this month, the three nations are gathering once again for a series of historic meetings. Raul Castro is scheduled to
make his first visit to Venezuela since becoming the new President of Cuba after his elderly brother Fidel stepped aside earlier this year. The event is expected to
take place in Caracas on November 26, and will involve the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA), an international cooperation organization in Latin
America and the Caribbean, and Petrocaribe, a Caribbean oil alliance. Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez has long hoped to hold a summit dedicated to tackling the
ongoing financial crisis, an event he has said would be an alternative to the recent G20 summit in Washington. That same week, Russian
President
will visit Brazil, Venezuela and Cuba following the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Peru. The
timing of these summits is no coincidence. “Viewing the transfer of power between U.S. President George W.
Bush and President-elect Barack Obama as a key transition period,” say Stratfor analysts, Medvedev’s “intent is to remind the
incoming U.S. president that [Medvedev] too can play in another power’s near abroad.” The same thinking
Dmitry Medvedev
motivates Castro and Chavez as well – they need to “lay out the chessboard for the incoming U.S. President.” Chavez in particular desperately requires the prestige
such meetings can provide him; Venezuelan voters go to the polls in state and local elections just a few days before his meeting with Castro, and the results may
indicate that Chavez’s popularity has fallen. Plummeting oil prices mean Chavez has far less leverage to bully his people, his neighbors and the United States, and
less money to pay his mounting domestic and foreign bills. However, Medvedev’s visit to Chavez will coincide with joint Russian exercises off the shore of
Venezuela. Perhaps the military spectacle will be enough to reinvigorate Chavez’s diminishing personal “brand”, even briefly. For Raul Castro, who has stood in his
brother’s long shadow for decades, these widely publicized gatherings let him position himself as a serious, recognized, long term leader among the world’s – for
lack of a better expression -- anti-American nations. Such public relations considerations take on added importance in light of the current international economic
crisis. Russia quite simply has less ready cash to spare in support of allies like Cuba and Venezuela, and evidence indicates that many existing arrangements between
these countries aren’t going according to plan. For example, Cuban negotiations with Russian oil giant LUKOIL to modernize two of its oil refineries “never
proceeded beyond the very initial stages. A source close to the intergovernmental commission explained that Cuba received more profitable propositions from
companies in other countries -- mainly the U.S.” Throughout both terms of the Bush administration, the three nations have positioned themselves as leaders of
what they call a “pluri-polar”, or “post-American”, world. Yet the election of Barack Obama helped alter international perceptions about the United States virtually
over night. The hoary old cartoonish image of America as the world’s self-appointed “cowboy cop” suddenly seems comical. Can even the most hostile America
bashers easily conjure up a mental image of this particular president elect wearing a big Stetson hat and firing six-shooters? Regardless, as Ray Walser, Senior Policy
Analyst for Latin America at the Heritage Foundation, told FrontPage, all
three nations – Venezuela, Cuba and Russia – are
“fixated upon historic illusions.” “Chavez's Bolivarian dream, Castro's vision of keeping the Communist flame alive, and the
Putin/Medvedev view of a Great Russia will cause turmoil in the region,” Walser predicts, “and test the
mettle of the Obama Administration.”
( ) Latin America can serve as a US-Russia flashpoint.
Walser ‘9
(Ray Walser, Senior Policy Analyst for Latin America at the Heritage Foundation -- What to Do about Hugo Chávez: Venezuela’s Challenge to
Security in the Americas – Backgrounder # 2243 – Feb 19th -- http://www.heritage.org/research/latinamerica/bg2243.cfm)
In the course of President Medvedev's historic visit to Caracas on November 26 and 27, 2008, the first by a Russian leader, the Russians and
Venezue-lans sealed a deal creating a $4 billion development bank to finance a variety of manufacturing and min-ing projects. A consortium of
five Russian oil compa-nies is collaborating with Venezuela's nationalized oil company, PdVSA, to develop the rich reserves of the Orinoco
basin's heavy oil. Venezuela is also turning to Russia's state monopoly GAZPROM to develop and exploit its substantial reserves of natural gas
and form a gas cartel with Russia, Iran, and Qatar.[51] A final piece in the energy picture is Russia's apparent readiness to lend Chávez a hand in
developing nuclear power-generating capability in Venezuela. Aiding Chávez in developing nuclear power is both dangerous and unnecessary,
as Venezuela has abundant energy resources, such as natural gas, to generate electricity, and lacks technological basics and expertise to
support a truly viable nuclear pro-gram.[52] Some U.S. security analysts worry that-- given Chávez's ambitions, his desire for political power,
and his hostility to the U.S.--he has a hid-den agenda and wants to become the first South American nation with a nuclear weapon. Venezuela
has also forged economic, educational, and energy agreements with the government of Belarus, another fellow traveler in the relentless
opposition to the U.S. The U.S. has imposed sanc-tions on Belarus because of its refusal to free political prisoners and allow basic democratic
freedoms. Having been called "Europe's last dictatorship"[53] under authoritarian ruler Alexander Lukashenko, Belarus is also selling arms to
Russia's
new links with Venezuela exists foremost to annoy the U.S. and to demonstrate pique with U.S.
policies--from the Balkans, where the U.S. and the European allies recognized independence of Kosovo, to NATO expansion, to ballistic
missile defense and support for a sovereign, pro-Western Georgia. These links add a layer of unpredictability and
Venezuela and is used by Rus-sia as a way to supply controversial weapons systems to Venezuela and other problematic customers.
uncertainty to the hemispheric security equa-tion. Russian sources discuss possibilities of perma-nent
Russian air and naval bases and intelligence collection stations in Venezuela and Cuba. It is true that the masters of the
Kremlin may one day decide that the Venezuela connection is not worth a clash with the U.S., but for the moment they appear quite
content to ride Chávez's anti-American wave.
Impact Materials
Impact Module – Brazil Prolif
Perception the US is losing Latin American influence causes Brazilian prolif
Stalcup ‘12
Travis C. Stalcup, Fellow @ Texas A&M, 10-10-2012, "What is Brazil Up to with Its Nuclear Policy?" Georgetown Journal of International Affairs,
http:// journal.georgetown.edu/2012/10/10/what-is-brazil-up-to-with-its-nuclear-policy-by-travis-stalcup/
Further north, the United States, long the guarantor of South American stability, appears hamstrung by economic challenges. According to
former Argentine diplomat Emilio Cárdenas, Brazil believes that the West is in gradual decline and that Brazil is jockeying with other rising
nations for position. This shift in the balance of power engenders a greater degree of uncertainty about U.S. capabilities and intentions in the
future. Such uncertainty, in addition to Brazil’s new political and economic prowess, gives it the ability to challenge the U.S. at the margins of its
power. Moreover, if
the ability of the U.S. to maintain order in the hemisphere is truly constrained, it is
incumbent upon the Brazilian government to seek alternative sources of security.¶ This perceived shift
in the balance of power presents Brazil with an opportunity for international leadership. That is why Brazil is seeking to
achieve a degree of political clout commensurate with its new economic power, setting as its chief foreign policy goal a permanent seat on the
United Nations Security Council. A key component of permanent membership is the ability to share the burdens of maintaining international
security. Currently, there is some question as to whether Brazil is capable of such a charge. Looking at the current permanent members as well
as the other BRICs – Russia, India, and China – Brazil sees nothing but countries with nuclear weapons.¶ According to Kenneth Waltz, the
preeminent realist international relations scholar, states mirror other states – states
without nuclear weapons see the power
and prestige of states with nuclear weapons and they want in. Former Brazilian Vice President José
Alencar who died last year, remarked that Pakistan won international relevance “precisely because it has a
nuclear bomb.” A nuclear weapon would not only deter rogue neighbors but solidify Brazil’s regional
dominance and prove that it possesses the military capability to contribute to international security.
Brazil prolif causes Latin American instability and regional prolif
Poblete ‘8
Jason Poblete, Vice-Chair to the National Security Committee of the American Bar Association, 9-16-2008, "Brazil Wants to Build 50 Nuclear
Power Plants, Nuclear Submarines, More?" http://jasonpoblete.com/2008/09/16/brazil-wants-to-build-50-nuclear-power-plants-nuclearsubmarines-more/
Despite repeated assurances to the contrary, Brazil’s
spotty record on transparency in this area should be cause for
concern. Unlike Iran or North Korea, a Latin American nation with a nuclear weapon would have an
immediate destabilizing effect in the Hemisphere . It will surely set off an mini-arms race with
Argentina
or, more likely, Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez. Either Brazil is committed to a nuclear-weapons zone or it is not. Recent statements
by high-ranking Brazilian military and civilian officials are not helpful.¶ The regional
mechanisms in place to deal with nonproliferation in the Americas are inadequate. For example, the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL), headquartered in Mexico City, Mexico, is wholly
unprepared to deal with these matters. For one thing, the U.S. is not a member, but an observer. The regional mechanism are in
need of reform and are politically anemic. Neither OPANAL, or the Organization of American States, has ever voiced concerns when Brazilian
military officials state that they should be “technologically prepared” to build an atomic weapon. If OPANAL is not willing to say anything, who
will?
Latin America instability causes global nuclear war
Rochin ‘94
James Rochin, Professor of Political Science, 1994, Discovering the Americas: the evolution of Canadian foreign policy towards Latin America,
pp. 130-131
While there were economic motivations for Canadian policy in Central America, security considerations were perhaps more important. Canada
possessed an interest in promoting stability in the face of a potential decline of U.S. hegemony in the Americas. Perceptions of
declining U.S. influence in the region – which had some credibility in 1979-1984 due to the wildly inequitable divisions of wealth
in some U.S. client states in Latin America, in addition to political repression, under-development, mounting external debt, anti-American
sentiment produced by decades of subjugation to U.S. strategic and economic interests, and so on – were
linked to the prospect of
explosive events occurring in the hemisphere. Hence, the Central American imbroglio was viewed as a fuse which could
ignite a cataclysmic process throughout the region. Analysts at the time worried that in a worst-case scenario,
instability created by a regional war, beginning in Central America and spreading elsewhere in Latin
America, might preoccupy Washington to the extent that the United States would be unable to perform
adequately its important hegemonic role in the international arena – a concern expressed by the director of
research for Canada’s Standing Committee Report on Central America. It was feared that such a predicament could generate
increased global instability and perhaps even a hegemonic war. This is one of the motivations which led Canada to
become involved in efforts at regional conflict resolution, such as Contadora, as will be discussed in the next chapter.
Independently, prolif causes nuclear war.
Utgoff ‘2
(Victor A., Deputy Director of the Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division of the Institute for Defense Analysis, Survival Vol 44 No 2
Proliferation, Missile Defence and American Ambitions, p. 87-90)
In sum, widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that such shoot-outs will
have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear
proliferation is stopped, we are headed toward a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the late 1800s. With most, if not
all, nations wearing nuclear 'six-shooters' on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a
while we will all gather on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations.
Impact Module – Turns Case
More “pink tide” turns case – hurts economy and boosts terrorism.
Manwaring ‘5,
(General Douglas MacArthur Chair and Prof of Military Strategy @ U.S. Army War College, Ret U.S. Army Colonel, Adjunct Professor of
International Politics @ Dickinson College (Max G, October, Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez, Bolivarian Socialism, and Asymmetric Warfare”, Strategic
Studies Institute, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB628.pdf)
At the same time, President Chávez’s
approach to Latin American security and stability requires a realignment
from capitalist and “neo-liberal” economics and politics to his socialism for the 21st century. That
realignment will likely generate instability, conflict, and probably exacerbate the processes of state
failure in important parts of the hemisphere. Thus, the corollary at this level must address questions associated with
“peacekeeping,” “stability operations,” “nation-building,” and “state failure.” The implications are straightforward. In the contemporary
security environment, international organizations such as the UN and the OAS, and individual national powers, increasingly are being called on
to respond to conflict generated by all kinds of material instabilities and human destabilizers. Likewise, the global community increasingly is
being asked to respond to failing and failed states. In these terms, it is important to remember that state failure is a process, not an outcome. It
is a process by which a state loses the capacity and/or the will to perform its essential legitimizing governance and security functions. In either
case, the associated question is “How should the processes of state failure be addressed before they run their courses and achieve conflict
and/or crisis proportions?” Conclusions from the Four Levels of Analysis. Chávez understands that every player in the international community
from small powers to the U.S. superpower must cope simultaneously with four separate and potentially grave types of contemporary threat.
These threats include, first, traditional and lingering boundary and territorial disputes, as well as balance of power concerns. Second, each
protagonist must deal with the very real possibility that transnational and internal nonstate actors can be used by one nation-state to play
serious roles in destabilizing and taking down another. Additionally, destabilizing nontraditional internal public and personal security threats
can been seen all over the hemisphere in ungoverned territories, urban criminal gangs, more conventional terrorism, and insurgency. At the
chronic poverty, disease, and other “root causes” of
conflict. Accordingly, all of the above types of threats are seen as methods of choice—or areas for exploitation—for various
same time, real threats to effective sovereignty exist, stemming from
commercial (narco-traffickers and organized criminals), ideological (insurgencies such as Peru’s Sendero Luminoso) movements, and caudillos
like Chávez who are completely and ruthlessly dedicated to achieving control or radical change in a given nation-state. Nevertheless, rather
than considering each level of conflict as an independent form of warfare, Chávez finds that it is more useful to think of them as parts
within his concept of total war, a people’s war, or a super insurgency. The questions associated with the corollaries and
implications of each of the above levels of analysis, thus, imply no easy set of tasks. However, if the United States and the other countries of the
Americas ignore what is happening in the region, that inaction could
destroy the democracy, free market economies,
and prosperity that has been achieved, and place the posterity of the hemisphere at serious risk. Some
Final Thought on Chavez’s Asymmetrical Conflict As a Challenge to Hemispheric Security Chávez may be a military caudillo, but he is no “nut
case.” He is, in fact, what Ralph Peters calls a “wise competitor.”57 He will not even attempt to defeat his enemies on their terms. Rather, he
will seek to shift the playing field away from conventional military confrontations and turn to nontraditional forms of assault on a nation’s
stability and integrity. Thus, it appears that this astute warrior is
prepared to destabilize, to facilitate the processes of
state failure, and thus to “destroy in order to rebuild” in true revolutionary fashion.58 As a consequence, it is
important to understand that Chávez considers three issues to be key to success (or failure) in contemporary asymmetric conflict. They are
closely related to his security scheme, social programs, and communications efforts. First, he understands the sophistication and complexity of
war as a whole. He also understands the value of facilitating the processes of state failure to achieve the objectives of bolivarianismo. Finally,
Chávez understands the centrality of relative moral legitimacy in conflict— and the critical importance of creating popular perceptions that his
cause is morally correct, and will lead to a better life. These are the bases of power—all else, to him, is illusion. The Sophistication and
Complexity of War as a Whole. Chávez understands that contemporary nontraditional war is not a kind of appendage (a lesser or limited thing)
to the more comfortable conventional military attrition and maneuver warfare paradigms. It is a great deal more. Again, it may be military or
nonmilitary, lethal or nonlethal, or a mix of everything within a state’s or a coalition of states’ array of instruments of power. As such, it may be
a zerosum game in which only one winner emerges or, in a worst-case scenario, no winner. It is, thus, total. That is to say, the “battlefield” is
extended to everyone, everything, and everywhere. To give the mind as much room as possible to contemplate the sophistication and
complexity—and the totality—of contemporary conflict, two Chinese colonels, Liang and Xiangsui, have provided a scenario that is instructive
and sobering: If
the attacking side secretly musters large amounts of capital without the enemy nation
being aware of this, and launches a sneak attack against its financial markets, then after causing a
financial crisis , buries a computer virus and hacker detachment in the opponent’s computer system
in advance, while at the same time carrying out a network attack against the enemy so that the
civilian electricity network, traffic dispatching network, financial transaction network, telephone
communications network, and mass media network are completely paralyzed, this will cause the
enemy nation to fall into social panic, street riots, and a political crisis. There is finally the forceful bearing down by
the army, and military means are utilized in gradual stages until the enemy is forced to sign a dishonorable peace treaty. Chávez
understands all this. He understands that war is no longer limited to using military violence to bring about desired political
change. Rather, all means that can be brought to bear on a given situation must be used to compel a
targeted government to do one’s will. This caudillo will tailor his campaign to his adversaries’ political
and economic vulnerabilities, and to their psychological precepts. And this is the basis of Chávez’s instruction to the Venezuelan
armed forces (at the “1st Military Forum on Fourth Generation War and Asymmetric War” in 2004) to develop a doctrinal paradigm change
from conventional to people’s war.61 The Issue of State Failure. President Chávez
also understands that the process
leading to state failure is the most dangerous long-term security challenge facing the global
community today. The argument in general is that failing and failed state status is the breeding
ground for instability, criminality, insurgency, regional conflict, and terrorism. These conditions breed
massive humanitarian disasters and major refugee flows. They can host “evil” networks of all kinds, whether they
involve criminal business enterprise, narco-trafficking, or some form of ideological crusade such as Bolivarianismo. More specifically, these
conditions spawn all kinds of things people in general do not like such as murder, kidnapping, corruption, intimidation, and destruction of
infrastructure. These means of coercion and persuasion can spawn further
human rights violations, torture, poverty,
starvation, disease, the recruitment and use of child soldiers, trafficking in women and body parts, trafficking and
proliferation of conventional weapons systems and WMD, genocide, ethnic cleansing, warlordism,
and criminal anarchy. At the same time, these actions are usually unconfined and spill over into regional
syndromes of poverty, destabilization, and conflict. Peru’s Sendero Luminoso calls violent and destructive activities that
facilitate the processes of state failure “armed propaganda.” Drug cartels operating throughout the Andean Ridge of South America and
elsewhere call these activities “business incentives.” Chávez
considers these actions to be steps that must be taken to
bring about the political conditions necessary to establish Latin American socialism for the 21st
century.63 Thus, in addition to helping to provide wider latitude to further their tactical and operational objectives, state and nonstate
actors’ strategic efforts are aimed at progressively lessening a targeted regime’s credibility and capability in terms of its ability and willingness
to govern and develop its national territory and society. Chávez’s
intent is to focus his primary attack politically and
psychologically on selected Latin American governments’ ability and right to govern. In that context, he
understands that popular perceptions of corruption, disenfranchisement, poverty, and lack of upward mobility limit the right and the ability of a
given regime to conduct the business of the state. Until a given populace generally perceives that its government is dealing with these and
other basic issues of political, economic, and social injustice fairly and effectively, instability and the threat of subverting or destroying such a
government are real.64 But failing and failed states simply do not go away. Virtuallyanyone can take advantage of such an unstable situation.
The tendency is that the best motivated and best armed organization on the scene will control that instability. As a consequence, failing and
failed states become dysfunctional states, rogue states, criminal states, narco-states, or new people’s democracies. In
connection with
the creation of new people’s democracies, one can rest assured that Chávez and his Bolivarian populist allies will be
available to provide money, arms, and leadership at any given opportunity. And, of course, the longer
dysfunctional, rogue, criminal, and narco-states and people’s democracies persist, the more they and
their associated problems endanger global security, peace, and prosperity.
Yes, US-Russia Miscalc happens
( ) Accidental war likely – safeguards won’t check
Rosenberg ‘6
Eric Rosenberg, National Correspondent and former National Editor, Hearst Newspapers – San Francisco Gate – Friday, October 6, 2006 –
http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Experts-warn-of-an-accidental-atomic-war-2550308.php
Accidental nuclear war is not so far-fetched. In 1995, Russia initially interpreted the launch of a
Norwegian scientific rocket as the onset of a U.S. nuclear attack. Then-President Boris Yeltsin activated his
"nuclear briefcase" in the first stages of preparation to launch a retaliatory strike before the mistake was
discovered. The United States and Russia have acknowledged the possibility that Russia's equipment
might mistakenly conclude the United States was attacking with nuclear missiles. In 1998, the two countries
agreed to set up a joint radar center in Moscow operated by U.S. and Russian forces to supplement Russia's aging equipment and reduce the
threat of accidental war. But the center has yet to open. A
major technical problem exacerbates the risk of using the D5 as a
decaying state of Russia's nuclear forces. Russia's nuclear missiles are tethered to
early warning radars that have been in decline since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. And Russia, unlike
the United States, lacks sufficient satellites to supplement the radars and confirm whether missile launches
are truly under way or are false alarms.
conventional weapon: the
( ) Miscalc likely – decision made in minutes
Wickersham ‘9
[“Confronting Nuclear War: The Role of Education, Religion, and the Community”. Professor of Peace Studies at Michigan State University,
Wickersham is part of the eight-member Missouri University Nuclear Disarmament Education Team, which he helped found in 2009. Their
mission is to enlighten Missouri and the rest of the world about the need to abolish nuclear war weapons from the planet through discussions
and presentations to interested groups. http://sites.google.com/site/confrontingnuclearwar/chapter-2-nuclear-weapons-on-hair-trigger-alert]
Currently, there are over 23,000 nuclear weapons in the world—a total of over 100,000 Hiroshima bombs or 7000 megatons of TNT. At its peak
in 1964, the U.S. alone had the equivalent of 17,000 megatons. For perspective, all of the bombs dropped during WWII totaled only 3
megatons, which is about ten average-sized strategic nuclear weapons. Combined, the U.S.
and Russia possess over 97 percent
of these weapons. Of which, about 3,500 remain on high alert status and are ready to be launched in minutes. In
a time of crisis or perceived attack, the Russian and U.S. presidents have three and eight minutes,
respectively, to make a decision to order an attack against each other. Thus, a single miscalculation or
computer error could lead to nuclear war (see table in appendix). Political leaders have taken elaborate steps to comfort these
fears. However, the mere existence of these weapons maintains the possibility of an unpredicted sequence
of events leading to its use.
( ) Their Accidental War defense is wrong. It’s likely and bad.
Phillips ‘3
Dr. Alan Phillips, Ph. D. with honours in physics at Cambridge University, former Radar operator for the British Army, An Introduction to No
Launch on Warning, http://www.web.net/~cnanw/nolowinterview.htm
Launch on Warning has kept the world exposed, for at least 30 years, to the danger of a nuclear war caused by
nothing but a coincidence of radar, sensor, or computer glitches, and a temporary failure of human
alertness to appreciate that an unexpected message of attack from the warning system is false, the enemy having done nothing. There is at
most 20 minutes for the human operators and commanders to call and conduct a "threat conference", while the chief of Strategic Command is
accidental
nuclear war has not happened yet, in spite of a large number of false warnings of which at least a few have had
very dangerous features. This is a credit to the care and alertness of the military in both Russia and the US. It should not be taken as
reassurance. A single instance of launch of nuclear weapons on a false warning would result in nuclear war, and the end of
civilization, just as surely as a nuclear war started by an actual attack. There would be no chance to
review the system to make it safer after one failure of that kind. The threat conferences require, and so far have
put in touch with the President to advise him, and the President decides whether to order retaliation. The disaster of an
achieved, the extraordinary standard of perfect accuracy. They have not been rare events. Probably most of them have been routine and it was
easy to exclude a real attack; others have been serious enough that the silo lids were rolled back. To get an idea of how the laws of chance
apply to the situation, suppose
we make a very conservative assumption: that just one conference a year had a risk of error
1% risk of disaster per year
for 30 years results in a 26% probability of one actual disaster in that period. On that assumption, then, we had
as high as 1% (and that the rest had a much lower risk). It is a simple calculation to show that taking one
approximately 3 to 1 odds in favour of surviving the period 1970 - 2000, and we did survive. But that means, from the risk of accidental war
alone, we had (on that assumption) a one in four chance of not surviving. A single trial of Russian roulette is safer: it gives a one in six chance of
death, or 5 to 1 odds in favour of surviving.14 During the Cold War, many
mishaps within the nuclear retaliation system
on the US side are known to have occurred, including false warnings. There must have also been many similar
incidents on the Russian side. One has been reported in which a Russian officer decided on his own initiative not to report an
apparently grave warning on his computer screen, on the correct belief that it was a false warning. He may have saved the world, but was
disgraced for failing to follow his orders; his career was ruined, and he suffered a mental breakdown.15 In a study of rival theories of accident
probabilities, Scott Sagan described a large number of errors and accidents within the US nuclear deterrence system. He concluded that the risk
of nuclear war from accidents had not been excessive.16 I came to the opposite conclusion from his data. I have collected 20 instances of
mishaps, from that source and others, which with less alertness among military officers, or accompanied by chance by some coincidental
problem, might have started a nuclear war.17 One example of a situation which was difficult to assess correctly at the Command Center, was
this: On the night of 24 November, 1961, all communication links between SAC HQ and NORAD went dead, and so cut SAC HQ off from the
three Ballistic Missile Early Warning Sites, at Thule (Greenland), Clear (Alaska), and Fylingdales (England).18 For General Power at SAC HQ, there
were two possible explanations: either enemy action, or the coincidental failure of all the communication systems, which had multiple
ostensibly independent routes including commercial telephone circuits. The SAC bases in the US were therefore alerted by a code message
instructing B-52 nuclear bomber crews to prepare to take off, and start their engines, but not to take off without further orders. In the hope of
clarifying the situation, radio contact was made with an orbiting B-52 on airborne alert which was near Thule (5,000 kilometers away) at the
time. Its crew contacted the Thule base and could report that no attack had taken place, so the alert was cancelled. The reason for the
"coincidental" failure was that the "independent" routes for telephone and telegraph between NORAD and SAC HQ all ran through one relay
station in Colorado. At that relay station a small fire had interrupted all the lines.19 There was a coincidental mishap during this event, which
could have been disastrous. It seems there was an error in transmitting the alert code to 380th Bomb Wing at Plattsburg, New York. A former
aircraft maintenance technician who was serving at that B-52 bomber base, recently told the author his vivid recollection of the incident. The
code order first received by the bomber crews was "alpha", instructing them to take off and proceed directly to their
pre-assigned targets, and bomb. They had never received that code before. Before any bomber had taken off the code was corrected to
"cocoa", meaning "wait with engines running". If the corrected code had not been received in time it could have
been very difficult to stop the bombers. The episode just described took place before L-o-W was instituted
for the ICBMs that were in service. By 1979 the policy of L-o-W was in effect and in that year, on the morning of 9 November, a war games tape
was running on a reserve computer when failure of the operational computer automatically switched in the reserve to take its place. The Threat
Conference saw the picture of a massive attack in a realistic trajectory from Russian launch sites. On that occasion, preparation to retaliate got
as far as launch of the president's National Emergency Airborne Command Post (though without the president), before the error was
discovered.
US-Russia Conflict outweighs all
US-Russia conflict outweighs everything – biggest existential risk.
Bostrom ‘2
(Nick, Dir. Future of Humanity Institute and Prof. Philosophy – Oxford U., Journal of Evolution and Technology, “Analyzing Human Extinction
Scenarios and Related Hazards”, 9, March, http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html)
The first manmade existential risk was the inaugural detonation of an atomic bomb. At the time, there was
some concern that the explosion might start a runaway chain-reaction by “igniting” the atmosphere. Although we now know that
such an outcome was physically impossible, it qualifies as an existential risk that was present at the
time. For there to be a risk, given the knowledge and understanding available, it suffices that there is some subjective
probability of an adverse outcome, even if it later turns out that objectively there was no chance of
something bad happening. If we don’t know whether something is objectively risky or not, then it is
risky in the subjective sense. The subjective sense is of course what we must base our decisions on.[2]
At any given time we must use our best current subjective estimate of what the objective risk factors are.[3] A much greater
existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the USSR. An all-out
nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that might have
been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the
information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or
permanently destroy human civilization.[4] Russia and the US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a
future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large
nuclear arsenals. Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan for instance, is not an
existential risk, since it would not destroy or thwart humankind’s potential permanently. Such a war might however be a
local terminal risk for the cities most likely to be targeted. Unfortunately, we shall see that nuclear Armageddon and comet or asteroid strikes
are mere preludes to the existential risks that we will encounter in the 21st century.
Saudi Arabia Disad
1NC
1NC Shell
A – Issue-Specific Uniqueness. Saudi Arabia has not yet acquired the bomb. Perception
of US support is the key factor.
Guzansky ‘13
Yoel Guzansky is a fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies, Tel Aviv University. His main research area is Gulf security. He has also
served as Iran coordinator at Israel's National Security Council. His recent publications include The Gulf States in a Changing Strategic
Environment (2012), One Year of the Arab Spring: Global and Regional Implications, and The Gulf States: Between Iran and the West – Middle
East Quarterly¶ Spring 2013, pp. 59-64 – available at: http://www.meforum.org/3512/saudi-arabia-pakistan-nuclear-weapon
Continued Iranian progress toward a nuclear weapon, Iraq's increasing alignment with Tehran, and an expedited U.S. exit from Afghanistan are
all changing the Saudi strategic landscape. The Obama administration's "lead from behind" approach in Libya and its hesitation to get involved
in the Syrian civil war all contribute to a reassessment of U.S. commitments. With
the U.S. "pivot to Asia"—taking the form of a series of
military, economic, commercial, and diplomatic initiatives aimed at contending with the rising power of China—and a changing global
energy map due to expansion of oil and natural gas production in the United States, Riyadh and others are
beginning to prepare for a post-U.S. Middle East.¶ According to recent reports, Washington is considering expanding its
nuclear cooperation with Riyadh on the basis of a 2008 memorandum of understanding: In exchange for foregoing the operation of nuclear fuel
cycles on its soil, Saudi Arabia was to receive nuclear assistance.[33] Such a move, should it come to pass, may be meant to persuade Riyadh to
abandon its strategic goals, prevent other players from gaining a foothold in the attractive Saudi market, and challenge Tehran's nuclear policy.
The United States is still Saudi Arabia's most effective security support, but if Washington distances itself
from regional matters, the gradual entrance of new players into the Gulf is inevitable.¶ The question of Saudi acquisition of
a nuclear deterrent is more relevant than ever when both enemies and friends of the United States are looking at a possible regional drawdown
on Washington's part as well as a lack of support for the pro-Western regimes that remain in place. If the U.S. government provides Riyadh with
formal security guarantees, it would be natural for it to demand that the kingdom forego its strategic goals. But Riyadh's
inclusion
under a U.S. defense umbrella is not a given and depends both on the quality of relations between
the two countries and other Saudi considerations. Riyadh remains skeptical over Washington's willingness to come to its aid
and may thus seek to purchase a nuclear deterrent, which would provide it with more freedom vis-à-vis its stronger ally.
Under present circumstances, it is not unreasonable for Riyadh to rely on other states for its defense in addition to Washington for the simple
reason that it has done so in the past. Likewise, it is more than likely that the Saudis will not act transparently because they have acted in secret
previously.¶ After
Iran, Saudi Arabia is the number one candidate for further nuclear proliferation in the
Middle East. Open source evidence remains circumstantial, but perhaps more than any other regional player, Riyadh has the
requisite ideological and strategic motives as well as the financial wherewithal to act on the option.¶ The
kingdom may conclude that its security constraints as well as the attendant prestige and influence generated by having a bomb outweigh the
political and economic costs it will pay. The difficulty in stopping Tehran's dogged quest for a nuclear capability coupled with Riyadh's
doubts about the reliability of Washington is liable to encourage Riyadh to shorten timetables for developing
an independent nuclear infrastructure, as well as to opt to purchase a turnkey nuclear system, an off-the-shelf
product, or to enter into a security compact of one sort with another power. Sunni-majority Pakistan has emerged as the natural
candidate for such an arrangement.¶ Heavy U.S. pressure is likely to be brought to bear on the Saudis not to acquire nuclear
capabilities. Indeed, it seems that, at present , the price Riyadh is likely to pay should it acquire military nuclear
capabilities might outweigh the advantages of such a move. But strategic interest , motivated by
could have the upper hand . Should it seem that the kingdom's vital security
interests are threatened, it may prefer to take a series of steps, including obtaining a nonconventional arsenal, to
reduce risks and ensure the continuity of the House of Saud.
considerations of survival,
B – Links.
First – Embargo limits status quo drilling. Plan involves the US – unlocking large-scale
Cuban production.
Padgett ‘8
Tim Padgett joined TIME in 1996 as Mexico City bureau chief covering Latin America. In 1999 he moved to Florida to become TIME’s Miami &
Latin America bureau chief, reporting on the hemisphere from Tallahassee to Tierra del Fuego. He has chronicled Mexico’s democratization and
drug war as well as the rise of Latin leaders like Lula and Hugo Chavez, “How Cuba’s Oil Find Could Change the US Embargo”¶ Time Magazine –
Oct. 23, 2008 – internally quoting Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado, a Cuba oil analyst at the University of Nebraska-Omaha.
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,¶ 1853252,00.html#ixzz13Li5cosN
The Spanish energy company Repsol-YPF has entered into a production-sharing agreement with Cupet and is scheduled to
start drilling the first real well in the EEZ next year. Other international firms, including Norway's StatoilHidro and India's Oil &
Natural Gas Corp., are part of the Repsol-led consortium. Venezuela's state-run Petroleos de Venezuela is considered a lesser player because it
has little deep-water drilling experience. (China is also interested but so far only involved in onshore drilling in Cuba.) Cuba is now in important
negotiations with Brazil's Petrobras, which just made its own multibillion-barrel oil find off its coast near Rio de Janeiro and could, analysts say,
be the major offshore drilling partner for Cuba if it jumps in.¶ Still,
the concessions so far represent less than a quarter
of the 59 drilling blocks that Cuba hopes to exploit in the 43,000-sq.-mi. (112,000 sq km) EEZ. Analysts say one reason
is the daunting infrastructural difficulties facing any company that drills in Cuba: firms have to bring
much more of their own capital, equipment, technology and on-the-ground know-how than usual. This
year's severe hurricane damage in Cuba has made the situation worse. Canada's Sherritt, in fact, recently dropped out of its four-block contract.
"Who
else is going to be willing to actually come in and take the risk in Cuba?" says Benjamin-Alvarado. "In
terms of proximity and technology, the only people really able to do it to the extent the Cubans need
are the Americans."
