Central European University
Department of Philosophy
KILLING
Dr. Andrés Moles
Molesa@ceu.edu
Office Hours: TBD (please send an e-mail 24hrs before.)
Vigyaxo F. u. 2, 223.
Elective Course, 4 Credits
Fall 2015
There is a prima facie duty not kill people. But, in certain circumstances it seems permissible
to do so. The course explores under which conditions killing is morally acceptable and the
kinds of constraints that we face when killing someone. We will address some of the
following questions: do we have to save the greater number of people? When is killing in
self-defence permissible? Is abortion morally acceptable? What constraints do apply when
killing in war?
Aims:
 To trigger an understanding of central discussions in contemporary moral philosophy
around the problem of killing.
 To foster the ability to analyse and discuss arguments in moral philosophy.
 To foster the ability to communicate both orally and in writing arguments in moral
philosophy.
 To develop the capacity to learn new ideas and approaches, and to apply them in
research.
Learning outcomes:
At the end of the course the student shall be able to:
 Understand the key positions within contemporary debates in moral philosophy.
 Produce critical and well-structured arguments in moral philosophy.
 Balance and contrast the weakness and strengths of different positions in
contemporary debates in practical ethics.
 Summarise arguments clearly and succinctly.
Requirements:
 All students must read the core reading before the lectures and seminars.
 Attendance is compulsory. You need at least 90% of attendance to get a grade.
 There will be a mid-term assignment, and a final 4000 words paper. The paper’s title
must be pre-approved, so consult me once you have an idea what you want to write about.
You can use some of the seminar questions to formulate the title or any other related topic
you are interested in
Grades will be awarded as follows:
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Mid-term assignment: 25%, participation 15%, presentation 15%, final paper 45%.
Essays are due on the date they are due! Extensions will be granted only in special
circumstances. Late submissions will get a -20% initial penalty, and a -10% daily penalty
afterwards. Organise your time!
Academic dishonesty will be severely penalised. Don’t plagiarise!!
Grades mean the following:
F= Fail. Poor
C+ Minimum Pass. Significant confusions; unawareness of some crucial arguments; poor
written style
B- Satisfactory. Struggles to organize main ideas of the paper. Some confusions, but a general
sense of the main arguments.
B Good. Cover material covered in class, good reconstruction of main arguments, written
expression is clear and succinct
B+ Very good. Cover material covered in class, good reconstruction of main arguments,
written expression is clear and succinct, plus understanding of subsidiary arguments,
familiarity with secondary literature. Some display of analytical skills.
A- Excellent. Cover material covered in class, good reconstruction of main arguments, written
expression is clear and succinct, plus understanding of subsidiary arguments, familiarity with
secondary literature; independent reconstruction of arguments; display of good analytical
skills; some critical engagement with the material.
A outstanding. Cover material covered in class, good reconstruction of main arguments,
written expression is clear and succinct, plus understanding of subsidiary arguments,
familiarity with secondary literature; independent reconstruction of arguments; display of
good analytical skills, signals of independent thought, critical engagement with the
arguments.
The essays must represent a significant piece of independent research; it can be a positive
argument of your own, or a critical argument. They should provide succinct, clear statements
of your positions and of arguments pro and con. Don’t make claims without arguing strongly
for them! Also, when you criticise and argument, use the best counter-argument you find,
don’t waste your time with straw men!
Finally, literary or emotive or heavily jargon-laden style is often unhelpful. Do not write a
one-sided essay: be sure to evaluate the strongest arguments on both sides!
For more on how to write a philosophy paper check Doug Portmore’s ‘Tip on writing a
philosophy paper’ at http://www.public.asu.edu/~dportmor/tips.pdf (also available at the elearning site). See also James Pryor’s guide at
http://www.jimpryor.net/teaching/guidelines/writing.html.
Weekly Program:
Week 1: ‘The Badness of Death’
Week 2: ‘Doing and Allowing: The Doctrine of Double Effect’
Week 3: ‘Self-defence: Rights’
Week 4: ‘Self-defence: Responsibility’
Week 5: ‘Saving numbers’
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Week 6: ‘Abortion’
Week 7: ‘Suicide and Euthanasia’
Week 8: ‘Killing Animals’
Week 9: ‘Poverty’
Week 10: ‘War I’
Week 11: ‘War II’
Week 12 ‘Revision and Conclusions’
Books on practical and general ethics, edited collections and introductions:
 Baron, M., P. Pettit, and M. Slote, Three Methods of Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997)
 Boonin, D., and G. Oddie What's Wrong?: Applied Ethicists and their Critics (New
York: OUP, 2010).
