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Rather than a source of division, military rule can ensure security and prosperity for citizens
in Africa. Discuss.
“Democracy, prosperity and self-rule: this was the vision of African independence”
(Decalo 1998: 93), but in the first few decades of independence from 1960, with the
exception of Mauritius, not one African leader had lost power via elections. African leaders
were disinclined to relinquish their power and, ‘within this context coups were the sole
manner of ousting incumbent leaders; the functional equivalent of elections’ (Decalo 1998:
94). Military rule is in operation when military leaders take over politics from rule by civilian.
When military leaders are in direct possession, this is also termed praetorianism, ‘In a
praetorian society military leadership and political leadership become one’ (Wiseman 1988:
231). Instead of civilian control of the military, the reverse has occurred and the state
observes military control of the civilian. By the late 1970s quasi-permanent military rule had
become the norm for much of the African continent (Decalo 1998: 1).
Early literature regarding military intervention in the African political sphere was
often optimistic. Corrupt, inept, and self-seeking political elites meant that the state
needed rescuing; the army gained an emancipatory dimension, responding to the need for
social transformation. Social, economic and political problems and weaknesses both
triggered and welcomed the armed forces into power and legitimized their takeover of the
political arena. For citizens, the military was a saviour, ‘stresses in African societies provoked
the armed forces to reluctantly to overthrow their civilian masters’ (Decalo 1998: 3).
Another angle of thought was that civilian control of the armed forces, as practiced in
western democracies, and the view that problematized military intervention, was
considered Eurocentric (Luckham 1994: 14). Moreover, in Africa, democracy and military
establishments had been externally imposed, meaning there had been little scope for
“internal foraging of mutual constraints between rulers and ruled” (Luckham 1994: 14). In
this sense the military were seen as a bridge towards a democratic future.
I will begin by examining the school of thought which argues military rule can serve
as a modernizing or developmental agent. Further analysis finds that this view idealises to a
certain extent the capabilities and intentions of the military institution; empirical studies
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show the army has failed to transform societies in Africa economically and politically in the
way supporters of military intervention imagined. Rather than instigating progression and
modernization, Mazrui has argued military rule can lead to a retraditionalization and reAfricanization of Africa. Furthermore, military rule has exacerbated rather than relieved the
following divisions that have characterized African society: gender; ethnic and regional;
mass-elite gap. Rather than providing security and prosperity, military rule has slowed the
progress towards democracy and hindered economic development.
The analysis of military rule in the essay will be grounded on the realities of Nigeria,
the most populous nation in Africa. Nigeria’s political history reveals successive cases of
praetorianism- when militaries take over political structures. The military organisation
originally created by the British colonial government in Nigeria was based on the Sandhurst
formula of the political neutrality of the military (Luckham 1971: 1). After less than 6 years
of independence, in 1966 the civilian regime was overthrown by a military coup. Since then,
one wing of the military has subsequently been displaced by another – in July 1966, 1975,
and 1985 (Tordoff 2002: 177). A close study of Nigeria reveals the societal effects of ethnic
cleavages within the military, the political neglect of women in patriarchal structures and
the painful struggle to make the transformation to democracy.
In his 1961 essay, “Armies in the Process of Political Modernization”, Lucian W. Pye
argued that the military is a ‘vigorous champion of progress and development’ (Pye 1961:
83). Pye researched the role of the military in the political development of new states and
argued that for the underdeveloped regions, ‘the military might become the critical group in
shaping the course of nation-building’ (ibid: 82). Pye envisions a political realm whereby
‘rational’ and ‘politically conscious officers’ are ‘aware of the need for substantial changes in
their won societies’ and are ‘extremely sensitive to the extent to which their countries are
economically and technologically underdeveloped’ (ibid: 85-86). The army’s westernised
form of organisation is similar to the most highly industrialised civilizations, making the
army ‘the most modernized organization in the society’ (ibid: 92). Soldiers have access to
advanced western technology, which makes them sensitive to the needs of modernization
and technological advancement. They also obtain in the army a level of education makes
them ‘modernized men’, in tune with intellectuals and students (ibid: 86). The army also
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provides a model of meritocracy for society to follow, with ‘channels for upward social
mobility’ (ibid: 90).
In Pye’s essay the army is depicted as a nationalising force. Men leave behind their
primitive origins and enter the ‘more impersonal world of the army’ where they learn to
identify with ‘a larger political self’ (Pye 1961: 88). Ethnic divisions are diminished as soldiers
learn that they ‘stand in some definite relationship to a national community’ and develop
‘goals of nationalism’ (ibid: 89). Controversially, he perceives the distance of army officers
from their civilian societies as a positive factor of military rule, since it allows for objective
judgement and comparisons to be made with the standards of the industrialised world.