Second – Cuban production trades-off with US- Mid-East oil ties
Alhaiji and Maris ‘4
[Dr. A. F. Alhajji is an energy economist and George Patton Chair of Business and Economics at the College of Business Administration at Ohio
Northern, Terry L. Maris is the founding executive director of the Center for Cuban. Business Studies and professor of management, “The
Future of Cuba’s Energy Sector,” Cuba Today, 2004, http://web.gc.cuny.edu/dept/bildn/publications/cubatodaybookcomplete.pdf#page=105]
The current economic, political, and social trends in Cuba indicate that¶ energy consumption will
increase substantially in the future. Transition to a¶ market economy would accelerate this trend. In this article the word
“transition”¶ refers to any movement towards a market economy. It does not necessarily¶ mean regime change.¶ The proximity of
Cuba to the United States and the possibility of massive¶ oil deposits in Cuban waters will have a
tangible impact on political, economic,¶ and social environments, not only in Cuba, but in the whole
region.¶ The discovery of commercial deposits of oil would affect Cuba’s economy on¶ one hand and US energy
policy and energy security on the other. If US-Cuba¶ relations improve in the future, discovery of large oil deposits could
affect the¶ energy trade patterns between the two countries and affect oil trade between¶ the US and
other oil producing countries, especially in the Middle East.
Third – Perception. Saudi Arabia fears the narrative that the US may abandon them for
North American supplies.
Rogers 3/20
[2013 – Will Rogers is the Bacevich Fellow at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). At CNAS, Mr. Rogers’ research focus is on science,
technology and national security policy. He has authored or co-authored a range of publications on energy, climate change, environmental
cooperation in Asia and cybersecurity, “America Committed to Gulf Security Despite Changing Relationship with Region's Oil, says Gen.
Dempsey,” Center for New American Security, 2013, http://www.cnas.org/blogs/naturalsecurity/2013/03/america-committed-gulf-securitydespite-changing-relationship-regions-]
America’s relationship with the Middle East’s energy resources is changing as U.S. domestic oil production continues
to grow. A combination of hydraulic fracturing, horizontal drilling and advanced seismic technologies have contributed to the largest annual
growth in U.S. crude oil production since Colonel Edwin Drake first drilled for oil in Titusville, Pennsylvania in 1859. Most of the crude oil is
coming from shale formations in North Dakota and Texas – what we call “light tight oil.” Since 2010, the United States has, on average,
increased monthly crude oil production by 50,000 barrels a day.¶ Not all of this U.S. light tight oil is displacing Middle East crude, of course. A
number of factors matter, most importantly the crude oil grade.
The United States is producing light tight oil, that is,
low-density crude oil , whereas the United States imports heavier crudes from the Persian Gulf, including from
Saudi Arabia . Moreover, U.S. refineries have been increasingly geared to absorb heavier crudes, from the Persian
Gulf, but more so from Canada, Mexico and Venezuela.¶ Nevertheless, the glut in U.S. crude oil production and declining demand
for oil (a consequence of slow economic growth and more fuel efficient vehicles) have contributed to a powerful notion that
the United States is relying less and less on oil from the Persian Gulf and could conceivably help wean
America off crude oil imports from the Middle East entirely (a debatable point).¶ Whether or not one believes
that the United States can break the tether to Middle East oil, U.S. allies and partners in the Persian
Gulf are increasingly nervous about America’s long-term security commitment to the region . After all,
if the U nited S tates no longer relies on energy from the region, why should American foot the bill for
protecting the sea lanes – that backbone of the crude oil trade in the region – or so the narrative
goes .¶ The United States has a number of stakes in stability of the Persian Gulf oil trade even if it does rely less on oil from the region. Supply
shocks will contribute to higher global oil prices, which will be felt at home. Moreover, supply shocks are damaging to our allies, particularly
those in East Asia that have grown more dependent on oil and gas from the Middle East and North Africa. But there are other legitimate
security concerns as well, which were not far from General Martin Dempsey’s mind when he responded to a question on Monday about how
the American energy revolution will impact U.S. interests and presence in the Persian Gulf. Here’s what the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
said:If by 2017 the United States can achieve some level of energy independence, why in the world would we continue to be concerned about
the energy that flows out of – out of the Gulf? Well, look, my answer to that is I didn’t go to the Gulf in 1991 and stay there for about the next
20 years because of oil. That’s not why I went. It’s not why my children went. It’s –and we went there because we thought that a region of the
world where we had – where we had not, except for a few bilateral relationships – where we hadn’t invested much of our, let’s call it,
bandwidth, intellectual energy, commitment – now, we went there in ’91 because of the – of the aggression of Saddam Hussein, but we stayed
there because I think we came to the realization that the future of the region was tied to our future, and not through this thing called oil but
rather through the – as I said earlier, the shared interest in a common future where people would be able to build a better life and where
threats could be managed collaboratively, not by the United States uniquely but by the relationships we would build on the basis of common
interests. So when I hear about in 2017, you know, oil won’t be as big a factor for us – and that’s great. I hope we do achieve energy
independence. But I can assure you that at least from a military perspective – and I can only speak, as I dress, from the military perspective –
that the continued development of capabilities – military capabilities, notably, in my world, but also partnerships and trust that we build by
working together, by exchanging officers and noncommissioned officers in our professional military schools, that on that basis, you will find –
you will find that the future will be a period of greater commitment.¶ Now, you know, if you measure our commitment in terms of numbers of
boots on the ground and numbers of aircraft and number of aircraft carriers, I think you’ll probably –you know, there’ll always be this debate
about inclining or declining commitment. But that’s not what the commitment’s all about, really, in my view. As I said, I went to – I went to the
Gulf in ’91, spent almost the next 20 years there on and off and didn’t do it for oil.¶ So we have two powerful strategic cross-currents that the
Obama administration will have to confront in the near term.¶ This
week marks the anniversary of the U.S. invasion of
Iraq, a solemn reminder for some that the United States should be less engaged in the Middle East, not
more. Add this to the notion that the United States could break the tether to Middle East oil, and the
narrative speaks for itself . At the same time, though, a credible U.S. security commitment to our
partners in the Persian Gulf may be the only way to allay concerns about security challenges in the
region. Take for example, Iran. My colleagues Colin Kahl, Melissa Dalton and Matt Irvine recently published a
report assessing the possibility that an Iranian bomb could lead to Saudi Arabia developing the bomb –
Atomic Kingdom: If Iran Builds the Bomb, Will Saudi Arabia be Next? Kahl, Dalton and Irvine argue quite persuasively that a number of
domestic
factors will keep Saudi Arabia from developing the bomb. But one of the big caveats to this is a
credible U.S. security commitment to Saudi Arabia. Does the Royal Family in Riyadh feel comfortable about this
commitment given the competing narrative that America may have an opportunity to walk away from the Persian Gulf if it doesn’t need access
to the region’s oil? The public
perception on these issues - at home and abroad - will have to be managed
carefully. What a tightrope to walk.
C- Impact – Saudi prolif causes nuclear war.
Edelman ‘11
(Eric –Distinguished Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments & Former U.S. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Foreign
Affairs, Jan/Feb, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67162/eric-s-edelman-andrew-f-krepinevich-jr-and-evan-braden-montgomer/thedangers-of-a-nuclear-iran)
There is, however, at least one state that could receive significant outside support: Saudi Arabia. And if it did, proliferation could accelerate
throughout the region. Iran and Saudi Arabia have long been geopolitical and ideological rivals. Riyadh would face tremendous pressure to
respond in some form to a nuclear-armed Iran, not only to deter Iranian coercion and subversion but also to preserve its sense that Saudi
Arabia is the leading nation in the Muslim world. The
Saudi government is already pursuing a nuclear power
capability, which could be the first step along a slow road to nuclear weapons development. And concerns
persist that it might be able to accelerate its progress by exploiting its close ties to Pakistan. During the 1980s, in response to the use of missiles
during the Iran-Iraq War and their growing proliferation throughout the region, Saudi Arabia acquired several dozen css-2 intermediate-range
ballistic missiles from China. The Pakistani government reportedly brokered the deal, and it may have also offered to sell Saudi Arabia nuclear
warheads for the css-2s, which are not accurate enough to deliver conventional warheads effectively. There
are still rumors that
Riyadh and Islamabad have had discussions involving nuclear weapons, nuclear technology, or security guarantees.
This “Islamabad option” could develop in one of several different ways. Pakistan could sell operational nuclear weapons and
delivery systems to Saudi Arabia, or it could provide the Saudis with the infrastructure, material, and technical
support they need to produce nuclear weapons themselves within a matter of years, as opposed to a decade or longer.
Not only has Pakistan provided such support in the past, but it is currently building two more heavy-water reactors for plutonium production
and a second chemical reprocessing facility to extract plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. In other words, it might accumulate more fissile
material than it needs to maintain even a substantially expanded arsenal of its own. Alternatively, Pakistan might offer an extended deterrent
guarantee to Saudi Arabia and deploy nuclear weapons, delivery systems, and troops on Saudi territory, a practice that the United States has
employed for decades with its allies. This arrangement could be particularly appealing to both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. It would allow the
Saudis to argue that they are not violating the NPT since they would not be acquiring their own nuclear weapons. And an extended deterrent
from Pakistan might be preferable to one from the United States because stationing foreign Muslim forces on Saudi territory would not trigger
the kind of popular opposition that would accompany the deployment of U.S. troops. Pakistan, for its part, would gain financial benefits and
international clout by deploying nuclear weapons in Saudi Arabia, as well as strategic depth against its chief rival, India. The
Islamabad
option raises a host of difficult issues, perhaps the most worrisome being how India would respond.
Would it target Pakistan’s weapons in Saudi Arabia with its own conventional or nuclear weapons? How
would this expanded nuclear competition influence stability during a crisis in either the Middle East or South Asia? Regardless of India’s
reaction, any
decision by the Saudi government to seek out nuclear weapons, by whatever means, would
be highly destabilizing. It would increase the incentives of other nations in the Middle East to pursue
nuclear weapons of their own. And it could increase their ability to do so by eroding the remaining
barriers to nuclear proliferation: each additional state that acquires nuclear weapons weakens the
nonproliferation regime, even if its particular method of acquisition only circumvents, rather than
violates, the NPT. Were Saudi Arabia to acquire nuclear weapons, the Middle East would count three
nuclear-armed states, and perhaps more before long. It is unclear how such an n-player competition would unfold because
most analyses of nuclear deterrence are based on the U.S.- Soviet rivalry during the Cold War. It seems likely, however, that the
interaction among three or more nuclear-armed powers would be more prone to miscalculation and
escalation than a bipolar competition. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union only needed to concern themselves with
an attack from the other. Multi- polar systems are generally considered to be less stable than bipolar systems
because coalitions can shift quickly, upsetting the balance of power and creating incentives for an
attack. More important, emerging nuclear powers in the Middle East might not take the costly steps
necessary to preserve regional stability and avoid a nuclear exchange. For nuclear-armed states, the bedrock of
deterrence is the knowledge that each side has a secure second-strike capability, so that no state can launch an attack with the expectation that
it can wipe out its opponents’ forces and avoid a devastating retaliation. However, emerging
nuclear powers might not invest
in expensive but survivable capabilities such as hardened missile silos or submarine- based nuclear
forces. Given this likely vulnerability, the close proximity of states in the Middle East, and the very short
flight times of ballistic missiles in the region, any new nuclear powers might be compelled to “launch on
warning” of an attack or even, during a crisis, to use their nuclear forces preemptively. Their governments might also delegate launch
authority to lower-level commanders, heightening the possibility of miscalculation and escalation. Moreover, if early warning systems were not
integrated into robust command-and-control systems, the risk of an unauthorized or accidental launch would increase further still. And without
sophisticated early warning systems, a nuclear attack might be unattributable or attributed incorrectly. That is,
assuming that the leadership of a targeted state survived a first strike, it might not be able to accurately determine which nation was
responsible. And this
uncertainty, when combined with the pressure to respond quickly, would create a
significant risk that it would retaliate against the wrong party, potentially triggering a regional nuclear
war. Most existing nuclear powers have taken steps to protect their nuclear weapons from unauthorized use: from closely screening key
personnel to developing technical safety measures, such as permissive action links, which require special codes before the weapons can be
armed. Yet there is
no guarantee that emerging nuclear powers would be willing or able to implement
these measures, creating a significant risk that their governments might lose control over the weapons
or nuclear material and that nonstate actors could gain access to these items. Some states might seek to mitigate
threats to their nuclear arsenals; for instance, they might hide their weapons. In that case, however, a single intelligence compromise could
leave their weapons vulnerable to attack or theft. Meanwhile, states outside the Middle East could also be a source of instability. Throughout
the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union were engaged in a nuclear arms race that other nations were essentially powerless to
influence. In a multipolar nuclear Middle East, other nuclear powers and states with advanced military technology could influence—for good or
ill—the military competition within the region by selling or transferring technologies that most local actors lack today: solid-fuel rocket motors,
enhanced missile-guidance systems, war- head miniaturization technology, early warning systems, air and missile defenses. Such transfers
could stabilize a fragile nuclear balance if the emerging nuclear powers acquired more survivable arsenals as a result. But they could also be
highly destabilizing. If, for example, an outside power sought to curry favor with a potential client state or gain influence with a prospective ally,
it might share with that state the technology it needed to enhance the accuracy of its missiles and thereby increase its ability to launch a
disarming first strike against any adversary. The
ability of existing nuclear powers and other technically advanced
military states to shape the emerging nuclear competition in the Middle East could lead to a new Great
Game, with unpredictable consequences.
Uniqueness – backlines
A-to Iran makes Saudi Prolif inevitable
( ) Iran prolif not inevitable – prefer expert reporters.
Hibbs ‘13
(Mark Hibbs is a former journalist who has been covering nuclear proliferation issues for more than 30 years. In 2006, The Atlantic's William
Langewiesche wrote that Hibbs "must rank as one of the greatest reporters at work in the world today." Hibbs is now a Bonn-based senior
associate with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace – This article is an interview of Hobbs by The Atlantic – “Is a Nuclear Iran
Inevitable ?” – The Atlantic – April 12th – http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/04/is-a-nuclear-iran-inevitable/274924/)
You mention that there are countries like Iran that don't necessarily pursue the path to the bomb in terms of months or years -- they pursue it
in terms of slow progress that reaches a kind of momentum where it's almost irreversible. Do
you think that we've reached the
point with Iran where they've slowly built their capability to the point that it's inevitable that they get the bomb, unless
there's something major like war, an attack or some sort of internal social breakdown that prevents them from getting there?¶ No, I don't
believe that. I think that most analysts would conclude that between the period of around the middle of the 1980s and today, there
have been forces in Iran that have led certain people in the decision-making structure to try to have a nuclear weapons
capability. There are probably others in the system who didn't want that. Iran is by no means a
monolithic country.¶ ...Iran right now has a decision to make. It has acquired considerable nuclear capability which have brought them very
far along down a path towards obtaining a nuclear weapons capability. There's no question about that in my mind. But right now it's up to
Iran to decide whether it's going to draw a red line there, or whether it's going to cross it. And I think there's no consensus
right now about which direction Iran's going to move in.
( ) Iran prolif would ONLY cause Saudi prolif IF the Saudis perceived weakened
commitment from the US.
McDowall ‘13
Angus McDowall is a British freelance reporter who lived in Tehran between 2003-07. He is internally quoting a report from the
Center for a New American Security, whose lead author, CNAS senior fellow Colin Kahl, served as deputy assistant Defense
secretary for the Middle East from 2009 to 2011. Colin Kahl is also an associate professor in the Security Studies Program in the
Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and a former finalist at the National Debate Tournament.
Maybe we’ll get him to come and talk to the camp. “Iran nuke unlikely to start Mideast arms race: report” – Source: Reuters
February 20, 2013 – http://www.cnas.org/node/10078
Sunni Muslim Saudi
Arabia, the world's biggest oil exporter, is engaged in a fierce rivalry with Shi'ite power
Iran and is seen in Western countries as the most likely Middle Eastern state to seek an atomic weapon
if Iran did the same.¶ Analysts have also said an Iranian nuclear weapons capability might persuade Egypt and Turkey to seek a bomb
too.¶ Israel, which has never declared its atomic weapons capability, is thought to be the Middle East's only nuclear-armed power now although
Iran's eastern neighbor Pakistan has atomic weapons.¶ In December 2011, former Saudi intelligence chief Prince Turki al-Faisal said that if
Tehran did gain nuclear weapons capability, Saudi Arabia should consider matching it.¶ Riyadh has also announced plans to build 17 gigawatts
of atomic energy by 2032 as it moves to reduce domestic oil consumption, freeing up more crude for export.¶ However, a
report by the
Center for a New American Security (CNAS) says that although there is some risk that Saudi Arabia would seek an
atomic bomb, it would more likely rely on its ally, the United States, to protect it. "The conventional
wisdom is probably wrong," the report said.
( ) Iran acquisition won’t prompt Saudi acquisition. They’d take other steps instead.
Oswald ‘13
Rachel Oswald is a reporter for Global Security Newswire. She is a graduate of the George Washington University, where she majored in Middle
Eastern Studies. Her article is internally quoting CNAS senior fellow Colin Kahl, who served as deputy assistant Defense secretary for the Middle
East from 2009 to 2011. “Saudi Arabia Unlikely to Pursue Nuke: Experts” – Global Security Newswire – Feb 21st –
http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/saudi-arabia-unlikely-pursue-nuke-should-iran-first-acquire-capability-experts/
Saudi Arabia is not likely to respond to a nuclear-armed Iran by pursuing a corresponding deterrent,
but would instead look to boost its conventional military capabilities and acquire an outside nuclear
defense guarantee , according to a new report by the Center for a New American Security.¶ The United States
and partner nations have warned that Tehran's suspected aim to develop a nuclear-weapon capability could lead to an atomic "domino effect" in the Middle East. A
rich Persian Gulf nation with a long-running rivalry with Iran, Saudi Arabia is often cited as the Arab state most likely to pursue a nuclear arsenal. ¶ “The Saudis fear
that Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons would tip the balance of regional leadership decisively in Tehran’s favor,” states
the report, whose lead
author, CNAS senior fellow Colin Kahl, served as deputy assistant Defense secretary for the Middle
East from 2009 to 2011. “Saudi leaders also worry that a nuclear deterrent would enable Iran’s coercive diplomacy, allowing Tehran to run higher risks
and more effectively push Arab states to accommodate Iranian interests.”
A-to “US production boom triggers the disad”
Extend our 1NC Rogers ev – the US can only produce light-crude. That doesn’t scare
Saudis because US refineries depend-upon heavy crude.
And – Cuban supplies differ from US supplies. They have heavy crude oil.
Alhaiji & Maris ‘4
[Dr. A. F. Alhajji is an energy economist and George Patton Chair of Business and Economics at the College of Business Administration at Ohio
Northern, Terry L. Maris is the founding executive director of the Center for Cuban. Business Studies and professor of management, “The
Future of Cuba’s Energy Sector,” Cuba Today, 2004, http://web.gc.cuny.edu/dept/bildn/publications/cubatodaybookcomplete.pdf#page=105]
The Institute for Cuban & Cuban American studies states on its web site¶ that oil
was discovered in Cuba in 1914. In a different
location, it indicates¶ that oil was first discovered in 1881, about 20 years after its commercial discovery¶ in the United States.4 However, it
was not developed commercially¶ until the early 1930s. The USGS estimates that Cuban waters may contain¶
about 4 billion barrels of oil. Several political and economic factors have limited¶ the development of
Cuban oil. The breakup of the Soviet Union and the¶ loss of Soviet oil shipments forced Cuba to increase its exploration activities¶ and
develop its oil resources. Several reports estimate proven oil reserves to¶ be between 510 million barrels5 (mb) and 750 mb in 2004.6 Even
conservative estimates reflect a substantial increase in Cuba’s oil reserves in recent years, which stood at 284mb in 2001.
All current
crude comes from onshore fields. Almost all Cuban crude is heavy with high sulfur content. Cuba needs to
find light crude oil reseres in order to achieve its goal of self sufficiency.
( ) US Shale boom doesn’t trigger the link – overstated supply.
Husain ‘13
[internally quoting Dr Bassam Fattouh, the Director of the Oil and Middle East Programme at the Oxford Institute of Energy Studies, Research
Fellow at St Antony’s College, Oxford University and professor at the School of Oriental and African Studies was in Dhahran. Syed Rashid Husain,
Energy Columnist at Saudi Gazette, CEO at Husain's Associates, Toronto, CANADA, Vice President at Al-Azzaz Est; Education: Institute of
Business Administration, 6/2/13, “Breaking down US energy independence hype,” Dawn, http://beta.dawn.com/news/1015486/breakingdown-us-energy-independence-hype]
Last week, Dr
Bassam Fattouh, the Director of the Oil and Middle East Programme at the Oxford Institute
of Energy Studies, Research Fellow at St Antony’s College, Oxford University and professor at the School of Oriental and
African Studies was in Dhahran, talking about the ongoing revolution in the energy world, the challenges it
presents and, ‘the disconnect’ between the hype that Washington is soon to be free of dependence on
the oil rich Middle East and the reality.¶ Can Washington really be on a solo flight? Would the geopolitics
of the oil rich Middle East about to change on account of the shale revolution? Isn’t all this for domestic political
consumption?¶ Fattouh kept countering and discarding the arguments of the hype mongers — one after the
other. He underlined in very clear terms, that no shale revolution would have taken place without the sustained high
crude market prices. The prices, he said, has been one of the major ‘enablers’ of this revolution.¶ While
many in the industry continue to argue that crude markets are about to turn soft — rather considerably —
due to the weakening market fundamentals, yet Fattouh says the possibility of a price meltdown is not too
high.¶ Even today producers are hedging their output in mid 90s, indicating that the prices may continue to be around the current price level.
And then the ongoing shale revolution owes its origin to cheap capitals — made available by the governments all around.¶ He argued that
looking at the incremental supplies from the US; one might get an impression of abundance. But that
is not the case — he countered.¶ “Despite the sloppy global demand, why are the oil prices not going down?” he questioned. An
interesting counter argument indeed.¶ The US developments alone could not transform the global markets, he emphasised. Other factors, such
as continued dwindling demand in the US and the rest of the world, non-Opec production scenario, squeeze on Opec and lack of cohesion
within the producers’ group, could lead to that. And with situation about the above issues not very clear, the current ongoing hype is only
adding to uncertainty in the markets.¶ Fattouh
also raised questions about the sustainability of the US output,
underlining that 90 per cent of the output from Bakken and Eagle Ford are coming from 5/6 counties
while the decline rates in the wells are considerable. Consequently, to ensure steady growth, the numbers of wells being
drilled are on rise.¶ Turning to the evolving market, he pointed out that US domestic production has led to
lack of demand of light and medium crude. However, demand for the heavy crude, produced by the Saudi Arabia is there.¶
And in the meantime, due to price discount the Canadian producers need to provide to their customers, the
growth in Canadian output is slowing down, resulting in continued US imports from the Middle East, the director at the
Oxford Institute for Energy Research underlined.
( ) US Shale is too short term to bridge energy independence
Business Insider ‘13
[Arthur Berman, (quoted in article) Oil Analyst, Labyrinth Consulting Services, 1/20/2013, “Oil Guru Destroys All Of The Hype About America's
Energy Boom,” Business Insider, http://www.businessinsider.com/arthur-berman-shale-is-magical-thinking-2013-1?op=1#ixzz2WKIYV4kB]
Not everyone believes the U.S. is capable of becoming energy independent thanks to its shale oil and
gas reserves, as the International Energy Association suggested recently.¶ The math just doesn't work out, they say —
America consumes too much . ¶ But some are even more skeptical than that.¶ Arthur Berman, an oil analyst with
Labyrinth Consulting Services, says the promise of America's shale reserves have been vastly
overstated.¶ His main argument: Shale is too expensive to drill, and shale wells usually don't last longer than
a couple of years.¶ Last year, he laid out his case at a gathering of the Association for the Study of Peak Oil and Gas in Austin Texas.¶
With his permission, we've reproduced it here.¶ Berman argues the promise of America's shale revolution is "magical
thinking." Shale drilling is too expensive and too ephemeral to make a lasting impact.¶ There tends to be a huge gap
between the estimated amount recoverable and what actually ends up getting recovered.¶ Shale is the
most expensive and most complicated source of energy.¶ The amount of product shale has contributed to overall consumption has been
relatively minuscule.¶ The
gap between production and consumption is 9 million barrels of oil a day. "It is
unlikely that the U.S. will become energy independent," Berman argues.¶ Berman focuses on the Bakken oil play in North
Dakota. As of last summer it had 236 rigs, second highest in the nation.¶ He says Bakken oil production has increased to
573,000 barrels per day from 4874 producing wells. The average well is 118 barrels of oil per day, and each well costs $11.5
million.¶ But the Bakken has a 38 percent decline rate, according to Berman — meaning if you stopped drilling now,
you'd lose 38% of your production after a year.¶ He says there was no improvement in well efficiency
between 2010 and 2011. In some cases it's taking increasing numbers of wells to get the same amount of product. Berman says the
costs are "astronomical."¶ The Bakken is already going at a breakneck rate — there's now very little production coming from
wells older than a few years.¶ We can see the same phenomenon occurring in other shale plays like the Eagle
Ford in Texas.¶ The number of currently viable wells in the Bakken has dwindled.¶ In conclusion: America's gains from
shale will be short-lived, and certainly won't be our bridge to independence.
( ) US fracking won’t unlock an oil independence– the product’s quality is too low.
Owen ‘13
[Jane Owen, resident and founder of Citizens League for Environmental Action Now (CLEAN), “Long-Term Costs Of Fracking Are Staggering,”
Climate Progress, 03/19/2013, http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2013/03/19/1742171/long-term-costs-of-fracking-are-staggering/?mobile=nc]
All the hype by the fossil fuel industry about energy independence from fracking (hydraulic fracturing) in tight
gas reservoirs like the Barnett Shale has left out the costs in energy, water and other essential natural
resources.¶ Furthermore, a recent report from the Post Carbon Institute finds that projections for an energy boom from
non-conventional fossil fuel sources is not all it’s cracked up to be.¶ The report cites a study by David Hughes,
Canadian geologist, who says the low quality of hydrocarbons from bitumen – shale oil and shale gas – do not
provide the same energy returns as conventional hydrocarbons due to the energy needed to extract
or upgrade them. Hughes also notes that the “new age of energy abundance” forecast by the industry will soon run dry because shale
gas and shale oil wells deplete quickly. In fact, the “best fields have already been tapped.”¶ “Unconventional fossil
fuels all share a host of cruel and limiting traits,” says Hughes. “They offer dramatically fewer energy
returns; they consume extreme and endless flows of capital; they provide difficult or volatile rates of
supply over time and have large environmental impacts in their extraction.”
Link – backlines
Cuban oil does trade-off
( ) US would sacrifice oil contracts from the Mid-East in exchange for Cuba – saves on
transport costs
Fesler 09
[Lily Fesler, Research Associate, “Cuban Oil: Havana’s Potential Geo-Political Bombshell,” June 11, Council on Hemispheric Affairs,
http://www.coha.org/cuban-oil-havana%E2%80%99s-potential-geo-political-bombshell/#sthash.XL8uloIO.dpuf]
Cuban Offshore Oil¶ Desperate
to end U.S. dependence on oil from the Middle East, United States’ officials
are certainly aware of Cuba’s oil-producing potential. In its 2004 assessment, the U.S. Geological Survey found that
Cuba has 5 billion barrels of crude oil off its northern shores; Havana claims it has 20 billion . Five billion barrels would put Cuba on par with
Colombia or Ecuador, while 20
billion barrels would make Cuba’s oil capacity comparable to that of the United
States’ and place it among the top 15 oil reserves nations in the world. Either way, Cuba’s oil is attracting the
attention of oil companies from around the globe. At the moment, Spain’s Repsol, Brazil’s Petrobras, and Norway’s StatoilHydro are overseeing
exploratory drilling in the Gulf of Mexico. India, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Venezuela also have signed deals with Cuba.¶ Havana
has
publicly stated that it welcomes American investment, but U.S. companies are incapable of
proceeding without an official go-ahead from Washington. As Juan Fleites, vice president of Havana’s state oil company
Cubapetroleo, said, “We are open to U.S. oil companies interested in exploration, production and services.” U.S. oil tycoons have shown
definite interest, but Kurt Glaubitz, a spokesman for Chevron, explained, “Until trade barriers are removed, Chevron is unable to do business in
Cuba. Companies like us would have to see a change in U.S. policy before we evaluate whether there’s interest.” The aforementioned foreign
companies already have contracted for 21 of the 59 offshore Cuban drilling blocks, and another 23 blocks are currently under negotiation by
other foreign nations, including Russia and China.¶ A U.S. Stake in Cuban Oil?¶ It is not too late for the U.S. to develop a stake in Cuba’s nascent
oil output. It takes between three and five years to develop oil reserves, and as of yet, there has been no major oil discovery off the island.
Repsol struck oil in 2004, but not enough to sell commercially. Several other foreign firms are currently using seismic testing, which assesses the
oil content of potential deposits, after which they will probably begin exploring in 2010 or 2011. The exploration manager for Cubapetroleo,
Rafael Tenreyro Pérez, has called the incoming results from seismic testing in Cuba’s reserves “very encouraging.”¶ After lifting
the
embargo, U.S. oil companies could most likely work out an arrangement whereby the U.S. would exchange its reserves with nearby holdings
of foreign companies, allowing the U.S. access to Cuba’s oil even after all of the contracts have been signed. This could appreciably save
transportation costs, because U.S. companies wouldn’t have to go halfway around the world in search of
oil refineries, with Cuba only 90 miles away.¶ U.S. oil equipment and service companies like Halliburton, however, already have
lost the opportunity to build refineries, pipelines, and ports, sacrificing tens of millions of dollars in revenue. U.S. companies’ oil contracts are
not just significant for their own potential profits, but also for American consumers’ access to reasonably priced neighboring oil. With oil prices
recovering from a December low of $32.40 a barrel back to around $70 a barrel,
matter of serious import.
access to more oil sources could become a
Perception link
( ) New oil markets makes Saudis perceive decline in US-Saudi ties.
House ‘12
(not oft-disgruntled House, M.D., but Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist and former publisher of The Wall Street Journal, Karen Elliott House.
Carnegie Council Transcripts and Articles – November 30, 2012 – lexis)
QUESTION: Warren Hoge[28], International Peace Institute.¶ Karen, there's a lot of talk in American politics about the
desire to become energy independent, no longer dependent upon countries like Saudi Arabia, and there's a real possibility
that could happen. The numbers are there, fracking and offshore oil, that sort of thing. Suppose that does happen. How would
that affect our relationship with Saudi Arabia , and is this something the Saudis themselves worry
about?¶ KAREN ELLIOTT HOUSE: I don't think they like it when we talk about energy independence .
They
do
take that as a personal insult . I think it would loosen somewhat our sense of dependence. But the
global economy is still going to be not we so much; I mean we're not a major importer of Saudi oil now but the global economy is a major
importer of Saudi oil and will continue to be.¶ There are a lot of people, like John Deutch[29], who is a very smart man and certainly knows
energy, who believes that it doesn't matter who runs Saudi Arabia, they will export oil. And they obviously will export some. But if you assume
that if anything happened to take the royal family out of the picture, the only other organized structure because nothing is allowed to organize,
no book clubs, no photography clubs, no soccer leagues other than the one the government runs is the religious organization. There are 70,000
mosques all over the country. That's basically one for every 150 men. So that's the most organized group.
US-Saudi Relations hinge on US Oil dependency
( ) Oil independence deteriorates US-Saudi ties
Tanter ‘12
[RAYMOND TANTER, Professor Emeritus, University of Michigan; President of Iran Policy Committee Publishing; and former member of the
National Security Council staff in the Reagan-Bush Administration, “The Geopolitics of U.S. Energy Independence,” International Economy,
Summer 2012, http://www.international-economy.com/TIE_Su12_GeopoliticsEnergySymp.pdf]
At issue is whether energy independence will cause¶ a revision of U.S. national security policy. Because¶ energy
is only one of the
drivers, energy independence¶ is unlikely to have the major effect implied by the¶ Verleger thesis. During the Cold
War, American participation¶ in the Korean and Vietnam Wars did not have¶ energy as a driver; likewise, energy is not at the core of U.S. longterm commitments to South Korea and Japan in the post-Cold War era. Shared values, prior commitments, and strategic calculations are more
important than energy regarding countries such as Israel. In my experience on the National Security Council staff in the 1980s, there was little
discussion of energy in relation to Israel. Ditto for Turkey. Control of energy was more important than values and commitments for Washington
to save Kuwait after Iraq’s invasion in the first Gulf War, but not relevant to the takedown of Saddam Hussein a decade later, and irrelevant to
the post-September 11 invasion of Afghanistan to defeat al Qaeda and the Taliban. With respect to Iran, energy was a factor in the cooperation
of American and British intelligence to overthrow the Mosaddeq government in 1953, but proliferation concerns trump energy a half century
later. Concerning
Saudi¶ Arabia, energy is at the heart of the relationship. So rising¶ oil prices and production costs,
declining reserves, and¶ increasingly available alternative fuels as well as nonconventional¶ sources of oil
are bound to make Riyadh of¶ less consequence to Washington than it is today. ¶ Saudi Arabia’s comparative
advantage in oil production¶ and the world economy’s thirst for oil converged to¶ make the Kingdom a strategic ally in the past. But the¶
odds that the Kingdom will survive the spreading Arab¶ revolts are not high, and the American
commitment to the¶ royal family is mainly against external, not internal,¶ threats. Hence, coming to
the defense of the Kingdom is¶ likely to be perceived in Washington as too costly when¶ the threat is
from within.¶ With European countries becoming more dependent¶ on Russia for energy supplies, and Russia as well as Germany¶
becoming closer economic partners, the likelihood¶ of out-of-area involvement by NATO in such places as¶ Afghanistan is not high. And as the
saying goes, “Out of¶ area or out of business!” Verleger suggests that American¶ energy independence could make this era the “New American¶
Century” by creating an economic environment¶ where the United States enjoys access to energy supplies¶ at much lower cost than other parts
of the world and giving¶ the U.S. economy an edge over other nations, particularly¶ northern Europe. In the context of enhanced¶ American
energy independence, the Obama Administration’s¶ pivot to Asia is likely to be of more import for¶ Europe than the Middle East. Finally, U.S.
energy independence¶ is likely to reinforce isolationist foreign policy¶ tendencies already in force in
the United States. A gamechanging¶ event like an Iranian nuclear weapon could wipe¶ out the tide toward isolationism.
