1
The following extract is edited, revised, and adapted from a paper presented at the
International Conference on Intercultural Communication, Asian Economic Integration and
Regional Order (March 18, 2014), National Chengchi University, Taiwan.
Intercultural Communication in Geo-political Affairs:
The Sino-Japanese Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands Dispute as a Model
Edwin R. McDaniel, Ph.D.
Introduction
The peaceful resolution of international conflicts requires extensive communicative
interaction between delegates from the involved nations and any third-party representatives.
In order to arrive at an amicable settlement, the emissaries must exchange grievances and
negotiate mutually acceptable terms of settlement, establish methods of implementation,
agree to verification procedures, and explore steps for future relations. Generally, the
negotiators come from varied cultural backgrounds with differing worldviews. These
differences can create divergent perceptions of the conflict, means of resolution, and the
shape of the final solution. To understand and overcome these complicating conditions, it is
necessary to have a broad appreciation of the factors which form and influence how an
individual perceives not only the problem at hand but also associated conditions.
This essay contends that globalization has increased the requirement for enhanced
intercultural communication skills. It is argued that in order to anticipate and understand the
communicative behaviors and messages of international delegates negotiating geopolitical
disputes, there is a need to consider a variety of variables, in addition to culturally instilled
values. The Sino-Japanese territorial dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands is used as a
model to demonstrate the importance of these variables.
Contemporary Global Social Order
We live in an increasingly complex global society. In the post-Cold War era,
advances in transportation technology and the advent of the digital age have increased
societal interaction and made the world socially, economically, and geopolitically smaller.
Today, national borders have become porous as a result of interdependent economies arising
from transnational organizations, international trade pacts, regional security alliances, and the
requirement for growing international cooperation on issues such as environmental
2
degradation, the potential for pandemic disease, human trafficking, poverty, privacy concerns,
natural disaster response, illicit drug trade, and other compelling concerns. The risk of
international conflict has also been amplified as nations engage in competition for natural
resources, contest cross-border pollution, advocate varying concepts of human rights, and
renascent nationalism revives contested historical geographical claims. As an illustration of
this latter concern, Table 1 provides a listing of territorial disputes ongoing in the Western
Pacific.
Table 1: International Conflicts in Western Pacific
Disputants
Issue
China – Japan
Territorial
Japan – Korea
Territorial
Japan – Russia
Territorial
China – SEA Nations
Territorial
China – US
Geopolitical influence
Source: Edwin R. McDaniel
Location
ECS islands
SOJ islands
Kuril Islands
SCS
NEA/SEA
Geopolitical and Sociocultural Structures of Intercultural Communication
Any effort to determine an individual’s perception of a particular problem or problem
set is fraught with difficulty and usually runs a high risk of failure. However, by considering
the broad-based geopolitical and sociocultural structures influencing a larger social group, it
is possible to derive a reasonable estimate of how a delegate, or delegation, from that social
group might approach a problematic situation.
To further develop this premise, four primary geopolitical and sociocultural structures
thought to influence the perception of an international incident are identified and briefly
discussed. Table 2 offers and an overview of the four concerned structures and their more
salient sub-elements. Subsequently, current China-Japan tension over East China Sea
territorial issues is used as a model for understanding how those structural elements can give
rise to varied perceptions that can influence communicative interaction between the
disputants.
Table 2: Geopolitical and Sociocultural Structures
 Political
 Economic
 National Ideologies
 Role of Religion
 Leven of Nationalism

Contested Geopolitical Issues


Primary
Secondary

Socioeconomic Considerations

Economic
3

Collective Historical Memory

Social




Importance
Construction
Sensitivity to
Role in national identity
Source: Edwin R. McDaniel
(Discussion of the first three variable sets has been omitted for the Global
Class lesson)
Collective Historical memory
There are compelling scholarly arguments that propose “collective memory” and
“historical memory” can carry different connotations (e.g., see Halbwachs, 1980, 1992;
Savage, 2006). For this essay, however, “collective historical memory” will be defined as
how the past is constructed and represented by a social body or, more specifically, how
members of a nation state receive, construct, and interpret national historical events.
