Graduate School of Development Studies
Religious Freedoms and Attacks on Minority Rights in
Bogor City, Indonesia
A Research Paper presented by:
David Leonard Hatumena
Indonesia
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for obtaining the degree of
MASTERS OF ARTS IN DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
Specialization:
Conflict, Reconstruction and Human Security
CRS
Members of the examining committee:
Dr. Helen Hintjens [Supervisor]
Prof. Dr Gerrie ter Haar [Reader]
The Hague, The Netherlands
November, 2010
Disclaimer:
This document represents part of the author’s study programme while at the
Institute of Social Studies. The views stated therein are those of the author and
not necessarily those of the Institute.
Inquiries:
Postal address:
Location:
Telephone:
Fax:
Institute of Social Studies
P.O. Box 29776
2502 LT The Hague
The Netherlands
Kortenaerkade 12
2518 AX The Hague
The Netherlands
+31 70 426 0460
+31 70 426 0799
ii
Contents
List of Tables
List of Maps
List of Acronyms
Abstract
Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1 Background
1.2 Introducing Bogor City
1.3 Central Research Question
1.2 Research Methodology
1.2 Structure of the Paper
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1
1
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3
3
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Chapter 2 Historical Precedence
6
2.1 Introduction
6
2.2 After the New Order
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2.3 Religious Rights of Minorities: the Constitution and the Law
7
2.4 Attacks on the Ahmadiyah Minority in Bogor City
9
2.5 The Government Response to Ahmadiyah Persecution
12
2.6 Conclusion
14
Chapter 3 The Case of Taman Yasmin
15
3.1 Introduction
15
3.2 Government Regulations
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3.3 Human Rights and Security
17
3.4 Looking at the Journey of Taman Yasmin Indonesian Christian
Church
18
3.5 Conclusion
23
Chapter 4 Lesson from Bogor
25
4.1 Introduction
25
4.2 Right to Freedom of Religion
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4.3 Overcoming Impunity or Punishing Victims
28
4.4 State Concessions to Radicalisation
30
4.5 Conclusion
31
Chapter 5 Conclusion
Appendices
References
152
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iii
List of Tables
Table 1 “Total Population and Religious Statistics of Bogor City 2010”
List of Map
Map 1 “Map of West Java Province and Bogor City”
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iv
List of Acronyms
AMAN
DPR
Asian Muslim Action Network
Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat/Peoples Representative’s
Assembly
DPRD
Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah/ Local Peoples
Representative’s Assembly
FPI
GKI
HTI
HRWG
ICRP
ICCPR
IMB
Front Pembela Islam/Islamic Defenders Front
Gereja Kristen Indonesia/Indonesian Christian Church
Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia
Human Rights Working Group
Indonesian Conference on Religion and Peace
International Covenant in Civil and Political Rights
Ijin Mendirikan Bangunan/Building Permit
JI
Jemaah Islamiyah
KOMNAS HAM
Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia/National
Commission on Human Rights
Majelis Ulama Indonesia/Indonesian Ulema Council
MUI
NU
PTUN
PBM
SATPOL PP
Nahdlatul Ulama
Pengadilan Tata Usaha Negara/State Administrative
Court
Persekutuan Gereja-Gereja di Indonesia/Indonesian
Council of Churches
Peraturan Bersama Menteri/Joint Ministerial Regulation
Satuan Polisi Pamong Praja/City Public Order Officers
SKB
Surat Keputusan Bersama/Joint Decree
PGI
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Abstract
This study is about religious freedom in Indonesia. It examines the cases of
two religious minorities – the Ahmadiyah, and a Protestant Christian group.
Fieldwork was conducted in Bogor City, a satellite city of Jakarta in Indonesia.
Many violations of religious freedom were found to affect both of the selected
religious minorities. These rights violations were carried out both by other religious organisations, and by local government authorities. Rights to freedom
of worship were neglected in different ways: through direct violence, illegal acts
including banning, arson and demolition of places of worship; withdrawal of
permits; lack of police protection; failure to arrest perpetrators. The key findings were that the authorities failed to protect the religious freedoms and rights
of minorities, as stipulated in the Constitution, as well as in state law and the
government’s international legal obligations. The attacks on minority religious
rights and freedoms are causing escalating tensions between different migrant
communities living in Bogor. The study’s conclusions are that impunity needs
to end, so that human rights principles can once more be respected and minority rights ensured.
Relevance to Development Studies
In regard to the religious freedom perspective regarding Ahmadiyah and Christians as minorities, this research paper offers another viewpoint of looking at
the different experiences of different minority groups in Indonesia. Interlinking the cases of the two minority groups, this paper aspires to give a new paradigm to the increase of violence and violation from the impunity angle, an angle that is common to explain oppression or discrimination. Although
discrimination occurred, protection on the basis of minority and religious freedom rights also collides with other different aspects of social and cultural beliefs and also the religious views and adherents.
Key words:
Religious Freedom; Minority Rights; Indonesia; Bogor; Violence; Impunity;
Legal Protection
vi
Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Background
Religious issues in Southeast Asia have been rising into religious violence and
have been part of politics of the region for some time. Southeast Asia is largely
Buddhist and Muslims, and both religions have been politically active in the
region during the latter part of the twentieth century and the beginning of the
twenty first. Some areas of conflict have involved yet another religious community: Southeast Asian Christians (Juergensmeyer 2008:145).
Indonesia, a country consisting of 237 million people1, has more Muslims
than any other in the world. Although with its long history of religious tolerance, a small extremist marginal group has become more spoken and fierce in
recent years. Freedom of religion or belief in Indonesia still has obstacles to
work out in a country that has varied origins of backgrounds. Those are because of the actions of a group of people without tolerance or are intolerant
towards other groups as well as discriminatory practices by the state that has
not been entirely removed.
Indonesia is a diverse country, comprised of various ethnic groups, religious or identity-based groups who now form part of the country that is the
Republic of Indonesia. The Republic was proclaimed on August 17, 1945, and
its foundation was Pancasila2 and 1945 National Constitution. Under the Constitution, plurality in the form Bhineka Tunggal Ika or Unity in Diversity is a national wealth that must be maintained as a tool of unity, central to the aspirations of the founders of the Indonesian nation. With this diversity, of course,
different elements in the society are responsible for – and have an obligation
for - protecting and respecting each of the elements forming the greater Indonesian plurality, including by respecting freedom of worship, religion and belief
as basic Human Rights.
The difficulty faced by contemporary Indonesia is a growing apparent intolerance of religious diversity within urban Indonesian society. This can be
seen most clearly in the rapid escalation in recent years of the attacks on religious minority groups and the closure, sealing and attacks on houses of worship. These attacks are carried out by the so-called vigilante groups who disguise themselves as religious organizations. These groups carry out violence
and sometimes take over law enforcement functions in to their own hands. In
the Setara Institute report, a press release dated July 26, 2010, it is reported that
in 2010, there was a rapid escalation of attacks on houses of worship, especially
Taken from the National Bureau of Statistics of Indonesia Sensus 2010
Pancasila consists of two Sanskrit words, “panca” meaning five, and “sila” meaning
principles. These five principles are the basis of the Indonesian national ideology: belief in the one and only God, just and civilized humanity, the unity of Indonesia, democracy and social justice.
1
2
1
on Christian places of worship, but also on other minority religions. The increase compared to the previous years can be seen in the recorded number of
attacks: 17 in 2008, 18 in 2009 and 28 cases of attacks on Christian places of
worship (of various denominations) in just six months, from January to July in
2010. The records of the Communion of Churches in Indonesia (PGI) show
10 recorded cases of prohibition of worship and closures of churches and
Christian institutions in the first quarter of 2010. The closure involved bans,
attacks in the form of vandalism towards churches, hall rooms and schools.
These events occurred in various parts of Indonesia but mainly on the Island
of Java and around the satellite cities of Jakarta in Bogor and Bekasi (PGI:
2010).
1.2 Introducing Bogor City
The single satellite city of Bogor has been selected as an example in order to illustrate how violent conflict can emerge and escalate following radicalisation of the politics of religious identities. Bogor’s case is also taken as an example of how state policies can fail to respond to what can be termed
‘entrenched fundamentalist’ pressures from the majority. Rather than being
responsive to the need to protect victims from minority belief communities,
the government seems to have failed to act to end impunity. Bogor city is a
city located 60 kilometers south of the nation capital Jakarta. It is located in
West Java province, an area where for the past two years, incident of religious
violence are increasing. The population are mostly Islam and have strong Islamic history in their society’s life. West Java has the root of high extremism
and practices of puritan religion. For instance, movement of Darul Islam and
Indonesian Islamic Forces (Tentara Islam Indonesia-DI/TII) under the leadership
of Kartosuwiryo that wanted to implement sharia as the nations government
policy in 1950’s (Setara:2009:37).
2
Table 1:
Total Population and Religious Statistics
Of Bogor City 20103
Religion
Adherents
Fraction of
population (%)
Number of religious buildings
Islam
877,466
92.64
715
Protestantism
32,807
3.40
27
Catholicism
23,657
2.43
8
Buddhism
10,046
1.02
13
Hinduism
1,552
0.15
9
552
0.06
13
2,986
0.30
Confucianism
Others
Total Population
949.066
According to the above table, the Ahmadiyah community can be included as
Muslim adherents, because Indonesian law does not acknowledge them legally.
The Ahmadiyah people have about 200.000 adherents alone in Indonesia, and
the precise number of the Ahmadiyah people who have been living in Bogor
City is also inaccessible but I assume they have a very large since before 2005,
they had concentrated their activities in Bogor city, such as having their own
campus for religious activities. For the Christian minorities, it is more tangible
because they are officially known by the local government and have stayed
Data was obtained from http://heldi.net/category/heldi-pns/bogor/, accessed on
28 October 2010 and
http://www.kotabogor.go.id/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=6193,
accessed on 28 October 2010
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3
long ago starting from the Dutch Colonial times, research have shown from
the early 19th century, and also the Christian have been the second largest religion staying and striving in Bogor City. Their number is estimated between
56.464, based on the data from the Bogor City Local Government and city
census of 2010.
The Bogor City area, according to the Setara Institute (2010) research, is
number two highest cities in the West Java Province after Bekasi to have religious violations in their area. Of 28 incidents for the first half of 2010 in Indonesia alone, Bogor City and Bogor Regency has conducted 4 incidents. These
incidents have been categorized as attack on religious activities and forced cessation of religious activities. As a satellite city of Jakarta and serving as a residential area with high number of residents, the need of a place of worship to
practice religion is clearly a need that cannot be avoided. The building of religious houses is obviously in accordance to the quantity of the citizens. The
higher amount of citizens, the need to build a place of worship will become
higher too (Setara: 2010). In the case of restrictions on the use of places of
worship, attacks on such buildings, and demolitions, the majority of the population of Bogor satellite city around Jakarta, live in pockets of ‘religiously defined’ areas and communities of different origins and languages rarely interact
with one another.
1.3 Central research questions
a)
b)
How and why are attacks on religious freedom escalating in the satellite
cities of Jakarta, using the example of Bogor city as the main focus?
Why is religious violence being allowed to escalate without consequences for the perpetrators? How can government inaction to punish
those responsible be explained?
