Business Case and Intervention Summary
Intervention Summary
Title: Global Mine Action Programme
What support will the UK provide?
This programme will provide £30,000,000 support over three years (July 2014 - July 2017) to clear
landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), and to reduce the risks posed by contaminated land,
in up to eleven countries worldwide.
Why is UK support required?
The problem of landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW)1 remains immense. In 2011, it was
estimated that more than 4,000 people were killed or injured by landmines and ERW. Many people in
post-conflict countries live alongside land littered by landmines, grenades, rockets and ammunition.
This is a major threat to the physical safety of communities, denying them the use of agricultural land
and the ability to access essential services, such as health and education. The presence of landmines
and ERW hampers freedom of movement, prevents the repatriation of internally displaced persons
(IDPs) and refugees and obstructs the delivery of humanitarian aid. Mine action is an essential
component of the process to build stability and enable development following a conflict.
UK funding for mine action saves lives. In the last three years alone, UK support has removed over
70,000 landmines and ERW; released over 10,000 hectares of contaminated or suspected hazardous
land; and increased the awareness of hundreds of thousands of people through mine risk education.
The UK also funds mine action to meet its international commitments. The UK is a signatory to the
Ottawa (Mine Ban) Treaty, as well as the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) and the Convention
on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW). As a signatory to the Ottawa Treaty, the UK has an
obligation to assist mine-affected countries to clear their anti-personnel (AP) mines.
This new programme follows DFID’s 2011-2014 Global Mine Action Programme which concludes on
30 June 2014. The new programme will consist of two phases: Phase 1, which continues programmes
in Mozambique, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Sri Lanka, building on results achieved in the 2011-2014
programme; and Phase 2, involving scoping work and programme implementation, as appropriate, in
other countries severely affected by mines, namely Burma, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Yemen and
Zimbabwe.
What are the expected results?
The new UK policy paper on mine action published in November 2013 states that the goal of the UK’s
mine action work is: ‘to build peace and security and support development in countries affected by
landmines and ERW’. The paper outlines three core objectives of the UK’s future mine action work:

Objective 1: Support landmine and ERW clearance and risk reduction in some of the poorest
countries;
1
Unexploded weapons such as artillery shells, mortars, grenades, bombs and rockets, left behind
after an armed conflict.


Objective 2: Strengthen the ability of national partners to manage their mine action
programmes; and
Objective 3: Respond rapidly to emergency needs in humanitarian crises.
Impact:
 Improved physical security and livelihoods leading to poverty reduction and progress against
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).
Outcomes:
 Fewer mines and ERW related injuries and deaths in the target countries, leading to increased
personal safety;
 Target communities feel safer, leading to increased well-being;
 Formerly contaminated land used productively by target communities, and increased access to
markets, leading to improved livelihoods;
 Target communities have increased access to basic services provided by national governments
or NGOs;
 Effective mine action programmes increasingly managed by national authorities with minimal
outside technical or financial input;
 Measurable progress towards Ottawa (Mine Ban) Treaty, Convention on Cluster Munitions and
Convention on Conventional Weapons compliance.
Some examples of anticipated results and benefits for countries within the programme:
 Marked increases in tourism and international investment in Mozambique as a result of
measurable progress towards Mine Ban Treaty completion;
 Clear increase in range and impact of economic opportunities provided to poor subsistence
farmers in rural Mozambique and on the border with Zimbabwe;
 Significant mine / ERW clearance in heavily contaminated areas in Vietnam leading to release
of land for livelihoods and socio-economic development of local communities;
 5 million m2 of land cleared per year in Laos from the effects of mines and ERW;
 2 million m2 of land cleared per year in Sri Lanka in the most complex, heavily mined areas of
the country;
 Increased employment opportunities in Sri Lanka, particularly focused on former combatants
and women;
 20,000 people receive mine risk education in Cambodia in the most at-risk areas, targeted
towards those who need it most, in particular children;
 Improved management, prioritisation, execution and quality management by Cambodian
National Mine Action authorities.
Business Case
Strategic Case
A. Context and need for a DFID intervention
What’s the problem?
1. The problem of landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) remains immense. In 2011, it
was estimated that more than 4,000 people were killed or injured by landmines and explosive
remnants of war (ERW). Furthermore, 59 states and six other areas, primarily in the Middle East,
Asia and Africa, are still contaminated by landmines. More recent conflicts, such as those in Syria
and Libya, present new challenges on a daily basis.
2. Many people in post-conflict countries live alongside land littered by landmines, grenades, rockets
and ammunition. This is a major threat to the physical safety of communities, denying them the
use of agricultural land and the ability to access essential services, such as health and education.
The presence of landmines and ERW hampers freedom of movement, prevents the repatriation
of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees, and obstructs the delivery of humanitarian
aid. Mine action is an essential component of the process to build stability and enable
development following a conflict.
3. The UK has shown a strong commitment to mitigating the effects of landmines and cluster
munitions2. The UK has signed and ratified both:
 The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of AntiPersonnel Mines and on their Destruction3 (the Ottawa Treaty), aimed at stopping the effects
of landmines used against humans around the world;
 The Convention on Cluster Munitions (the Oslo Treaty), an international treaty that prohibits
the use, transfer and stockpile of cluster bombs.
As a signatory to the Ottawa Treaty, the UK has an obligation to assist mine-affected countries to
clear their anti-personnel (AP) mines.
4. For over 20 years, the UK has supported some of the poorest countries around the world to clear
landmines and ERW after conflict, building up considerable knowledge and experience in the
mine action sector. UK funding has helped to save lives. Recorded casualty rates have
decreased significantly over the past five years in part due to continued donor commitment.
5. The UK’s current global mine action programme, managed by the Conflict, Humanitarian and
Security (CHASE) Department in DFID, is due to end on 30 June 2014 following extensions to
some of the projects. The programme has provided £30 million to eight country projects over the
period 2011-2014 to the Mines Advisory Group (MAG) and the HALO Trust in: DRC, Sri Lanka,
Laos, Cambodia, South Sudan, Mozambique, Vietnam and Iraq4. DFID has also funded the
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF)
and the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), commonly referred to as UNMAT. This
component of the programme has supported mine action work (capacity development and mine
risk education) in ten mine affected countries, namely Afghanistan, Cambodia, Colombia,
Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Iraq, Laos, Mozambique, Nepal and Sudan.
6. UK support in the current programme has removed over 70,000 landmines and ERW; released
over 10,000 hectares of contaminated or suspected hazardous land so that people can return to
2
A type of explosive weapon which scatters smaller munitions
http://www.un.org/millennium/law/xxvi-22.htm
4 Other DFID priority countries which, to varying degrees, have problems with landmines and other
ERW include: Afghanistan (where DFID-A has a significant mines programme), Burma, Kenya,
Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT), Pakistan, Somalia, Sudan, Yemen and Zimbabwe.
3
their everyday lives; and increased the awareness of hundreds of thousands of people through
mine risk education (MRE).
7. A comprehensive independent evaluation of the impact and value for money of the current mine
action
programme
and
its
strategy
was
finalised
in
July
2013
(http://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-203746/documents/). It concluded that there were
“significant benefits derived by mine-affected communities who benefited from DFID sponsored
demining programmes”. These benefits were not constrained to reducing the risk of future
casualties, but included other positive outcomes such as allowing the safe return of Internally
Displaced Persons (IDPs), improving livelihoods and attracting investment. The programme was
found to have delivered good value for money for the UK taxpayer and a large, positive impact.

UK Policy Paper
8. The evaluation, and a subsequent process of consultation, informed the development of HMG’s
new mine action policy paper entitled: “Clearing a path to development: The UK Government’s
approach to landmines and explosive remnants of war in developing countries”. The policy paper
sets out the UK Government’s priorities and principles in tackling the threat of landmines and
ERW in developing countries over the next few years.
9. The policy paper, approved by DFID Ministers and subsequently published in November 2013,
states that the goal of the UK’s mine action work is to: ‘to build peace and security and support
development in countries affected by landmines and ERW’. The paper outlines three core
objectives of the UK’s future mine action work:



Objective 1: Support landmine and ERW clearance and risk reduction in some of the poorest
countries;
Objective 2: Strengthen the ability of national partners to manage their mine action
programmes; and
Objective 3: Respond rapidly to emergency needs in humanitarian crises.
10. It highlights the following guiding principles:

Landmine and ERW clearance and risk education activities are often the first step towards stabilisation
and security, and are a fundamental precursor to development.

Decisions about which land to clear and how to use cleared land can be politically contentious. It is
vital that these decisions are well integrated into national and local decision-making structures and plans.

Development does not happen automatically once land or infrastructure is declared safe for
productive use. Mine action provides the space and opportunity to build livelihoods.

National ownership is important. For work to be sustainable there needs to be strong leadership and
management by national governments. Donors should work closely with national authorities to integrate
mine action programmes into broader development plans, tackling issues related to conflict, governance
and livelihoods.

Mine action programmes should be designed and implemented in a way that takes into account the
different needs, priorities, knowledge and capabilities of women, girls, men, and boys ensuring that they
participate in, and benefit equally from, interventions.

More effort needs to be invested in monitoring and evaluating the impact of land clearance and mine
risk education to inform future programming.

Donors can play a vital role in encouraging and improving coordination amongst mine action and
stakeholders
to increase
the impact
of programmes and funding.
development
Country Focus
of New
Mine Action
Programme
11. As of October 2012, 59 states and six other areas were confirmed to be mine-affected; primarily
located in the Middle East, Asia and Africa5. Of the 59 affected states, 36 were party to the
Ottawa (Mine Ban) Treaty. A further 13 states had either suspected or residual mine
contamination. As well as containing over 10km² of contaminated land, nine countries were
estimated to have high levels6 of casualty rates in 2011: Afghanistan, Colombia, Myanmar,
Cambodia, South Sudan, Libya, Somalia, Iraq and Sudan. A number of other states saw
increased levels of casualty rates from 2010-2011: Myanmar, South Sudan, Libya, Iraq and
Sudan. There is no credible estimate of the total number of mines in the ground worldwide.
12. Considering the scale of the global challenge, DFID will allocate its resources to those countries
where we can have the greatest humanitarian impact and where we can add most value:
principally in the poorest countries affected by landmines and ERW. To this end, we have
prioritised country focus according to the following criteria:
- Levels of poverty;
- Casualty rates from landmines and ERW;
- Levels of landmine and ERW contamination;
- Gaps in existing donor assistance;
- Development potential (following mine action activity);
- Commitment on the part of the host government to address the issue;
- Presence and capacity of national coordination body; and
- Opportunities for integration into wider bilateral programming.
13. The presence and capacity of a DFID country office has also been taken into consideration. In the
evaluation of the existing programme, our work was judged to be most effective in countries
where DFID has an office and links can be made between landmines work and broader conflict,
governance and livelihoods programmes.
14. Following extensive analysis of the above criterion, it was agreed to focus the new mine action
programme in up to eleven countries worldwide: Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Mozambique, Somalia,
South Sudan, Sudan, Sri Lanka, Vietnam, Yemen and Zimbabwe over the course of the
programme. The target countries for the new programme were agreed by DFID, the MoD and
FCO in August 2013.
15. The new programme is proposed to have two phases:

Phase 1: Phase 1 will consist of continuing programmes in Mozambique, Vietnam,
Cambodia, Laos and Sri Lanka. These programmes will be between 9-36 months in length
and will build on results achieved in the 2011-2014 programme. As DFID has been funding
mine action programmes for more than 20 years, we have sought to retain continuity where
we have previously funded mine action and where continuity is both required and productive.
It is expected that the projects will not be renewed following the end of the programme in
2017, as UK funding will either no longer be necessary; for example, in the case of
Mozambique due to Ottawa Treaty completion; or as the country has reached middle-income
status.