Collective historical memory, then, provides the cohesive that binds the people together,
forms their national identity, and concurrently reflects how they see themselves. Moreover,
an examination of collective historical memory offers insight into the interests and political
actions of a nation’s people (MacMillan, 2010; Wang, 2012).
A produce of multiple sources, construction of historical memory commences early in
childhood with family stories recounting past memorable individual, familial, and societal
events. Ultimately, the record and perception of historical events becomes “deeply embedded
in the public consciousness and are transmitted to succeeding generations formally by
education and informally through the arts, popular culture, and mass media” (Shin, 2011, p.
4). In effect, it becomes an integral part of one’s worldview.
However, the recording and presentation of the histories that constitute national
collective historical memory are subject to multiple influences, including value laden
interpretations of the events, individual perception, and selective presentation arising from
political objectives and/or power relationships. In some nations, the historical accounts
presented in the formal education systems are tailored to “shape beliefs and values in ways
that legitimize the polity” (Jones, 2011, p. 208), with the objective being to construct a state
sanctioned collective historical memory of past national and global events (Jones, 2011). This
can, and indeed does, lead to divergent interpretations of history, or what Shin and Sneider
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(2011) call “divided memories”. For instance, in the US, the historical view of WWII greatly
emphasizes the almost half a million American causalities and the heroic Normandy landing;
but in Russia, the concentration is on the country’s over 20 million military and civilian
deaths and the famous battle of Stalingrad and siege of Leningrad—two quite different
focuses.
Perhaps the best explanation of the criticality of collective national memory is offered
by Berger (1997, p. 41), who writes that “state behaviour is first and foremost shaped by the
particular sets of normative and cognitive beliefs which a society and its leaders hold about
the nation…” This is interpreted to mean that historical memory not only informs the nation
and its leaders about the past but also provides a lens for viewing the future. Collective
historical memory, then, can construct a compelling focus on how the people of one nation
view the people of another nation. Thus, “divided memories” can have a critical impact on
communication between representatives engaged in international dispute resolution.
The Sino-Japanese Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands Dispute as a Model
Until 2012, the long simmering dispute between China, Japan, and Taiwan over
ownership of the Diaoyu/Senkaku/Tiaoyuta island group was confined to acrimonious
speeches and jingoistic press releases, with aperiodic incursions by activists, fishing boats,
and government vessels. In 2012, however, the situation boiled over when the Government of
Japan paid a private Japanese owner over USD26 million for three of the five islets it did not
already hold title to. Peking greeted this event with escalated rhetoric, and anti-Japanese
protests quickly broke out across China, resulting in considerable damage to Japanese
business interests. Since that time, the polemical battles have grown more frequent and
accusatory and are now augmented by both Chinese and Japanese maritime assets
maintaining a near continuous presence in the area (D.Z., 2013; “Sino-Japanese,” 2012;
Smith, 2013).
With no mutually satisfactory solution yet identified, this unresolved territorial
conflict presents an excellent opportunity to examine how the macrostructural
geopolitical/socio-cultural variables presented in Table 2 might impact perceptions and
communicative behaviors. For this application, it is assumed that Beijing and Tokyo have
agreed to begin negotiations to find a common agreement on the problem.1 The intent is to
explicate factors that potentially influence the formation of perceptions representatives from
the two nations bring to the discussions and to identify issues which could potentially
constrain or facilitate amenable resolution of the conflict. Table 3 provides an overview of
the variables that may differ (or agree) between the two nations. The most significant
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discussion of the variables will center on collective historical memory, which is currently a
very prominent factor in Beijing-Tokyo relations.