1.4 Research Methodology
This research is conducted through literature review and library research in order to understand the nature of religious freedom and minority rights in Indonesia. This research relies on the analysis with simple data available and presents the relevant information. I will focus my analysis on related journals,
about minority rights, freedom of religion, law enforcement, and state impunity. In addition to conducting the literature review, I use secondary information
through data collection from related literatures, reports, conference papers,
media and various violence and violation related towards religion. The main
source if data used in this research was monitoring the national news of Indonesia. The case study of Ahmadiyah community and Christians in West Java
became my choice because of the long history of both communities and its tie
to the majority population of Indonesia. Furthermore, both of these communities are vulnerable minority groups in the present time of religious relations in
Indonesia.
4
In this report, I will try to utilize the perspective of freedom of religion
and belief, but also try to be more broadly. The case of Ahmadiyah has been
chosen as the first case because of the history of the most discriminated Muslim minority in Indonesia, and also the continuous persecution towards them
by the state and non-state actors. The case of GKI Taman Yasmin was chosen
because of the straight example of the impunity of the government towards
defending minority rights and this case happened in the same city, Bogor. The
research of this issue is important because of the position and the existence of
these groups is underestimated in terms of the potential discriminations they
are facing.
Limitations from this research are firstly, the data and literature of the
Ahmadiyah development in Indonesia are very limited in the sense of time
range of events and actions are not quite adequate. The literature on Christianity movement and development was also quite delicate because the case that I
research was quite recent, and data provided was subjugated through the media.
1.5. Structure of the Paper
Following this Introduction, which has laid down the key themes and questions, as well as the research methodology of this study, Chapter 2 will tell the
story of inter-religious relations and policies in Indonesian during the postNew Order period of just over a decade. Chapter 2 thus contextualises the
study of Bogor and first presents and tries to explain the attacks on the Ahmadiyah religious minority in Bogor City, between July 2005 and 2010. Chapter
3 then takes this analysis further to consider the case of attacks on religious
rights of a Protestant Christian Church, the Calvinist church, also in Bogor,
between 2008 and 2010. To deepen our understanding of the implications of
these two examples, Chapter 4 will analyse the relations between these two
cases and government policies towards minority rights, focusing on religious
rights in particular. This question is related to the problem of impunity, to radicalisation and to the need for the political will to protect minority rights. The
last chapter, Chapter 5, is a brief conclusion to the study as a whole.
5
Chapter 2: Historical precedents and background
2.1 Introduction
This chapter starts to show how, in the recent past, the Indonesian state has
not consistently provided protection and respect for the rights to freedom of
worship, religion and belief for all its citizens. The first example of this is introduced in the second half of the chapter, in the form of the Ahmadiyah
community of Bogor City. First, this chapter shows how partly for domestic
reasons and partly in response to global processes, attacks on minority religious
rights have been allowed to continue. The Ahmadiyah case thus becomes a
precedent for more recent attacks on Christian minority rights, which are the
subject of Chapter 3. This will then be followed by directives on the case of
Bogor city in Chapter 4.
2.2. After the New Order
Since the fall of President Soeharto and the New Order4 in 1998, Indonesia has
undergone a transition period, shifting from a highly centralised government
system to a more democratic and decentralised set of governance structures.
Prior to 1999, governance was politically controlled by the central government
authorities, and regional governments were subordinated completely to central
decision-making, whether in the provinces, in regencies or cities and villages
(Crouch 2009:55). Under Soeharto’s repressive regime, state control was asserted through all state institutions, and advocates for Sharia and an Islamic
state were harshly silenced by systematic governments strategies designed to
undermine political Islam in favour of a more cultural and nationalist variant of
Islam.
After the fall of the New Order regime in 1998, demands for democracy intensified, some might say they even ‘exploded’ from within and across Indonesian society’s plural and component parts. The Reformasi5 government
issued three important innovations in terms of human rights policies in the
first three years of its administration. The first was the Decree on the People’s
Consultative Assembly on Human Rights, created in 1998; the second the law
on human rights of 1999; and the third provision was to introduce an
Amendment of the 1945 Constitution in 2000, only the second amendment
since 1945 (Bagir 2008:11).
The New Order, known as Orde Baru or Orba, refers to the period from 1966 to 1998 when
Soeharto was the President of Indonesia.
5 A new era for Indonesia after the New Order period and the fall of Soeharto.
4
6
In the first years of the post-Soeharto “Reformasi” era, a new phenomenon also arose, as the many and diverse religious groups that had been
banned during the Soeharto era re-emerged and new ones appeared for the
first time. Some espoused political Islam, the so-called ‘fundamentalist’
groups, which included those which sought to impose the Sharia in Indonesia
through making it official policy, applicable to the population as a whole. Several of these ‘radical’ Islamic groups also had small armed militias, and these
religious militias could be very influential in the new political and social conditions that emerged during the crisis and the post-New Order era. These militant groups are usually led by a charismatic leader, often with extensive experience in religious preaching and ‘mobilising’ great numbers of people.. At the
start of the 21st century, these groups were advocating Islamic law as the sole
basis for Indonesia’s political order, something that appear incompatible with
the plural ideology of the National Constitution. Some of these groups, such
as the Islamic Defenders Front6 (FPI/Front Pembela Islam) and the Jihad Army
(Laskar Jihad) believe that Muslims are disadvantaged in the Indonesian system,
and seek to have more Islamic principles enshrined in the working of government. They want a less prominent and visible role for Indonesians of other,
minority religions (Federspiel 2002:111). These groups have loyal followers and
tend to comprise mainly young and low income people who turn to religion
perhaps as a means of ‘empowering’ themselves and asserting their rights.
2.3. Religious Rights of Minorities: the Constitution & the
Law
The Indonesian Constitution explicitly guarantees freedom of religion and it is
stipulated at the national level that Indonesia has recognised the right to religious freedom in Article 187 of the International Covenant in Civil and Political
Rights (1966). This human rights instrument was ratified by Indonesia in 2005
The Front Pembela Islam (FPI; Islamic Defenders Front) was declared on August
17, 1998 by Mohammad Rizieq Shihab is an Indonesian Islamist movement which has
advocated for the implementation of conservative laws and whose activists have been
involved in militant attacks upon groups, institutions and practices deemed un-Islamic
and immoral by the FPI leadership
7 Article 18 of the International Covenant in Civil and Political Rights includes: (1)
freedom to adopt a religion or belief of his/her choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or
belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching; (2) no one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his
choice; (3) freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to such
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order,
health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others; (4) the States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty of parents and,
when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral education of their
children in conformity with their own convictions.
6
7
through Law 12/2005 on the Ratification of International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights. The covenant is legally binding, and as a State Party that
has ratified it, Indonesia has the obligation to integrate it into national legislations and to provide a periodic report to the UN Human Rights Council8
(Setara Institute 2009:5).
In addition to the International Covenant in Civil and Political Rights,
the National Constitution also clearly stipulates in Article 28I and 29 in guaranteeing religious rights and minorities. The Indonesian constitution mentions in
article 29 that “The State guarantees all persons the freedom of worship, each
according to his/her own religion or belief”. Moreover, the Article 28I prescribes that freedom of thought and conscience and freedom of religion are
human rights which cannot be limited under any circumstances. And in line to
articulate the national constitution, the government has also issued Law
39/1999 on Basic Human Rights that again has specified the rights in article 4
and 22 respectively (Crouch 2009:81). From the three human rights instruments above, in general it can be concluded that freedom of religion and belief,
the freedom both individually and in community with others, to manifest one’s
religion and belief through worship, observance, practice and teaching in public or in private, including the freedom to change one’s religion or religious beliefs, or not to adopt any religious beliefs, are rights guaranteed by law in Indonesia.
The importance of international human rights law in the protection of
the rights of minorities has not been universally accepted. As a result, such
protection has, in the past been patchy and inadequate. Recent history has
shown the world that minority rights cannot be ignored and that rather than
increasing unwanted tendencies they may be a prerequisite for the peaceful
stable societies which benefit us all (O’Nions: 2007).
Human rights law is an international civil law which puts State as State
Party; it means that State is the subject of law that is obliged to obey human
rights law. As the subject of law, every human rights violation always puts State
as the perpetrator. Violations of human rights law happens when the State
does not obey norms that bind the State, as enshrined in international covenants and conventions, in which the State has promised to obey through the
process of ratification. As the subject of law, State is obliged to respect and to
protect human rights (Setara Institute 2009:9) In regards to the issue of the
regulation of places of worship, the Joint Ministerial Regulation 8 & 9/2006 on
Places of Worship, stipulates the procedure for building a place of worship.
This issue has become a subject of controversy in recent years, through a series
of conflicting and violent events. This Ministerial Regulation replaced an earlier
Ministerial Decision 1/1969, which had been criticised for contributing to justifying earlier violence at places of worship. The Places of Worship regulation
requires religious groups to obtain the signatures of at least 90 members of
The United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) is the successor to the United Nations
Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR), adopted on 15 March 2006.
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8
their group and of at least 60 members of the surrounding general community
not in the group. All applications for a permit in each municipality or district
are decided on by the newly-formed Inter-religious Harmony Forum (Forum
Kerukunan Umat Beragama). This Forum consists of local religious leaders in
each area/province/municipality. Unfortunately, since the introduction of this
regulation in 2006, conflict at places of worship has continued and indeed has
increased rather than declining, as those who pressed for the new Regulation
had hoped. Instead of strengthening the right to freedom of religious expression, particularly for religious minorities and vulnerable communities, the state
seems to have used the law instead to further restrict the right to freedom of
religious expression. It has become increasingly difficult for religious minorities to obtain permits to build places of worship compared with in the past. It
is this that lies behind the conflicts over buildings, some of which may be constructed without permits in the face of official refusal to allow permits to be
granted (Setara: 2010).
2.4 Attacks on the Ahmadiyah minority in Bogor City
Indonesia has the largest Muslim population in the world, as is well known,
with more believers in Islam that in all the Arab countries put together. For the
majority of Muslims around the world, as for the other monotheistic religious,
Christianity and Judaism, religious belief is a primary marker of identity, a
source of meaning and guidance not only in daily life but also in the affairs of
state (Bagir 2008:8).
Among the attacks towards minorities, Ahmadiyah is perhaps the most
serious one. Ahmadiyah is an Islamic sect founded by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad
(died.1908), an Indian Muslim reformer, in 1889. Ahmadiyah came to Indonesia in the early 1920s, during the “national movement era” period. A lot of organizations, intellectual circles, and study groups emerged during this era. Tasywirul Afkar, a study group based in Surabaya invited Maulana H. Khwadja
Kamaluddin, on November 28, 1920, an Ahmadiyah leader of the Lahori
Branch, to give a keynote speech in a celebration of the Prophet’s birthday at
the Sunan Ampel mosque. This was obviously the first appearance of Ahmadiyah in a communal scene in Indonesia. Since the invitation of Khwadja Kamaluddin, information on Ahmadiyah gradually advanced. Ahmadiyah literatures
began to influence some study circles in Yogyakarta, Bandung, and other major
cities. In 1926, an Ahmadiyah branch was officially founded in Padang, West
Sumatra. Starting from 15 followers, this branch rapidly developed and extent
to other cities. The branch was later named the Indonesian Ahmadiyah Group
(Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia, JAI), which now adores hundreds of followers
(Assyaukanie:2009:8)
9
Although the persecution of Ahmadiyah happens with fluctuating frequency, according to the monitoring conducted by the Setara Institute9, violations still continues to occur at least in the years 2007-2009: in 2007, of the 185
violations of freedom religion/belief in Indonesia, 15 of them targeted Ahmadiyah communities; in 2008, from 367 violation acts, 238 action targets the Ahmadiyah community, and in 2009 from 291 actions, there were 33 violations
include actions targeting the Ahmadiyah community throughout Indonesia,
although most events occurred in West Java.