( ) US-Saudi interaction is fully dependent on oil – the plan removes that link
Congregalli ‘13
[Matteo Congregalli, International Politics Journalist, “Without Oil. Without Allies: USA and the New American Dream of Independent Energy,”
Urban Times, 2/15/13, http://urbantimes.co/magazine/2013/02/usa-oil-saudi-arabia-independent-domestic-energy-supply/]
Examples of oil-diplomacy are known to be neither smooth nor easy. Take, for example, the harsh relations
between the US and Colonel Gaddafi’s Libya; or the invasion of Iraq, back in 2003, whose justification was not uniquely about Saddam’s
Weapons of Mass Destruction – as UN reports confirmed; or the closure of the Hormuz strait, back in 2011. Iran threatened to close the strait in
retaliation to the massive burden of sanctions on the Islamic Republic. As an unlucky coincidence, almost 17 billion barrels pass through the
strait, every day. The blockade imposed by the Iranian military Navy made the oil prices skyrocket in just few weeks.¶ Saudi
Arabia’s
relationship with the US was always based on mutual convenience. After 9/11, both Washington and
Riyadh were allies in War on Terror. US wanted stability in the area. Later on, Saudi Arabia wanted to preserve their power in
spite of the Arab Spring. US needed oil for a convenient price. Saudi Arabia needed arms.¶ In 2008, the US Senate
struggled to approve a resolution to help cut soaring gasoline prices by providing the Saudi government with 900 cutting-edge military kits in
return for increasing oil production. The resolution aimed at securing the Gulf area and winning support for the growing sanctions on Iran.
Despite the potential revenue – about $20 billion – the decision was stalling at the Senate as the
Saudis were not keen on downing the price of the crude oil from 75 cents to 50 cents per gallon.¶ “We
are saying to the Saudis that, if you don’t help us, why should we be helping you? ” said the democratic
Senator Chuck Schumer. “We are saying that we need real relief, and we need it quickly. You need our arms,
but we need you to cooperate and not strangle American consumers.” The resolution passed, eventually.¶
According to statistics: throughout Bush’s terms, the arms dealing with Saudi doubled from $19 billion between 2001-2004 to $40 billion
between 2005- 2008. In the last five years, under Obama’s administration, the deals reached $60 billion.¶ At the end of December 2011, the US
Department of State held a press briefing about a further arms sale to Saudi Arabia. The
agreement included 84 brand new F15 combat aircrafts for an eight-figure sum: $30 billion. The Assistant secretary Andrew Shapiro declared:¶ “This
agreement serves to reinforce the strong and enduring relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia.Ӧ No matter how much
discounted oil you can get. Providing cutting-edge arms is also a strategy to ensure the stability of the region, crucial for American interests.¶
“There are geopolitical interests at stake, driving the arms deal. Saudi Arabia works with the US as they have a common strategy and common
agreement,” says Farhang Moradi, senior lecturer in Globalisation and Development at University of Westminster, London.¶ Shipping F-15s to
Riyadh is a first-line defence to empower the biggest US ally in the region. But¶ “We have to keep in mind that buying arms in respect of selling
oil could be the case. However, buying advanced arms doesn’t put the Saudi in the position of defining the area from actors such as Iran.”¶
Security, first – The positions of the American military bases in the Persian Gulf (Image Source: Google Maps).¶ An additional security belt of air
and ground bases extends all around Iran and the Persian Gulf. There are at least 21 bases in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, United Arab Emirates,
Iraq, Bahrain and Kuwait. The question we should answer is whether the military infrastructures are about to be left behind now that the
burden of regional interests and energy need is shrinking.¶ “These bases are giving them the infrastructures to check and balance. It costs them
something but the cost is worth it in order to manage the gulf,” says Moradi.¶ The military presence is a result of with oil production and the
control of the political actors. The Gulf oil has always been a priority for the US. But in the age of the war on terror and the growing threat of a
nuclear Iran, abandoning the battlefield is not a strategy-wise option. In the same regard, we should not expect the sanctions against Iran to
diminish and that the US army will leave their bases anytime soon.¶ The
real shift in the region could come in the long
run.¶ “If US oil demands fall, it doesn’t mean that foreign demand won’t continue. Emerging countries suck oik;
China, India, Turkey. They need oil on their routes to development” says Moradi.¶ According to many, in ten years time there will be a new
producer-consumer relationship in the region. It will not involve the US anymore. Russia,
China, India will be bounded by new
energy ties.¶ “The demand for oil is going to be pretty good. Those producing oil are therefore going to export a lot. The balance of forces
will change in terms of energy and power. Those changes will have subsequent effects upon other countries that
may perceive themselves as competing powers against USA; China and Russia.Ӧ This likely shift of interest will
cause a scenario where China and India will discontinue being mere investors in the Middle East and Central Asia. In the near future they could
install bases and military infrastructures in the region, while the American ones will be gone.¶ The
de-Americanisation of the Gulf
is yet to come. But the first signs are already emerging. At the beginning of February, the US secretary
of Defence, Leon Panetta announced that just one aircraft carrier will be deployed in the Gulf instead
of two. The decision is motivated by defence budget cuts. Is it a sign of the de-prioritisation of the control of the Gulf? Probably. In the
meantime, the lowering security in the area, as well the US’ soft way of dealing with the Arab Spring, is making the Gulf States nervous. Are
diplomatic relations facing a crisis? It is definitely a sign of an upcoming change.¶ The surge in US oil and natural gas
production, which will scatter the American diplomatic ties, is not without reason. America suddenly found out that
underneath their land, millions of barrels of sweet crude oil were reachable by merely changing the drilling technique. A well-known one is
called ‘fracking’ which involves fracturing layers of rock and pumping water and sand in the well to get to the oil reserve. Tens of sites in the US
were considered worthless till fracking was introduced. Fracturing the rocks allow to reach deep and huge oil reserves, otherwise out-of-theway. That’s how the States are turning into a Saudi Arabia with burgers, baseball, and guns.
A-to “Cuban extraction inevitable in the squo”
( ) Cuban oil exploration will stay low in the squo.
Pinon ‘13
(Progreso Weekly talked with energy affairs researcher Jorge Piñón, a Cuban-American who left the island during Operation Peter Pan and
these many years later continues to talk in first-person-singular when referring to Cuba. Piñón has worked in the oil industry and was president
for Latin America of AMOCO Oil Co. At present, he is a researcher for the Center for Energy and Environmental Resources of the University of
Texas at Austin. The interview was held at the Meliá Habana Hotel in Cuba. The portion quoted in this card are the portions where Pinon is
speaking – ¶ Progreso Weekly – May 7th – http://www.havanatimes.org/?p=92634)
That is the process we have conducted for the past 10 years in Cuba, which includes a study by the U.S. Geological Survey. This
study, done
for the first time in 2004, estimates
that in Cuba’s geological north strip, off shore, from Pinar del Río Province to northern
are oil reserves.¶ The surveyors raise the possibility that from 4 billion to 6 billion
barrels of crude are still to be found. These geological studies are very environmental, but historically they are highly trusted by
Matanzas province, there
our industry. That doesn’t mean that they guarantee the amount of oil, but it’s the first step in that stage.¶ We are beyond the stage of studies;
now we are in the stage of exploration. Four wells have been exploited by serious international oil companies – each well has cost at least $100
million – so, in other words, it wasn’t a political “game.”¶ So far, the hoped-for results have not materialized; at least, that’s what I’m told by
sources I’ve consulted. We still have the rest of the Gulf of Mexico, the deep waters in the rest of the Gulf of Mexico, adjacent to the United
States’ exclusive zone. I think that there are possibilities there.¶ In my opinion, in
the next three to five years, unfortunately,
I don’t see a high probability that Cuba will maintain the level of exploration in deep waters such as
we’ve seen in the past two or three years.
( ) Cuban oil not inevitable. International oil companies are turning to other parts of
the globe.
O’Grady ‘13
Mary O'Grady is a member of the editorial board at The Wall Street Journal – WSJ – April 24, 2013 –
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324474004578442511561458392.html
Remember all the hype about Cuba drilling for oil in Caribbean waters and American companies missing out
on the bonanza because of the U.S. embargo? Well, like all the other Cuban get-rich-quick schemes of the
past 50 years, this one seems to have flopped too.¶ Last week, Florida's Sun Sentinel reported that "after spending nearly $700
million during a decade, energy companies from around the world have all but abandoned their search for oil
in deep waters off the north coast of Cuba near Florida." Separately, CubaStandard.com reported on Friday that "the shallowwater drilling platform used by Russian oil company OAO Zarubezhneft will leave Cuban waters June 1, to be redeployed to Asia."¶
According to the Sun Sentinel story, Jorge Piñon, an oil-industry guru who had been cheering Cuba's exploration attempts, said "Companies
are saying, 'We cannot spend any more capital on this high-risk exploration. We'd rather go to Brazil; we'd rather go to
Angola; we'd rather go to other places in the world where the technological and geological challenges are less.'"
A-to “No Cuban Oil Reserves”
( ) Large untapped reserves in Cuba
Sadowski ‘11
Richard Sadowski is a Class of 2012 J.D. candidate, at Hofstra University¶ School of Law, NY. Mr. Sadowski is also the Managing Editor of
Production of¶ the Journal of International Business and Law Vol. XI. “Cuban Offshore Drilling: Preparation and¶ Prevention within the
Framework of the United¶ States’ Embargo” – ¶ Sustainable Development Law & Policy¶ Volume 12; Issue 1 Fall 2011: Natural Resource
Conflicts Article 10 – http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1497&context=sdlp
A U.S. Geological Survey estimates that Cuba’s offshore¶ oil fields hold at least four and a half billion barrels
of recoverable¶ oil and ten trillion cubic feet of natural gas.29 Cupet, the¶ state-owned Cuban energy
company, insists that actual reserves¶ are double that of the U.S. estimate.30 One estimate indicates¶ that Cuba
could be producing 525,000 barrels of oil per day.31¶ Given this vast resource, Cuba has already leased offshore oil¶ exploration blocks to
operators from Spain, Norway, and India.32¶ Offshore oil discoveries in Cuba are placing increasing pressure¶ for the United States to end the
embargo. First, U.S. energy companies¶ are eager to compete for access to Cuban oil reserves.33¶ Secondly, fears of a Cuban oil spill are argued
to warrant U.S.¶ investment and technology.34 Finally, the concern over Cuban¶ offshore drilling renews cries that the embargo is largely a
failure¶ and harms human rights.
( ) Old studies wrong – large untapped reserves exist.
Schenk ‘10
Christopher J. Schenk is Project Chief of the U.S. National Oil and Gas Assessment – ¶ GEOLOGIC ASSESSMENT OF UNDISCOVERED OIL AND GAS
RESOURCES OF THE NORTH CUBA BASIN, CUBA – http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2010/1029/pdf/OF10-1029.pdf
The potential
for undiscovered petroleum resources of the North Cuba Basin historically has focused on
the heavy oil fields of the onshore fold and thrust belt (Echevarria-Rodriguez and others, 1991; Pindell, 1991; Petzet, 2000; Oil
and Gas Journal, 1993, 2000, 2002,¶ 2005), but recent efforts have focused on the offshore potential (fig.7) (Vassalli
and others,¶ 2003; Moretti and others, 2003a,b; Magnier and others, 2004). This study indicates that the offshore of the
North Cuba Basin might have significant potential for undiscovered oil and gas resources (Schenk, 2008).
Impact – Backlines
2NC-1NR impact wall
Quick Saudi prolif ensures accidents and miscalc–that’s Edelman.
That will result in Extinction
Toon ‘7
(Owen B, chair – Department of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences – Colorado University, climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/acp-7-1973-2007.pdf)
To an increasing extent, people are congregating in the world’s great urban centers, creating megacities with populations
exceeding 10 million individuals. At the same time, advanced technology has designed nuclear explosives of such small size they can be easily
transported in a car, small plane or boat to the heart of a city. We demonstrate here that a
single detonation in the 15 kiloton
range can produce urban fatalities approaching one million in some cases, and casualties exceeding one million.
Thousands of small weapons still exist in the arsenals of the U.S. and Russia, and there are at least six other countries with substantial nuclear
weapons inventories. In all, thirty-three
countries control sufficient amounts of highly enriched uranium or
assemble nuclear explosives. A conflict between any of these countries involving 50-100 weapons with yields of
15 kt has the potential to create fatalities rivaling those of the Second World War. Moreover, even a single surface
plutonium to
nuclear explosion, or an air burst in rainy conditions, in a city center is likely to cause the entire metropolitan area to be abandoned at least for
decades owing to infrastructure damage and radioactive contamination. As the aftermath of hurricane Katrina in Louisiana suggests, the
economic consequences of even a localized nuclear catastrophe would most likely have severe national and international economic
consequences. Striking effects
result even from relatively small nuclear attacks because low yield
detonations are most effective against city centers where business and social activity as well as population are
concentrated. Rogue nations and terrorists would be most likely to strike there. Accordingly, an organized attack
on the U.S. by a small nuclear state, or terrorists supported by such a state, could generate casualties comparable to
those once predicted for a full-scale nuclear “counterforce” exchange in a superpower conflict. Remarkably, the
estimated quantities of smoke generated by attacks totaling about one megaton of nuclear explosives could lead to
significant global climate perturbations (Robock et al., 2007). While we did not extend our casualty and damage predictions to include
potential medical, social or economic impacts following the initial explosions, such analyses have been performed in the past for large-scale
nuclear war scenarios (Harwell and Hutchinson, 1985). Such a study should be carried out as well for the present scenarios and physical
outcomes.
Most probable impact.
Russell ‘9
James A. Russell, Senior Lecturer, National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, ‘9 (Spring) “Strategic Stability Reconsidered: Prospects
for Escalation and Nuclear War in the Middle East” IFRI, Proliferation Papers, #26, http://www.ifri.org/downloads/PP26_Russell_2009.pdf
Strategic stability in the region is thus undermined by various factors: (1) asymmetric interests in the bargaining
framework that can introduce unpredictable behavior from actors; (2) the presence of non-state actors that introduce
unpredictability into relationships between the antagonists; (3) incompatible assumptions about the
structure of the deterrent relationship that makes the bargaining framework strategically unstable; (4)
perceptions by Israel and the United States that its window of opportunity for military action is
closing, which could prompt a preventive attack; (5) the prospect that Iran’s response to pre-emptive attacks could
involve unconventional weapons, which could prompt escalation by Israel and/or the United States; (6) the lack of a
communications framework to build trust and cooperation among framework participants. These
systemic weaknesses in the coercive bargaining framework all suggest that escalation by any the parties could happen either on purpose or as a
result of miscalculation or the pressures of wartime circumstance. Given these factors, it is disturbingly easy to imagine
scenarios under which a conflict could quickly escalate in which the regional antagonists would
consider the use of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. It would be a mistake to believe the
nuclear taboo can somehow magically keep nuclear weapons from being used in the context of an
unstable strategic framework. Systemic asymmetries between actors in fact suggest a certain increase in the
probability of war – a war in which escalation could happen quickly and from a variety of participants. Once such a war
starts, events would likely develop a momentum all their own and decision-making would consequently be shaped
in unpredictable ways. The international community must take this possibility seriously, and muster every tool at its disposal to prevent such
an outcome, which would be an unprecedented disaster for the peoples of the region, with substantial
risk for the entire world.
Miscalc in the Mid-East is especially likely.
Kapila ‘9
(Subhash, Royal British Army Staff College, MA Defense Science – Madras U., PhD Strategic Studies – Allahabad U., Consultant in Strategic
Affairs – South Asia Analysis Group, South Asia Analysis Group Paper # 3114, “MIDDLE EAST 2009: POLITICAL DYNAMICS STIRRED BY UNITED
STATES”, http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers32%5Cpaper3114.html)
More than any other strategic regions of the globe , the Middle East in the 21st Century presents the
dubious prospect of being the most conflict-prone region globally. Global armed conflicts or strategic jostling
can arise at any moment in this region not only because of intra-regional rivalries but more for reasons
connected to energy security, control of strategic choke points and nuclear and WMD proliferation.
Besides these major issues the propensity of major conservative Islamic countries not to be pro-active in controlling or liquidating Islamic Jihadi
impulses to proliferate to threaten US and the West, are another complicating feature.
A-to “Saudis won’t ever prolif”
( ) Aff ev doesn’t assume perceived breakdown of US-Saudi ties—that causes prolif.
Lippman ‘11
(Sr. Adjunct Scholar-Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.susris.com/2011/08/05/saudi-arabia’s-nuclear-policy-lippman/)
So let us suppose that Saudi
Arabia’s currently testy relationship with the United States deteriorated to the point
where the Saudis no longer felt they could rely on Washington’s protection. If the Saudis could no longer assume
that the armed forces of the United States are their ultimate weapon against external threats, might they not wish to acquire a
different ultimate weapon? With that in mind, could not a reasonable case be made in the Saudis’ minds for the development of an
alternative security relationship, and perhaps a nuclear agreement, with another major power should relations with the United States
deteriorate? A possible candidate for such a role would of course be China, a nuclear power that has a close relationship with Saudi Arabia’s ally
Pakistan and a growing need for imported oil. Sufficiently remote from the Gulf not to pose a direct threat to Saudi Arabia, and no longer part
of any international communist movement, China could theoretically be an attractive partner. This is not to say that Saudi Arabia is actually
seeking such a relationship with any country other the United States, or that China would undertake such a mission, but to be unaware of any
such outreach is not to exclude it from the realm of possibility. THE STRATEGY GAP The Saudi Arabian armed forces have
never
developed a coherent national security doctrine that could provide a serious basis for a decision to acquire nuclear
weapons. But to summarize the reasons why Saudi Arabia might pursue such a course: it is a rich but
weak country with armed forces of suspect competence; outmanned by combat-hardened, truculent and potentially nuclear-armed
neighbors; and no longer confident that it can count on its American protector. Even before the Iraq War, Richard L.
Russell of the National Defense University argued in a 2001 essay arguing the case for Saudi acquisition of nuclear capability that “It would be
imprudent, to say the least, for Riyadh to make the cornerstone of [its] national-security posture out of an assumption that the United States
would come to the kingdom’s defense under any and all circumstances.” It might be even more imprudent now. “From Riyadh’s perspective,”
continued Russell, “the acquisition of nuclear weapons and secure delivery systems would appear logical and even necessary.” Those “secure
delivery systems,” Russell argued, would not be aircraft, which are vulnerable to ground defenses, but “ballistic-missile delivery systems that
would stand a near-invulnerable chance of penetrating enemy airspace” — namely, the CSS-2s. Military experts say it is theoretically possible
that the missiles
could be made operational, modernized, and retrofitted with nuclear warheads acquired from
China, Pakistan or perhaps, within a few years, North Korea. Any attempt to do so, however, would present immense technical and political
difficulties — so much so that Saudi Arabia might emerge less secure, rather than more.
( ) Lack of oil relations causes rapid prolif
Black ‘9
(Major Chris, master’s program at the Joint Forces Staff College, “Post Oil America and a renewable energy policy leads to the abrogation of the
Middle East to China.,” http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA530125&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)
All of these factors
have slowly led to Saudi Arabia wanting to assume a more independent role in its own
security.181 In 2007, Saudi Arabia brokered a deal between Fatah and Hamas and hosted an Arab League Summit which they had declined
to attend the two previous years. Also in 2007, King Abdullah also hosted Iran’s President Ahmadinejad and canceled a state dinner with
President Bush.182 Recently Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faial warned Iran on two separate occasions to stop meddling in inter-Arab
affairs and has urged Arabs to unify clearly concerned with Iranian efforts to acquire nuclear weapons.183 Additionally, this
has brought
about a renewed emphasis by the Saudis to acquire from Pakistan both Chinese-designed missiles and dual-key
Pakistani nuclear warheads which is a major concern by the US.184 Saudi Arabia is now flexing their muscle in the Middle East and
has taken an increasing role in managing their own affairs. This scenario could lead to either cooperation or competition between the US and
China in the region. Further, in this scenario,
Saudi Arabia will increasingly align with the countries who are buying
their oil . A geopolitical shift will begin with the rise of China in the Persian Gulf region secondary to a diminishing
American presence, which will intensify Saudi Arabian concerns for their security.
**Politics – Plan unpopular
Note to students
**See also the entire politics Core – it will have many applicable links **
Plan not popular in Congress
( ) Zero support in Congress for the plan.
Guggenheim 11
David E. Guggenheim, marine scientist, conservation policy specialist, submarine pilot, ocean explorer and educator, president and founder of
Ocean Doctor, led the formation of the Trinational Initiative for Marine Science & Conservation in the Gulf of Mexico & Western Caribbean—a
major project to elevate collaboration in marine science and conservation among Cuba, Mexico and the U.S. to a new level, holds a Ph.D. in
Environmental Science and Public Policy from George Mason University, a Master’s in Aquatic and Population Biology from University of
California-Santa Barbara, and a Master’s in Regional Science and Bachelor’s in Environmental Studies from the University of Pennsylvania, 2011
– “Cuba Offshore Oil Drilling: Why We’re Not Ready,” Ocean Doctor blog, October 23rd, Available Online at http://oceandoctor.org/cubaoffshore-oil-drilling-why-were-not-ready/
It’s been no secret that Cuba has been planning to conduct offshore oil drilling. On Christmas day 2004, Fidel Castro announced that two
Canadian companies had discovered reserves of 100 million barrels in Cuban waters of the Gulf of Mexico. Shortly after I learned the details in
Havana a few months later, I briefed then-Governor Jeb Bush’s senior staff in Tallahassee and urged a face-to-face dialogue with Cuba, to at
least coordinate on an emergency plan and response should the worst happen. My colleagues and I have been briefing Members of Congress
and the Administration ever since, but it
has taken all these years—until the drilling rig is actually on its way and Cuba is weeks away
from drilling—for the Senate to hold a hearing about the issue. The hearing—which was also focused on offshore drilling in
Canada, Russia and the Bahamas—took place last week.¶ Yet at the Senate hearing last week, testimony by Michael R. Bromwich, (Director of
the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement) and Vice Admiral Brian M. Salerno (United States Coast Guard, Deputy
Commandant for Operations), made it crystal clear that their respective legal authority to work with Cuba in the event of a spill was anything
but clear. Given the proximity of the drilling site to the Keys, and given the swiftness of the currents of the Straits of Florida, we would need to
mobilize a response to an oil spill within hours, not days. Both Mr. Bromwich and Vice Admiral Salerno indicated that authorities would need to
be granted by an alphabet of agencies, including the State Department, Department of Commerce, Department of Justice, Department of the
Treasury, and more. Surely if the legal issues are not dealt with in advance, our best-planned emergency response efforts would be hamstrung
by ongoing delays by legal debate and political wrangling.¶ Unfortunately,
not a single Senator was willing to explore
the possibility of actually establishing a dialogue with Cuba, despite testimony from oil industry
representatives recommending it.
Earlier this year, President Obama’s National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil
Spill and Offshore Drilling, co-chaired by former Senator Bob Graham and former EPA Administer Bill Riley, recognized that we must work with
our neighbors in the Gulf, Cuba and Mexico, stating, “It is in our country’s national interest to negotiate now with these near neighbors to agree
on a common, rigorous set of standards, a system for regulatory oversight, and the same operator adherence to the effective safety culture
called for in this report, along with protocols to cooperate on containment and response strategies and preparedness in case of a spill.” The
Commission got it right. There can be no substitute for face-to-face dialogue to set high standards, create an emergency plan and open lines of
communication should the unimaginable occur.¶ To
make matters worse, Republican Senators Lisa Murkowski (R-Alaska)
and Bob Corker (R-Tennessee) exploited the opportunity to call for opening up more areas in domestic
waters to offshore drilling. Senator Murkowski (R-AK) stated, “…it makes no sense for this country to sit stubbornly in between active
drilling operations in neighboring waters with our arms folded. It does us no good to complain that offshore drilling is too risky for us to pursue
as other nations are clearly very busy reaping its benefits right outside our front door. And yet that position is precisely is what some senators
and some groups would advocate, that the us stay out of this business entirely.Ӧ Further, Senator Murkowski claimed that one of the best
ways to help the U.S. respond to an international oil spill disaster is to expand offshore drilling in our own waters. Senator Corker picked up on
this and put the question to Mr. Bromowich, “The ranking member [Senator Murkowski] mentioned something about the fact that the more we
have in the way of resources ourselves involved in exploration, the better we could respond to something that might happen in waters that are
nearby. Is that a sensible notion that she laid out, that in fact the more we’re producing and exploring off our own continental shelf, the better
we can actually respond to something that’s happening in other countries’ waters?” Mr. Bromwich’s responded, “I think Senator Murkowski is
absolutely right in stating that.”
( ) Plan gets drawn into divisive embargo debates
Nerurkar and Sullivan ‘11
Neelesh Nerurkar, Specialist in Energy Policy, and Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs, Congressional Research Service, 2011,
“Cuba’s Offshore Oil Development: Background and U.S. Policy Considerations,” http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41522.pdf
On the opposite side of the policy debate, a number of policy groups and members of Congress oppose
engagement with Cuba, including U.S. investment in Cuba’s offshore energy development . A
legislative initiative introduced in the 111th Congress, H.R. 5620, would go further and impose visa restrictions and
economic sanctions on foreign companies and its executives who help facilitate the development of Cuba’s
petroleum resources. The bill asserts that offshore drilling by or under the authorization of the Cuban government
poses a “serious economic and environmental threat to the United States” because of the damage that an oil spill could
cause. Opponents of U.S. support for Cuba’s offshore oil development also argue that such involvement
would provide an economic lifeline to the Cuban government and thus prolong the continuation of the
communist regime. They maintain that if Cuba reaped substantial economic benefits from offshore oil development, it could reduce
societal pressure on Cuba to enact market-oriented economic reforms. Some who oppose U.S. involvement in Cuba’s energy development
contend that while Cuba might have substantial amounts of oil offshore, it will take years to develop. They maintain that the Cuban
government is using the enticement of potential oil profits to break down the U.S. economic embargo on Cuba.
( ) Bipartisan opposition to joint oil development with Cuba
Oracle ‘11
The Oracle, 2-16-2011, “US leaders must cooperate with Cuba to prevent oil spills,” http://www.usforacle.com/us-leaders-must-cooperatewith-cuba-to-prevent-oil-spills-1.2471166
In Singapore, a semisubmersible oil rig is being prepared for oil exploration off the coast of Cuba. Repsol, a Spanish energy company
working with Cuba, is expected to drill as close as 50 miles off the coast of Florida and at depths deeper than
Deepwater Horizon, which exploded in U.S. waters last year, producing the largest oil spill ever in the Gulf of Mexico. These
developments rightly have the attention of Florida's federal leaders. Attempts to use brute force in ceasing Cuban oil
operations to protect Florida's beaches, marine life and tourism revenue may be sincere, but they are not the best way to prevent a repeat of
bipartisan efforts include placing pressure on Repsol and legislation such as U.S. Sen. Bill
Nelson's (D-Fla) plan to pull U.S. visas for company executives associated with Cuban oil. or U.S. Rep. Vern
Buchanan's (R-Sarasota) proposed legislation that would have the U.S. Interior Department deny oil and gas leases to
companies dealing in Cuban oil.
the Deepwater spill. The
A-to Link Turns – General
( ) Despite link turns, mere introduction of the Aff is net controversial.
White ‘10
(Jonathan P. White; J.D. 2010, University of Colorado Law School. Mr. White thanks Daniel Whittle, Cuba Program Director, Environmental
Defense Fund; Dr. Orlando Rey Santos, Lawyer and Director of the Environmental Directorate, Ministry of Science, Technology, and the
Environment (CITMA), Havana, Cuba; and Richard Charter, Senior Policy Advisor, Defenders of Wildlife, for their guidance and input in
preparation of this note. Summer, 2010 – Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy – 21 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y
557 – lexis)
Cuba's moves to open the Florida Straits to drilling have generated a bifurcated American political
response. Reminiscent of the Helms-Burton Act's effort to penalize foreign third parties, some U.S. politicians have
responded to Cuba's moves by calling for laws that would deny U.S. visas to employees of foreign oil
companies doing business in Cuba. n201 Legislation by Senator Bill Nelson of Florida seeks to ban companies drilling for oil in the
Florida Straits from operating in the United States. n202 Other politicians have introduced legislation that would
exempt U.S. companies from the expansive Cuban trade embargo in order to allow them to compete for leases off Cuba. n203
The Cuban government, meanwhile, has encouraged American oil companies to bid for tracts in Cuban-controlled waters in the Florida Straits.
n204 So
far, neither partisan faction has prevailed in this tug-of-war.
Senator Nelson cited environmental concerns
as a motivator behind his anti-drilling legislation, stating: "At risk are the Florida Keys ... not to mention the $ 8 billion Congress is investing to
restore the Everglades." n205 Advocates for rescinding the U.S. trade embargo cite the drilling controversy for evidence of the embargo's
counterproductive effects on the U.S. [*588] economy. n206 In Florida itself, attitudes towards offshore drilling appear to be in flux. While
Florida's federal congressional delegation continues to almost unanimously oppose offshore drilling, the Florida House of Representatives voted
in April 2009 to allow drilling in state-controlled waters immediately offshore. n207 Despite the feuding in the United States over how to
respond to Cuban plans to drill in the Florida Straits, if momentum in the Sunshine State itself shifts in favor of drilling offshore in state waters,
then drilling in the entire Florida Straits will perhaps become less-controversial. That said, the Deepwater Horizon oil spill could change public
attitudes in Florida over offshore drilling. Either way, the lingering question is whether there is any hope for a productive dialogue between the
two countries over stewardship of the Florida Straits.
( ) Plan is controversial despite bipartisan support.
Lanier ‘13
C. Adam Lanier, J.D. Candidate at the University of North Carolina School of Law, holds a B.A. from the University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill, 2013 – “In Deepwater: Cuba, Offshore Drilling, and Political Brinkmanship – North Carolina Journal of International Law & Commercial
Regulation (38 N.C.J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 571), Winter, Lexis-Nexis
A change in the tone of U.S. policy toward Cuba is long overdue. n175
Although there is significant bipartisan support for
shifting U.S. policy toward Cuba to a more engaging model, n176 the sharply polarized environment in
Washington seems to force legislators to remain at loggerheads . n177 The intransigency of the parties
has led to repeated instances of brink man ship , n178 which is counterproductive to the national interest. Engaging with
Cuba in the development of its energy resources is an issue that both parties should be able to agree on, even over the objections of the
minority, who continue to take a hardline approach to anything related to Cuba. n179 This issue is simply too important. As Dan Whittle,
director of the Environmental Defense Fund's Cuba Project, put it: "This isn't about politics. It's about protecting our beaches, our shores, our
fishermen, our communities." n180
A-to Oil Lobby Link Turns
( ) Despite Oil Lobby, plan still drains capital.
Werner ‘10
(Johannes Werner is editor of Cuba Trade & Investment News, a monthly newsletter, and Cuba Standard, a Web site featuring real-time news
about the Cuban economy – St. Petersburg Times (Florida) – January 31, 2010 – lexis)
What with full patdowns for Cuba travelers at U.S. airports, continued Bush-era regime-change programs, and Havana arresting a USAID
subcontractor, it's
Ice Age 3 in U.S.-Cuba relations.¶ But a very powerful player is beginning to increase the
heat: Big Oil.¶ Very quietly, Sens. Mary Landrieu, D-La., and Lisa Murkowski, R-Alaska, inserted oil exemption
wording into a Senate bill last year - and now an oil industry association has gone on the record to say it prompted the move.¶ The
bill (S 1517) mainly deals with increased federal oil revenue sharing for Gulf of Mexico states. It includes a section toward the end that
would allow U.S. citizens and residents to "engage in any transaction necessary" for oil and gas exploration and extraction in Cuba
- "notwithstanding any other provision of law." For that purpose, the bill would amend the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement
Act of 2000, allowing oil industry employees to travel to Cuba without having to apply for a specific license with the Treasury Department.¶ The
bill is pending before the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources. With
George LeMieux, R-Fla.,
senators such as Bob Menendez, D-N.J., and
determined to defend the embargo tooth and claw, the bill is facing a tough
fight . Even so, the bill is remarkable because it embodies the first Cuba-related move on Capitol Hill by the U.S. oil industry.
A-to “Plan popular b/c of Eco-Concerns”
( ) Plan unpopular – Congress thinks drilling in Cuba is risky and they think prevention
is the best medicine
Suchlicki ‘11
Jaime Suchlicki, Cuban-American Studies Prof @ University of Miami, June 2011, “Drilling for Oil in Cuban Waters,”
http://ctp.iccas.miami.edu/FOCUS_Web/Issue143.htm
A key factor driving opposition to Cuban drilling in the U.S., especially from politicians representing
Gulf Coast states, is concern about what happens if something goes wrong with Cuban drilling. The Gulf
oil spill in 2010 increased apprehension about liability close to the Florida Coast and the Bahamas. Given Cuba’s economic
conditions, liability for an oil spill will rest with the European and Asian companies involved in drilling.
The U.S. embargo would prevent U.S. companies, in most cases, from helping with cleanup efforts in the event of a major accident. Yet in the
event of a spill, the U.S. would be under pressure to grant an exception to the embargo allowing U.S. companies to help so that the spill would
not negatively impact US territory. During the Gulf spill, the U.S. shared information with Cuba about the spill. The Administration publicly
declared its willingness to provide limited licenses for U.S. firms to respond to a catastrophe that threatened Cuba. Meanwhile, Cuba permitted
a vessel from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration to look for damage in Cuban waters. But, ongoing
concerns about
the US underwriting the costs of spill cleanup has increased political pressure to halt Cuban drilling
before it even begins.
( ) Environmental concerns don’t outweigh our links
Hoffman ‘12
Karen Hoffman, Earth Island Journal, 3-15-2012, “Cuba’s Gulf of Mexico Oil Exploration Makes Strange Bedfellows,”
http://www.earthisland.org/journal/index.php/elist/eListRead/cubas_gulf_of_mexico_oil_exploration_makes_strange_bedfellows/
From his hotel in Havana, marine scientist and conservation policy specialist David Guggenheim, aka the “Ocean Doctor,” can see the lights of
Scarabeo 9. The recently arrived oil-drilling platform off the Cuban coast began drilling exploratory deepwater wells on
the Cuban side of the Florida Straits, about 70 miles from Key West, last month. The 53,000-ton rig is, literally, under more
pressure than Deepwater Horizon. Operated by Spanish company Repsol, it’s what’s known as an “ultra-deepwater” platform, drilling at depths
up to 6,000 feet. (Deepwater Horizon’s depth was 5,000 feet.) A Scarabeo 9 spill
would damage critical marine ecosystems
in the Gulf. US environmentalists and policymakers are concerned that Cuba doesn’t have the resources, technology,
or expertise needed to prevent or respond to such a disaster. But even the threat of irreparable environmental
damage hasn’t been enough to clear away old Cold War resentments and political inertia between
the two countries
and get them working together to formulate an emergency response plan. Which is why an unlikely coalition of
environmentalists, oil executives, and scientists — like Guggenheim — are joining forces to try to, in his words, “fight half a century of an
illogical policy with logic.”