Table 3: Geopolitical & Sociocultural Structures of Intercultural Communication
Geopolitical & Sociocultural Structure
Political
National Ideologies
Contested Geopolitical
Issues
Economic
Role of Religion
Level of Nationalism
Primary
Secondary
Economic*
Socioeconomic
Considerations
Social
China
Communist state
Japan
Parliamentary
democracy
“Mixed”
Free-market
None
Minimal
High
Low but increasing
Territorial claim
Territorial claim
Maritime sovereignty
Seabed resources
Pelagic resources
Exports 7.4% (3rd) Exports 18.1% (1st)
Imports 9.8% (1st) Imports 21.3% (1st)
Historical enmity
Face
High
Moderate
Government
Government
High
Situational
High
Moderate
Importance
Construction
Sensitivity to
Role in National
Identity
Source: Edwin R. McDaniel
*CIA Factbook 2012 figures
Collective Historical
Memory
(Discussion of the first three variable sets has been omitted for the Global
Class lesson)
Collective Historical Memory
Construction of historical memory by Northeast Asia nations has long been a
controversial topic and one of considerable academic focus. Of particular note is the Divided
Memories and Reconciliation Project conducted by Stanford University, which examines
how the WWII era is reconstructed by China, Japan, and Korea (“Divided”, n.d.). As
previously discussed, collective historical memory often provides a lens for interpreting
historical events and for judging people from another nation, culture, or ethnic group. To
assess the role that the respective collective historical memories might play in the
Diaoyu/Senkaku disagreement, four factors will be examined for each country. These include
(1) the importance placed on historical memory, (2) the primary agent of construction, (3)
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how sensitive are the people to the past, and (4) the role of historical memory in national
identity.
Importance of collective historical memory. Both China and Japan place
considerable importance on their national history, albeit with a selective emphasis. Each
nation possesses magnificent artifacts attesting to past cultural achievements and monumental
events. China’s long, continuous history and record of scientific, social, and cultural
achievements is considered a testament to the perseverance and ingenuity of the Chinese
peoples. This is reflected in Chinese officials’ use of the word “rejuvenation” to refer to the
country’s recent economic gains. From their perspective, China is not “rising” to a position of
importance on the world stage but simply “recapturing” its previous grandeur (Wang, 2013).
Along with the ancient record, China’s contemporary history also occupies a
prominent place in the nation’s collective historical memory. What receives the greatest
attention is the period when China was divided and dominated by Western powers and Japan,
known as the “Century of National Humiliation” (1839-1949). Japan in particular is regularly
singled out for its belligerent conduct during that period, which includes the First SinoJapanese War (1894-95), invasion of Manchuria (1931), and the Second Sino-Japanese War
(1937-45).
In many respects, Japan enjoys an equally illustrious past characterized by a plethora
of noteworthy achievements and events. However, Japan tends to place the greatest emphasis
on those historical periods prior to the early 20th century. Imperial Japan’s military demarches
in the Pacific from the late 19th century until 1945 are generally downplayed, and historical
recounts of that era often focus on the human suffering the Japanese experienced during
WWII, rather than military activities in China, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific.
The different emphasis that China and Japan place on their modern historical
interactions clearly creates very different perceptions of events, often resulting in antagonism
toward each other. The result of this selective, or “divided memories” (Shin & Sneider, 2011),
approach exerts an unmistakable impact on communicative exchanges between the two
counties, as even a cursory reading of contemporary news reports will disclose.
Construction of collective historical memory. In the case of both China and Japan,
the collective historical memory is heavily influenced by significant levels of governmental
involvement in school curricula and textbook content. Japanese students, for example, receive
only a limited appreciation of Imperial Japan’s actions as an antagonist in Northeast and
Southeast Asia. On the other hand, their Chinese contemporaries receive a comprehensive
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recounting of Japanese aggression and conduct occurring during the century of humiliation
(French, 2004; Jones, 2011; Mitani, 2011).
Moreover, contemporary Chinese society is treated to a near continuous litany of
Japan’s misdeeds during the invasion and occupation of China. In the two year period 201112, Beijing approved 177 anti-Japanese media productions (“Staged,” 2013). More recently,
in February 2014 the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress established two
new national holidays—Victory Day, marking the Chinese defeat of Japan, will be celebrated
on September 3, and December 13 will be the Memorial Day for the Nanjing Massacre
(“Keeping,” 2014)—over 60 years after the actual events. Also in February, an official
Chinese news agency launched “Shoot the Devils,” and online game directed at Japan’s
WWII military leaders.