 Cohen, A. and C. Heath Wellman, Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics (Oxford:
Blackwell, 2005).
 Kagan, S., Normative Ethics (Boulder: Westview, 1998).
 La Follette, H. The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000)
 La Follette, H. Ethics in Practice: An Anthology (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997)
 LA Follette, H., The Oxford Handbook of Practical Ethics (Oxford: OUP, 2003).
 Frey, R. G. and C. Heath Wellman, A Companion to Applied Ethics (Oxford,
Blackwell, 2005).
 Pettit, P. (ed) Consequentialism (Dartmouth: Aldershot, 1993).
 Rachels, J. Ethical Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).
 Scheffler, S. Consequentialism and its Critics (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1988)
 Singer, P. Applied Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986)
 Singer, P. A Companion to Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993)
 Timmons, M., Moral Theory: An Introduction (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield,
2002). Another great introduction to moral theory
Week 1.
‘The Badness of Death’
The seminar introduces some of the questions to be discussed during the course. Intuitively
we think that death is bad for us. But is it puzzling that something can be bad for us, when we
no longer exist. We’ll revise some answers to this problem.
Seminar questions:
 How can death be bad for the person who dies?
Core reading:
 Nagel, T. ‘Death’ Noûs, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Feb., 1970), pp. 73-80. This paper has been
reprinted in many other places.
Supplementary reading:
 Benatar, D., Better Never to Have Been, (Oxford: Clarendon, 2006)
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Fischer J. M., (ed.) The Metaphysics of Death, (Stanford: SUP, 1993) A collection of
essays on death
Kagan, S. Death (YUP, 2012)
McMahan, J. ‘Death and the Value of Life’, Ethics, 99 (1988), 32-61
McMahan, J. The Ethics of Killing (Oxford: OUP, 2002)
Parfit, D. Reasons and Persons (Oxford: OUP, 1984).
Week 2.
‘Doing and Allowing: The Doctrine of Double Effect’
Some theories distinguish between intending something and allowing it to happen as a
foreseen consequence of a different act. On many of this views we can explain why bringing
about someone’s death is permissible by appealing to the DDE. We explore the plausibility of
these views.
Seminar questions:
 Is there a moral difference between doing something and allowing it to happen?
 What is the DDE? Is it plausible?
 Is it permissible to turn the trolley? Is this best explained by the DDE?
Core reading:
 Quinn, W. ‘Actions, Intentions and Consequences’ in his Morality and Action, (Cambridge:
CUP, 1993), 175-193
 Thomson J. ‘The Trolley Problem’ in her Rights, Restitution and Risk (Cambridge, Mass:
HUP, 1986).
Supplementary reading:
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Asscher, J., Killing and Letting Die: the Similarity Criterion. Journal of Applied Philosophy,
24 (2007), 271–282
Conway, D. ‘Is Failing to Save Lives as Bad as Killing?’ Journal of Applied Philosophy, 5
(1988).
Frey, R. ‘The Doctrine of the Double Effect’ in Frey, R. G. and C. Heath Wellman, A
Companion to Applied Ethics (Oxford, Blackwell, 2005), 464-74.
Hanser, M. ‘Killing, Letting Die and Preventing People from Being Saved’, Utilitas, 11
(1999).
Kamm, F. ‘Harming Some to Save Others’ Philosophical Studies, 57 (1989).
Kamm, F. ‘Killing and Letting Die: Methodological and Substantive Issues’ Pacific
Philosophical Quarterly, 64 (1983).
Kamm, F. Morality, Mortality Vol II (Oxford: OUP, 1996) Part II.
Norcross, A. ‘Off her trolley? Frances Kamm and the Metaphysics of Morality’ Utilitas, 20,
1 (2008).
Otsuka, M. ‘Double Effect, Triple Effect and the Trolley Problem: Squaring the Circle in
Looping Cases’ Morality’ Utilitas, 20, 1 (2008).
Rakowski, E., ‘Taking and Saving Lives’, Columbia Law Review, 93, (1993), 1063-1156.
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Scanlon, T. Moral Dimensions (Cambridge, Mass: HUP. 2008).
Tadros, V. The Ends of Harm (OUP, 2011))
Tadros, V. ‘Wrongful Intentions without Closeness’, Philosophy & Public Affairs 43, no. 1
(2015): 52–74.