***NEG CASE DEFENSE STARTS HERE
**Oil Spills Neg starts here
1NC
Spills – 1NC frontline
( ) No drilling in the squo – all companies have bailed.
O’Grady ‘13
Mary O'Grady is a member of the editorial board at The Wall Street Journal – WSJ – April 24, 2013 –
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324474004578442511561458392.html
Then came promises of an oil boom and last week the predictable bust. The Brazilian state-owned Petrobras
PETR4.BR +1.01% had given up on deep-sea drilling in Cuban waters in 2011. Repsol REP.MC -2.46% gave up in May
2012. The deep water platform it was using was then passed to Malaysia's state-owned Petronas, which also came up empty.
Venezuela's PdVSA had no luck either. In November Cuba announced that the rig that had been in use would
be heading to Asia. Last week came the end of shallow-water drilling.
( ) Turn – plan causes drilling.
a) Embargo discouraging Cuban drilling – makes other countries more appealing.
Krauss ‘12
(et al; Clifford Krauss has been a correspondent for The New York Times since 1990. He currently is a national business correspondent based in
Houston, covering energy. He covered the State Department, Congress and the New York City police department before serving as Buenos Aires
bureau chief and Toronto bureau chief. Before working at The Times, he worked as a foreign correspondent for The Wall Street Journal and was
the Edward R. Murrow fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. He is author of “Inside Central America: Its People, Politics and History,”
(1991). He has published articles in Foreign Affairs, GQ and Wilson Quarterly, along with other publications. New York Times – November 9,
2012 – http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/10/world/americas/rigs-departure-to-hamper-cubas-oil-prospects.html?_r=0)
The best-case scenario for production, according to some oil experts, would be for Cuba to eventually become a medium-size producer like
Ecuador. But as
the three dry holes showed, far more exploration effort would be needed, and that
presents a challenge for a country with limited resources and the hurdle of American sanctions. There are
many offshore areas that are competing with Cuba for the attention of oil companies , particularly off
the coasts
of South America and East and West Africa.¶ In Cuba’s case, the American embargo makes it far
more difficult for companies seeking to explore Cuban waters. The Scarabeo 9, the rig set to depart, is the only one
available that is capable of drilling in deep waters and complies with the embargo. To get it built, Repsol, the Spanish oil giant, was forced to
contract an Italian operator to build a rig in China to drill exploration wells.
b) Lifting embargo uniquely causes drilling. Prefer daily drilling damage over
unlikely accidental catastrophe.
White ‘10
(Jonathan P. White; J.D. 2010, University of Colorado Law School. Mr. White thanks Daniel Whittle, Cuba Program Director, Environmental
Defense Fund; Dr. Orlando Rey Santos, Lawyer and Director of the Environmental Directorate, Ministry of Science, Technology, and the
Environment (CITMA), Havana, Cuba; and Richard Charter, Senior Policy Advisor, Defenders of Wildlife, for their guidance and input in
preparation of this note. Summer, 2010 – Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy – 21 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y
557 – lexis)
Even without a catastrophe like the Deepwater Horizon spill, as a basic matter, leaks from offshore drilling rigs
pollute, and natural forces common to the Florida Straits, such as tropical cyclones, could [*579] exacerbate spills or cause new spills and further
contamination. n143 As an example of the impact of a benign tropical storm, in 2005, Tropical Storm Arlene damaged an oil platform off the coast of Louisiana,
discharging 560 gallons of oil and causing the death of over 1,000 pelicans. n144 Beyond the otherwise-forgotten Arlene, the 2005 hurricane season saw the release
of 717,234 gallons of oil into the Gulf of Mexico during the passage of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. n145 Significant amounts of oil also spilled into Gulf waters that
year from hurricane-damaged onshore refineries and holding facilities in Louisiana and Texas, resulting in estimated discharges of around 9 million gallons of oil.
n146 This figure falls only slightly below the 10.8 million gallons of oil released into Alaska waters from the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill. n147 Moreover, dangerous
tropical cyclones are common in the Florida Straits region, exemplified by Cuba suffering over $ 10 billion in damages from Hurricanes Gustav, Ike, and Paloma in
2008. n148 Lastly, many scientists claim that the intensity and regularity of hurricanes will increase as the earth's climate warms, further subjecting the Florida
Straits to catastrophic storms and creating additional hazards for oil infrastructure. n149 The 2005 and 2008 hurricane seasons demonstrate the risk in offshore oil
drilling in the Florida Straits. Accordingly, one frequently-cited reason not to drill in the Florida Straits is the potential for hurricane-inflicted oil pollution, with Mark
Ferrulo, director of the Florida Public Interest Research Group, stating that drilling proposals in the Straits amount to "putting hundreds of drilling rigs in the middle
of a hurricane highway." n150¶ An additional geographical
concern is that the Florida Straits comprise a main conduit
for the Gulf of Mexico Loop Current, a flow of water that originates in the Gulf and passes through the Straits before entering the
Atlantic Ocean as the Gulf Stream. n151 A spill in the Straits poses not only localized effects, but could also leave oil deposits
on Florida's Atlantic beaches. n152 Any oil spill in the Florida Straits would [*580] reach Miami and Fort Lauderdale beaches because of the Gulf Stream current.
n153¶ Meanwhile, oil drilling in the Florida Straits will stress an ecosystem already strained by development, a strain existing prior to the Deepwater Horizon oil
The mere presence of offshore drilling infrastructure will introduce heavy metals and
hydrocarbons into Florida Straits waters surrounding industrial platforms. n154 The Florida Straits presently suffer assorted pollution problems. Discharge
spill.
from agriculture, urban development, and sewage facilities in the United States and Cuba flows into the Straits and their coral reefs. n155 It is estimated that over
seventy percent of wastewater generated in Cuba, including most of the human sewage in Havana, a city located on the Florida Straits, receives only minor
treatment before being dumped directly into streams and surrounding Florida Straits waters. n156 Pollution-induced red-tides have also occurred in waters off
Florida, and coral reefs in the state show signs of stress. n157 ¶ An unknown issue at the time this Note goes to publication is the environmental havoc the ongoing
Deepwater Horizon spill in the Gulf of Mexico will cause in the Florida Straits. Recalling the previously discussed scenario of oil caught in the Gulf of Mexico Loop
Current, scientists and oceanographers warn that the crude from the spill off Louisiana could enter the Gulf of Mexico Loop Current and pass through the Florida
Straits, reaching the Atlantic Ocean, fouling south Florida beaches and ecosystems, and persisting in shallow coastal areas like Florida Bay for years. n158 Some
oceanographers warn the oil spilled at the Deepwater Horizon site may be carried by the Gulf Stream and reach beaches as far away as those in North Carolina.
n159 The spill itself, which continues to leak at the time this Note goes to print because a blowout preventer failed to activate, and because a series of fixes have
not stopped the leak, reveals in grave detail the inherent risks in offshore drilling. n160 ¶ [*581] In conclusion, oil infrastructure and industrial
development in the Florida Straits will compound this ecosystem's preexisting environmental problems.
Even with stringent environmental controls and laws mandating environmental impact reviews, industrial development will introduce
additional toxins into the Florida Straits, while placing the Florida and Cuba coasts at greater peril from oil
slicks.¶ Beyond the environmental risks associated with drilling in the Florida Straits, any industrialization of this maritime zone depends on Cuba's success in
modernizing its refining capacity and reducing bureaucratic impediments to investment. n161 While interest in oil leasing off Cuba has
generated a "buzz," as indicated by the formation of joint ventures between international firms and Cubapetroleo, the considerable
expenses associated with doing business with the communist nation may inhibit drilling. n162
( ) Cuban and non-US prevention efforts are sufficient now.
Sadowski ‘11
Richard Sadowski is a Class of 2012 J.D. candidate, at Hofstra University¶ School of Law, NY. Mr. Sadowski is also the Managing Editor of
Production of¶ the Journal of International Business and Law Vol. XI. “Cuban Offshore Drilling: Preparation and¶ Prevention within the
Framework of the United¶ States’ Embargo” – ¶ Sustainable Development Law & Policy¶ Volume 12; Issue 1 Fall 2011: Natural Resource
Conflicts Article 10 – http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1497&context=sdlp
Fears that Cuban offshore drilling poses serious environmental¶ threats because of the proximity to the United
States and¶ the prohibition on U.S. technology transfer are overblown. Cuba¶ has at least as much
incentive to ensure safe-drilling practices¶ as does the United States, and reports indicate that Cuba is
taking¶ safety seriously.64 Lee Hunt, President of the Houston-based¶ International Association of Drilling Contractors, said, “[t]he¶
Cuban oil industry has put a lot of research, study and thought¶ into what will be required to safely drill,”
and that “they are¶ very knowledgeable of international industry practices and have¶ incorporated many of
these principles into their safety and regulatory¶ planning and requirements.”65 Thus, while the economic¶
embargo of Cuba restricts American technology from being utilized,¶ foreign sources have provided
supplemental alternatives.66
( ) Sanctions won’t block US safety response – Helix proves.
Bolstad ‘12
Erika Bolstad is a reporter who covers Washington for the Anchorage Daily News, the Idaho Statesman and McClatchy
Newspapers. This evidence internally quotes Lee Hunt, the former president of the International Association of Drilling
Contractors. Hunt, in this instance, is arguably not biased in favor of drilling, as he is speaking to safety and clean-up regimes
and he is speaking before a liberal think-tank in favor of human rights – McClatchy Newspapers – May 10, 2012 –
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2012/05/10/148433/cuba-embargo-could-threaten-oil.html#.UaoUWpyADq0
Several of the experts said Thursday they are confident that the Treasury Department could react quickly in an
emergency to allow U.S. oil response teams to get emergency permits to do business with the Cuban
government.¶ The department, which oversees the embargo, has authorized an American firm, Helix Energy Solutions,
to handle spill response for Repsol. It’s a red-tape ordeal that company officials said they’ll have to repeat when
working with the other companies that have contracted to use the same rig next in Cuban waters.
( ) Cuban oil spills stay contained – no risk of large spread
Whittle ‘12
Daniel J. Whittle et al, Cuba Program Director for the Oceans Program, Environmental Defense Fund, 2012, “Bridging the Gulf: Finding Common
Ground on Environmental and Safety Preparedness for Offshore Oil and Gas in Cuba,” http://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/EDFBridging_the_Gulf-2012.pdf
While areas at risk of immediate impact appear to be those along the Straits of Florida and U.S. south Atlantic coast, scientists are careful to
note that the models are far from precise, authoritative forecasts. NOAA
specialists themselves emphasize that the models
vary significantly based on weather data and location of the drilling site. Richard Sears, who served as chief
scientific advisor on the federal commission that investigated the Deepwater Horizon disaster, stressed there was significant
uncertainty in projecting the path of the BP oil slick in 2010, even with the combined technical expertise
of federal agencies and private companies.42 “There were a wide array of models surrounding the BP
spill, ranging from most of the oil projected to come ashore to Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida—to a significant
portion going out through the Straits of Florida and up the East Coast towards North Carolina,” Sears said
in a personal interview. “Neither of those happened.”
( ) Marine ecosystems are resilient
Kennedy ‘2
Victor Kennedy, PhD Environmental Science and Dir. Cooperative Oxford Lab., 2002, “Coastal and Marine Ecosystems and Global Climate
Change,” Pew, http://www.pewclimate.org/projects/marine.cfm
There is evidence that marine organisms and ecosystems
are resilient to environmental change. Steele (1991) hypothesized that
components of marine systems are tightly coupled to physical factors, allowing them to
respond quickly to rapid environmental change and thus rendering them ecologically adaptable. Some
species also have wide genetic variability throughout their range, which may allow for adaptation to
the biological
climate change.
2NC-1NR Extensions
Extensions – No drilling in the squo
( ) No Cuban drilling now – rigs have departed.
LaGesse ‘12
David LaGesse¶ reporter, with recent articles that have appeared in National Geographic, Money, and most frequently in U.S. News & World
Report – National Geographic News – November 19, 2012 – http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/energy/2012/11/121119-cuba-oilquest/
An unusual high-tech oil-drilling rig that's been at work off the coast of Cuba departed last week, headed for either Africa or Brazil.
With it went the island nation's best hope, at least in the short term, for reaping a share of the energy treasure
beneath the sea that separates it from its longtime ideological foe.¶ For many Floridians, especially in the Cuban-American community, it was
welcome news this month that Cuba had drilled its third unsuccessful well this year and was suspending
deepwater oil exploration. (Related Pictures: "Four Offshore Drilling Frontiers") While some feared an oil spill in the Straits of Florida, some 70
miles (113 kilometers) from the U.S. coast, others were concerned that drilling success would extend the reviled reign of the Castros, long-time dictator Fidel and his
brother and hand-picked successor, Raúl.
( ) Trend is with the Neg – Cuban oil exploration will stay low in the squo.
Pinon ‘13
(Progreso Weekly talked with energy affairs researcher Jorge Piñón, a Cuban-American who left the island during Operation Peter Pan and
these many years later continues to talk in first-person-singular when referring to Cuba. Piñón has worked in the oil industry and was president
for Latin America of AMOCO Oil Co. At present, he is a researcher for the Center for Energy and Environmental Resources of the University of
Texas at Austin. The interview was held at the Meliá Habana Hotel in Cuba. The portion quoted in this card are the portions where Pinon is
speaking – ¶ Progreso Weekly – May 7th – http://www.havanatimes.org/?p=92634)
That is the process we have conducted for the past 10 years in Cuba, which includes a study by the U.S. Geological Survey. This
study, done
that in Cuba’s geological north strip, off shore, from Pinar del Río Province to northern
Matanzas province, there are oil reserves.¶ The surveyors raise the possibility that from 4 billion to 6 billion barrels of crude are still to
for the first time in 2004, estimates
be found. These geological studies are very environmental, but historically they are highly trusted by our industry. That doesn’t mean that they
guarantee the amount of oil, but it’s the first step in that stage.¶ We are beyond the stage of studies; now we are in the stage of exploration.
Four wells have been exploited by serious international oil companies – each well has cost at least $100 million – so, in other words, it wasn’t a
political “game.”¶ So far, the hoped-for results have not materialized; at least, that’s what I’m told by sources I’ve consulted.
We still have the rest of the Gulf of Mexico, the deep waters in the rest of the Gulf of Mexico, adjacent to the United States’ exclusive zone. I
think that there are possibilities there.¶ In my opinion, in
the next three to five years, unfortunately, I don’t see a high
probability that Cuba will maintain the level of exploration in deep waters such as we’ve seen in the
past two or three years.
( ) Drilling not inevitable over the long-term. No reserves in Cuba.
O’Grady ‘13
Mary O'Grady is a member of the editorial board at The Wall Street Journal – WSJ – April 24, 2013 –
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324474004578442511561458392.html
Remember all the hype about Cuba drilling for oil in Caribbean waters and American companies missing out
on the bonanza because of the U.S. embargo? Well, like all the other Cuban get-rich-quick schemes of the
past 50 years, this one seems to have flopped too.¶ Last week, Florida's Sun Sentinel reported that "after spending nearly $700
million during a decade, energy companies from around the world have all but abandoned their search for oil
in deep waters off the north coast of Cuba near Florida." Separately, CubaStandard.com reported on Friday that "the shallowwater drilling platform used by Russian oil company OAO Zarubezhneft will leave Cuban waters June 1, to be redeployed to Asia."¶
According to the Sun Sentinel story, Jorge Piñon, an oil-industry guru who had been cheering Cuba's exploration attempts, said "Companies
are saying, 'We cannot spend any more capital on this high-risk exploration. We'd rather go to Brazil; we'd rather go to
Angola; we'd rather go to other places in the world where the technological and geological challenges are less.'"
( ) Quantity of reserves is exaggerated.
Padgett ‘8
Tim Padgett joined TIME in 1996 as Mexico City bureau chief covering Latin America. In 1999 he moved to Florida to become TIME’s Miami &
Latin America bureau chief, reporting on the hemisphere from Tallahassee to Tierra del Fuego. He has chronicled Mexico’s democratization and
drug war as well as the rise of Latin leaders like Lula and Hugo Chavez, “How Cuba’s Oil Find Could Change the US Embargo”¶ Time Magazine –
Oct. 23, 2008 – internally quoting Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado, a Cuba oil analyst at the University of Nebraska-Omaha.
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,¶ 1853252,00.html#ixzz13Li5cosN
But is
the Cuban calculation really on the level? Skeptics ask if the 20-billion-bbl. estimate is just a ploy to
rekindle investor interest, at a time when falling oil prices could make the maritime find less attractive to the potential international
partners Cuba needs to extract the oil. The effort is all the more urgent, they add, because reduced oil revenues could also make friends like
left-wing Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez less able to aid Cuba with cut-rate crude shipments and capital to improve the island's aged
refineries. "The
Cuba numbers from my point of view are not valid," says Jorge Pinon, an energy fellow at the University of Miami
think they're feeling a lot of pressure right now to accelerate the
development of their own oil resources." Benjamin-Alvarado gives Cuba's geologists more benefit of the doubt; but he calls
the 20-billion-bbl. estimate "off the charts." "I trust them as oil people, and their seismic readings might be right," he says, "but
until we see secondary, outside analysis, this is going to be suspect."
and an expert on Cuba's oil business. "I
Extensions – Turn: Plan causes Drilling
( ) Embargo blocks drilling – 10% provisions and high cost-of-business
LaGesse ‘12
David LaGesse¶ reporter, with recent articles that have appeared in National Geographic, Money, and most frequently in U.S. News & World
Report – National Geographic News – November 19, 2012 – internally quoting Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado, a University of Nebraska professor
and expert on Cuba's oil industry – http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/energy/2012/11/121119-cuba-oil-quest/
There's perhaps no better symbol of the complexity of Cuba's energy chase than the
Scarabeo 9, the $750 million rig that spent much of
this year plumbing the depths of the Straits of Florida and Gulf of Mexico. It is the only deepwater platform in the world
that can drill in Cuban waters without running afoul of U.S. sanctions. It was no easy feat to outfit the
rig with fewer than 10 percent U.S. parts, given the dominance of U.S. technology in the ultra-deepwater industry. By some
reports, only the Scarabeo 9's blowout preventer was made in the United States.¶ Owned by the Italian firm Saipem, built in China, and
outfitted in Singapore, Scarabeo 9 was shipped to Cuba's coast at great cost. "They had to drag a rig from the
other side of the world," said Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado, a University of Nebraska professor and expert on Cuba's oil industry. "It
made the wells incredibly expensive to drill."¶ Leasing the semisubmersible platform at an estimated cost of
$500,000 a day, three separate companies from three separate nations took their turns at drilling for
Cuba. In May, Spanish company Repsol sank a well that turned out to be nonviable. Over the summer, Malaysia's Petronas
took its turn, with equally disappointing results. Last up was state-owned Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA); on November 2,
Granma, the Cuban national Communist Party daily newspaper, reported that effort also was unsuccessful.¶ It's not unusual to hit dry holes in
drilling, but the approach in offshore Cuba was shaped by uniquely political circumstances. Benjamin-Alvarado
points out that some of the areas drilled did turn up oil. But rather than shift nearby to find productive—if not hugely lucrative—sites, each new
company dragged the rig to an entirely different area off Cuba. It's
as if the companies were only going for the "big
home runs" to justify the cost of drilling, he said. "The embargo had a profound impact on Cuba's efforts
to find oil."
( ) Motive not enough – no rig mechanism for Cuban drilling
LaGesse ‘12
David LaGesse¶ reporter, with recent articles that have appeared in National Geographic, Money, and most frequently in U.S. News & World
Report – National Geographic News – November 19, 2012 – internally quoting Jorge Piñon, a former president of Amoco Oil Latin America (now
part of BP) and an expert on Cuba's energy sector who is now a research fellow at the University of Texas at Austin.–
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/energy/2012/11/121119-cuba-oil-quest/
But last week, Scarabeo 9 headed
away from Cuban shores for new deepwater prospects elsewhere. That
leaves Cuba without a platform that can drill in the ultradeepwater that is thought to hold the bulk of
its stores. " This rig is the only shovel they have to dig for it,"
said Jorge Piñon, a former president of Amoco Oil Latin
America (now part of BP) and an expert on Cuba's energy sector who is now a research fellow at the University of Texas at Austin.
( ) US Embargo blocks oil development
Benjamin-Alvarado ‘10
Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado, PhD of Political Science, University of Nebraska, 2010, “Cuba’s Energy Future: Strategic Approaches to
Cooperation,” a Brookings Publication – obtained as an ebook through MSU Electronic Resources – page 112-13
Future challenges in the upstream oil and gas sector need to be understood in terms of current and reported future international oil companies
that are involved in Cuba’s deepwater search for oil and gas: their competency, strategic objectives, and possible long-term contribution to the
island’s goal of becoming energy-independent. As
long as the U.S. government’s current economic and trade restrictions
imposed on the government of Cuba remain in place, all companies, regardless of their nationality or technical
competence, will have a very difficult time monetizing any newly discovered hydrocarbon resources,
because they need access to the U.S. oil services and equipment sector.
( ) No drilling now – embargo blocks it.
Hatcher ‘10
Monica Hatcher, Energy Reporter for the Houston Chronicle, “Cuba Drilling Poses Spill Issue: Group Says Trade¶ Embargo Could Hinder a
Response by the U.S.”, Houston Chronicle; Sept. 6, 2010 – internally quoting Jorge Piñon, a visiting research fellow at the Cuban Research
Institute of Florida International University – www.chron.com/business/energy/article/Group-warns-Cuba-trade-embargo-could-hurt-a-spill1695883.php
Piñon said Cuba
has been slow to develop its petroleum reserves until now, mainly because of a lack of
equipment capable of sidestepping embargo restrictions . They prohibit drilling vessels containing more than 10 percent
U.S. parts or technology from working in Cuba.¶ Piñon said that among other laws, the 1996 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, often
called Helms-Burton, penalizes
foreign companies that traffic with Cuba in property formerly owned by
U.S. citizens or by Cubans who have since become U.S. citizens.
Extensions – Cuban and non-US prevention efforts sufficient now
( ) Companies investing in Cuba have extensive offshore experience
Nerurkar and Sullivan ‘11
Neelesh Nerurkar, Specialist in Energy Policy, and Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs, Congressional Research Service, 2011,
“Cuba’s Offshore Oil Development: Background and U.S. Policy Considerations,” http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41522.pdf
It is difficult to assess the likelihood of a spill. According to Saipem, Scarabeo-9 is built to Norwegian
standards, including extra equipment to shut off blown-out wells beyond what is required in the
United States .30 Repsol has significant offshore experience, including projects in the U.S. Gulf of
Mexico. It has had issues with oil spills, which is not abnormal for an oil company.31 Among other Cuban lease holders,
Petrobras and Statoil have extensive offshore experience, including projects in the U.S. Gulf of
Mexico, and are generally seen as accomplished offshore operators. Petronas, ONGC, and PetroVietnam also have
offshore experience. PdVSA does not, but its offshore project appears the furthest from seeing drilling activity among existing licenses.
( ) Will be safe – foreign operators will solve
Goodhue ‘10
David Goodhue, Editor at The Reporter, Miami/Fort Lauderdale Area, “Cuba Leases to Bring Deepwater Drilling Within 50 Miles of Key West”,
WorkBoat.com (Sept. 9, 2010), internally quoting Jorge Pinon, a visiting research fellow at the Cuban Research Institute at Florida International
University. http://www.workboat.com/¶ newsdetail.aspx?id=4294998861
While Cuba's CUPET is ill-equipped to carry out drilling operations, many of the companies seeking to lease
blocks off Cuba are veterans of offshore drilling, Pinon said. He added that the DeepWater Horizon incident
was a game-changer in terms of following safety procedures .¶ Other companies planning to follow
Repsol's lead are Statoil of Norway, ONGC of India, Petr"leus of Venezuela, Brazil's Petrobras, Russia's
Gazprom and Petronas of Malaysia, according to several media reports.¶ "Cuba's national oil company does not have the
experience and/or technology for deepwater exploration," Pinon said in an e-mail. "But I believe that the foreign operators
operating in Cuba will now conduct business by the strictest rules in the book . From this point of
view, the Deepwater Horizon incident helped us. [Repsol] can not risk the reputation and cost of another catastrophic
incident."¶ Hunt said he's also heard from people concerned that the rig may be unsafe because it was made in China.¶ "One thing I'd like to
respond to is the horrific response to the Chinese deep drilling. There are five rigs in the Gulf of Mexico right now that were made in China.
The Chinese are not novices at this," he said.
Extensions – Sanctions don’t block actions
( ) Case-by-case safety exemptions solve without lifting embargo
Hatcher ‘10
Monica Hatcher, Energy Reporter for the Houston Chronicle, “Cuba Drilling Poses Spill Issue: Group Says Trade¶ Embargo Could Hinder a
Response by the U.S.”, Houston Chronicle; Sept. 6, 2010 – internally quoting Jorge Piñon, a visiting research fellow at the Cuban Research
Institute of Florida International University – www.chron.com/business/energy/article/Group-warns-Cuba-trade-embargo-could-hurt-a-spill1695883.php
Some who support the decades-old embargo are suspicious of the sudden push to tweak the trade
sanctions and suspect U.S. oil companies are trying to back their way into Cuba's potentially lucrative oil reserves.¶ "I can't see these
companies getting excited over half a dozen wells that are going to be drilled off the coast of Cuba
when there are thousands of wells off the coast of Louisiana and Mississippi. Why all of a sudden are they
worried about this?" asked Jaime Suchlicki, director of the Institute for Cuban and Cuban American Studies at the University of Miami.¶ He said
the government already can issue licenses at its discretion in the event of an emergency and that the
industry is pushing to ease the embargo by playing on public fears after the BP Gulf spill.
( ) Coast guard already has contingency plans for a Cuban spill
McClatchy ‘11
McClatchy Newspapers, 2-4-2011, “Coast Guard preparing for Cuba oil spills,” http://www.theolympian.com/2010/09/30/1531424/coastguard-preparing-for-cuba.html
The new U.S. Coast Guard commander for the southeastern United States said Thursday that his agency is looking "very
seriously'' at Cuba's plans to drill for oil and reviewing contingency plans in the event of a spill that could
reach the Florida coast. "We are actively looking at all the different implications and scenarios to make sure our plans are
revised and up to date,'' Rear Adm. William D. Baumgartner told editors at the Miami Herald. He said other
agencies also are reviewing their plans. The Spanish oil giant Repsol has leased several undersea blocks from the Cuban
government and is expected to begin drilling next year with a rig, the Scarabeo 9, that is being built in China in part to avoid conflicts with the
U.S. trade embargo on Cuba. The first block Repsol is expected to explore lies under 5,600 feet of water — 600 feet deeper than the water
where BP's Deepwater Horizon well exploded in April — and about 55 miles south of Florida's Marquesas Key. Baumgartner acknowledged that
the United States has no emergency response agreement with Cuba for oil spills. The U.S. signed such an agreement with Mexico in 1980. "We
have longstanding agreements with Mexico about how we would manage incidents and the . . . plan is routinely monitored,'' Baumgartner said.
"There is not a bilateral U.S.-Cuba agreement on oil spills right now.'' While some oil industry analysts worry that Cuba would be ill prepared for
an oil spill, Baumgartner noted that Repsol
would be responsible for cleaning up any spill that entered U.S. waters
Coast Guard would manage any cleanup in U.S. waters. "There are international agreements
that discuss the notification and information sharing that has to happen between countries,'' he said.
and that the
Extensions – Spill stays contained
( ) Spill impact would be very contained – probably only affects Florida
Whittle ‘12
Daniel J. Whittle et al, Cuba Program Director for the Oceans Program, Environmental Defense Fund, 2012, “Bridging the Gulf: Finding Common
Ground on Environmental and Safety Preparedness for Offshore Oil and Gas in Cuba,” http://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/EDFBridging_the_Gulf-2012.pdf
In preparation for Repsol’s exploration project in 2012, NOAA
generated computer tracking models to assess the
threat to U.S. coasts and shorelines from deepwater drilling off the coast of Cuba. NOAA selected 20 potential
deepwater drilling sites from the western region of Cuba to the Bahamas. The model was run using 200 different spill
scenarios based on a variety of ocean current and weather conditions. According to the agency’s first study of a hypothetical spill from a
deepwater well site offshore of Cuba, the area at highest risk of shoreline impact could be the eastern shore of
Florida.40 Areas as far north as Charleston, South Carolina could face potential shoreline risk, though
the modeled scenario predicted a lower likelihood of oiling for shorelines north of the Florida border.
A-to “Spill kills US Econ”
1NC Frontline vs. Econ Advantage
( ) Econ resilient
E.I.U. ‘11
(Economist Intelligence Unit – Global Forecasting Service, 11/16/’11
(http://gfs.eiu.com/Article.aspx?articleType=gef&articleId=668596451&secID=7)
The US economy, by any standard, remains weak, and consumer and business sentiment are close to 2009 lows. That said, the
economy has been surprisingly resilient in the face of so many shocks. US real GDP expanded by a relatively
robust 2.5% in the third quarter of 2011, twice the rate of the previous quarter. Consumer spending rose by 2.4%, which is
impressive given that real incomes dropped during the quarter (the savings rate fell, which helps to explain the anomaly.)
Historically, US consumers have been willing to spend even in difficult times. Before the 2008-09 slump,
personal spending rose in every quarter between 1992 and 2007. That resilience is again in evidence: retail sales in September
were at a seven-month high, and sales at chain stores have been strong. Business investment has been even more
buoyant: it expanded in the third quarter by an impressive 16.3% at an annual rate, and spending by companies in September on
conventional capital goods (that is, excluding defence and aircraft) grew by the most since March. This has been
made possible, in part, by strong corporate profits. According to data compiled by Bloomberg, earnings for US companies in
the S&P 500 rose by 24% year on year in the third quarter. All of this has occurred despite a debilitating fiscal debate in
Washington, a sovereign debt downgrade by a major ratings agency and exceptional volatility in capital
markets. This reinforces our view that the US economy, although weak, is not in danger of falling into a recession
(absent a shock from the euro zone). US growth will, however, continue to be held back by a weak labour market—the unemployment rate has
been at or above 9% for 28 of the last 30 months—and by a moribund housing market.
( ) US isn’t key to the global economy – decoupling proves
Bloomberg ‘10
[“Wall Street Sees World Economy Decoupling From U.S.”, October 4th, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-03/world-economydecoupling-from-u-s-in-slowdown-returns-as-wall-street-view.html]
The main reason for the divergence: “Direct transmission from a
U.S. slowdown to other economies through exports is just not large
enough to spread a U.S. demand problem globally,” Goldman Sachs economists Dominic Wilson and Stacy Carlson wrote in a Sept. 22
report entitled “If the U.S. sneezes...” Limited Exposure Take the so-called BRIC countries of Brazil, Russia, India and China. While
exports account for almost 20 percent of their gross domestic product, sales to the U.S. compose less than 5
percent of GDP, according to their estimates. That means even if U.S. growth slowed 2 percent, the drag on these four
countries would be about 0.1 percentage point, the economists reckon. Developed economies including the U.K., Germany
and Japan also have limited exposure, they said. Economies outside the U.S. have room to grow that the
U.S. doesn’t, partly because of its outsized slump in house prices, Wilson and Carlson said. The drop of almost 35 percent is more than
twice as large as the worst declines in the rest of the Group of 10 industrial nations, they found. The risk to the decoupling wager is a repeat of
2008, when the U.S. property bubble burst and then morphed into a global credit and banking shock that ricocheted around the world. For
now, Goldman Sachs’s index of U.S. financial conditions signals that bond and stock markets aren’t stressed by the U.S. outlook. Weaker Dollar
The break with the U.S. will be reflected in a weaker dollar, with the Chinese yuan appreciating to 6.49 per dollar in a year from 6.685 on Oct. 1,
according to Goldman Sachs forecasts. The bank is also betting that yields on U.S. 10-year debt will be lower by June than equivalent yields for
Germany, the U.K., Canada, Australia and Norway. U.S. notes will rise to 2.8 percent from 2.52 percent, Germany’s will increase to 3 percent
from 2.3 percent and Canada’s will grow to 3.8 percent from 2.76 percent on Oct. 1, Goldman Sachs projects. Goldman Sachs isn’t alone in
making the case for decoupling. Harris at BofA Merrill Lynch said he didn’t buy the argument prior to the financial crisis. Now he believes global
growth is strong enough to offer a “handkerchief” to the U.S. as it suffers a “growth recession” of weak expansion and rising unemployment, he
said. Giving him confidence is his calculation that the U.S. share of global GDP has shrunk to about 24 percent from 31 percent in
2000. He also notes that, unlike the U.S., many countries avoided asset bubbles, kept their banking systems sound and improved their trade
and budget positions. Economic Locomotives A book published last week by the World Bank backs him up. “The Day After Tomorrow”
concludes that developing
nations aren’t only decoupling, they also are undergoing a “switchover” that will make them
such locomotives for the world economy, they can help rescue advanced nations. Among the reasons for the revolution are
greater trade between emerging markets, the rise of the middle class and higher commodity prices, the book said. Investors are signaling they
agree. The U.S. has fallen behind Brazil, China and India as the preferred place to invest, according to a quarterly survey
conducted last month of 1,408 investors, analysts and traders who subscribe to Bloomberg. Emerging markets also attracted more money from
share offerings than industrialized nations last quarter for the first time in at least a decade, Bloomberg data show. Room to Ease Indonesia,
India, China and Poland are the developing economies least vulnerable to a U.S. slowdown, according to a Sept. 14 study based on trade ties by
HSBC Holdings Plc economists. China,
Russia and Brazil also are among nations with more room than industrial
countries to ease policies if a U.S. slowdown does weigh on their growth, according to a policy- flexibility index
designed by the economists, who include New York-based Pablo Goldberg. “Emerging economies kept their powder relatively dry, and are, for
the most part, in a position where they could act countercyclically if needed,” the HSBC group said. Links to developing countries are helping
insulate some companies against U.S. weakness. Swiss watch manufacturer Swatch Group AG and tire maker Nokian Renkaat of Finland are
among the European businesses that should benefit from trade with nations such as Russia and China where consumer demand is growing,
according to BlackRock Inc. portfolio manager Alister Hibbert. “There’s a lot of life in the global economy,” Hibbert, said at a Sept. 8
presentation to reporters in London.