The point-and-shoot game allows users to fire a handgun at one of 14 Japanese
convicted as Class A war criminals after the war, to the accompaniment of a popular
Chinese military tune. The 14 are the same men now honored at the Yasukuni Shrine
in Japan… The selection screen includes biographies of each one, describing their
roles in the war. (Feng, 2014, para. 5)
Reportedly, the objective of the game is to “expose the war crimes of the Japanese invaders”
and help users to “forever remember history” (Feng, 2014, para. 6)
The Chinese people are also exposed to Beijing’s interpretation of history through the
presence of numerous memorials and museums dedicated to events that transpired during the
wars with Japan. The National Museum of China, directly across Tiananmen Square from the
Great Hall of the People, houses “The Road of Rejuvenation,” a permanent exhibition
detailing China’s struggles from the Opium War to the present.2 While the exhibit very
forcefully brings out the transgressions committed by the western powers and Japan, left
unsaid are the deprivations of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution.
Beijing is also home to the Sculpture Garden of Chinese People's Anti-Japanese War,
which is near the Chinese People's Anti-Japanese War Memorial Hall. And both are in the
immediate vicinity of the Marco Polo Bridge, site of the 1937 incident considered the
beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese War. Monuments, museums, and commemorative
events are also used to mark prominent events that occurred during the war, such as the 1931
Mukden (Manchurian) Incident and the 1937 Nanjing massacre.
Quite in contrast to China, the Japanese public experiences far less exposure to events
occurring between the 1930s and 1945, the end of WWII. Contemporary media presentations
about the war are a rarity and usually center on the inhumanity and suffering of war, as seen
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in “With Best Wishes for Tomorrow” (Ashita e no yuigon; 明日への遺言). The 2008
Japanese film about a Class B War Crime trial recounts the story of a Japanese general who
accepted full responsibility for executing a group of captured US airmen. The movie very
directly questions the legality of US bombing civilian targets.
At the two most recognized Japanese war related memorials/museums, Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, events are implicitly presented from a victims’ perspective. Presentations at the
National Showa Memorial Museum (Showakan; 昭和) in Tokyo are designed to demonstrate
life in Japan during and immediately after WWII, especially for the Japanese children.
Yasukuni shrine (靖国神社), a Shinto memorial and the focus of frequent Chinese and
Korean opprobrium, is intended to honor the dead from all Japanese wars since the Meiji
Restoration. Yasukuni’s infamous reputation is principally due to its enshrinement of over
1000 WWII war criminals (Lee, 2014), especially 14 individuals convicted of Class A war
crimes. Immediately adjacent to Yasukuni shrine is the Yūshūkan (遊就館) war and military
museum, which tracks Japan’s military activities from the Meiji Restoration (1868-1912) to
1945. Suffice to say, the museum depicts Imperial Japan’s activities abroad from a clearly
discernable right-wing, nationalistic perspective. According to a leading Japanese journalist,
the museum “… declares the vindication of the Class-A war criminals on the basis of its
private management’s conviction that the wars were fought for self-preservation, self-defense
and for the liberation of Asia from Western colonial rule” (Watanabe, 2006, p. 8)
Of all the war related museums I have visited in Japan, only the Edo-Tokyo museum
offers any noteworthy insight to Japanese WWII activities. There, a couple of exhibits make
mention of Japanese wartime transgressions in China, such as the Marco Polo Bridge incident
and aerial bombings.
This brief discussion clearly illustrates that influencing factors in China and Japan can,
and do, lead to the construction of divergent collective historical memories. China builds an
active collective memory that casts the Japanese as an unrepentant antagonist, responsible for
untold Chinese physical and social deprivation. In contrast, Japan’s post-war generations
have been largely shielded from historical accounts of Imperial Japan’s overseas military
ventures. These conflicting, or divided, views of history lead to skewed perceptions of the
other, perceptions that can ultimately have a negative effect on communication between
representatives from the two countries.
Sensitivity to historical memory. As can be deduced from the preceding section,
sensitivity to historical memory varies in China and Japan. As previously suggested, the
9
Chinese have long placed considerable importance on their history. Professor Peter Hays
Gries has posited that “… in China the past lives in the present to a degree unmatched in most
other countries…” (as cited in Wang, 2012, p. 8). The importance placed on China’s recent
history is readily evident by the continuous references to the era of humiliation, particularly
to Imperial Japan’s transgressions. This importance was clearly illustrated when Xi Jinping
led the Standing Committee of the CPC Central Committee Political Bureau to visit “The
Road of Rejuvenation” exhibit in November 2012 (“Xi,” 2012).