Phase 2: This will involve more extensive scoping in six additional countries, as political
conditions allow, for new or modified programmes in 2014 including: Burma, Somalia, South
Sudan, Sudan, Yemen and Zimbabwe.
5
6
www.landminemonitor.com
100 or more recorded casualties
B. Programme Design
16. The proposed design of the country projects is in accordance with DFID’s policy paper on mine
action7. Future projects to be funded by DFID will:
i.
Include demining tasks which have the greatest potential to:
a. Reduce death and injuries;
b. Enhance livelihoods;
c. Increase peace and security, including human security;
d. Facilitate humanitarian access;
e. Allow the safe movement of mine affected communities; and
Promote community engagement at every stage of the project cycle;
Improve integration between mine action and broader humanitarian and development
planning and operations;
Support risk education where it is an effective way of reducing the threat of death and injury
from mines and ERW; and
Demonstrate value for money.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.
17. As there is no “one size fits all” approach to tackling landmines and ERW, it is imperative that
country projects are designed to meet individual country needs and priorities, and even regional
needs and priorities within each country. The priorities and focus of activities in different contexts
varies, as does the link with development and longer-term outcomes. Therefore, the selection of
implementing partners (whether that is demining or capacity development organisations, or
multilateral agencies) should be determined against the country context.
18. Over the last few months, DFID has undertaken technical analysis and scoping in the countries
listed under Phase 1 of the programme; as recommended in DFID’s recent evaluation. This will
allow DFID to provide clear guidance to prospective operators and set out precise expectations
for programming. The scoping has provided a detailed assessment and analysis of the landmines
and ERW context, as well as options for future funding following discussions with national
authorities and all other relevant stakeholders. Phase 1 is expected to absorb around 45% of the
programme budget:
Mozambique
Sri Lanka
Laos
Vietnam
Cambodia
Capacity Building Component
£1,500,000
£1,600,000
£7,600,000
£2,700,000
The design and rationale of each country project under Phase 1 can be found below:

Mozambique
19. DFID previously funded the HALO Trust approximately £3.43m for mine clearance work in
Mozambique, 2011-2014. The project has been highly regarded for its work across difficult
terrain, removing over 5,000 mines and ERW. The project was also highly valued by the
Mozambique national authorities and the UK Government has been a strong and consistent
supporter of mine action in Mozambique over the last ten years. Since the Northern provinces
7
Clearing a path to development: the UK Government’s approach to landmines and ERW in developing
countries, November 2013.
were declared ‘mine free’ in 2007 there has been a marked increase in tourism and international
investment in the north.
20. The Government of Mozambique has requested a further Ottawa Treaty Article 5 extension to 31
December 2014 to clear all its remaining minefields. As Mozambique nears completion, the
continuing support of the UK Government is required. In addition, UK support is needed to
provide support to a national capability able to cope with the residual threat from 2015 onwards.
The Government of Mozambique believes that a national ‘mine free’ status post December 2014
will lead to increases in tourism and allow international companies to invest further in the country.
21. Objective 1: Demining and Mine Risk Education (MRE). The scope of this project directly follows
the priorities set out by the National Demining Agency (Instituto Nacional de Desminagem (IND)8.
IND reports that there are 229 mine sites totalling 8.76km2 of suspected hazardous areas (SHA)9
remaining in Maputo, Manica, Inhambane, Sofala and Tete. The greatest remaining mine action
challenge in Mozambique is the survey and clearance of mines and ERW on the border with
Zimbabwe. The border minefields represent the greatest risk to people in Mozambique from
landmines, and those most likely to be harmed are poor rural subsistence farmers, who are
sometimes forced, by economic necessity, to take risks. It is recommended that a single
demining and MRE project be funded by DFID in the provinces of Tete and Manica, following a
request from IND. The project will run from 01 July 2014 until 31 March 2015 (9 months).
22. Objective 2: Capacity Building. It is recommended that a national mine action capacity
development project be funded by DFID. IND have requested UK support to share their mine
action management skills with the military, police, civil engineering and mining sectors so that
there is an integrated approach across the government.

Vietnam
23. In the previous project in Vietnam, DFID invested £3.42m through the Mines Advisory Group
(MAG) from 2011-2014. The project focused on the clearance of unexploded ordnance (UXO),
mine risk education and developing the capabilities of the national and provincial mine action
authorities. Official US Government data shows that 14 million tonnes of explosive and incendiary
bombs were dropped by the US Air Force and Navy during the Indochina War from 1965-73.
What remains are deep buried bombs, cluster munitions, artillery shells and smaller items such
as grenades. All 63 provinces are affected to some degree, however the greatest threat can be
found in the four central provinces of Quang Binh, Quang Tri, ThaThien (TT) Hue and Quang
Nam. Most of the current DFID mine action funding in Vietnam is currently focussed on Quang Tri
province. Three projects are recommended over the next 36 months operating until 31 March
2016.
24. Objective 1: Demining and MRE. It is recommended that a single demining and MRE project be
funded by DFID in the Province of Quang Tri. This is endorsed by the British Embassy and DFID
Country Office. Not only is Quang Tri one of the four most heavily impacted provinces,
improvements in its management of mine action should provide lessons on mine action efficiency
and effectiveness which can be applied to the other provinces.
25. Objective 2: (a) National capacity development. It is recommended that a national mine action
8
IND serves as the Mine Action Coordination Centre (MACC): a semi-autonomous statutory body
reporting directly to the Foreign Affairs Ministry, which acts as the National Mine Action Authority
(NMAA). IND is mandated to coordinate and oversee the implementation of demining tasks, including
quality assurance of contractors and information management for the whole mine action programme.
9 A Suspected Hazardous Area (SHA) is an area suspected of having a mine/ERW hazard.
capacity development project be funded by DFID. The objective of the project will be to enable
the National Mine Action Authority10 to direct and regulate mine action in Vietnam, and for the
VBMACC to develop and oversee the VMAP more effectively. (b) Provincial capacity
development. It is recommended that a provincial mine action capacity development project be
funded by DFID. The objective of the project will be to enable the Quang Tri authorities11 to
prioritise and manage mine action projects in the province more efficiently and effectively.

Laos
26. In the previous programme, DFID funded MAG approximately £3.3m, from 2011-2014, for ERW
clearance in Laos. This UK-funded project has cleared over 6.5 km2 of land and responded to
over 3,500 requests to make unexploded ordnance safe and provided mine risk education to over
90,000 people. Most of the 2011-2014 DFID-funded mine action in Laos is currently focussed on
Xieng Khouang.
27. Per capita, Laos is the most heavily bombed country in the world. All 17 provinces and 25% of all
villages are affected to some degree, however the greatest threat can be found in the provinces
of Xieng Khouang (in the north), and Savannakhet, Khammouane, Sekong and Attapeu (in the
south). The future UK-funded project will place greater emphasis on land release using
procedures other than clearance, and improving national governance. Three projects are
proposed:
28. Objective 1: Demining and RE. It is recommended that DFID fund a demining and mine risk
education project in Laos covering one or more provinces for 24 months to 30 June 2016.
29. Objective 2: Capacity Development. It is recommended that DFID fund a national mine action
capacity development project in Laos. The objective of the project will be to enable the National
Regulatory Authority more effectively to direct, regulate and coordinate mine action in Laos. The
project will include the development of a national standard which sets out the processes and
responsibilities to better integrate UXO clearance with national development projects; and the
development of a centre of excellence in risk management.
30. National survey. It is recommended that DFID fund a national cluster munition contamination
survey project in Laos. The objective of the project will be to enable the national and
provincial/district authorities more effectively and efficiently to prioritise and manage mine action
UXO clearance projects.

Sri Lanka
31. In the previous programme, DFID gave funds to the HALO Trust of approximately £3.9m, from
2011-2014, in northern Sri Lanka. The current programme has had a significant impact allowing
the re-settlement of 70,000 IDPs. Whilst contamination of land has fallen sharply, a landmine
problem persists in the north of Sri Lanka. Furthermore, donor funding levels have decreased
significantly from 2011 to 2012 by around 60%.
32. An additional £1.6m programme until 31 December 2015 (18 months) was agreed by DFID
Ministers in November 2013 and announced by the Prime Minister during the Commonwealth
Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in 2013.
33. Objective 1: Demining and MRE: Three conflict-affected districts in the North: Jaffna; Kilinochichi
and Mullaitivu, are the Government’s priority areas for mine action. The main task for UK funding
The National Steering Committee, Standing Board and Executive Committee collectively act as Vietnam’s
National Mine Action Authority.
10
11
The Department of Foreign Affairs and its PPC in Quang Tri.
will be clearance of land to release it for livelihood opportunities, as well as schools and roads. As
the Sri Lankan Government requested that all international demining operations leave by 31
December 2014 to allow the Sri Lankan Army to take over, DFID support to demining from
January 2015 onwards will be sub-contracted to the local NGO DASH. DFID support to demining
is needed therefore for 18 months. After 2015, demining will focus on medium and low priority
areas.
34. In addition, UK support will support the mainstreaming of MRE into the work of the National Mine
Action Centre (NMAC) and the national school system as well as the development of village-level
MRE committees. This will be the final DFID-funded mine action programme in Sri Lanka.
35. Objective 2: National capacity-development: Given that Sri Lanka wishes to take-over all mine
action tasks as of end of 2014, DFID should support capacity development of the NMAC and the
local NGO, DASH. Efforts are needed to strengthen national capacity in a number of areas,
particularly information management and quality assurance/control (QA/QC).

Cambodia
36. In the previous programme, DFID gave funds to MAG of approximately £5.27m, from 2011-2014,
for mine clearance. The current UK-funded project has had a major impact by clearing
contaminated land for productive use and providing MRE benefiting 100,000 people. Cambodia is
severely contaminated with landmines and other explosive remnants of war (ERW), the result of
protracted internal and regional conflicts that ended in the 1990s. 1,915 km2 of Cambodia is still
contaminated by mines and ERW. The most affected provinces are Battambang, Oddar
Meanchey, Meanchey and Vihear. With many of the mined areas in the country's interior now
cleared, demining efforts are focussed on the border minefields.
37. It is recommended that DFID fund a three year demining and MRE project in Cambodia to 30
June 2017.
38. National capacity development. The scoping study confirmed Cambodia's reputation as a wellmanaged and productive mine action programme. But the country remains heavily contaminated
with mines and ERW, and further improvements in the management and execution of the
programme are needed. It is recommended that DFID fund a national mine action capacity
development project in Cambodia. The objective of the project will be to enable the Cambodia
Mine Action Authority to more effectively direct, regulate and coordinate mine action in Cambodia.
PHASE 2
39. Each of the countries in Phase 2 of the programme has a significant landmines and ERW
problem and is a priority country for UK work to build stability overseas. For a variety of reasons,
thorough scoping will be required in advance of any mine action investments to ensure greatest
impact and value for money. DFID has a presence in each country and the offices are engaged in
the scoping and will be involved in the oversight of any future programme.
40. Burma, Somalia, Sudan and Yemen each have their own issues of access, security and
changeable political, social and economic dynamics. The political situation in each is fluid and the
space to work on landmines may open up rapidly. With fewer donors present, UK resources may
have the potential for significant development impact. Some preliminary analysis on mines
contamination in these countries can be found below:

Burma: Burma has the fourth highest mine casualty figures globally, and landmines were still
being laid as recently as 2013. There is significant land contamination. At present no mine
survey or clearance takes place, although the Government has set up the Myanmar Mine
Action Centre. If political conditions allow, the potential for development impact through mines
clearance is significant.