( ) No diversionary theory – it’ll be small scale if it happens
Harrison ‘11
(Mark, Department of Economics, University of Warwick, Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of Birmingham, Hoover
Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford University, “Capitalism at War” Oct 19
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/staff/academic/harrison/papers/capitalism.pdf)
Diversionary wars In
the concept of diversionary wars, political leaders seek and exploit conflict with external
adversaries in order to rally domestic support. The idea is well established in the literature, perhaps because the theoretical case is quite
intuitive, and narrative support is not hard to find. In fact, it may be too easy; as Jack Levy (1989) pointed out, few wars have not been attributed to political leaders’
desire to improve domestic standing. The
idea of diversionary wars is directly relevant to a discussion of capitalism
only if it can be shown that capitalist polities are more likely to exploit foreign adventures. One reason might be
advanced from a Marxist perspective: perhaps capitalist societies, being class-divided, are more likely to give rise to wars
intended to divert the workers from the cause of socialism. A longstanding interpretation of the origins of World War I in domestic
German politics conveys exactly this message (Berghahn 1973). This view does not sit well with the equally traditional idea that
a class-divided society is less able to go to war. The official Soviet histories of World War II used to
claim that, under capitalism, divided class interests made the working people reluctant to fight for the nation.
Because of this, the workers could be motivated to take part only by “demagogy, deception, bribery, and
force” (Grechko et al., eds 1982, vol. 12, p. 38; Pospelov et al., eds 1965, vol. 6, pp. 80-82). Quantitative empirical work has lent little support to the idea (Levy
1989). Exceptions include studies of the use of force by U.S. and British postwar governments by Morgan and Bickers (1992) and Morgan and Anderson (1999). They
of force is more likely when government approval is high but the government’s
supporting coalition is suffering erosion. They also suggest that force is unlikely to be used at high intensities
under such circumstances (because likely costs are high, eroding political support) or when domestic
conflict is high (because conflict would then be polarizing rather than consolidate support). Another line of
conclude that the use
research suggests that new or incompletely established democracies are particularly vulnerable to risky adventures in nation-building (Mansfield and Snyder 2005).
One inspiration for this view was the record of the new democracies born out of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. More recently, Georgia seems to have
provided out-of-sample confirmation. Suppose
diversionary wars exist. Is capitalism somehow more internally
conflicted than other societies, and so disproportionately likely to externalize conflict? As a comparator, the case
of fascism seems straightforward. Fascism did not produce diversionary wars because, for fascists, war
was not a diversion; it was the Schwerpunkt. The more interesting case is that of communism. Communists do not
seem to have pursued diversionary wars. But the domestic legitimacy of Soviet rule visibly relied on the
image of an external enemy, and thrived on tension short of military conflict. Soviet leaders used external
tension to justify internal controls on movement, culture, and expression, and the associated apparatus of secrecy, censorship, and surveillance.
When they tolerated trends towards détente in the 1970s, they subverted their own controls. An East German Stasi
officer told his boss, repeating it later to Garton Ash (1997, p. 159): “How can you expect me to prevent [defections and revelations], when we’ve signed all these
international agreements for improved relations with the West, working conditions for journalists, freedom of movement, respect for human rights?” If Soviet
foreign policy was sometimes expansionist, it sought expansion only up to the point where the desired level of tension was assured. Bolsheviks of the 1917
generation knew well that too much too much conflict abroad encouraged defeatist and counter-revolutionary sentiments at home. Oleg Khlevniuk (1995, p. 174)
noted: “The complex relationship between war and revolution, which had almost seen the tsarist regime toppled in 1905 and which finally brought its demise in
1917, was a relationship of which Stalin was acutely aware. The lessons of history had to be learnt lest history repeat itself.” Stalin did all he could to avoid war with
Germany in 1941 (Gorodetsky 1999). Postwar Soviet leaders risked war by proxy, but avoided direct conflict with the “main adversary.” Faced with unfavourable
odds, they tended to withdraw (from Cuba) or do nothing (in Poland) or accepted them with great reluctance (in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan).
Diversionary tension must fall short of diversionary war. From this follows an acceptance that capitalism,
because of its tendency to give rise to democratic structures and political competition, has been more
open to diversionary wars than other systems. But the empirical research and analysis that underpin this
conclusion also imply that such wars would generally be small scale and short lived, and the
circumstances that give rise to them would be exceptional or transient. We should place this in the wider
context of the “democratic peace.” As Levy (1988) wrote: “Liberal or democratic states do not fight each other …
This absence of war between democracies comes as close as anything we have to an empirical law in
international relations.” Since all liberal democracies have also been capitalist on any definition, it is a
finding of deep relevance.
( ) Decline doesn’t cause war
Barnett ‘ 9
(Thomas P.M Barnett, senior managing director of Enterra Solutions LLC, contributing editor/online columnist for Esquire, 8/25/’9 – “The New
Rules: Security Remains Stable Amid Financial Crisis,” Aprodex, Asset Protection Index, http://www.aprodex.com/the-new-rules--securityremains-stable-amid-financial-crisis-398-bl.aspx)
When the global financial crisis struck roughly a year ago, the blogosphere was ablaze with all sorts of scary
predictions of, and commentary regarding, ensuing conflict and wars -- a rerun of the Great Depression leading to
world war, as it were. Now, as global economic news brightens and recovery -- surprisingly led by China and emerging
markets -- is the talk of the day, it's interesting to look back over the past year and realize how globalization's first
truly worldwide recession has had virtually no impact whatsoever on the international security landscape.¶ None
of the more than three-dozen ongoing conflicts listed by GlobalSecurity.org can be clearly attributed to the
global recession. Indeed, the last new entry (civil conflict between Hamas and Fatah in the Palestine) predates
the economic crisis by a year, and three quarters of the chronic struggles began in the last century. Ditto for the 15 low-intensity
conflicts listed by Wikipedia (where the latest entry is the Mexican "drug war" begun in 2006). Certainly, the Russia-Georgia conflict last
August was specifically timed, but by most accounts the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics was the
most important external trigger (followed by the U.S. presidential campaign) for that sudden spike in an almost twodecade long struggle between Georgia and its two breakaway regions.¶ Looking over the various databases, then, we see
a most familiar picture: the usual mix of civil conflicts, insurgencies, and liberation-themed terrorist
movements. Besides the recent Russia-Georgia dust-up, the only two potential state-on-state wars (North v. South Korea,
Israel v. Iran) are both tied to one side acquiring a nuclear weapon capacity -- a process wholly unrelated to global
economic trends.¶ And with the United States effectively tied down by its two ongoing major interventions (Iraq and
Afghanistan-bleeding-into-Pakistan), our involvement elsewhere around the planet has been quite modest, both leading up
to and following the onset of the economic crisis: e.g., the usual counter-drug efforts in Latin America, the usual military exercises
with allies across Asia, mixing it up with pirates off Somalia's coast). Everywhere else we find serious instability we pretty
much let it burn, occasionally pressing the Chinese -- unsuccessfully -- to do something. Our new Africa Command,
for example, hasn't led us to anything beyond advising and training local forces.
Extensions – Econ resilient
( ) US econ resilient
Johnson ‘13
(Robert , CFA, director of economic analysis with Morningstar, Morningstar.com, “U.S. Economy Not So Fragile After All” – 1/19 –
http://news.morningstar.com/articlenet/article.aspx?id=581616)
No, the U.S. Economy Has Not Been Fragile After All¶ Although most economists got at least some things right about the
U.S. economy over the past two years, the one nearly universal error was the expectation that the economy was
fragile. The U.S. economy has proven to be anything but fragile.¶ I believe this to be the single biggest error that
economists have made over the last two years. During that time, the U.S. has survived the fallout from a major debt
crisis in Europe, a divisive election, temporarily going over the fiscal cliff, gasoline prices that have been on
a yo-yo, a tsunami in Japan, and Hurricane Sandy, which shut down New York and even the stock
exchanges for a couple of days. These are not signs of a fragile economy.
( ) Econ resilient – fundamentals growing
Stewart ‘13
(Hale Stewart spent 5 years as a bond broker in the late 1990s before returning to law school in the early 2000s. He is currently a tax lawyer in
Houston, Texas. He has an LLM from the Thomas Jefferson School of Law in domestic and international taxation where he graduated Magna
Cum Laude, seeking alpha, “Is The U.S. Economy Moving Into A Higher Growth Phase? Part 1 - The Positive” – Feb 5th –
http://seekingalpha.com/article/1158011-is-the-u-s-economy-moving-into-a-higher-growth-phase-part-1-the-positive?source=google_news)
All three of the above sectors -- housing,
autos and manufacturing -- are bedrock components of the economy. If all
three are doing fairly well, the worst that can happen is slow growth. There is simply too much of a
multiplier effect of the combined total for a recession to occur with the above three expanding.
However, this is before we get to the latest and upcoming fiscal follies from the people in Washington. We'll touch on that in Part 2.
( ) Recovery from 2008 proves economy resilient
Drezner ‘12
(Daniel, Professor International Politics Tufts University, October, “The Irony of Global Economic Governance: The System Worked” Council on
Foreign Relations International Institutions and Global Governance)
In looking at outcomes, the
obvious question is how well the global economy has recovered from the 2008
crisis. The current literature on economic downturns suggests two factors that impose significant barriers to a strong recovery from the Great
Recession: it was triggered by a financial crisis and it was global in scope. Whether measuring output, per capita
income, or employment, financial crashes trigger downturns that last longer and have far weaker recoveries than standard
business cycle downturns.10 Furthermore, the global nature of the crisis makes it extremely difficult for countries
to export their way out of the problem. Countries that have experienced severe banking crises since World War II have usually
done so when the global economy was largely unaffected. That was not the case for the Great Recession. The global economy has
rebounded much better than during the Great Depression. Economists Barry Eichengreen and Kevin O’Rourke have
compiled data to compare global economic performance from the start of the crises (see Figures 1 and 2).11 Two facts stand out in their
comparisons. First, the
percentage drop in global industrial output and world trade levels at the start of the
2008 financial crisis was more precipitous than the falloffs following the October 1929 stock market
crash. The drop in industrial output was greater in 2008 nine months into the crisis than it was eighty years earlier after the same amount of
time. The drop in trade flows was more than twice as large. Second, the post-2008 rebound has been far more robust. Four years after the
onset of the Great Recession, global
industrial output is 10 percent higher than when the recession began. In
years after the 1929 stock market crash, industrial output was at only two-thirds of
precrisis levels. A similar story can be told with aggregate economic growth. According to World Bank figures, global economic
output rebounded in 2010 with 2.3 percent growth, followed up in 2011 with 4.2 percent growth. The global growth rate in
contrast, four
2011 was 44 percent higher than the average of the previous decade. Even more intriguing, the growth continued to be poverty reducing.12
The World Bank’s latest figures suggest that despite the 2008 financial crisis, extreme poverty continued to decline across all the major regions
of the globe. And the developing world achieved its first Millennium Development Goal of halving the 1990 levels of extreme poverty.13 An
important reason for the quick return to positive economic growth is that cross-border
flows did not dry up after the 2008
crisis. Again, compared to the Great Depression, trade flows have rebounded extremely well.14 Four years after the 1929
stock market crash, trade flows were off by 25 percent compared to precrisis levels. Current trade flows, in contrast, are more than 5 percent
higher than in 2008. Even compared to other postwar recessions, the current period has seen robust crossborder exchange. Indeed, as a report
from CFR’s Maurice R. Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies concluded in May 2012, “The
growth in world trade since the
start of the [current] recovery exceeds even the best of the prior postwar experiences.”15 Other crossborder flows have also rebounded from 2008–2009 lows. Global foreign direct investment (FDI) has returned to robust levels. FDI inflows rose
by 17 percent in 2011 alone. This put annual FDI levels at $1.5 trillion, surpassing the three-year precrisis average, though still approximately 25
percent below the 2007 peak. More generally, global foreign investment assets reached $96 trillion, a 5 percent increase from precrisis highs.
Remittances from migrant workers have become an increasingly important revenue stream to the developing world—and the 2008 financial
crisis did not dampen that income stream. Cross-border remittances to developing countries quickly rebounded to precrisis levels and then rose
to an estimated all-time high of $372 billion in 2011, with growth rates in 2011 that exceeded those in 2010. Total cross-border remittances
were more than $501 billion last year, and are estimated to reach $615 billion by 2014.16 Another salient outcome is mass public attitudes
about the global economy. A
general assumption in public opinion research is that during a downturn, demand for
greater economic closure should spike, as individuals scapegoat foreigners for domestic woes . The
global nature of the 2008 crisis, combined with anxiety about the shifting distribution of power,
should have triggered a fall in support for an open global economy. Somewhat surprisingly, however, the
reverse is true. Pew’s Global Attitudes Project has surveyed a wide spectrum of countries since 2002, asking people about their opinions
on both international trade and the free market more generally.17 The results show resilient support for expanding trade
and business ties with other countries. Twenty-four countries were surveyed both in 2007 and at least one year after 2008,
including a majority of the G20 economies. Overall, eighteen of those twenty-four countries showed equal or greater support for trade in 2009
than two years earlier. By 2011, twenty of twenty-four countries showed greater or equal support for trade compared to 2007. Indeed,
between 2007 and 2012, the unweighted average support for more trade in these countries increased from 78.5 percent to 83.6 percent.
Contrary to expectation, there has been no mass public rejection of the open global economy. Indeed, public support for the open trading
system has strengthened, despite softening public support for free-market economics more generally.18 The
final outcome
addresses a dog that hasn’t barked: the effect of the Great Recession on crossborder conflict and violence.
During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple analysts asserted that the financial crisis would lead states to
increase their use of force as a tool for staying in power.19 Whether through greater internal
repression, diversionary wars, arms races, or a ratcheting up of great power conflict, there were
genuine concerns that the global economic downturn would lead to an increase in conflict. Violence in the
Middle East, border disputes in the South China Sea, and even the disruptions of the Occupy movement fuel impressions of surge in global
The aggregate data suggests otherwise , however. A fundamental conclusion from a recent report by the
Institute for Economics and Peace is that “the average level of peacefulness in 2012 is approximately the same as
it was in 2007.”20 Interstate violence in particular has declined since the start of the financial crisis —as
have military expenditures in most sampled countries. Other studies confirm that the Great Recession has not triggered any
public disorder.
increase in violent conflict ; the secular decline in violence that started with the end of the Cold War has not been reversed.21
Extensions – US not key to global econ
( ) US not key—global economies decoupling
Caryl ‘10
[Christian Caryl is a Editor at Foreign Policy and Newsweek and a Senior Fellow of the CSIS at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, “Crisis?
What Crisis?” 4/5/10 http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/04/05/crisis_what_crisis?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full]
We went through a terrifying moment back in the fall of 2008. The financial system in the United States was imploding. It
was impossible to predict how the effects would ripple through the rest of the world, but one outcome seemed inevitable: Developing
economies were going to take a terrible hit. There was just no way they could escape the maelstrom without seeing millions of their citizens
impoverished. Many emerging-market countries did experience sharp drops in GDP. Their capital markets tanked. Dominique Strauss-
Kahn, managing director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), sounded downright apocalyptic: "All this will affect
dramatically unemployment, and beyond unemployment for many countries it will be at the roots of social unrest, some threat to
democracy, and maybe for some cases it can also end in war." The Economist recently noted, "The Institute of International
Finance (IIF), a think-tank in Washington, DC, forecast that net private capital flows into poor countries in 2009 would be 72% lower than at
their peak in 2007, an unprecedented shrinkage." Virtually everyone expected to see the countries that had benefited so dramatically from
growth in the years leading up to the crisis to suffer disproportionately in its wake. An entirely rational assumption -- except it
hasn't
turned out that way at all. To be sure, there were far too many poor people in the world before the crisis,
and that still remains the case. Some 3 billion people still live on less than $2.50 a day. But the global economic crisis
hasn't added appreciably to their ranks. Just take China, India, and Indonesia, Asia's three biggest
emerging markets. Although growth in all three slowed, it never went into reverse. China's robust growth
through the crisis has been much publicized -- but Indonesia's, much less conspicuously. Those countries, as well as Brazil and
Russia, have rebounded dramatically. The Institute of International Finance -- the same people who gave that dramatically
skepticism-inducing estimate earlier -- now says that net private capital flows to developing countries could reach $672 billion this year (double
the 2009 amount). That's less than the high point of 2007, to be sure. But it
still seems remarkable in light of the dire
predictions. In short, the countries that have worked the hardest to join the global marketplace are
showing remarkable resilience. It wasn't always this way. Recall what happened back in 1997 and 1998, when the Thai
government's devaluation of its currency triggered the Asian financial crisis. Rioting across Indonesia brought down the Suharto government.
The administration of Filipino President Joseph Estrada collapsed. The turbulence echoed throughout the region and into the wider world,
culminating in the Russian government default and August 1998 ruble devaluation. Brazil and Argentina trembled. The IMF was everywhere,
dispensing advice and dictating conditions. It was the emerging markets that bore the brunt of that crisis. So
what's different this
time around? The answers differ from place to place, but there are some common denominators. Many of the BRICs (Brazil, Russia,
India, China) learned vital lessons from the trauma of the late 1990s, hence the IMF's relatively low-key
profile this time around. (The fund has been most active in Africa, where they still need the help -- unless you count Greece, of course.)
Many emerging economies entered the 2008-2009 crisis with healthy balance sheets. In most cases
governments reacted quickly and flexibly, rolling out stimulus programs or even expanding povertyreduction programs. Increasingly, the same countries that have embraced globalization and markets are
starting to build social safety nets . And there's another factor: Trade is becoming more evenly distributed
throughout the world. China is now a bigger market for Asian exporters than the United States. Some
economists are talking about "emerging market decoupling." Jonathan Anderson, an emerging-markets economist at the
Swiss bank UBS, showed in one recent report how car sales in emerging markets have actually been rising during this latest
bout of turmoil -- powerful evidence that emerging economies no longer have to sneeze when America
catches a cold . Aphitchaya Nguanbanchong, a consultant for the British-based aid organization Oxfam, has studied the crisis's effects on
Southeast Asian economies. "The research so far shows that the result of the crisis isn't as bad as we were expecting," she says. Indonesia is a
case in point: "People
in this region and at the policy level learned a lot from the past crisis." Healthy
domestic demand cushioned the shock when the crisis hit export-oriented industries; the government weighed
in immediately with hefty stimulus measures. Nguanbanchong says that she has been surprised by the extent to which families throughout the
region have kept spending money on education even as incomes have declined for some. And
that, she says, reinforces a major
lesson that emerging-market governments can take away from the crisis: "Governments should focus
more on social policy, on health, education, and services. They shouldn't be intervening so much directly in the economy itself."
This ought to be a big story. But you won't have much luck finding it in the newspapers -- perhaps because it runs so contrary to our habitual
thinking about the world economy. The U.N. Development Programme and the Asian Development Bank recently published a report that
attempts to assess what effect the crisis will have on the world's progress toward the U.N. Millennium Development Goals, benchmarks that
are supposed to be achieved by 2015. At first glance the report's predictions are daunting: It states that 21 million people in the developing
world are "at risk" of slipping into extreme poverty and warns that the goals are unlikely to be met. Many experts wonder, of course, whether
the V-shaped crisis we've witnessed so far is going to turn into a W, with another sharp downturn still to come. Some argue that the Great
Recession's real damage has yet to be felt. Yet the report also contains some interesting indications that this might not be the case. "The global
economic crisis has been widely predicted to affect international migration and remittances adversely," it notes. "But as the crisis unfolds, it is
becoming clear that the patterns of migration and remittances may be more complex than was previously imagined." In other words, these
interconnections are proving to be much more resilient than anyone might have predicted earlier. As the
report notes, receipts of remittances have so far actually increased in Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, and
Sri Lanka. Perhaps migrant workers -- those global experts in entrepreneurship and risk-taking -- know something that a lot of the rest of us
don't. So why should we care? Anirudh Krishna, a Duke University political scientist who studies poverty reduction, says that there's a moral to
the story: "Certainly cutting countries and people off from markets is no longer a sensible thing to do. Expanding
those connections, bringing in a larger part of a talent pool into the high-growth sector -- that is what would make most countries grow faster
and more individuals climb out of poverty." Echoing Nguanbanchong, he argues that governments are well-advised to concentrate on providing
their citizens with education and health care -- the great enablers in the fight for social betterment. Microfinance and income subsidy programs
can fill important gaps -- as long as they aim to empower future entrepreneurs, not create cultures of entitlement. This is not to say the outlook
is bright on every front, of course. As the Economist noted, the number of people facing hunger recently topped 1 billion, the highest since
1970. The reason for that has more to do with the 2007-2008 spike in food prices than with the financial crisis. (Remember how the price of rice
shot up?) We are still a long way from conquering poverty. There is still a huge -- and in some cases growing -- gap between the world's rich and
poor. Yet
how remarkable it would be if we could one day look back on the 2008-2009 crisis as the
beginning of a more equitable global economy.
( ) The U.S is not key – Asia fill-in and decoupling
Xinbo ‘10
(Wu, a professor and deputy director of the Center for American Studies at Fudan University in Shanghai, and a member of TWQ’s editorial
board“Understanding the Geopolitical Implications of the Global Financial Crisis” The Washington Quarterly – 33:4 pp. –
155163http://www.twq.com/10october/docs/10oct_Xinbo.pdf)
While China suffered moderately from
the crisis economically, it has gained remarkably in politico-economic terms.
For one thing, the Chinese model of development_ featured by a strong role of the state in economic development, stress on the
real rather than the virtual economy, a high savings rate, measured financial market liberalization, etc._has empowered China to
better resist the financial storm and minimize the losses associated with it. As a developing country, China’s
experience appears more applicable to the developing world. For instance, as Alex Perry of Time magazine observed,
‘‘African governments look at Western economic instability over the past two years and find a better model in Asia’s extraordinary growth.’’8 In
the post—ColdWar era, the U.S. model used to be hailed as the only way to economic prosperity. Now, the Chinese model seems to provide an
alternative. To be sure, the Chinese model is not perfect and is actually confronted with many challenges such as a widening income gap,
serious environment pollution, and rampant corruption. Yet, the record of tiding over two financial crises (the 1998—1999 Asian financial crisis
and the 2008—2009 global financial crisis) and securing three decades of a high economic growth rate testifies to its strength. Unlike
Washington, Beijing
does not like to boast of its model and impose it on others, but the increased appeal
of the Chinese experience will certainly enhance Beijing’s international status and augment its influence among developing
countries. Even before the recent crisis, there was already discussion of decoupling Asian economies from the United
States, given growing intra-Asian economic activities.9 The reality that China has already become the largest
trading partner to some major regional economies, such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, provided an additional
incentive to further East Asian regional economic cooperation. Even in Japan, where the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ)
rose to power during the crisis in August 2009, Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama noted that: [T]he recent financial crisis has suggested to many
people that the era of American unilateralism may come to an end. It has also made people harbor doubts about the permanence of the dollar
as the key global currency. I also feel that as a result of the failure of the Iraq war and the financial crisis, the era of US-led globalism is coming
to an end and that we are moving away from a unipolar world toward an era of multipolarity.10 Hatoyama continued that, ‘‘Current
developments show clearly that China, which has by far the world’s largest population, will become one of the world’s
leading economic nations, while also continuing to expand its military power.’’11 He pledged to strengthen relations with Asian
countries, particularly China, and work to build an East Asian Community. Behind this lies a recognition of China’s growing importance to
Japan’s economic future. South Korea also expressed enthusiasm for forging a free trade agreement with China as early as possible. Taiwan
signed the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) with mainland China in June 2009, marking a major step forward in relations
across the Taiwan Strait. The agreement, focusing on tariff concession and easier market access, will remove tariffs within two years on 539
Taiwan export items to the mainland worth $13.84 billion, as well as 267 mainland export items to Taiwan valued at $2.86 billion. The pact will
also give Taiwan firms access to 11 service sectors on the mainland including banking, accounting, insurance, and hospitals.12 The
financial crisis also prompted Beijing to boost its domestic consumption. As the great potential of its internal
market is further released, it will serve both to thicken China’s economic ties with regional partners and to strengthen its role as an East Asian
economic hub. In a nutshell,
the financial and economic turmoil underscored China’s position as the engine of
the Asian regional economy and even the global economy as well . In international politics, political and economic
relations always follow each other. AfterWorldWar II, many regional members developed close economic ties with the United States, following
tight political and security arrangements with Washington. By the same token, today and in the future, China’s
deepening economic
connections with its regional partners promise to expand its political clout in East Asia. Given China’s
growing economic size and its excellent performance during the crisis, it is no surprise that the financial turmoil served to raise China’s status in
global economic governance. The
G-20 emerged from the crisis as the premier forum for international economic
cooperation, shadowing the traditional role of the G-8 in world economy. China, as the world’s third largest economy and the largest
foreign reserve holder, ascended to center stage within the G-20. The idea of a G-2, consisting of Beijing and Washington
governing the world economy or managing international geopolitics, was tossed around among U.S. scholars and former government officials
(although not endorsed by either Beijing or Washington), reflecting
a recognition of China’s newly-accrued economic
and geopolitical weight. In April 2010, the World Bank decided to increase China’s voting rights, making it the third largest voter in the
institution. The IMF is also expected to raise China’s representation in its current round of reconstruction endeavors. All in all, the financial
crisis benefited China by quickening the pace of the global economic and financial power transition,
turning China from a peripheral member into a key player. Last but not least, the crisis gave credit to China’s currency Renminbi
(RMB) for its strength and stability. Even before the crisis, the RMB was already used in some of China’s
neighboring countries for settling accounts in border trade. The financial storm revealed the volatility of the U.S. dollar
and highlighted the strength of the Chinese yuan. Although the RMB is not yet freely convertible, some of China’s major
trading partners saw the desirability of increasing its holding as the U.S. dollar has been getting
weaker, arousing concerns that an unstable dollar would lead to increased costs and risks for traders. Since the onset of the crisis, China has
signed bilateral currency swap agreements with Argentina, Belarus, Iceland, Indonesia, Malaysia, Hong Kong, Singapore, and South Korea, with
a total amount of 803.5 billion yuan (about $118.1 billion). Some
countries also moved to take the RMB as one of its
reserve currencies. It was the crisis that caused Beijing to think seriously about the regionalization of
the RMB. To enhance that goal, the Chinese government undertook to push the RMB settlement pilots in the trade between China’s two
most important exporting regions, Guangdong and the Yangtze River Delta, with Hong Kong and Macao, and between two Chinese provinces
bordering Southeast Asia, Gaungxi and Yunnan, with the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In early 2009, Beijing
also approved Shanghai’s ambitious goal of turning itself into an international financial center by 2020, matching China’s economic influence
and the yuan’s international position. It will be a long journey for theRMBto become a major international reserve currency, but it seems that
the global financial crisis has turned out to be its starting point.
Extensions “Diversionary theory wrong”
( ) Diversionary war theory is false
Boehmer ‘7
(Charles, political science professor at the University of Texas, Politics & Policy, 35:4, “The Effects of Economic Crisis, Domestic Discord, and
State Efficacy on the Decision to Initiate Interstate Conflict”)
This article examines the contemporaneous effect of low economic growth and domestic instability on the threat of regime change and/ or
involvement in external militarized conflicts. Many studies
of diversionary conflict argue that lower rates of economic
growth should heighten the risk of international conflict. Yet we know that militarized interstate conflicts, and especially
wars, are generally rare events whereas lower rates of growth are not. Additionally, a growing body of literature shows that regime changes are
also associated with lower rates of economic growth. The question then becomes which event, militarized interstate conflict or regime change,
is the most likely to occur with domestic discord and lower rates of economic growth? Diversionary
theory claims that leaders
seek to divert attention away from domestic problems such as a bad economy or political scandals, or to garner
increased support prior to elections. Leaders then supposedly externalize discontented domestic sentiments onto other nations, sometimes as
scapegoats based on the similar in-group/out-group dynamic found in the research of Coser (1956) and Simmel (1955), where foreign countries
are blamed for domestic problems. This process is said to involve a “rally-round-the-flag” effect, where a leader can expect a short-term boost
in popularity with the threat or use of force (Blechman, Kaplan, and Hall 1978; Mueller 1973). Scholarship on diversionary conflict has focused
most often on the American case1 but recent studies have sought to identify this possible behavior in other countries.2 The Falklands War is
often a popular example of diversionary conflict (Levy and Vakili 1992). Argentina was reeling from hyperinflation and rampant unemployment
associated with the Latin American debt crisis. It is plausible that a success in the Falklands War may have helped to rally support for the
governing Galtieri regime, although Argentina lost the war and the ruling regime lost power. How many other attempts to use diversionary
tactics, if they indeed occur, can be seen to generate a similar outcome? The goal of this article is to provide an assessment of the extent to
which diversionary strategy is a threat to peace. Is
this a colorful theory kept alive by academics that has little
bearing upon real events, or is this a real problem that policy makers should be concerned with? If it is a strategy readily available to
leaders, then it is important to know what domestic factors trigger this gambit. Moreover, to know that requires an understanding of the
context in external conflict, which occurs relative to regime changes. Theories
of diversionary conflict usually emphasize
the potential benefits of diversionary tactics, although few pay equal attention to the prospective
costs associated with such behavior. It is not contentious to claim that leaders typically seek to remain in office. However, whether they
can successfully manipulate public opinion regularly during periods of domestic unpopularity through their states’
participation in foreign militarized conflicts—especially outside of the American case—is a question open for debate. Furthermore,
there appears to be a logical disconnect between diversionary theories and extant studies of domestic conflict and regime change. Lower rates
of economic growth are purported to increase the risk of both militarized interstate conflicts (and internal conflicts) as well as regime changes
(Bloomberg and Hess 2002). This implies that if
leaders do, in fact, undertake diversionary conflicts, many may still be
thrown from the seat of power—especially if the outcome is defeat to a foreign enemy. Diversionary conflict would thus
seem to be a risky gambit (Smith 1996). Scholars such as MacFie (1938) and Blainey (1988) have nevertheless questioned the validity of the
diversionary thesis. As noted by Levy (1989), this perspective is rarely formulated as a cohesive and comprehensive
theory, and there has been little or no knowledge cumulation. Later analyses do not necessarily build on past studies and the discrepancies
between inquiries are often difficult to unravel. “Studies have used a variety of research designs, different dependent
variables (uses of force, major uses of force, militarized disputes), different estimation techniques, and different data sets covering
different time periods and different states” (Bennett and Nordstrom 2000, 39). To these problems, we should add a lack of theoretical precision
and incomplete model specification. By a lack of theoretical precision, I am referring to the linkages between economic conditions and domestic
strife that remain unclear in some studies (Miller 1995; Russett 1990). Consequently, extant studies are to a degree incommensurate; they offer
a step in the right direction but do not provide robust cross-national explanations and tests of economic growth and interstate conflict. Yet a
few studies have attempted to provide deductive explanations about when and how diversionary tactics might be employed. Using a Bayesian
updating game, Richards and others (1993) theorize that while the use of force would appear to offer leaders a means to boost their popularity,
a poorly performing economy acts as a signal to a leader’s constituents about his or her competence. Hence, attempts
to use
diversion are likely to fail either because incompetent leaders will likewise fail in foreign policy or
people will recognize the gambit for what it is. Instead, these two models conclude that diversion is likely to be undertaken
particularly by risk-acceptant leaders. This stress on a heightened risk of removal from office is also apparent in the work of Bueno de Mesquita
and others (1999), and Downs and Rocke (1994), where leaders may “gamble for resurrection,” although the diversionary scenario in the
former study is only a partial extension of their theory on selectorates, winning coalitions, and leader survival. Again, how often do leaders fail
in the process or are removed from positions of power before they can even initiate diversionary tactics? A few studies focusing on leader
tenure have examined the removal of leaders following war, although almost no study in the diversionary literature has looked at the effects of
domestic problems on the relative risks of regime change, interstate conflict, or both events occurring in the same year.3
( ) Low growth makes politicians cautious—they don’t want to risk war because it
makes them vulnerable
Boehmer ‘7
(Charles, political science professor at the University of Texas, Politics & Policy, 35:4, “The Effects of Economic Crisis, Domestic Discord, and
State Efficacy on the Decision to Initiate Interstate Conflict”)
Economic Growth and Fatal MIDs The theory presented earlier predicts that lower
rates of growth suppress participation in
foreign conflicts, particularly concerning conflict initiation and escalation to combat. To sustain
combat, states need to be militarily prepared and not open up a second front when they are already
fighting, or may fear, domestic opposition. A good example would be when the various Afghani resistance fighters expelled the Soviet Union
from their territory, but the Taliban crumbled when it had to face the combined forces of the United States and Northern Alliance insurrection.
Yet the coefficient for GDP growth and MID initiations was negative but insignificant. However, considering
that there are many
reasons why states fight, the logic presented earlier should hold especially in regard to the risk of
participating in more severe conflicts. Threats to use military force may be safe to make and may be
made with both external and internal actors in mind, but in the end may remain mere cheap talk that
does not risk escalation if there is a chance to back down. Chiozza and Goemans (2004b) found that secure leaders were more likely
to become involved in war than insecure leaders, supporting the theory and evidence presented here. We should find that leaders
who face domestic opposition and a poorly performing economy shy away from situations that could
escalate to combat if doing so would compromise their ability to retain power.