Thomson ‘Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem’ in her Rights, Restitution and Risk
(Cambridge, Mass: HUP, 1986).
Thomson, T. ‘Turning the Trolley’ Philosophy & Public Affairs, 36 (2008) 359-74.
Week 3.
‘Self-defence: Rights’
A popular view holds that we are entitled to kill a person if this is the only way in which we might
save our own life. However, there is some disagreement concerning whether we are always entitled
to do so. We will discuss the challenges that innocent threats pose to a theory of the permissibility of
self-defence. In this session we focus on the claim that defensive harm is permissible whenever the
person who poses a threat will violate a right not to be killed.
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Seminar questions:
Are we ever permitted to kill in self-defence?
Are we ever permitted to kill innocent people in self-defence?
What is the morally relevant difference between human shields and innocent threats?
Is the distinction between eliminative and manipulative agency telling?
Core reading:
 Thomson, J. ‘Self-Defence’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 20, 4, (1991), 283-310.
 Otsuka, M. ‘Killing the Innocent in Self-Defence’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 23, 1
(1994), 74-94.
Week 4
‘Self-defence: Responsibility’
Some people think that it is permissible to impose defensive harm only when the person who poses a
threat is responsible for posing that threat. We analyse this view.
Core reading:
McMahan J., “The Basis of Moral Liability to Defensive Killing,” Philosophical Issues 15, no. 1
(2005): 386–405.
Supplementary reading:
 Benbaji,Y. ‘Culpable Bystanders, Innocent Threats and the Ethics of Self-Defense’,
Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 35,4 (2005), 585-622.
 Frowe, H. ‘Equating Innocent Threats and Bystanders’, Journal of Applied
Philosophy, 25 (2008), 277–90.
 Frowe, H. Defensive Killing (OUP, 2014)
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Kaufman, W., Justified Killing: The Paradox of Self-Defense, (Lanham, MD:
Lexington Books, 2009)
Lazar, S., 'Responsibility, Risk, & Killing in Self-Defense', Ethics, 119, (2009), 699728.
Lazar, S., “The Responsibility Dilemma for Killing in War: A Review Essay,”
Philosophy & Public Affairs 38, no. 2 (2010): 180–213
McMahan, J. ‘Self-Defense and the Problem of the Innocent Attacker’, Ethics, 104, 2
(1994), 252-290.
McMahan, J. ‘The Basis of Moral Liability to Defensive Killing’, Nous Supplement:
Philosophical Issues, 15 (2005) 386-405.
Miller, S. ‘Self-Defence and Forcing the Choice between Lives’, Journal of Applied
Philosophy, 9, 2 (1992), 239-43.
Quong, J. ‘Killing in Self-Defence’ Ethics, 119, (2009), 507-37.
Quong, J., “Liability to Defensive Harm,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 40, no. 1
(2012): 45–77
Rodin, D., War and Self-Defense, (Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2002)
Statman, D. ‘On the Success Condition for Legitimate Self-Defence’ Ethics, 118
(2008) 659-86.
Tadros, V. “Orwell’s Battle with Brittain: Vicarious Liability for Unjust Aggression,”
Philosophy & Public Affairs 42, no. 1 (2014).
Week 5.
‘Numbers’
Consequentialists have no problem explaining why is it better to save more rather than less
people. But non-consequentialists struggle with this because they reject aggregating the value
of lives. Nevertheless, they still affirm that we are morally required to save more rather then
less people. How can they explain this?
Seminar questions:
 Are morally required to save the 5 instead of the 1?
 Can we explain this without appealing to aggregation?
 Should we accept Taurek’s solution?
Core reading:
 Taurek, J. ‘Should Numbers Count’ Philosophy and Public Affairs, 6 (1977), 293316.
 Scanlon, T. What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, MA: HUP, 1998) pp. 229-41.
Supplementary reading:
 Kamm, F. M. Morality, Mortality, Volume I (Oxford: OUP. 1993),
 Kamm, F. M., ‘Aggregation and Two Moral Methods’, Utilitas 17 (2005), 1-23.
 Kamm, F. Intricate Ethics (Oxford: OUP, 2007) Ch. 2.
 Lubbe, W. ‘Taurek’s No Worse Claim’ Philosophy & Public Affairs 36 (2008),
69-85.
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Otsuka, M., ‘Scanlon on the Claims of the Many versus the One,’ Analysis 60
(20003), 288–293.
Otsuka, M. ‘Saving Lives, Moral Theory, and the Claims of Individuals’
Philosophy & Public Affairs 34, (2006), 109-35.