Although Pye makes interesting hypotheses about the modernizing capabilities of
the military, he allows a high degree of armchair theorizing, failing to provide in-depth
empirical case studies to support his theories. Empirical evidence reveals substantial flaws in
his arguments and suggests that African armies have not created better leaders than the
civilian regimes they overthrew. Decalo writes, ‘Military juntas by and large are either as
incompetent as ruling hierarchies or incapable of effecting change’; their economic and
social policies or abilities do not fare better than those of civilian regimes and they are rarely
freer of corruption (Decalo 1976: 24). Theorists of the modernization literature often
idealise the motives for military coups, which are rarely simple. There may be a personalist
seizure of power such as the case of Lt. Samuels in Ghana, who aimed to become the first
lieutenant Head of State in Africa (ibid: 19). The factors that infringe on an authoritarian’s
ability to rule effectively reach military generals, ‘greed and avarice know no distinction
between soldier and civilian’ (ibid: 24-25). Perhaps Pye overestimates the will and ability of
soldiers returning from military training overseas to return, intervene and “tidy up the
mess” and ‘to create a new political order (ibid: 14).
Mazrui questioned the social scientists expressing the belief the armed forces were
agents of modernization. His essay, “Soldiers as Traditionalizers”, contests that the military
has modernizing capabilities which, ‘change the rest of the society away from traditionalist
preconceptions and toward a pattern of behaviour more characteristic of modern societies’
(Mazrui 1977: 247). Commentators have often discerned a ‘conservative streak in the
military mind’, observing that the armed forces esteem discipline, rigor, orders and
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predictability and are relatively insulated from outside ideas. However, according to Mazrui,
this has largely been ignored when analysing the role of the armed forces in Africa (ibid:
250).
Unlike Pye’s conception of the modern soldier, Mazrui alerts us to the fact that
armies in developing countries tend to recruit from some of the least privileged sectors of
the population. These ‘peasant warriors in uniform’ may be less acculturated than urbanized
secondary school graduates; even the officers who receive further training do not reach the
level of normative westernization than civilian university graduates. Mazrui adds that
officers’ comparatively lower intelligence may have a political cost to rational policy making
(ibid: 256). Soldiers and military leaders may play a traditionalizing role for Africa. Mazrui
suggests that whilst the military organization itself may be and ‘logical with regard to
systems of co-ordination’ and technologically advanced, individual soldiers remain ‘steeped
in primordial beliefs and traditionalist tendencies (ibid: 252). Through the partial
resurrection of indigenous cultural ways, the soldiers may prove to be greater agents for
retraditionalization and the re-Africanization of Africa than their civilian predecessors. For
example, Idi Amin of Uganda brought in his traditional beliefs in occult powers into politics
(ibid: 257). Mazrui doubts that it is good for political culture to have such beliefs
resurrected. However Mazrui is not able to determine if this aspect of traditionalization is
pronounced in civilian rule.
The individual soldier may also not embrace a national identity as Pye hypothesized.
Another aspect of retraditionalization under military rule is retribalization, that is military
rule may aggravate ethnic resurgence. Certain communities were commonly excluded as
warriors during colonialism, either because they feared resistance from them if armed, or
because of a perceived lack of physical strength and other ‘fighting qualities’ (ibid: 258). An
example is the Baganda in Ethiopia, since they were regarded as a martial community the
colonialists were reluctant to recruit them into the armed forces. Mazrui looked at the
repercussions of this divisive action in the relations between soldiers and civilian after
independence. Many theorists claim colonialists politicised tribes (ibid: 260). Stereotypes
were formed within communities about other ethnic communities and within the army
itself. In Nigeria this also affected relations within the military itself- since the Ibo tribe had
not been categorized as a martial race Northern officers were reluctant to take orders from
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them (ibid: 260). Mazrui concludes that the military may be more ‘bedevilled by ethnic
factors than a situation of civilian politics’ (ibid: 262).
Decalo confirms that soldiers in reality rarely embrace a national identity, ‘African
armies have rarely been cohesive, nontribal, Westernized, or even complex organizational
structures’ (Decalo 1976: 14). Although Pye points to the neat hierarchical command
structure in armies as models of meritocracy to wider society, these often just mask deep
cleavages that reflect wider societal chasms. ‘Differential recruitment and promotion
patters cause tensions that reinforce other lines of division based on rank, age, tribe, and
education’ (ibid: 14). Instead of resembling a complex organisation model, armies are ‘a
coterie of distinct armed camps owing primary clientelist allegiance to a handful of mutually
competitive officers of different ranks seething with a variety of corporate, ethnic, and
personal grievances’ (ibid: 14) In Uganda, General Idi Amin dismantled the entire officer
corps to exclude potential rivals, while bringing in members of ethnic minorities loyal to
himself (Luckham 1994: 38). Overall, there may not be modernization in military structures;
military rule may only draw society back to destabilization.