Extensions – Econ decline not cause war
( ) Economic decline doesn’t cause war
Jervis,’11
(Robert, Professor PolSci Columbia, December, “Force in Our Times” Survival, Vol 25 No 4, p 403-425)
Even if war is still seen as evil, the security community could be dissolved if severe conflicts of interest were to arise. Could the more peaceful
world generate new interests that would bring the members of the community into sharp disputes? 45 A zero-sum sense of status would be
one example, perhaps linked to a steep rise in nationalism. More likely would be a worsening
of the current economic difficulties,
back old-fashioned beggar-my-neighbor
economic policies. While these dangers are real, it is hard to believe that the conflicts could be great enough to
lead the members of the community to contemplate fighting each other. It is not so much that economic
which could itself produce greater nationalism, undermine democracy and bring
interdependence has proceeded to the point where it could not be reversed – states that were more internally interdependent than anything
seen internationally have fought bloody civil wars. Rather it is that even
if the more extreme versions of free trade and
economic liberalism become discredited, it is hard to see how without building on a preexisting high
level of political conflict leaders and mass opinion would come to believe that their countries could
prosper by impoverishing or even attacking others. Is it possible that problems will not only become severe, but that
people will entertain the thought that they have to be solved by war? While a pessimist could note that this argument does not appear as
outlandish as it did before the financial crisis, an optimist could reply (correctly, in my view) that the
very fact that we have seen
such a sharp economic down-turn without anyone suggesting that force of arms is the solution shows
that even if bad times bring about greater economic conflict, it will not make war thinkable.
( ) Multipolarity makes your arguments untrue—economic decline doesn’t cause war
Thirlwell ‘10
—MPhil in economics from Oxford U, postgraduate qualifications in applied finance from Macquarie U, program director in International Economy for the Lowy Institute for International Policy
(Mark, September 2010, “The Return of Geo-economics: Globalisation and National Security”, Lowy Institute for International Policy, google scholar,)
Summing up the evidence, then, I would judge that while empirical support for the Pax Mercatoria is not conclusive, nevertheless it’s still
strongly supportive of the general idea that international integration is good for peace, all else equal. Since there is also even stronger evidence
that peace is good for trade, this raises
the possibility of a nice virtuous circle: globalisation (trade) promotes peace,
which in turn promotes more globalisation. In this kind of world, we should not worry too much about the big
power shifts described in the previous section, since they are taking place against a backdrop of greater economic integration which
should help smooth the whole process. ¶ Instead of ending this section on that optimistic note, however, it’s worth thinking about some
reasons why the
Pax Mercatoria might nevertheless turn out to be a poor, or at least overly optimistic, guide to our
future.¶ The first is captured by that all important get-out-of-gaol-free card, ‘all else equal’. It’s quite possible that the peace-promoting
effects of international commerce will end up being swamped by other factors, just as they were in 1914.¶ Second, perhaps the theory itself is
wrong. Certainly, a realist like John Mearsheimer would seem to have little time for the optimistic consequences of the rise of new powers
implied by the theory. Here’s Mearsheimer on how the US should view China’s economic progress, for example:¶ ‘ . . . the United States has a
profound interest in seeing Chinese economic growth slow considerably in the years ahead . . . A wealthy China would not be a status quo
power but an aggressive state determined to achieve regional hegemony.’ 62¶ Such pessimistic (or are they tragic?) views of the world would
also seem to run the risk of being self-fulfilling prophecies if they end up guiding actual policy. ¶ Finally, there is the risk that the
shift to a
multipolar world might indirectly undermine some of the supports needed to deliver globalisation. Here I am
thinking about some simple variant on the idea of hegemonic stability theory (HST) – the proposition that the global economy needs
a leader (or ‘hegemon’) that is both able and willing to provide the sorts of international public goods that are required
for its smooth functioning: open markets (liberal or ‘free’ trade), a smoothly functioning monetary regime, liberal
capital flows, and a lender of last resort function. 63 Charles Kindleberger argued that ‘the 1929 depression was so wide,
so deep, and so long because the international economic system was rendered unstable by British inability and
US unwillingness to assume responsibility for stabilizing it’, drawing on the failures of the Great Depression to make the original case
for HST:¶ ‘ . . . the international economic and monetary system needs leadership, a country that is prepared . .
. to set standards of conduct for other countries and to seek to get others to follow them, to take on an undue share of
the burdens of the system, and in particular to take on its support in adversity...’ 64¶ Kindleberger’s assessment appears to capture a rough
empirical regularity: As Findlay and O’Rourke remind us, ‘periods
of sustained expansion in world trade have tended to
coincided with the infrastructure of law and order necessary to keep trade routes open being provided by a dominant “hegemon”
or imperial power’. 65 Thus periods of globalisation have typically been associated with periods of hegemonic or
imperial power, such as the Pax Mongolica, the Pax Britannica and, most recently, the Pax Americana (Figure 9).¶ The risk, then, is that by
reducing the economic clout of the United States, it is possible that the shift to a multipolar world economy
might undermine either the willingness or the ability (or both) of Washington to continue to supply the
international public goods needed to sustain a (relatively) smoothly functioning world economy. 66 That in turn
could undermine the potential virtuous circle identified above.
*Neg vs. Adv Two Starts Here
A-to US-Cuba Relations
US-Cuba Relations – frontline
( ) Gradualism solves
A – Normaized US-Cuban ties coming. Happens by 2018 under Diaz-Canel.
Gott ‘13
Richard Gott is a writer and historian. He worked for many years at the Guardian as a leader-writer, foreign correspondent and as the features
editor. He is the author of Cuba: A New History, published by Yale University Press – Guardian – Feb 25th –
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2013/feb/25/cuba-us-ties-castro-raul
The mills of God grind slowly, yet they grind exceeding small. So it is with the history of Cuba, which has long moved forward at a barely
observable speed. The
announcement by Raúl Castro, aged 81, that he will retire in 2018 (after two terms in office),
and that his likely successor as eventual president will be Miguel Diaz-Canel Bermúdez (now appointed vicepresident), aged 52, suddenly catapults the half-century-old revolutionary process into new and unfamiliar waters.
By 2018, Fidel Castro, aged 86, long described as an ageing revolutionary, will likely be dead; so too will most likely be Cuba's
revolutionary ally in Venezuela, Hugo Chávez. Barack Obama will also have left the scene, the last of nearly a dozen US presidents that the
Cuban revolution has outlived. Cuba will then move forward at its customary glacial pace without any Castros at the helm and without any
members of the revolutionary generation of 1959 that will by then have guided the country for nearly 60 years (the retiring vice-president, the
revolutionary veteran José Ramón Ventura Machado, was born in 1930 and is 30 years older than his replacement). Four questions immediately
pose themselves. What is the nature and character of the new leader? What will be his impact on the internal Cuban scene? What will be the
future of the all-important economic relationship with Venezuela, which provides cheap oil in exchange for Cuban developmental aid (in terms
of doctors, security advisers and sports instructors)? And how will a new Cuban leadership affect relations with the United States which has
maintained an economic blockade of the island for the past half century? For supporters of the Cuban revolution, there are reasons to give
optimistic answers to all four questions. Diaz-Canel may have an unfortunate physical resemblance to a Soviet-style Bulgarian apparatchik of
yesteryear but he has proved to be a competent administrator and a genial party chief in two provinces, Villa Clara and Holguín. Plucked from
relative obscurity to be the youngest ever member of the politburo, he has been minister of higher education and has recently taken on
important foreign roles. With a background as a university professor and an enthusiastic cyclist, he has also served in the armed forces, a
significant and necessary detail in the biography of a future leader. As a protégé of Raúl Castro, Diaz-Canel has been a supporter of the current
programme to introduce market forces into some aspects of the economy and there is no reason to suppose that this would not continue. The
list of reforms is impressive: the introduction of co-operatives outside the agricultural area; the creation of private farms and businesses; the
sale of private houses and cars; and the availability of visas for foreign travel. For many people these reforms have not gone far enough, but the
new mood of optimism in Cuba is palpable. Diaz-Canel has also been a strong advocate of the existing close relationship with Venezuela which
will continue for the next six years under the likely Venezuelan presidency of Nicolas Maduro, the chosen successor of Chávez. So no change
there either. An important feature of this relationship, aside from its economic benefits, is that Cuba is now respected and welcomed
throughout the continent, not just with Venezuela's close ideological allies like Bolivia and Ecuador, but also with Brazil and Argentina. In this
context it is now the US that is the odd man out. Indeed the
most intriguing question now concerns Cuba's future
relationship with the US. Many people have expressed the hope that Obama, with no re-election problem to worry about, might feel
emboldened to make conciliatory noises towards the existing Castro government. Most people both in Cuba and in the US have begun to forget
what the quarrel was all about. The
road to a new friendship remains a possibility, yet one of the stumbling
blocks has been the continued existence of a Castro in power. Under the terms of the Helms-Burton Act, imposed by the US
Congress in 1996, the US cannot contemplate recognising a Cuban government in which one of the Castro brothers has a continuing role. By
2018, this will no longer be relevant. There
seems little doubt that under a future President Diaz-Canel, Cuba
would be able to forge a new and beneficial relationship with the US .
B – Embargo will inevitably and slowly fall in the squo. Waiting for discovery,
not drilling, is key.
Franks ‘8
Jeff Franks – Havana correspondent for Reuter’s – New York Times – 6/12/2008¶
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/12/business/worldbusiness/12iht-cubaoil.4.13670441.html?_r=0
Sometime next year, Cuba
plans to begin drilling
a major oil field off
its northern coast that might do what little
else has done - bring change to U.S-Cuba relations. ¶ In a rare confluence of circumstances - including a new leader
in Havana and a new one coming to the United States, as well as record-high crude oil prices - a new
petroleum source could grease the wheels for the two longtime foes to reunite out of mutual need, experts
say.¶ Getting there would require a sea change in U.S. policy, namely altering the U.S. trade embargo imposed against
Cuba in 1962 to try to topple Fidel Castro's Communist government.¶ If the embargo remains as is , a nearby source of oil
will be off limits to the United States, and the American oil industry will miss out on billions of dollars of
business.¶ Opponents of the embargo rule out any change until President George W. Bush, who has toughened the embargo, leaves office next
year.¶ Even then they can expect a fight from influential Cuban-American leaders, who argue that helping Cuba produce oil will aid the Cuban
government and undermine the 46-year-old embargo's reason for being.¶ "We think what really needs to happen in Cuba is for that system to
change," U.S. Commerce Secretary Carlos Gutierrez, who was born in Cuba, told Reuters.¶ But opponents
of the embargo say the
combination of economics, energy needs and environmental concerns, as well as new leaders in the two
countries, make easing the embargo possible.¶ " The pro-embargo status quo is really threatened right
now ," said Sarah Stephens, director of the Center for Democracy in the Americas. " The sands are running out of the clock
on the policy
and I think that has the pro-embargo folks worried."¶ The U.S. Geological Survey has estimated the Cuban field holds at
least five billion barrels of recoverable oil and 10 trillion cubic feet, or 280 billion cubic meters, of natural gas.¶ In a few years, Cuba could be
producing 525,000 barrels of oil a day, enough to make it energy independent and perhaps even an oil exporter, said Jorge Piñón, a former oil
company executive who is now a researcher at the University of Miami. Cuba currently consumes 145,000 barrels of oil daily, of which 92,000
barrels come from Venezuela, though that would most certainly rise if the embargo were lifted.¶ The government has sold oil concessions to
seven companies and has said a consortium of Spanish, Indian and Norwegian companies will drill the first production well in the first half of
2009.¶ Drilling was supposed to begin this year and has been put off twice because of undisclosed factors that U.S. experts said most likely
included difficulty getting a rig because global drilling activity was high, the need for more facilities to handle the oil and possible effects of the
U.S. embargo.¶ The Cuban field lies as much as six miles, or 9.7 kilometers, below the sea surface, depths at which U.S. production technology is
superior, said a Cuban oil expert, Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado, at the University of Nebraska-Omaha.¶ "Cuba and none of the present partners
have that capability without accessing American technology, and therein lies the rub," he said. "U.S. export controls forbid them to transfer that
technology to Cuba."¶ Cuba, looking past the United States, has been in talks with Petrobras of Brazil, which has deep-water expertise, about
getting involved.¶ The
embargo has withstood repeated legislative attempts to loosen its terms, including
unsuccessful bills in the U.S. Congress in 2006 to exempt oil companies.¶ But Kirby Jones, a consultant on Cuban business and founder of the
U.S.-Cuba Trade Association in Washington, and who is against the embargo, said a big Cuba oil find would change the
political equation.¶ "This is the first time that maintaining the embargo actually costs the United States
something," he said. "And we need oil. We need it from wherever we can get it, and in this case it's 50 miles off our
coast."
( ) A Drilling agreement alone won’t spill-over to broad relations
Padgett ‘12
Tim Padgett joined TIME in 1996 as Mexico City bureau chief covering Latin America. In 1999 he moved to Florida to become TIME’s Miami &
Latin America bureau chief, reporting on the hemisphere from Tallahassee to Tierra del Fuego. He has chronicled Mexico’s democratization and
drug war as well as the rise of Latin leaders like Lula and Hugo Chavez, TIME, 1-27-2012, “The Oil Off Cuba: Washington and Havana Dance at
Arms Length Over Spill Prevention,” http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2105598,00.html#ixzz2NxDjxp81, accessed 5-10-2013
What experts on both sides of the Straits hope is that sea currents will carry any oil slick directly out into the Atlantic Ocean. But that's
wishful
thinking. So probably is the notion that U.S.-Cuba cooperation on offshore drilling can be duplicated on
other fronts. Among them are the embargo, including the arguably unconstitutional ban on U.S. travel to Cuba, which has utterly failed to
dislodge the Castro regime but which Washington keeps in place for fear of offending Cuban-American voters in
swing-state Florida; and cases like that of Alan Gross, a U.S. aid worker imprisoned in Cuba since 2009 on what many call questionable spying
charges.
( ) Alt causes to US-Cuban ties – Human Rights, Guantanamo, and Cuban exiles
Hanson & Lee ‘13
Stephanie Hanson and Brianna Lee, Council on Foreign Relations, “U.S.-Cuba Relations”, 1/31/13 http://www.cfr.org/cuba/us-cubarelations/p11113
What are the issues
violations.
preventing normalization of U.S.-Cuba relations? Experts say these issues include: Human rights
In March 2003, the
Cuban government arrested seventy-five dissidents and journalists, sentencing them to
prison terms of up to twenty-eight years on charges of conspiring with the United States to overthrow the state. The
Cuban Commission for Human Rights and National Reconciliation, a Havana-based nongovernmental group, reports that the government has in recent
years resorted to other tactics besides prison --such as firings from state jobs and intimidation on the
street-- to silence opposition figures. A 2005 UN Human Rights Commission vote condemned Cuba's human rights record, but the country was elected to the
new UN Human Rights Council in 2006. Guantanamo Bay . Cuba indicated after 9/11 that it would not object if the United States brought prisoners to
Guantanamo Bay. However, experts such as Sweig say Cuban officials have since seized on the U.S. prison camp--where
hundreds of terror suspects have been detained--as a "symbol of solidarity" with the rest of the world against the United
States. Although Obama ordered Guantanamo to be closed by January 22, 2010, the facility remains open as of January 2013, and many analysts say it is likely to
stay in operation for an extended period. Cuban exile community . The Cuban-American community in southern
Florida traditionally has heavily influenced U.S. policy with Cuba. Both political parties fear alienating
a strong voting bloc in an important swing state in presidential elections.
( ) Cuba doesn’t want close relations with the US
French ‘13
Anya Landau French, Director of the New America Foundation U.S. – Cuba Policy Initiative, 2-10-2013, “Secretary Kerry: Will He or Won't He
Take On Cuba?,” http://thehavananote.com/2013/02/secretary_kerry_will_he_or_wont_he_take_cuba
And, then
there’s the Cuban government. As much as many in the Cuban government (particularly the diplomatic corps)
want to reduce tensions with the United States and finally make real progress on long-standing grievances held by both sides,
they aren’t desperate for the big thaw . Many U.S. analysts, including in government, speculate that this is
because Cuba’s leaders don’t really want to change the relationship, that strife serves their needs
better than would the alternative. That could be so, but there’s also a hefty amount of skepticism and pride
on the Cuban side, as well. After so many decades and layers of what Cuba calls the U.S. blockade, Cubans are
unwilling to have the terms of any ‘surrender’ dictated to them. In fact, they are bound and determined
that there will be no surrender. They would argue, what is there to surrender but their government’s very existence, something the
leadership obviously isn’t going to put on the table.
Extensions – Diaz-Canel = Castro successor in squo
( ) Diaz-Canel is the likely successor
Allam ‘13
(Hannah Allam is a national correspondent for McClatchy Newspapers, covering foreign affairs and the State Department. She is internally
quoting Jorge Dominguez, a Cuban American professor of Mexican and Latin American politics and economics at Harvard University. Miami
Herald; 2-25 – http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/02/25/3253690/even-if-raul-castro-steps-down.html)
Diaz-Canel is “an impressive career politician,” said Jorge Dominguez, a Cuban American professor of Mexican and Latin
American politics and economics at Harvard University. He moved through the Communist Party ranks, serving as a provincial first secretary,
minister of higher education, a member of the party’s political bureau and one of the Castro’s gaggle of vice presidents. “In those roles, he
has a wider array of responsibilities that have positioned him well for the eventual succession, ”
Dominguez said. “He has also been traveling abroad with Raul to add foreign experience to what had been principally a domestic-policy
resume.” When Castro elevated Diaz-Canel to first vice president and set a date for his own stepping aside, for the first time there was an
expiration date for Castro rule of Cuba. “It is true that other would-be successors appeared from time to time, but none was anointed, and
none had a formal designation as the successor,” Dominguez said. “Sure,
political party, after all, and politicians will jockey for power and position.
there will be political fights in the future. Theirs is a
But Diaz-Canel is now the frontrunner.”
( ) Succession coming – Diaz-Canel will assume power in the squo.
Newsday ‘13
(June 3, 2013 – This article was obtained using the cache function. It is also an AP wire article –
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:fKzv5fBLTq4J:www.newsday.com/news/world/raul-castro-turns-82-with-heirapparent-on-deck-1.5396959+diaz-canel+AROUND%2830%29+inevitable&cd=3&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=ca)
Earlier this year Castro announced that his current presidential term, which ends in 2018, will be his
last, for the first time since the 1959 revolution naming a date beyond which Cuba will not be led by him or his brother. In a sign of the
inevitable generational leadership change , Castro named as his new vice president and heir-apparent Miguel
Diaz-Canel, who at 53 is relatively young compared to the octogenarians who occupy many top
positions.
Extensions – Gradualism
A big oil find is a game-changer. It’ll gradually loosen the embargo.
Padgett ‘8
Tim Padgett joined TIME in 1996 as Mexico City bureau chief covering Latin America. In 1999 he moved to Florida to become TIME’s Miami &
Latin America bureau chief, reporting on the hemisphere from Tallahassee to Tierra del Fuego. He has chronicled Mexico’s democratization and
drug war as well as the rise of Latin leaders like Lula and Hugo Chavez, “How Cuba’s Oil Find Could Change the US Embargo”¶ Time Magazine –
Oct. 23, 2008 – http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,¶ 1853252,00.html#ixzz13Li5cosN
Washington's own Cuba time warp got a jolt as well. The oil discovery has renewed debate over whether
a crude-thirsty U.S. should loosen its 46-year-old trade embargo against Cuba and let yanqui firms join the drilling,
which is taking place fewer than 100 miles off U.S. shores. Despite the Bush Administration's hard line on Cuba, Republicans in
Congress have proposed legislation to exempt Big Oil from the embargo. That clamor is sure to rise —
especially if Barack Obama, who is more open to dialogue with Havana, becomes the next President — now that
Cuba's state oil company, Cubapetroleo, or Cupet, has announced a stunning new estimate of more than 20 billion bbl. bubbling off its shores.
"This is not a game," Cupet's exploration manager, Rafael Tenreyro, assured reporters in Havana last week.¶ If true, those potential
reserves could make Cuba a major petro player in the hemisphere. (The U.S. has reserves of 29 billion bbl.) And it
could render the embargo an even more ineffective means of dislodging the aging Castro brothers, Fidel
and current President Raúl. "If it really is 20 billion, then it's a game changer," says Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado, a Cuba oil
analyst at the University of Nebraska-Omaha. "It provides a lot more justification for changing elements of the
embargo, just as we did when we allowed agricultural and medical sales to Cuba" a decade ago.
Extensions – plan insufficient to solve US-Cuba ties
( ) plan insufficient to solve US-Cuba ties
Bert and Clayton ‘12
Melissa Bert, Military Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, Chief of the Maritime and International Law Division at the U.S. Coast Guard,
former Adjunct Professor at George Washington University and Florida International University, holds a Command and Staff degree in strategic
studies from the Naval War College and degrees from the Coast Guard Academy and the George Washington University Law School, graduate
of the Coast Guard Academy and George Washington University Law, and Blake Clayton, Fellow for Energy and National Security at the Council
on Foreign Relations, former lecturer in finance and economics at the Oxford University Programme for Undergraduate Studies and researcher
at the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, holds a doctorate in business economics and strategy from Oxford University, 2012 (“Addressing the
Risk of a Cuban Oil Spill,” Brookings Institution Policy Innovation Memorandum No. 15, March 7th, Available Online at
http://www.cfr.org/cuba/addressing-risk-cuban-oil-spill/p27515
Efforts to rewrite current law and policy toward Cuba, and encouraging cooperation with its government,
could antagonize groups opposed to improved relations with the Castro regime. They might protest
any decision allowing U.S. federal agencies to assist Cuba or letting U.S. companies operate in Cuban
territory.¶ However, taking sensible steps to prepare for a potential accident at an oil well in Cuban waters
would not break new ground or materially alter broader U.S. policy toward Cuba . For years, Washington has
worked with Havana on issues of mutual concern. The United States routinely coordinates with Cuba on search and rescue operations in the Straits of Florida as well
as to combat illicit drug trafficking and migrant smuggling. During the hurricane season, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) provides
Cuba with information on Caribbean storms. ¶ The recommendations proposed here are narrowly tailored to the specific challenges that a Cuban oil spill poses to
the United States. They would not help the Cuban economy or military. What they would do is protect U.S. territory and property from a potential danger
emanating from Cuba.¶ Cuba will drill for oil in its territorial waters with or without the blessing of the United States. Defending against a potential oil spill requires
a modicum of advance coordination and preparation with the Cuban government, which need not go beyond spill-related matters. Without taking these
precautions, the United States risks a second Deepwater Horizon, this time from Cuba.
A-to China Scenario
China war w/n happen
( ) China is committed to working peacefully with the US – most recent trip proves
Zhang and Shi ‘13
[Yuhan Zhang is an energy professional in a multinational energy company based in the United States and a former researcher at the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace. Lin Shi is an energy professional in a multinational energy company based in the United States and a
former consultant at the World Bank. “Conflict between China and the US is not inevitable,” East Asia Forum, 4/13/2013,
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/04/13/conflict-between-china-and-the-us-is-not-inevitable/]
President Xi Jinping’s official visit to the United States in February 2012 — as China’s then vice president — suggests that conflict between the two states is not
inevitable. This goes against the ideas of American offensive realists, who have publicly argued that conflict is an unavoidable consequence of the will to survive,
which requires large states to maximise power and pursue hegemony in their own regions. But
Xi’s visit saw China and the United States
reach consensus on a number of important issues. They agreed to prioritise shared interests and
mutual respect as a means of ushering in an era of win–win cooperation between China and the
United States.¶ Xi’s visit had three main goals: first, to strengthen trust between the two powers through an official visit; second, to familiarise American
leaders with the basic political, economic, ideological and diplomatic style of China’s next leader; and, third, to consolidate Sino–US trade relations.¶ The
timing of Xi’s visit coincided with the 40th anniversary of President Nixon’s visit to China and the
publication of the Sino–US joint communiqués, which played a critical role in normalising relations between the two states. Upon his
arrival, Xi met with a number of former secretaries, including former secretaries of state Henry Kissinger and Madeleine Albright and former secretary of the
Treasury Henry Paulson. Xi also met with many policy makers from the current administration, including President Barack Obama. ¶ His
visit laid a good
foundation for the positive development of China-US political and economic relations for at least the
next decade. There are two key reasons for this. The first is that the visit successfully delivered the message that China is willing to engage in political
communication and economic cooperation with the United States. During meetings with current and former politicians, business people and the media, Xi
repeatedly stressed the importance of cooperation and friendship between China and the United States. ¶
This message is necessary to
reduce the possibility of future strategic misunderstandings , especially because the United States, as
a representative Western capitalist power, has been seen as ideologically prejudiced against China
since the Cold War.¶ It is also timely because China’s rapid economic growth in the past decades has arguably aroused envy and fear in the United States
and some European countries, which have been suffering from the consequences of the global financial crisis and the European debt crisis. These anxieties have
hardly been assuaged by statements from a growing pool of commentators who predict that China will soon equal the United States in economic power, and will
eventually supplant its hegemony.¶ But this prediction fails to account for the philosophical grounding of Chinese leaders, which indicates that China has neither the
intention nor the capacity to challenge America’s hegemony. As Mao Zedong pointed out in the early 1960s, ‘We [China] are a socialist country. We do not invade
other countries, not in 100 years or 1000 years’. Mao’s successors have consistently reiterated this principle and repeated many times that China will never seek
hegemony. Xi’s visit served as another reminder that China’s and America’s interests are in many ways aligned, and that there is considerable scope for the largest
advanced economy and the largest emerging economy in the world to establish a new type of partnership. ¶ Secondly,
Xi’s visit helped to
further China-US trade and economic relations. In recent years, as part of China’s ‘going out’ strategy,
more and more state-owned enterprises and private companies in China have engaged in mergers and
acquisitions activities in North America and Europe, with the intention of absorbing Western advanced technologies and management
techniques.¶ After Xi’s visit to the US, hundreds of accompanied Chinese entrepreneurs have now moved
closer to possessing an accurate understanding of local policies and the investment environment in America. This
deepening of China-US relations will encourage more Chinese enterprises to invest in the United
States. High-tech, clean energy and manufacturing industries are bound to become new hotbeds of bilateral cooperation in the next few years. The trade orders
signed in Iowa and California by Xi’s team also included preferential agricultural policies for American farmers, which have been welcomed and endorsed by the
federal government, state governments and the American public.¶ Admittedly, the 2012 US presidential election campaign saw candidates from both the
Democratic and the Republican parties score political points by criticising many of China’s policies, including its exchange rate and trade policies. But, overall,
visit indicated that the future of China-US relations under his presidency will be shaped by
cooperation, despite the intrusion of domestic politics.
( ) Recent Summit solved military relations
Rudd ‘13
Xi’s
[Kevin Rudd, former prime minister of Australia, “A subtle defrosting in China’s chilly war with America” Financial Times, June 10, 2013,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/594776d2-d1ba-11e2-9336-00144feab7de.html#axzz2WXapvlZM]
High quality global journalism requires investment. Please share this article with others using the link below, do not cut & paste the article. See
our Ts&Cs and Copyright Policy for more detail. ¶ In
Beijing analysts still struggle to define the precise state of the
China-US relationship. As one said to me recently: “Bu shi rezhan, bu shi lengzhan; er shi liangzhan.” Or, in the Queen’s English: “It’s
not a hot war, it’s not a cold war; it’s more like a chilly war.”¶ The problem for leaders, diplomats and analysts is that the relationship defies
simple definition. Variants range from “strategic engagement”, “strategic co-operation” and “strategic competition” to “China as a responsible
global stakeholder”.¶ The problem with these ideas is that they mean very little to the Chinese . The phrase that
hits home in both capitals these days is “strategic trust deficit” – a gap between China and the US which, if left unchecked, could destabilise the
entire Asia-Pacific region.¶ Such a deficit is potentially disastrous for both parties. We see it in the world of cyber espionage and cyber warfare;
in escalating tensions in the East and South China Seas, where hundreds of naval and air assets are deployed; in escalating tensions on the
Korean peninsula; and in the UN Security Council stalemate over Syria.¶ That
is why the working summit between
presidents Barack Obama of the US and Xi Jinping of China at the weekend was so important . There
had been no high-level political mechanism for the two sides to manage these and other apparently
intractable challenges facing the regional and global order.¶ With this summit, with more to follow, we at last have the capacity to
build such a mechanism. The fact is, unless the Chinese president himself (simultaneously chairman of the Central Military Commission and
general secretary of the Communist party) engages personally in negotiations with his US counterpart, China’s political system is geared to the
defence of the status quo. In the US, the secretaries both of state and defence are able to make some strategic calls in negotiations. But their
Chinese counterparts are not even among the 250 most senior officials in the party hierarchy. Only the president, in consultation with the other
six members of the Politburo Standing Committee, can make the genuinely big calls.¶ Despite
opposition in both capitals, both
presidents decided to depart from the diplomatic conventions that have governed relations for the
past 40 years and convened a working summit, free of the pomp normally associated with state visits.
This is a success in its own right. More importantly, both camps are privately delighted by the tone, depth and content of this first engagement,
with neither expecting a laundry list of deliverables. Nobody present saw this as the “cyber summit” described in the US media.¶ So,
what
are the outcomes? First, the agreement to establish a regular military-to-military dialogue is critical .
It could contribute to rules of the road on cyber security; crisis management for the Korean peninsula;
the management of incidents at sea and in the air as well as creating a mechanism to develop basic
confidence and security-building measures for the region.¶ Second, the summit represented the first
systematic engagement and calibration between the two nations on the future of North Korea,
including their reported public commitment to prevent Pyongyang acquiring nuclear weapons. Third,
there was agreement on climate change, perhaps reflecting the start of a commitment to make the
global rules-based order more effective.¶ No one should expect Chinese policy to change quickly. Much could go wrong. But,
without a programme of working bilateral summitry, there is little prospect of getting much of strategic importance right. After 20 years of drift
in the relationship – following the elimination of the Soviet threat, which for the previous 20 years provided the underlying rationale for cooperation – this meeting could mark the start of a new period of detente. We were headed towards strategic
competition – or worse. We may now have the capacity to build sufficient trust in the relationship, creating a framework to manage the
growing complexity of bilateral, regional and global challenges the nations face.¶ It could even lead to what Mr Xi himself described as “a new
model of great power relations” for the future, one that does not mindlessly replicate the bloody history of the rise and fall of great powers in
centuries past.
China War – Impact Answers
( ) US-China war won’t escalate
Dobbins ‘12
James Dobbins, directs the International Security and Defense Policy Center at the RAND Corporation, previously served as American
Ambassador to the European Community and Assistant Secretary of State, August/September 2012, “War with China,” Survival, Vol. 54, No. 4,
p. 7-24
China is seeking neither territorial aggrandisement nor ideological
sway over its neighbours. It shows no interest in matching US military expenditures, achieving a
comparable global reach, or assuming defence commitments beyond its immediate periphery. Such
intentions might change, but if so, the United States would probably receive considerable warning, given the
lead times needed to develop such capabilities. Despite cautious and pragmatic Chinese policies, the risk of conflict with the United States remains,
and this risk will grow in consequence and perhaps in probability as China’s strength increases. Among the sources of conflict most likely to
occasion a China–US military clash over the next 30 years, listed in descending order of probability, are changes in the status of North Korea and
Taiwan, Sino-American confrontation in cyberspace, and disputes arising from China’s uneasy relationships with Japan and India. All these sources are on China’s
immediate periphery, where Chinese security interests and capabilities seem likely to remain focused. It is important to stress that a China–US
It is important to begin any such analysis by recognising that
military conflict is not probable in any of these cases , but that judgement is based on the view that the United States will retain the capacity to
deter behaviour that could lead to such a clash throughout this period.
( ) China can’t challenge the US
Kaplan & Kaplan ‘11
Robert D. Kaplan, senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, and Stephen S. Kaplan, former vice chairman of the National
Intelligence Council, March/April 2011, “America Primed,” National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/print/article/america-primed-4892
AMERICA’S MACROSTRATEGIC environment is chockablock with assets unavailable to any other
country. If nothing else, the United States has an often-overlooked and oft-neglected bulwark of allies: the Anglosphere. This is
Washington’s inner circle of defense ties, and it finds no equivalent in its competitor nations’ strategic
arsenals. The Anglosphere is perennially—and incorrectly—declared dead or in decline by the media and politicians.
Nevertheless, Great Britain, Canada, Australia and the United States remain extremely close in their military and intelligence relations and exchange vast volumes of
sensitive information daily, as they have for decades. On terrorism, virtually anything and everything is shared. The National Security Agency and Britain’s
Government Communications Headquarters have been nearly inextricable since World War II. The same is largely true of the CIA and Britain’s Secret Intelligence
Service. The various English-speaking nations, in practical terms, even assign individual parts of the world to each other, and each worries about the others’ security
equities. The linguistic and other cultural links between the United States and these other English-speaking countries are so deep that the sharing of sensitive
information 24-7 is practically an afterthought, even as the media and politicians highlight the narcissism of comparatively small differences. Of course, the values
and national purposes of the individual countries are unique, owing to different geographies and historical experiences; yet that is something America can quietly
manage. Given how close the United States is to the Anglosphere in most ways, when these allies resist what America is attempting to do, that should constitute a
warning that perhaps the policy coming out of Washington is either outright wrong or needs adjustment. (Canada’s balking in the face of U.S. bullying to hop on
board the Iraq War train is an obvious case in point.) The Anglosphere, in addition to everything else it provides, is a reality check that can facilitate American policy
making. With a combined population of 420 million, with
strategic locations off the continent of Europe (Great Britain), near the
intersection of the Indian Ocean and western Pacific sea-lanes (Australia), and in the Arctic and adjacent to
Greenland’s oil and gas (Canada), the Anglosphere, if not abused or ignored, will be a substantial hard-power asset for the
United States deep into the twenty-first century. China and Russia enjoy nothing comparable.
A-to Resource Wars
Frontline
( ) No resource wars – too expensive and market checks
Victor ‘8
David G,- Adjunct Senior Fellow for Science and Technology, Council on Foreign Relations; Director, Program on Energy and Sustainable
Development @ Stanford “Smoke and Mirror” http://www.nationalinterest.org/PrinterFriendly.aspx?id=16530
MY ARGUMENT is that classic resource wars—hot conflicts driven by a struggle to grab resources—are
increasingly rare. Even
where resources play a role, they are rarely the root cause of bloodshed. Rather, the root cause usually lies in
various failures of governance. That argument—in both its classic form and in its more nuanced incarnation—is hardly a straw man, as Thomas
Homer-Dixon asserts. Setting aside hyperbole, the punditry increasingly points to resources as a cause of war. And so do social scientists and
policy analysts, even with their more nuanced views. I’ve triggered this debate because conventional wisdom puts too much emphasis on
resources as a cause of conflict. Getting the story right has big implications for social scientists trying to unravel cause-and-effect and often
even larger implications for public policy. Michael Klare is right to underscore Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait, the only classic resource
conflict in recent memory. That episode highlights two of the reasons why classic resource wars are becoming rare—they’re expensive
and rarely work. (And even in Kuwait’s case, many other forces also spurred the invasion. Notably, Iraq felt insecure with its only access
to the sea a narrow strip of land sandwiched between Kuwait on one side and its archenemy Iran on the other.) In the end, Saddam lost
resources on the order of $100 billion (plus his country and then his head) in his quest for Kuwait’s 1.5 million
barrels per day of combined oil and gas output. By contrast, Exxon paid $80 billion to get Mobil’s 1.7 million barrels per day of oil and gas
production—a merger that has held and flourished. As the bulging sovereign wealth funds are discovering, it is easier
to get resources through the stock exchange than the gun barrel.