Somalia: Somalia is littered with landmines, ERW contamination, improvised explosive
devices (IEDs) and stockpiles of weapons, although the true scale of the problem is not fully
known. At least 146 casualties were recorded in Somalia (excluding Somaliland) in 2011.
DFID Somalia funds some community security activities, some of which is related to ERW
clearance and weapons management. A larger investment in mine clearance could contribute
to wider peace, stability and development objectives in the country.

Sudan: In 2011, 122 casualties were identified in Sudan. Recent armed violence in South
Sudan has added to existing mine contamination, and 10 out of 17 states contain possible
contamination from landmines. There is over 260,000 km² of dangerous or suspected
hazardous areas and minefields mainly located in Darfur, the eastern states, Blue Nile and
South Kordofan. DFID Sudan has identified the need to address this issue as a priority in its
operational plan.

Yemen: In 2011, there was 94 child casualties. It is estimated that 11,200 km² are
contaminated across the South of Yemen, though exact figures are unknown. Priority areas
are Abyan and Saada; secondary areas of operation are Hadramout and Ibb. The
government maintains complete control of demining activity in Yemen, which is carried out by
the military. Any scoping work in the country will look at these issues and associated risks in
this environment.
41. In South Sudan, while DFID has had a mine action programme, the DFID footprint has been
limited, with only a small number of communities benefiting from the current funding.
Nevertheless, all 10 states of South Sudan have a significant problem with landmines and ERW,
challenges which have been exacerbated by recent outbreaks of conflict. If political conditions
allowed an expanded programme in South Sudan, further scoping of a new approach (including
new geographical focus) would be required.
42. We do not have an existing programme in Zimbabwe, however the Mozambique programme in
Phase 1 will clear minefields in the border region and will only be for 9 months. It is therefore
logical to scope out a mine action programme to clear the remaining mine affected areas on the
Zimbabwe side of the border for Phase 2.
Objective 3: Rapid Response
43. UK support for rapid response demining will be channelled through a pre-existing mechanism: the
Humanitarian Rapid Response Facility (RRF)12. In 2012, DFID set up the RRF to support
response within 72 hours of an emergency for up to 12 weeks. A number of mine action
organisations are on the register of pre-approved organisations and can be deployed quickly to
assess risk and clear landmines and ERW. The UK has a range of capabilities to respond to
humanitarian emergencies based on need: either directly through our relief materials, or working
through NGOs, the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and multilaterals.
Monitoring and Evaluation
44. Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) forms an essential part of DFID's policy paper on mine action.
M&E are critical tools for ensuring we achieve the best value from our programmes and also to
generate evidence of which approaches work best. Monitoring tools will be designed to reflect the
anticipated outcomes of country programmes. It is imperative we evaluate how effective UK mine
action programmes have been in achieving real change on the ground. This will generate lessons
12
For more information on the RRF please see https://www.gov.uk/rapid-response-facility.
for future programming for the UK and the wider sector.
45. M&E are critical tools for ensuring DFID achieves the best value from its mine action programme,
and generates evidence to inform the design, development and implementation of future
programmes and projects for the UK and the wider mine action sector. Monitoring performance
should provide information to DFID to confirm that targets and milestones have been achieved
(using lag indicators) and provide confidence that future targets and milestones will be achieved
(using lead indicators). Monitoring should also provide information that will be subsequently used
in programme evaluations and audits. An evaluation should provide information that is credible
and useful, enabling the incorporation of lessons learned into the decision-making process of
both donors (such as DFID) and recipients (such as national mine action authorities and
implementing partners).
46. Critical issues to cover in monitoring and evaluating mine action programmes include:
-
-
Identification of baselines using sex and age disaggregated data: against which progress can
be monitored on an annual basis;
Design of a monitoring strategy with the right feedback mechanisms to the programme so that
activities remain on track, VFM is being achieved and lessons learned are being fed into
operational plans, programme implementation and future programme design;
Identification of outcomes on beneficiaries disaggregated by age and gender;
Monitoring and evaluation visits to review progress and discuss emerging issues;
Timely evaluation of the programme to inform future policies.
B. Impact and Outcome that we expect to achieve
47. Through developing mine / ERW clearance, mine risk education and capacity building projects in
up to 11 countries worldwide, we will expect to achieve the following impact and outcomes:
Impact:
 Improved physical security and livelihoods leading to poverty reduction and progress against
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).
Outcomes:
 Fewer mines and ERW related injuries and deaths in the target countries, leading to
increased personal safety;
 Target communities feel safer, leading to increased well-being;
 Formerly contaminated land used productively by target communities, and increased access
to markets, leading to improved livelihoods;
 Target communities have increased access to basic services provided by national
governments or NGOs;
 Effective mine action programmes increasingly managed by national authorities with minimal
outside technical or financial input;
 Measurable progress towards Ottawa (Mine Ban) Treaty, Convention on Cluster Munitions
and Convention on Conventional Weapons compliance
48. An example of some of the anticipated results and benefits for Phase 1 countries can be found in
the table below:
Mozambique

Marked increases in tourism and international investment as a result of measurable
progress towards Article 5 Ottawa (Mine Ban) Treaty completion;
Clear increase in range and impact of economic opportunities provided to poor
subsistence farmers in rural Mozambique and on border with Zimbabwe;
30 ha of confirmed high priority contaminated land in two high-priority provinces released
for productive use;
90% of cleared land used for agriculture and infrastructure development;
Over 75 findings of UXO safely destroyed;
Employment of approximately 125 Mozambique de-miners and national staff;
More mine risk education in the most at-risk areas;
Expanded national capacity to manage residual threat.







Vietnam








Significant mine / ERW clearance in heavily contaminated Quang Tri province;
Release of land for livelihoods and socio-economic development of local communities; and
all requests by development partners for land clearance responded to;
150,000 beneficiaries from clearance activities;
25,000 household surveys completed in over 200 villages;
10,000 items of ERW removed and destroyed;
Improvements in national management of mine action and land prioritisation process;
20% year on year improvement in the effectiveness of mine clearance nationwide;
More mine risk education in the most at-risk areas.
Laos
 Land cleared of mines and ERW: approximately 5m m2 of land cleared per year;
 Release of land for livelihoods and socio-economic development of local communities, in
particular improved integration of mine action and wider national development;
Sri Lanka
 100,000 direct beneficiaries of clearance and community liaison work;
 20,000 items of UXO identified and destroyed and thousands of requests to make ordnance
and ERW safe are responded to;
 20% year on year improvement in efficiency nationwide in land release 200 mine risk
education sessions targeted to those at-risk, in particular children.
 Comprehensive national mines and ERW contamination survey conducted across Laos.
Sri Lanka







Land cleared of mines: approximately 2,000,000 m2 of land cleared per year in the most
complex, heavily mined areas of the country. Complete clearance is expected in the district of
Jaffna and near complete clearance in Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu districts;
Better livelihoods opportunities: 15 km2 of suspected hazardous areas cancelled from Sri
Lankan national database; and 80% of released land used for livelihoods and socio-economic
development of local communities;
Approximately 40,000 direct beneficiaries from clearance work;
More mine risk reduction: in the most at-risk areas, targeted towards those who need it most,
in particular children;
Over 200 community visits by survey teams;
Expanded Sri Lankan capacity for mine clearance;
Increased employment opportunities, particularly for former combatants.
Cambodia