The first major and apparently organised attack towards the Ahmadiyah10 minority religious community in Indonesia was on 15 July 2005. There
had been many smaller and more sporadic attacks and assaults had occurred
against other Ahmadiyah communities before, the early event happen in September 1988, where an Ahmadiyah mosque in Garut, West Java, was attacked,
resulting in much damage, and the Muslim majority often threatened Ahmadiyah members. After the downfall of Soeharto, Ahmadiyah followers in Indonesia have been living in jeopardy and fear of further attacks of this kind, and the
lack of protection of the government and police. Various Ahmadiyah concentrations became the target of attack. On September 6, 2002, an Ahmadiyah
complex in Maluku was stormed by a group of Muslims. Four days later, in
East Lombok, another mob attacked and destroyed an Ahmadiyah mosque.
This action was followed by burning at least eight houses and several
other buildings owned by Ahmadiyah members. In several towns in West Java,
banners urging people to exterminate and burn Ahmadiyah’s properties were
erected. In Kuningan, two mosques and 18 houses were destroyed. Reports
said that apart from the inflammatory banners, the attack was provoked by a
decree issued by the local government several days earlier. The persecution
culminated in 2005, thousands of members of a number of political Islamic
groups assembled and together concertedly attacked the Ahmadiyah gathering
for their Annual Meeting at their headquarters campus in Parung, Bogor. The
attackers forced the Ahmadiyah members to leave the compound area and flee
(Siboro: 2005).
It all started in Bogor, where Ahmadiyah’s Islamic boarding school
known as Al-Mubarak Campus is located. On July 8-10 2005, 10,000 Ahmadiyah members held an annual meeting in this 4.5 hectare compound. Before the
event ended, however, a mob from the radical Islamic Defenders Front (FPI)
and the Institute for Islamic Study and Research (LPPI) came to the location
See the Setara Institute (2010): Atas Nama Ketertiban dan Keamanan: Persekusi
Ahmadiyah di Bogor, Garut, Tasikmalaya dan Kuningan, Thematic Review page 8
10 Ahmadiyah claims to have 200,000 followers in Indonesia, where it first came to
Indonesia in 1925. In 1953 they received legal permission from the government as a
social organization and in 2003 they received permission as a community organization
through a formal letter from the Ministry of Internal Affairs No. 75/D.I./VI/2003.
The group does not believe that Muhammad was the last Prophet; instead their teaching believes that the Ahmadiyah founder Mirza Ghulam Ahmad was the final prophet.
This sect has difficulties throughout much of the ‘Muslim world’.
9
10
and launched their protest, forcing the organizers to immediately cancel the
event. Arguing that they did not do any harm, the Ahmadiyah leaders decided
to ignore the mob’s demand, which consequently made the mob angry. Thus,
they began to throw stones and other projectiles at the campus complex. As
the situation got worse, the police escorted all the participants out of the complex for the sake of their safety. Ten days later, the local government administration closed down the complex and ordered all Ahmadiyah’s activities to
stop, oddly arguing that Ahmadiyah’s teachings could spark public disorder
(Assyaukanie 2009:9).
After the attack towards the Ahmadiyah complex, on 28 July 2005, the
religious authority, the Indonesian Ulemas Council or known as Majelis Ulama
Indonesia (MUI) issued an edict that pronounced Ahmadiyah as heretical and
blasphemous, and are not allowed to call themselves as ‘Muslims’. The edict on
Ahmadiyah was issued precisely in the middle of this crisis. It was like pouring
gasoline onto the flame; hatred and violence against Ahmadiyah rapidly burst
and spread widely (ibid:9). This edict also states that Muslims must consider
their religion to be the one true religion, and to consider other sects as misdirected. The same edict stipulated that Ahmadiyah, an Islamic group that does
not recognize Muhammad as the last prophet, should be considered a heretical
sect, and defined its followers as apostates (Diani: 2005). Indeed, it was this
MUI edict that sparked the rising confrontation and the growing violence
against the Ahmadiyah congregation.
These acts of violence have occurred until now and have caused persecution in various forms conducted by individuals or groups against the Ahmadiyah. The series of events that occur repeatedly and systematically involves
radical Islamic organizations, supported by the state MUI, and legitimized by
the government and local governments through publishing discriminative and
intolerant policies.
The case of Ahmadiyah, which peaked in 2008, is quite complicated.
The group that wants Ahmadiyah to be restricted or even disbanded view this
issue as a matter of religious heresy. The groups who does not always agree for
Ahmadiyah to be dissolved look at their beliefs "okay", even in part by explicitly stating do not agree. But for them it is purely by the law, whether it concerns
the right of existence Ahmadiyah as well as violation of the law appear in the
violence against them. If this is the issue of desecration or deviation religion,
perhaps it is natural that some Muslims figures are uneasy as figures from other
religions come to speak. But if this issue is a civic issues (rights and security
guarantee for every citizen), and of every citizen-state is entitled to even participate in the talk in order to achieve the best solution.(CRCS:2008)
It seems that, rather than turning a blind eye on one side or on the other side that this is the religious issues or civic issues alone, it is more well recognized that there were indeed two-dimensional to this problem, both of
which must be resolved, If not there will continue to have problems remaining. To be straightforward, this is exactly the position taken by the government, when they finally issued a decree about Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia (JAI)
in June 2008.
11
2.5. The Government response to Ahmadiyah Persecution
Although the central Government holds authority over religious matters, it did
not try to arrest any groups that had attacked the Ahmadiyah community in
2005. This is in spite of the face that religious freedom of expression is guaranteed in the Constitution. Following the 2005 edict by the MUI, in 2007 the
MUI issued a further edict containing guidelines again condemning the Ahmadiyah and other groups considered to be heretical. Throughout 2005 to
2007, the Indonesian government remained silent in respect of these MUI
edicts. The authorities failed to review or revoke local government regulations
that effectively restricted the religious freedoms of the Ahmadiyah. Instead
there was a widespread tolerance for the on-going violence against the Ahmadiyah community and their places of worship being targeted (Caveat: 2010: 5).
Indeed in 2008, the Government went further than the MUI and restricted
the Ahmadiyyah from Indonesia by issuing the Joint Declaration No. 3/2008,
which was issued with the agreement of the Minister of Religious Affairs, the
Minister of Internal Affairs and the Attorney General. The justification for this
Joint Declaration was that it was seen as necessary to restrict the Ahmadiyah
communities, as part of a dangerous cult that could disrupt the religious life of
Indonesia especially among devoted Muslims. This issuance of repressive and
discriminative policies was also followed by other local regulations through out
the provinces in Indonesia that had significant Ahmadiyah followers which in
basic terms prohibits the existence of Ahmadiyah in that province.
The number of violations in 2008 increased highly compared with the year
2007 and 2009. Even most of the violations towards religious freedom are
largely targeting the Ahmadiyah community. An increasing number of these
events occur because of two concern, first, the escalation of persecution of
hard line Muslim organizations against the Ahmadiyah in 2008, is also a form
of pressure for the government to issue a Presidential Decree about the dissolution of Ahmadiyah, and second, the serious implications of the existence of
Three Joint Decree of the Minister, No. 3 of 2008, No. KEP033/A/JA/6/2008, Number: 199 Year 2008 About the Warning and Command to the adherents, members, and / or members of the Ahmadiyyah
Community Organization Indonesia (JAI) and the Citizens (Setara 2010:9).
The content of the joint ministerial decree is as follows (International Crisis Group 2008: 1-2):
1. Warns and orders all citizens not to speak about, endorse or seek public support for an interpretation of a religion followed in Indonesia, or
undertake religious activities that resemble the activities of such a religion, in a way that deviates from the central tenets of that religion;
2. Warns and orders followers, members and/or leaders of the Indonesian Ahmadiyah Congregation (Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia, JAI), as
long as they claim to be Muslims, to stop dissemination of interpretations that deviate from the main teachings of Islam, that is, spreading
12
the understanding that there was a prophet after the Prophet Mohammed;
3. Warns that the followers, members and or leaders of JAI who do not
heed the warnings and instructions mentioned above may face legal
sanctions in accordance with laws and regulations;
4. Warns and orders members of the public to safeguard and protect religious harmony as well as public order and not undertake actions
and/or behaviour that violate the law against followers, members and
or leaders of JAI; and
5. Notes that members of the public who do not heed the warnings outlined in the first and fourth points above can face legal sanctions.
This move towards the legalisation of violations towards Ahmadiyah suggests
two things: first, that the decree issued by the Three Ministers proved incapable of resolving the Ahmadiyah problem in Indonesia; and second, that in the
field the Ahmadiyah joint decree turn out to be a form of legitimating mob
persecution – for example in Bogor - of this minority religious community.
What should have been a protective role for local government under the Constitution and Indonesia’s international obligations to protect freedom of religious expression became an excuse for local government to issue further and
even more discriminatory resolutions and regulations against the Ahmadiyah.
In reaction to the first shock of growing violence towards the Ahmaddiyah community, the government did take some actions. Unfortunately, the
final decisions were generally in favour of the violators, rather than to protect
those persecuted. Besides this, many perpetrators responsible for the Bogor
attacks, for example, were never arrested or brought to justice. An act of omission was conducted by the police force that was there, they literally handed
over control of the situation to the mobs. The government response, towards
the Joint Ministerial decree reflected no political will to seriously defend or
protect the freedom of religious minorities in the country. The Ahmadiyah sect
was not conclusively banned, but simply instructed to stop practising their beliefs and encouraged to return to mainstream Islam as practised in Indonesia
by the majority (Caveat: 2010:5).
Although some findings have indicated that some Ahmadiyah followers have been able to continue worshipping in private houses and buildings,
generally they are under intense pressure not to do so. The treatment of the
Ahmadiyah minority religion and its followers is siginificant since it poses an
example of a set of crucial rights violations. What happened in Bogor represents a wider trend in Indonesian society and governance that presents a dangerous precedent around practices that undermine religious freedoms. This
situation allows the majority religious beliefs to influence regulation and policy
implementation by the authorities, local and national. It also means that religious rights generally, also of the majority, may not be as well protected as they
appear to be under the Constitution and Indonesia’s international human rights
obligations.
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2.6. Conclusion
The case of GKI Taman Yasmin in Bogor City, revealed that the Ahmadiyah
community were more discriminated than any other minorities in Indonesia,
regardless of their class and social status. And, this was more added with the
issuance of the edict by the MUI and the discriminative regulation by the government. These events ignited more discrimination actions towards the Ahmadiyah, which signifies that Ahmadiyah was considered a very dangerous religion or sect to survive and strive in this country. Whereas, the condition in
Bogor showed that Ahmadiyah were discriminated of pressure from radical
majority Muslim organizations that sought their extinction and extermination
from Indonesia. After some insights on Ahmadiyah minorities in Bogor, we
will also continue to look at the Christian minorities in Bogor also, to compare
the lessons that can be reached from this study.