( ) Chinese Resource War claims are false
Victor ‘7
(David G,- Adjunct Senior Fellow for Science and Technology, Council on Foreign Relations; Director, Program on Energy and Sustainable
Development @ Stanford “What Resource Wars?” 11/12 http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=16020)
RISING ENERGY
prices and mounting concerns about environmental depletion have animated fears that the
world may be headed for a spate of “resource wars”—hot conflicts triggered by a struggle to grab valuable resources. Such
fears come in many stripes, but the threat industry has sounded the alarm bells especially loudly in three areas. First
is the rise of China, which is poorly endowed with many of the resources it needs—such as oil, gas, timber and most
minerals—and has already “gone out” to the world with the goal of securing what it wants. Violent conflicts may follow as the country shunts
others aside. A second potential path down the road to resource wars starts with all the money now flowing into poorly
governed but
resource-rich countries. Money can fund civil wars and other hostilities, even leaking into the hands of terrorists. And third is global
climate change, which could multiply stresses on natural resources and trigger water wars, catalyze the spread of disease or bring about
mass migrations. Most of this is bunk, and nearly all of it has focused on the wrong lessons for policy. Classic resource wars
are good material for Hollywood screenwriters. They rarely occur in the real world. To be sure, resource
money can magnify and prolong some conflicts, but the root causes of those hostilities usually lie elsewhere. Fixing them
requires focusing on the underlying institutions that govern how resources are used and largely determine whether stress explodes into
violence. When conflicts do arise, the weak link isn’t a dearth in resources but a dearth in governance.
Extensions – No Resource Wrs
( ) Resource wars are empirically false and won’t escalate
Homer-Dixon ‘8
(Thomas,- Chair of Peace and Conflict Studies at the Trudeau Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies at the University. of Toronto. "Oil, Oil, Toil
and Trouble."– The National Interest – January /February, edition)
Rather, we argue that resource
stress always interacts in complex conjunction with a host of other factors-ecological, institutional, economic and political--to cause mass violence. Also, causation is almost always indirect .
People, groups and countries rarely fight over natural resources directly ; instead, resource stress causes various forms of
social dislocation--including widening gaps between rich and poor, increased rent-seeking by elites, weakening of states and deeper ethnic
cleavages--that, in turn, make violence more likely. And, finally, this
violence is almost always sub-national; it takes the form of
The claim that resource stress is
sufficient by itself to cause violence is easily refuted. One simply has to identify cases where resource
stress was present but violence didn't occur. Likewise, the claim that resource stress is a necessary cause of violence is easily
insurgency, rebellion, gangsterism and urban criminality, not overt interstate war.
refuted by finding cases of violence not preceded by resource stress. At various points in his article, Victor uses exactly these strategies to
debunk the link between resources and war.
( ) Best studies prove resources have very small effect on warfare.
Goldstone ‘2K
(Jack,- professor of public policy, George Mason, Population and Security: How Demographic Change Can Lead to Violent Conflict., JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, Fall2002, Vol. 56, p. 123)
For example, Wenche Hauge and Tanja Ellingsen, in the
most comprehensive global test of the environmental-scarcityleads-to-violence hypothesis with recent data (1980–92), found that while deforestation, land degradation
and low freshwater availability were positively correlated with the incidence of civil war and armed conflict, the
magnitude of their effects was tiny. By themselves, these factors raised the probability of civil war by 0.5 to
under 1.5 percent. These factors did have a slightly higher impact on the probability of lesser kinds of armed conflict (causing increases in
the chances of such conflict by from 4 percent to 8 percent); but their influence paled compared to the impact of such
traditional risk factors as poverty, regime type and current and prior political instability.
A-to US-Latin American Relations
Frontline
( ) Arizona law block US-Latin American ties:
A. blocks effective coop on global issues.
Steinberg ‘10
(James B., Deputy Secretary of State, former Dean of the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin, Deputy
National Security Adviser on the staff of the National Security Council, President and Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings
Institution, affidavit filed in US v. Arizona, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA, Case 2:10-cv-01413-NVW Document
6-1 Filed 07/06/10, http://www.scribd.com/doc/33977183/U-S-v-Arizona-Exh-1-to-Motion-for-Preliminary-Injunction-Affidavit-of-JamesSteinberg)
55.If
S.B. 1070, Arizona's attempt to set its own immigration policy in pursuit of "attrition through enforcement,"
were to go into effect, it would directly call into question the ability of the United States to speak with
one voice at the international level on issues related to immigration and migration policy. Only the national government is in a
position to accurately assess the impact of a policy such as S.B. 1070 on our overall foreign relations agenda and to balance the competing
foreign relations considerations involved in the adoption and enforcement of such a law. When
the United States incurs criticism
of immigration law and policies adopted at the federal level, the United States is normally in a position to review the criticism and
determine whether to defend the practices against attack or else to take appropriate action to modify its practices. The United States is
also able to develop and implement immigration policy in anticipation of these and other foreign relations concerns. In this case, however, the
policy being pursued has not been developed, nor would it be implemented, with sensitivity to the full range of foreign policy information and
considerations available to the national government, and the United States is unable to calibrate its immigration and foreign policies to respond
effectively to these claims. 56.If the
several states were each allowed to pursue independent immigration
enforcement policies such as the Arizona law, these serious concerns would be multiplied significantly,
as the United States could be subjected to a cacophony of competing immigration enforcement
priorities and agendas, with little regard for the sensitive diplomatic and foreign relations considerations that immigration policy
addresses, and with an extreme adverse impact on the United States' ability to speak with one voice. 57.S.B.
1070 — and in particular the mandatory verification regime requirement — thus poses a risk of provoking retaliatory treatment against U.S.
nationals by other states, and threatens ongoing adverse consequences for important and sensitive bilateral
relationships with U.S. allies such as Mexico, for our regional relations in the western hemisphere, and for
our global relations in regional and multilateral institutions. It is likely to hinder our ability to secure the
cooperation of other states in efforts to promote U.S. interests internationally across a range of trade,
security, tourism, and other interests unrelated to immigration. Finally, it is likely to undermine the United States' ability to
engage effectively with the international community to promote the advancement and protection of human rights.
Moreover, repairing such harm to international relations and U.S. stature in bilateral, regional and multilateral
relationships after the fact can be extremely difficult.
B. Yes, this assumes Latin America
Steinberg ‘10
(James B., Deputy Secretary of State, former Dean of the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin, Deputy
National Security Adviser on the staff of the National Security Council, President and Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings
Institution, affidavit filed in US v. Arizona, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA, Case 2:10-cv-01413-NVW Document
6-1 Filed 07/06/10, http://www.scribd.com/doc/33977183/U-S-v-Arizona-Exh-1-to-Motion-for-Preliminary-Injunction-Affidavit-of-JamesSteinberg)
40.Bolivia's President Morales, Ecuador's President Correa, El
Salvador's President Funes and Guatemala's President
Colom have also voiced public criticism of the Arizona law. Other governments, including that of Brazil,
Colombia, Honduras, and Nicaragua have issued statements criticizing the law. Additionally, the National
Assemblies in Ecuador and Nicaragua, and the Central American Parliament based in Guatemala, have adopted critical resolutions or other
statements. S.B.
1070 has also been raised with high level U.S. officials by various foreign states on a
number of occasions in nonpublic settings.
( ) Alt cause – US drug policy.
Shifter ‘12
(Michael is an Adjunct Professor of Latin American Studies at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. He is a member of the Council
on Foreign Relations and writes for the Council's journal Foreign Affairs. He serves as the President of Inter-American Dialogue. “Remaking the
Relationship: The United States and Latin America,” April, IAD Policy Report,
http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf)
Another chronic irritant is US drug policy, which most Latin Americans now believe makes their drug and
crime problems worse. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, while visiting Mexico, acknowledged that US anti-drug programs have not
worked. Yet, despite growing calls and pressure from the region, the United States has shown little
interest in exploring alternative approaches.
( ) Alt cause – Immigration.
Shifter ‘12
(Michael is an Adjunct Professor of Latin American Studies at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. He is a member of the Council
on Foreign Relations and writes for the Council's journal Foreign Affairs. He serves as the President of Inter-American Dialogue. “Remaking the
Relationship: The United States and Latin America,” April, IAD Policy Report,
http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf)
In the main, hemispheric relations are amicable. Open conflict is rare and, happily, the sharp antagonisms that marred relations in the past have
subsided. But the US-Latin America relationship would profit from more vitality and direction. Shared interests are
not pursued as vigorously as they should be, and opportunities for more fruitful engagement are being missed. Well-developed ideas for
reversing these disappointing trends are scarce. Some
enduring problems stand squarely in the way of partnership
and effective cooperation.
of Washington to reform its broken immigration system is a
The inability
constant source of friction between the United States and nearly every other country in the
Americas. Yet US officials rarely refer to immigration as a foreign policy issue. Domestic policy debates on this issue disregard the United
States’ hemispheric agenda as well as the interests of other nations.
Extensions – Alt Cause, Arizona Law
( ) The Arizona law will spillover – shattering regional coop.
Steinberg ‘10
(James B., Deputy Secretary of State, former Dean of the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin, Deputy
National Security Adviser on the staff of the National Security Council, President and Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings
Institution, affidavit filed in US v. Arizona, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA, Case 2:10-cv-01413-NVW Document
6-1 Filed 07/06/10, http://www.scribd.com/doc/33977183/U-S-v-Arizona-Exh-1-to-Motion-for-Preliminary-Injunction-Affidavit-of-JamesSteinberg)
14.By contrast, by
pursuing a singular policy of criminal enforcement-at-all- costs through, among other things, imposing
an extraordinary mandatory verification regime coupled with what is effectively state criminalization of unlawful
presence, S.B. 1070 is likely to provoke retaliatory treatment of U.S. nationals overseas, weaken public
support among key domestic constituencies abroad for cooperating with the U.S, and endanger our
ability to negotiate international arrangements and to seek bilateral, regional or multilateral support across
a range of economic, human rights, security, and other non- immigration concerns, and be a source of
ongoing criticism in international fora. Arizona's unprecedented effort to set its own, contrary immigration policy predictably
conflicts with U.S. foreign policy interests and with the United States' ability to speak with one voice
( ) Federal government will be held accountable and The Arizona Law will kill coop.
Steinberg ‘10
(James B., Deputy Secretary of State, former Dean of the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin, Deputy
National Security Adviser on the staff of the National Security Council, President and Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings
Institution, affidavit filed in US v. Arizona, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA, Case 2:10-cv-01413-NVW Document
6-1 Filed 07/06/10, http://www.scribd.com/doc/33977183/U-S-v-Arizona-Exh-1-to-Motion-for-Preliminary-Injunction-Affidavit-of-JamesSteinberg)
32.As both a matter of international law and practice, the
federal government is held accountable internationally for
the actions of state and local authorities regarding our treatment of foreign nationals. International bodies and
foreign governments do not typically distinguish between the conduct of the national government and
the conduct of an individual state within a federal system. This is starkly evidenced by the United States'
experience in cases where state and local government authorities have failed to comply with U.S. obligations
under the VCCR to provide consular notification to all foreign nationals in U.S. custody. Failure to provide such notice by state officials has
led to three suits by Paraguay, Germany and Mexico against the United States in the International
Court of Justice, an advisory opinion sought by Mexico in the Inter- American Court of Human Rights, a petition against the United States
in the Inter- American Commission on Human Rights, and bilateral complaints by numerous foreign governments. 33.The United States takes
seriously allegations that it has failed to adhere to its international law obligations and foreign policy commitments and engages in these fora to
address such claims. Although the government is fully prepared to defend U.S. practices against unjustified claims of human rights
shortcomings, criticism from
an international body over immigration human rights issues can directly
undercut the credibility of U.S. efforts to advance human rights and can lead to significant diplomatic
obstacles — both on immigration issues of bilateral concern and on other interests that might be the subject of
diplomatic negotiations. As discussed below, in this context, S.B 1070's sweep into subjects left properly to federal
direction and control subjects the United States to this criticism while denying the United States the
tools to decide for itself whether and how to adjust such policies. The federal government should have to make its
defenses or consider appropriate modifications only with regard to policies that are adopted through a considered process that reflects the
interests of all the American people, not with regard to the views of one state.
( ) Arizona law hurts US coop in the region
Steinberg ‘10
(James B., Deputy Secretary of State, former Dean of the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin, Deputy
National Security Adviser on the staff of the National Security Council, President and Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings
Institution, affidavit filed in US v. Arizona, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA, Case 2:10-cv-01413-NVW Document
6-1 Filed 07/06/10, http://www.scribd.com/doc/33977183/U-S-v-Arizona-Exh-1-to-Motion-for-Preliminary-Injunction-Affidavit-of-JamesSteinberg)
A. Impact on Bilateral Relationships 36.S.B.
1070 has unquestionably generated negative reaction that has
damaged the public image of the United States and has thereby undermined the United States' ability to
pursue various diplomatic objectives. The law has provoked numerous public criticisms by governments with which the United
States maintains important and sensitive diplomatic relations. 37.In Mexico, S.B. 1070 has precipitated a sharply negative
public perception of the attitude toward immigrants in Arizona (and potentially by extension elsewhere in the U.S.), which in turn
has negatively affected diplomatic processes with Mexican government officials. The Mexican President,
Mexican Cabinet Members, the Mexican Congress, and opinion makers in Mexico all have reacted strongly in
response to the law. These voices have also expressed concern about the safety of Mexicans in Arizona. 38.During his recent visit to
Washington, for example, Mexico's President Calder& pointedly criticized the law, both during his joint press conference with President Obama
on May 19 and in his address to the United States Congress on May 20. Speaking to the Congress, he emphasized the need for comprehensive
immigration reform and focused attention specifically on the Arizona law: I am convinced that comprehensive immigration reform is also crucial
to secure our common border. However, I strongly disagree with the recently adopted law in Arizona. It is a law that not only ignores a reality
that cannot be erased by decree but also introduces a terrible idea: using racial profiling as a basis for law enforcement. And that is why I agree
with President Obama, who said the new law "carries a great amount of risk when core values that we all care about are breached." I want to
bridge the gap of feelings and emotions between our countries and our peoples. I believe in this. I believe in communications, I believe in
cooperation, and we together must find a better way to face and fix this common problem. 39.President CalderOn's criticisms reflect how
negatively S.B. 1070 has affected public attitudes in Mexico toward the United States. A
recent poll in Mexico by the Pew Global
Attitudes Project, for example, indicates that whereas before the adoption of the Arizona law 62 percent of those
polled had a favorable attitude toward the United States and only 27 percent had an unfavorable attitude, following
its adoption only 44 percent had a favorable attitude toward the U.S., while 48 had an unfavorable
attitude. See The A rizona Effect on U.S. Favorability in Mexico, available at www.pewglobal.org . The poll demonstrates that an effort to
establish a divergent immigration policy by a single state, which has not yet even gone into effect, nevertheless can
significantly harm foreign attitudes toward the United States as a whole. Such effect in turn can
seriously undermine support among important Mexican constituencies for Mexico's cooperation with
the United States.
Extensions – Alt Cause, US Drug Policy
( ) US Drug policy block US-Latin American relations
Shifter ‘12
(Michael is an Adjunct Professor of Latin American Studies at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. He is a member of the Council
on Foreign Relations and writes for the Council's journal Foreign Affairs. He serves as the President of Inter-American Dialogue. “Remaking the
Relationship: The United States and Latin America,” April, IAD Policy Report,
http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf)
In the spirit of “shared responsibility,” often invoked by senior US policy officials,
it is critical that the US government respond to
increasing calls from Latin American leaders for a serious review of drug policy. As the Latin American
Commission on Drugs and Democracy made clear, current measures addressing the drug problem are
not working and alternatives need to be considered. That commission, led by three highly regarded former Latin American presidents—
Fernando Henrique Cardoso of Brazil, Ernesto Zedillo of Mexico, and César Gaviria of Colombia—rightly emphasized that drug problems
and their contributions to criminal violence and widespread corruption threaten the rule of law in a number of countries.
The commission’s recommendations—including the decriminalization of marijuana, greater emphasis on drugs as a public health
problem, and increased support for harm reduction—should be taken seriously and should serve as a starting point for an
honest US-Latin American dialogue on the drug question. More serious attention and resources directed at
reducing consumption in the United States are essential. Since the commission’s report in 2009, even some sitting Latin
American presidents, including Mexico’s Felipe Calderón, Colombia’s Juan Manuel Santos, and Guatemala’s Otto Pérez Molina, have called for
collective pursuit of new drug policy options, including consideration of legalization. Although there is debate about the merits of alternative
policies—and political obstacles in the region and, particularly, in the United States, remain strong—a serious discussion is urgently needed
about how to be more effective in dealing with the drug problem. This sense of urgency is underscored by the alarming crime statistics
reported in the region. According to the United Nations, Latin America has the highest rate of homicides per capita of any region in the world.
Although the causes are many, the narcotics trade is a key contributor.
A-to Nuclear Terrorism
Frontline
( ) No nuclear terrorism – tech barriers.
Chapman ‘12
(Stephen, editorial writer for Chicago Tribune, “CHAPMAN: Nuclear terrorism unlikely,” May 22, http://www.oaoa.com/articles/chapman87719-nuclear-terrorism.html)
A layperson may figure it’s only a matter of time before the unimaginable comes to pass. Harvard’s Graham Allison, in his book “Nuclear
Terrorism,” concludes, “On the current course, nuclear terrorism is inevitable.” But remember: After
Sept. 11, 2001, we all thought
more attacks were a certainty. Yet al-Qaida and its ideological kin have proved unable to mount a second
strike. Given their inability to do something simple — say, shoot up a shopping mall or set off a truck
bomb — it’s reasonable to ask whether they have a chance at something much more ambitious. Far from
being plausible, argued Ohio State University professor John Mueller in a presentation at the University of Chicago, “the likelihood that
a terrorist group will come up with an atomic bomb seems to be vanishingly small.” The events
required to make that happen comprise a multitude of Herculean tasks. First, a terrorist group has to get a
bomb or fissile material, perhaps from Russia’s inventory of decommissioned warheads. If that were easy, one would
have already gone missing. Besides, those devices are probably no longer a danger, since weapons that are not
maintained quickly become what one expert calls “radioactive scrap metal.” If terrorists were able to steal a Pakistani
bomb, they would still have to defeat the arming codes and other safeguards designed to prevent unauthorized
use. As for Iran, no nuclear state has ever given a bomb to an ally — for reasons even the Iranians can
grasp. Stealing some 100 pounds of bomb fuel would require help from rogue individuals inside some government who are prepared to
jeopardize their own lives. Then comes the task of building a bomb. It’s not something you can gin up with
spare parts and power tools in your garage. It requires millions of dollars, a safe haven and advanced
equipment — plus people with specialized skills, lots of time and a willingness to die for the cause.
Assuming the jihadists vault over those Himalayas, they would have to deliver the weapon onto American soil. Sure,
drug smugglers bring in contraband all the time — but seeking their help would confront the plotters with possible exposure or extortion.
This, like every other step in the entire process, means expanding the circle of people who know
what’s going on, multiplying the chance someone will blab, back out or screw up. That has heartening
implications. If al-Qaida embarks on the project, it has only a minuscule chance of seeing it bear fruit. Given the formidable odds, it
probably won’t bother. None of this means we should stop trying to minimize the risk by securing nuclear stockpiles, monitoring
terrorist communications and improving port screening. But it offers good reason to think that in this war, it appears, the worst
eventuality is one that will never happen.
( ) No nuclear terror – counter to the goals of terror groups.
Kapur ‘8
(S. Paul; Associate professor in the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, The Long Shadow: Nuclear
Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia. pg. 32)
Before a terrorist group can attempt to use nuclear weapons, it must meet two basic requirements. First, the group must decide that it wishes
to engage in nuclear terrorism. Analysts and policy makers often assume that terrorist groups necessarily want to do so (Carter 2004; U.S.
Government 2002). However, it is
not clear that terrorist organizations would necessarily covet nuclear
devices. Although analysts often characterize terrorism as an irrational activity (Laqeuer I999: 4-5),
extensive empirical evidence indicates that terrorist groups in fact behave rationally, adopting strategies
designed to achieve particular ends (Crenshaw I995: 4; Pape 2003: 344). Thus whether terrorists would use nuclear weapons is contingent on
whether doing so is likely to further their goals. Under what circumstances could nuclear weapons fail to promote terrorists' goals? For
certain types of terrorist objectives, nuclear weapons could be too destructive. Large-scale
devastation could negatively influence audiences important to the terrorist groups. Terrorists often
rely on populations sympathetic to their cause for political, financial, and military support. The horrific
destruction of a nuclear explosion could alienate segments of this audience. People who otherwise
would sympathize with the terrorists may conclude that in using a nuclear device terrorists had gone
too far and were no longer deserving of support. The catastrophic effects of nuclear weapons could also damage or destroy
the very thing that the terrorist group most values. For example, if a terrorist organization were struggling with another
group for control of their common homeland, the use of nuclear weapons against the enemy group
would devastate the terrorists' own home territory. Using nuclear weapons would be extremely counterproductive for the
terrorists in this scenario.
( ) No nuclear terror – they’ll choose conventional weapons.
Mueller ‘8
John Mueller, political science professor at Ohio State University, “The Atomic Terrorist: Assessing the Likelihood” Jan. 1
http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/APSACHGO.PDF
Meanwhile, although
there have been plenty of terrorist attacks in the world since 2001, all (thus far, at least)
have relied on conventional destructive methods--there hasn't even been the occasional gas bomb. In effect the terrorists
seem to be heeding the advice found in a memo on an al-Qaeda laptop seized in Pakistan in 2004: "Make use of that which is available...rather
than waste valuable time becoming despondent over that which is not within your reach" (Whitlock 2007). That is: Keep it simple, stupid. In
fact, it
seems to be a general historical regularity that terrorists tend to prefer weapons that they know
and understand, not new, exotic ones (Rapoport 1999, 51; Gilmore 1999, 37; Schneier 2003, 236). Indeed, the truly notable
innovation for terrorists over the last few decades has not been in qualitative improvements in
ordnance at all, but rather in a more effective method for delivering it: the suicide bomber (Pape 2005, Bloom
2005).
( ) US won’t use nuclear retaliation against non-state nuclear terror.
Washington Post ‘7
(Thursday, August 2, 2007 – “Obama says no nuclear weapons to fight terror” – http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/08/02/AR2007080201375_pf.html)
Presidential hopeful Barack Obama
said Thursday he would not use nuclear weapons "in any circumstance" to fight
terrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan, drawing criticism from Hillary Rodham Clinton and other Democratic rivals." I think it would be a
profound mistake for us to use nuclear weapons in any circumstance," Obama said, with a pause, "involving civilians."
Then he quickly added, "Let me scratch that. There's been no discussion of nuclear weapons. That's not on the table."
( ) No miscalc impact – US-Russian safety systems check conflict.
Morrison ‘7
(James Morrison, formerly served as an assistant foreign editor for the Washington Times. Mr. Morrison returned to the Foreign Desk in 1993
to launch the Embassy Row column, a diplomatic news column primarily focusing on foreign ambassadors in the United States and U.S.
ambassadors abroad. The column is the only one of its kind in U.S. journalism. The Washington Times, September 25, 2007, Sentinels on Guard,
lexis)
Despite growing foreign-policy disputes, Moscow and Washington have prevented an accidental nuclear
disaster with extensive communication links through Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers (NRRCs), Russian
Ambassador Yuri Ushakov said in a review of 20 years of the program established under President Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. "The NRRCs
have proved their efficiency as an instrument of transparency and confidence-building," he said in a speech last
week at the State Department. "Moreover, they
have become a reliable mechanism designed to diminish and eliminate
the very potential threat of an accidental nuclear disaster."
Extensions – Too many tech barriers
( ) No Nuclear terror – too many tech bariers
Schwartz & Falk ‘3
(Yaron Schwartz, US office director of the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, and Ophir Falk, Vice President of Advanced
Security Integration Ltd., 2003”Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear Terrorism” 5-13-2003
http://www.ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=487)
For a terrorist group to obtain a nuclear weapon, two principal channels exist: build a device from scratch or somehow
procure or steal a ready-made one or its key components. Neither of these is likely. Of all the possibilities, constructing a bomb from
scratch, without state assistance, is the most unlikely. “So remote,” in the words of a senior nuclear
scientist at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, “ that it can be essentially ruled out.” The chief obstacle lies not only in
producing the nuclear fuel—either bomb-grade uranium or plutonium—but also the requirements for testing and securing safe havens for the
terrorists.[16] Unlike uranium, a much smaller quantity of plutonium is required to form a critical mass. Yet to make enough of it for a workable
bomb, a reactor is needed. Could terrorists buy one? Where would they build it? Could such a structure go undetected by satellites and other
intelligence tools? That is all very implausible indeed. If making nuclear-bomb fuel is out of the question, why not just steal it, or buy it on the
black market? Consider plutonium: if
terrorists did manage to procure some weapon-grade plutonium, would
their problems be over? Far from it: plutonium works only in an “implosion”-type bomb, which is
about ten times more difficult to build than the more simple uranium bomb used at Hiroshima. Among a
litany of specialized requirements is an experienced designer, a number of other specialists and a testing program. Hence, the terrorist’s
chances of getting an implosion bomb to work are very low. An alternative to stealing plutonium is bomb-grade uranium. The
problem
with buying bomb-grade uranium is that one would need a great deal of it—around 50kg for a guntype bomb—and nothing near that amount has turned up in the black market.[17] Even when
considering a country like Pakistan, the only possibility for terrorists to lay their hands on that
country’s uranium would be if its government fell under the control of sympathizers. Given that
Pakistan’s army is by far the most effective and stable organization in the country, there is not much
chance of that happening. Russia, again, is the terrorists’ best bet and therefore a potential target. It has tons of bomb-grade
uranium left over from the cold war and, in addition to bombs, has used this material to fuel nuclear submarines and research reactors. With
a reported history of smuggling attempts, there are definite prospects in Russia. If terrorists could
strike the main deposit and get enough uranium for a bomb, they would be on their way. But it would
still be a long journey: designing and building the bomb is anything but a trivial undertaking, as is
recruiting the suitably skilled technician/s for the task. The main risk for terrorists is getting caught. Finding an
isolated location for minimal risk of detection also would not be easy. Stealing or buying a complete
bomb would circumvent the aforementioned obstacles. But this option presents other pitfalls which
are even greater: all countries, including Russia and Pakistan (with US assistance), make ever greater efforts
to safeguard their warheads and materials, and even rogue states—if they should get the bomb (as North Korea appears to
staunchly pursue)—would be highly likely to do the same. Countries employ security measures specifically
designed to prevent theft. Warheads are typically stored in highly restricted bunkers. Terrorists would
have a very hard time trying to take over one of these and even if successful, it would be much harder
to leave with the contents in hand.[18]
( ) Nuclear terror risk exaggerated – tech barriers block the process.
Mueller ‘10
John Mueller is Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University and the author of "The Remnants of War. Foreign Policy –
JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 – http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/01/04/think_again_nuclear_weapons?page=0,2
"Fabricating a Bomb Is 'Child's Play.'" Hardly. An editorialist in Nature, the esteemed scientific journal, did apply that
characterization to the manufacture of uranium bombs, as opposed to plutonium bombs, last January, but even that seems an absurd
exaggeration. Younger,
the former Los Alamos research director, has expressed his amazement at how
"self-declared 'nuclear weapons experts,' many of whom have never seen a real nuclear weapon,"
continue to "hold forth on how easy it is to make a functioning nuclear explosive." Uranium is
"exceptionally difficult to machine," he points out, and "plutonium is one of the most complex metals
ever discovered, a material whose basic properties are sensitive to exactly how it is processed."
Special technology is required, and even the simplest weapons require precise tolerances.
Information on the general idea for building a bomb is available online, but none of it, Younger says, is
detailed enough to "enable the confident assembly of a real nuclear explosive." A failure to
appreciate the costs and difficulties of a nuclear program has led to massive overestimations of the
ability to fabricate nuclear weapons. As the 2005 Silberman-Robb commission, set up to investigate the intelligence failures that
led to the Iraq war, pointed out, it is "a fundamental analytical error" to equate "procurement activity with
weapons system capability." That is, "simply because a state can buy the parts does not mean it can put
them together and make them work." For example, after three decades of labor and well over $100
million in expenditures, Libya was unable to make any progress whatsoever toward an atomic bomb.
Indeed, much of the country's nuclear material, surrendered after it abandoned its program, was still
in the original boxes.
( ) non-State actors can’t pull it off.
Mueller ‘8
(John, political science professor at Ohio State University, “The Atomic Terrorist: Assessing the Likelihood” Jan. 1
http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/APSACHGO.PDF)
More than a decade ago Allison boldly insisted that it would be "easy" for terrorists to assemble a crude bomb if they could get enough fissile
material (Allison et al. 1996, 12).13 Atomic scientists, perhaps laboring under the concern, in Langewiesche's words, that "a declaration of
safety can at any time be proved spectacularly wrong" (2007, 49), have been comparatively restrained in cataloguing the difficulties terrorists
would face in constructing a bomb. But physicists Wirz and Egger have published a paper that does so, and it concludes that the
task
"could hardly be accomplished by a subnational group" (2005, 501). They point out that precise blueprints are
required, not just sketches and general ideas, and that even with a good blueprint they "would most
certainly be forced to redesign" (2005, 499-500). The process could take months or even a year or more (Pluta and Zimmerman
2006, 62), and in distinct contrast with Allison, they stress that the work, far from being "easy," is difficult, dangerous, and
extremely exacting, and that the technical requirements "in several fields verge on the unfeasible."
They conclude that "it takes much more than knowledge of the workings of nuclear weapons and access to
fissile material to successfully manufacture a usable weapon" (2005, 501-2).
Extensions – Will use Conventional Weapons
( ) Terrorist will use Conventional Weapons instead.
Hashmi ‘12
(Muhammad, author of “Nuclear Terrorism in Pakistan: Myth of Reality,” and expert in defense and strategic studies, “Difficulties For Terrorists
To Fabricate Nuclear RDD/IND Weapons – Analysis,” Jan 30, http://www.eurasiareview.com/30012012-difficulties-for-terrorists-to-fabricatenuclear-rddind-weapons-analysis/)
Many believe that these threats of nuclear terrorism are inflated and have been overstated because
technical hurdles still prevent terrorists from acquiring or building a nuclear device. Brain McNair argues that
the threats of nuclear terrorism have been exaggerated by the world. As the matter stands today, the possibility of nuclear terrorism remains
more a fantasy than fact. Furthermore, Shireen Mazari argues that Nuclear
weapons would not be a weapon of choice for
terrorists. Instead, she claims that “terrorists already have access to enough destructive capabilities with in
conventional means, so their need for nuclear weapons is simply not there.” Analysts have endorsed
the assessment that the threat of nuclear action by terrorists appears to be exaggerated. Similarly, religious
cults and left-wing terrorists with their beliefs of certain prohibitions against mass murder are less likely by
many estimates to use WMDs in a terrorist activity, even though there is not any guarantee that terrorists will use WMDs.
It has also been witnessed that no terrorist group is known to have developed or deployed a nuclear explosive device, and the severity of the
threat of nuclear terrorism remains disputed amongst international scholars. So it becomes too early to conclude that how grave the threats of
nuclear terrorism are. James kitfield concludes in an interview from security expert that: Seven years after the September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks, experts and presidential candidates continue to put nuclear terrorism atop their lists of the gravest threats to the United States. Yet
Brian Michael Jenkins, a longtime terrorism expert with the Rand Corp., says that the
threat lies more in the realms of
Hollywood dramas and terrorist dreams than in reality. There has never been an act of nuclear
terrorism, he notes, yet the threat is so potentially catastrophic that it incites fear — and that fear fulfills a terrorist’s primary goal. In
nutshell, we can say that it takes much more than knowledge of the workings of nuclear weapons and
access to fissile material to successfully manufacture a usable weapon. Current safety and security
systems help ensure that the successful use of a stolen weapon would be very unlikely . Meaning, it remains,
thankfully, an incredibly challenging task for terrorists to practice their idea in a successful way to meet their objectives.
Extensions – No Nuclear Retaliation
( ) Obama won’t retaliate with nuclear weapons
Crowley ‘10
(Michael Crowley, Senior Editor the New Republic, “Obama and Nuclear Deterrence”, Jan 10th – http://www.tnr.com/node/72263)
The Los Angeles Times ran an important story yesterday about the
Obama administration's Nuclear Posture Review,
which evaluates U.S. policy towards the use of nuclear weapons. Apparently there's a debate inside the
administration--one that is splitting the civilians from the generals--not just about the size of our nuclear stockpile but also how we conceive of
possible first-strike and retaliatory policies. A
core issue under debate, officials said, is whether the United States should
shed its long-standing ambiguity about whether it would use nuclear weapons in certain
circumstances, in hopes that greater specificity would give foreign governments more confidence to make their own decisions on nuclear
arms. Some in the U.S. argue that the administration should assure foreign governments that it won't use nuclear weapons in reaction to a
biological, chemical or conventional attack, but only in a nuclear exchange. Others argue that the United States should promise that it would
never use nuclear weapons first, but only in response to a nuclear attack. As the story notes, some experts
don't place much weight
on how our publicly-stated doctrine emerges because they don't expect foreign nations to take it
literally. And the reality is that any decisions about using nukes will certainly be case-by-case. But I'd still like to
see some wider discussion of the underlying questions, which are among the most consequential that policymakers can consider. The
questions are particularly vexing when it comes to terrorist groups and rogue states. Would we, for
instance, actually nuke Pyongyang if it sold a weapon to terrorists who used it in America? That implied
threat seems to exist, but I actually doubt that a President Obama--or any president, for that matter--would go
through with it.
( ) Nuclear retaliation won’t happen.