Approximately 5,000,000 m2 cleared by all teams and released to communities for livelihoods
and socio-economic development;
Better livelihoods opportunities: release of land for livelihoods and socio-economic
development of local communities, in particular returning IDPs;
Over 100,000 beneficiaries from clearance and mine risk education activities;
20,000 people receive mine risk education during 500 sessions in the most at-risk areas,
targeted towards those who need it most, in particular children.
10,000 dangerous items safely removed and destroyed;
20% year on year improvement in efficiency of clearance;
Improved management, prioritisation, execution and quality management by Cambodian
National Mine Action authorities.
UK Theory of Change for Mine Action
Inputs
UK funding
channelled
through mine
action partners
HMG
diplomacy,
advisory &
programme
staff time
Accurate & upto-date data
Activities
Outputs
Landmine & ERW
clearance that
targets vulnerable
groups
Land released
following effective
tasking &
prioritisation
Mine/ERW risk
education
delivered to target
beneficiaries &
linked to
prioritisation &
clearance
Coordination
between national
authorities, mine
action
implementers,
donor community
& development
actors
Capacity building
of national
implementation
staff & national
mine action
authorities
Assumptions:
-Security and/or political
situation allows work to
take place
-Strong programme
design
Notes:
Clearance = land release, including through
clearance
Affected
communities aware
of the risks of
landmines & ERW &
able to manage
them & assist
prioritisation
Mine action more
closely linked with
wider development
planning &
implementation
Capable & trained
national staff & staff
in national mine
action authorities
meeting identified
needs
Assumptions:
-Assets not misappropriated
-Security and/or political situation
allows work to take place
-MRE successfully targets those at
risk
-National authority has sufficient will
& backing to improve
-Trained staff remain in sector
-Actors have incentives to coordinate & an effective mechanism is
in place
-Mine action coordination bodies
willing & able to prioritise on the basis
of vulnerability & development impact
Outcomes
Impact
Target communities feel
safer, leading to
increased well-being
Formerly contaminated
land used productively
by target communities,
& increased access to
markets, leading to
improved livelihoods
Target communities
have increased access
to basic services
provided by national
governments or NGOs
Poverty reduction &
improved physical
security leading to
better livelihoods &
progress against the
MDGs
Effective mine action
programmes
increasingly managed
by national authorities
with minimal outside
technical or financial
input
Measurable progress
towards Ottawa Treaty,
CCM & CCW
compliance
Assumptions:
-Improvements in safety from mines &
ERW not outweighed by other variables
-Benefits of clearance accrue to intended
beneficiaries
-Land prioritised for clearance can be used
productively by targeted communities
-Complementary development inputs for
targeted communities are secured
-National authority has sufficient will &
backing to improve
-Security and/or political situation remain
favourable
-Implementing organisation able to
prioritise on the basis of vulnerability &
development impact & measure change
against baselines
Assumptions:
-Benefits of clearance
accrue to intended
beneficiaries
-Security and/or political
situation remain favourable
Appraisal Case
A. What are the feasible options that address the need set out in the Strategic case?
49. Demining and mine risk education
- Option 1: Provide up to £25.5m over three years through a country specific approach;
providing direct funding to demining organisations. RECOMMENDED.
- Option 2: Provide up to £25.5m over three years and route it through the UK Ministry of
Defence.
- Option 3: Provide £25.5m over three years and route it through the United Nations Mines
Action Team (UNMAT).
50. Capacity Building
- Option 1: Provide up to £4m over three years to a capacity development organisation through
a competitive tender. RECOMMENDED.
- Option 2: Provide £4m to UNMAT to undertake capacity development.
51. Monitoring and Evaluation
- Option 1: Provide up to £500,000 to a M&E organisation through a competitive tender.
RECOMMENDED.
- Option 2: Conduct M&E internally.
52. Do nothing.
OBJECTIVE 1: DEMINING AND MINE RISK EDUCATION
-
OPTION 1: Provide up to £25.5m over three years through a country specific approach;
providing direct funding to demining organisations.
53. This option would involve the provision of £25.5m over three years to demining organisations in up
to eleven countries worldwide (Phase 1: Mozambique Vietnam, Laos, Sri Lanka and Cambodia as
outlined in the strategic case; and Phase 2: Burma, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Zimbabwe and
Yemen to be detailed in due course). The procurement method would be modified according to the
context and country in question.
-
Demining and Mine Risk Education
54. Those likely to compete for UK funds include international non-governmental organisations
(INGOs) and / or commercial organisations currently working in the mine action sector. In most
countries, the process of accreditation and licensing to work will limit the number of contractors
able to bid for this work.
-
In Mozambique, the project would be completed by a single contractor, selected by competitive
tender. As Mozambique has a clearance completion deadline of 31 December 2014, this
contract would only be for 9 months (to also allow time for de-mobilisation). The National Mine
Action Authority has specifically asked the UK to continue funding the work set out in the
business case.
-
In Vietnam, the project would be completed by a single contractor, selected by competitive
tender for 21 months. It is envisaged that the outputs and intended outcomes will be more
challenging than those used in the existing single contract with MAG for Vietnam.
-
In Laos, operators for the project should be selected by competitive tender for 24 months.
Ideally the project should be implemented by a single contractor, but the proposals may justify
two separate projects.
-
In Sri Lanka, the project will be implemented through the provision of a competitive contract.
The selected option is based on the assumption that the 31 December 2014 deadline for
INGOs remains in place. The contract would be for 18 months but the 12 months in 2015
would be sub-contracted to a local NGO: DASH.
-
In Cambodia, the project would be completed by a single contractor, selected by competitive
tender for 36 months. Proposals would cover one or more provinces.
Evidence for the option
55. The option of funding demining organisations through a competitive tender is the most suitable
model to meet the needs set out in the strategic case. This option will drive value for money and
provides DFID with the greatest control over the design of the programme and choice of
implementing partners. The results of the programme will be directly attributable to UK aid and it
will ensure DFID retains influence over funding and the direction of travel.
56. This country specific approach is strongly aligned to the recommendations made in the recent
evaluation of the existing DFID mine programme, and also with the new UK policy paper on mine
action “Clearing a Path to Development”. Both documents stress the importance of ensuring a
context specific approach to mine action funding, and using a procurement model which is fit for
purpose.
57. Over the past two decades, DFID has developed a strong relationship with a number of demining
organisations. They are often the best actors on the ground, with vast experience and expertise in
mine action and with access to those areas most affected by landmines and ERW which most
impede development. As there are often a number of operators working in the mine-affected areas
of DFID’s selected countries, a competitive tendering process will allow a level playing field for
these projects.
58. This option fits with wider UK priorities in a number of the priority countries. With DFID country
offices and UK embassies directly engaged in oversight of the programme, we can ensure that
there are direct links between demining and broader development and political priorities; another
recommendation made in the recent DFID evaluation. In addition, this option is national
government led, and in direct alignment with the support requested by national mine action
authorities.
59. In terms of costs and administration, this option will not result in extensive transaction costs; only
small costs to local NGOs in country to conduct MRE, for example. The option would ensure high
levels of transparency and accountability with DFID having direct oversight of its implementing
partners. In addition, DFID currently owns a number of assets in each of these countries; this
option would allow a smooth transfer of assets, if necessary.
Risks
60. The greatest drawback of this option is the programme management burden involved in managing
a number of diverse contracts. A further difficulty with this option is that it involves a significant
number of competitive tender processes in a challenging and technical sector where best practice
on issues such as VFM continues to evolve.
Mitigating Actions
61. To mitigate these risks, DFID has undertaken an internal analysis to understand the resource
required to effectively manage this programme. On balance, the benefits of a tailored country
approach, and the potential for impact, are felt to outweigh the programme management
challenges. DFID will need to plan sufficient programme management capacity from the outset of
the work to mitigate this risk. Through outsourcing other components of the programme
(monitoring and evaluation) there would be more space to manage all the separate contracts.
62. In terms of the management of the tendering process, the risk of legal or reputational problems in
this round is judged to be minimal, in large part due to the approach taken to undertaken
significant scoping before deciding on the procurement method. Furthermore, technical guidance
on a number of issues such as value for money in mine action has been commissioned and will
accompany the invitation to tender. DFID has been open and transparent throughout the process
of evaluating its existing programme and drafting a new policy paper, engaging heavily with all
prospective operators, and will continue to do so as the programme develops.
-
OPTION 2: Provide up to £25.5m over three years and route it through the UK Ministry of
Defence.
63. This option would involve routing the UK’s mine action funding over three years through the UK
Ministry of Defence (MOD). DFID would develop a joint mine action plan with the MOD that would
target the countries which DFID has already established as priorities for mine action. The MOD
were consulted for consideration of this option.
64. Since DFID’s spend on this issue must qualify as official development assistance (ODA), this
arrangement would require the MOD to send military demining experts and personnel into priority
countries in order to train local civilian partners in mine action, thus mirroring the approach
currently adopted by demining operators such as the HALO Trust and MAG. Military action itself
including military-military aid does not qualify as official development assistance (ODA) and would
therefore be excluded under this option.
Evidence for the option
65. There are some advantages to this option. The involvement of the UK military means that it may
be easier to provide security during mine action work in potentially insecure locations. The UK
would also be able to present a more “joined up” approach on mine action across Whitehall.
Risks
66. Humanitarian demining is not a (funded) military task and existing Ministry of Defence (MOD)
resources; capabilities; utility and commitments do not lend themselves to such tasks.
Furthermore, the advice from MOD is that their capability is unlikely to be as competitive as a
competitive tender process for mine action. Capitation rates will reflect operators being soldiers,
combat engineers or technicians first and then EOD specialists. This would not represent good
value for money for HMG overall.
67. In addition, defence EOD and Search is a resource limited specialist capability with operational
and contingent liabilities impacting on suitability, cost effectiveness and availability for
humanitarian demining. Engagement would entail doubling/tripling-up on duties, at further risk,
against tasks at home and operations elsewhere. Capacity is focused on non-permissive
environments for force protection, freedom of manoeuvre and where there is an immediate risk to
life. This requires operators to be soldiers first; C-IED, EOD and Search do not consider
humanitarian mine action a priority; the environment and context are different requiring training
and experience working to International Mine Action Standards, impacting further on cost
effectiveness, utility and availability. There has been and there will be efficacy in military experts
supporting post-conflict clearance, physical security and stockpile management (PSSM) tasks.
However, this is always context-driven on a case by case basis.
68. There is an added risk that in certain countries the presence of the UK military would be viewed
negatively, creating political obstacles to mine action that are not faced by NGOs, commercial
operators or the UN. In many countries, access may not even be possible, for example in many of
the Phase 2 countries. Moreover, the partners that DFID has worked with on mine action thus far
have a significant base of institutional knowledge and expertise built up over two decades of work
in this field. The UK military would need to build up knowledge and expertise in the countries from
a zero baseline. Furthermore, other donors are likely continue to fund mine action organisations
and we would risk creating duplicate or overlapping functions in the field. There are also
components of the UK mine action policy paper that would not be operational under this option.
The UK military would not be the best actor to deliver or manage mine risk education where it is
needed; nor would it be able to operationalize objective two: to strengthen the capacity of the
national government.
69. Furthermore, under OECD-DAC rules, the MOD would face obstacles to effective mine action
when operating in countries where the national implementing partner is the military. Since military
to military aid is excluded from the definition of ODA, the MOD would not be able to engage fully
with countries in which the military is the principal partner in mine action.
-
OPTION 3: Provide £25.5m of earmarked funds over three years and route it all through
the UN Mine Action Team through the Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF)
70. This option would involve delivering all of DFID’s funding on mine action over three years through
the United Nations Mine Action Team (UNMAT, consisting of UNMAS, UNDP, and UNICEF). This
would allow DFID funds to be spread over a range of mine action activities across target countries.
We would therefore ask UNMAT to earmark our funds to DFID priority countries (particularly Sri
Lanka, Laos, Cambodia, Mozambique, Vietnam, Burma, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Yemen
and Zimbabwe) where we have decided to prioritise spend (as outlined in the strategic case).