History also occupies an important place among the Japanese, but greater public
emphasis is placed on the early-modern period than events during the first half of the 20th
century. This is evident in the popularity of samurai related TV dramas, manga, anime, and
movies. The Japanese school curricula’s lack of adequate coverage of Imperial Japan’s
military bellicosity demonstrates a particular sensitivity to historical memory.
Attending to different historical periods can erode the ability to achieve a common
understanding or acceptance of past events, thereby leading to varied perceptions between
Chinese and Japanese representatives of both historical events and each other. These
differences are likely to be played out in communicative exchanges when trying to construct
a mutually agreeable solution to international disagreements.
Role of collective historical memory in national identity. Collective historical
memory is a defining part of national identity. A nation’s interpretation of the past provides
the populace a narrative to understand the past and a direction for the future. China’s
historical legacy of 5000 years of continuous civilization and once being the “Middle
Kingdom” surrounded by tributary nations serves to unite the Chinese, both at home and
abroad, with a common heritage. Beijing’s contemporary historical focus on the era of
exploitation by Western powers and Imperial Japan can be seen as an effort to instill the
populace with a sense of belonging and thereby garner greater loyalty to the nation and party.
Research by Sasaki (2004) suggests that feelings of national identity do not “play a
particularly significant role” (p. 79) among the Japanese. According to Sasaki’s study (2004),
the Japanese identify much more strongly with their town or village and “that only about a
quarter of all the respondents [felt] a strong attachment to their nation-state” (p. 80). This lack
of a strong feeling of national identity can be, in part, attributed to the tumultuous events
related to the formation of Japan as a nation-state, which did not arise until the Meiji
Restoration in the mid-18th century. The resulting rapid modernization and ultimate
expansionistic activities tended to separate Japan from the other Asian nations and align it
more with the Western Powers. This structure was demolished in the aftermath of WWII. As
10
the Japanese set out to rebuild their nation, their identity became more associated with
economic development and technological advancement. In the wake of the collapse of the
“bubble economy”, Japan seems to have been searching for yet another identity. This
situation has opened the door for right-wing elements and some members of the Japanese
government to begin promoting feelings of nationalism among the greater population. These
feelings are being exacerbated by current Japanese tensions with China and Korea (Hayashi,
2014). The shift is also seen in Prime Minister Abe’s call to have Japanese textbooks reflect a
more patriotic perspective, in order to “restore the country’s sense of self, ” which has been
eroded by the “overly negative view of Japan’s wartime behavior” (Fackler, 2013, para. 4).
This suggests that collective historical memory plays a very important role in Chinese
national identity, but apparently less so among the Japanese—for now.
Conclusion
The preceding discussion should make clear that collective historical memory is an
extremely important component of one’s worldview. Moreover, this worldview then exerts an
influence on how people from one group (nation) evaluate people from another group
(nation). This evaluation then too often dictates how interactions are played out when
members of the two groups come into contact. What is often disregarded is that a nation’s
ruling elite may selectively promote certain historical events or even skew the recounting of
those events in the pursuit of a political goal. Additionally, it is easy to overlooked that
members of one generation may not be fully aware of the actions of past generations. And
this raises the questions—should present generations be held responsible for the sins of their
forefathers? Or should we judge an individual on his or her personal merits?
Discussion Points:
1. What were the significant influences in the construction of your historical memory?
2. Who was responsible for preparing the influences that build your historical memories? Is
there an underlying objective (e.g., political aim, economic motivation, etc.) in those
influences?
3. Do you think your historical memory is objective?
4. Is it possible to suspend historical memory when interacting with people from another
group?
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Notes
1
For simplicity, the application will be limited to China and Japan, This is, of course, not to
dismiss Taiwan’s claims, but to make the exercise less conflated.
I have personally visited the “The Road To Rejuvenation” exhibition in Beijing and all of
the Japanese war and military related museums mentioned in this report. Additionally, visits
were have been made to the Japanese “Chiran Peace Museum for Kamikaze Pilots” and the
“Memorial Museum for Soldiers, Detainees in Siberia, and Postwar Repatriates.”
2
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