Bremmer ‘4
(Ian Bremmer is the president of Eurasia Group, the leading global political risk research and consulting firm. Bremmer has a PhD in political
science from Stanford University (1994), and was the youngest-ever national fellow at the Hoover Institution. He presently teaches at Columbia
University, and has held faculty positions at the EastWest Institute and the World Policy Institute, 9-13-2004, New Statesman, “Suppose a new
9/11 hit America”)
What would happen if there were a new terrorist attack inside the United States on 11 September 2004? How
would it affect the presidential election campaign? The conventional wisdom is that Americans - their patriotic defiance aroused - would rally to
President George W Bush and make him an all but certain winner in November. But consider the differences between the context of the
original 9/11 and that of any attack which might occur this autumn. In 2001, the public reaction was one of disbelief and incomprehension.
Many Americans realised for the first time that large-scale terrorist attacks on US soil were not only conceivable; they were, perhaps,
inevitable. A majority focused for the first time on the threat from al-Qaeda, on the Taliban and on the extent to which Saudis were involved in
terrorism. This time, the public response would move much more quickly from shock to anger; debate over how America should respond
would begin immediately. Yet it
is difficult to imagine how the Bush administration could focus its response on
an external enemy. Should the US send 50,000 troops to the Afghan-Pakistani border to intensify the hunt for Osama Bin Laden and
'step up' efforts to attack the heart of al-Qaeda? Many would wonder if that wasn't what the administration pledged to do after the attacks
three years ago. The
president would face intensified criticism from those who have argued all along that Iraq was a
And what if a significant number of the terrorists responsible for the pre-election attack were again
Saudis? The Bush administration could hardly take military action against the Saudi government at a time when
crude-oil prices are already more than $45 a barrel and global supply is stretched to the limit. While the Saudi royal family might
distraction from 'the real war on terror'.
support a co-ordinated attack against terrorist camps, real or imagined, near the Yemeni border - where recent searches for al-Qaeda have
concentrated - that would seem like a trivial, insufficient retaliation for an attack on the US mainland. Remember how the Republicans criticised
Bill Clinton's administration for ineffectually 'bouncing the rubble' in Afghanistan after the al-Qaeda attacks on the US embassies in Kenya and
Tanzania in the 1990s. So what kind of response might be credible? Washington's concerns about Iran are rising. The 9/11 commission report
noted evidence of co-operation between Iran and al-Qaeda operatives, if not direct Iranian advance knowledge of the 9/11 hijacking plot. Over
the past few weeks, US officials have been more explicit, too, in declaring Iran's nuclear programme 'unacceptable'. However, in the absence of
an official Iranian claim of responsibility for this hypothetical terrorist attack, the
domestic opposition to such a war and the
international outcry it would provoke would make quick action against Iran unthinkable. In short, a decisive
response from Bush could not be external. It would have to be domestic. Instead of Donald Rumsfeld, the defence
secretary, leading a war effort abroad, Tom Ridge, the homeland security secretary, and John Ashcroft, the attorney general, would pursue an
anti-terror campaign at home. Forced to use legal tools more controversial than those provided by the Patriot Act, Americans would experience
stepped-up domestic surveillance and border controls, much tighter security in public places and the detention of a large number of suspects.
Many Americans would undoubtedly support such moves. But concern for civil liberties and personal freedom would ensure that the
government would have nowhere near the public support it enjoyed for the invasion of Afghanistan.
( ) The U.S. won’t retaliate with nuclear weapons—it makes no sense
Spring ‘1
(Baker, Research Fellow at Heritage Foundation, Heritage Backgrounder 1477, Sept 20,
http://www.heritage.org/Research/MissileDefense/BG1477.cfm)
Nuclear retaliation is not appropriate for every kind of attack against America. Some opponents of missile
defense believe that the United States has an effective nuclear deterrent that, if necessary, could be used to respond to attacks on the
homeland. But no
responsible U.S. official is suggesting that the United States consider the use of nuclear
weapons in response to the horrific September 11 attacks. In most cases of attack on the United States,
the nuclear option would not be appropriate, but a defense response will almost always be appropriate. The United States
needs to be able to resort to defensive options.
A-to Global Warming Advantage
Frontline v. Warming Advantage
( ) Warming not real- recent temperatures show no increase
Happer ‘12
(William is a professor of physics at Princeton. “Global Warming Models Are Wrong Again”, Wall Street Journal, 3/27/12,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304636404577291352882984274.html)
What is happening to global temperatures in reality? The answer is: almost nothing for more than 10 years.
Monthly values of the global temperature anomaly of the lower atmosphere, compiled at the University of Alabama from
NASA satellite data, can be found at the website http://www.drroyspencer.com/latest-global-temperatures/. The latest (February
2012) monthly global temperature anomaly for the lower atmosphere was minus 0.12 degrees Celsius,
slightly less than the average since the satellite record of temperatures began in 1979
( ) Warming evidence skewed – urban heat island
Evans ‘12
(David has a PhD in electrical engineering, worked from 1999 to 2006 for the Australian Greenhouse Office, an agency of the Australian
government, designing a carbon accounting system- Financial Post, "Global Warming Theory Is Based on False Science.", 7 Apr. 2011, infotrac)
There are now several independent pieces of evidence showing that the earth responds to the
warming due to extra carbon dioxide by dampening the warming. Every long-lived natural system behaves this way,
counteracting any disturbance. Otherwise the system would be unstable. The climate system is no exception, and now we can prove it. But the
alarmists say the exact opposite, that the climate system amplifies any warming due to extra carbon dioxide,
and is potentially unstable. It is no surprise that their predictions of planetary temperature made in 1988 to the U.S. Congress, and
again in 1990, 1995, and 2001, have all proved much higher than reality. They keep lowering the temperature increases
they expect, from 0.30C per decade in 1990, to 0.20C per decade in 2001, and now 0.15C per decade—yet they have the gall to
tell us "it's worse than expected." These people are not scientists. They overestimate the temperature
increases due to carbon dioxide, selectively deny evidence, and now they conceal the truth. One way they
conceal is in the way they measure temperature. The official thermometers are often located in the warm exhaust
of air conditioning outlets, over hot tarmac at airports where they get blasts of hot air from jet
engines, at waste-water plants where they get warmth from decomposing sewage, or in hot cities
choked with cars and buildings. Global warming is measured in 10ths of a degree, so any extra heating nudge is
important. In the United States, nearly 90% of official thermometers surveyed by volunteers violate official
siting requirements that they not be too close to an artificial heating source. Global temperature is also
measured by satellites, which measure nearly the whole planet 24/7 without bias. The satellites say the hottest recent year
was 1998, and that since 2001 the global temperature has levelled off. Why does official science track
only the surface thermometer results and not mention the satellite results?
( ) Not anthropogenic – multiple warrants
Spencer ‘12
(Roy, former NASA climatologist and author, “Ten Years After the Warming,” 2/26, http://www.drroyspencer.com/2012/02/)
As can be seen,
in the last 10 years the estimated forcing has been the strongest. Yet, most if not all temperature
datasets show little or no global-average warming recently, either in the atmosphere, at the surface, or in the upper 700
meters of the ocean. For example, here are the tropospheric temperatures up though a few days ago: So what is happening? You
cannot simply say a lack of warming in 10 years is not that unusual, and that there have been previous 10-year periods without warming, too.
we are supposedly in uncharted territory with a maximum in radiative forcing of the climate
system. One cannot compare on an equal basis the last 10 years with any previous decades without warming. There are 5 possibilities for
the recent cessation of warming which are most discussed: 1) cooling from anthropogenic aerosols has been cancelling
No,
out warming from more greenhouse gases 2) natural cooling from internal climate fluctuations or the
sun is cancelling out the GHG warming 3) increased ocean mixing is causing the extra energy to be
distributed into the deep ocean 4) the temperature ’sensitivity’ of the climate system is not as large as
the IPCC assumes. 5) there is something fundamentally wrong with the GHG warming theory itself Of
course, some combination of the above 5 explanations is also possible. The 1st possibility (aerosol cooling is cancelling out GHG forcing) is one
of the more popular explanations with the climate modelers, and especially with NASA’s James Hansen. The
uncertain strength (and
aerosol forcing allows the climate modelers to use aerosols as a tuning knob (aka fudge factor)
in making their models produce warming more-or-less consistent with past observations. Using an assumed
large aerosol cooling to cancel out the GHG warming allows the modelers to retain high climate sensitivity, and thus the
fear of strong future warming if those aerosols ever dissipate. The 2nd possibility (natural cooling) is a much less
desirable explanation for the IPCC crowd because it opens the door to Mother Nature having as much or more
influence on the climate system than do humans. We can’t have that, you know. Then you would have to consider the
possibility that most of the warming in the last 50 years was natural, too. Goodbye, AGW funding. The 3rd possibility
even sign) of
(increased ocean mixing) is one of the more legitimate possibilities, at least theoretically. It’s popular with NCAR’s Kevin Trenberth. But one
would need more observational evidence this is happening before embracing the idea. Unfortunately, how vertical mixing in the ocean
different IPCC models have widely varying strengths of mixing,
and so ocean mixing is a huge wild card in the global warming debate, as is aerosol cooling. I believe much
naturally varies over time is poorly understood; the
of past climate change on time scales of decades to many centuries might be due to such variations in ocean mixing, along with their likely
influence on global cloud cover changing the amount of solar input into the climate system. The 4th possibility (the
climate system is
relatively insensitive to forcing) is the top contender in the opinion of myself, Dick Lindzen, and a few other climate
researchers who work in this field. The 5th possibility (increasing GHGs don’t really cause warming) is total anathema to the IPCC.
Without GHG warming, the whole AGW movement collapses. This kind of scientific finding would normally be Nobel Prize territory…except that
the Nobel Prize has become more of a socio-political award in recent years, with only politically correct recipients. The self-flagellating elites
humans might not be destroying the Earth. The longer we go without significant
warming, the more obvious it will become that there is something seriously wrong with current AGW
theory. I don’t think there is a certain number of years – 5, 10, 20, etc. – which will disprove the science of AGW….unless the climate system
don’t like the idea
cools for the next 10 years. Eek! But I personally doubt that will happen.
( ) Species can adapt – especially in tropical hotspots
Wiley Sciences ‘12
(Citing research carried out at the University of Zurich led by Dr Richard Walters, David Berger now at Uppsala University and Wolf
Blanckenhorn, Professor of Evolutionary Ecology at Zurich, “Newsflash: tropical species adapt to temperature changes,”
http://wattsupwiththat.com/2012/08/16/newsflash-tropical-species-adapt-to-temperature-changes/#more-69341)
In the face of a changing climate many species must adapt or perish. Ecologists
studying evolutionary responses to climate
change forecast that cold-blooded tropical species are not as vulnerable to extinction as previously
thought. The study, published in the British Ecological Society’s Functional Ecology, considers how fast species can evolve and
adapt to compensate for a rise in temperature. The research, carried out at the University of Zurich, was led by Dr Richard
Walters, now at Reading University, alongside David Berger now at Uppsala University and Wolf Blanckenhorn, Professor of Evolutionary
Ecology at Zurich. “Forecasting the fate of any species is difficult, but it is essential for conserving biodiversity and managing natural resources,”
said lead author Dr Walters. “It
is believed that climate change poses a greater risk to tropical cold-blooded
organisms (ectotherms), than temperate or polar species. However, as potential adaptation to climate
change has not been considered in previous extinction models we tested this theory with a model
forecasting evolutionary responses.” Ectotherms, such as lizards and insects, have evolved a specialist physiology to flourish in a
stable tropical environment. Unlike species which live in varied habitats tropical species operate within a
narrow range of temperatures, leading to increased dangers if those temperatures change. “When its
environment changes an organism can respond by moving away, adapting its physiology over time or,
over generations, evolving,” said Walters. “The first two responses are easy to identify, but a species’ ability to adapt
quick enough to respond to climate change is an important and unresolved question for ecologists .” The
team explored the idea that there are also evolutionary advantages for species adapted to warmer environments. The ‘hotter is better’ theory
suggests that
species which live in high temperatures will have higher fitness, resulting from a shorter
generation time. This may allow them to evolve relatively quicker than species in temperate environments. The team
sought to directly compare the increased risk of extinction associated with lower genetic variance, owing to temperature specialisation, with
the lowered risk of extinction associated with a shorter generation time. “Our
model shows that the evolutionary
advantage of a shorter generation time should compensate species which are adapted to narrow
temperature ranges,” said Walters. “We forecast that the relative risk of extinction is likely to be lower for
tropical species than temperate ones.” “The tropics are home to the greatest biodiversity on earth, so
it imperative that the risk of extinction caused by climate change is understood,” concluded Walters. “While
many questions remain, our theoretical predictions suggest tropical species may not be as vulnerable
to climate warming as previously thought.”
( ) Feedbacks are net negative
Spencer ‘8
(Roy W. Ph.D., climatologist, author, former NASA scientist, “Satellite and Climate Model Evidence Against Substantial Manmade Climate
Change (supercedes “Has the Climate Sensitivity Holy Grail Been Found?”)”, Roy W. Spencer, 12/27/08,
http://www.drroyspencer.com/research-articles/satellite-and-climate-model-evidence/)
The comparisons modelers make between their models and satellite data are typically rather crude and cursory.
They are not sufficiently detailed to really say anything of substance about feedbacks — in either the models or the
satellite data – and yet it is the feedbacks that will determine how serious the manmade global warming
problem will be. And as I have tried to demonstrate here, the main reason for the current inadequacy of such
methods of comparison between models and observations is the contaminating effect of clouds causing
temperatures to change (forcing) when trying to estimate how temperatures cause clouds to change
(feedback). This not a new issue, as it has been addressed by Forster and Gregory (2006, applied to satellite measurements) and Forster
and Taylor (2006, applied to climate model output). I have merely demonstrated that the same contamination occurs from internal fluctuations
The bottom line from the model and observational evidence presented here is that: Net
feedbacks in the real climate system — on both short and long time scales — are probably negative. A
misinterpretation of cloud behavior has led climate modelers to build models in which cloud feedbacks
are instead positive, which has led the models to predict too much global warming in response to
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions.
in clouds in the climate system.
Extensions – No Warming
( ) No warming – models are wrong, feedbacks are negative and its cyclical
Evans ‘11
(David, doctor in electrical engineering, worked from 1999 to 2006 for the Australian Greenhouse Office, an agency of the Australian
government, designing a carbon accounting system, “Climate models are fundamentally flawed as they greatly overestimate the temperature
increases due to carbon dioxide,” 3/23, http://www.ted.com/conversations/2533/climate_models_are_fundamental.html)
The core idea of every official climate model: for each bit of warming due to carbon dioxide, it ends up
causing three bits of warming due to the extra moist air. The climate models amplify the carbon dioxide
warming by a factor of three – so two thirds of their projected warming is due to extra moist air (and other factors), only
one third is due to extra carbon dioxide. This is the core of the issue. All the disagreements spring from this. The alarmist case is
based on this guess about moisture in the atmosphere. There is simply no evidence for the
amplification that is at the core of their alarmism. Weather balloons had been measuring the atmosphere since the 1960’s. The
climate models all predict that as the planet warms, a hot-spot of moist air will develop over the
tropics about 10km up. Weather balloons have found no hot-spot. Not even a small one. This evidence proves the
climate models are fundamentally flawed and they greatly overestimate the temperature increases
due to carbon dioxide. There are now several independent pieces of evidence showing that the earth responds to the
warming due to extra carbon dioxide by dampening the warming. In the US, nearly 90% of official thermometers
surveyed by volunteers violate official siting requirements that they not be too close to an artificial heating source. Global temperature is also
measured by satellites, which measure nearly the whole planet 24/7 without bias. The satellites say the hottest recent year was 1998, and that
since 2001 the global temperature has leveled off. So what is really going on with the climate? The earth has been in a warming trend since the
The Pacific Decadal Oscillation causes alternating global warming and cooling for
25 – 30 years at a go in each direction. Having just finished a warming phase, expect mild global
cooling for the next two decades.
Little Ice Age around 1680.
( ) Aerosols block warming now
Biello ‘11
(David Biello- award-winning online associate editor for environment and energy for Scientific American- Stratospheric Pollution Helps Slow
Global Warming-July 11 2011- http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=stratospheric-pollution-helps-slow-global-warming)
research suggests that for the past decade, such stratospheric aerosols—injected into the atmosphere by either
recent volcanic eruptions or human activities such as coal burning—are slowing down global warming. "Aerosols acted to
keep warming from being as big as it would have been," says atmospheric scientist John Daniel of the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA) Earth System Research Laboratory, who helped lead the
research published online in Science on July 21. "It's still warming, it's just not warming as much as it would have
been." Essentially, sulfur dioxide gets emitted near the surface, either by a coal-fired power plant's smokestack or a volcano. If that SO2
makes it to the stratosphere—the middle layer of the atmosphere 10 kilometers up—it forms droplets of diluted sulfuric acid,
known as aerosols. These aerosols reflect sunlight away from the planet, shading the surface and
cooling temperatures. And some can persist for a few years, prolonging that cooling. By analyzing satellite data and
other measures, Daniel and his colleagues found that such aerosols have been on the rise in Earth's atmosphere in
the past decade, nearly doubling in concentration. That concentration has reflected roughly 0.1 watts per meter squared of
sunlight away from the planet, enough to o/ffset roughly one-third of the 0.28 watts per meter squared of extra heat trapped by rising
atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide. The researchers calculate that the aerosols
prevented 0.07 degrees Celsius of warming in average temperatures since 2000.
Now,
( ) Temperatures this decade have balanced out- no changes
Totty ‘9
Michael Totty, 2009 news editor in the WSJ's San Francisco bureau. reporter, editor and podcaster
(http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703819904574551303527570212.html) Wall Street Journal, “What Global Warming?”,
December 6, 2009)
But this isn't evidence of a cooling planet. Partly, it's a result of picking an exceptionally hot year—
1998—as a starting point. That year experienced an unusually strong El Niño, a natural and periodic
warming of the Pacific Ocean that can have powerful effects on global climate. The long-term trend
since the mid-1970s shows warming per decade of about 0.18 degree Celsius (about 0.32 degree Fahrenheit).
That temperatures this decade have hardly increased demonstrates how natural year-to-year variations
in climate can either add to or subtract from the long-term warming trend caused by the increase in
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. The '00s still have been exceptionally warm: The 12 years from 1997 through 2008 were
among the 15 warmest on record, and the decade itself was hotter than any previous 10-year period. While 2008 was the coolest
year since 2000—a result of the cooling counterpart of El Niño—it was still the 11th-warmest year on record. And 2009
is on track to be among the five warmest.
Extensions – Not Anthropogenic
( ) Sunspots cause warming – new isotope records prove
Watts ‘11
(Anthony, Meteorologist and president of IntelliWeather Inc., citing “A new approach to the long-term reconstruction of the solar irradiance
leads to large historical solar forcing,” a study conducted by the World Radiation Center in Switzerland, “New solar reconstruction paper
suggests 6x greater solar forcing change than cited by the IPCC,” 5/10, http://wattsupwiththat.com/2011/05/10/new-solar-reconstructionpaper-suggests-6x-tsi-change-than-cited-by-the-ipcc/)
This recent paper published in the journal Astronomy & Astrophysics here has done a
reconstruction of TSI using Beryllium 10 isotope records combined with sunspot records. The paper
suggests that the Total Solar Irradiance (TSI) has increased since the end of the Little Ice Age (around
1850) by up to 6 x more than cited by the IPCC. Here is how they did it:
For the reconstruction to the past this amplitude is scaled with proxies for solar activity. Two proxies are available for the
reconstruction: Group sunspot number, which is available from the present to 1610 AD, and the solar modulation
potential extending back to circa 7300 BC. The latter is a measure of the heliospheric shielding from cosmic rays derived
from the analysis of cosmogenic isotope abundances in tree rings or ice cores, and is available with a time resolution of 2-3
solar cycles (Steinhilber et al. 2008). Although sunspot number dropped to zero for a long time during the
Maunder minimum, the solar cycle was uninterrupted (Beer et al. 1998; Usoskin et al. 2001) and the modulation
potential did not fall to zero. Hence, a reconstruction based solely on sunspot number may
underestimate the solar activity during theMaunderminimum. Therefore in our reconstruction we used the solar
modulation potential to calculate the long-term variations and sunspot number to superpose them
with the 11-year cycle variations (see the Online Section 6.2). The modulation potential used in the calculations is based on the
This is interesting.
composite of data determined from the cosmogenic isotope records of 10Be and neutronmonitor. 10Be data are available up to about 1970
(McCracken et al. 2004) and neutron monitor data, which are used to calculate the current solar modulation potential, are available since the
1950s.
( ) Prefer our methodology – cites ice cores and monitoring
Shapiro et al. ‘11
(A. I. Shapiro, W. Schmutz, E. Rozanov, M. Schoell, M. Haberreiter, A. V. Shapiro and S. Nyeki, researchers for the World Radiation Center,
Switzerland and Institute for Atmospheric and Climate science ETH, Switzerland, “A new approach to the long-term reconstruction of the solar
irradiance leads to large historical solar forcing,” 2/22, http://wattsupwiththat.com/2011/05/10/new-solar-reconstruction-paper-suggests-6xtsi-change-than-cited-by-the-ipcc/)
The variable Sun is the most likely candidate for the natural forcing of past climate changes on time scales of
50 to 1000 years. Evidence for this understanding is that the terrestrial climate correlates positively with the solar
activity. During the past 10 000 years, the Sun has experienced the substantial variations in activity and there have been numerous attempts
to reconstruct solar irradiance. While there is general agreement on how solar forcing varied during the last several hundred years – all
reconstructions are proportional to the solar activity –
there is scientific controversy on the magnitude of solar
forcing. Aims. We present a reconstruction of the total and spectral solar irradiance covering 130 nm–10 μm from 1610 to the present with
an annual resolution and for the Holocene with a 22-year resolution. Methods. We assume that the minimum state of the quiet Sun in time
we use available long-term proxies of the solar
activity, which are 10Be isotope concentrations in ice cores and 22-year smoothed neutron monitor data,
to interpolate between the present quiet Sun and the minimum state of the quiet Sun. This
determines the long-term trend in the solar variability, which is then superposed with the 11-year activity cycle calculated
from the sunspot number. The time-dependent solar spectral irradiance from about 7000 BC to the present is
then derived using a state-of-the-art radiation code.
corresponds to the observed quietest area on the present Sun. Then
Conclusions
We present a new technique to reconstruct total and spectral solar irradiance over the Holocene. We
obtained a large historical solar forcing between the Maunder minimum and the present, as well as a
significant increase in solar irradiance in the first half of the twentieth-century. Our value of the
historical solar forcing is remarkably larger than other estimations published in the recent literature.
Extensions – Feedbacks are Negative
( ) Positive feedback models wrong, their impacts exaggerated
Happer ‘12
(William is a professor of physics at Princeton. “Global Warming Models Are Wrong Again”, Wall Street Journal, 3/27/12,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304636404577291352882984274.html)
The direct warming due to doubling
CO2 levels in the atmosphere can be calculated to cause a warming of about one
degree Celsius. The IPCC computer models predict a much larger warming, three degrees Celsius or even
more, because they assume changes in water vapor or clouds that supposedly amplify the direct
warming from CO2. Many lines of observational evidence suggest that this "positive feedback" also has been
greatly exaggerated. There has indeed been some warming, perhaps about 0.8 degrees Celsius, since the end of the socalled Little Ice Age in the early 1800s. Some of that warming has probably come from increased amounts of CO2, but the timing of the
warming—much of it before CO2 levels had increased appreciably—suggests that a substantial fraction
of the warming is from natural causes that have nothing to do with mankind.
( ) Empirics proves feedbacks are negative
Worstall ‘12
(Tim, writer for Forbes, “If the MWP Was Global What Does That Tell Us About Climate Change Now?”
http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2012/03/23/if-the-mwp-was-global-what-does-that-tell-us-about-climate-change-now/)
That the Earth has temperature cycles isn’t a surprise, we all know there were Ice Ages. So that we had a time when temperatures
were higher than now and everything was just dandy doesn’t mean that it will all remain dandy if we carry on in our current manner. However,
the great unknown of climate change science is “climate sensitivity”. This is how much temperature will
rise given a doubling of atmospheric CO2 (technically, CO2-equivalent, converting all the methane etc to one handy unit). We
know how much will come directly: 0.7 of a degree. That isn’t something to worry overmuch about. The
question then becomes, well, what happens then: when the ice melts and albedo lowers, when warmer weather
and higher CO2 increase plant growth, what happens to clouds and so on through a list of hundreds of
possible feedbacks. We don’t even know if some of these will be positive or negative, will further increase
temperatures or reduce them and we certainly don’t know what the cumulative effect will be. Currently the best
guesses are in the 2 to 4.5 degree range but these are indeed guesses. Well informed guesses, being done with a variety of methods by very
And the most important information underlying them is,
happened previous times the Earth got warmer? Did it carry on doing so? Or did it get so far and stop or even
retreat? Which is where the MWP comes in. If it was a truly global phenomenon then we’ve more
evidence (only more evidence, nothing conclusive at all) that rises in temperature similar to what we’re seeing
don’t, always, carry on. Sometimes at least they stop of their own accord: could be solar action, could
be feedbacks. From which the takeaway point is that perhaps climate sensitivity is lower than currently
thought and thus climate change is less dangerous than currently thought.
*Note: MWP = Medieval Warming Period
good scientists trying to get at the truth but they are guesses.
well, what
( ) Err neg – if feedbacks are somewhere in the middle adaptation solves
Ridley ‘12
(Matt, writer for Wired Magazine, “Apocalypse Not: Here’s Why You Shouldn’t Worry About End Times,” 8/17,
http://www.wired.com/wiredscience/2012/08/ff_apocalypsenot/all)
So, should we worry or not about the warming climate? It is far too binary a question. The lesson of
failed past predictions of ecological apocalypse is not that nothing was happening but that the middleground possibilities were too frequently excluded from consideration. In the climate debate, we hear a lot
from those who think disaster is inexorable if not inevitable, and a lot from those who think it is all a hoax. We hardly ever allow the
moderate “lukewarmers” a voice: those who suspect that the net positive feedbacks from water
vapor in the atmosphere are low, so that we face only 1 to 2 degrees Celsius of warming this century;
that the Greenland ice sheet may melt but no faster than its current rate of less than 1 percent per
century; that net increases in rainfall (and carbon dioxide concentration) may improve agricultural
productivity; that ecosystems have survived sudden temperature lurches before; and that adaptation
to gradual change may be both cheaper and less ecologically damaging than a rapid and brutal
decision to give up fossil fuels cold turkey. We’ve already seen some evidence that humans can forestall warmingrelated catastrophes. A good example is malaria, which was once widely predicted to get worse as a result of
climate change. Yet in the 20th century, malaria retreated from large parts of the world, including North America and Russia,
even as the world warmed. Malaria-specific mortality plummeted in the first decade of the current century by an astonishing 25
percent. The weather may well have grown more hospitable to mosquitoes during that time. But any effects of warming were more
than counteracted by pesticides, new antimalarial drugs, better drainage, and economic development.
Experts such as Peter Gething at Oxford argue that these trends will continue, whatever the weather. Just as policy
can make the climate crisis worse—mandating biofuels has not only encouraged rain forest destruction, releasing carbon, but
driven millions into poverty and hunger—technology can make it better. If plant breeders boost rice yields, then
people may get richer and afford better protection against extreme weather. If nuclear engineers
make fusion (or thorium fission) cost-effective, then carbon emissions may suddenly fall. If gas
replaces coal because of horizontal drilling, then carbon emissions may rise more slowly. Humanity is
a fast-moving target. We will combat our ecological threats in the future by innovating to meet them
as they arise, not through the mass fear stoked by worst-case scenarios.
Extensions – Models Fail
( ) Observational evidence disproves climate models
Evans ‘12
(David has a PhD in electrical engineering, worked from 1999 to 2006 for the Australian Greenhouse Office, an agency of the Australian
government, designing a carbon accounting system, Financial Post, "Global Warming Theory Is Based on False Science.",7 Apr. 2011)
The planet reacts to that extra carbon dioxide, which changes everything. Most critically, the extra warmth
causes more water to evaporate from the oceans. But does the water hang around and increase the
height of moist air in the atmosphere, or does it simply create more clouds and rain? Back in 1980, when
the carbon dioxide theory started, no one knew. The alarmists guessed that it would increase the
height of moist air around the planet, which would warm the planet even further, because the moist
air is also a greenhouse gas. This is the core idea of every official climate model: For each bit of
warming due to carbon dioxide, they claim it ends up causing three bits of warming due to the extra
moist air. The climate models amplify the carbon dioxide warming by a factor of three—so two-thirds of their projected warming is due to
extra moist air (and other factors); only one-third is due to extra carbon dioxide. That's the core of the issue. All the disagreements
and misunderstandings spring from this. The alarmist case is based on this guess about moisture in
the atmosphere, and there is simply no evidence for the amplification that is at the core of their
alarmism. Weather balloons had been measuring the atmosphere since the 1960s, many thousands of them every year. The climate
models all predict that as the planet warms, a hot spot of moist air will develop over the tropics about
10 kilometres up, as the layer of moist air expands upwards into the cool dry air above. During the
warming of the late 1970s, '80s and '90s, the weather balloons found no hot spot. None at all. Not even
a small one. This evidence proves that the climate models are fundamentally flawed, that they greatly
overestimate the temperature increases due to carbon dioxide. This evidence first became clear around the mid1990s.
( ) Models aren’t detailed enough – prefer observational evidence
Spencer ‘8
(Roy W. Ph.D., climatologist, author, former NASA scientist, “Satellite and Climate Model Evidence Against Substantial Manmade Climate
Change (supercedes “Has the Climate Sensitivity Holy Grail Been Found?”)”, Roy W. Spencer, 12/27/08,
http://www.drroyspencer.com/research-articles/satellite-and-climate-model-evidence/)
What I
have presented here is, as far as I know, the most detailed attempt to reconcile satellite observations of
with the behavior of climate models in the context of feedbacks. Instead of the currently
popular practice of building immensely complex and expensive climate models and then making only simple
comparisons to satellite data, I have done just the opposite: Examine the satellite data in great detail, and
then build the simplest model that can explain the observed behavior of the climate system. The
resulting picture that emerges is of an IN-sensitive climate system, dominated by negative feedback.
And it appears that the reason why most climate models are instead VERY sensitive is due to the illusion of a
sensitive climate system that can arise when one is not careful about the physical interpretation of
how clouds operate in terms of cause and effect (forcing and feedback). Indeed, climate researchers seldom (if
ever) dig into the archives of satellite data and ask the question, “What are the satellite data telling us
about the real climate system?” Instead, most climate research money now is funneled into building expensive climate models
the climate system
which are then expected to provide a basis for formulating public policy. Given the immense effort that has been invested, one would think that
those models would be more rigorously tested. There is nothing inherently wrong with a model-centric approach to climate research…as long
as the modeler continues to use the observations to guide the model development over time. Unfortunately, as Richard Lindzen at MIT has
the fact that modelers use the term “model validation” rather than “model testing” belies
their inherent preference of theory over observations. The allure of models is strong: they are clean, with well-defined
equations and mathematical precision. Observations of the real climate system are dirty, incomplete, and prone to measurement error. The
comparisons modelers make between their models and satellite data are typically rather crude and cursory.
They are not sufficiently detailed to really say anything of substance about feedbacks — in either the models or the
satellite data – and yet it is the feedbacks that will determine how serious the manmade global warming
problem will be.
pointed out,
A-to War Impact
( ) Climate change does not cause wars or conflict between nations
Tertais ‘11
Bruno Tertrais Senior Research Fellow at the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratgique (FRS). He graduated from the Institut d'études politiques
de Paris in 1984. He holds a Master's degree in Public Law (1985) and a Doctorate in Political Science (1994), Summer 2011 “The Climate Wars
Myth” http://csis.org/files/publication/twq11summertertrais.pdf
So much for ‘‘climate wars.’’ But the idea according to which climate change is nevertheless a new,
important factor to be taken into account in defense and security planning is itself questionable. Of course,
nothing precludes us from including it in the growing list of non-military issues that may have a bearing on global security. But this has to
be done in a realistic way. It is not unreasonable to state that climate change may be a ‘‘threat
multiplier,’’ for instance. However, stating this says nothing about the probability of increased violence or instability either at the
global level or for a given crisis, or about the likelihood of state failure. Such consequences depend primarily on the reaction of governments
and societies a factor which is impossible to calculate in advance.
There are no data to support the vague idea that
climate change can have a key role in triggering collective violence that is, be the proverbial straw that
breaks the camel’s back, as argued by an alarmist study (citing once again the example of Darfur).
Climate is ‘‘one of myriad factors in a complex causal web underlying conflict,’’ and the environment is
just ‘‘one of manifold and nonessential causal factors’’ which may lead to war. The main causes of contemporary
conflict are societal, not natural (in the broadest sense of the term, i.e., including man-made). Conflicts are borne out of human
choices and mistakes. Could regional previsions of the impact of climate change at least inform
policymakers and planners about the areas of the world which are more likely all things being equal to
suffer from them? The answer is no. Regional effects are extremely difficult to predict with the degree of probability which can be
useful for planning. The IPCC itself underscores that current models do not have the ability to deliver useful previsions at a higher scale than the
continental one. Nobody knows, for instance, whether African monsoons will move northwards (with positive effects on agriculture) or
southwards (with negative effects). Here, as noted by a contributor to the IPCC, ‘‘there is complete disagreement between the various models.’’
And when the IPCC attempts to give regional previsions on the evolution of agricultural output, for instance, it is in a way which does not
buttress the case for alarmism. Its 2007 report mentions a possible reduction by 50 percent of rain-fed agricultural output in some African
countries in 2020. But the sole source it cites to support this claim is a report produced for a Canadian non-governmental organization in which
There are indeed, it seems, some
causal links between climate and warfare. But they are of a seasonal nature: ‘‘nations address seasonal
climate change in terms of where they fight, rather than through when or whether disputes occur. . . .
Fighting moves to higher latitudes in the summer, and lower latitudes during the cooler months of the
year.’’ The stakes of climate change are important and that is why this area should not be the object of intellectual fantasies or fashions. It is
appropriate for defense and security planners to monitor the evolution of the scientific and political debate on its possible consequences. But
there is no objective reason today to list climate change as a key issue for defense and security planning.
it is mentioned that (unpublished) studies evoke this scenario for three Maghreb countries.