71. Under the existing programme, DFID funds the UN agencies through the Voluntary Trust Fund
(VTF). This remains the preferred mode of delivery for the UN in receiving donor funds. The aim of
using this funding model was to reduce the transaction costs for DFID, by only managing one grant
rather than three separate funding arrangements.
UN Mine Action Service
72. The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) was established in 1997 as the focal point for
all United Nations (UN) mine action activities. It is mandated by the General Assembly to
coordinate the mine action assistance of the 14 UN agencies working to assist and support
member states to implement mine action. At the global level, UNMAS coordinates the
development of appropriate mine action policies and standards. At country-level, UNMAS is
responsible for providing mine action assistance in the context of humanitarian emergencies and
peacekeeping operations as well as providing resources for mine-action programs including mine
clearance, stockpile destruction, mine risk education, victim assistance and advocacy activities.
UN Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF)
73. Under the VTF, funds can be earmarked towards a specific country or project or be un-earmarked,
in which case their precise use is not specified. The VTF is used primarily to finance the:
- Conduct of assessment missions to monitor the scope of the landmine threat and the
programmes established to deal with it;
- Initiation of new mine action activities and programmes when and where required;
- Bridging of funding delays in on-going programmes; and
- Coordination and advocacy work of United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS).
Evidence for the option
74. The UNMAT VTF enables access to a broad range of service providers and services through the
Portfolio of Mine Action Projects presented annually. This option will allow DFID funds to be
spread over a range of demining activities across target countries. We would also ask UNMAT to
earmark our funds to a particular country or region. A key advantage of channelling earmarked
funds through the VTF may be the ability to reduce DFID’s administrative burden (i.e., managing a
single instead of multiple grant arrangements with implementing partners). The approach should
also reduce the administrative costs associated with finding an implementing agency and following
up field activities.
Risks
75. The most significant disadvantage of this option is that there is a substantial management fee
involved for UNMAT (anywhere from 7-20% and much higher than demining operators) and less of
DFID’s money would be directed at the objectives outlined in the UK policy paper than if we funded
demining agencies directly. The UN agencies do not conduct mine clearance themselves and
instead would subcontract all of their funding to mine action operators.
76. As UNMAT does not actively link mine action to its development activities we would not be able to
report the benefits from affected communities to the MDGs, as outlined in the theory of change.
There does not appear to be a system in place to assess the cost effectiveness of UNMAS
proposals received as part of the annual Portfolio of Mine Action projects.
77. The current arrangement with UNMAT has proven extremely costly in terms of administrative
overheads (for DFID and for the UN agencies) and human resources. DFID’s Annual Review of
UNMAT in December 2012 stressed that one of the goals of funding the VTF: “reducing the
administrative burden on DFID” has not been borne out. These high costs were attributed to the
lack of a common administrative and reporting mechanism among the different UN agencies
receiving funds.
78. Another risk with funding through the VTF may be inefficiency. Under the existing arrangement,
the time lapse between disbursement and the use of funds for activity in the field was long and an
issue of concern. There was a perceived lack of transparency regarding the disbursement and
exact use of funds and overall reporting.
79. More generally, problems with reporting have meant tracing the impact of funding UNMAT through
the VTF has been difficult. Information on general expenditure and the ability to create a clear line
of sight between the funding received by the UNMAT and the funds that have directly contributed
to the benefit of individuals on the ground is difficult with the current UN annual reporting system.
OBJECTIVE 2: CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT
80. The ultimate responsibility for addressing the mine and ERW problem lies with the government of
the contaminated country. Donors and other international actors work with national authorities and
civil society in mine-affected countries to fulfil this responsibility in ways that develop national
capacities, ensure sustainability and encourage the sharing of information and good practice. The
role of capacity development (and thus DFID’s funding of such work) is becoming ever more
important as government institutions assume more responsibilities.
-
OPTION 1: Provide up to £4m over three years to a capacity development organisation
through a competitive tender.
81. Under this option, the capacity development needs of each country would be headed up by a
single contractor, selected by competitive tender. For each country there must be clearly defined
capacity development outcomes and outputs, and the contractor must develop separate log
frames for each country project. This contract would be over the course of 36 months and for a
value up to £4million (for Phase 1 and Phase 2). It would initially cover those countries under
Phase 1 of the programme but would be flexible to ensure it could be expanded to cover any
capacity building initiatives under Phase 2 of the programme.
Evidence for the option
82. In the existing programme, DFID has provided funding to UNMAT, and HALO and MAG, to
undertake capacity development for national mine action authorities. For the INGOs this has run
alongside their demining and MRE work. However, DFID’s recent evaluation of its mine action
programme found that INGO’s were not the most suitable operator to deliver this work. The
evaluation stated that “the capacity building strengths of organisations like HALO and MAG lie in
training and mentoring mine action operational staff. They should not be required to deliver
services aimed at strengthening management in governmental or quasi-governmental institutions”.
The option proposed therefore is aligned to the recommendations put forward in the evaluation, as
well as the UK policy paper on mine action.
83. There is often a conflict of interest in mandating INGOs to undertake this work as part of a
clearance contract, as they are tasked with demining by the Government themselves. They are not
always the best actor to undertake capacity building requirements, such as quality assurance and
M&E assistance.
84. It is unlikely that any single contractor will have the knowledge and proven skills to conduct all the
tasks in all eleven countries therefore they will need to sub-contract to other operators, where
appropriate, to undertake the tasks outlined in the strategic case. This is a multi-skilled piece of
work which requires one organisation to bring in a diverse number of actors and expertise. We
may therefore encourage consortia (with multiple capabilities) to bid for the work.
85. A significant advantage of this approach is that one organisation would be tasked with transferring
lessons from one country / region to another. It would also allow them to share best practice
across all of the targeted countries; and additionally reduce the administrative burden on DFID of
managing up to eleven capacity building contracts and eleven demining and MRE contracts.
86. It is likely that any management costs incurred under this option would be significantly cheaper
than funding the UN to undertake this work which normally charge admin costs of between 7-20%.
Similar projects undertaken by other organisations feature management fees of 5%.
87. As DFID has undertaken significant scoping in each of the priority countries, this approach would
ensure a tailored outcome in each country delivering the specific outputs detailed in the strategic
case. A competitive tender would allow DFID to drive down costs and best ensure value for money
for UK funds.
Risks
88. A potential difficulty with this option is that the relationship with the national government may be
difficult in certain circumstances, and Phase 2 countries may well require the presence of the UN
who is mandated to undertake this work. The most suitable actor on the ground to support the
national government is often a multilateral agency who is already working closely with the national
authorities in the field.
89. This option is a relatively new and innovative approach to funding capacity development work
therefore there is a degree of uncertainty. Moreover, a disadvantage with this approach is the
potential added transaction costs involved with up to eleven very different projects across eleven
countries which may well require sub-contracting to a number of different actors.
Mitigating Actions
90. It is envisaged that if and when the UN were found to be the best actor to undertake the national
capacity work, then organisation who wins this bid would work closely with, or possibly provide
funds to, the relevant UN country office. In terms of the transaction costs, we will ask for a clear
line of sight in any project proposal and will not agree to any proposals with unreasonable costs.
An assessment will be undertaken to assess the need of the intervention versus its relative value
for money.
-
OPTION 2: Provide £4m to UNMAT
91. This option would involve delivering DFID’s funding on capacity development (£4m) over three
years through the United Nations Mine Action Team (UNMAT). This would be a similar
arrangement to the current Memorandum of Understanding with UNMAT, but with stronger
provisions for monitoring and evaluation. The advantages and disadvantages of this option are
broadly similar to Option 3 of Objective 1. Nevertheless some additional analysis can be found
below.
Evidence for this option
92. The UNMAT has a specific mandate and responsibility to address the various challenges
presented by mines and ERW, particularly long-term capacity development. The United Nations
role in mine action is rooted in the UN Charter and further defined in UN resolutions, which
consider “mine action to be an important component of United Nations humanitarian and
development activities”. As such, the UN is often the most suitable actor on the ground to work
alongside national governments to strengthen planning, coordination, data management and
quality assurance mechanisms.
93. The recent Strategy of the United Nations on Mine Action 2013-2018 presented the common
objectives and commitments that will guide the work of the United Nations in mine action. One of
the four strategic objectives of the new strategy is to ensure that the ‘transfer of mine action
functions to national actors is accelerated, with national capacity to fulfil mine action
responsibilities increased’. The activities detailed include supporting affected states in developing
and implementing national strategies; providing technical advice; institutional support and capacity
building and supporting the development of national information management and data collection
systems. Therefore this contribution would demonstrate UK support to the aims and objectives of
the strategy which are aligned to the various activities outlined in the strategic case.
Risks
94. Whilst the UNMAT (in particular UNDP) are often tasked with supporting national ownership of
mine action coordination and management, they are not based in all of the countries that DFID
wishes to support. For example, in Sri Lanka, UNDP have recently de-prioritised their work on
mine action despite a clear need to further support the capacity and technical expertise of the Sri
Lankan NMAC. Their presence in Cambodia, Laos, Mozambique and Vietnam is small.
95. A further disadvantage is that the impact of funding through the UNMAT is unclear. Information on
general expenditure and the ability to create a clear line of sight between the funding received and
the funds that have directly contributed to the benefit of individuals on the ground is difficult from
the current UN annual reporting system. Moreover, as detailed previously, the management costs
of funding the UN, are higher than we would expect through a competitive tender.
MONITORING AND EVALUATION
-
OPTION 1: Provide up to £500,000 to an M&E organisation through a competitive tender
96. Under this option DFID would provide up to £500,000 through a competitive tender to outsource
the monitoring and evaluation of the programme to an external organisation.
97. It is essential that this piece of work is: (1) independent i.e. those conducting the evaluation, for
example, must be objective and not connected with the intervention under study; (2) be
transparent i.e. results must be publically available; and (3) use robust methodologies which, if
replicated, will produce similar results. The organisation would have a thorough understanding of
the outputs and intended outcomes of each mine action project, as defined in the project contract
and log frame. They would know the capabilities of the mine action contractor (or grantee), and the
challenges/risks associated with the effective implementation of the project.
98. The monitoring and evaluation of the programme will require a team which includes technical
expertise in demining. It is not technically feasible for DFID to conduct the evaluation as the
department does not currently employ a technical expert in the demining field. The evaluating
organisation should have proven experience in evaluating development and poverty reduction
programmes for DFID, and should have access to world-class mine action experts. In particular, it
should understand the concept of 'enabling development and poverty reduction'. An evaluation
organisation should aim to determine, using OECD DAC evaluation criteria how successful DFID
and its implementing partners have been in achieving the objectives of the DFID mine action policy
“Clearing a Path to Development”. The evaluation should inform the development of future policy
which shape the UK Government's approach to landmines and ERW in developing countries.
99. In addition, value for money can be ensured through putting the evaluation out to a competitive
tender process. The estimated costs of the monitoring and evaluation component are relatively
similar to the recently completed 2011-2013 evaluation of the existing programme, as the
operator(s) separately would be collecting, analysing and collating the routine reports and returns
provided by the mine action contractor.
100. The disadvantage to this approach is that the monitoring of the programme could be conducted
internally and therefore is an additional cost of the programme.
-
OPTION 2: Conduct M&E internally.
101. As above, this option would incur fewer costs for DFID. However, whilst DFID has traditionally
undertaken the monitoring of the existing programme, it does not have the capacity to robustly
assess the bi-annual reports (often up to 100 pages) of eight country projects. The next
programme will be working in up to eleven countries, with diverse programmes and differing needs
in terms of capacity development. Furthermore, an internal evaluation of DFID’s Mine Action work
