Alexander Green
December 1, 2015
Mad Science: The Khan Network and the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
Since the first detonations of nuclear weapons in Hiroshima and Nagasaki decades ago,
the issue of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons has weighed heavy on the mind of
nations and policy analysts the world over. The NPT was formed largely as a means of
preventing countries with nuclear expertise from engaging in proliferation, and for most of its
history has been relatively successful in doing so. But the biggest proliferation threat faced by
the NPT has turned out not to be an actual state actor, but instead, a mad scientist: Abdul Qadeer
Khan. Khan was one of Pakistan’s leading nuclear scientists, and ultimately built a black market
network that has spread nuclear technology to countries as far flung as Iran, North Korea, and
Libya. While Khan was ultimately exposed, it is believed that some of his network remains
intact, and is still a threat to global nonproliferation goals to this day.
The Khan network initially began as a means of procuring nuclear technology for
Pakistan through clandestine, black market channels.1 Khan was the founder and head scientist
for Pakistan’s nascent nuclear program, but lacked the technology and scientific tools to build
the program on his own. He acquired an initial list of potential suppliers from a URENCO lab in
the Netherlands, bringing the data back to Pakistan so that he could begin seeking out and
purchasing nuclear technology and equipment.2 According to Leonard Weiss, Khan ended up
1
2
Lin "The AQ Khan Revelations and Subsequent Changes to Pakistani Export Controls | NTI."
Weiss "Turning a Blind Eye Again? The Khan Network's History and Lessons for U.S. Policy."
acquiring technology from “businessmen and firms in a variety of different nations, including the
United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Germany, South Africa, Switzerland, and
Turkey, among others.”3 The United States was largely aware that this was happening, but chose
to prioritize its relationship with Pakistan rather than attempt any real measures to prevent the
spread of the vital nuclear technology. Congressional amendments were passed, including the
Pressler amendment, which threatened to sanction Pakistan if it was discovered to possess a
nuclear weapon, but the executive branch largely put off invoking these laws until 1990, roughly
three years after Pakistan was believed to have already possessed the bomb.4 In the end, despite
Khan’s underhanded methods, he was largely allowed to continue building his network
unopposed.
Once Pakistan possessed the nuclear bomb, however, Khan’s ambitions grew further, and
became more personal. He began to realize that his various black market connections, which he
had used to acquire nuclear technology for his home country of Pakistan, could also be used for
the opposite purpose: disseminating nuclear technology and expertise to countries that did not
currently possess it, which could build some relationships and benefits and for Pakistan, but
more importantly, could enrich Khan himself.5 Khan’s laboratory began promoting itself at arms
conventions and other venues, publishing some scientific papers to prove its credibility, and
largely strived to spread its products to an abundance of regimes that sought to acquire nuclear
weapons technology for themselves.6 The most significant customers of Khan’s were from three
major countries: Iran, North Korea, and Libya. Of these three, the North Koreans eventually
3
Weiss "Turning a Blind Eye Again? The Khan Network's History and Lessons for U.S. Policy."
Weiss "Turning a Blind Eye Again? The Khan Network's History and Lessons for U.S. Policy."
5
Weiss "Turning a Blind Eye Again? The Khan Network's History and Lessons for U.S. Policy."
6
Weiss "Turning a Blind Eye Again? The Khan Network's History and Lessons for U.S. Policy."
4
acquired a functional bomb, while Iran has settled for a functioning, and so far peaceful, nuclear
energy program. Libya ultimately decided to dismantle its own nuclear program in an attempt to
build closer relationships with the west.
After Khan’s dealings with Libya were exposed, the Pakistani government had no choice
but to shut him down, and placed him under house arrest in Pakistan. However, the Pakistani
government has kept him under tight lock and key, refusing to turn him over to international
investigators.7 It remains a mystery to this day just how much support Khan might have had
from the actual Pakistani government. Khan himself claims to be largely a scapegoat, protecting
higher echelons of the Pakistani government from being brought to justice by international
investigators. Nevertheless, it has become clear that the Khan network has outlived the man
himself, and that many of its channel and suppliers remain functional, representing a real and
present threat to the NPT and its goals of preventing further proliferation of nuclear weapons
technology.
Experiential Learning Project Proposal:
For the experiential learning portion of the project, I would like to write a research paper
that delves deeper into what remains of Khan’s network in the present day. This topic is quite
murky, and much of the information that would be useful to have in order to write it is likely
kept hidden away from the public sphere. Nevertheless, I think it would be fascinating to delve
into what knowledge has trickled into the public sphere, so that we can explore the current nature
of Khan’s network as it stands today. This would be divided into three major themes: what
support, if any, did Khan receive under the table from the Pakistani government (and to what
7
Weiss "Turning a Blind Eye Again? The Khan Network's History and Lessons for U.S. Policy."
extent, if any, was he used as a scapegoat), what major companies and individuals (that we know
of) made up the bulk of his supply network, and to what extent, if any, is his network still known
to exist without him?
For the first theme, the issue of how much support Khan received from the Pakistani
government remains an open questions, with a variety of differing viewpoints. Some view Khan
as simply a rogue “mad scientist”, operating under the nose of the Pakistani government to
achieve his own selfish ends, financially and politically. Others believe that his operations were
carried out with the tacit approval of the Pakistani government, allowing them to build
relationships with various rogue states through the transfer of nuclear technology, without
officially dirtying their own hands. In this narrative, Khan himself was used as a scapegoat by
the Pakistani administration, allowing them to deny all knowledge of his nefarious schemes
while simultaneously protecting themselves from retribution by their allies, in particular the
United States. I would like to delve into what primary sources we have available and determine
what logical conclusions we can safely come to, if any, about how involved the Pakistani
government was in Khan’s dealings.
For the second theme, I would like to explore the exact nature and makeup of Khan’s
criminal network. Which companies and individuals made up his network? How did they
operate? What were their motives, if any exist other than sheer desire for greater profits? Now
obviously, this research would come with some serious caveats. The exact nature of Khan’s
network is hardly public knowledge, and even the CIA and other top notch intelligence agencies
are still trying to piece together the nature of Khan’s network. It is likely that we will never
know the exact nature of how the network was made up and how it functioned. Nevertheless, I
would like to examine whatever public knowledge does exist, and whatever primary sources are
available to the public, in order to determine the current state of public knowledge of the Khan
network and how it operated.
Finally, and similarly to my second theme, I would like to examine the third theme of
chronicling to what extent the Khan network still exists, despite the takedown of its founder.
Khan remains in house arrest in Pakistan, under the protection of the Pakistani government. The
government of Pakistan has so far refused to allow international investigators to have access to
Khan, and the extent to which his network remains intact is largely a mystery. As with my
second point above, this would come with some serious caveats. The extent to which the Khan
network still operates without him is a matter of some debate and controversy, even among the
top intelligence agencies. Moreover, even the information that is currently possessed by these
agencies can hardly expected to be widely available to the public for any college student to write
an essay on. Nevertheless, I would like to be able to summarize what the current state of our
knowledge on the subject is, based on publicly available sources and testimony, in order to
uncover exactly what we can safely say we know about the Khan network and how it operates in
his absence.
Works Cited
Lin, Shi-chin. "The AQ Khan Revelations and Subsequent Changes to Pakistani Export Controls
| NTI." NTI: Nuclear Threat Initiative. Nuclear Threat Initiative, 01 Dec. 2004. Web. 01
Dec. 2015.
Weiss, Leonard. "Turning a Blind Eye Again? The Khan Network's History and Lessons for U.S.
Policy." Arms Control Association. Arms Control Association, 1 Mar. 2005. Web. 01
Dec. 2015.