Ontology and Change
BA 740 1
Kurt Stuke
What can be learned from the study of change as it applies to social phenomena? Specifically,
what can be learned from examining the “that which endures” change, i.e. the “really real.”
Some thinkers characterize the socially “really real” in terms of ideas or concepts, e.g.
Lieberman. Some thinkers tend to stress structure or institution as the “really real,” e.g. Sewell.
Others seem to craft a sort of hybrid among the ideational and the structural as the “really real,”
e.g. Steinmo. Despite the tact taken, within this overall approach, the “really real” is taken as
QED or as some sort of given. The role taken by the above-mentioned thinkers, when
contemplating change, is to describe the erosion or impact, caused by change, to the “really
real.” This essay presents two brief examples of two attempts to explain change using precisely
the described apparatus and methodology as described above. The examples are followed by a
critique and a brief conclusion, in which, a different approach is suggested.
T.H. Marshall is known for his positing of “social citizenship.” Marshall is an odd sort of
structuralist in that he is identifying the “really real” with “social citizenship.” His treatment of
citizenship begins with the identification of citizenship as “a status bestowed on those who are
full members of a community.” (18) [. ← The period belongs after the parentheses.] He contends
that as the structure of community evolves historically, the meaning and reality of that structure
also develop. Marshall characterizes the eighteenth century as establishing “civil citizenship,”
the nineteenth century as evolving into “political citizenship,” and, finally, the twentieth century
as culminating in “social citizenship.” (8) Thus, a citizen of eighteenth century England would
understand the “purpose” or “end” of citizenship civilly, i.e. in terms of basic freedoms such as
speech, thought, and commerce. As change introduced more freedoms, the structure/community
grew to understand and re-envision citizenship in terms of participating and sharing in political
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power. (8) Once the civil and political layers are in place, argues Marshall, the stage is set for
“social citizenship.” (8) Within this enlightened state, the role of change is primarily done. No
higher social evolutionary state can be attained as, within this structure/state, the needs of the
community have become the needs of the individual. In short, Marshall is arguing that each stage
within the structure of citizenship defined citizenship in accordance with how each stage defined
and afforded the “really real.”
The curious Marshallian utopia does insist on the need for some distinctly non-utopic
elements. In his vision, the tension between the freedom as introduced by opportunity and the
freedom as introduced by a distribution of primary goods is resolved in favor of opportunity.
Marshall employs a building analogy in order to present his favoring of opportunity. He
describes the point of social evolution and the rise to social citizenship not as mere “class
abatement” but as a genuine raising of the structure (his term, not mine) above the muck and
mire of suffering (28) [What does Marshall mean here by “structure?”]. Thus, capitalism is not a
temporary fix (such as offered in structures which attempt to forcefully redistribute social goods
and reduce opportunity) but a permanent move towards social justice as made possible through
opportunity.
While Marshall’s structure revolves around the force of change as introduced through
history [I’m not sure I understand what you mean by this point. What is the mechanism that
provokes change in Marshall’s historical account?], Polanyi’s quasi - ideational treatment
revolves around an ethical claim that humanity (and its needs) ought not to be subordinated to
market forces. Specifically, he cites the treatment of land, labor, and money as commodities (his
so-called “fictitious commodities”) as inverting the natural ethical and ontological prioritization
of humanity over the needs generated by an economy. According to Polanyi, when this inversion
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Kurt Stuke
occurs a conflict arises between the desire of the market economy to grow and the desire for
protection against such growth. Ultimately, it is this very tension among desires that is the cause
of conflict and therefore the agent of transformation/change. [And how does this point relate
back to Marshall? Or perhaps Marshall adopts the same point of departure to make his own
claim?]