could not be a truly independent analysis of the strategy.
102. If this work is not undertaken, the UK risks losing the benefits from developing its policy and
programming on Mine Action with a full understanding of lessons learnt from the programme.
DO NOTHING
103. This option would involve DFID deciding not to fund any further mine action at all. The benefit
of this option is that it could free up funds to spend on other programmes. However this would be
at the risk of significant humanitarian, political, and legal costs.
104. Humanitarian: For over 20 years, the UK has supported some of the poorest countries around
the world to clear landmines and ERW after conflict, building up considerable knowledge and
experience in the mine action sector. UK funding saves lives and recorded casualty rates have
decreased significantly over the past five years in large part due to continued donor commitment.
105. The problem of landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) remains immense. In 2011, it
was estimated that more than 4,000 people were killed or injured by landmines and explosive
remnants of war (ERW). While significantly lower than the historical average, this is higher than in
previous years, and on account of recent and new conflicts in countries such as Libya and Syria
the trend is upwards.13 Furthermore, 59 states and six other areas primarily in the Middle East,
Asia and Africa are still contaminated by landmines. More recent conflicts, such as those in Syria
and Libya, present new challenges on a daily basis.
13
Landmine Monitor, 2012, p32
106. Many people in post-conflict countries live alongside land littered by landmines, grenades,
rockets and ammunition. This is a major threat to the physical safety of communities, denying them
the use of agricultural land and accessing essential services, such as health and education. The
presence of landmines and ERW hampers freedom of movement, prevents the repatriation of
internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees and obstructs the delivery of humanitarian aid.
Mine action is an essential component of building stability and enabling development to take place
following a conflict.
107. Direct UK support has helped achieve significant progress both in the clearance of over 70,000
mines and ERW over the past three years, as well as education of hundreds of thousands of
people in communities around the world of the risks of mines and ERW. By doing nothing, we risk
losing the progress that has been made and increasing the likelihood that ever greater numbers of
people will be killed or disabled by mines and ERW. The negative humanitarian consequences of
putting an end to the UK’s mine action funding are substantial.
108. Political: the UK has historically been a major leader in international mine action efforts,
having been one of the first states to sign and ratify the Ottawa Treaty, thus committing itself to
work towards securing a world free from the use and manufacture of, and trade in, landmines. This
has delivered some major successes with fewer than thirteen countries today still manufacturing
landmines, and a near-global moratorium on sale and transfer of mines.
109. Under the ‘do nothing’ option, the UK (DFID) will forego an important opportunity to influence
international demining policy. UK influence has had a major catalysing influence in increasing the
efforts taken by other states and civil society in mine action. There is a real chance that other
actors will reduce their own interest in the issue, leading to a reverse multiplier effect and the
fragmentation of the global consensus against landmines.
110. Legal: the UK is a state party to the Ottawa Treaty having signed in 1997 and ratified in 1998.
The UK therefore has an obligation under Article 6 of the treaty to “provide assistance for mine
clearance and related activities”. By deciding to do nothing, the UK would be in breach of our legal
obligations arising from a major international treaty.
111. For all of the reasons outlined above, we feel that it would be extremely unwise to cease UK
funding for such important work. Therefore, ‘do nothing’ has been rejected as an option.
Mine Action Programme: Appraisal Case Options
Objective 1: Demining and Mine Risk Education
OPTION
EVIDENCE
RISKS
1: Provide £25.5m over three
years through a country specific
approach; providing direct
funding to demining
organisations.
- Provides DFID with greatest control over the design of
the programme and choice of implementing partners.
- Results will be directly attributable to UK and will
ensure DFID retains influence over funding and
direction of travel.
- Strongly aligned with existing UK policy on mine action.
- Programme management burden involved in
managing diverse contracts.
- Difficult tendering process based on contested
terminology.
2: Provide £25.5m over three
years and route it through the
UK Ministry of Defence.
- Involvement of UK military means that it may be easier
to provide security during mine action work in
potentially insecure locations.
- UK would take greater credit for its mine action work,
and it would provide a credible form of employment for
trained military personnel.
- No appetite in MOD for humanitarian demining
to become a military task.
- MOD will be less competitive than NGOs: poor
VFM.
- Presence of UK military may cause political
obstacles to mine action not faced by NGOs.
3: Provide £25.5m of earmarked
funds over 3 years and route it
through the UN Mine Action
Team
- Institutional value of UNMAS provides broad range of
service providers through UN portfolio.
- Potential for reduced admin burden on DFID given one
rather than multiple grant arrangements.
- Higher management fees Inefficiency and lack
of transparency.
Objective 2: Capacity Development
1. Provide up to £4m over 3
years to a capacity
development organisation
through competitive tender.
- Aligned to DFID policy paper and evaluation.
- UN and INGOs not the most suitable operators given
conflict of interest.
- Management costs would be cheaper.
- Potential difficulties in working with national
authorities.
- Transaction costs due to working with up to 11
different actors across multiple countries.
2. Provide £4m to UN agencies
- UN has mandate for capacity development.
- UN Mine Action has no presence in some
countries.
- Impact of UN funding is unclear.
- High management costs.
Monitoring and Evaluation
1. Up to £500K to an M&E
organisation through
competitive tender.
- Necessary expertise on demining that DFID does not
have can be contracted.
- External organisation can ensure independence,
transparency and robustness of methodology.
- Additional cost to DFID compared to conducting
M&E internally.
2. Conduct M&E internally
- Fewer costs for DFID
- Capacity required to assess bi-annual reports
for 8-11 country projects.
- Technical expertise required in order to capture
full lessons learned.
DO NOTHING
Do Nothing
- Frees up funding for other programmes.
- Significant humanitarian, political and legal
costs.
- Humanitarian: still 59 mine-affected countries
and 4000 deaths a year.
- Political: UK has been a leader on mine action.
Doing nothing would forego influencing
opportunities.
- Legal: UK has an obligation under A.6 of Ottawa
Treaty to carry out mine action work.
B. Assessing the strength of the evidence base for each feasible option
112. In the table below the quality of evidence for each option is rated as either Strong, Medium or
Limited
OBJECTIVE 1
Option
1
2
3
Evidence rating
Medium (limited for economic case14)
Limited
Medium
OBJECTIVE 2
Option
1
2
Evidence rating
Medium
Medium
MONITORING AND EVALUATION
Option
1
2
Evidence rating
Medium
Medium
What is the likely impact (positive and negative) on climate change and environment for each
feasible option?
113. Overall this programme could have a positive impact on the environment and on communities’
ability to cope with climate variability and change if development following landmine clearance is
climate sensitive. There are some risks to the climate and environment from travel and use of
heavy machinery in demining operations.
Categorise as A, high potential risk / opportunity; B, medium / manageable potential risk / opportunity;
C, low / no risk / opportunity; or D, core contribution to a multilateral organisation.
Option
Climate change and environment risks
and impacts, Category (A, B, C, D)
C Emissions from air and road travel.
Emissions from machinery used in
demining
1
14
Climate
change
and
environment
opportunities, Category (A, B, C, D)
C There are limited opportunities to share
best practice and building resilience in
natural resources management following
landmine clearance as CHASE will be
several steps removed from the
implementation agencies. The proposals
do not support any action other than
demining.
Given that a substantial evaluation has been performed of a previous stage of this project, it is
disappointing that it did not produce more robust VFM analysis, results and recommendations, and
that such great uncertainty remains in the economic returns on investment in mine clearance in
familiar contexts. Of the five Phase One countries, data for a cost-benefit analysis is available for only
two, and in one of those the data and analysis are not of sufficient quality to determine whether the
benefits outweigh the costs. Of necessity, this data forms the basis of predictions of returns from this
business case, although there are good reasons to believe these predictions will overstate the likely
returns.
2
C Emissions from air and road travel. B There are opportunities to enhance
Emissions from machinery used in environmental policy making and
demining.
implementation, sharing of best practice,
and building resilience in natural
resources management.
3
C Risk of explosion causing localised C Without supporting this programme
landslide and disturbance.
some opportunities to raise awareness of
environment and climate issues affecting
communities would be lost.
C. What are the costs and benefits of each feasible option?
114. The costs and benefits of mine clearance vary significantly between contexts, and it is always
necessary to carefully weigh the priority areas for demining within and between particular
countries. In each case, clearance should concentrate on areas where the humanitarian and socioeconomic impact of mines is most severe.
115. The highest economic returns to mine clearance are generally expected where demining
permits access to pre-existing assets, where the full value of the returns of the asset can be
claimed. Such assets vary from critical infrastructure assets such as railways and electricity
transmission lines (as in Mozambique) to existing housing permitting the return of IDPs (as in Sri
Lanka).
116. Useful economic returns can also be expected where mine clearance enables new investment
projects or development of scarce agricultural land, although the costs of investment and demining
should be weighed together against the benefit stream (there is a risk that this will not happen if
the costs of investment and demining are paid by different organisations).
117. Mine clearance should be scrutinised more closely when it is enabling access to land which is
of questionable economic use. For instance, if demining seeks to release agricultural land in a
country in which large amounts of uncultivated land already exists, there is good reason to
investigate whether any particular benefits of the cleared land outweigh the significant investment
involved. The benefits of demining are often higher when it is coupled with additional development
activity that ensures that economic returns to released land are fully exploited.
118. Country studies were completed during the WYG International evaluation for Cambodia,
Mozambique, Sri Lanka and South Sudan, all of which have programmes in the current business
case (all except South Sudan in Phase One). Sufficient data is available to construct useful costbenefit analyses for Cambodia and Sri Lanka; for the other countries no more than a limited
qualitative assessment is possible.
119. Whilst evidence on DFID programmes from a previous business case represents the best
evidence available, it should be noted that if DFID has been able to successfully target the most
cost-effective mine clearance interventions in the past, then the average benefit-to-cost ratio will
be falling over time as diminishing returns set in (this is particularly true in Sri Lanka, where highreturn IDP return is largely complete). If this is the case, then the following case studies will be
somewhat optimistic if used as predictors of returns over the next few years. However, if targeting
of high-return opportunities is better in the proposed interventions than previously, it is possible
that these estimates could underestimate future returns.
Cambodia
120. The Cambodian CBA is based on the single village of Phnom Koy, where clearance has been
intended to enable agricultural production on previously unsafe land. 83 per cent of the previous
DFID-funded MAG programme was aimed at clearing land for agriculture, so whilst not a
representative sample, this village represents the dominant rationale for clearance in this context.
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
30,375
643
643
643
643
643
643
643
643
643
643
NPV of
benefits
NPV of
costs
Total
revenues
30,375
6,458
940
5,871
9,583
855
7,920
9,583
777
7,200
9,583
706
6,545
9,583
642
5,950
9,583
584
5,409
9,583
531
4,918
9,583
482
4,471
9,583
439
4,064
9,583
399
3,695
Totals 36,728 56,042
Previous employment of 20% of benefits 36,728 44,834
Previous employment of 50% of benefits 36,728 28,021
391
391
391
391
391
391
391
391
391
391
30,375
1,034
1,034
1,034
1,034
1,034
1,034
1,034
1,034
1,034
1,034
Farm
revenues
cassava
Farm
revenue
maize
Total
Costs
Cassava
input
costs
Maize
input
costs
Deminin
g service
3.5 hectares of land was cleared for four farming families (28 individuals). The key assumptions
used are:
 An appraisal period of ten years.
 Quantified benefits are returns from agricultural production of maize and cassava. The balance
of the crops is typical for Phnom Koy, and conservative (in terms of returns) for Cambodia
more generally.
 A discount rate of 10 per cent is used.
 The baseline assumption is that those working on this land previously had no employment or
income-earning livelihoods activities whatsoever. Given Cambodia’s unemployment rate of 0.1
per cent15 this assumption is unrealistic, but estimating the productivity of labour in alternative
employment is challenging, since this data was not incorporated in the evaluation. Informal
sector labour is likely to be underemployed, so that even if those who work on released land
had previously had some employment, it is plausible that the benefits of that former
employment could accrue to others once the land had been cleared. Alternatively, it may be
possible for workers to continue some or all of their former livelihoods activities whilst
simultaneously working on newly cleared land. This assumption is tested with sensitivity
analysis, in which benefits are reduced by 20 per cent and 50 per cent to take into account
possible alternative employment by those working cleared land.
 Additional health and community safety benefits are not included.
3,333
3,333
3,333
3,333
3,333
3,333
3,333
3,333
3,333
3,333
3,125
6,250
6,250
6,250
6,250
6,250
6,250
6,250
6,250
6,250
All values in US$.
Total prior unemployment