14
Chapter 3: The Case of GKI Taman Yasmin,
Bogor
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, outlines the recent experience of Christian minorities also in
Bogor compared with the experience of the Ahmadiyah in Bogor. This chapter
focuses on the case of GKI Taman Yasmin Church also in Bogor that occurred during the first quarter of 2010 and previous history of the construction
of the building. Many violations of place of worship and minority rights have
occurred in the Bogor region of West Java, this has been a main focus on how
religious freedom is being practiced and defended in Indonesia. This chapter is
organized in four sections. Section one introduces the readers with the government policies and its linkages to the different experiences of Ahmadiyah
from chapter 2; section two describes the experiences of human rights and security in Bogor city (West Java). The need to incorporate the Ahamdiyah experience in Bogor is due to its significance to support the following section; section three retells the narratives of GKI Taman Yasmin in Bogor city also. And
lastly, section four concludes this chapter.
3.2. Government Regulations
The government changing attitudes and policies towards minorities has always
been a serious issue that has never been solved nicely throughout the years.
Many decision and outputs regarding this matter has been dealt with anger and
grieve by minority groups who wish to build places of worship. In a country
where the implementation of the law is still weak on the field, the role of the
government feels like an elastic and flexible rubber that bends whenever a
stronger party insists in its goal.
In regards to the issue of the regulation of places of worship, the Government had the Joint Ministerial Regulation 8 & 9/2006 on Places of Worship, stipulates the procedure for building a place of worship. This issue has
become a subject of controversy in recent years, through a series of conflict
and violent events. This Ministerial Regulation replaced an earlier Ministerial
Decision 1/1969, which had been criticised for contributing to justifying earlier
violence at places of worship. The Places of Worship regulation requires religious groups to obtain the signatures of at least 90 members of their group and
of at least 60 members of the surrounding general community not in the
group. All applications for a permit in each municipality or district are decided
on by the newly-formed Inter-religious Harmony Forum (Forum Kerukunan
Umat Beragama). This Forum consists of local religious leaders in each area/province/municipality. Unfortunately, since the introduction of this regulation in 2006, conflict at places of worship has continued and indeed has increased rather than declining, as those who pressed for the new Regulation had
hoped. Instead of strengthening the right to freedom of religious expression,
15
particularly for religious minorities and vulnerable communities, the state
seems to have used the law instead to further restrict the right to freedom of
religious expression. It has become increasingly difficult for religious minorities to obtain permits to build places of worship compared with in the past.
The Joint Decree No. 1/1969 Article 4 Paragraph 3 is very vague and multiple interpretations, which say that if deemed necessary, the regional subject to
head or official designee may be asked for opinions from religious organizations and local clergy. However, in reality, the decree was replaced with Joint
Decree No. 8 and 9 of 2006 that is even more improper and ignores human
rights and civil rights communities.
The issue not only has encouraged the emergence of infringement of freedom which concerned with religious activities or beliefs of people or groups,
but also can be categorized as a crime. The state, either through the government or through the police, not only has the obligation to respect, but also
protects the right for freedom for everyone, especially the fundamental freedoms, such as freedom of religion or belief (Kampschulte: 2001:23). What is
this source about? With that obligation, the state must not interfere with the
freedom of every person in the religion or belief and to practice. The state is
also obliged to respect those who carry out collective worship in peace. How
the violation does take place? By negligent and neglectful by the local authorities and the enforcers of law and order. First, when the government or police
intervention in the form of discriminative action takes place against the activities of worship, then that's when the violation occurred. Second, the offense
must be more forceful if the freedom of religion or belief is being manipulated
by the law such as Law No. 1/PNPS/1965 that was published by an authoritarian regime.
Third, the law also can be a source of discriminatory policies in the development or establishment of houses of worship for minority groups, Government policies and practices discriminatory character of a religious group or belief can be alleged as a violation of freedom of worship. Fourth, of course, the
police must protect a group conducting worship in peace so as not to be disturbed or hassled by other groups who are intolerant. If the police presence did
not prevent the disruption or destruction, then the police can be accused of
violating freedom of worship: by being negligent or neglectful. Governments,
especially local governments-provincial, district, and city-people must respect
and protect the right to collective worship and peace. Instead, they are the
forefronts actors to remove the practice of discrimination in society. They
should be at the forefront. Indeed, attitudes and practices of intolerant discriminatory act sourced from narrow and exclusive perspectives of a group so it can
lead to attitudes of rejection or resentment of other groups. And in general, the
minorities were always targeted as of practice of rejection and hatred.
In an extreme way, they view as if there is only one group alone on Earth.
Conversely, other groups are ignored simply because they have different skin
colours, perspectives, religion or belief, and not because of bad deeds or mistakes made. This is discrimination and intolerance that occur in the reality of
diversity (Hendardi, 2010).
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3.3 Human Rights and Security
Exclusivism, rejection or hatred based on differences of race or religion, can
trigger a person or class of persons to act in brutal repression of other sections
of the innocent. The expressions of exclusivism can be started with propaganda shouting hatred of a group, and then followed by action such as disturbing
and intimidation towards worship activities, property destruction, even abuse,
or other forms of indecency. Problems of freedom of worship, religion and
belief as described above is the tip of the iceberg, it means that the cases above
are just some of the various existing problems (CRCS:2009)
According to McGrew and Paco (2007), Human Security is freedom from
fear as described as a condition of existence in which human dignity is realized,
embracing not only physical safety but going beyond that to include meaningful participation in the life of community, control over one’s life and so on. In
other words, human security embraces the whole extent of rights, civil and political, economic and social, and cultural.
Talking about human rights, in Indonesia, especially the Government has
denied the Constitution and other laws that recognize the existence of the right
to freedom of worship, religious, and believes as intended in Article 28E Paragraph (1) and Article 29 paragraph (2) of the Constitution 1945 jo11. Article 22
of Law No. 39 Year 1999 on Human Rights jo. Article 18 of the Act. No. 12 of
2005 on Ratification of International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights jo
article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).
In particular it must be stressed that the right to worship individually or
together in a closed or open is a human right guaranteed in the Constitution
and other legal regulations as mentioned above. On the other hand, should also be emphasized that the closure/sealing of houses of worship besides violating citizens' constitutional rights, in terms of public policy shows the error and
fundamental error because it is a form of state intervention against the privacy
rights of citizens (Isharyanto:2009). The state should focus more on taking care
of the problem of poverty, health, education, farmers and agriculture, fishermen, labour, urban poor and other vulnerable groups. Terror of worship is a
violation of human rights (human rights) and constitutional rights of citizens.
Therefore, both instruments of international human rights law and the national
constitution are both asserted guarantees freedom of religion/belief in Indonesia.
On 16 August 2010, a day before the Independence day of Indonesia, the
President gave a State Address in front of the Parliament and the Council of
Indonesia. President Yudhoyono said "... I want to underline the need to continue to maintain and strengthen our brotherhood, harmony, and tolerance of
us as a nation. In everyday life, we still find cases that do not reflect harmony,
tolerance and mutual respect ... "(Yudhoyono 2010).
http://www.indonesia-ottawa.org/indonesia/constitution/fourth_amendment_const.pdf,
accessed 15 September 2010
11
17
The speech was given a day after numerous religious organizations
demonstrated in the streets of Jakarta demanding and addressed the need for
the government to be hands on the problem of violence among religions. On
the same occasion he also mentioned: "We should not let this situation to continue. We want every citizen to live their lives in a serene and peaceful condition, in accordance with the rights they have. This is the real philosophy of
"living in harmony and peace in diversity or Bhineka Tunggal Ika". This is the
real meaning of Unity in Diversity intact that we acknowledge and believe
in"(Yudhoyono:2010).
The State Address conveyed by SBY is only rows of jargon that are already
known in the Unity in Diversity motto. The President had shown no concern
about that sealing of mosques, attacks on churches, and the politics of uniformity in the name of religion and morality in different regions through local
syariah regulations. These are the factors in the future that will tear apart the
harmony and tolerance among Indonesians.
Many observers commented that the President is to busy defending public
criticism of government failure to guarantee citizens freedom of religion and
worship. A series of facts and events have confirmed that the state neglected
the guarantees of civil liberties of its citizens. The President also ignores the
fact that the disruption of religious freedom has been surviving at least for five
years in some parts of Indonesia (Kompas:2010).
Symptoms of intolerance and discrimination on the base of religion and minority show a fairly worrying escalation. These symptoms are not localized, but
instead demand comprehensive, systematic, deep knowledge to the constitution and international human rights law that has been ratified by the Indonesian Government. The abandonment of the constitutional rights of citizens
and the choice of attitude outside the framework of law and the constitution is
the beginning of the disobedience of the organizers of the state against the
1945 National Constitution. There are important things to do, namely how to
promote a more open socio-religious relations in Indonesia. If the two ministerial decree will be revised, it should have a new perspective that is inserted into
it, that is the spirit of protection of minorities, this is absent from the regulations regarding places of worship now (Wahid, 2010).
3.4 Looking at the Journey of Taman Yasmin Indonesian
Christian Church
In explaining the case, before introducing the Indonesian Christians,
they comprise just fewer than 10 percent of the national population. Christians
have long been disproportionately represented in the professions and middle
class. The primary reason for this imbalance is that during the colonial era
Christians had greater access than Muslims to higher education and state resources (Hefner:2000). After the fall of Soeharto, Christians became more fragile and are easy targets for religious violence throughout Indonesia. The Indonesian Protestant church that will be my research was brought by the Dutch
East Indies and usually resided in big cities during colonial times. Protestants
18
wheter European or Indonesian belonged to the Protestant Church of the
Dutch East Indies called the Indische Kerk. The status of this church was different from the Catholic Church because it was under government authority (Aritonang:2008).
As many Protestant denomination in the world, the Church were I am
researching is from the Calvinist Denomination which is called Gereja Kristen
Indonesia or The Indonesian Christian Church. It was first designated from
Chinese Indonesian communities, who were newly converted into Christianity.
It first started in 1850, mainly in Central Java, at the Banyumas City. These first
Chinese Christian communities than started sending the gospel to the natives,
with the help of also the Dutch Priest during the colonial times.
They started in the northern region central Java, the message of the
gospel at first done was done in Salatiga. This effort was followed by Zending
Salatiga (originally came from Germany with the name De Ermelosche Zendingsgemeente/ The Ermelo Missionary Church) which was formed in 1886, working mainly in the city of Semarang.
In addition, since the 19th century, there was also a church standing
Kwitang Gereformeerd in Jakarta, which consists of both the Dutch people, chinese people and natives, who at first appeared as the fruit of the gospel message of Christelijk Zendeling Haan Gereformeerde Kerken/ Christian Reformed
Churches Missionary Haan. During the colonial times, even churches were segregated by the colour of the skin but this practice soon erased due the Reformed Churches. After the upheaval in the church body in the Netherlands
(1886) and stood Gereformeerd/Reformed churches, the message of the gospel in
the southern part of Central Java was handed over to the Church of NGZV
Nederlandsche Gereformeerd Zendings Vereniging / Reformed Dutch Reformed
Church Missionary Society. This is in accordance with one principle of the Gereformeerd was seen as the official church by the synod of the Church who carry
the message of the gospel that should be a church and not the body zending.