Looking at our case study reveals that armies are not as untainted and neutral as Pye
suggests. Luckham explores the ethnic and regional cliques within the army in detail in his
study of the military revolts in Nigeria of 1966. Pye postulated simple relationships between
military professionalism and modernity, but Luckham’s study argues that, ‘it was precisely
the military’s bureaucratic and professional attributes that accelerated its fracture into
ethnic and regional cliques’ (ibid: 15). When the army revolted against the civilian regime in
the coup of January 1966 they violated the Sandhurst formula of the political neutrality of
the military (Luckham 1971: 1). Once in power, the army began to fragment and pressure
from the primordialisms of tribe and region caused discipline to break down. By July 1966
conflict had broken out between the officers of different regions and ethnic groups. Many
officers were subsequently killed and the nation divided into hostile parts causing the civil
war in July 1967 (ibid: 1). Not only did the military fail to nationalise soldiers and diminish
ethnic divisions, the military organisation itself broke down and internal strife led to civil
war. Whilst seemingly protected by professional loyalties and the army’s unity of structure,
boundaries were broken by ethnic or regional loyalties (ibid: 177).
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Pye’s analysis of the military suffered from a series of overestimations regarding the
modernizing capabilities of armies; the altruistic purposes of military generals and their
potential to ‘save’ a country from its political failings; soldiers as modernizing agents with
regards to their education, rejection of primordial beliefs and nationalizing goals; the
structure of unity vaunted by armies that may cloak problematic cleavages and ethnic
loyalties. It is interesting that omitted from Mazrui’s discussion of military rule as a
modernizing or retraditionalizing force is the discussion of women. The gender division
within African societies is seldom touched upon in the literature of military rule, which is a
patriarchal system of governance.
I will now address whether male-dominated military governments form policies which
enhance or diminish the status of women. Do they provide more educational and economic
opportunities or access to political power than elected representative governments? I will
again use the case study of Nigeria where, ‘there is a huge disparity in the socio-economic
development of the genders’, revealed in literacy rates, population in the labour force and
the negligible participation of women in politics (Omonubi-McDonnell 2003: 01). Since
women make up over fifty per cent of Nigeria’s population, it is divisive that women
throughout military rule constituted a negligible part of the armed forces.
Mba researched the implications of the militarization of the state for women in Nigeria,
examining each military regime and using the First Republic, 1960 to 1965, as a basis for
comparison. After the First Republic was deposed by Nigeria’s first military coup in 1966, the
Federal Military Government was formed with Major-General Ironsi as the Head of State.
During his leadership, all political leaders were excluded from participation in the
government. Mba notes that this action did not deprive women of any power since they had
none in the First Republic, ‘women were not in the armed forces, civil service or in the
professions to begin with’ (Mba 1989: 71). When Gowon was head of state (1966-75), Mba
argues at this time political power was more centralized than ever before, and as a result,
‘Military service becomes more isolated from the people they were supposed to govern.
With no women at any level of government, the military was indeed very remote from
women (ibid: 72). The third military coup brought General Murtala Mohammed into power
in 1975. Shortly after he was assassinated and his deputy Lt. General Olusegun Obasanjo
continued his policies of the demilitarization of the political system, and the demobilization
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of the army, setting a date to terminate military rule. Under Obasanjo things improved for
women slightly in terms of representation in government. Mba found, ‘at state level, it
appears to have been the unofficial policy that there should be one woman commissioner in
each state’ (ibid: 75). Obasanjo’s military regime also brought the right to vote for women in
the Northern States, twenty years after those on the south. It appears that political
involvement improved slightly for women under Obasanjo’s rule.
Overall, Mba concluded that although some military rulers provided a little
transformation within society, where the civilian leaders did not, this was not due to a
commitment to improving the rights of women. Obasanjo reportedly once said, ‘While we
want our women to be fully involved in our national life, we also want them to take care of
our homes’ (ibid: 75), overall, ‘in the view of the military government, the opinion of women
was neither relevant nor necessary’ (ibid: 75). We may question whether it is possible for an
organisation, which is inherently patriarchal and largely excludes the participation of
women, to protect their interests or be perceived as a modernizing force. Luckham writes,
military and security bureaucracies ‘embody ideological relations between male protectors
and female protected […] reinforcing the social and political marginality of women within
the state all the more so under military or authoritarian governments, whose social base in
the armed forces has almost by definition excluded women from key power positions
(Luckham 1994: 23).