Previous employment 20% of benefits
Previous unemployment 50% of benefits
Benefit to cost
ratio (BCR)
1.53
1.22
0.76
Internal rate of
return (IRR)
22.6%
15.6%
3.1%
121. The benefit-to-cost ratio is high if previous employment of those working on agricultural land
had no previous employment, or if all previous employment revenue accrues to other
underemployed community members after the mine clearance. If workers forgo a revenue stream
15
Source: Trading Economics, 2012, http://www.tradingeconomics.com/cambodia/unemploymentrate. The World Bank estimated the Cambodian unemployment rate at 0.2 per cent in 2011 (World
Bank Development Indicators).
equivalent to 20 per cent of the revenue from farming cleared land, the benefit-to-cost ratio is still
significantly above unity. However, if the forgone revenue stream is 50 per cent, project costs
outweigh benefits under this set of assumptions. There is substantial uncertainty about the likely
level of revenue forgone, and the 20%–50% range (or more) is plausible. Consequently, there is
substantial uncertainty about whether the project will be value creating. The figures of 1.53 (as an
optimistic scenario) and 0.76 (for the moderately pessimistic case of prior employment
representing 50% of the after-project revenue stream) will be used later in the aggregated estimate
of benefits under this business case.
Mozambique
122. In Mozambique, mine action has prioritised restoring and protecting infrastructure assets
(including railways, a hydroelectric dam and power transmission lines) and may enable new
investment, although information on this is limited. Insufficient data is available to assess the
benefit-to-cost ratio of this activity. It is important to highlight that more than 90 per cent of
Mozambique’s arable land is currently uncultivated, so it is highly questionable whether clearing
land for agricultural development would have significant economic benefits.
Sri Lanka
123. The Sri Lankan CBA focuses on the resettlement of 47,804 IDPs from the Manik Farm refugee
camp into their former homes, with access to their former agricultural holdings or other means of
employment. Given that mine clearance is enabling access to pre-existing assets, we would
expect a strong benefit-to-cost ratio.
124. The CBA assesses benefits on the basis of average earnings in agriculture, fishing and
labouring. Since beneficiaries were all previously unemployed IDPs in camps, receiving food aid
from the Government of Sri Lanka and IOM, it is plausible to assume that the counterfactual would
involve zero earnings. Key assumptions are:
 Appraisal periods of one and ten years.
 Quantified benefits are usual earnings per profession, and do not include renewed access to
road and rail infrastructure, which are likely to be significant. Gains to the government and
IOM from no longer having to support IDPs in camps are not included, although these too are
likely to be significant.
 Costs included are only DFID investment, which included mine action and limited shelter and
livelihoods support for beneficiaries most in need, but do not include any additional relocation
costs incurred by beneficiaries or other development organisations. These may well be
significant, but perhaps less costly than providing comparable services to the IDP population
in camps.
 It is assumed (conservatively) that each family of 3.3 people has one working member.
Agriculture
Fishing
Labouring
Other
Unknown17
Total benefits
Total costs
16
17
Resettled families
5,735
1,375
4,476
2,253
790
14,629
Annual earnings
per family (LKR)
150,000
200,000
126,000
150,000
126,000
Annual total
earnings (GBP)16
4,481,565
1,432,881
2,938,626
1,760,615
518,581
11,132,268
1,950,000
Sri Lankan Rupee (LKR) exchange rate: LKR 1,000 = GB £5.21; LKR 1 = GB £0.00521
Unknown due to survey inconsistency. 1 small division dropped from Kilinochchi, 2
from Mullaitivu. Unlikely to be much different from district averages.
1 year
10 years
NPV of costs
1,950,000
1,950,000
NPV of benefits
10,614,201
71,741,638
Benefit-to-cost ratio
5.4
36.8
125. It is not possible to calculate an IRR for this project because it yields net positive returns within
the first year. For the purposes of NPV calculations, it is assumed that project costs are incurred
immediately at project start and that earnings are received mid-year each year thereafter.
126. The benefit-to-cost ratio is clearly highly favourable, especially when viewed over a ten-year
horizon (as was used in the Cambodian example). The costs and benefits excluded from the
calculation mean that the BCRs are far from precise, but since it is likely that excluded benefits
would be substantially greater than excluded costs, the BCRs are conservative. The stark
difference in BCRs between this and the Cambodia case should serve to underline the high
variation in returns to mine clearance and the correspondingly vital importance of prioritisation in
the overall process.
127. However, IDP resettlement is largely over, and demining from 2014 onwards will focus on land
for livelihoods and other socio-economic development purposes. It would therefore be illegitimate
to make projections for future returns in Sri Lanka on a similar scale to those in the previous
programme.
South Sudan
128. The purpose of clearance in South Sudan is to release land for use in agriculture and other
livelihoods activities such as stone quarrying. At the time of the evaluation the programme had had
limited reach (having cleared around 100 hectares, or 1 km2), and no data was available on
changes in agricultural output or other economic benefits.
Aggregate benefits
129. Here it is assumed that the benefit-to-cost ratio of future demining activities is similar to that of
the Cambodian case study. The Sri Lankan example implies the very high returns gained from IDP
relocation, which are no longer available even in Sri Lanka, and not applicable to other Phase One
countries. The data could be criticised on the following grounds:
 There is good evidence that economic returns differ widely between contexts and types of land
use, so there is no justification for expecting this very small sample to be representative.
 The evaluation of previous mine clearance identified this case study (along with the Sri Lankan
one) as the most economically successful,18 which could imply that returns in other contexts
will be lower. However, this may merely reflect the serious errors in their analysis, which
overestimated economic returns.
 To the extent that prioritisation has successfully identified the areas yielding the highest returns
in the past, it should be expected that economic returns will diminish over time as only lowerreturn opportunities remain.
Optimistic Case
Pessimistic Case
Investment (£m)
25.5
25.5
Benefit-to-cost ratio
1.53
0.76
Returns (£m)
38.9
21.0
“[T]he clear successes so far in terms of community and economic impacts are in Sri Lanka and
Cambodia, where population density and hence immediate pressures to use released land are
greatest.” Mine Action Evaluation by WYG International, p16.
18
Conclusions
130. Given the limitations of available data, these figures should be given less weight than the
following qualitative conclusions:
1. Demining activity can have highly favourable benefit-cost ratios in certain contexts, but that
2. The returns on investment vary widely, so expending significant effort to identify the most
favourable contexts pays off.
131. Evidence currently available does not demonstrate whether mine clearance is value creating.
However, wider considerations need to be taken into account, including the stabilising effects of
mine clearance, and treaty obligations of countries relating to mine action. Cost effectiveness
measures will be looked at as part of the programmes M&E.
D. What measures can be used to assess Value for Money for the intervention?
132. The DFID approach to defining and measuring Value for Money (VfM) is the 3E model of
effectiveness, efficiency and economy, while also considering cost-effectiveness in addition.
133. The preferred option involves partnering with demining organisations and multilateral
organisations across up to ten countries. Since there is no “one size fits all” approach, value for
money considerations will differ on a country by country basis depending on context. Metrics for
measuring the VfM of specific country programmes will, therefore, be outlined in country-level
programme documents and tracked through the M&E framework.
134. The supporting programme document will require the partner to report on value for money. The
reporting to be provided by the partner will set out the progress against the indicators specified in
the programme’s logical framework. This will help provide the evidence for the overall
effectiveness of the intervention. There will also be project financial reports from all the
implementers which will be used to assess VfM.
135. When considering the Value for Money provided to the taxpayer for the mine action
programme as a whole, we will use the ‘3E’ model:
i.
Economy refers to the costs and quality of inputs and resources of an intervention (i.e. a
programme, or the projects within a programme).
Typical inputs for mine action interventions are international staff, local employees, vehicles, equipment,
consumables, information, travel and accommodation. In some cases, such as information about
suspected hazardous areas, the quality and availability of inputs are more important than unit costs,
though costs can be easily assessed.
ii.
Efficiency refers to how well inputs and resources are converted into outputs.
Typical outputs for mine action interventions can be assessed through the quantity of surveyed land,
cleared land, communities briefed on how to reduce the risk of injury from mines and unexploded
ordinance, post-clearance impact surveys, the development of national mine action standards and
information databases, and the training and mentoring of national mine action managers.
iii.
Effectiveness refers to how far an intervention achieves its intended outcomes.
Mine action outcomes tend to be local, such as enabling communities to use cleared land productively,
and to provide safe access to sources of water, firewood, medical centres and places of education.
Some outcomes may be more strategic such as enabling the construction, maintenance and repair of
power lines, or the re-opening of provincial roads.
iv.
Cost-effectiveness refers to the degree to which an intervention achieves its intended impact
relative to the inputs used.
Mine action impacts tend to be strategic and long term such as: enabling a country, or part of a country,
to be declared as ‘mine free’; to empower national mine action authorities; and to encourage greater
national investment in addressing the residual threat of mines and ERW.
136. Countries frequently make use of a Landmine Impact Survey which can determine the level of
social and economic suffering experienced by a given community resulting from the harm or risk or
harm caused by mine and ERW hazards and hazardous areas. High, medium, or low levels of
impact are identified.
137. These can be summed up in the following diagram which demonstrates the link between
economy, efficiency, effectiveness, and cost-effectiveness in the context of the programme’s
theory of change:
138. Given the evidence available of very high variation in benefit-to-cost ratios (BCRs) in different
locations, the greatest value for money benefits are likely to stem from improved prioritisation of
clearance tasks. Inefficient landmine clearance in high priority areas is likely to yield significantly
better value for money than efficient landmine clearance in low priority areas.
139. In some contexts there is political sensitivity about donor-driven prioritisation processes. Within
countries it is therefore often not possible for DFID to determine clearance priorities. However,
there are various measures that DFID can take to improve value for money through better
prioritisation across the portfolio of clearance within this business case.
1. The capacity building component of this project will aim to improve prioritisation by national
authorities, including by increasing the quality of economic appraisal used in this process.
2. DFID can offer technical assistance in the form of economic analyses of clearance options for
the use of national authorities in prioritising action.
3. In countries where national authorities are interested in working together with donors on
clearance prioritisation, DFID can actively engage in that process.
4. Clearance resources will be allocated to countries on the basis of the expected economic
returns from projects prioritised by national authorities; those countries that identify greater
opportunities for economic returns will receive priority access to resources.
E. Summary Value for Money Statement for the preferred option
140. The economic argument for mine and ERW clearance is that a population that has been
cleared of landmines and ERW are often at the first step towards stabilisation and security and
therefore it is a fundamental precursor to development. Countries recover more quickly if they are
supported during mine clearance programmes as most of those countries do not have the funds or
expertise to lead on eradication programmes. They can also get back on their feet quickly are
more able to get back on track with reaching development targets to achieve the Millennium
Development Goals if supported.
141. Our chosen option will ensure accountability to beneficiaries, and transparency; and will place
a focus on results, with emphasis on outcomes and the impact on the affected countries and
communities. This option involves DFID contracting partners to undertake mine action work. This
creates a series of VfM considerations for all stages of the process: selecting a contractor,
monitoring performance, and evaluating the programme.
1. Selecting a Contractor
142. Contractors will be selected based on VfM of their proposals, i.e. those projects which are
expected to use resources most economically, apply procedures most efficiently, achieve outputs
most effectively, and are likely to achieve the required socio-economic outcomes and impact.
143. When drafting terms of reference for contractors, DFID will require them to propose projects
which will provide VFM in achieving required outcomes and impact. In particular, the proposals
should:
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.
vi.
Demonstrate that the contractor will ensure that the project inputs constitute an appropriate
amount and quality of resources to enable the required outputs to be achieved. High cost
items, such as the use of international staff and organisational overheads should be justified.
Demonstrate that the contractor has access to accurate, reliable and affordable information.
Describe how the contractor will provide a secure and safe working environment for its
employees.
Describe a project which adopts efficient operational procedures and processes. For
example, grouping mined areas which are geographically close will normally be more
efficient than clearing mined areas which are prioritised simply in terms of socio-economic
impact but are geographically dispersed.
Propose outputs which are specific, measurable, appropriate, relevant and time-bound, and
which provide the conditions necessary to achieve the intended outcome(s) of the project.
Describe how the outcomes will be realised once the mine action outputs have been