Otsuka, M. ‘Scepticism about Saving the Greater Number’, Philosophy & Public
Affairs 32 (2004): 413–26,
Week 6.
‘Abortion’
Discussions on abortion are some the hardest problems for political and moral philosophers.
Some people think that abortion is morally impermissible insofar as it involves the deliberate
killing of a person. Three objections to this position will be discussed.
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Seminar questions:
Is abortion morally objectionable?
To what extent are questions about personhood essential to discussions on abortion?
Is legal abortion the best way to protect the sanctity of human life?
Does abortion implies justifying infanticide?
Core reading:
 Thomson, J. Rights, Restitution and Risk, (Cambridge, Mass: HUP, 1986), Ch. 1
 Marquis, D. ‘An Argument that Abortion is Wrong’ in LaFollette, H. (ed.) Ethics in
Practice, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), 91-102.
Supplementary reading:
 Boonin, D. The Morality of Abortion, (Cambridge, CUP, 2003).
 Burley, J. (ed.), Dworkin and His Critics (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), essays by
Clayton, Shiffrin, Kamm, and Rakowski
 Cudd, A. ‘Sensationalized Philosophy: A Reply to Marquis’s “Why Abortion is
Immoral”’, The Journal of Philosophy, 87(5), 1990, 262-4
 Dworkin, R. Life’s Dominion, (New York: Vintage, 1994), ch 3
 Dworkin, R. ‘Unenumerated Rights: Whether and How Roe v. Wade Should be
Overruled’, University of Chicago Law Review, 59 (1992), 395-432
 Glover, J. Causing Death and Saving Lives (London: Penguin, 1977), 119-149
 Hare, R.M. ‘Abortion and the Golden Rule’, in Hare (ed) Essays on Bioethics
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1993), 147-67 or J. Rachels (ed) Moral Problems (New
York: Harper and Row, 1979).
 Harris, J. Clones, Genes, and Immortality (OUP, 1998)
 Harris, J. The Value of Life: An Introduction to Medical Ethics (London:
Routledge, 1985), 136-173.
 Harris, J. and Holm, S. ‘Animals’, in H.LaFollette (ed), The Oxford Handbook of
Practical Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 112-135.
 Hall, T. ‘Life Extension and Creation: A Reply to Silverstein and Boonin’,
Journal of Social Philosophy, 35, 4 (2004), 485–492.
 Kaczor, C. The Ethics of Abortion (New York: Routledge, 2011).
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Kamm F. ‘Ronald Dworkin’s Views on Abortion and Assisted Suicide’, in J.
Burley, Dworkin and his Critics, Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), 218-41.
Kamm, F. Creation and Abortion, (Oxford: OUP)
Kuhse, H. and Singer, P. (eds) Bioethics: An Anthology (Oxford: Blackwell,
1999), 9-82.
Lang, G. ‘Nudging the Responsibility Objection’, Journal of Applied Philosophy,
25, 1 (2008), 56–71.
Lee, P. and R. George ‘The Wrong of Abortion’ in A. Cohen and Ch. Heath
Wellman Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005),
13-26
McMahan, J. The Ethics of Killing (Oxford: OUP, 2002)
McMahan, J. ‘Infanticide’, Utilitas, 19, 2 (2007), 1-29.
McMahan, J. ‘Paradoxes of Abortion and Prenatal Injury’, Ethics, 116, (2006),
625-55.
McInerney, P. ‘Does a Foetus Already have a Future-Like-Ours?’ The Journal of
Philosophy, 87 (5), 1990, 264-8
Narveson, J. Moral Issues (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1983), Ch.9.
Norcross, A. ‘Killing, Abortion, and Contraception’, The Journal of Philosophy,
87 (5), 1990, 268-77
Oderberg, D. S., ‘The Metaphysical Status of the Embryo: Some Arguments
Revisited’. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 25 (2008), 263–276
Quinn, W. ‘Abortion: Identity and Loss’ Philosophy and Public Affairs, 13 (1984)
93-123.
Rajczi, A., ‘Abortion, Competing Entitlements, and Parental Responsibility’,
Journal of Applied Philosophy, 26: (2009), 379–395
Rachels, J. (ed) Moral Problems 3rd edition (New York: Harper and Row, 1979).
Scanlon, T. ‘Partisan for Life’ (review of Dworkin's book), New York Review of
Books, July 15, 1993.