Since then the message of the gospel grew in every major city in Java Island,
and the Indonesian Christian Church now has 217 congregations or churches
in 7 provinces in Indonesia with approximately 220.192 official members
(PGI:2010).
In telling the story of the closure and attacks towards places of worship
of, we must understand that since the Reformation era, these actions have increased and escalated in the past 10 years. For example, for the past three
years, 63 places of worship have been attacked, shut down, licenses being revoked, and obstruction of Christians conducting their religious acts. Actual
attacks have been directed towards the existence of churches/existing places of
worship, plans to build churches, even towards churches that have legally obtained a license to build their house of worship (Setara: 2010).
Members of the Church itself are quite aware of the threat of the situation. In its many of its official statement concerning the closures and violence
towards minorities in Indonesia, the two official Churches in Indonesia,
Protestant and Catholic, unequivocally condemned all acts of violence in Indonesia. But both Churches realize that they have less influence in the center of
political power in Indonesia. Therefore, both the Churches can only be called
19
on government to take steps to be able to stop the violent acts, especially in
areas affected by violence. Both Churches are also aware, that the legal system
does not work properly, thus the church will not get the demanded protection
adequate in the face of violence from fanatical groups. Against the perpetrators
of the destruction of church buildings, the Church has pursued the legal process but with no avail (CRCS: 2009).
This is because until now there have been not many real actors who are
captured by the police and usually these actors can be radical organizations or
the state itself. The main purpose of the Church today in Indonesia is to increase dialogue with the moderates, who are the majority in Islamic population
in order to explain the actual facts and build public awareness in order to work
together against human rights violations and acts of violence against religious
groups anywhere else. A rather striking fact is that whenever there is an incident, then the Church is always trying to forge better relations with representatives of Islamic groups. This means, that defensive reactions are not directed at
Islam in generally, but only against the militant fanatics and supporters who
stood behind them. Representatives of churches and official representatives of
Islamic groups agree in condemning the destruction-destruction of houses of
worship (Kampschulte:2001).
It is inevitable, that Indonesia as the country with the largest Muslim
population in the world, the constitution provides guarantees to all its citizens
to freely embrace his/her religion. This fact was acknowledged positively by
the majority people of Indonesia and by the majority of community leaders and
political parties, which currently has a large political influence. This freedom is
the result of an agreement between parties that want a secular state and those
who want the establishment of an Islamic state the days of preparation for independence. Thus the unity and integrity of the nation with diverse cultures
and religions can come true. Compromise is known by the name of Pancasila or
the "five pillars" which is the basis of the state constitution. The first Sila or
article states that belief in God is a constitutive part of Indonesia, no more and
no less.
Regional autonomy also provide great opportunities for certain areas in
Indonesia that wants to implement Islamic law in its territory, although in the
Autonomy Law which came into force in early 2001 clearly states that Religious affairs is not the autonomous regions duty or concerns . The implementation of Sharia law in Aceh Province has given new example for other regions
to carry out the same thing. One specific symptom which now appears in Indonesia is the emergence of various groups of Islamic radicals who are ready to
impose this will by force of weapons.
It should be noted that the present government and its officials in
many cases do not fulfil their obligations to protect the rights of religious freedom guaranteed by the constitution. The destruction of house of worship
buildings in many places in Indonesia belonging to minorities is very sad evidence. But the government's inability to provide protection, can not be interpreted as a new politics, but even more so is the result of the chaotic state of
the country in law enforcement. Now the government is not only a lack of financial funds, but also seems to lack people who really are responsible for sav20
ing the state law. Weak social groups and religious minorities, who do not get
protection in from fanatical groups because of neglecting the law, are getting
discomfort. Faced with this worrying development, the Church did not remain
silent. The Church officially announced a firm statement in condemning violence action and demanded the government take steps to recover peace. The
Church asked people to not do any form of retaliation and care for the surrounding neighbours of other faiths of their economic and social difficulties.
The Church in particular entered into dialogue with representatives of the Islam willing to talk and to create an atmosphere of openness in opposing every
forms of fanaticism. The Church believes that the church buildings and its institutions can be destroyed, but people’s faith can not be destroyed.
The issue concerning of GKI or Yasmin Indonesian Christian Church
is the same as many other churches in Indonesia, but they were a church that
already had the adequate and suffice requirements to construct a house of worship. But in the end, they were denied by the same institution that declared
their building permit. So in this matter, I chose the case of Yasmin church to
be compared with the Ahmadiyah case. It originally started in 2008, but we are
going to start from March 11th 2010, were the GKI Taman Yasmin located in
Bogor City, West Java was shut down. This was conducted by the Regional
Government because they were pressured by Forkami (the Indonesia Moslem
Communication Forum) Bogor. This shut down was conducted because the
Regional Government of Bogor has officially taken away the IMB (building
permit) for this church. The license was away because the existence of the
church was considered to cause unease to the society. When it was shut down,
the Civil Police Office was assisted by the Bogor Police Office and Military
Sub District Command (Setara:2010).
The first phase of the case of GKI Taman Yasmin in cosntructing a place
of worship in by obtaining a construction permit that is very hard to get for
minority religious groups, this phase was conducted from 2002-2006. This
phase included Socialization activities towards the people and Muslim community who lived near the construction site, after the congregation bought a 1721
square meter land that is located in near the Taman Yasmin complex. This
kind of socialization was needed for approval of the surrounding neighbours
and local authorities to inform them that a minority group has intended to
move to their area and build their place of worship. Information dissemination
was always the first and crucial step to take in building places of worship for
minorities. Especially in an area with Muslim majority consists around 90%.
The need to inform local community leaders, local administrative leaders and
also local mosque clerks were vital and important to contact. In align with that,
administrative procedures to the local governments also was going through,
around 5 technical and administrative letters were needed to obtain the construction permit or license for the church. The permit was finally obtained on
July 16th 2006 from the mayor of Bogor city as the sole authority to issue a
building permit in the city. It took approximately 3 years to finally obtain the
permit. This is was quite a swift reply form the local government, as many other groups had to wait for 10-20 years for obtaining a permit, without any excuses from the authorities for the delay.
21
In continuation after obtaining the permit, the second phase was the construction process. As soon as the permit was in hand, socialization was conducted to inform the local leaders and neighbors on the plans to construct the
church. This event was attended by the head and the secretary of MUI of Bogor, head of sub-district Bogor Barat, representatives of religious leaders, head
of village, head of police sector, deputy of police sector, head of village, representative of the citizen of Curug Mekar region, and community leaders. On
August 19th 2006, the first stone ceremony was underway, officially starting the
construction of the church. After 2 months of construction, a notification
came from the region secretary of Bogor city to move the location of the
church construction, claiming that there were protests from certain community
groups and demanded GKI to discontinue the construction of the church. But
based on the building permit by the Mayor of Bogor city and notification letter
from the contractor of the housing complex near the construction site mentioning that there was no social facility for non Moslem’s house of worship
near the premises, GKI insist to stand in the location and continue the construction. And after a while, there were no more obstruction from any parties,
but the construction process was halted because of lack of funding and internal
disputes.
In the start of 2008, new dynamics emerged, a demonstration conducted
at Region Representative Council by certain community groups (who was
claiming as the majority religious group in the surrounding area of the church),
forcing the IMB of GKI church building in Taman Yasmin to be revoked. And
then the unexpected happened, on February 14th 2008, the local government of
Bogor city officially suspended the construction permit that was obtained by
the church in 2006. The church then reacted by sending a complaint letter to
the Mayor of Bogor City regarding the suspension of the Construction Permit
for the church. The copy of the letter was sent to the Head Office of Urban
Design and Landscape of Bogor, Head of Legal Division of Region, Head of
Satpol PP: Satuan Polisi Pamong Praja and Forum of Ulamas and Islam Society
Organization of the entire of Bogor City. The church also filed a report to the
KOMNAS HAM (Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia/National Commision on
Human Rights. As a response, KOMNAS HAM sent a letter to the Minister of
Religion of the Republic of Indonesia regarding repudiation on the suspension
of the construction permit of the church.
Legal actions were taken by the GKI by going to court is this case the State
Administrative Court, they went to different cities, Bandung as the capital of
the West Java province and Jakarta as the nations capital. Both courts verdict
that the suspension of the construction permits by the city of Bogor is null and
void. The church wanted to file the case to the Supreme Court, but it was informed that the decision made by State Administrative Court was a final and
binding decision. Based on the Joint Minister Regulation in constructing places
of worship the law of license freezing is not recognized in the said joint, but
the one and only legal process that can be apply to cancel the IMB is thru lawsuit. It has clearly shown that the government has done a terrible error but has
no willpower to defend minority rights.
22
After the legal process was underway, protests and attacks on the church
increased in 2009. A group of protesters came to the construction site and did
a violent attack. GKI advocacy team members, from GKI and also a Muslim
community leader were physically abused by them. After the attack, the church
received a threat letter to stop the construction works. At one point, for security reason, the construction project was discontinued. And yet, a group of people broke the fence of the church as well as the temporary shelter for the construction workers. No legal investigation was conducted by police on this
incident.
At February 25th 2010, the mayor of Bogor withdrew his official recommendation for the construction of the church which was issued earlier. On the
letter it stated the reason for the withdrawal of the recommendation is “the
existence of some protests towards the plan to build the church”. And on
March 11th 2010, the Bogor Authorities sealed the construction site and demanded the church to stop its construction process. The church reaction was
to write a letter to the Police, the Mayor, the local Army Corps that the first
Sunday service of GKI Taman Yasmin will be held on 11 April 2010.
The members of the GKI congregation are forced to conduct their religious activity (Sunday service) on the pedestrians in front of the construction
location. Since April 11, 2010 there have been Sunday service served on the
pedestrian every two weeks attended by congregation members including elderly, women, and children. During the Sunday service both police officers and
city public order officers (Satpol PP) blocked the entrance to the church building area.
The church has done some latest legal actions such as sending a letter to
the President of Republic of Indonesia on May 30, 2010 concerning the complaint on the attitude and the behavior of the Government of Bogor City that
does not respect the Law. And for the last 2 months (July and August 2010)
the church has been visiting and bringing the case to the National Commission
on Human Rights, Local Bogor House of Representative, as well as having dialogues to get supports from NGOs and various parties including interfaith dialogue partners. There is still no sign of peace and solution between the two
conflicting parties until this research was conducted.
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter introduced the GKI Yasmin conception on the above narratives
showed significant in West Java in Bogor City. My main argument for this
chapter is that the minority identity reveals that it does always inflict them with
discrimination throughout the country but it also may give them protection. In
other words, the elements of ethnicity, occupation, class, and age may be the
ingredient of discrimination for some but not necessarily an essential constituent for others.
The condition in Bogor, revealed that Christians were discriminated such
as any other minority group in Indonesia, regardless their class and ethnicity.
Which signify that Christians were not discriminated on the basis of their religion, but instead were not identified of their rights. Whereas, the condition in
23
Bogor still showed that Christians were discriminated but not as bad as the
Ahmadiyah. Because, on the contrary, Christians living in Bogor city (regardless their age and class) were denied of their basic rights. After some insights
on Ahmadiyah minorities in Bogor in chapter 2, and the case of the Christian
minorities in Bogor at chapter 3, we should compare the lessons that can be
reached from this study in chapter 4.
24
Chapter 4: Lessons of Bogor
4.1 Introduction
This chapter defines some of the key concepts that will be used for further
analysis of the violations of two minority groups in the Bogor City. The chosen concepts have been selected to help explain how violence against a minority religious group was once again, in a different case, able to increase, and once
again to go largely unpunished. The concepts consist mainly of key issues that
arise in considering the problem of minority rights and freedoms in Indonesia
today.
The concern of this research is to examine the violations of equal rights in
Indonesian society, especially in terms of guarantee of freedom of religious belief and expression in satellite cities of the capital, Jakarta, where many recent
migrants have made their homes. The aim is to research the situation, so as to
lay the basis for deeper insights into how rights to freedom of religious practice
are being violated. This research concerns an on-going issue and something of
growing concern in contemporary Indonesia, because of appearance of evidence of rising intolerance for a decade or more, regarding ethnic, religious,
race and other minority groups. During the New Order all these issues were
prohibited in public discussion, whereas since 1998 this taboo (and legal prohibition) has been lifted. Some freedoms, it seem, can thus infringe others.
Freedom of worship appears to conflict with freedom of expression in ways
that notably disrupt national stability and unity.
Some possible remedies may also be proposed, including through more effective enforcement of existing provisions that seek to protect religious minorities from attacks on their freedoms of belief. In the context of present-day
Indonesia, the focus of this research on freedom of religion arises from recent
and increasing violations of places of worship, on which religious communities
– often of quite recent migrants – depend for freedom of worship. The focus
of the work has been archival, press and informal observation and discussions,
with those most directly involved in the faith-based communities in satellite
cities of Jakarta. The study includes a consideration of intra-religious relations
as central to both the problem of religious intolerance and its resolution. In
addition, the study places some responsibility on the state, including local government, for ending impunity of attacks on religious minorities.
Distribution of responsibility for attacks on religious minorities lies
first of all with the perpetrating groups. However, a second level of responsibility, distinct from the criminal acts involved in damage and attack, lies with
government and officials. Local Government, national and global institutions
also play a part in this situation. The picture overall is heterogeneous, in the
sense that the government does not seem to choose to exercise its powers to
protect minorities, and instead allows other elements in society, such as the
Muslim majority citizens and religious organizations, to exercise power as it
were ‘on behalf’ of official authorities that could be expected to ‘keep the
peace’, but fail to do so. These authorities, which allow actions with apparent
25
impunity, include the police, but also the Satuan Polisi Pamong Praja (SatPol PP)
or Public Order Agency, the pertahanan sipil (hansip) or civilian defense and other local security.
The dynamism of power being practiced against the minorities is thus
both asymmetrical and informal. The violence is nonreciprocal, and one-sided;
as such it arises from officially sanctioned or permitted persecution rather than
from conflict per se. These are the main themes explored in this chapter. We
will now deal with a number of critical issues in this research, including, first of
all the question of freedom of religious beliefs, the rise of so-called ‘fundamentalist’ variants of Islam and the question of impunity and how to overcome it.
All three are considered from the point of view of global and local factors.
4.2 Right to Freedom of Religion
Political Islam in Indonesia has undeniably emerged as a focus of world attention since the World Trade Center attacks of September 2001. Interest in it had
already been growing, however, because just several years after the end of the
Cold War, the governments of advanced industrial countries had clearly developed considerable unease with the distinctly anti-Western stance exhibited by
many of political Islam’s social agents around the globe (Hadiz 2010:4). The
upsurge in acts of terrorism in the country was related to the growing tensions
between political Islam and Western ‘secular’ politics that came to surface in
the climate of the “war on terror” that was announced in the US immediately
following September 11, 2001. The response in many parts of Asia, especially
in Islamic populated countries like Indonesia, has been a reaction also to
America’s increasingly apparent political, cultural and security (military) presence in the wider region (Juergensmeyer, 2008:145).
The future of freedom of religion in Indonesia is affected by the turmoil
that has taken place during the middle of a slow democratization process. This
had tended to make the democratization process more inconsistent and unpredictable, although it remains amazing in its range of achievements and problems. Democratisation has indeed included handling and trying to resolve
bloody conflicts in places like the Moluccas, South Sulawesi and West Kalimantan. These were all widely reported by the international press especially in
the early post-Soeharto years. But it was undoubtedly the first ‘Bali bombing’
in October 2002, costing the lives of many foreign tourists as well as far more
Indonesians, that initially stirred a more intense level of interest in ‘political
Islamic movements’ arising in Indonesia. This event brought the entity known
as Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) to global attention, given its assumed part in what was
understood as a global jihadi movement led by Al Qaeda.
The Bali Bombing has become for Indonesia an event closely related in
public perceptions to September 11, 2001 attacks on New York and Washington. For Indonesia, a country that had officially long regarded itself as having
a hospitable and calm national culture, it was the deadliest terrorist act in the
country’s history (ibid:147).
26
4.3 Radicalisation or Fundamentalism?
There have been important concessions to ‘radicalisation’. The radicalisation
of Islam in Indonesia at the turn of the century, has made speculation in the
change of the face of Islam in Indonesia. Some observers have made remarks
that these are just a small portion of 200 million Muslims in Indonesia alone.
The rise of Islamic Movement after the New Order Era, most importantly, a
rise in the number of Islamic associations that follow to fundamentalist principles and that are often militant in their attitude to societal and cultural problems towards modern Indonesia. They are openly and strongly anti-Christian
and anti-American; they call for the conversion of Indonesia to an Islamic
state. The Laskar Jihad and the Islamic Defenders Front are the most prominent of these new groups (Federspiel 2002:111).
According to (ter Haar, 2003:8), Islamic fundamentalism is significant
as a cultural ideology that will advocate and discover the past of Islam. This
notion was resembled such as the rise of Islam in Malaysia that is connected
with the British colonial and related western culture influence. Also another
component of religious fundamentalism is the objective to empower people, in
ways that do not adapt to build the interests. She also added that to achieve a
successful implementation of fundamental agenda is a sense of commitment
that is generated and sustained through religious ideology.
Contemporary Islamic Fundamentalist regard themselves as the Islamic
“just” striving to achieve their goal of a form of direct democracy under the
auspieces of God and sharia law (Haynes: 2008).Facing the state power that is
searching to destroy or control formerly dominant Muslim communitarian
structures and replace them with values, norms, beliefs and institutions focusing on the concept of national citizenry Islamist emerged in many Muslim
countries.
To understand the face of Islam in Indonesia, we must go back to history during the development of Indonesian nationalism, where Islam played a
major role, and achieved independence in 1945. After that the constitution was
framed in terms of then President Soekarno declared to be the five principles
of national life: belief in God, humanitarians, national unity, democracy amd
social justice. In their vagueness, the principles appeal to all religious communities without privileging Islam as the largest religion in the country. Muslim nationalist were understandably unhappy with this compromise. They tried repeatedly to bring Indonesia constitutional law and public policy closer to the
ideal of an Islamic state, in particular urging that Muslims be required to adhere
to the sharia (Lawrence:1989). Under Soekarno and his successor, Soeharto, it
has been secular nationalism, with a predisposition to religious pluralism,
which has dominated in Indonesia. Both Soekarno and Soeharto are viewed as
model secular humanitarians. Muslim leaders cannot match their flexibility in
public life. In a sense, they and Islam have been the victims of regional politics
for at national level it is Javanese syncretism that has prevailed, repressing the
Muslim statist ambitions of Sumatrans and particularly Acehnese.
The Islamic identity can be one of the identities the person regards as important, but without thereby denying that there are other identities that may
27
also be significant. What is often called “the Islamic World” does, of course,
have a preponderance of Muslims, but different persons who are all Muslims
can and do vary greatly in other respects, such as political and social values
(Sen:2006).
Historic Islamic political orders had been composed of many religious and
ethnic communities that opened the road today to adoption of a pluralistic society. Unlike those who have been upholding the notion of a purely Islamic, or
only ideological state, have argued that the fundamental law of the first Islamic
state distinguished between religious authority and political authority. And although the religious authority had only to call people to religion, the political
authority had to deal with social, ethnic and religious organizations, political
and economic development and changes (Moussalli: 2001)
These groups are generally pointed out as peripheral to the mainstream of
Indonesian Islam, which remains overwhelmingly committed to tolerance
within the Indonesian nation. The militant groups are said to have limited influence in society, yet the message they convey resonates within the wider Indonesian Muslim community. Observers told that these fundamentalists are
“home-grown” groups—not under the control of foreign organizations—even
though some leaders have talked to and have been hospitable to people of a
similar ideology from outside the country, including some groups promoting
active terrorism. These groups are the ones that have garnered the greatest
press coverage in recent times and have given the impression that the state of
Indonesian Islam is in serious trouble (ibid:111).
4.4 Overcoming Impunity or Punishing Victims
The case of impunity of the government has overcome many events and violations that are caused by Fundamentalist and radical groups. In conducting persecution committed by hard-line Islamic organizations, series of events happen
by following the same pattern (Setara Institute 2010:9-11). The 5 steps toward
the persecution are as follows: These cases are firstly started by a large mass of
people who form hard line Islamic group through propaganda. Even though it
looks solid, real hard-line Islamic organizations are only minorities in Indonesian Muslims. The rest are people from flexible12 societies who are recruited on
the spot or provoked in an effort to create solidity through instant but mind
washing preaching;
After building solidity at the organizational level, the next step is to broaden the issue and get public support with spreading hatred against the target
through rejection and suggestive banners of hostility. Aside from being a
means of gathering support public, it would also provide legitimacy for them
to act. The messages of hostility in the name of the organization is not always
Flexible means unemployed, people who have part time jobs and people who were
just in vicinity of the area or live near the Islamic Organization.
12
28
the hard line Islam, but could be conducted without a name, or names that
were created hastily and easy to remember by the public;
Step three is “road shows” that consists of recitation and “tabligh akbar”or
long march conducted by the hard-line Islamic organizations. A number of
prominent religious scholars from Jakarta from other cities are invited to get
together and burn the people’s emotion. Propaganda material as well as pure
propaganda is inserted as messages of hatred against the Ahmadiyah community or other targets. This propaganda’s are accompanied by religious arguments. The “tabligh akbar” or long march, are usually performed before the
commencement of action. After managing to install hatred in people’s head,
the hardline Islamic group then give ultimatums and threats of termination
worship activities. This threat was issued publicly on the grounds that the public are restless with Ahmadiyah religious activity or other targets;
The next step is pressuring the victim groups through a written statement,
the start of the processes of dialogue is a written statement under pressure. The
letter contains a statement of 'willingness' for not conducting religious activities; 'willingness' to take down their buildings, even a willingness to convert
beliefs; If the activities that are condemned still hasn’t stopped, or after all the
legal procedures or stages are passed, the hard-line Islamic organizations found
legitimacy to take action into their own hands.
The last phase is the Impunity by the Police or Government, after the
closing of the place of worship which is rarely accompanied by violence, on
behalf of the law enforcement; the police actually do the sealing. At the same
time, the police also let mass conducting destruction. Even if the police guards
and protect the area, the argument for letting this happen is because lack of
apparatus to disperse the mass. This is where in-active actions of police and
local government officials could be qualified in conducting human rights violations due to take part and to violate the right to worship/belief. This is also
added, by the police who are not making arrests and prosecution towards citizens, who conduct criminal acts.
The attitude of the central government in Jakarta responding to acts of violence against minority religious groups such as the destruction of house of
worship and human rights abuses, are also uncertain and unsure. The Government deplores these events and invite the representatives of all faiths to discuss common issues of conflict. The government itself expressly reject such
violent acts. But the impression that is understood, that the government action
is more symbolic, because until now the government has never taken real action to protect its citizens. The Local government reacted variously. Some of
them like the Sultan of Yogyakarta acted decisively to maintain public order
and thus protect minority religious groups (Kampschulte: 2001). But the overall impression gained is that local governments do not fully use the authority
owned in facing groups that use violence. It is questionable, how far the role of
law enforcement agencies in tackling the crisis that has struck the entire country. The answers obtained to these questions are very disappointing. In general,
people believe, that in Indonesia, does not longer apply and implements the
rule of law. Never before has the moral basis of state law become so damaged
as it is now, because judges can easily be bribed as well as politicians. Often we
29
hear, that the court might not take a fair decision, whether it concerns human
rights abuses or injustices against the religious group or in the handling of caserelated matters such as corruption scandals. It is often said, that the court did
not give any hope to succeed. Such a situation is caused, because usually people with money influence the judge's decision. Besides, many judges are afraid
of the reaction to his decision. If the masses can be mobilized to scare people,
then a case, for instance about the house of worships that were damaged or
destroyed, will have a difficult time to be filed again. If such a pessimistic assessment about the legal system in Indonesia is true, then the minority groups
who threatened violence can not expect much from the court (CRCS: 2009).
4.5 State Concessions to Radicalisation
The rise of religious violence in Indonesia at the start of the turnover into the
21st century is argued to be related to the old Darul Islam movement, which for
some decades had been advocating Islamic law as the sole basis for Indonesia’s
political order (Juergensmeyer, 2008:147).
The current relationship between Muslims and Christians in Indonesia is
starting to show that there are unresolved matters between these two religions
and their interaction as majority and minority. During the 1970s and 1980s under the New Order regime, in what was considered the Golden Age of religious tolerance in Indonesia, there were few incidents related with religious
issues. But during the 1990s, this tolerance started to shift and soon religious
conflict came to be, or to appear, as the main source of conflicts in Indonesian
society. Religious tensions and conflicts in the past recent years in Indonesia
has witnessed many violence incidents and struggles, which have led many to
question the fundamental human right to freedom of religious belief in a
peaceful way. Many events have occurred such as restrictions on building places of worships, religious repression of minority groups and attacks on existing
houses of worship, as well as banning of minority religious communities in
some cases. All these have been notably on the increase in recent years.
Comparing to the cases similar to Indonesia, in Pakistan religious minorities is not free also. Their mosque and churches are under attack by religious
fascist; their members are victimized and executed, and there is no hope of development for them in the plans of any of the political parties or leaders. The
justice system discriminates systematically against the Ahmadiyah is particular,
from the highest courts down to the local police, and there are only one or two
brave voices raised against defence of the victims (PHRG: 2010).
In the cases of buildings of worship conflict in the satellite cities of Jakarta
in West Java, the attitude taken by the government often seems to prefer a safe
way out by following what is portrayed as the ‘popular opinion’ among the
masses, or the majority of the population. This could be seen in almost all cases in 2009. Apparently the government efforts to give responsibility to the local government by forming FKUB (Forum Kerukunan Umat Beragama) or the
Forum of Religious Harmony through the Joint Regulations of the Minister of
Religion and Minister of Interior Affairs Nos. 8 and 9 Year 2006 is still prob30
lematic in its implementation. This regulation actually is not discriminatory, it
provides guarantee for every religious group in Indonesia to build its house of
worship and it states that the local government has the responsible in providing help for protecting the rights of all religious groups to do so (INCRES,
2010: 27).
To explain further, for example, to request the establishing of a new building of worship, any organization needs 90 signatures from potential users of
the building of worship and 60 additional signatures from people who lives
near the location that will be endorsed by the FKUB, but are not likely to be
potential users. The FKUB functions as adviser to recommend that these
building have their approval for the state, or not. But in many cases the FKUB
are threatened and repressed by the parties who object to the buildings, and
then the FKUB are intimidated so that they hesitate and often fail to forward
the request in order to placate the latter.
4.6 Conclusion
The condition in Bogor City, revealed that the Ahmadiyah community were
more discriminated than any other minorities in Indonesia, regardless of their
class and social status. And, this was more added with the issuance of the edict
by the MUI and the discriminative regulation by the government. These events
ignited more discrimination actions towards the Ahmadiyah, which signifies
that Ahmadiyah was considered a very dangerous religion or sect to survive
and strive in this country. The Christians were discriminated by the state denying their rights to build houses of worship. Whereas, the condition in Bogor
still showed that minorities were discriminated, by religious organizations and
also by the State that should have been protecting the minority’s rights. The
regulation and policies that should have been implemented were no use in the
field, and the government and the law enforcement were inadequate in providing help towards plead and petition of the weak. It seems that equal treatment
and equal rights are still needed to look for.
31
Chapter 5: Conclusion
Religious violence and violations have escalate and increased in this past few
years in Indonesia, the statistics showed by numbers towards the state, including the state of West Java, that has the highest state violations in the country.
The state and the government are most highly responsible for violations that
have been done by many radical organizations.
The government still hasn’t found a formulation in making peace between
majority and minorities issue because of the political will that is still weak on
defending them. This is caused by pressure of small but very influential hard
line groups that are promoting intolerance in Indonesia.
Explaining the case of Ahmadiyah, for hardliner religious organizations, all
acts of violence were conducted on behalf of the defence for the purity of Islamic teachings and condemnation against Ahmadiyah. In addition to being a
popular issue, protection towards Islam is highly potential to get increased
broad public support and justification towards their actions. Hard-line Islamic
groups have chosen the issue of elimination against Ahmadiyah as one of the
political agenda and interests of these religious organizations (Setara 2010:13).
In despite of that, the government still hasn’t taken constructive actions to
prevent the violence towards the Ahmadiyah community in Indonesia. Recent
outbreaks of violence are also perpetuated by regulations that were issued by
local governments in certain areas that manifestation the violence resulted
from social intolerance and public pressure. Related with the case of violation
of places of worship, many cases showed that even if the required legal processes of building places of worship had been met, there was no certainty that
minority groups would be able to exercise their rights undisturbed (Haryanto,
2010).
The law seems it does not want to protect pluralism and multiculturalism,
a hint of the future has shown that the people will have a preconceived idea
about the legal process and this will further diminish their trust in the legal system. This notion of idea is really a threat of the relations of religions in Indonesia.
Such as the case of GKI Yasmin, where they have fulfilled the necessary
requirements and procedure based on the law and regulation that have applied
by the state. They are denied of operation by the same institution that issued
their permit to conduct their religion. On the other hand, if the government
denies the rights of community or parties who have legal power on their hands,
there is no legal mechanism that can sue the government for not doing their
job as public servants. This is a loop hole that the government has used in
many cases and have ignored hundreds or thousands of similar cases in the
stake of majority aspiration as they call it. It is also based on reports that the
construction of minorities’ place of worship has caused unrest and uneasiness
of people around the construction site. Legal instruments that treat each all
faiths as equals and national leadership that firmly defend the constitution for
32
any political price, is the primary key to prevent more incidents of violence in
the name of the majority (Kompas 2010).
A new observation, however, is that people from the majority does not
seem to want diversity anymore and tend to project their hatred and fear onto
‘different’ religious communities, including especially Christians as the biggest
minority religion. This is usually claimed to be because Muslims say it is feared
that Christians or also Ahmadiyah might start to do missionary work engaging
new recruits or converts in their area of community.
What about future development of religious freedom in Indonesia? To answer this question, the important thing is not the relationship between the majority and minority religious groups. The most crucial issue in the future, is the
debate and struggle between the majority Muslim group that is tolerant on the
one hand and the fanatical Muslim minority and its sympathizers on the other. Will Indonesia become an open civil society and all citizens can obtain the
right to live guaranteed by the constitution to practice his religious beliefs respectively? Or whether the hard-line and radical Islamic groups will manage to
achieve their goal to thwart the system of the government into a religious dictatorship that will produce a closed and backward society. The majority of Indonesian people do not want this. We hope that the supporters of religious
freedom from all groups managed to gather courage among their people and
the political parties to deal with radical fanatics so that they can be
stopped. Only in an open society and possessing freedom of religion, religious
minorities will have a safe place.
In response to the practice of religious violence, the government and the
police has to be firm in perceiving and dealing with the violence as a criminal
practice. Particularly relevant violence that occur to the Ahmadiyah, there is no
other way for the government and the Police, to investigate all the violence and
proceed legally. Without a strict law enforcement effort, the government and
the police can been seen as practicing acts of omission against violence in society. If cases of violence still continue against the Ahmadiyah group, the efforts
of the Ministry of Religion to build a series of dialogues on the issue Ahmadiyah could be meaningless (CRCS: 2008). Apart from the growing debate
around religious discourse, firm action against all forms of violence not only
about the case Ahmdiyah should not discriminate into who is the perpetrator
and who is the victim. For every perpetrators of violence must be punished
and every victim of violence must be protected. Besides corruption, the ongoing practice of violence is still the great enemy of the Indonesian.
To develop a sense of nationhood and the values beyond the boundaries
of religious groups, education that emphasizes on civic pluralism13, religious
social cohesion, inter-group relations religion and the "rules of the game" of
cultural and legal matters in these important relationships is transformed into
Civic Pluralism concerns policy-making and law enforcement in matters of social
relations of religious groups, and also how a group of people from different religions
relate to one another, negatively or positively.
13
33
in religious education or education citizenship in schools. In the public
schools, it is for principals and teachers to pay attention to the development of
religion activities that may strengthen attitude of intolerance. In universities, if
there exist certain religious units why don’t begin to grow a unique interreligious student activity. Interfaith meeting activity for students and young
people such as youth camps and other forms of activity are strongly demanded
to enrich the direct interaction experience between religions.
Some recommendations towards the state as the sole and primary actor in
continuing the effort to maintain stability and peace are, firstly, the will of the
President of Indonesia to take breakthrough steps in order to facilitate the
construction of house of worships that have been refuses. Whether it is refusal
by the people, refusal of permit or land insufficiency. The President can instruct the Regent/Mayor to give a quick facilitation to the availability of houses
of worship. Second, the Indonesian Parliament must also take part and full attention to the various violation of Freedom of Religion/belief by making the
surveillance role towards various institutions more effective, especially to the
Indonesian Minister of Religious Affairs, the Minister of Law and Human
Rights, The Minister of Domestic Affairs, The Attorney General and the Indonesian Police. Aside from integrating the issue of Freedom of Religion/Belief violation in the Parliamentary surveillance performances, the Parliament can create a Parliamentary work group for Freedom of Religion/Belief,
in order to push constructive legislation to guarantee the freedom of religion/Belief. Third, the most important part is law enforcement on the field;
the Indonesian Police must act upon the perpetrators of violence and destruction of houses of worship. The Indonesian Police must have working guidelines for police officers on the field, in handling cases involving freedom of
religion/belief.
34
Appendices
Maps of Research
Map 1
“Map of West Java Province”
Bogor City
35
Appendix
GKI Bogor-Taman Yasmin Congregation Chronology (2001-2010)
Background of the GKI Taman Yasmin
Starting in 2001, considering the growth of the member of congregation/worshippers compared to the capacity of the existing church building located on Jalan (street) Pengadilan 35, Bogor, the GKI Bogor congregation decided to buy a land and build a new church building in the area of Taman
Yasmin Housing Complex, Bogor 14.
In addressing the traffic jam and other social problems at Jalan Pengadilan
35 and to answer the need of house of worship in Taman Yasmin area as the
result of internal studies and surveys showed that the number of GKI Bogor
members living in Taman Yasmin and the surrounding areas has reached 300
people. The GKI Bogor members decided to construct a new church for their
growing congregation.
Part 1: Process of obtaining construction permit (2002-2006)
Socialization activies (1):
1. 10 March 2002
170 people signed “Approval Statement letter” for the construction of the
church (in and area of 1721m) located in Taman Yasmin sector III kavling
31 Jalan Ring Road Bogor Barat, Bogor, Curug Mekar.
2. 1 March 2003
Discussion between a youth group of Curug Mekar, committee of the
church construction, and GKI regarding the consent to approve the construction works of the church.
3. 25 October 2005
The church applied to the mayor of Bogor city for “recommendation letter
to construct a church building” on 1720m land at JL. K.H. Abdullah bin
Nuh No.31 Taman Yasmin Village Curug Mekar, sub district West Bogor,
Bogor city.
4. 8 January 2006
42 people of the citizen of Curug Mekar signed the approval letter for the
construction of the church.
5. 12 January 2006
Information dissemination meeting regarding the construction plan of the
church attended by 71 local citizens of neighbourhood unit (RT:Rkun
Tetangga) I, II, III, IV and VI Curug Mekar Village consist of community
Data Obtained from http://www.pgi.or.id/Penutupan_GKI.html, accessed 3 November 2010
14
36
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
Unit (RW: Rukun Warga) Neighboorhoood unit, Mosque welfare board
(DKM) dewan kesejahteraan masjid and community leaders.
14 January 2006
25 community leaders of Curug Mekar village signed approval statement
letter for the construction of the church. The explanation was brought by
the head of the village and the head of the society empowerment institution (LPM) of Curug Mekar village. The letter was also signed by the head
of society empowerment institution and the head of the village.
15 January 2006
Information dissemination meeting regarding the church construction plan
was held and attended by 40 citizens of Taman Yasmin housing community sector III, Rw VIII, Curug Mekar Village. The approval statement letter
was acknowledged by the head of LPM curug mekar, head of RW VIII and
head of curug mekar village.
15 February 2006
Letter of recommendation to build the church from the mayor of Bogor
city, Diani Budiarto, was issued by GKI Jl, Pengadilan no.35 Bogor, to
process construction permit IMB601/389-Pem.
3 March 2006
The Bogor Office of the City Environment and Hygiene (DLHK: Dinas
Lingkungan Hidup dan Kebersihan Kota) issued letter of technical advice number 660.1/144/DLHK for the church, GKI Jl. Pengadilan No.35 Bogor.
14 March 2006
The local level of the National Land Board (BPN: Badan Pertanahan Nasional) of Bogor, issued letter of technical consideration of the use of land
(Number 460/20/PPTGT-P/2006) for the church.
15 March 2006
The Bogor office of traffic and public transportation (Dinas Lalu lintas dan
Angkutan Umum) issued Assessment and Traffic Technical Advice Number
503/262-DLLAJ to the church.
3 April 2006
Application for use of green planning (application to use the park/green
channel (jalur hijau), drainage, and pedestrian for enter and exit) and for installing lightings on the street (public lighting) with letter number 090/MJGKIBgr/IV/06 was submitted to the head of the office of urban design
and landscape Bogor.
12 April 2006
Bogor Office of highways and water issued a license letter to make an entrance way to the church (number 503/238/018-BINA)
17 April 2006
Head of the Bina Marga Office (Bogor) issued letter number 610/319/018BIMA concerning technical advice.
30 May 2006
Bogor office of urban design and landscape issued affirmation of Site Plan
No.645.8/705-DTKP (regarding the plan to construct the church.
37
16. 13 July 2006
Finally, the church obtained decree letter from the mayor of Bogor city
concerning the construction permit (no.645.8.372 year 2006), signed by the
head of the Boor Office of Urban Design and Landscape.
Part2: Construction Process (2006-2008)
17. 18 August 2006
The church held an information dissemination meeting regarding the construction works of the church. It was attended by the head and the secretary of MUI of Bogor, head of sub-district Bogor Barat, representatives of
religious leaders, head of village, head of police sector, deputy of police
sector, head of village, head of LPM, representative of the citizen of Curug
Mekar, and community leaders
18. 19 August 2006
The first stone Laying Ceremony: officially starting the construction of the
church. The ceremony was attended by representatives of local government in Bogor City
19. 11 October 2006
An Option from the region secretary of Bogor city to move the location of
the church construction, claiming that there were protest from certain
community groups (who was claiming as the majority religious group in the
surrounding area of the church) to the Head District of Bogor City, demanded GKI to discontinue the construction of the church.
20. 6 December 2006
Notification letter from PT.Inti Innovaco that there was no social facility for
non Moslem’s house of worship at the location of sector VII, Housing
Community Taman Yasmin (the land for social facility was planned to
build the Holy Mosque of Taman Yasmin, that the building foundation had
been started). Based on this letter GKI insist to stand in the location.
21. 10 January 2007
The stake pillar installations were to be provided by PT. Sunway Yasa.
Part 3: Freezing of IMB and legal process (2008-2010)
22. 10 February 2008
A demonstration conducted at Region Representative Council (DPRD: Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah) by certain community groups (who was
claiming as the majority religious group in the surrounding area of the
church), forcing the IMB of GKI church building in Taman Yasmin to be
revoked
23. 14 February 2008
Instead of protecting the needs and rights of the minority groups for house
of worships, the local government of Bogor city officially suspended the
construction permit (IMB) that was obtained by the church in 2006.
24. 28 February 2008
The church sent a complaint letter to the Mayor of Bogor City regarding
the suspension of the Construction Permit for the church. The copy of the
letter was sent to the Head Office of Urban Design and Landscape of Bo38
gor, Head of Legal Division of Region, Head of Satpol PP: Satuan Polisi
Pamong Praja and Forum of Ulamas and Islam Society Organization of the
entire of Bogor, (No.64/MJ-GKI Bogor/II/2008).
25. 10 March 2008
The church filed a report to the KOMNAS HAM (Komisi Nasional Hak
Asasi Manusia/National Commision on Human Rights). As response,
Komnas HAM sent a letter to the Minister of Religion of the Republic of
Indonesia No.592/K/PMT/IV/08 regarding repudiation on the suspension of the construction permit (IMB) of the church dated 7 April 2008.
26. Several consideration to go to the court:
By virtue of article 6 verse (1) Joint Regulation of Minister of Religion and
Minister of Domestic Affairs Number 9 Year 2006/Number 8 Year 2006
regarding the implementation guidance of head/vice head of region in
maintaining the peace among religion. Empowering the peace among religion forum, and establishing of house of worship and there were not governed authority to be able to either revoke or freeze, IMB of house of worship moreover at this case the Head office of Urban Design and landscape
of Bogor issued the freezing letter not on behalf of the head of district.
The law of license freezing is not recognized in the said joint, but the one
and only legal process that can be apply to cancel the IMB is thru lawsuit.
Current situation
27. 4 September 2008
The verdict of the state administrative Court (PTUN: Pengadilan Tata Usaha
Negara) Bandung (No.41/G/2008/PTUN-BDG. Dated 4 September 2008)
declared that the suspension of the construction permit (IMB) dated 14
February 2008 is null and void.
28. 2 February 2009
The appeal court of the State Administrative Court (PT. TUN:Pengadilan
Tinggi Tata Usaha Negara) in Jakarta confirmed the decision made earlier by
PTUN Bandung (Decision No.241/B.2008/PT.TUN.JKT dated 2 February 2009)
29. 30 March 2009
Based on a official letter issued by the Head of the administrative court
(PTUN) in Bandung (No.41/G/2008/PTUN-BDG dated 30 March 2009),
in relation with to the decision of PT.TUN Jakarta
No.241/B/2008/PT.TUN.JKT dated 2 February 2009, it was informed
that the case cannot be filed to the Supreme Court for the decision made
by PTTUN on 2 February 2010 was a final and binding decision.
Protests and Attacks
30. 25 April 2009
A group of protesters came to the construction site and did a violent attack. GKI advocacy team members, from GKI and also H. Ujang Suja’i
who is a Muslim (from Nahdlatul Ulama or NU) were physically abused by
them.
31. 4 January 2010
The construction works of the church were continued
39
32. 8 January 2010
The church received a threat letter to stop the construction works. At one
point, for security reason, the construction project was discontinued. And
yet, a group of people broke the fence of the church as well as the temporary shelter for the construction workers. No legal investigation conducted
by police on this incident.
SEALED
33. 25 February 2010
The mayor of Bogor withdrawn his official recommendation for the construction of the church which was issued earlier. On the withdrawal letter
(No.503/367/Huk), it stated the reason for the withdrawal of the recommendation is “the existence of some protests towards the plan to build the
church”
34. 8 March 2010
The head of Bogor Office for Creation and City Planning (Kepala Dinas
Cipta Karya dan Tata Ruang) issued a letter to the church, requesting the
church to stop construction works of the church building.
35. 11 March 2010
A sign “SEALED” was put on the wall without explanation and GKI still
continue the construction.
36. Early April 2010
The GKI wrote a letter to the Police (Polresta), the Mayor, the Army Corps
(Kodim) that the first Sunday service of Yasmin Church will be held on 11
April 2010.
37. 10 April 2010
Around 05.00 PM: neglecting the decision of all levels of State Administrative Courts, a group of the City Public Order Officers (under the authority
of the Mayor of Bogor) known locally as Satpol PP broke the key of the
fence of the church building area and replace it with their own key and put
on sign “SEALED” on the fence of the church.
Current Situation
Sunday Service on the street
As a result, the members of the GKI congregation are forced to conduct
their religious activity (Sunday service) on the pedestrians in front of the
construction location. Since April 11, 2010 there have been Sunday service
served on the pedestrian every two weeks attended by congregation members including elderly, women, and children. During the Sunday service
both police officers and city public order officers (Satpol PP) blocked the
entrance to the church building area.
Latest Actions
 GKI sent a letter to the President of Republic of Indonesia on May 30,
2010 concerning the complaint on the attitude and the behavior of the
Government of Bogor City that unrespects the Law.
40


GKI received the copy letter from the Ombudsman Republic of Indonesia
dated June 8th 2010 concerning the Implementation of the decision of the
Bandung state administrative court no.41/G/PTUN-BDG by Bogor Office of urban design and landscape. Ombudsman RI obliged the Mayor to
give the written explanation in 14 days which were counted since the acceptance of the letter.
For the last 2 months (July and August 2010) GKI has been visiting and
bringing the case to the National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas
HAM) Local Bogor House of Representative (DPRD Bogor), Human
rights working group (HRWG) as the UN Special Rapporteur on religious
freedom, as well as having dialogues to get supports from NGOs and various parties including cross-religion groups such as the Indonesian Conference on religion and peace (ICRP) and the Asian Muslim Action Network
(AMAN) Indonesia.
41
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