According to Polanyi, the ideational battle between growth and protection can be
understood to have one observable starting point with the introduction of the so-called
“Speenhamland scale” in eighteenth century England. In 1795, the town of Speenhamland
discussed an ordinance in which a “minimum income should be assured to the poor irrespective
of their earnings.” (82) Although never enacted, the “Speenhamland scale,” as it came to be
called, was adopted throughout the country. The scale essentially offered compensation based on
specific prices of necessary perishables, e.g. milk and bread. Hailed as economic innovation at its
onset, grabbing such labels as the “right to live” program, the outcome of the scale was the very
opposite of its intended outcome, i.e. it pauperized the workers. Thus, as the tension for
protectionism waned, the desire for growth became dominant. The Corn Laws were repealed, the
Reform Act of 1832 was introduced, and the Poor Law of 1834 was established. According to
Polanyi, these actions were the mark of the transition to the market economy within Britain. (86)
The industrialization of England, and, by extension, the world, was born at this time and in this
place.
Change was a necessary and critical element for both Marshall and Polanyi. The role of
change within Marshall’s plan, however, differs from change’s agency according to Polanyi.
Much like a sculptor removes parts of the medium so that the reality hidden within the medium
may be revealed, history, the sculptor, is using change to realize the masterpiece revealed, in
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Kurt Stuke
time, for Marshall. Social citizenship (the structure qua “really real”) is logically prior to change
but a temporal consequent. The role of change for Polanyi is more efficient (in the Aristotelian
sense). While ameliorism is suggested throughout The Great Transformation, Polanyi’s vision
seems less materialistic or deterministic than Marshall’s vision. As the tension between market
growth and the tension born of the need for protection from the consequences of that same
growth battle, change necessarily follows. Polanyi treats the resulting change as purposive; that
is, the resulting change engineers reality, i.e. it is transformative. Thus, for Polanyi, the
ideological conflict of tensions, set against the normative observation that humanity ought not to
be subordinated to economy, is that which is logically prior. Change seems to erupt from the
conflict and sets loose transformative efficiency once awakened. It should not come as a surprise
that both thinkers logically prioritize the reality they embrace as ontologically “really real.”
A critique of the above should rest not on an evaluation of conclusions, but, rather, on an
evaluation of method based on the following observation: is it really the case that, within
experience, ideas and structures, are ontologically discrete? Isn’t the strength of, say, Inglehart’s
approach, precisely that he has attempted to re-integrate that which, in experience, is organically
united? The separation of the ideational and the structural is an artifact of the method; it is a
necessary consequence of a cognitive approach. The flood of theory, in which, the posited
dualism of one pole to another is attempted to be ameliorated (although intellectual impressive)
is not a reflection of reality as we experience it, but only an artifact created by an abstract and
over-intellectualized cognitive method. Ontological assumptions follow from the cognitive
approach. The “really real” is logically prior to and removed from experience. The role of
change, at best, is efficiency but more likely is merely instrumental. Assumptions concerning
truth and meaning also follow. These epistemological entities, much like the ontology assumed,
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are “givens” and demand that we participate in them or perhaps attempt correspondence to them
in order that we may know them. Certainty seems attainable, as long as we stick to the cognitive
rules of engagement, and apply the method correctly. All of these assumptions are
unquestioningly accepted by the cognitive approach yet are clearly contentious in nature.
Perhaps it is these meta-assumptions, and the approach built upon these meta-assumptions, that
should be questioned.
Kurt, your essay is a tremendous inquiry into these questions, but I would like to see you try to
make the genuine move away from your philosophical considerations in the next essay and to
embrace the interdisciplinary side of this program by trying to leave behind your disciplinary
background. You raise profoundly important questions, but I think it will be a genuinely
productive exercise for you to try not to relate other disciplinary lines of inquiry to your
disciplinary background. I realize this is an impossible task, but just as Rawls develops his “veil
of ignorance” as a heuristic device, and recognizes in Justice as Fairness that the device is
simply an intellectual exercise and not a realistically feasible exercise, please try to write the next
essay as though you are going behind this veil of ignorance. The final essay will ask you to
return to your area of strength and comfort, but I want you to focus on the relative claims of the
Seminar 2 authors in the second essay. Again, your essay is tremendous in its insight and
precision and is without question an “A,” so please accept my comments entirely as constructive
criticism and as an effort to help you grow as a scholar. Kirk