Singer, P. (ed) Applied Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 29-86
(articles by Rachels, Thomson and Tooley).
Singer, P. Practical Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 13574.
Silverstein, H. S. ‘A Woman’s ‘Responsibility’ for the Fetus’, Social Theory and
Practice, 13 (1987) 103–19.
Silverstein, H. S. ‘Creation and Abortion: A Reply to Hall’, Journal of Social
Philosophy, 35, 4 (2004), 493–505.
Thomson, J. Rights, Restitution and Risk, (Cambridge, Mass: HUP, 1986), Ch 2
Tooley, M., C. Wolf-Devine, P. Devine and A. Jaggar, Abortion: Three
Perspectives, (Oxford: OUP, 2009).
Tupa, A., ‘Killing, Letting Die, and the Morality of Abortion’, Journal of Applied
Philosophy, 26, (2009), 1-26.
Week 7.
‘Suicide and euthanasia’
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Description:
On a popular view suicide is both irrational and immoral. We will examine this position. If it
turns out that suicide is not morally prohibited, we will ask whether a right to suicide
involves a liberty-right or a claim-right too. We connect this question with issues related to
euthanasia.
Seminar questions:
 Is suicide immoral? Is it irrational?
 Under which circumstances is suicide permissible?
 What constraints does the right to suicide place on others?
 Is non-voluntary euthanasia morally permissible? Under what circumstances?
 What other values are at stake?
 Are there lives not worth living? Who can make these claims?
Core reading:
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Velleman, D., ‘A Right of Self-Termination?’, Ethics, 109 (1999), pp. 606-628.
Supplementary reading:
On suicide:
 Ataner, A., ‘Kant on capital punishment and suicide’ Kant-Studien 97 (2006).
 Battin, M., ‘Age Rationing and the Just Distribution of Health Care: Is There a Duty
to Die?’, Ethics, 97 (1987), pp. 317-340.
 Battin, M. and Mayo, D. (eds.), Suicide: The Philosophical Issues, (New York: St.
Martin's. 1980)
 Battin, M. R. Rhodes and A. Silvers (eds.) Physician Assisted Suicide (London:
Routledge, 1998).
 Beauchamp, T. L., Intending Death: The Ethics of Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia,
(Prentice Hall; 1995)
 Benatar, D., Better Never to Have Been, (Oxford: Clarendon, 2006)
 Brandt, Richard. ‘The Morality and Rationality of Suicide’ Donnelly, J. (ed.), 1998,
Suicide: Right or Wrong? Amherst, NY: Prometheus
 Cholbi, M., ‘Kant and the Irrationality of Suicide’, History of Philosophy Quarterly,
17 (2000): 159–176
 Cholbi, M., ‘Suicide Intervention and Non-ideal Kantian Theory’, Journal of Applied
Philosophy, 19 (2002), 245–259.
 Cooley D. R., ‘Crimina carnis and morally obligatory suicide’, Ethical Theory and
Moral Practice 9 (2006).
 Cosculluela V., ‘The right to suicide’, Journal of Value Inquiry 30 (1996).
 Cowley, C., ‘Suicide Is Neither Rational Nor Irrational’, Ethical Theory and Moral
Practice, 9 (2006): 495–504
 Donnelly, J. (ed.), 1998, Suicide: Right or Wrong? Amherst, NY: Prometheus
 Frey, R.G., ‘Did Socrates Commit Suicide?’, Philosophy, 53 (1978), 106–108.
 Frey, R. G., ‘Suicide and Self-Inflicted Death’, Philosophy, 56 (1981) 193–202
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Frey R. G., ‘Hume on suicide’, Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 24 (1999), 336351
Glover, J. Causing Death and Saving Lives (London: Penguin, 1977), Ch.13.
Humber, J., and Almeder, R. (eds.), 2000, Is There a Duty to Die?, Totowa, NJ:
Humana Press.
Hume, David. "On Suicide." In Essays: Moral, Political, and Literary Indianapolis:
Liberty, 1985).
Kamm, F.M. ‘Physician-Assisted Suicide, the Doctrine of Double Effect, and the
Ground of Value’, Ethics, 109 (1999), 586-605
Kant, I. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (Cambridge: CUP, 1998)
Kupfer, Joseph, ‘Suicide: Its Nature and Moral Evaluation’, Journal of Value Inquiry,
24 (1990), 67–81
Locke, J. Second Treatise of Civil Government (Various Editions)
Lombardi J., ‘Suicide and the service of God’, Ethics, 95 (1984):56-67.
Maltsberger, J.T., and Goldblatt, M., Essential Papers on Suicide. (New York: NYU
Press, 1996)
Mayo, D., ‘The Concept of Rational Suicide’, Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 2
(1986), 143–155.
Pal J., ‘The right to suicide’, Journal of Value Inquiry 32 (1998)
O'Keefee, T.M, ‘Suicide and Self-Starvation’, Philosophy, 56 (1981), 349–363
Rachels, J., ‘The Value of Human Life’ in his The Legacy of Socrates (New York:
Columbia UP, 2007).
Shneidman, E.S., The Suicidal Mind, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998)
Szasz, T. Fatal Freedom: The Ethics and Politics of Suicide, (Syracuse: Syracuse
University Press, 2002
On euthanasia:
 Battin, M. Ending Life (Oxford: OUP, 2005).
 Battin,M., L. Francis, and B. Landesman (eds.) Death, Dying and the Ending of Life
(Ashgate: Aldershot,2007) 2 Vols.
 Biggar, N, Aiming to Kill: The Ethics of Suicide and Euthanasia, (London: Darton,
Longman and Todd., 2004).
 Dworkin, G., R. Frey, and S. Bok Euthanasia and Physician Assisted Suicide
(Cambridge, CUP, 1998).
 Dworkin, R., Life’s Dominion, (New York: Vintage, 1994), Chapters 7-8.
 Foley, K. and H. Hendin, (eds.), , The Case Against Assisted Suicide: For the Right to
End-of-Life Care, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002)
 Glover, J., Causing Death and Saving Lives (London: Penguin: 1977)
 Keown, J. Euthanasia Examined (Cambridge: CUP, 2005)
 Keown, J., , Euthanasia, ethics and public policy: an argument against legalization,
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002)
 Lewis, P., , Assisted Dying and Legal Change, (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2007)
 McIntyre, A., , “Doing Away With Double Effect”, Ethics, 111 (2001), 219–255
 McMahan, J. The Ethics of Killing (Oxford: OUP, 2002)
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Rachels, J., The End of Life: Euthanasia and Morality, Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1986.
Rakowski, E., ‘Taking and Saving Lives’, Columbia Law Review, 93, (1993), 10631156.
Tooley, M. “Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide’ in Frey, R. G. and C. Heath Wellman,
A Companion to Applied Ethics (Oxford, Blackwell, 2005).
Tulloch, G., Euthanasia: Choice and Death (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press,
2005).
Velleman, D., ‘A Right of Self-Termination?’, Ethics, 109 (1999), pp. 606-628.
Warnock, M., and E. MacDonald Easeful Death (Oxford: OUP, 2008
Young, R., Medically Assisted Death, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
2007).
Ethics, 109 (1999) Special issue on Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide.
Week 8.
‘Animals’
In this seminar we will discuss the challenge that killing animals has for moral and political
philosophy. We will discuss Singer’s claim that our moral theories are guilty of ‘speciesism’,
and what does this entail. Discussion will be centred on the issues of vegetarianism, animal
experimentation and animal farming.
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Seminar questions:
Are we guilty of ‘speciesism’?
What’s wrong with eating meat?
Are animals moral beings?
Core reading:
 Singer, P. Practical Ethics (3rd edition, Cambridge: CUP, 2011), Ch. 5.
 DeGrazia, D., ‘Moral Vegetarianism from a Very Broad Basis’, Journal of Moral
Philosophy, 6 (2009), 143-165.
Supplementary reading:
 Beauchamp, T and R.G. Frey, The Oxford Handbook of Animal Ethics, Oxford: OUP,
2011
 Bonnie S. ‘Speciesism and the Idea of Equality’, Philosophy 53 (1978) 247-56.
 Cochrane, A. Animal Rights and Animal Experimentation: An Interest-Based
Approach’, Res Publica, 13 (2007), 293-318.
 Cochrane, A., An Introduction to Animals and Political Theory (Basingstoke:
Palgrave, 2010)
 Devine, P., The Moral Basis of Vegetarianism’, Philosophy, 53 (1978), 481-505.
 Fox, Mi. A. ‘Why We Should Be Vegetarians’, International Journal of Applied
Philosophy, 20 (2006), 295-310.
 Garner, R. Animal Ethics (Cambridge: Polity, 2005)
 Gruen, L. ‘Animals’ in Singer, P., A Companion to Ethics, 343-53.
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Jamieson, D. (ed) Singer and His Critics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999) (especially,
chapters by McGinn, Holton & Langton, Hare and Singer).
Jamieson, D. ‘Animal Liberation is an Environmental Ethic’, in Jamieson (ed)
Morality’s Progress (Oxford: Clarendon, 2002) 197-212.
Jamieson, D. Ethics and the Environment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008),
102-44.
Harrison, J., ‘The Vagaries of Vegetarianism’, Ratio, 21 (2008), 286-299.
LaFollette, H. Ethics in Practice, Sections on animals, various articles.
LaFollette H. and N. Shanks, Brute Science: Dilemmas of Animal Experimentation
(London: Routledge, 1996)
Leahy, M., Against Liberation: Putting Animals in Perspective (London: Routledge,
1993).
McMahan, J. ‘Animals’ in Frey, R. and C. Heath (eds) Wellman A Companion to
Applied Ethics, 525-36.
McMahan, J., ‘Our Fellow Creatures’, Journal of Ethics, 9 (2005).
McMahan, J., ‘Eating Animals the Nice Way’, Daedalus, 137 (2008), 6676.[http://www.fas.rutgers.edu/cms/phil/dmdocuments/Eating_Animals_the_Nice_W
ay.pdf]
Nobis, N., ‘Vegetarianism and Virtue: Does Consequentialism Demand Too Little?’,
Social Theory and Practice, 28 (2002), 135-156
Nussbaum, M., ‘Animal Rights: The Need for a Theoretical Basis’, Harvard Law
Review 114, 2001, 1506-1550.
Orlans, F. et al, The Human use of Animals (New York: Oxford University Press,
1998)
Rachels, J., ‘The Basic Argument for Vegetarianism’ in his The Legacy of Socrates
(New York: Columbia UP, 2007)
Sapontzis, S., Food for Thought (Amherst: Prometheus Books, 2004).
Sherratt, A., ‘Vegetarians and Their Children’, Journal of Applied Philosophy,
24(2007), 425-434.
Singer, P. Animal Liberation (London: Pimlico, 1995)
Sunstein, C. and M. Nussbaum (eds.) Animal Rights (Oxford: OUP, 2004) various
articles.
Week 9.
‘Poverty
Perhaps the largest moral catastrophe we face in the contemporary world is that of human
poverty. In this seminar we examine what morality requires us to do about it.
Seminar questions:
 How demanding is morality?
 If we can prevent something bad from happening without sacrificing something
comparable, are we morally compelled to do it?
 Is non-consequentialism any less demanding?
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Core reading:
 Singer, P. ‘Famine, Affluence, and Morality’ Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1, 3
(1971).
 Arthur, J., ‘Famine Relief and the Ideal Moral Code’ in LaFollette, H. Ethics in
Practice (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007)
Supplementary reading:
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Aiken, W., and H. LaFollette (eds.) World Hunger and Morality (Englewood Cliffs:
Prentice Hall, 1996).
Cullity, G. The Moral Demands of Affluence (Oxford: OUP, 2008).
Dower, N. ‘World Hunger’ in LaFollette, H. The Oxford Handbook of Practical
Ethics (Oxford: OUP, 2003
Herman, B. ‘The Scope of Moral Requirement’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 30, 3
(2001), 227-56.
Hurley, P. ‘Fairness and Beneficence’, Ethics, 113 (2003), 841–864.
Hurley, P. ‘Does Consequentialism Make Too Many Demands, or None at All?’,
Ethics, 116 (2006), 680–706.
Hutchings, K., Global Ethics, (Cambridge: Polity, 2010)
Kagan, S., The Limits of Morality (Oxford: OUP, 1991)
Kagan, S. Normative Ethics (Boulder, Westview, 1998), pp. 153-170
Mulgan, T. ‘Two Conceptions of Benevolence’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 26, 1
(1997), 62-79.
Murphy, L. ‘The Demands of Beneficence’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 22, 4
(1993), 267-92.
Pogge, T. Freedom from Poverty as a Human Right (Oxford: OUP, 2007). Various
articles.
Pogge, T. Politics as Usual…
Rachels, ‘Killing and Starving to Death’ in his The Legacy of Socrates (New York:
Columbia UP, 2007).
Unger, P. Living High and Letting Die (Oxford: OUP, 1996) Ch. 1-2
Week 10
‘War I’
Most people think that people fighting a war face different constraints when killing than noncombatants. We examine this belief.
Seminar questions:
 Are all combatants morally equal?
 How can it be that in war other constraints about killing take place?
Core reading:
 Walzer, M. Just and Unjust Wars (New York, Basic Books, 1977), Ch. 4.
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McMahan, J., (2005), Just Cause for War. Ethics & International Affairs, 19: 1–21.
doi: 10.1111/j.1747-7093.2005.tb00551.x
Supplementary reading:
(see next week)
Week 11.
War II
In this seminar we discuss whether the moral equivalence of combatants is true.
Core reading:
 Hurka, T. “Liability and Just Cause,” Ethics & International Affairs 21, no. 2 (2007):
199–218.
 Jeff McMahan, “On the Moral Equality of Combatants,” Journal of Political
Philosophy 14, no. 4 (2006): 377–93.
Supplementary reading:
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Caney, S., Justice Without Borders (Oxford: OUP, 2005)
Coady, C. ‘War and Terrorism’ in Frey, R. (ed) A Companion to Applied Ethics
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2003).
Buchanan, A. ‘Institutionalizing Just War’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 34, 1,
(2006), 2-38.
Cohen, G. A. ‘Casting the First Stone’, Philosophy, 58 (supp), (2006), 113-36.
Estlund, D. ‘On Following Orders in an Unjust War’ Journal of Political Philosophy,
15 (2007) 213-34.
Fabre, C., ‘Guns, Food, and Liability to Attack in War’, Ethics, 120 (2009), 36-63
Fabre, C. Cosmopolitan Wars, (OUP, 2012).
Frowe, Helen (2012). Self-Defence and the Principle of Non-Combatant Immunity.
Journal of Moral Philosophy 8 (4):530-546
Jaggar, A. ‘What is Terrorism, Why it is Wrong, and Could it Ever be Morally
Permissible?’ Journal of Social Philosophy, 36, 2 (2005), 202-17
Hutchings, K., Global Ethics, (Cambridge: Polity, 2010).
Kamm, F. M. ‘Terror and Collateral Damage: are they Permissible?’ Journal of
Ethics, 9, 3-4 (2005), 381-401.
Kamm, M. F. ‘Terrorism and Several Moral Distinctions’ Legal Theory, 12, 1 (2006),
19-69.
Kamm, F. M. ‘Terrorism and Intending Evil’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 36, 2
(2008), 157-86
Kamm F. M. Ethics for Enemies (Oxford: OUP, 2011).
Kamm, F.M. The moral target: aiming at right conduct in war and other conflicts
(OUP, 2012)
LaFollette, H. Ethics in Practice (3rd ed.) (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), pp 701-45
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Lazar, S., 'Responsibility, Risk, & Killing in Self-Defense', Ethics, 119, (2009), 699728
Lazar, S., 'The Responsibility Dilemma for Killing in War', Philosophy & Public
Affairs, 38: (2010), 180-213
Seth Lazar (2012). Necessity in Self-Defense and War. Philosophy and Public Affairs
40 (1):3-44.
McPherson, L. ‘Is Terrorism Distinctively Wrong’, Ethics, 117, 3 (2007), 524-46.
Meisels, T., Defining Terrorism –A Typology’, Critical Review of International
Social and Political Philosophy, 12 (2009), 331-51.
Nagel, T., ‘War and Massacre’ in his Mortal Questions (Cambridge: CUP, 1979)
Pogge, T. ‘Reflections on Harming the Innocent’, Journal of Political Philosophy, 16,
1 (2008), 1-25.
Rodin, D. and H. Shue, Just and Unjust Warriors (Oxford: OUP, 2008)
Scheffler, S. ‘Is Terrorism Morally Distinctive?’ Journal of Political Philosophy, 14,
1 (2006), 1-17.
Shue, H. ‘War’ in LaFollette, H. The Oxford Handbook of Practical Ethics (Oxford:
OUP, 2003)
Statman, D. ‘Supreme Emergencies Revisited’, Ethics, 117 (2006) 58-79.
Sterba, J. ‘Terrorism and International Justice’ Journal of Moral Philosophy, 3, 1,
(2006).
Sterba, J. (ed) Terrorism and International Justice (Oxford: OUP, 2003). See
whatever articles interest you.
Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (New York, Basic Books, 1977
Ethics, 114, 4 (2004), (Special issue in Terrorism)
Journal of Ethics, 8, 1 (2004). (Special issue in Terrorism)
Analysis 71, 3 (2011) Symposium on McMahan’s book (papers by McMahan, Lang,
Otsuka, and Strawser).
Week 12.
‘Revision and Conclusions’
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