When a state is governed under a patriarchal system, women have little voice.
Omonubi-McDonnell claims it is their political powerlessness which retards their political,
economic and social development (Omonubi-McDonnell 2003: 01). In the long run, being
governed by unelected, self-imposed military personnel has had serious implications on
women’s political involvement and women’s right have gone unprotected. Laws exist which
mitigate against the advancement of women and ‘perpetrate the gap of inequality between
the sexes’ (ibid: 05) and female genital mutilation is practiced in most parts of the country.
The discussion of women highlights the powerlessness of groups within society to make
changes under military rule. Some regimes are noted for their disrespect for the rule of law,
serious corruption, human rights abuse and massive looting of the national treasury (ibid:
62), but military regimes are unelected and accountable to no one. Military intervention was
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often welcomed and justified on the basis that military regimes would hand over power
back to civilian elites once they had created a new political order. The optimism for military
intervention was originally based on the idea of the ‘effectiveness of armies in promoting
national development and eventually democratic practices’ (Pye 1961: 83). Can the military
somehow be part of the democratic process? Some theorists have argued that the military
can play a role in providing the necessary stability and order that makes democracy
possible, but can the seizure of power through undemocratic means lead to a stable and
democratic future?
In reality military rulers in Africa rarely relinquish their power and step down. During
the 60s and 70s the inexorable trend was ‘toward the militarisation of ruling hierarchies on
the continent on a permanent basis’ (Decalo 1998: 34). Governments would often come to
be led by a single powerful person, and were autocracies in addition to military
dictatorships, for example Idi Amin in Uganda, Sani Abacha in Nigeria and Muammar
Gaddafi in Libya. Military regimes even created institutional and structural avenues for their
re-entry into political reckoning (Nwankwo 1996: 30). Military rulers like Babangida in
Nigeria, ‘have placed obstacles in the way of democratic openings at every turn’ (Luckham
1994: 64).
Nwankwo looks into the 1993 military intervention in Nigeria’s political process in
1993, an action which constituted a ‘betrayal of democracy’ (Nwankwo 1996: 30). The
military Head of State, Babangida, publicly committed himself to making the transition to
democracy in 1986 (Ihonvbere 1996: 197), but after an elaborate 8-year transfer process
and the June 1993 presidential elections that were widely proclaimed to be the best the
nation had ever had, the General announced that the elections were annulled and banned
the candidates from any further presidential contests, thus derailing the transition to
democracy. Ihonvbere doubts whether the military leaders had any intention of handing
over power to the politicians (ibid: 198). The General had controlled the elections, sent
death threats to dissidents, forced press closure and ignored public opposition and privately
embarked on a ‘sinister programme that involved dismantling institutions of civil society,
entrenching arbitrary rule, and totally militarizing the political landscape’ (ibid: 198),
denying the empowerment of the people and their communities. His actions were set to
prevent popular involvement in the evolution of government and society in Nigeria.
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Nwankwo writes, the ‘Nigerian Military is incapable of governing civil society, of
implementing positive restructuring of the Federal polity, and of leaving behind a legacy of
enduring and sustainable democratic order (Nwankwo 1996: 31). Military rule does not
therefore always enable a swift transformation to democracy.
This essay has highlighted how military rule has been a source of ethnic, regional and
gender division within countries in Africa. On the whole military regimes have failed to
promote security and prosperity for citizens to a greater extent than civilian rulers, since
divisions have led even to civil war, as in the case of Nigeria, and to the almost total
exclusion of women from politics and a lack of commitment to women’s rights. Military
organisations themselves fail to create a new political order since they themselves are part
of the problem- they are patriarchal establishments entrenched in deep ethnic cleavages,
allowing for authoritarian rule and a mass-elite gap.
Furthermore, Military rule itself is not only undemocratic but is unlikely to
precipitate a neat transition to democracy. The few who benefit significantly under military
rule may be those with clientelist relations with the key officers in power, but even this
security may only last until the next military coup, ‘coups are more likely in states where
major plots and coup attempts have already occurred’ (Luckham 1994: 31). Nigeria for
example has witnessed eleven coup d’etats, which have hardly brought stability to the
political arena (Igbuzor 2005: 103). Military governments may devote more time and effort
to consolidating and warding off alternative challenges to their authority than to providing
the country with purposeful leadership (Luckham 1976: 15). Complete military
disengagement from politics and a commitment to the process of democratization is
essential if African citizens are to gain security and prosperity. Political power must be
transferred from a small ruling class to the mass of the African people in a democratic
system that will promote ‘the continuing responsiveness of the government to the
preferences of its citizens considered as political equals’ (Nwabueze 1993: 75).
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