achieved. It may be appropriate to conduct a formal risk assessment to identify the issues
which may prevent the outcomes being realised, and propose mitigating measures.
2. Monitoring contractor performance
144. The monitoring of contractor performance is fundamental to VFM. Monitoring is required for
three reasons: (1) to provide information to the contractor as a routine part of effective project
management; (2) to provide information to DFID to confirm that targets and milestones have been
achieved (using lag indicators) and to provide confidence that future targets and milestones will be
achieved (lead indicators); and (3) to provide information to the contractor and DFID which will
improve the VfM of future mine action programmes and futures.
145. Whenever possible, data provided by contractors to DFID should achieve all three purposes,
i.e. information requested by DFID should also assist the contractor's routine project management
and lead to a better understanding on how to conduct mine action more efficiently and effectively.
3. Evaluating the programme/project
146. A key requirement of DFID is the evaluation of programmes and its projects. This is likely to be
carried out towards the end of a three year mine action programme, and aims to provide DFID with
strategic lessons from the UK Government's investment in the programme and its projects.
147. The evaluation will draw on information provided to monitor the performance of the contractor
(which tends to focus on how well the contractor has delivered the agreed outputs), but it will also
apply broader research methods which aim to discover whether the intended outcomes and the
longer term impact of the programme have or will be achieved.
Commercial Case
Direct procurement
A. Clearly state the procurement/commercial requirements for intervention
146. As outlined in the DFID policy paper on mine action, no single model for programming can be
applied in all situations. Country programmes will be designed to meet individual country needs
and priorities. As stated in the appraisal case, the recommended option under the components for
Demining and MRE, Capacity Building and M&E is predominantly through a competitive tender.
147. We will run the tender process in accordance with DFID procurement rules; and bidders will
be asked to submit output-based budgets to ensure best value for money. Separate fixed price
contracts will be offered for the selected countries, and may offer multiple contracts in the same
country. Adjudication of tenders will be on cost; quality of their proposals; the technical expertise
of bidding organisations; cost-benefit analysis; management experience; sound financial
management and clear procurement practices.
B. How does the intervention design use competition to drive commercial advantage for
DFID?
148. An overall budget will be offered for a number of different countries, rather than a fixed price
budget per country, which will be subject to open market competition. The competition for these
contracts will ensure that DFID receives the maximum benefit from the available budget.
C. How do we expect the market place will respond to this opportunity?
149. The pool of supplier expertise is niche, but we anticipate that a number of suppliers will be
interested in the opportunities offered by this programme. Given that DFID no longer has MOUs
in place with country governments it will be challenging from both a cost and time perspective for
commercial organisations to obtain registration and tax exemptions. We therefore expect the
majority of bidders to be INGOs, however our requirements will be set to ensure equal treatment
of all potential interested bidders and we will be transparent as to the requirements that all
bidders require to secure in order to operate within our mine action selected countries.
150. DFID have consulted widely on the new Mine Action policy and extensive supplier input has
been received for our consultation process. We therefore expect a strong market response to the
procurement competition.
D. What are the key cost elements that affect overall price? How is value added and how will
we measure and improve this?
151. Key cost elements relate to personnel, management costs and equipment. The significant
variable between potential suppliers is the level of overhead costs they attribute to the projects
and the efficiency and effectiveness of their methodology for mine clearance, MRE and capacity
building initiatives.
152. The procurement process will call for fixed price proposals with payment linked to delivery of
specified outputs.
E. What is the intended Procurement Process to support contract award?
153. The new programme will be mainly implemented under an open procurement procedure. It
will be imperative that DFID draws on experienced procurement and legal advice to ensure the
procurement process is compliant with public procurement procedures and legal and reputational
risks are mitigated. The proposed start date for Phase 1 contracts is 1 July 2014, by which time
the current set of contracts will have expired. A swift turnaround will ensure there is no break in
DFID funding and service provision.
F. How will contract & supplier performance be managed through the life of the intervention?
154. Through project reports and audited annual statements from partners in accordance to the
requirements of their contracts. Regular supplier performance reviews will be held with successful
bidders reporting performance to DFID on a quarterly basis.
155. An independent monitoring and evaluation partner will be appointed to independently
measure and assess the performance of the overall mine action strategy and the contribution of
selected suppliers.
156. Annual reviews will include team members external to the lead programme team. Lead
suppliers should respond in writing with an action plan of how they will address review
recommendations in a specified time frame. Payments may be withheld until actions are taken, if
deemed appropriate by the lead department. Key performance indicators and break points may
be agreed in line with milestones set out in the logical framework to ensure each supplier meets
specific requirements.
Financial Case
A. What are the costs, how are they profiled and how will you ensure accurate forecasting?
157. The total costs of the programme will be £30,000,000. An approximate breakdown of this
funding, according to country programme and activity can be found
Year 1
(2014-2015)
Phase 1
Clearance, MRE
Mozambique
Sri Lanka
Vietnam
Laos
Cambodia
Capacity Building
Phase 1 countries
Phase 2
All activities
Monitoring and Evaluation
158.
Year 2
Year 3
(2015-2016) (2016-2017)
Total
1,500,000
1,100,000
0
500,000
0
0
1,500,000
1,600,000
3,000,000
3,000,000
1,600,000
7,600,000
1,000,000
1,000,000
700,000
2,700,000
3,700,000
5,600,000
6,800,000
16,100,000
80,000
70,000
350,000
500,000
10,380,000
10,170,000
9,450,000
30,000,000
The majority of the budget is allocated to operational costs. These will be disbursed monthly in
arrears. Where possible, fixed payment schedules will be linked to programme milestones. As
long as the milestones are met, the forecasts should remain in line with the agreed payment
schedules.
B. How will it be funded: capital/programme/admin?
159. The funding for these activities will be drawn from the CHASE programme budget. The
proposed budget can be funded from the current CHASE resource allocation for 2014/15 and
2015/16, and it has been confirmed that funds for 2016/17 and 2017/18 are available for this
project. Management of the project will be by existing CHASE staff, so no additional
administration or front line delivery costs will be incurred.
160. The Divisional Accountant and FCPD have been informed that this investment goes beyond
the current CSR. When Ministerial approval has been granted, the Divisional Accountant will work
with FCPD to put a proposal to HMT and obtain the necessary clearance, as required.
C. How will funds be paid out?
161. The direct procurement contracts will be offered as fixed price payment schedules. Expenses
and fees will be paid monthly in arrears,. The payment of fees will be conditional on meeting
agreed milestones for the outputs of the project. All payments will be made on receipt of
satisfactory invoices.
D. What is the assessment of financial risk and fraud?
162. Financial risk and fraud is considered to be low. The fixed price contracts together with output
milestones will ensure that funds are being spent where intended.
163. We will ask for assurance from bidders that they have rigorous internal procedures in place for
procurement and accounting. Bidders will also be asked to periodically review systems in country
to ensure that all procedures are being followed and that any weak areas highlighted by reviews
are being addressed.
E. How will expenditure be monitored, reported, and accounted for?
164. Detailed reports of expenditure will be expected to accompany each request for payment by
partners. This will detail actual and forecast expenditure and state the level or balance of DFID
funds held. There will also be yearly annual reviews of the programme and a request for annual
audited statements.
165. DFID has a zero tolerance policy on fraud. Through close engagement with suppliers audit
processes and scrutiny of their financial statements, DFID will ensure all spend is properly
accounted. We will work with supplier to strengthen financial oversight, where required, and
where fraud is detected we will demand repayment in full. Continued disbursement of funds will
be contingent upon adequate financial oversight mechanisms by all suppliers.
166. Assessment of financial reporting will be done alongside technical reports detailing progress
towards programmes logical framework. DFID will undertake an annual review of the overall
programme at the end of each programme year which will include financial scrutiny. Performance
will be managed as outlined in Section F of the Commercial Case.
Management Case
A. What are the Management Arrangements for implementing the intervention?
167. As the scoping for each of the countries under Phase 2 (Burma, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan,
Yemen and Zimbabwe), cannot be completed in the timeframe required for Phase 1, an adjusted
approval process will be needed for Phase 2. We propose that the approval process for Phase 2
will proceed as follows:
1. Programme Scoping
2. Drafting of Terms of
Reference
3. Approval by head of CHASE
and DFID Country head
4. Approval by Ministers
5. Procurement begins
168. The contracts for both Phase 1 and Phase 2 will have clearly defined outputs that should be
met by suppliers or organisations as a condition of payment. This will be closely monitored on a sixmonthly basis by DFID. Annual breakpoints will be built into the contracts, enabling DFID to assess
performance and to terminate or change the programme as required.
169. The progress of the programme at input, activity and output levels will be monitored by the
CHASE Programme Manager. Six-monthly and annual reports will be provided by the selected
suppliers to CHASE, highlighting all project activities during the reporting period.
170. Following contract agreement, the global logical framework will be further developed (draft
attached) that takes into account all project activities and provides milestones against progress.
Individual log frames will also be agreed for each country and for each component of the
programme. The selected suppliers will be required to discuss the logical framework with DFID on a
bi-annual basis and agree changes if required. The Annual Review will also be a key mechanism
for reviewing progress and identifying gaps and challenges.
171. DFID has sufficient staff resources to provide proportionate management and oversight of UK
tax payers’ funds. The Programme Manager will be asked to allocate time to liaise with suppliers on
a monthly basis. This post will be responsible for programme management, including programme
reviews and payments. All programme management activities will be carried out in accordance with
the DFID oversight requirements.
B. What are the risks and how these will be managed?
Risk (RAG)
Likelihood Impact
Mitigation
Fraud & Fiduciary
Low
Low
Due diligence checks will be undertaken on
selected suppliers or organisations as part of
the contract process. They will be expected to
have robust financial and audit procedures in
place
Delivery
Low
Low
Underachieving and incomplete clearance of
defined areas. CHASE will endeavour to select
suppliers or organisations with a track record of
delivering all outputs in a timely manner.
Regular monitoring by CHASE and the
independent monitoring and evaluation agency
will track progress.
Political
Low
Medium
Risk of Disruption – many of the countries
affected by mines and ERW have delicate
political environments. These will be closely
monitored, but are predominantly outside the
control of DFID.
Financial Risk
Low
Low
Funds paid out to suppliers that do not have
sound financial management e.g. through subcontracting is considered a low risk this will be
mitigated by contracting procedures that ensure
lead contractors are held accountable for
financial management of all sub-contracted
funds and have strong financial management
expertise.
Economic risk (that High
Medium Competitive tender will require participants to
returns are lower
submit cost-benefit projections for their context;
than projected)
these will be used to divert funding to the areas
with the highest return. Prior to Phase Two,
DFID will conduct a further cost-benefit analysis
to prioritise high-return contexts for greater
funding levels.
C. What conditions apply (for financial aid only)?
N/A
D. How will progress and results be monitored, measured and evaluated?
172. An independent monitoring and evaluation partner will be appointed to independently measure
and assess the performance of the overall mine action strategy and the contribution of selected
suppliers. Progress towards anticipated results will be regularly monitored, measured and reported
against the overall logframe for the programme. A monitoring and evaluation strategy will be
developed within 90 days of contract approval.
173. There will be two Annual Reviews and one Project Completion Report submitted for the overall
programme. The annual review will draw on annual reports generated for each country, which will
also allow for country level investigation of progress towards performance targets. The independent
M&E agency will also be closely engaged.
174. Project implementing suppliers will report on progress on a six monthly basis (via short reports
and regular meetings) with yearly annual technical and financial reports, including yearly externally
audited accounts.
175. As we have requested additional (minimal) support and oversight from country offices, CHASE
will organise regular meetings with policy leads across the programme.
176. In addition to monitoring throughout, we plan to undertake an external independent evaluation
at the end of the funding period for the project. The purpose will be to assess the impact and
effectiveness of the UK’s funding for the mine action in the chosen countries in terms of
performance and the impact of its work on intended the beneficiaries. The evaluation costs will be
met from CHASE’s monitoring and evaluation budget line; the report will be made publicly
available.
Logframe
Quest No of logframe for this intervention: