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Picture: Arab Sheikhs in Kirkuk
© Wladimir van Wilgenburg
BY
WLADIMIR
VAN
WILGENBURG
FAILED (OR ABORTED) ARAB SPRING IN
IRAQ:
A Study of the Political Mobilization of
Sunni Arabs in Kirkuk
Wladimir van Wilgenburg
3417786
Utrecht University
12 August 2011
A Thesis submitted to the Board of Examiners in partial fulfillment of the
requirements of the degree of Master of Arts in Conflict Studies & Human Rights
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0
Supervisor: Mario Fumerton
Submitted on 12 August 2011
Programme Trajectory : Research and Thesis Writing Only (30 ECTS)
Word Count: 22,782
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Abstract
In this thesis I examine the impact of opportunity structures, framing efforts, and organizational
structures and resources on the attempts of the APC(APC) in Kirkuk to organize ethnic
demonstrations against the Kurdish authorities in Kirkuk’s Provincial Council. I argue that the
primordialist bias of many academics on the issue of Kirkuk prevents sound analysis and
understanding of events. For instance Ted Gurr (1993: 161) argues that representatives of ethnic
groups are more likely to initiate conflict, or protest against the government, if they have recently
lost power. This idea is shared by many of the academics who write about Kirkuk. Some
automatically assume that ethnic identities serve as the prime motivators of the people of Kirkuk.
This while disaffection about the lack of success of politicians to deliver services is something
universal among all ethnicities in Kirkuk. The failure of the strategic framing efforts of the APC to
convince its target population to support demonstrations against their rival ethnic-group, the Kurds,
during the Tunisian-inspired unrest in Iraq was compounded by the APC”s lack of organizational
capacities and material and non-material resources as well as the lack of opportunity structures
within the regime for the APC (due to rivalry, and the weakness in Baghdad). This shows that the
people of Kirkuk did not necessarily support nationalist claims over their own basic needs like
services, water, and jobs. Furthermore, there were demonstrations in Kirkuk by Arabs against their
own Arab representatives in Kirkuk. This was one of the reasons, apart from a lack of opportunity
structures within the regime, and resources and organizational capabilities, that for the moment an
ethnic Arab uprising has failed in Kirkuk. In this light, I argue in this thesis there is a need for a more
non-ethnic understanding of Kirkuk, and more research and analysis of the different perceptions
within the different communities about their own representatives, and their perceived ethnic
identities.
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Table of contents
Acknowledgements
Maps of Kirkuk
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6
7
INTRODUCTION
8
Acronyms and Abbreviations
Chapter 1: THEORY AND RESEARCH PUZZLE
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1.1. Theory
1.2. Methodology
1.2.1. Framing
1.2.2. Organizational structures and resource mobilization
1.2.3. Opportunity structures
1.2. Research constraints
Chapter 2. FRAMING
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2.1. Frames
2.1.1. Provincial Council
2.1.2. Security Forces
2.1.3. Constitution
2.1.4. Water
2.1.5. Demography and normalization
2.1.6. Status of Kirkuk
2.1.7. Demonstrations
2.2. Support For Frames
2.2.1. Status of Kirkuk and the Constitution
2.2.2. Security Forces
2.2.3. Water
2.2.4. Demography and Normalization
2.2.5. Demonstrations
2.3. Summary
Chapter 3: ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES AND RESOURCE MOBILIZATION
3.1. Human resources
3.2. Material and financial resources
3.3. Pre-existing networks or institutions
3.1.1. Tribal organizations
3.1.2. Religious Networks
3.1.3. Civil and Political Organizations
3.1.4. Media Networks
3.1.5. Insurgent Networks
3.2. Skills and knowledge
3.3. Summary
Chapter 4: OPPURTUNITY STRUCTURES
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4.1. Independent centres of power
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4.1.1. Erbil
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4.1.2. Kirkuk
4.1.3. Baghdad
4.1.4. Summary
4.2.Open or closed system
4.3. Political alignments
4.3.1. Kurdish divisions
4.3.2. Divisions within Iraqiyya list
4.3.3. Arab Divisions Within Kirkuk
4.4. Availability of allies
4.4.1. International
4.4.2. Regional
4.4.3. National
4.4.4. Local
4.4.5. Summary
4.5. Facilitation or Repression
4.4. Challengers and facilitators
4.5. Summary
CONCLUSION
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Bibliography
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ANNEX A. IRAQI MEDIA IN KIRKUK
ANNEX B. DEMONSTRATIONS IN KIRKUK 2004-2011
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Acknowledgements
“
The king sent three spies to a neighboring country before he began his invasion.
One spy told him: “Everybody is praying and going to the mosques.”
Another spy told him:”Everybody is drinking and is partying.”
The last spy told him:”Everybody is doing good business and the markets are crowded.”
The king asked his chief advisor what to do with all these different stories.
His advisor told the king: You sent three people who only spent time with their own people. If
you want the reality, you have to mix all things to together.
1
”
This research is dedicated to the courageous people of Kirkuk, both Kurds, Turkmen, Christians and
Arabs. Without their generous help, and hospitality, I would have never finished this research. A new
life was born, while others, who I met, sadly died. May their souls rest in peace.
Despite my initial doubts about the feasibility of this research, they convinced me to continue on
paths I never expected. We spoke in several languages (Turkmen, Kurdish, English) and I even learned
some Iraqi Arabic. Despite death threats, kidnapping risks, assassinations and other challengers, they
took risks to help this stubborn stranger and hosted me, introduced me to their families, supported
me (and often discouraged me, when needed). I hope that in the future their lives will improve and
stability and peace will come to Kirkuk.
Furthermore I would like to thank my external advisors James Devine and David Romano for their
excellent help and criticism. Credit is also due to my supervisor Mario Fumerton, who had to endure
the many delays and second-thoughts I had about the subject of this thesis. I would also like to thank
the Provincial Joint Coordination Centre which provided me with necessary data and the police chief
of Kirkuk for advice and help. Furthermore the comments and thoughts and data provided by former
PRT-officials Christopher Price, Gabriel Escobar and USIP-analyst Sean Kane were very helpful.
1
A story told by my Iraqi friend, and fixer in Kirkuk. This picture is taken by French photographer Christophe
Petit-Tesson and shows the Baba Gurgur (father of fire in Kurdish) oil field in Kirkuk.
Page 5
I also like to thank Ismail Hadidi and his sons. He is the former deputy governor of Kirkuk, who hosted
me, fed me, taught me more about the situation of Kirkuk and introduced me to many people from
all ethnicities. We went to funerals, saw people in distress, the shootings, and he and his family took
care of me when I was knocked out for one week by a severe fever and bacterial infection. Without
his help and advice, my research would have been more difficult.
Acronyms and Abbreviations
APC
ICC
ICG
IA
IHEC
IRI
ISF
ITF
KDP
KPC
KRG
PCM
PJCC
PRT
PUK
SLA
USF-I
USIP
Arab Political Council
Joint Operations Centre (ICC)
International Crisis Group
Iraqi Army
Independent High Electoral Commission of Iraq (IHEC)
International Republican Institute
Iraqi Security Forces
Iraqi Turkmen Front
Democratic Party of Kurdistan led by Kurdish president Barzani
Kirkuk Provincial Council
Kurdistan Regional Government
Provincial Council Member
Provincial Joint Coordination Centre
Provincial Reconstruction Team
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan led by Iraqi president Jalal Talabani.
State of Law Alliance
United States Forces - Iraq
United States Institute for Peace
Page 6
Map of Kirkuk
Figure 1: Map taken from Inter-Agency Information Analysis Unit (February 2011)
Page 7
Introduction
This thesis will argue that Kirkuk’s Arab Political Council (APC) did not have the resources,
opportunity structures or sufficient support for their framing efforts, to mobilize a Tunisian-esque
uprising or mass protests against the Kurdish controlled authorities in Kirkuk in February 2011.
However the threatened uprising in January 2011 never materialized despite academics like Ted
Gurr (1993: 161) arguing that representatives of ethnic groups are more likely to initiate conflict, or
protest against the government, if they have recently lost power.
An example of this approach is the well-known U.S. Professor Juan Cole who argued that ‘oppressed
minorities, such as Arabs in Kurdish-dominated areas of Iraq, took heart from the Tunisian
achievement’ and threatened to mount an uprising against Kurdish security forces and the Kurdishdominated police.2 The Tunisian uprising that overthrew the 23-year-old regime of strongman Zine
el-Abidine Ben Ali reverberated throughout the Middle East and was used by the opposition
movements in Egypt, Libya, Syria, Bahrain, and other countries, to break the status quo.
The Sunni Arabs in Iraq who enjoyed a privileged status for over 400 years, lost their hegemony when
Saddam Hussein was ousted by U.S.-led coalition forces in 2003 (Zeidel 2008:40). The Kurdish
political parties took over the Kirkuk province and, tried in every way, to annex the province to the
Kurdistan region. These irreconcilable discourses led analysts, journalists, and academics to conclude
a civil war was imminent (Rafaat 2008: 259).
Moreover the huge amount of oil and gas resources in Kirkuk literally put oil on the fire, according to
observers. Many of them concluded the conflict was about who controlled the oil in Kirkuk.
As a result, Kirkuk took a central role in the media and academic study after the 2003 invasion.
Currently with the prospect of an imminent U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, leaving Kirkuk behind without
a neutral force to prevent tensions, it again plays a pivotal role in the Iraqi and Western media. Most
articles about Kirkuk argued for consensus building, or a negotiated settlement, or other solutions
(Natali 2008; Rafaat 2008; Stansfield & Anderson 2009; Romano 2007 & ICG 2009).
2
Cole, Juan (2011), “Tunisian Revolution Shakes, Inspires Middle East”, Alternet, 18 January 2011
(http://www.alternet.org/story/149591/tunisian_revolution_shakes_and_inspires_middle_east)
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So far, the APC has been unable to mount a Tunisian-uprising against Kurdish security forces. Political
mobilization theorists argue that there are many situations where there are numerous reasons to
revolt, but unless there exists the means to mobilize, no real revolt or uprising can happen – with
discontent being limited to a few disorganized riots. But the Tunisian-inspired revolutions challenged
this view and showed that opposition forces could challenge a regime without significant resources,
clear leadership, or even traditional organization.
However, Kirkuk was a different issue due to the ethnic divisions. No Tunisian uprising happened,
despite short-lived protests against the local authorities and threats by the APC. The APC failed to
mount a challenge to the Kurdish dominated provincial council, because they did not attempt a postmodern uprising. They followed the schema of traditional uprisings, and consequently failed because
that approach requires proper organization. Furthermore, the Tunisian inspired youth challenged the
old leadership of the APC, and focused on non-ethnic demands such as an end to corruption,
services, employment and called for the resignation of the Arab-led city council in Hawija and of Arab
politicians in the sub districts and the provincial council.
These grievances regarding the inefficiency of Arab politicians, who have been in power since 2003,
2004, or 2005, without any elections, rendered the ethnic framing efforts of the APC futile.
Furthermore they lacked the financial resources, organizational capabilities, and opportunity
structures, such as independent centers of power, allies within the government, or supporters in the
security forces, needed to launch a traditional mobilization effort.
The aim of this research is to understand why this Tunisian-style uprising failed to erupt and to
explain the dynamic of resistance of the Sunni APC towards the Kurds. For this thesis space is too
limited, to research the effect of the Arab spring on Iraq as a whole. Even taken alone, Kirkuk is seen
as important on both a regional and an international level due to fears of a civil war, which could
instigate interference from Iran, Syria and Turkey, who fear Kurds annexing Kirkuk would empower
their own Kurdish minorities.
This research will provide a theoretical background to the debate over Kirkuk since most observers
focus on recommending possible solutions or negotiations over the status of Kirkuk in order to end
contention between ethnic groups. Often they focus on identity and presumed motives of political
actors or their actions, without spending much time on the political process (Tilly 2007: 141). Other
studies have been focused on explaining the different historical frames of the ethnic political groups
in Kirkuk or inter-ethnic relations, but they fail to explain the political mechanisms in the province of
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Kirkuk.
I will use the political mobilization approach that suggests that neither grievances nor opportunistic
elites are sufficient to produce large scale violence. There is an additional need for organization and
the opportunities to mobilize as well as strategic reasons for choosing conflicting tactics. Since the
APC organized itself in a traditional structure, the political mobilization approach can be applied to
this situation.
Here I will explain the methodological approach, research constraints and the theory behind my
thesis proceeding to focus on the strategic framing efforts of Arab politicians in Kirkuk. The second
chapter will deal with the resources and organizational capacities the APC have in Kirkuk, and the last
chapter will deal with the opportunity structures within the regime of Iraq, Kurdistan, and the
provincial council in Kirkuk.
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Chapter 1: Theory and Methodology
1.1. Theory
There is growing academic interest in groups mobilizing along communal identities after the eruption
of ethnic conflicts, following the end of the Cold War (Gurr 1993: 161). The perceived explosive
situation is part of this interest. Academics have concluded that Kirkuk is poised for conflict, as a
result of its ethnic mix. It reminds analysts of the horrors of Rwanda and Yugoslavia, and the
international community is united in their determination to prevent this occurring again.
Ted Gurr (1993: 161) argues that representatives of ethnic groups are more likely to initiate conflict,
or protest against the government, if they have recently lost power. Indeed, Sunni Arab politicians in
Kirkuk threatened an election boycott and civil war against Kurds in 2004 (Rafaat 2008: 259). In
January 2011, as reported by Sumaria TV, they threatened with an Tunisian-inspired uprising to kick
Kurdish security forces out of the province, but eventually nothing materialized.
The problem is that many academics on Kirkuk uncritically accept the discourses of local actors and
do not provide further insight in the political mechanism leading to demonstrations, tensions,
conflict or civil war. For instance Michiel Leezenberg emphasizes the fact that ethnic identities in
Kirkuk are rather more flexible and negotiated than nationalist rhetoric would indicate it (Leezenberg
2010: 137). Assuming that ethnic identities serve as prime motivators of people in Kirkuk amounts to
a primordialist position on the issue. The non-ethnic demonstrations focused on services in Iraq
demonstrates the fallacy of such an assumption and indicates that we should treat the relevance of
ethnicity as only one of our questions when it comes to mobilization efforts.
A primordialist position does not explain why in some countries ethnic minorities do rebel and in
other countries they do not. In some cases ethnic minorities may have other priorities than their
ethnic background or have assimilated into the dominant ethnicity in the country. There are
grievances in Kirkuk but this does not necessarily lead to conflict or successful mobilization efforts.
For instance well-known U.S. Professor Juan Cole argued that the oppressed Arabs in the Kurdishdominated areas of Iraq took heart from the Tunisian uprising to mobilize against Kurdish parties.3
3
Cole, Juan (2011), “Tunisian Revolution Shakes, Inspires Middle East”, Alternet, 18 January 2011
(http://www.alternet.org/story/149591/tunisian_revolution_shakes_and_inspires_middle_east)
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There is however a major difference between ethnic unrest and uprisings taking place during the
Arab spring (now approaching an "Arab winter"). Most of these are not based on ethnic or nationalist
demands, and target their own rulers (Bashar al-Assad, Ben Ali, Hosni Mubarak, and others). It’s not
Arab nationalism against Israel, but its citizens versus corrupt, and authoritarian rulers.4
This primordialist bias that suggests that oppressed minorities automatically protest on the basis of
ethnic grievances is proven to be baseless by the events in Kirkuk.
But why then, is ethnicity not the prime motivator of humans? Constructivists argue that ethnic
identities are constructed and that ethnic boundaries can change over time, while primordialists
portray communal groups as unchangeable social entities based on a set of genetic, cultural,
linguistic, and religious givens (Gurr 1993: 162). According to the constructivists, therefore, people
can have multiple identities at the same time and do not operate only on the basis of their ethnic
background.
This still doesn’t explain the instances in which ethnic identity is used as a motivation for violence or
civil unrest. Often constructivists go too far, by suggesting that ethnicity doesn’t play any role in
conflicts. But here instrumentalists step in and provide an answer. They agree that ethnic boundaries
are constructed, but argue that elites manipulate ethnic boundaries for political power (Demmers
2011 ch1: 11).
Furthermore, violence can strengthen ethnic identities which can be manipulated by elites. In Kosovo
elites created negative truths about the other in order to create intense feelings of victimization and
insecurity (Harlz 2010: 43).
Structuralists disregard these types of motivations or framing of grievances. They say that
revolutions, rebellions or political unrest are the result of the broader political system, the economy,
historical trends, and the general characteristics of a society (Romano 2007:9). For instance there are
authors who argue the Kirkuk conflict is just over the control of oil, not ethnicity (Othman 2011: 9).
The problem with mere structuralist approaches is that they are very deterministic. The literature on
social movements and contentious politics underscores the point that less powerful groups limited
by structural factors can nonetheless overcome the more formidable assets of their opponents (King
4
Harel, Amos (2011), “Amos Harel: Arab Spring. Bad for Israel? Not necessarily”, Al Arabiya, 6 July 2011
(http://english.alarabiya.net/views/2011/07/06/156338.html)
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2007: 117). This was shown powerfully by the Arab spring. Rebellions and demonstrations erupted in
the most unexpected places: the rigid autocratic dictatorships of the Middle East.
Political mobilization theorists argue that there are many situations where there are plenty of
reasons to revolt, but unless there exists the means to mobilize, no real revolt or uprising can happen
- just a few disorganized riots at most. Political mobilization theories focus on “how” movement
formations happen (Romano 2006: 12). “How do individuals (get) mobilize(d) for collective purposes
and actions? How are movements built, and what makes people join in, or turn away from these
movements?” (Demmers 2011 ch4: 9). My thesis will show that this is the key to why the Sunni Arabs
did not engage in mass protests on an ethnic basis.
In general, mobilization theories focus on the processes by which a discontented group assembles
and invests resources for the pursuit of group goals (Romano 2006: 12). There are several
approaches to understanding political mobilization. Tilly and Tarrow (2007: 10) focus on identifying
mechanisms and processes by looking at contentious events. They say that some students allocate
primary attention to social bases of contentions – for example, to social network organizations,
cultural predispositions, etc. However, in this case there are insufficient events to analyze
contentious politics in Kirkuk, since efforts to launch demonstrations quickly failed. There was not a
continuous enough stream of events for a Tilly and Tarrow-style analysis of events.
Resource mobilization theory on the other hand considers the availability of resources, political
mobilization by political groups and political mobilization strategies that effectively take advantage of
opportunities for collective action. Their focus is not only on events, but also on strategies and
organizational capacities.
One problem for scholars of contentious politics is the so-called free rider or collective action
problem: why would people take risks - while more rights would accrue to them anyway – irrelevant
of direct participation? (King 2007: 117). This can be overcome through organizations appealing to
moral sensibilities, force, or ideals or attitudes within the local culture that emphasizes for instance
self sacrifice for certain ideals through cultural framing.
Many people in Kirkuk suggested that security forces played a role in preventing people from
demonstration. But the people in Syria, Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and other countries show that people
were willing to take risks after they were convinced by frames constructed by the media, local actors,
opposition groups that demonstrations were worth the risk, even if death was a probability.
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Therefore, I will focus on the three crucial areas of inquiry used by scholars of contentious politics:
(1) opportunities, (2) organizational structures and resources, and (3) framing (King 2007: 117). I will
employ the comprehensive synthesis of opportunity structures, resource mobilization and framing
processes used by David Romano and McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald and other political mobilization
theorists to explain why the Sunni APC failed to mobilize for a Tunisian uprising in the province of
Kirkuk.
1.2. Methodology
1.2.1. Framing
Framing is the strategic efforts by groups or people to fashion shared understandings of the world
and of themselves that legitimize and motivate collective action (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996:
6). The goal is the reinterpretation of certain conflict events within a certain frame to generate
support from the target population. This enables the collective action that is necessary for collective
identity formation (Uslu 2007: 10). Groups are more likely to accept these frames through networks
of communication within the group and from credible leaders (Gurr 2001: 171).
Therefore I will focus on the claims on perceived injustices of the APC and Sunni Arab politicians and
whether their frames are supported by the target population. Collective action, like demonstrations,
is not possible without successful strategic framing efforts.
I identified the frames by undertaking semi-structured interviews with Arab politicians and an
archival research by creating a nexis of articles of Arabic media (Sumaria TV, Awsat al-Iraq English,
Dar al-Hayat, Niqash.org, Al Jazeera English), Kurdish media (Rudaw, Kurdish Globe, AK News Agency)
and international media (New York Times, Washington Post, NPR, AP, Reuters) between January
2011 and June 2011. This was prior to and during the time of protests in Kirkuk. Furthermore I
reviewed literature to identify framing and surveys to see if the population supported the framing of
Arab politicians.
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1.1.2. Organizational Structures and Resource Mobilization
A second source of inquiry is the organizational structures around which political mobilization
revolve and the resources they can mobilize, both material (financial resources, arms, people, etc)
and non-material sources (skills, legitimacy, etc) or preexisting social networks (Romano 2006: 12).
An organization is a social arrangement to distribute tasks for a social goal. In order for a social
movement to organize in a traditional way, it must have strong leadership and sufficient resources.
The resources the APC can collect and the networks it can rely on, play an important role in
organizing collective action. Furthermore, as part of resource mobilization strategy, political
entrepreneurs usually establish institutions, such as print houses, newspapers, radio and TV stations,
internet sites, political parties, youth organizations, etc., to reach out to the masses and maintain
their resources. This is how they sustain the movement. They can also exploit pre-existing institutions
such as tribes, student unions or labor unions for organization.
I will focus on:
(1) Human Resources (the number of people it can mobilize).
(2) Financial resources
(3) Pre-existing networks or institutions the Sunni Arab movement can count on (for instance media,
tribal networks, civil organizations, etc).
(4) Skills and knowledge the APC can build on.
I will identify the resources and the organizational structures the Arab politicians have, via semistructured interviews and non-random interviews with Arab politicians and political rivals and other
relevant key players to identify the resources the Sunni Arab political movement has in Kirkuk.
Furthermore I will verify this collected data by reviewing selected academic articles, books, media
articles and NGO reports.
1.1.3. Opportunity structures
My final method of inquiry examines opportunity structures. These are the political constraints
within which social movement operate. Numerous authors identify the properties for a regime that
play a role in contentious politics. Tilly and Tarrow (2007: 205) describe them as:
(1) The multiplicity of independent centers of power within it.
(2) Its openness to new actors or the closure of the institutionalized political system.
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(3) Instability of the current political alignments.
(4) The availability of influential allies or supporters for challengers.
(5) The extent to which the regimes represses or facilitates collective claim making.
(6) Decisive changes in items 1 to 5.
But this approach is focused on a social movement making claims versus a national state or
government, whereas in Kirkuk political actors try to control only one disputed province. There are
centers of power in Baghdad, as well as in the semi-autonomous Kurdish state in Erbil and also
within the province of Kirkuk. Furthermore there other non-state actors operating in Kirkuk such as
insurgents, tribes, religious networks, and the United States Force in Iraq (USF). There are also
various local security organizations operating in Kirkuk like the Iraqi army (IA), Kurdish security forces
and Iraqi police. Therefore, there is a need to adjust some of these factors to the situation in Kirkuk.
Furthermore, my focus is on the attempts to stage a Tunisian-style uprising by the APC(2011) and
since this failed to gain momentum, there is not a continues stream of events to analyze or to see
any decisive changes in these items. So my focus will be on the:
(1) The multiplicity of independent centers of power within Kirkuk, Baghdad and Erbil.
(2) Its openness to new actors or the closure of the institutionalized political system
(3) Instability of the current political alignments
(4) The availability of local, regional, national or international allies or supporters for Sunni Arab
challengers of the Kurdish political parties.
(5) The extent to which the reigning legal security forces in Kirkuk repress or facilitate collective
action of different opposition groups in contention
(6) The extent that other non-state actor groups challenge or facilitate policies of the Iraqi Arab
council in Kirkuk (other political parties, rival tribes or Jihadis)
By examining changes in available political opportunities, one could surmise where and when
windows of opportunity open for challenger movements (Romano 2006: 19). Similarly, the type of
opportunities that arise can affect the form such emergent movements take: social movements5 can
be expected to mobilize in response to and in a matter consistent with very specific changes that
grant them more leverage. I identified these structures by undertaking semi-structured interviews
with observers, politicians, NGOs, journalists and civilians. For this I used the non-probability
5
According to Tilly and Tarrow (2007: 8) a social movement is a sustained campaign of claim making,
performances (demonstrations, boycotts, etc), based on organizations, networks, traditions, and solidarities
that sustain these activities. In this case the Arab Political Council in Kirkuk.
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‘purposive’ and ‘snowball’ sampling methods. In order to supplement data gathered from interviews
I used NGO reports, books, academic articles and observation of police operations, tribal meetings
and other events to supplant the techniques of literature research and semi-structures interviews. In
addition I used statistics from the police to identify opportunity structures in Kirkuk.
1.3. Research Constraints
The security situation in Kirkuk provided a clear challenge to my research with the ongoing threat of
assassinations, kidnappings, and car bombings. Although I had good contacts with all the security
services in Kirkuk, this did not help much when I was travelling with civilians in Kirkuk. Therefore, I
often had to remain in homes, did not go out in the streets, and just did my interviews in political
party building, or homes. This eventually prevented me from carrying out a survey, since the
universities were closed after I recovered from a sickness and I was warned of numerous security
risks by my contacts in Kirkuk
This security situation also influenced the answers of the various individuals I interviewed. Observers
and NGO members warned that people may not answer questionnaires honestly, as a result of
security threats. For instance some of my translators were threatened by insurgents and someone
who worked with the APC was assassinated. Some friends and family members of someone I stayed
with were kidnapped or arrested by security forces coming from Baghdad.
This severely constrained my movements and also the accessibility of research subjects. To minimize
this risk I won the trust of many important Arab tribal leaders and politicians by respecting their
cultural beliefs and traditions. They directed me to other sources of information and provided a level
of protection. Furthermore I used my Kurdish and Turkish language skills to avoid detection by
insurgents groups or other unwanted criminals. In public restaurants I was seen as a Turkish
businessman, or visitor, due to my semi-fluent Turkish language skills. Such was the nature of the
environment there were considerable risks were I to speak English which could have endangered my
security situation.
Although I speak some Kurdish and Turkish, my Arabic language skills are limited. I dealt with this
issue by using translators, friends and tribal networks to help me with translation and networking.
Furthermore the hot weather in the summer, the summer breaks, and politicians not working
because of summer, and outside travels by Kirkuk’s elites, also severely slowed down my research,
apart from the security risks. However, I hope this thesis will still present a relevant case.
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Chapter 2: Framing
For collective action, strategic framing by the APC is essential to mount any serious challenge to the
Kurdish political groups in Kirkuk. For this chapter I analyzed 93 frames made by Arab politicians,
which I summarized under several key words as described in the following subchapters. Since this
framing is only based on recent framing efforts, I cannot insure it will include all the framed
grievances of Arab politicians versus its Kurdish challengers.
2.1. Frames
2.1.1. Provincial Council
Since 2003, Arab and Turkmen nationalist politicians have complained about the fact that the Kurds
control most positions in the provincial council and launched boycotts of the provincial council. This
underrepresentation of non-Kurds in the council is seen by experts as the result of the Sunni Arab
boycott of the January 2005 provincial elections which opened the door for the Kurdish parties to
wield disproportionate influence over provincial government structures outside the Kurdistan region
from 2005 (Kane 2011: 9).
Arab politicians boycotted the political process from 2003 to 2007 (Kane 2011: 23). An example is the
15 March boycott by four Arab politicians of the Kirkuk Provincial Council (KPC) in which they
demanded the post of the Provincial Chairman and more share in the posts. Furthermore Arab
politician Achmed Obeid threatened to launch protests against this alleged “marginalization of the
Arab component” in April 2011 (Dar al Hayat, 3 April 2011).6
2.1.2. Security Forces
Another issue of contention is the makeup of the security forces. Under a security agreement
reached in September 2009, the security inside the city is the responsibility of the governor and the
police (both the governor and police chiefs are Kurdish), while south and west of it are under IA
authority and areas north and east of it are under Kurdistan Regional Guard authority (Also known as
Peshmergas) (ICG 2011: 16). Furthermore, there are the Sunni Arab Sahwa (Awakening) militias, and
6
Dar al-Hayat. (2011), “Kirkuk: Arab Representatives call for protest sit-ins”, Dar al-Hayat,
(http://international.daralhayat.com/internationalarticle/250889).
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18
the Kurdish party-affiliated security police, the Asaesh or Asayish, and of undercover intelligence
operatives working for the Parastin (KDP) and Zanyari (PUK) (ICG 2011: 20).
To reduce tensions, the U.S. created joint checkpoints and controls of Arab and Kurdish security
forces among the trigger line between Kurds and Arabs (ICG 2011: 14). Local Arab and Turkoman
nationalist politicians saw it as favoring a pro-Kurdish status quo (ICG 2011: 14) and organized
protests against it.
Arab political leaders have accused the Kurdish parties of controlling the security in Kirkuk,
discriminating against Arabs inside the security apparatus and carrying out raids against Arabs during
their operations. They called for a bigger Arab representation inside the security forces; release of
Arabs who were arrested and imprisoned in Kurdish prisons since 2003; expulsion of the Asayish and
Peshmerga forces from Kirkuk and their replacement by the Iraqi army. The International Crisis
Group suggests that non-Kurdish Kirkukis accuse Kurdish security forces of involvement in arbitrary
arrests, illegal transfer of detainees to prisons in the Kurdistan region and detention without trial
(ICG 2011: 21).
An example is the deployment of an estimated 10,000 additional Peshmergas and Zerevanis
(paramilitary “special guards”) to Kirkuk on 24 February (ICG 2011: 25). In response, Arab leaders
called for the replacement of Kurdish security forces by the Iraqi army. 78 The call for an Tunisianstyle uprising in January 2011, was also aimed at expelling Kurdish security forces from Kirkuk.9 The
APC-leader, Sheikh Abdulrahman al-Assi called on the Iraqi government to end illegal arrest by
Kurdish security forces (Dar al-Hayat 2011).10
Al Jazeera supported this frame, by suggesting that Kurdish security forces intimidate Arabs and
Turkmen, while Kurdish-controlled police carry out operations in Arab-areas, and through
7
Dar al-Hayat (2011) “Kirkuk’s Arabs in favor of a parliamentary inquiry of Talabani”, Dar al-Hayat, 13 March
2011 (http://international.daralhayat.com/internationalarticle/243713)
Kirkuk's Arabs in favor of a parliamentary question Talabani
8
Niqash (2011), “An uneasy truce in Kirkuk”, Niqash, 23 March 2011,
(http://www.niqash.org/print.php?contentTypeID=75&id=2806&lang=0&plang=0)
9
Sumaria TV (2011) “Kirkuk's Arab residents threaten Tunisian-style uprising”, Sumaria TV, 21 January 2011
(http://www.linktv.org/scripts/episode_transcript.php?episode=mosaic20110121)
10
Dar al-Hayat (2011) “Kirkuk's Arabs Demand an End to Arrests”, Dar al-Hayat, 22 March 2011,
(http://international.daralhayat.com/internationalarticle/247003)
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19
kidnappings by the Kurdish secret police, Asaish (Al Jazeera 2011).11 Provincial Council Member
(PCM) Ramla Hameed Obeidi claimed the Asayish are illegal in Kirkuk and she refused to meet the
Asayish inside Kirkuk, only in Erbil or Suleymaniyah. “If we conduct meetings with them [in Kirkuk]
this means we recognize them. We have to conduct any meeting with the Kurdish security forces in
Erbil or Suleymaniyah.”12 Also Deputy Governor Rakaan Saad Jibouri argues that the Asayish are
illegal in Kirkuk (Bakker 2010: 97).
2.1.3. Constitution
Another point of contention is the Iraqi constitution. Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution outlined a
series of steps to determine Kirkuk’s status by December 31, 2007 (SIPA 2011: 1): normalization (the
resolution of outstanding land disputes by voluntary offering compensation for Arabs brought by the
former regime to return ), census and a referendum. The deadline for this article expired in 2007, but
Kurdish parties continue to insist on full implementation of the article. This while Arabs and
Turkomen politicians maintain that Article 140 is expired and a new formula must be negotiated
(SIPA 2011: 1). For instance in March 2011 the APC called for mass demonstrations against the
Peshmerga troops and asked for changing Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution (Dar al-Hayat).13
Kurdish news outlets claimed that demonstrations in Kirkuk were aimed against article 140 (AK news
2011).14
The APC-head argued that, “according to the opinion of Turkmen and Arabs the time is over. Article
140 is dead and we never accept it.”15 Instead of article 140, Arab and Turkomen politicians argue
that the joint administration agreement signed in December 2007 and art 23 of the provincial
election law must be implemented and posts divided based on ethnicity. This also includes the Dead
Sea Declaration of December 2008 and again in the Berlin Accords of April 2009, the latter including a
specific agreement on the distribution of senior posts in the provincial administration as mandated
11
Josh Rushing (2011), “Kirkuk explosions: No surprise”, Al Jazeera (http://blogs.aljazeera.net/middleeast/2011/02/10/kirkuk-explosions-no-surprise-0)
12
Author’s interview with provincial council member Ramla Hameed al-Obeidi inside the provincial council
building on 16 June 2011. She was also a member of the Committee for Disappeared Arabs (2005-2008) that
investigated arrest of Arabs by Kurdish security forces, by going to Kurdish prisons in the Kurdistan region.
13
Dar al-Hayat (2011), “Kirkuk’s Arabs postpone demonstration demanding withdrawal of Peshmerga troops”,
Dar al-Hayat, 2 March 2011 (http://international.daralhayat.com/internationalarticle/239755).
14
See for instance AKnews (2011), “Kirkuk chair disrupted by boycott”, AKnews, 24 March 2011
(http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/4/227049/)
15
Author’s interview with Sheikh Abdulrahman al-Assi in his house in Kirkuk on 1 July 2011. He is the head of
the APC and spent around 10 months in jail in 2007 after being arrested by the USF-I. After his release he
founded the Arab Political Council. This is an alliance of tribes, former Baathists, and Arab nationalists.
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20
under Art. 23 of the Provincial Elections Law16 (Wolf 2010: 1). All of these agreements were blocked
by the Kurdish political parties, and therefore Arab politicians continue to insist on its
implementation.
2.1.4 Water
In March 2011 a new grievance was framed by Arab politicians. Arab farmers complained about the
lack of water for agriculture and drinking water and suggested that the Kurdish government which
controls the Dukan dam was purposely reducing the water proportion (Niqash 2011).17 Also the
APCissued a statement, saying that the Kurdish authorities were deliberately manipulating the share
of water coming from the Dukan dam in order to inflict damage on Arabs (Niqash 2011). 18
2.1.5. Demography and Normalization
After the U.S.-led allied invasion in 2003, the Kurds returned en masse and sought to reintegrate
Kirkuk into their semi-autonomous northern enclave of Kurdistan. Furthermore they tried to restore
the pre-Saddam demography through Article 140 which includes a process to return Arabs brought
by Saddam Hussein back to their native provinces. Some Arab politicians argue that the number of
Kurds heavily increased. For instance the head of the APC argues that Kurds brought hundreds of
Kurds into the province. “In the past Kirkuk’s population numbered 800,000 people. Now it’s
1,600,000 people. The increase is only from the Kurdish nation.”19 Iraqi MP Omar Al-Jibouri also
claimed around 950,000 Kurds were brought into Kirkuk without legal grounds (Al Jazeera).20
A former Baath-officer Khalid suggested that Kurds are changing the demography of Kirkuk: “They
are changing the demography of the city; hundreds of thousands are returning. I think that only ten
Per cent of the returnees is really chased out of the city, the rest is import.” (Bakker 2010: 78). News
papers claim Arabs politicians accuse the Kurds of what they term the ‘Kurdization’ or ‘Kurdification’
16
This law was vetoed by the Iraqi president Jalal Talabani and the new law does not refer to any powersharing. It only excluded Kirkuk from the provincial elections, and says that the status of Kirkuk should remain
unresolved, until new provincial elections are held in the province. Currently UNAMI is discussing with several
political actors the way how to hold Provincial Elections in the province.
17
Niqash (2010), “Water - a new battleground between Kurds and Arabs”, Niqash.org, 30 March 2011
(http://www.niqash.org/content.php?contentTypeID=75&id=2807&lang=0)
18
Ibidem.
19
Author’s interview with Sheikh Abdulrahman al-Assi in his house in Kirkuk on 01 July 2011.
20
BBC Monitoring Services (2011), “Iraqi Turkoman, Arab MPs warn of "civil war" in Kirkuk”, Al Jazeera, 19
March 2011.
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21
of Kirkuk after the 2003 toppling of Saddam Hussein (AK news 2011)21 (Dar al-Hayat 2011).22 PCM
Mohammed Khalil Jibouri accused the Kurds of similar policies like Arabization and argued that Kurds
brought hundreds of families to the city (Dar al-Hayat 15 May).23
Most academic reports concerning Kirkuk talk about the role of demography in Kirkuk.24 The
International Crisis Groups argues that “because its ethnic groups and their political representatives
seem to believe that the matter will be resolved based on who is the majority, the primary fight has
been over demographics: how many of each group live in Kirkuk or have the right to live there; and
how these numbers should be determined.” (ICG 2011: 8).
In 2011 Kurdish-dominated provincial authorities tried to restore the so-called pre-Saddam
demography by canceling agricultural 2,199 permits of Arab farmers as part of the normalization
process described in article 140. Arab politician Mohammed Khalil Jibouri argued that the Arab
farmers had gotten their lands "legally" according to Law 117 of 1970, the Agricultural Reformation
Law (Kurdish Globe 2011).25 Iraqi MP Omar al-Jubouri also argued that the cancellation was a
violation of the legal provisions (AKnews 2011).26 After these discussions a quarrel over land tenure
broke out in the Al-Bashir village on 11 February between Shiite Turkmen and Arab farmers. This
resulted in 3 deaths and 7 wounded. Kurdish officials such as Iraqi MP Khalid Shwani supported the
Shiite Turkmen. “The Iraqi government should act quickly to reinstate the Turkomani lands that were
taken without any legal justification and distributed among Arab citizens in Kirkuk,” he said (AKnews
2011).27 This while Arab Council Members Burhan al-Assi suggested the police supported “the
attack” by the Shiite Turkmen against Arabs (AKnews 2011).28 The Arab politician Achmed Obeid said
that "the Arab component in Kirkuk firmly refuses to be deported from the province because we are
21
AKnews (2011), “Arabs of Kirkuk oppose peshmarga presence in committee”, AKnews, 24 March 2011,
(http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/4/227031/)
22
Dar al-Hayat (2011), “Bombings targeting police stations kill and wound dozens of Iraqs in Kirkuk”, Dar al
Hayat, 20 May 2011 (http://international.daralhayat.com/internationalarticle/268623).
23
Dar al-Hayat (2011), “Renewed tensions between Arabs and Turkmen in Kirkuk”, Dar al-Hayat, 15 February
2011, (http://international.daralhayat.com/internationalarticle/234422).
24
Liam Anderson says a reasonable estimate is that some 250,000 Kurds returned to Kirkuk province between
2003 and 2008 (Anderson 2009: 12).
25
Kurdish Globe (2011), “Disputes continue over Kirkuk's agricultural lands”, Kurdish Globe, 30 January 2011,
(http://www.kurdishglobe.net/display-article.html?id=8AD6CA6468FBC4EA20A847F3CC525C0A)
26
AKnews (2011), “Kirkuk deputy warns of backlash following Article 140 measures”, AKnews, 13 January 2011
(http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/210220/)
27
AKnews (2011), “Unrest in Kirkuk over contested land ownership”, AKnews, 12 February 2011,
(http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/9/217690/)
28
Ibidem.
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22
part of the people of Kirkuk, and we are with the law not against it," he said (AKnews 2011).29
2.1.6. Status of Kirkuk
Another principal difference between Kurdish nationalists and Arab and Turkoman nationalists is that
the Kurdish nationalists consider Kirkuk historically part of Kurdistan, while Arabs and Turkoman
nationalist flatly disagree (ICG 2011: 6). This was shown by a speech of president Jalal Talabani on the
occasion of the anniversary of the Kurdish 1991 uprising in Sulaimaniya city against Iraq’s former
ruling Baath regime, that Kirkuk was the "Jerusalem of Kurdistan," calling on the Kurds to conclude a
strategic Kurdish-Turkoman Coalition, to liberate the city from what he described as "terrorists and
neo-occupiers." (Aswat al-Iraq 2011).30 "We must not forget that there are areas not reunited with
the (Kurdistan) region such as Kirkuk, the Quds (Jerusalem) of Kurdistan,” President Talabani said
(AKnews 2011).31
After this a member of the al-Iraqqiya Coalition, Wihda al-Jumeily, began collecting signatures to
summon President Jalal Talabani to retract his statements (Aswat al-Iraq).32 Furthermore Arab
politicians from Kirkuk reacted negatively to this statement. Iraqi MP Omar al-Jibouri said that
anyone who tries to impose a Kurdish identity of Kirkuk is responsible for stirring up sedition or an
ethnic conflict inside Kirkuk (Al Jazeera).33 Al Jazeera suggested Talabani has angered Arab politicians
and ‘Arabs who live in the region, which has been disputed for generations, say that his comments
paint them as foreign occupiers’ (Al Jazeera, 17 April).34 In my interviews with Sunni Arab politicians
many of them also referred to Kirkuk as an Iraqi city. For instance Provincial Council Member Sheikh
Burhan al-Assi said that the Sunni Arab politicians ‘are working city of Kirkuk and the city of Kirkuk,
to be Iraqi and for all Iraqis’35.
29
AKnews (2011), “Kirkuk Arabs call on religious authority to resolve land disputes”, AKnews, 22 February 2011
(http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/220091/).
30
Aswat al-Iraq (2011), “Iraq's President can be summoned by Parliament if he violated constitution, Kurdish
MP says”, Aswat al-Iraq, 13 March 2011.
31
AKnews (2011), “Conflicting reports of Kirkuk governor’s imminent dismissal”, AKnews, 14 March 2011
(http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/4/225065/)
32
Aswat al-Iraq (2011), “Iraq's President can be summoned by Parliament if he violated constitution, Kurdish
MP says”, Aswat al-Iraq, 13 March 2011.
33
BBC Monitoring Services (2011), “Iraqi Turkoman, Arab MPs warn of "civil war" in Kirkuk”, Al Jazeera 19
March 2011.
34
Al Jazeera (2011), “Iraq tensions rise over Kirkuk”, Al Jazeera, 17 April 2011
(http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2011/04/2011417182758142832.html)
35
Author’s interview with Sheikh Burhan Mezher Assi al-Obeidy in the provincial council building on 19 June
2011. He is from the village Mizhir al-Assi and is the founder of the Republican Gathering Party that
participated in the 2005 elections.
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23
2.1.7. Demonstrations
As described before there was a wave of protests in Iraq inspired by the events in North Africa and
the Gulf. Sumaria News (2011)36 reported that Kirkuk’s Arab residents threatened to trigger a
revolution against the city’s Kurdish security agencies they accuse of repressing their rights. This
resulted in framing contests between Arabs and Kurdish politicians, but also showed internal
differences within the Arabic community of Kirkuk. Initially three members of the APCSheikh Abdul
Rahman al-Assi, Khalid al-Mafarraji and Hussein Salih37 called for an Tunisian uprising against the
Kurdish security forces. “Our Arab citizens will react as well; they will no longer stand idly by. The
same way Tunisian masses marched and toppled the president of the republic in just a few days, we
will remove these agencies from Kirkuk,” said the head of the Arab Political Council, Sheikh Abdul
Rahman al-Assi, but later they retracted their support for demonstrations.
On 25 February there were indeed demonstrations in Kirkuk city and the Arab districts of Kirkuk as
confirmed by data from the Joint Operations Centre (ICC)38 , the ICG (2011: 25), and newspapers.
Some provincial council members like Mohammed Khalil Jibouri39 and Ramla Hameed Obeidi40 said
the demonstrations were not peaceful but were used by insurgents groups. Both Mohammed Khalil
Jibouri and the head of the Hawija City Council Hussein Salih41 suggested the demonstrations were
the work of Kurdish parties to divide the Arabs. This because the demonstrations were not against
Kurdish parties and asked for the removal of Arab politicians. Protest organizer Hamza Hasan
Shawqee from Hawija argued that the protests were “against injustice, corruption and the
36
Sumaria TV (2011) “Kirkuk's Arab residents threaten Tunisian-style uprising”, Sumaria TV, 21 January 2011
(http://www.linktv.org/scripts/episode_transcript.php?episode=mosaic20110121)
37
Hussein Salih al-Jibouri is a powerful member of the Jibouri tribe and leads the city council of Hawija and is
also a member of the Arab Political Council. Furthermore he maintains good relations with members of the
Iraqiyya list of Iyad Allawi.
38
Data given to me by the head of the Provincial Joint Coordination Centre (PJCC), Yadghar Sh. Abdullah in the
police headquarters of Kirkuk and news items collected for analyzing claim making of actors in Kirkuk.
39
Author’s interview with Kirkuk provincial council member Mohammed Khalil Jibouri in his home on 22 June
2011. He is a sort of independent politician.
40
Author’s interview with Ramla Hameed al-Obeidi in her office in the Provincil Council building on 15 June
2011.
41
Author’s interview with Hawija City Council head Hussein Salih Jibouri (Abu Saddam) inside the provincial
council building in Kirkuk on 10 July 2011.
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24
occupation. Not for one ethnic group.” He denied any involvement of Kurdish parties.42
Table 1.1.7 FRAMES OF CONTESTING ACTORS (APC[Arab] versus PUK/KDP[Kurdish]
Frames focused on:
Frame by Arab politicians and actors
Provincial Council (1)
The council is dominated by Kurds and are Arabs
marginalized inside Kirkuk. Need to share posts based on
ethnicity (32/4).
Security forces (2)
Kurdish security forces are illegal and Arabs are
marginalized within the security institutions. Kurdish
security forces should be replaced by the Iraqi army.
Water (3)
Kurdish parties block water to Arab farmers. This is a
conspiracy against Arabs.
Constitution (4)
Demography and
normalization (5)
Status of Kirkuk (6)
Demonstrations (7)
Article 140 is expired and there is a need for power
sharing through agreement of 2007. Seats distributed
according to 32/4 formula.
Kurds are brought in from outside of Kirkuk to establish a
Kurdish majority in the province and to add it to the
Kurdistan region. Agricultural permits given to Arab
farmers in 1970 are legal.
Arab politicians argue that Kirkuk is Iraqi and should be
controlled by Baghdad.
Initial call for demonstrations against Kurdish parties and
especially the Kurdish security forces. Later discourse
changed since protests were not against Kurdish political
parties, or article 140. Some Arab politicians suggested
demonstrations were influenced by insurgent groups, or
influenced by Kurdish parties. They suggested the
demonstrations were not peaceful nor democratic and
disloyal to the Arab community in Kirkuk for calling for
the removal of Arab politicians.
2.2. Support For Frames
This section will further analyze the support the APC has for these frames. Just describing the framing
efforts of the APC is not enough to understand framing efforts. Surveys are a good instrument to
identify the support the target population gives to the framing efforts. Since I failed to carry out a
survey in Kirkuk, I used surveys done by others institutions in Iraq, and a Kurdish student of the
Kurdistan University at the Kirkuk Technical Institute in Kirkuk.
42
Author’s interview with Hawija protest organizer Hamza Hasan Shawqee in an undisclosed location on 10 July
2011.
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25
Most of the Arab politicians who were involved in strategic framing efforts versus the Kurdish
political parties were supporting the Iraqiyya list during the Iraqi parliamentary elections of 2010,
while the Kurdish statements mostly come from officials being part of the PUK or the KDP. The PUK
and KDP were united in the Kurdistan Alliance list. Although I do not have survey results, elections
results show that the Arab population is willing to support the frames in the elections and do not
vote for other Iraqi political parties. These elections results were also used by UNAMI to better
understand local political preferences in the absence of a credible and broadly accepted census in
Iraq since 1957 (Kane 2011 March: 15).
2.2.1. Status of Kirkuk and the Constitution
During the elections the Iraqiyya list got 211,675 of the total of 560,903 votes.43 According to USIP
the Arab and Turkoman vote was almost entirely consolidated into the Iraqiyya alliance (39 Per cent
of the vote) (Kane 2011 March: 25). As a result both the Iraqiyya list and the Kurdistan Alliance got 6
seats in Kirkuk. According to USIP the 2010 election results indicate that if an Article 140 referendum
were held today using Kirkuk’s current administrative boundaries, it would likely generate a divisive
51-49-type result (51 Per cent for joining the Kurdistan region and 49 Per cent against it) (Kane 2011
March: 27). This shows that the majority of the Arabs in Kirkuk are willing to support the framing of
Sunni Arab politicians during the elections.
This might also indicate that they support the claims of the APC to get more representation within
the KPC, since this would limit the chances for Kurdish politicians to annex the province of Kirkuk to
the Kurdistan region.44
A survey conducted by a Kurdish BA-student among a total of 30 Arab, Turkmen and Kurdish students
also provides a possible indicator of support for the frames of the politicians. Despite of this the
survey is probably not representative of the whole population, since he only surveyed 15 Arab
students. According to his results the majority of the Arab population of Kirkuk rejects Kirkuk
becoming part of the Kurdistan region (67 Per cent), while 20 Per cent favors Kirkuk becoming part of
Kurdistan and 13 Per cent wants Kirkuk to become an independent province (Othman 2011: 54). This
43
Data of the 2010 elections from the Independent High Electoral Commission of Iraq (IHEC) in Kurdish.
According to the Iraqi constitution one third of the KPC-members could call for a referendum about the
status of Kirkuk without resorting to article 140. Sean Kane suggest this is one of the fears of Arab politicians, if
Provincial Elections are held in Kirkuk (follow-up interview with Sean Kane by Skype on 6 August 2011).
44
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26
means 80 Per cent of the surveyed Arab students do not want Kirkuk to join the Kurdistan region.
This means they would not support the implementation of Article 140.
Surveys done by the International Republican Institute show that the majority of the Arabs in Iraq are
against article 140, while Kurds support it. This opens up possibilities for the APC to mobilize its
supporters in Kirkuk and get support from outside of Kirkuk. For instance a survey of the
International Republican Institute done in 2005, shows that 84,40 Per cent of the Arabs in Iraq favor
Kirkuk being placed under the authority of the Iraqi central government (IRI 2005: 45). Furthermore
only 1 Per cent of the Arabs in Iraq is in favor of placing Kirkuk under control of the KRG (IRI 2005:
45).45 A poll done in 2006 27 April shows that 82 Per cent of the Arabs living in Northern Iraq (which
includes Kirkuk) do not accept the concept of federalism and think Baghdad should have all political
power and authority (IRI 2006: 39). Another poll shows that 95 Per cent of the Sunnis in Iraq are
against Kirkuk becoming part of the Kurdistan region (ABC/BBC/ARD/NHK POLL 2008: 40). Another
poll from 2010 shows that 22 Per cent of the Sunni Arabs are not favorable towards the Kurdistan
region (IRI 2010 September: 4).
In Kirkuk the situation is not much different. If a referendum was held regarding the status of Kirkuk
and the residents of Kirkuk voted to join the Kurdistan region, 62 Per cent of the Arab population of
Kirkuk would not respect the result of the referendum (IRI 2010 August: 47). They would however
accept Kirkuk to become a special region (68 Per cent) or to keep the status quo in tact (84 Per cent).
In Kirkuk 44 Per cent would accept the annexation of Kirkuk to Kurdistan (in the case the majority of
Kirkuk voted for this in a referendum), while 39 Per cent is opposed (IRI 2011 June: 72). While 49 Per
cent of the population of Kirkuk were in favor of implementing article 140, and 38 Per cent opposed
(IRI 2011 June: 85).
The election results and these surveys show that the majority of the Arab population, almost
universally, support the Arab political claims that Kirkuk should remain an “Iraqi city” and reject
article 140. Most of the Arab civilians I talked to also referred to Kirkuk as an Iraqi city or complained
about Kurdish dominance over the city of Kirkuk. This could be used by the APC to mobilize its
supporters, it’s politicians to get votes, or to get support from Baghdad.
45
71.80 Per cent of the Kurds were in favor of placing Kirkuk under the control of the KRG.
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2.2.2. Security Forces
Most surveys do not focus on the Kurdish security forces but one assumes that a dislike for the
Kurdistan region or article 140 carries over into a dislike for the Kurdish security services in Kirkuk.
There are also concrete indications that Arabs dislike the Kurdish security forces such as the Asayish
or Kurdish police officers. The PUK’s Asayish director confirmed to the International Crisis Group that
Arabs and Turkomen dislike the Asayish: “Arabs and Turkomans give us a hard time, but they forget
that the security situation has improved a lot thanks to us. And yes, we are unpopular in Arab areas,
especially, but this is where the terrorists are active” (ICG 2011: 21). Halo Najat Hamza, Kirkuk
director of KDP’s Asayish in Kirkuk echoed the same sentiments in an interview with the ICG and
suggested Arabs were accusing them of being a tool for implementing Article 14046 (ICG 2011: 21).
In my observations of security raids by Kurdish dominated outer-district police forces, I also saw that
the Kurdish police doesn’t like the Arab population much and support Kurdish nationalist claims on
Kirkuk.47 This could influence perceptions of Arabs towards the security forces. Often Arab politicians
complain about the police head of the outer-districts, and the fact that he carries out raids in Arabdominated areas.
Some of the interviewed expressed reservations towards Kurdish security forces of the Asayish and
he police. According to the International Crisis Group non-Kurds say the Kurdish security forces
abuse their rule by furthering the Kurdish leadership’s political interests in Kirkuk and other disputed
territories (ICG 2011: 28). Human rights organizations like Amnesty International (2009: 9-10), CSIS
(2009: 94), Human Rights Watch (2004, 2007), UNCHR (2007: 45, 2009:168) accused the Kurdish
security forces of human rights abuses, including torture, arbitrary arrests and threats in- and outside
of the Kurdistan region.
46
Article 140 sets out to remedy the Arabisation under Saddam Hussein, through three steps. These are, firstly,
normalization - a return of Kurds and other residents displaced by Arabisation – followed by a census taken to
determine the demographic makeup of the province's population and then finally, a referendum to determine
the status of disputed territories. Source: Niqash (2011), “Homeless at home: iraq's displaced persons cause
ethnic tensions”, Niqash.org, 27 July 2011.
(http://www.niqash.org/content.php?contentTypeID=74&id=2871&lang=0).
47
I stayed at the headquarters of the outer-district police lead by Serhad Qadir and observed some of their
operations (5 May 2011 and 18 May 2011) in the Arab-districts outside of Kirkuk. Most of the police officers
expressed their loyalty to the KDP-leader Massoud Barzani. Their operations were carried out in cooperation
with the USF-I and IA. There seemed to be tensions between IA and police.
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28
But the UNCHR notes that the practice of transferring Arabs from Kirkuk to prisons in Kurdistanproper has largely stopped since 2008 (UNCHR 2009:167). Arab and other non-Kurdish civilians also
suggest that the Asayish only go after those who are against them or are involved in insurgent
activities.48 A former employee of the Kirkuk PRT at U.S. Department of State suggested the ‘Arabs do
not like the idea that the Asayish can take them away’ and suggested they were involved in human
rights violations and involved in setting political scores on the Kurdish side.49
According to a poll of the ABC News Polling Unit only 19 Per cent of the people of Kirkuk trust the
Peshmerga forces with security, while 44 Per cent trust the Iraqi army and police with the security of
Kirkuk (Cordesman 2007: 23). But this poll doesn’t deal with the Asayish or Kurdish officers inside the
police. Another poll of IRI shows that the population of Kirkuk do not trust the Peshmerga with
protecting their neighborhoods. 24 Per cent trust them a lot, 12 Per cent a fair amount , but 21 Per
cent a little and 36 Per cent not at all (IRI 2011 June: 68).
This indicates that there is not a lot of trust towards Peshmerga inside Kirkuk and a great trust in Iraq
security institutions among the population. Trust of Sunni Arabs towards the Kurdish population is
also on a low level. While 55 Per cent of Kurds say relations between Arabs and Kurds in Iraq are
good; just 24 Per cent of Sunnis agree (ABC News/BBC/ARD/NHK poll 2008: 12). 44 Per cent of them
say their relations with Kurds are getting worse, while just 15 Per cent see it improving. This might
also affect their position towards Kurdish security forces inside Kirkuk.
Therefore in my opinion it’s clear that the majority of the Arab population in Kirkuk doesn’t like the
Kurdish security forces, and support the claims of Arab politicians. This however doesn’t always mean
they are willing to demonstrate against Kurdish security forces, or that this issue overrides all other
daily life concerns of Arab citizens in Kirkuk.
2.2.3. Water
The agricultural Arab-district Hawija depends on the release of water from the Kurdish-controlled
Dokan Dam into the Lesser Zab river and irrigation canals upstream in Dibis and the Kurdistan region
48
One Arab student (Unnamed respondent 3) and one Arab civilian (Unnamed respondent 1) suggested the
Asayish do not target Arabs randomly. Some even suggest the Arabs eventually accepted the presence of
Kurdish security forces, as long as they improve the security, as suggested by the former deputy governor
Ismail Hadidi (interviewed in his home on 16 July 2011).
49
Author’s interview with Christopher Price on 1 July. He is a former official of the Kirkuk Provincial
Reconstruction Team in Kirkuk PRT is part of the U.S. State Department.
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29
(Kane 2011 March: 69). For that reason, there is a possibility the farmers of Hawija would blame any
water problems on the Kurdish authorities. Furthermore most “Arabs outside the city have demands
considering water.”50 According to UNAMI there is opposition towards separating Hawija from
Kirkuk, since a downstream Hawija would be at the mercy of water flows through irrigation systems
in what would be a Kurdish-controlled Kirkuk (Kane 2011 March: 54). Therefore there is a likelihood
Hawija Arabs would support the APC in any demands considering water.
2.2.4. Demography and Normalization
It’s however difficult to assess if the Arab population supports the claims of Arab politicians about
normalization. Article 140 emphasizes that normalization is a voluntary process, and some indicate
that most wafideen Arabs (Shiites) returned to their native places. For farmers with agricultural
permits from the Saddam Hussein regime it could however be a big concern since they would lose
their livelihood and lands to the original owners.
2.2.5. Demonstrations
Despite the fact that there is animosity among Sunni Arabs towards the Kurdish security services,
Kurdistan region, Kurdish policies towards Kirkuk, and other claims, it’s difficult to assess whether
they would still support collective actions efforts against the Kurdish controlled security forces or
Kurdish political parties. The Arab population might support the Arab politicians during the elections,
but this doesn’t mean they support all the claims of Arab politicians. In my opinion they might vote to
prevent the Kurds from taking more power inside Kirkuk. This however doesn’t mean they like Arab
politicians or their political tactics in Kirkuk.
On 25th February most demonstrations in Arab-districts, and by Arabs in Kirkuk city were focused on
services, against corruption and called for removing (Arab) politicians from their posts rather than on
any of the earlier mentioned demands. PJCC data shows that demands were directed at the
politicians and did not focused on ethnicity. Although the demonstrations were dominated by Arabs
(Kurdish parties and the Iraqi Turkmen Front asked the Kurds not to participate) the slogans were not
aimed against Kurdish nationalist demands. Video’s from Hawija show the banners and slogans were
50
Notes of an off-the-record interview with a PRT official on 9 July 2011 in the PRT building in Kirkuk Provincial
Council Building.
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30
not against any Kurdish claims.51 They looked similar to the demonstrations in Suleymaniyah where
opposition protests were also focused against the ruling Kurdish political parties and their perceived
nepotism and corruption (see also ICG 2011: 25).
Most of the politicians that were targeted by the demonstrators were supporting the Iraqiyya list
during the elections and were part of, or had good relations with, the Arab Political Council.
According to KPC member Mohammed Khalil Jibouri, all of their demands were solely focused on the
resignation of the Hawija City Council and a new group to replace them.52 When the protest
organizers talked with Mohammed Khalil Jibouri, he asked them why they did not support the
following ethnic demands:
1) The removal of Kurdish security forces and Peshmerga from Kirkuk.
2) Shutting down all headquarters of the Asayish in Kirkuk and all Asayish to leave Kirkuk
3) Replacing the Kurdish police chief of Kirkuk
4) Reviewing all lists of departments heads, chief of departments in Kirkuk (to see if there is a lack of
Arabs)
5) Applying a quota for the common administration (32 Per cent for each ethnic group in Kirkuk).
But protest organizer Hamza Hasan Shawqee from Hawija argued that the protests were “against
injustice, corruption and the occupation. Not for one ethnic group” and denied any involvement of
Kurdish parties.53 Despite this, he told me that he rejected Article 140 of the Iraqi constitution, and
refused Kirkuk to become part of the Kurdistan region. But apparently this was not his main concern
in Hawija. His main concern was services, the lack of jobs, and corruption. This is confirmed by a PRTofficial Christopher Price who suggested that in talks with the PRT, NGOs, tribal actors, and people
outside of the establishment expressed high levels of frustration with their politics.54
According to Transparency International, Iraq is among the most corrupt countries in the world, and
Kirkuk is among the most corrupt cities in Iraq (Rydgren and Sofi 2011: 30). Furthermore, according
to a report from the International Republic Institute (IRI), in 2004, on a scale from 1 to 20 Kirkuk
scored 18.98 on corruption levels and Erbil (for example) 6.94. In fact, Kirkuk was considered the
51
Mobile Phone footage acquired from a citizen from Hawija and video footage acquired from PUK’s Kurdsat
TV.
52
Author’s interview with Provincial Council Member Mohammed Khalil Jibouri in his house on 14 June 2011.
53
Author’s interview with Hawija protest organizer Hamza Hasan Shawqee in an undisclosed location on 10 July
2011.
54
Author’s interview with former PRT official Christopher Price on 26 May 2011 by Skype.
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31
second most corrupt region in Iraq (Rydgren and Sofi 2011: 30).
Surveys show that Iraqis see politicians as corrupt, non-effective and more involved with their own
personal squabbles than running their own country (AKnews 2011). 55 A lot of village heads, subdistrict heads, and city council heads in the Arab districts were appointed by the U.S. army without
any election. Furthermore the KPC members haven’t left their seats since 2005, due to disputes over
how to hold the Provincial Council elections. This raises questions over the mandate these politicians
have in Kirkuk, and therefore the U.S. sees it in its interest to carry out provincial elections in Kirkuk,
since it would make the politicians more representative of the population.
This also translates in widespread support for the protests occurring in the Arab world. 29 Per cent
of the people of Kirkuk support the protests in the Arab world for ‘greater democracy’ and
‘government responsiveness’ strongly, 52 Per cent agree somewhat, while 6 Per cent somewhat
disagree, 4 Per cent disagree strongly, and 10 Per cent have no opinion (IRI June: 20). This shows 81
Per cent of the people of Kirkuk support the calls for more democracy and government
responsiveness in their own province and the Arab world. This shows a great gap between the goals
of the APC, Arab politicians, and the wishes of the people in Kirkuk.
The result of these surveys are consistent with interview data gathered by me in June and July. My
interviews with NGOs, observers, and students show there is also disaffection among Arabs about
the APC in Kirkuk. “The APC do not support Arabs in Kirkuk with services or anything. The Arabs in
Kirkuk do not support them. They work only for their family or tribes,” said one student.56 This was
also an argument echoed by the rival of the Arab Political Council, Ahmed al-Obeidi, who suggested
most of them are corrupt and own businesses, mansions, etc. ‘And you expect these people to
demand the right of the people?’57
Former PRT-official Gabriel Escobar suggests this is also the case: “The APC did not always have much
public support. The public is rightly tired of the lack of progress by the Kirkuk political parties. I
55
Wing, Joel (2011), ‘Iraq thinks its politicians and parties are failing them according to new opinion poll’,
AKnews, 18 July 2011 (http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/8/252383/)
56
Author’s interview with anonymous Arab student (Unnamed respondent 2) in his home on 16 July 2011.
57
Author’s interview with Achmed al-Obeidi in his NGO office on 7 July 2011. He had disagreements with other
Arab politicians since 2007 and controls two provincial council members, who are from the same family (Ramla
and Hala Obeid). He is accused by Sheikh Abdulrahman of giving bad information about him to the Americans,
of which as a result, he was jailed.
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32
suppose not many people were interested or the demonstrations were poorly organized.”58 Other
observers like Sean Kane of USIP and former PRT-official Christopher Price agreed with this analysis.
Christopher Price suggests that people might be worried about issues like demography, article 140,
and others, but their daily worries are more focused on services, water, and jobs.59
Another former PRT official suggested that the APC-leaders like Abu Saddam and Abdulrahman
Munshid cannot lead any Tunisian-like uprising, but can lead military coups, or plots. Furthermore
they have alleged ties with insurgent groups. “Those guys are Ghaddafis. They always call for
violence. They are not constructive leaders.”60
This affected the abilities of the APC to mobilize its people against the Kurdish political parties in a
traditional way (with clear leadership, and organizations) especially while the Arab youth was
challenging them. This data shows that the strategic framing efforts of the APC failed in regard to the
demonstrations. This also shows further support for the fact that ethnic minorities who are under
pressure do not necessarily mount demonstrations, or violence, against their alleged oppressors. The
leaderless Tunisian-uprising inspired the Arab youth to challenge the Arab leadership, instead of
challenging the Kurdish parties. The daily worries of corruption, services, and jobs, prevailed over the
ethnic demands of the APC.
2.3. Summary
One can conclude that the election results show that most Arab voters voted for candidates
supported by the APC and those politicians who are involved in strategic framing efforts against
Kurdish parties. This is furthermore confirmed by surveys from 2005-2011 that show that the
majority of Sunni Arabs and Arabs inside Kirkuk are against Kirkuk becoming part of Kurdistan.
Therefore most of them agree with politicians about the status of Kirkuk and article 140. In addition,
Sunni Arabs in Iraq say their relations are not good with the Kurds which could translate into further
support for the framing of Arab politicians. Kurdish Security Heads themselves indicate and
interviews with politicians, civilians and observers concur that Arabs are not that fond of the Kurdish
security services. Therefore they might support Arab politicians when they demand a bigger share of
58
Author’s interview with Gabriel Escobar on 16 June 2011. In the past, Gabriel was the Team Leader of the US
State Department’s Provincial and Diplomatic Reconstruction Team in Kirkuk Province, Iraq and is the author of
a report about Kirkuk for the Columbia University.
59
Author’s follow-up interview with former PRT official Christopher Price on 7 August 2011.
60
Ibidem.
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33
Arabs inside the security positions in Kirkuk. There is also some basis of support for claims when it
comes to demography, Kurdish security services and water.
This however doesn’t mean they are willing to mount demonstrations against the Kurdish political
parties or Kurdish security agencies since there is also widespread disaffection among the people of
Kirkuk over the performance of Arab politicians in Kirkuk. The politicians supported by the APC might
have electoral support during the national elections, but when the elections are over, it’s a different
situation. Electoral support doesn’t necessarily leads to political action.61
The Arab youth in fact challenged Arab politicians instead of the Kurdish political parties. Therefore it
seems to be difficult for Arab politicians to mobilize Arab citizens inside Kirkuk city on the basis of
ethnic demands. This contradicts the obvious primordialist bias of some journalists, observers and
academics, who assume that ethnic identity serves as a prime motivator for mobilization. This
demonstrates that we should treat the relevance of ethnicity as only one of our questions when it
comes to mobilization efforts.
But this doesn’t completely explain why the strategic framing efforts failed. As mentioned, there are
clear ethnic biases among Arabs against Kurdish claims on Kirkuk. Gur notes that groups are more
likely to accept framing through networks of communication within the group and from credible
leaders (Gurr 2001: 171). The next chapter will show that it is these credible leaders, and networks of
communications, are exactly what the APC is lacking, and therefore its framing efforts failed, in
relation to demonstrations.
The following chapter will explain, if the APC is having access to networks of communication, or any
other institutions, or resources, to launch demonstrations.
61
See for instance the interview with local Wifaq-leader Abu Mazen Abdul-Jabbar in the Wifaq headquarter on
16 July 2011. “The population don’t think about the political situation. Only during the elections. But when
there is a normal situation, nobody is busy with politics.”
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34
Chapter 3: Organizational Structures and Resource mobilization
In addition from frames to persuade the Arabs population in Kirkuk to support the APC;
organizational capabilities, sufficient material and human resources are important to mobilize
people. In order for a social movement to organize it must have strong leadership and sufficient
resources. In this chapter I will focus on the material and financial resources, skills and knowledge
and pre-existing networks or institutions the Sunni Arab Political Movement can utilize. This chapter
will show that this is precisely what the APC lacks.
3.1. Human Resources
TABLE 3.1: ELECTED ARAB CANDIDATES FROM KIRKUK IN 2010 ELECTIONS
Candidate Name
Votes
Where/background
Party (Iraqiyya list)
Mohamad Ali Tameemi
40537
Hawija / Jibour Tribe
Iraqi Front for
National Dialogue
(Salih al-Mutlaq)
Yaseen Ibraheem
20167
Hawija/Obeid tribe
Iraqi front for
Mahmood (Yasin al-
National Dialogue
Obeidi)
(Salih al-Mutlaq)
Ibraheem Naef al-
12851
Hawija/Obeid tribe
Muheri
National Movement
for Development
and Reform party
(Jamal Karbouli)
Omar Jibouri
10204
Hawija/Jibour tribe
Arab Union
It is impossible to organize demonstrations or uprisings without both the support of the population
and people who commit themselves to the goals of the political movement. During the 2010
elections the Iraqiyya list received 39 Per cent of the vote. Although the APC does not support all
policies of the Iraqiyya list, it did support the list during the elections.62 This shows that the APC have
some supporter base, especially in Hawija. All the Arab candidates were from Hawija, tribe members,
and backed by the Hawija Council Head, and APC member, Hussein Salih al-Jibouri (Abu Saddam).63
Still the number the APC can mobilize is at a minimum between 1000 and 5000 according to former
62
63
Author’s interview with Sheikh Abdulrahman Munshid al-Assi in his house in Kirkuk on 01 July 2011.
Data acquired from former PRT-official Christopher Price
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35
PRT-official Christopher Price.64
Police data shows that most demonstrations of the Arab community were carried out in the Arabdominated district Hawija outside of Kirkuk and not inside the city. 65 This is because this district is
controlled by Arab security forces (local police and the Sahwa) and politicians, while Kirkuk city is
mixed and the security controlled by Kurds.66 Often there was an involvement of tribal leaders, or
tribes. Most demonstrations were between 200-2000 people. This illustrates the APC is able to
mobilize enough people for small demonstrations. In some instances, actors outside of Kirkuk
supported demonstrations, like the Sadr movement (2004-2005) and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al
Maliki (2008).
However there are also problems with mobilization as shown by the demonstrations carried out
against Arab-led city councils and provincial council in Kirkuk by Arabs, and the discontent among
Kirkuk’s Arabs about the lack of successes of Arab politicians. Some Arab politicians reacted to the
demonstrations by suggesting it was orchestrated by Kurds. One KPC member said about the anger:
“All Iraqis are angry with the political leaders. There are no services. They [the politicians]are not
serving the people well.”67 This is why the framing efforts of the Arab nationalist politicians failed on
25 February, and the number of people it could mobilize on the streets at this moment is limited.
64
Author’s interview with former PRT official Christopher Price on 26 May 2011.
Selection data (2003-2011) from newspapers and the Provincial Joint Coordination Centre.
66
Author’s interview with NGO-members Ali Ghadeer and Qeas J. Abdul-Raheem on 15 July 2011. They run the
NGO Unrestricted Writers in Kirkuk.
67
Author’s interview with Sheikh Burhan Mezher Assi al-Obeidy in the provincial council building on 19 June
2011.
65
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36
Table 2.1.2: ARAB (ETHNIC) DEMONSTRATIONS IN KIRKUK 2003-2011
Date
Where
People
Wounded/ Additional Info
death
1.
19-3-2011
Hawija
200-250
Participants Rakaan Saad Jibouri,
Hussein Salih, Ibrahim Nayif, Omar
Jibouri and Abdullah (MPS) and
Tribes Abdel-Rahman, Yasser
Dhari al-Awad and Mohammed
Hassan al-Jumaili) against Kurds
2.
10-8-2009
Kirkuk
225-250
The Assembly of Tribes have
assembled at the Wasiti
neighborhood to form an Advisory
Council Arab of Sunnis and Shiites
in Kirkuk. This is probable no
demonstration.
3.
5-9-2009
Hawija
1000-1500
Arabs against the joint forces
4.
31-10-2009 Kirkuk
Unconfirm
Arabs mobilizing in front of the
ed
PUK-office rejecting the
postponement of elections.
5.
10-3-2008
Kirkuk
Unconfirm
Demonstration against Kurdish
ed
control
6.
14-7-2008
Hawija
1500
Against inclusion of Kirkuk into
Kurdistan, joined by chairman
Abu Saddam, and rejecting
elections
7.
28-7-2008
Hawija
Unconfirm
Against Kirkuk becoming part of
ed
Kurdistan
8.
2-8-2008
Kirkuk
800-900
Arabs against annexing Kirkuk to
Kurdistan but in favor of Article
24.
9.
15-11-2008 Hawija
2500-3000
Mostly tribal organizations in
support of the Isnad councils of
Iraqi PM Maliki and against
Articles 140.
10. 15-2-2007
Kirkuk
500
Arab tribes marched against the
decision to deport Arabs
11. 9-5-2007
Kirkuk
Unconfirm
Arabs demanding legal rights of
ed
Arabs in prisons
12. 7-9-2006
Hawija
1200
Against Saddam Hussein’s death
sentence and dividing Iraq
13. 17-10-2006 Hawija
500
Arab tribes against Kurdish
demands for federalism and
Saddam Hussein’s trial
14. 5-11-2006
Hawija
80-100
Against Saddam Hussein’s death
sentence
15. 5-11-2006
Riyadh
900-1000
Against Saddam Hussein’s death
sentence
16. 6-11-2006
Hawija
100-200
Against Saddam Hussein’s death
sentence
17. 7-11-2006
Hawija
300-350
Against Saddam Hussein’s death
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18.
2-2-2005
Hawija
19.
2-3-2005
Hawija
20.
23-5-2005
Kirkuk
21.
20-8-2005
Hawija
10,00015,000
Unconfirm
ed
Unconfirm
ed
200
22.
25-8-2005
Rashaad
2000
23.
26-8-2005
Riyadh
2000
24.
25-8-2005
Hawija
25.
31-12-2005
Kirkuk
Unconfirm
ed
Hundreds
26.
1-1-2004
Kirkuk
Thousands
sentence
Non-arrival of election papers
[Arabs blamed the Kurds for this]
Arabs demonstrate against Kurds
[elections]
Arabs and Turkmen against Kurds
Against constitution and
federalism [Arabs protesting
against Kurdish demand for
federalism ]
Against federalism [Arabs
protesting against Kurds]
Against federalism [Arabs
protesting against Kurds]
Arabs and Sadr Movement against
Kurdish demands.
Arab and Turkmen protest against
election results [Kurdish won the
majority of seats]
Sadr/Arabs against Kurdish claims
3.2. Material and Financial Resources
Every organizations needs material and financial resources to organize itself. One of the problems in
this regard is that it’s difficult to assess the financial capabilities of the Arab Political Council.
According to ICG-expert Joost Hilterman it’s almost impossible. “I also do not know if the council, or
any other political party in Kirkuk (including the Kurds), receives outside funding; they won’t tell you,
and you shouldn’t believe what they say if they say anything.”68 The lack of transparency in Kirkuk
and the secrecy prevent any reliable information.
The Kurds I interviewed commonly expressed the idea that the Arabs were financed by foreign Arab
countries, or supported by Baathist groups and insurgents. For instance the PUK-director of the
Asayish suggested 23 Arab countries were helping them.69 An USIP report confirms that the APC tried
to get support from Sunni Arab countries in the region and Arab politicians also confirmed they travel
68
Author’s interview with Kirkuk expert of the International Crisis Group Joost Hilterman by e-mail on 11 June
2011.
69
Former deputy governor Ismail Hadidi, in an interview in his home on 16 June 2011. In the past he was part
of the pro-Kurdish Kirkuk Brotherhood List and was an Iraqi MP in Baghdad for the Kurdish supported alliance.
During his post as deputy governor he didn’t support an Arab boycott against alleged Kurdish dominance of the
provincial council. His tribe is more closer to the Kurds since they are seen as indigenous by the Kurds. See also
the ICG report from ICG (2005) “Iraq: Allaying Turkey’s Fears Over Kurdish Ambitions”. 26 January 2005.
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38
to neighboring countries.70 During the 2010 elections Turkey supported the Iraqiyya list and its allies
to challenge the Kurdish parties (Kane June 2011: 9).
Most Arab politicians claimed in interviews they do not have a lot of financial support. Even the
formerly Kurdish-supported politician Ismail Hadidi said the Arabs do not have much financial
support.71 The APC-leader, Sheikh Abdulrahman al-Assi, claimed that they do not have money for
newspapers, TV-channels, and that for financial support in Kirkuk you need Iran or the Kurds.72
During my interviews I witnessed examples of a number of the Arab politicians wealth, for example
their lavish mansions. In general terms, Arabs occupy 23% of the total administrative posts in Kirkuk
(Anderson 2009: 15); hold 15% of the seats in the Provincial Council and the post of the Deputy
governor, and have control over city and district councils in Arab-dominated regions outside of Kirkuk
like Rashaad, Riyaadh and Hawija. In the North Oil Company and the oil sector the majority of the
workers is also Arab. According to a KRG report Arabs control 70 Per cent of the positions inside the
North Oil Company (KRG MOERA 2007: 20) as a result of the attempts of Saddam to put Arab in
important administrative and oil posts. Moreover they receive money from the Sahwa programs.
However, their business interests and personal wealth does not necessarily equate to an ability to
catalyze political mobilization
According to a former PRT-official the Arab politicians have the financial resources, “they just choose
not to spend it on the things I would spend on if I were putting together a political movement
(Media, youth/NGO outreach, party building).”73 He states that informal reports show that some
members of the APC received money from Turkey74, while they also obtain money through contracts
with the USF-I75 and salaries from the Sahwa militias76, kidnapping rackets77 and corruption inside
70
Author’s interview with Sean Kane on 9 June 2011 by telephone. He is a Senior Program Officer with USIP's
Iraq Programs. He worked as a Political Affairs Officer with the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq
(UNAMI) in Baghdad, Erbil, Mosul and Kirkuk from 2006 to 2009.
71
Author’s interview with Halkawt Abdulla Aziz, head of PUK’s Asayish in his building near the PUK-building in
Kirkuk on 10 July 2011.
72
Author’s interview with Sheikh Abdulrahman al-Assi in his house in Kirkuk on 01 July 2011
73
Author’s interview with former PRT official Christopher Price on 5 August 2011.
74
Rumours and intelligence sources suggest that the APC-leader Abdulrahman al-Assi and Abu Saddam receive
250,000-300,000 dollars a month said the former PRT official.
75
PRT officials, and Arab politicians like Achmed Obeid confirmed there were contracts between the U.S., and
Arab officials.
76
Abu Saddam, with the support of the American army, received permission from Baghdad to form Sahwamilitias in Hawija to combat Al Qaeda in late 2007. See Bakker, Paulien (2009), ‘Sons of Iraq: Stuck between Al
Qaeda and the American army’, Vrij Nederland, November 2009.
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political offices. An example is Sahwa-leader Sheikh Abu Saif al-Jibouri (killed by his cousin in 2008)
who built a big residency complex to receive USF-I in Kirkuk.78
Although it seems the Kurdish parties have larger funding revenues than the APC, there are still
sufficient resources to finance political activities. However the Arab politicians do not efficiently fund
their institutions, as shown in the next chapter, due to a lack of experience or proper application of
money and funding.
3.3. Pre-existing Networks or Institutions
Another way to mobilize supporters is through pre-existing networks or institutions. Examples of
these institutions include the media, tribal organizations, religious organizations or movements,
trade unions, political organizations and student unions, etc.
3.3.1. Tribal Organizations
Among the Sunni Arabs tribal affiliations still play a big role. Experts say nearly three-quarters of
Iraq's 24.7 million people identify with a specific tribe, especially in the rural regions outside of Kirkuk
city, where a big part of Kirkuk’s Arab live (Around 215,582 people of 902,019 Kirkuk’s population live
in Arab-district Hawija (IAU 2011: 1) and more live in the sub-district of Rashad). In the past, some of
them were armed and used in irregular units by the former regimes (Talabany 1995: 25), while some
of them are currently armed by the U.S. army to fight against Sunni insurgents. The biggest tribes are
the Obeid and the Jibour tribe, who were settled in the Kirkuk province since the 1920s (ICG 2008: 28).
Most of the Arab politicians in Kirkuk are member of one of these tribes or tribal sheikhs.79 As
explained by a member of an Arab NGO, “they [Shiites] elected their members because of religion,
but in Kirkuk all Arab Sunnis are ruled by tribes.”80 An example of this Ibrahim al-Muheri, who was
77
This is also claimed by PUK’s Asayish director Halkawt Abdulla Aziz who suggests most of the kidnapped
people are found back in Arab-districts outside of Kirkuk in tribal areas. Its however likely Arab politicians
would deny this. Several were however arrested by the USF-I for links with insurgents.
78
Wilgenburg van, Wladimir (2010), “Journaliste: Kerkuk hoort niet bij Koerdistan”, Rudaw.nl, 2 October 2010
(http://rudaw.nl/?p=1912)
79
In Arabic, sheik means leader, or simply a venerable male elder, and each level of tribal organization--tribe,
clan, and house--generally has a sheik at its head, but the authority of the sheikhs can differ. See: Otterman,
Sharon (2003), “IRAQ: The Role of Tribes”, Council on Foreign Relations, 14 November 2003
(http://www.cfr.org/iraq/iraq-role-tribes/p7681).
80
Author’s interview with NGO-members Ali Ghadeer and Qeas J. Abdul-Raheem on 15 July 2011.
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elected on the Iraqiyya slate, and whose father is an important Sheikh in the Jibour tribe.81
The Al-Jibour tribe is one of the most influential tribes in Iraq. During the Iran-Iraq war they supplied
the Baath-regime with hundreds of soldiers. The tribe lost favor with Saddam in 1989 and led a failed
assassination attempt that resulted in the execution of many tribe members. They also attempted a
revolt in 1993 (Otterman 2003). Some members of the Obeid tribe played a role in the Baath-regime
and received preferential treatment, however in the 1990s some of them were singled out as
revolutionaries and retired or incarcerated (Baram 2003). As a result of the significant influence tribal
allegiance exercises, the Arab parties used tribal links to mobilize people in Kirkuk. For instance, in a
protest in January 2004 the al-Jibour, Shammar, al-Obeid, al-Bayati and al-Saadun tribes launched a
march denouncing Kurdish attempts to incorporate Kirkuk (Anderson 2009: 21). The Sahwa-militias
controlled by Arab leaders are mostly tribal and played a role in some protests (either defending
them or as participants).
At a conference in Hindiyah in October 2006, Sunni Arab tribes rejected federalism and Article 140
(Anderson 2009: 21). The head of the Arab Political Council, Sheikh Abdul Rahman Munshid, is one
of the members of the Obeid tribe, while Hussein Salih (Abu Saddam) is a member of the Jibour tribe.
The Jibour tribe in particular played a pivotal role in the formation of Sunni Sahwa that fought
against Al Qaeda, while this formation was rejected by some members of the Obeid tribe.82
The presence of tribes can be seen as a hindrance or a benefit for the Arab political movement. They
played a role in several demonstrations and are influential in the Arab Political Council. According to
an IRI survey 11 Per cent of the people of Kirkuk think tribes have a strong influence on politics; 35
Per cent think they have some influence, while 54 Per cent say they have no influence (IRI 2011 June:
78). 17 Per cent of the people of Kirkuk would approach a tribal leader first if they had problems in
their neighborhood (IRI June 2011: 83). Tribes were rated higher than other institutions in being an
“advocate of people’s needs (tribes 27 Per cent, NGOs 23 Per cent, provincial council 11 Per cent,
local council 22 Per cent, governor 6 Per cent, and 11 Per cent other) (IRI June 2011: 82). This shows
that tribal allegiance remain influential in Kirkuk among the different communities.
However, there also problems. Often tribes promote their own tribal members before others. Lisa A.
Verdon, a social researcher for the U.S. army notes: “In Iraq, corruption is the norm, and the method
81
Author’s interview with Sean Kane on 9 June 2011 by telephone. Muheri’s father is Sheikh Nayef Al Muheri
from the Jibour tribe.
82
Author’s interview with former PRT official Christopher Price on 26 May 2011.
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by which leaders secure their power. Tribal leaders use force to maintain their positions over those
they govern. They resort to bribes and preferential treatment as they work up the hierarchical chain
or become hostile towards an inferior challenger” (Verdon 2009: 51). There are indeed complaints
that some of the Arab political leaders use force and bribery to stay in power. In some circles, the
head of the Hawija city council, Abu Saddam (Hussein Salih al-Jibouri) is perceived as a dictator and
his council corrupt.83 The demonstrations in the Arab districts on 25 February were directed against
him and other tribal leaders in the city councils of Arab-districts.
My interviewees seem to confirm that there is mistrust of tribes. Although I cannot generalize this.
“People suffer from their tribes, they want real leaders. The politicians work only for the benefit of
their family,”84 said the editor-in-chief of the Al-Iraq Ghaddan newspaper. Another politician said,
“Tribal leaders just focus on their selfish targets, goals, funding sources and projects, only for their
own benefits.”85
There are furthermore differences between the people inside and outside of the Kirkuk city. “People
in Kirkuk [city] see themselves as citizens (…). But the political Arab leaders are outside of Kirkuk and
have different ideas than the people inside Kirkuk. They are tribal and the citizens are not tribal. The
citizens want a democratic life, but the Sheikhs are dictators who want to rule them and are not
democratic.” 86 Arabs in the city tend to be less tribal, more modern, more educated.87
Moreover there exists rivalries within the tribes, and between the tribes; particularly within the
Obeid tribe as the leadership of the tribe is disputed.88 An Arab Provincial Council member suggested
that the Obeid and Jibour are, in fact, fighting each other.89
Therefore one can conclude that tribes are both a benefit, and a hindrance, for the APC. They can use
83
In a meeting of Arab leaders, Abu Saddam was depicted as a dictator. See Bakker, Paulien (2010), ‘Een
romantisch volk: verslag uit een Iraakse oliestad’, (Amsterdam/Antwerpen: Uitgeverij Atlas), p. 87.
84
Author’s interview with Kholud Abdul Razzak Obeid on 19 July 2011. She is the editor-in-chief of the Al-Iraq
Gaddan (Iraq Tomorrow) which in the past was supported by the U.S. army.
85
Author’s interview with Achmed al-Obeidi in his NGO office on 07 July 2011. He is the leader of the Arabic
Stream Project or Arabic Current. A rival of the APC.
86
Author’s interview with Ali Ghadeer and Qeas J. Abdul-Raheem of the NGO Unrestricted Writers org. Middle
East which is registered both in Baghdad, Erbil (Kurdistan region), and Ankara (Turkey) on 15-07-2011.
87
Author’s interview with Emma Sky by e-mail on 10 July 2011. Emma Sky left Iraq in September 2010, where
she had served for three years as Political Advisor to General Odierno. In 2003/2004 she was the Governorate
Coordinator for the CPA in Kirkuk.
88
Author’s interview with Emma Sky by e-mail on 10 July 2011.
89
Interview with Provincial Council Member Mohammed Khalil Jibouri in his house on 14 June 2011.
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them to mobilize for political organizations, but on the other hand, some people suggest they are not
working in the benefit of them, and there is tribal rivalry.
3.3.2. Religious Networks
In the recent protests in Suleymaniyah, and in the protests in Egypt, and other parts of the Arab
world, religious figures such as Mullahs played a role in supporting protests. According to the Council
on Foreign Relations (Otterman 2003) religious leaders have had a lower public profile among Sunnis
in Iraq. Kirkuk-expert Joost Hilterman suggests religious networks are “present, but not dominant.”90
This idea is also shared by former UNAMI-analyst Sean Kane and former PRT official Christopher
Price. Most of them seems to be secular Arab nationalists, and the APC doesn’t have any links with
the Islamist Tawafuq list. During my observations, I did not witness a significant/large presence of
religious figures.
But Bakker notes in her book that one Mullah Achmed from Hawija participated in the meetings of
the APC (Bakker 2010: 87). Furthermore, some Mullahs play a role in the Sahwa-militias (Bakker
2009).91 Some Muslim scholars played a role in supporting the insurgency. The Association of Muslim
Scholars in Iraq for instance opposes the USF-I, Article 140 and the deportation of Arabs, but it’s not
based in Kirkuk (Al Jazeera 2007).92 They were one of the key players in calling for the Sunni boycott
of the 2005 elections. It’s however unlikely they could support the APC in demonstrations. It seems
there is only a minor role for religious networks in Kirkuk.
3.3.3. Civil and Political Organizations
Labor organizations, workers unions and students union often play a role in demonstrations in the
Arab world. But according to my interviewees the APC have failed to develop these organizations to
harness support in demonstrations. For instance PUK-politician Xidir Hamdani says that the Sunni
Arab parties have no student organizations to support them, while Kurdish parties operate several
90
Author’s interview with Joost Hilterman by e-mail on 06 August 2011. Hilterman is the Deputy Program
Director, Middle East and North Africa, of the International Crisis Group. He authored many of ICG reports
about Kirkuk.
91
Bakker, Paulien (2009), ‘Sons of Iraq: Stuck between Al Qaeda and the American army’, Vrij Nederland,
November 2009
92
BBC Monitoring Service (2007), ‘Al-Jazeera TV interviews Iraqi tribal chief on plan to relocate Kirkuk Arabs’,
Al-Jazeera TV, Doha, in Arabic 1430 gmt 11 Feb 07.
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43
NGOs and the Kurdistan Student Association.93 According to Ronak Ali of the KDP-supported NGO
Union of NGOs in Kirkuk, Arab NGOs do not have significant financial support from Baghdad, while
Kurdish NGOs can access funding from the Kurdistan region.94 This was confirmed by another Arab
NGO-member, who said that “there is no big Arab party. All NGOs need support. In Kirkuk they take
support from Kurdish parties. The big parties are Turkmen or Kurds. “95
For instance, the PUK’s Organizations and Associations in Kirkuk have around 59,206 members,
which includes student organizations, farmers, workers, geologists, etc (85% Kurds, 9% Arabs, 4%
Turkmen, and 1.5% Christians) (Rydgren and Sofi 2011: 39). Former PRT-official Christopher Prices
notes that most NGOs are compromised of supporters and members of the political parties in
Baghdad or from the Kurdistan region. Furthermore the Kurdish political parties fund some Arab
NGOs in Kirkuk and even in Hawija.96
I did some interviews with Arab NGOs in Kirkuk from Hawija and Kirkuk city, for example/including
the Unrestricted Writers org. Middle East, Kirkuk – Our House, Non-Violence Youth Organization
(Hawija), Association Defence of Student Rights (Hawija), Iraq Organization for Human Rights, Al-Haq
Organization for Human Rights Culture (part of the Kirkuk Net for civil society organizations) but
there was no evidence they were connected to the Arab Political Council or support their goals, even
though some of them receive money from Kurdish political parties (For instance Kirkuk Net is part of
a NGO network funded by Kurdish PM Barham Salih of the PUK
During my observations at meetings of the APC, I encountered workers, students or university
professors, but they were not organized into organizations or NGOs. The Arab-dominated North Oil
Company does not appear to support the APC in their activities, but survey data substantiating this is
unavailable. For example, Abu Mazen Abdul-Jabbar of the Wifaq party, who is an engineer in the
NOC, states he is against ethnic demonstrations and suggests Tunisia is very different from Kirkuk.97
There is one National Union of Iraqi students, but this is controlled by Baghdad. There are also unions
for doctors or engineers, but most of these are also controlled by Baghdad and the APC have no
influence over them. While the Kurds and Turkmen have their own unions.
93
Author’s interview with Xidir Hamdani (aka Abu Ibrahim) in his office in the PUK-building on 6 July 2011 and
11 July 2011..
94
Author’s interview with Ronak Ali and other NGO-workers in her office on 20 July 2011. She runs the
Federation of NGOs in Kirkuk which is supported by the KDP.
95
Author’s interview with Khaled Aleezy, Iraqi Organization for Human Rights, in his office on 03 July 2011.
96
Author’s Interview with former PRT official Christopher Price on 26 May 2011.
97
Interview with Abu Mazen Abdul-Jabbar of the Wifaq party in his headquarter in Kirkuk on 16 July 2011
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In general one could summarize that the APC lacks grassroots organizations to support them in their
activities. Whether this is the result of a lack of financial support or a lack of organizational capacity is
unclear. It is however obvious they are not organized well enough to generate support from civilian
organizations in order to mobilize people.
3.3.4. Media Networks
Many Arab politicians say the same applies to the media.98 According to Sheikh Abdulrahman Al Assi
‘we do not have the financial support to make newspapers, TV-channels. This needs a lot of
money.’99 Nor is there evidence of any Arab supported newspapers or TV-stations inside Kirkuk. Most
of the media in Kirkuk is supported by Kurdish political parties, Iraqi Turkmen Front or by the U.S.
army. An exception is Radio Al-Rasheed (financed by Saad al-Assi Janabi in Baghdad) and Radio
Muhaliyeen of Arab Politician Achmed Obeid (who opposed the APC). But it is apparent that the Arab
Political Council has neither their own newspapers nor TV-stations like other Iraqi parties to incite
supporters to demonstrate, for example the Kurdish opposition parties in Suleymaniyah: Gorran
(KNN), Komal (Peyam) and Islamic Union of Kurdistan (Speda). The pro-Sunni Sharqiya channel also
supported demonstrations in Baghdad against the government.100
Despite this, the APC is not ignored in the media. A random news search on Google Arabic shows that
newspapers and news websites like Dar al-Hayat, Radio Sawa, Azzaman, Al Sumaria TV network,
news agency Aswat al-Iraq, Elaph.org, albawwaba.net, Aljeeran.net, and Al Jazeera reported about
the Arab Political Council. Often the APC makes press statements which are spread by email to
important players inside and outside Kirkuk (for instance to PRT officials, Arab politicians, UNAMI,
etc). They however do not use social networks like Facebook. The main reason that the APC doesn’t
use internet, or internet networks is that the internet is too expensive for most people from Kirkuk.
Only 5 Per cent of Northern Iraq uses internet for news (IREX 2010: 8). Besides this only 10.2 Per
98
Several respondents like Provincial Council Members Mohammed Khalil Jibouri, Ramla Hameed, politicians
Achmed Obeid, Abu Mazen Abdul-Jabbar, Sheikh Abdulrahman al-Assi, NGO members Qeas J. Abdul-Raheem,
Ali Ghadeer expressed the idea there is no real media to support Arabs in Kirkuk (15 July 2011).
99
Ibidem.
100
The government tried to close down the channel in 2007 and its new Ramadan drama series Al Bab Al Sharqi
glorifies the revolutions taking place in the rest of the Arab world. See CPJ (2007), ‘Al-Sharqiya ordered closed
in Baghdad’, CPJ, 12 January 2007 (http://www.cpj.org/2007/01/alsharqiya-ordered-closed-in-baghdad.php).
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cent of the families have a personal computer in Kirkuk (IAU 2011: 1).”101
Television is considered the best way to reach an audience in Iraq. 100% of Iraqis access news and
current events through television, according to a survey by IREX (2010: 8). While the Arab Political
Council does not own any channels in Kirkuk, there are some TV-channels who are close to the
Iraqiyya list or Sunni Arabs. A survey from 2005 shows that the most popular channels in Iraq are AlIraqiyya (32,7%)and al-Sharqiya (30,% first choice) (ICRSS 2005: 7). A survey from 2010 confirms that
both Al-Iraqiyya (21%) and Sharqiya (33%) are the most trusted media source (IREX 2010: 13). Others
are Al Hurra (20%), Al Arabia (19%), Al Baghdadiya (19%), Al Sumaria (13%), Al Jazeera (11%) and BBC
Arabic (10%) (IREX 2010: 13).
Among Iraq’s television channels there are also Sunni-Arab channels such as Rasheed TV, Salahadeen
TV from Tikrit, Rafideen satellite channel based in Syria, Al-Babiliyah Sat. TV channel controlled by
Salih al-Mutlaq, Al-Baghdadi (of the Islamic party Tawafuq), Sumaria, and the Baghdad satellite
channel and Sharqiya channel of Sunni nationalist Saad al-Bazzaz. During my observations of
conferences and events I saw that several of these channels did reports on Kirkuk (Sumaria TV, AlHurra, Al-Babeliye, Rasheed, and Sharqiya). Some of the observers or politicians I interviewed102
suggest these channels could be used by the APC to support demonstrations. According to Emma
Sky, ‘at a national level, Sharqiyya and Baghdadia TV stations tend to align with Iraqiyya. If they called
for demonstrations, the message would be heard broadly’.103 The channel Al-Babeliya is also
supported by Iraqiyya member Salih al-Mutlaq who has good relations with the APC, while Al
Rasheed is funded by Saad al-Janabi (who also has relations with the APC).
Therefore there are possibilities that Sunni channels could support the APC in their claim-making, or
demonstrations launched against the Kurdish political parties. One issue is that the channels in
Baghdad have to strike a balance in their reports, have to report about all of Iraq, and also have to
maintain their ties with other political parties in Baghdad, especially if they need the other political
parties. “When the Turkmen TV-stations or Kurdish stations will tell people, they will go. But Sharqiya
101
The APC-leader expressed distrust to the ability of internet. ‘You need money for internet and some people
are poor. Main problem is that there is no union to guide them, to connect them to each other, or to create
their own website to meet them. Author’s interview with him (9 June 2011).
102
There were several people I spoke to that thought the APC could get support from TV-stations when they
launch demonstrations. Former PRT-official Gabriel Escobar, NGO-head Ronak Ali, PUK-official Xidir Hamdani,
former U.S.-official Emma Sky, Associate Professor Thomas Ambrosio and Iraqi Turkmen Front member
Narmeen Mufti.
103
Interview with Emma Sky by e-mail on 10 July 2011.
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46
is for all of Iraq.”104 Furthermore a lot of Iraqi channels are controlled by political parties which
control positions inside the government. It’s unlikely that they would risk their positions by
supporting demonstrations in Kirkuk, or they take a balanced point of view.105
To conclude, the APC lacks its own media to directly support the demonstrations. Channels in
Baghdad, or Iraqi channels based outside of Iraq, could however cover the demonstrations. But this
would depend on the political situation. Especially the Al-Babiliyah channel of Salih al-Mutlaq could
support the APC (Mutlaq has close ties to Arab politicians from Kirkuk) since surveys show This
however depends on a , Al-Babiliyah, But they would not show a continues stream of events in
Kirkuk like what Al Jazeera did in different countries or the Kurdish opposition channels did when the
Kurdish opposition parties where organizing demonstrations that lasted for 62 days in
Suleymaniyah.106 The APC controls no media inside Kirkuk, like the ITF or PUK and KDP.
3.3.5. Insurgent Groups
Furthermore there are alleged ties with insurgent groups. In 2004, U.S. troops suspected that some
tribal leaders in Kirkuk area, who benefited from Saddam’s rule, were taking advantage of the gap
and uncertainty created by his fall to create a form of ‘Sunni nationalism’ directed against the USFI.107 Some Arab leaders of the APC are suspected of having ties to the National Baath Party (NBP), or
were wanted. For instance Abdulrahman al-Assi was arrested on Article IV of the terrorism law, and
released in 2008. The same day I interviewed him, three visitors in his house were arrested by the
USF-I. Arab members in the KPC asked for his release as part of a deal with the U.S., and the other
political parties.108 During my observations I spoke with many Arab politicians, or tribal Sheikhs, who
were arrested by the USF-I. Often they complain about the actions of the USF-I forces. This shows
there are some links.
These alleged links, or the fact that the insurgency is the strongest in the Arab-districts, however
doesn’t help the APC much, and weakens their political power. The USF-I presence harasses the
104
Author’s interview with Ali Ghadeer and Qeas J. Abdul-Raheem of the NGO Unrestricted Writers org on 15
July 2011 in a public place.
105
This idea is shared by Christopher Price in an interview on 07 August 2011. He thinks that Iraqiyya members
like Deputy Prime Minister Salih al-Mutlaq would not give up his position by backing up the APC in Kirkuk. “This
is against their interests.”
106
See for instance AKnews (2011) ‘Kurdish Police charge opposition KNN TV boss for broadcasting "lies" in
Iraqi Kurdistan’, AKnews, May 17, 2011.
107
AFP (2011), “Hawijah holds clues to cause of anti-US insurgency”, AFP, 4 January 2004.
108
Author’s interview with former PRT official Christopher Price on 26 May 2011.
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Sunnis more than all the other communities due to the fact that Sunni regions have the most
insurgents (Zeidel 2008: 46). As a result the Kurdish political opponents used this against them.109
The USF-I trusted the Kurdish security forces, and Kurdish political parties, more than Arab ones.
According to USIP this close military relationship between the U.S. and Kurdish security services
allowed the Kurdish political parties to establish control over many public institutions in the province
(Kane 2011 March: 23). Before the 25th February demonstrations, Kurdish officials warned for former
Baathists, terrorist groups and the APC were threatening citizens in Kirkuk, and used this to legitimize
the reinforcing of the Kurdish Peshmerga forces (Dar al-Hayat, 3 April).110
3.4. Skills and Knowledge
The lack of grass root organizations, media and other institutions to support the Arab Political
Council, in my opinion shows the lack of organizational skills and knowledge of the APC. Many of the
Arab politicians explain this by their past reliance on the former Baath-regime. “The main reason is
that the Arabs are not so organized, is when the regime fall, we did not have our own political
parties. The Turkmen and Kurds had well organized parties [before 2003]. Now we have 14 political
parties [in Iraq], but most of them are not well-organized.”111 While Shiite political parties and
Kurdish parties were in opposition against the Baath-regime, the Sunni Arabs in Kirkuk did not have
this organization.
When the regime fell in 2003, Kurdish political parties and their security forces rolled into Kirkuk and
set up many organizations and institutions. That they could manage this was partially because they
had controlled their own autonomous region since 1991 and were able to build autonomous
institutions separated from the regime (after the imposition of the no-fly zone by the West).
But the Sunni Arabs after 2003 had nothing and had to start all over again. “The Kurds are way ahead
of us. We are new to the political process. Also considering finances. Arab parties are self-funded.”112
This also further illustrated by the number of political blocks or councils (see table 3.4 below) they
109
There were rumours Kurds put rockets in the office of the predecessor of the APC, and as a result the APCleader was arrested.
110
Dar al-Hayat (2011), “Kirkuk: Arab representatives call for protest sit-ins”, Dar al-Hayat, 3 April 2011
(http://international.daralhayat.com/internationalarticle/251233)
111
Author’s interview with Kirkuk provincial council member Mohammed Khalil Jibouri in his home on 22 June
2011.
112
Author’s interview with provincial council member Ramla Hameed al-Obeidi inside the provincial council
building on 16 June 2011
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formed after 2003 and were dissolved in a few years and reformed again, while the Kurdish parties
and Turkmen Front have a longer history, and were able to mobilize its supporters well.113
Table 3.4: ARAB PARTIES OR COUNCILS SINCE 2003 (DATA COLLECTED FROM INTERVIEWS)
Name English
Name Arabic
Leader
Year
Arab Bloc
Tecuma al-Arabi
Ismail al-Abbudi
2003–2004
Tribes Assembly and Arab
Tecuma al-Arabi & Meclis
Sheikh Ghassan Mizir al-
2004-2005
Bloc
al-Asaihr
Assi
Arab Republican Gathering
Tecumma Cumhurriye
Sec-general Achmed
Arab
Obeidi (prov council)
2005
(list 229)
Advisory Arab Council
Al-Meclis Istisaari al-Arabi
Sheikh Abdul Rahman al-
2005-2007
Assi
Unified Arab Front
Ceba Arabi al-Muhade
Wasfi al-Assi al-Obeidi
2004-2005
United Arab Group
Al-Kutla Arabi al-Muhade
Hussein Salih Jibour [met
2009-2010
A. Obeid]
Arab Political Council
Meclis Siyasi al-Arabi
Sheikh Abdulrahman al-
2008-now
(APC)
Assi
Arab Current Project
Achmed Hameed Obeid
2010-2011
[Coalition 12 small parties]
Iraqi Kirkuk Front
Iraq Kirkuk Wahid
Achmed Hameed Obeid
2010-2011
Tribal Council
Asaihr Meclis
Wasfi al-Assi (Maliki
2008-2010
supported)
The main rivals of the APC, the PUK and KDP, have their own telecommunications companies Korek
(KDP) and Asiacell (PUK)114; several media institutions in Kirkuk, Baghdad, and the Kurdistan region in
both Arabic and Kurdish; NGOs; security and intelligence services; control over some important
institutions in Kirkuk like the police and administration; and even support Arab and Turkmen political
parties with money. The Kurdish parties have such an advantage over the APC that the majority of
113
The KDP was founded in Iran in 1946 and the PUK founded in Syria in 1975. The Iraqi Turkmen Front was
formed in 1995 in Erbil (with support of Turkey).
114
Asiacell was founded in Suleymaniyah under influence of the PUK, while Korek was created by the nephew
of the KDP-leader Massoud Barzani. Asiacell has a license to operate all over Iraq. See: Wall Street Journal
(2007), “Asiacell and Korek, Kurdistan rivalries play out on cellphones “, Wall Street Journal, November 26,
2007.
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the Arab politicians uses the PUK-controlled mobile network of the PUK115. Furthermore some Arab
parties are funded by the PUK and some work for Kurdish security organizations116 and the PUK also
controls Arab media outlets like Al-Naba (newspaper), Al Hurriyeh (TV) and Al-Ittihad (newspaper).
This is in stark contrast to the weak organizational capacities of the APC in Kirkuk. According to
journalist Soran Daudey of the Al-Hurra channel Kirkuk’s Arabs do not have much experience. “The
Kurds have a long history of 20 years. They have a lot of NGOs, satellite channels, mobile networks.
But the Arabs in Kirkuk do not do that.”117
Often the APC tries to reach out to other Sunni Arab countries or national Sunni party leaders, but
are very unorganized on the local level. Despite the fact Arabs also have educated people, lawyers,
professors, doctors, lawyers and engineers in Kirkuk city, this doesn’t translate into grass root
organizations or other institutions the APC can use.
Former PRT-official Escobar notes that, “[Arab Sunni] parties [in Kirkuk] select their members based
on tribal affiliation (Obeidi or Jibouri), based on political competence (who is electorally wellreceived), and business and other connections. Not so much on education.”118 Most of the Sunni
Arab politicians of Kirkuk were educated inside Iraq and selected on the basis of their tribal
background without any real experience in politics. Others were selected on the basis of their
military background, but the old army was dissolved by the U.S. in 2003 (Özerdem 2010: 46), and
there are ongoing assassinations against former members of the army.119
There is also is no clear leadership among the Sunni Arab parties inside Kirkuk. Unlike the clear
115
There it’s a possibility it’s used by the security services and the PUK to spy on rivals or insurgent networks.
Former members of PUK’s Asayish told me it’s used to spy on people who use the telecommunication network
during the Kurdish election in the headquarters of the opposition Gorran. An office of Asiacell was bombed by
Al Qaeda in 2010 for ‘spying on the Mujahadeen’. See AP (2010) “Al-Qaida in Iraq Claims Baghdad Bombings”,
Associated Press, September 24 2010.
116
The APC is very worried about Arabs spying on their organization. See Bakker, Paulien (2010), ‘Een
romantisch volk: verslag uit een Iraakse oliestad’, (Amsterdam/Antwerpen: Uitgeverij Atlas), p. 87.
117
Author’s interview with Soran Daudey of the Al-Hurra channel in the Al-Hurra office in Kirkuk on 10 July
2011. Al-Hurra is an American funded Iraqi channel.
118
Author’s interview with former PRT official Gabriel Escobar on by e-mail on 16 June 2011.
119
Brig-General, Abdul-Wahid Attiya was assassinated on 14 June in southern Kirkuk. He was a former senior
Baath-member, and was part of the APC. See: Aswat al-Iraq (2011), “Iraq’s former Army officer assassinated in
Kirkuk”, Aswat al-Iraq, 14 June 2011,
(http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=143139&l=1).
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50
leadership among the Kurdish political parties or Turkmen.120 Therefore Kurdish parties prefer
Baghdad over the leaderless Arabs in Kirkuk. Although there have been some attempts to talk with
Arab parties by the PUK in 2008 in Abdullah restaurant which was bombed by insurgents on the day
of the meeting.121 Some suggest this is also the result of the tribal backgrounds and infighting among
Sunni Arab parties. As a result the Kurdish political parties prefer to deal with Baghdad and not with
local leaders in Kirkuk.122 An example is Achmed Obeid who was expelled from one of the Arab Arab
Advisory Council.123 According to Sunni Arab politician Sheikh Burhan al-Assi there were more than
30 Arab parties in Kirkuk of which the majority was not active or did not even participate in the
elections (Bakker 2010:87). Therefore the APC doesn’t have enough skills, leadership, or knowledge
to organize itself, compared to other parties. Its organization is mostly based on tribal basis, and
former officers of the military.
3.3. Summary
One can therefore conclude that the APC lacks pre-existing networks and institutions. It was able to
mobilize people outside of city of Kirkuk and has the strongest human resources in Arab districts
outside of Kirkuk. There is however some problems with anger about corruption among Arab
population as shown by the demonstrations on 25th February against Arab politicians and shown by
surveys in general.
Although Arab politicians claim they do not have financial resources, they do some financial
resources through contracts with the USF-I, outside financial support, corruption through
administration post, alleged money through kidnapping and money earned from Sahwa militias. It’s
just not used well for building up grass root organizations. This is in stark contrast to the Kurds who,
although they have way more money, managed to build up a lot of organizations and finance them.
As a result the APC doesn’t have much unions, media networks, NGOs or any of a institutions or preexisting networks. They mostly rely on tribal support, but not every part of the population supports
this and some even oppose tribes for their non-democratic mentality to control people(inside the city
120
This is confirmed by Kirkuk-expert Sean Kane and Arab politicians like Mohammed Khalil Jibouri,
Mohammed Ghareeb and Ramla Hameed Obeid.
121
See: Sky News (2008), “Kids Die In Restaurant Bomb Blast”, Sky News, 11 December 2011
(http://news.sky.com/home/world-news/article/15177495).
122
Author’s interview with Kirkuk provincial council member Mohammed Khalil Jibouri in his home on 22 June
2011.
123
Author’s interview with Achmed al-Obeidi in his NGO office on 07 July 2011.
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the population is urban, while the population outside of Kirkuk is more rural).
The APC still lacks critical organizational skills and knowledge. Although they managed to organize
some demonstrations. The Turkmen and Kurdish parties have way more experience in this regard.
One could conclude therefore that the APC doesn’t have a lot of resources or organizational
capabilities to mobilize people for a Tunisian-style uprising, although it has organized some
demonstrations in the past. This also explain why its framing efforts failed, despite an almost
universal opposition among Arabs in Iraq against article 140, and Kurdish nationalist demands to
annex Kirkuk to the Kurdistan region
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Chapter 4: Opportunity structures
This chapter will look at changes in available political opportunities which could show where and
when windows of opportunity might open for the APC as a challenger movement. Social movements
mobilize in response to and in a matter consistent with very specific changes that grant them more
leverage. This chapter will show that the APC does not have a lot of opportunity structures within the
regimes (KRG, Baghdad) and inside Kirkuk to mobilize its resources to challenge the Kurdish
domination over local politics in Kirkuk.
4.1. Independent centers of power
This section will deal with the multiplicity of independent centers of power within Kirkuk, Baghdad
and Erbil. Erbil is the capital of the Kurdistan region which has its own autonomous government.
Furthermore there is the central government in Iraq and a Provincial Council in Kirkuk province. Are
there any centers of power where the APC can augment their position?
4.1.1. Erbil
The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) is based in Erbil, the capital of the semi-autonomous
Kurdistan Region. It administers the governorates of Erbil, Suleymaniah and Dohuk and is controlled
mostly by the KDP and PUK. The Kurdish President is Masoud Barzani (KDP) and the Prime Minister
Barham Salih (PUK). The KRG receives 17 Per cent, approximately US $10 billion, of the total Iraqi
budget from Baghdad, Rudaw: (2010)124. The Kurdistani list, an alliance between the PUK and KDP,
controls 57.3 Per cent of the 111 parliamentary seats (a total of 59 seats), and opposition parties
Gorran (23,57 Per cent) (25 seats), and the Services and Reform list of the Islamists and Communists
hold 12% of the seats (13 seats) (KRG.org)125.
As a result there is no independence source of power for the APC inside the Kurdistan region. The
APC-leader suggested that if the power of the Islamic Group grows, they might could work together
on the basis of a Sunni identity. But in general Kurdish politics is dominated by Kurdish nationalism.
This prevents Kurdish opposition parties from compromising on Kirkuk, or working with Arab
124
Mohammed, Najba (2010). “Possible Delay in Baghdad's Budget Approval Will Affect Projects in Kurdistan”,
Rudaw, 29 Oktober 2010 (http://www.rudaw.net/english/kurds/3253.html).
125
KRG.org (2009), “Electoral Commission announces final results of Kurdistan Region elections”, KRG.org, 8
August 2009, (http://www.krg.org/articles/detail.asp?rnr=223&lngnr=12&smap=02010100&anr=30895).
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nationalists. They could be accused of treachery.
4.1.2. Kirkuk
Kirkuk’s first elected, 41-member governorate council assumed office during the summer 2005
(Anderson 2009: 13). The Deputy Governor Rakaan Jibouri is Arabic; Governor Najmedeen Karim
Kurdish and Provincial Council Chairman Hassan Torhan is Turkmen. They were selected through
political agreements, and the political parties. Arabs control 15 Per cent of the seats in the Provincial
Council, while Kurds control 63 Per cent of the seats. In the December 2005 elections, the Kurdistan
Alliance won 53 Per cent of the vote, and if smaller Kurdish Islamic parties are included, pro-KRG
parties won a narrow majority of 55 Per cent in the province, while the rest of the 41 Per cent of the
vote was split among several Arab and Turkmen parties (Keane 2011 March: 25). Therefore the Kurds
managed to get the most important positions. The Arab nationalist politicians do have some posts
within the council, but their influence is marginal, and they launched boycotts from 2003-2007 and in
2011, to change this position.
They do however have control over district council in Hawija (23.9 Per cent of the Kirkuk population
(IAU 2011: 1)) and posts in the Arab sub-districts of Kirkuk like Rashad and other villages. There were
several political gatherings in Hawija, and demonstrations against Kurdish nationalist demands. Still
the Kurdish controlled outer-districts police forces have some control here, and arrested many
persons after the 25th demonstrations in Hawija.
4.1.3. Baghdad
The Iraqi Government consists of the Council of Representatives (325 Seats) and 46 ministries
(Ottoway & Kaysi 2011). The government was formed by the State of Law Alliance of Prime Minister
Maliki and his Shiite allies, who control 24 ministerial positions. It includes most political parties as a
‘national unity government’. Most power is controlled by the Dawa party of Prime Minister Maliki.
Maliki is the prime minister and thus ex-officio commander in chief of the armed forces. He also
controls the Baghdad Brigade and the three crucial ministries—defense, interior, and national
security, which are currently vacant as a result of disagreements over allocation of the security
ministry. To date the Iraqi PM has rejected all proposed candidates and remains in control of the
security of Iraq (Ottoway & Kaysi 2011). The Iraqiyya list controls the Parliament Speaker, while the
PUK-leader Jalal Talabani, a Kurd, controls the Iraqi presidency. Other members of the Iraqiyya list
are Deputy President Tariq al-Hashimi and Deputy Prime Minister Salih al-Mutlaq. Iraqiyya leader
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Iyad Allawi was promised the post of the Strategic Council Head, but this has not been confirmed by
the parliaments and there are still ongoing negotiations over the current government. The Education
Minister Mohammed Tameemi is from Hawija, Kirkuk and a member of Iraqiyya.
Currently there is little attention paid to the Kirkuk issue and Kirkuk’s Arabs are dissatisfied with the
Iraqiyya list. 126 Iraqiyya did not manage to control any important positions. The attempts of Iraqiyya
to control the government makes any opposition to Kurdish demands unlikely.
This could change, however, if there was a change in the political strategies, or electoral situation. An
example is the signature campaign in Baghdad to summon the Iraqi president Jalal Talabani for
suggesting Kirkuk is part of Kurdistan (Aswat al-Iraq),127 or the nationalist campaign Maliki waged
against the Kurds in the disputed areas128 and demonstrations in favor of Maliki’s attempts to create
tribal support council, after the Kurdish president Massoud Barzani reacted negatively about this
attempt.129 Since surveys show the majority of Arabs in Iraq reject article 140130, this shows the APC
could use this towards their own benefit.131
4.1.4. Summary
One can conclude that Kirkuk’s Arab Sunni politicians do not have many independent centres of
power within Iraq. Inside Kirkuk they have a limited amount of influence and only control the Arabdistrict and sub districts outside of the city. In the Kurdistan region the PUK/KDP control everything
and in Baghdad the State of Law Alliance controls most important positions and the Iraqiyya coalition
(which the APC supported in the elections and is allied to) doesn’t have much influence in. In the
future there is a possibility that the APC, or Arab nationalists in Kirkuk, could use Arab nationalism to
unite the different parties against the Kurds. Surveys show that the majority of the Arabs in Iraq
126
Both Sheikh Abdulrahman al-Assi (01 July 2011) and ITF-member Narmeen Mutfi (11 July 2011) said that the
Iraqiyya allies in Kirkuk are dissatisfied with the result on a national level.
127
Aswat al-Iraq (2011), “Iraq's President can be summoned by Parliament if he violated constitution, Kurdish
MP says”, Aswat al-Iraq, 13 March 2011.
128
Crocker, Ryan (2009) “Pm Maliki: Strengthened Center Or Emerging Strongman?”, US embassy cable
Baghdad, 13 Feb 2009 (http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/02/09BAGHDAD379.html)
129
Crocker, Ryan (2009) “Pm Maliki: Strengthened Center Or Emerging Strongman?”, US embassy cable
Baghdad, 13 Feb 2009 (http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/02/09BAGHDAD379.html)
130
Only 1 Per cent of the Arabs in Iraq is in favor of placing Kirkuk under control of the KRG (IRI 2005: 45).
131
Another example is that in July 2008, the majority of the Iraqi parliament passed the provincial election law
without consultation from the Kurds and law didn’t refer to Kurdish demands (Parker 2009). It included many
demands of the APC, but was vetoed by the Iraqi president.
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reject Kirkuk being annexed to Kurdistan. But so far this seems unlike due to the Shiite-Sunni
divisions.
4.2. Open or closed system
An open political system encourages social movements to stay within the system or in many cases
become a part of the system, and provides them with a chance to access resources and power,
increasing their ability to achieve their goals (Romano 2006: 52). A closed political system, however,
encourages illegal action outside of the system and excludes the groups many of the means they
need to grow and pursue their agenda.
In Kirkuk, a majority of the Arab community boycotted politics from 2003 to 2007 (Kane 2011 March:
9) as a result the Kurds controlled most positions. The U.S. tried to pressure the various parties to
compromise and in December 2007, local leaders signed a U.S.-brokered agreement to share power
(ICG 2009: 12). However the Kurds still control most posts in the Provincial Council and the security
forces (police).
An attempt by the Iraqi parliament to impose power sharing (32 Per cent for each community) by
passing Provincial Election Law 23 in July 2008 failed, after a veto of the Iraqi president Jalal Talabani
(Parker 2009). The Dead Sea Declaration of December 2008 and the Berlin Accords of April 2009,
which included specific agreements to share posts were also not implemented (Wolf 2010: 1). On 8
November 2009 the Provincial Election Law was passed without any refers to demands of Arab
politicians in Kirkuk and excluded Kirkuk from the provincial elections in 2009.
This resulted in an underrepresentation of Arabs in the provincial council and a lack of access to
resources and power. As a result they boycotted council meetings until 2007, threatened with
violence, sit-ins and demonstrations, or asked for outside interference to get support and impose
their claims. Between 15 March and 13 June there was another boycott by Arab politicians after the
KDP/PUK decided to give the post of the Provincial Chairman to a Turkmen of the ITF, while the
Governor position remained in the hands of Kurds.
Furthermore a number of Arab nationalist politicians were arrested for alleged terrorist activities and
there is a continued insecurity in the Arab-districts which limits participation in politics.132 Some of
132
An example is the arrest of Sheikh Abdulrahman Munshid in 2007, or an American raid of the house of
Iraqiyya MP Yasin al-Obeidi on 14 May in Hawija. Kirkuk Now (2011), “Joint forces raid Iraqiyya MP’s house in
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them sympathize with the former regime, which the Kurdish parties use against them by forming a
close relationship with the USF-I (Kane 2011 June: 24). The control by Kurds over the security forces
is also an disadvantage for Arab nationalist participation, and the APC members accuse the Kurdish
parties of using them to settle political scores. Therefore one could argue the system for the APC is
closed in Kirkuk. Especially if they want to mobilize their supporters. For instance in 2004 the Kurdish
governor decided that any demonstration must obtain official permission from the police and
governor after the ITF demonstrated against Kurdish claims on Kirkuk.133
4.3. Political alignments
However, weaknesses in the political alignments of its opponents could help the APC to break the
status quo and rally its supporters. Conversely, weaknesses among their own allies and Baghdad
could threaten their own power inside Kirkuk.
4.3.1. Kurdish divisions
In the March 7 nation-wide Iraqi elections, Gorran, a break-away Kurdish party, ran on a separate
slate from the KDP-PUK Kurdistan Alliance List (Romano 2010).134 This raised fears among Kurdish
nationalist this would weaken the Kurdish power within Iraq. The APC and the Iraqi Turkmen Front
hoped that Gorran would weaken the PUK in Kirkuk (Hilterman 2010).135 Furthermore Hilterman
suggested that Gorran could look for compromise with the APC, the ITF and other political groups
(Hilterman 2010). But eventually Gorran could not win any seats in Kirkuk and the status quo
remained. Furthermore the Kurdish opposition parties are united with the PUK and KDP on solving
the Kirkuk question through article 140. “The PUK and KDP have their own internal problems. In
reality these problems are bigger than ours. But when they talk with Arabs they are one front,” said
Provincial Council Member Mohammed Jibouri.136
Hawija”, Kirkuk Now, 17 May 2011, (http://kirkuknow.com/english/index.php/2011/05/joint-forces-raid-intoIraqiyya-mps-house-in-hawija/)
133
BBC Monitoring Services, “Iraq: Prior permission will be required for marches in Kirkuk”, Kurdsat TV, 9
January 2004.
134
Romano, David (2010), "The Gorran Movement – A Change in the Iraqi Kurdish Political Landscape",
Jamestown Foundation, 2 April 2010,
(http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=36229).
135
Hilterman, Joost (2010), “Kurds no closer to taking Kirkuk after Iraqi elections”, Foreign Policy, 8 March
2010,
(http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/03/08/kurds_no_closer_to_taking_kirkuk_after_iraqi_elections)
136
Author’s interview with KPC member Mohammed Khalil Jibouri in his home on 22 June 2011.
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4.3.2. Divisions within Iraqiyya list
Despite the fact that some observers noted that the Kurdish position on Kirkuk would weaken, due to
the fact the seats were split between the Iraqiyya list and the Kurdistani List in Kirkuk, this eventually
wasn’t the case. Although the Iraqiyya list won 2 more seats than the State of Law Alliance, it failed
to form the government. Maliki and Sadr emerged as the winners; and Allawi as the loser, with the
Kurdish parties maintaining their status quo (Ottaway & Kaysi 2011). The Kurds were eventually
kingmakers in forming the government and both Allawi and Maliki needed to court the Kurds to form
the government to the dismay of Iraqiyya’s allies. As a result both Iraqiyya and the State of Law
Alliance (SLA) could not oppose Kurdish demands (instead of working together against article 140).
Iraqi PM Nouri al-Maliki eventually accepted the Kurds’ 19-demands and formed the government
with them and promised to carry out article 140 (ICG 2011: 3).
The failure to make any gains in cabinet negotiations, and a loss of deputies to the breakaway faction
‘White Iraqiyya’, made local leaders from Kirkuk skeptical of Iraqiyya’s abilities to represent their
interests in Baghdad (see also Fantappie137). This showed the weakness of the alliance and the
tensions within the list. The Iraqiyya list is not as neatly organized as the KDP and PUK under the
Kurdistani Alliance, or Sadrist/Dawa under SLA, notes Christopher Price138. The APC leader expressed
this in an interview: “His [Allawi] relations with Barzani and Talabani are close (…). We are afraid he
sells Kirkuk to Kurdistan.”139 For instance on a national level the Iraqiyya list endorsed the idea to give
the Kirkuk Provincial Chairman position to the Turkmen, while Arab members of the KPC in Kirkuk
disagreed with this.140 Still the ITF is also critical of the Iraqiyya list and suggests they just talk and
accuse them of failing to deliver on promises.141
4.3.3. Arab Divisions Within Kirkuk
Another issue is the divisions amongst Arab politicians inside Kirkuk over tactics. Although the
majority agree on strategy: that Kirkuk should not be annexed to Kurdistan, there is dispute
137
Fantappie, Maria (2011), “Maliki Attempts to Bolster His Power by Looking to the Provinces”, Los Angeles
times, 13 July 2011, (http://carnegie-mec.org/publications/?fa=45060).
138
Author’s interview with former PRT official Christopher Price on 26 May 2011
139
Author’s interview with Sheikh Abdulrahman al-Assi in his house in Kirkuk on 1 July 2011.
140
Author’s interview with Sean Kane on 9 June 2011 by telephone. Abdulrahman al-Munshid and the Iraqiyya
list in Baghdad supported the new power structure. Majority of the Arab KPC-members were against it.
141
Author’s interview with ITF-member Narmeen Mutfi in ITF building in Kirkuk on 11 July 2011. She is a
Turkmen journalist and member of the Iraqi Turkmen Front (ITF).
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regarding tactics largely as a result of the lack of leadership. When the APC threatened to launch
demonstrations the response highlighted the lack of unity with some Arab politicians and tribal
sheikhs dissenting.
After 2005 the Republican Gathering (5 out of 6 Arab seats) fall apart.142 As a result the Arab
politicians in the KPC are divided over tactics. Achmed Obeid furthermore created his own list in
2010 and contests the tactics of the APC. He extends influence over both Ramla Hameed and Hala
Ferji who are from the extended family. This was followed by Mohammed Khidir Ghareeb,
Mohammed Khalil Jibouri, Sheikh Burhan al-Assi and Abdullah Sami Al-Assi opposing demonstrations
in Kirkuk fear that the demonstrations could lead to a bad situation. The Iraqi Turkmen Front, a major
ally of the APC in Kirkuk, suggested that the protests could bring even more Kurdish security forces to
Kirkuk and be manipulated to extend Kurdish control over Kirkuk.143
There was evidence of these divisions prior to the Iraqi elections in 2010 and the Arab boycott of the
Provincial Council in 2011. Hussein Salih Jibouri (Abu Saddam), an important APC-member, excluded
two Arab politicians from the Iraqiyya list and placed his own candidates from Hawija on the Iraqiyya
election list.144
Tensions continued to amplify during the 14 March boycott, Mohammed Khalil Jibouri, Abdullah
Sami al-Assi, Mohammed Khidir Jibouri, Ramla Hameed Obeid and Hala Ferji Nurredin boycotted the
council meetings. Although Sheikh Burhan al-Assi and Deputy Governor Rakaan Jibouri refused to do
a boycott. Both Sheikh Burhan al-Assi and Rakaan Jibouri have the closest relations with the APC (but
even these relationships were subject to tensions, particularly between Rakaan Jibouri and Abu
Saddam).
4.3.4. Summary
This shows that the instability of the political alignments benefited the Kurdish political parties and
hindered the APC. Arab politicians are both divided on a national level and a local level. Iraqiyya,
APC’s ally in Baghdad, is excluded from the power nexus. While inside Kirkuk fights and
disagreements over tactics to change the status quo stultify progress. This can, in part, be traced
142
The Republican Gathering was formed by Sheikh Burhan al-Assi to participate in the 2010 elections after one
of the predecessors of the APC fall apart. After the elections the Republican Gathering also slowly fell apart.
143
Author’s interview with former PRT official Christopher Price on 26 May 2011
144
Ibidem.
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back to the lack of skills, resources and organizational capabilities the APC has in Kirkuk. Any
weakness of Arab nationalists in Baghdad and Kirkuk is beneficial for Kurdish nationalist parties in
the Kurdistan region on a short-term level. This was showed by PM Maliki agreeing to the demands
of the Kurdish parties, in exchange for getting Kurdish support for forming the government.
4.4. Availability of allies
This section will discuss the availability of local, national, regional or international allies or supporters
of the APC which will influence the ability of the APC to mobilize supporters. Although a number of
local, national, regional and international actors oppose Article 140 and the annexation of Kirkuk to
Kurdistan this does not automatically imply support for the APC’s tactics which some believe
threatens the stability and balance of power in Kirkuk.
4.4.1. International
In general the international or Western opinion aims to neutralize, or at least control, tensions or
the risk of in war in Kirkuk. Examples are provided in the reports of the International Crisis group
(2011) that recommends a consensus or the Baker-Hamilton report that calls for delaying the
implementation of Article 140 (Baker & Hamilton, 2006: 65-66). In regard to the international
community; the European Union does not exercise much leverage in Iraq and the U.S. changed their
position of supporting the Kurdish position on Kirkuk (Article 140) in 2007 and now supports the
UNAMI-proposal for a negotiated settlement (ICG 2008: 8). Former PRT-head Howard Keegan
criticized the Kurdish-dominated makeup of the KPC.145 Despite the fact that the U.S. supported
more power sharing and consensus, the Kurdish parties still blocked the 2007 agreement. But this
doesn’t mean that the U.S. supports the tactics of the APC. Furthermore the U.S. supported joint
security mechanism in Kirkuk to prevent tensions between the Iraqi army and Kurdish security forces
(ICG 2011: 14). Both the ITF and the APC opposed this, suggesting this legitimized the presence of
Kurdish security forces in Kirkuk. The Baathist-sympathies, insurgent ties and tactics of the APC does
not generate international approval from the West and the APC-leader is considered more as a
problem than a solution inside Kirkuk.146 The APC-leader was himself arrested on 26 November 2007
for 10 months and 13 days on terrorism charges147 when rockets were found in the headquarters of
145
BBC Monitoring Services (BBC 2008), “A response to the US consul in Kirkuk Howard Keegan", Khabat, 29
September 2008.
146
Author’s interview with former PRT official Christopher Price on 26 May 2011.
147
Author’s interview with Sheikh Abdulrahman al-Assi in his house in Kirkuk on 1 July 2011.
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the Arab Advisory groups in the Wasiti neighborhood.
4.4.2. Regional
The Iraqi Kurds do not have much external support throughout the region. Sunni parties in Iraq
sometimes depend on support from the Sunni hinterland (Sunni Arab countries), while Shiites
sometimes depend on their Shiite hinterland (Iran). On a regional level both Iran, Turkey and Syria
oppose Kurdistan annexing Kirkuk due to fears this could empower their own Kurds (ICG 2011: 32).
During the 2010 elections Shiite Islamist parties received varying degrees of support from Iran for the
elections, and the mainly Sunni groupings were bankrolled by the Gulf States and politically
supported by Syria and Turkey (Keane June 2011: 7). Turkey, in particular, played a role in uniting
Arab nationalists, neo-Ba’athists like the Al-Hadba list in Mosul, Sunni Islamist, and ethnic Turkoman
nationalists (ITF) in the Iraqiyya slate to contest the 2010 elections together under Ayad Allawi
(Keane June 2011: 9). Despite the fact that Turkey also has good ties with the KRG, Turkey allegedly
financially supported both the Al-Hadba list and the APC. However this support was mostly limited to
the Iraqi elections and it is unclear if they would support conflict or tensions inside Kirkuk.
4.4.3. National
As demonstrated above the Iraqiyya list is divided and weak. Kirkuk’s Arab nationalists do not have a
figure on the national level unlike the Kurdish nationalists who have Jalal Talabani. As a result of the
ongoing negotiations over government formation, the Kurds were courted by both Iraqiyya and the
SLA. Both parties needed the support of the Kurds to gain any positions of influence. It is important
to note that they did not approach the APC in Kirkuk. In the past Maliki (2008) and the Saddrists
(2004-2006) supported Sunni Arab mobilization against the Kurds; however by the time of the
demonstrations on 25th February, Maliki and the Kurdistani List shared their a mutual enemy. Both
Maliki and the KDP and PUK felt threatened by demonstrations and on 25th February Maliki spoke of
a Baathist threat that used protests to overturn the regime.148 Likewise Kurds warned of a terrorist
and Baathist threat in Kirkuk.
According to the U.S. embassy Maliki shows a tendency to associate all Sunni opposition to his
policies with Baathist irredentism and his relationship with Sunni allies of the APC in Kirkuk, like Salih
148
Author’s interview with Sean Kane on 9 June 2011 by telephone.
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Al-Mutlak and Tariq al-Hashimi, are strained.149 Furthermore the PM tried to use the demonstrations
in Northern Iraq to break the link between provincial leaders and the Iraqiyya coalition (Fantappie
2009).150 According to the ICG, “Maliki tolerated ‘the Kurdish forces’ role in blocking demonstrations
that could prove embarrassing not only to Kirkuk’s Kurdish leadership but also to him” (ICG 2011:
26). At this point, mutual interest (blocking protests) united the Kurdistani List and Prime Minister
Maliki to the exclusion of the APC. The Iraqiyya Parliament Speaker Osama al-Nujayfi did oppose the
presence of Peshmergas in Kirkuk, but did not speak out against the ban on APC demonstration by
Kurdish leaders. According to Iraq-expert Thomas Ambrasio, “the larger Sunni-Shi’ite split has
dominated politics and therefore Kirkuk is not an issue that is on the front burner.”151 Kirkuk’s
Provincial Council Chairman Torhan agreed with this, “Our central government only deals with
problems in Baghdad.”152 This while Iraqqiya MP Omar al-Jibouri said that Baghdad cannot support
the Arabs in Kirkuk, and is based on consensus and power-sharing.153
4.4.4. Local
As mentioned before the Kurds have control over most important political positions in Kirkuk and
therefore control the situation in Kirkuk. The APC’s main ally the Iraqi Turkomen Front (ITF) did not
support their attempts to launch demonstrations; whilst, a number of Arab KPC members also
opposed the attempts to launch demonstrations. In this regard, the APC was politically isolated and
was weakened by a shortage of allies.
4.4..5 Summary
The lack of allies limits the possibilities of the APC to launch demonstrations against the Kurdish
parties controlling Kirkuk. Especially the lack of important allies in Baghdad. The SLA controls all the
security positions in Baghdad, and shares a mutual enemy with the Kurdish parties, the Sunni Arabs
parties. The APC-supported candidates in the Iraqiyya list did well during the elections, and there
149
Crocker, Ryan (2009) “Pm Maliki: Strengthened Center Or Emerging Strongman?”, US embassy cable
Baghdad, 13 Feb 2009 (http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/02/09BAGHDAD379.html)
150
Fantappie, Maria (2011), “Maliki Attempts to Bolster His Power by Looking to the Provinces”, Los Angeles
times, 13 July 2011, (http://carnegie-mec.org/publications/?fa=45060).
151
Author’s interview with assistant professor Thomas Ambrosio on 13 June 2011 by e-mail. He wrote several
articles about Iraq and the Kurds.
152
Author’s interview with Hassan Torhan on 16 June 2011 in his office. He is the current Provincial Council
Chairman and a known as a more moderate member of the Iraqi Turkmen Front.
153
Author’s interview with Omar al-Jibour on 27 June 2011. He is an Iraqi MP from Kirkuk and was elected in
the 2010 elections.
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might be national (both in the government, and among the population), regional and international
support for more consensus in the province or against article 140, but this doesn’t translate in strong
outside support for the launch of a Tunisian-uprising. The current political conditions do not allow it.
4.5. Facilitation or Repression
This section will describe to what extent the reigning security forces in Kirkuk repress or facilitate
collective action of the APC in Kirkuk. The 12th division of the Iraqi army occupies the outer layer of
security (mixed forces controlled by Baghdad), the police are critical to the populated areas in the
middle and inner layers (and are indirectly controlled by Erbil and Suleymaniyah). The middle layer,
which covers the governorate’s districts and sub-districts, is composed of police under Brig. General
Serhad Qader Muhammad, a Kurd affiliated to the KDP. The inner layer, Kirkuk city proper, is
controlled by police under Brig. General Burhan Tayib Taha, a Turkoman. Both report to the
provincial police commander, Maj. General Jamal Taher Baker, a Kurd affiliated to the PUK, and his
deputy, Maj. General Turhan Yousef Abd-al-Rahman, a Turkoman (whose mother is Kurdish and lived
in the Kurdistan region before). In addition, the middle and inner layers also contain Kurdish asaesh
and Parastin/Zanyari intelligence forces (ICG 2011: 19) and there are also Kurdistan Regional Guard
forces (Peshmerga) in Kirkuk in the north and east of Kirkuk (ICG 2011:16).
On 24 February an additional 10,000 Peshmerga/Zerevani (paramilitary police) were sent to Kirkuk
without the knowledge of the USF-I (ICG 2011:16). The Iraqi army nor U.S. army did not prevent this
deployment. Therefore the only security forces politicians under control of the APC are the Sawha
militias in the Arab-districts outside of the city. Therefore the APC has no control over the inner layer
of Kirkuk, where they were attempting to launch demonstrations against the Peshmerga forces.
When the APC planned a demonstration on 1 March against the Peshmerga, the Kurdish police chief
Jamal Taher announced that four car bombs entered Kirkuk, and a curfew and vehicle ban was
announced.154 This clearly shows the security forces won’t tolerate any moves by the APC to
mobilize.
4.6. Challengers and facilitators
This section will show to which extent that other non-state actor groups challenge or facilitate
154
Aswat al-Iraq (2011), “Curfew, vehicle ban in Kirkuk”, Aswat al-Iraq, 28 February 2011.
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policies of the APC in Kirkuk. As shown, there is a coalition of Arab parties of Achmed Obeid
challenging the policies of the APC and tribal rivalries within the Arab political movement in Kirkuk.
Furthermore there were mobilizations by youth and civil society organizations against politicians
allied with the APC in Riyaadh, Hawija and Rashaad on 25 February. Despite calls for ethnic
demonstrations, there were only demonstrations against the establishment. Furthermore the Iraqi
Prime Minister challenged the policies of the APC in cohesion with the Kurdish parties to stop
protests in Iraq. Another challenge towards the APC are the insurgent groups inside Kirkuk, like the
Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), Naqsibandi army (Baathists), and the Ansar al-Sunna play. Irrelevant to the
truth that the APC works with, or against insurgent groups, the alleged closeness of the APC with the
National Baath Party (NBP) justifies crackdowns by Kurdish security forces or arrests by the USF.
One of the few facilitators the APC has are the Arab tribal links within Kirkuk and the rest of Iraq, that
could facilitate mobilization. For instance in October 2006, 300 tribesmen, and 35 Sunni Sheikhs
came together in Hindiya, to pledge allegiance to the former president, and to oppose the U.S.
occupation, and Kurdish claims on Kirkuk.155 In November 2008 thousands of Sunni and Shiite Arabs
from different tribes took to the streets across Iraq Saturday to support the idea of Prime Minister
Nuri al-Maliki to create tribal support councils, after the Kurdish president Barzani rejected it (AFP
2008).156
This mobilization was also possible because of the almost universal opposition among Arabs in Iraq
against the annexation of Kirkuk to the Kurdistan region (see the earlier chapters). This is a possible
facilitator Arab nationalists could use against their Kurdish nationalist challengers. These emotions
can however not be used, when the government in Baghdad is weak and involved in internal fights
over power, as shown by the competition between the SLA and Iraqiyya.
Another facilitator was the Arab spring, or unrest in North-Africa that swept the rest of the MiddleEast. This unrest was used by several groups in the region to challenge the status quo. However, it
eventually turned out against the APC, and the Arab youths were mobilized against the old guard of
Arab nationalists.
4.8. Summary
The APC has practically no opportunity structures through which to launch demonstrations, or
155
Howard, Michael (2006) “Kirkuk: a city at boiling point”, The Guardian, 26 October 2006
(http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/oct/26/iraq.michaelhoward)
156
AFP (2008) “Thousands of Iraqi Arabs attend anti-Kurdish protests”, AFP, 15 November 2008
(http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iiQ44O9q6ZS7SM88gApwLYcbQB4A)
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challenge the Kurdish parties control over Kirkuk. The system seems relatively open, but many
demands of the Arabs are not met due to Kurdish control over the top security and political posts in
Kirkuk. On a local level in Kirkuk the Kurds remain more powerful than the Arab challengers. Despite
their strong position, the Kurds are unable to implement Article 140 due to opposing forces on the
national, regional and international level (who are motivated by their fear of civil war or
empowerment of Kurdish nationalism). In spite of these entrenched fears no support is extended to
the Arab challengers of the Kurds in Kirkuk, except during the elections.
Conclusion
Despite the claims that oppressed minorities automatically mobilize on the basis of their ethnicity,
this thesis demonstrates that we should consider ethnicity as only one of several factors that play a
role in mobilization efforts. Thus, we should not adopt a primordialist bias when analyzing conflicts.
There is undeniably almost universal opposition among Arabs in Kirkuk, and the rest of Iraq, against
Kurdish nationalist efforts to annex Kirkuk to the Kurdistan region, yet the APC’s framing efforts
failed to catalyze its target population to protest. Instead of mobilizing against the Kurdish leadership
in Kirkuk, the Arab youth directed their discontent at the Arab leadership in Kirkuk.
This can be explained by a lack of effective leadership, and the APC’s lack of material and nonmaterial resources. Surveys, my semi-structures interviews and data collected from the police
demonstrate that there is support for some of the Arab nationalist’s claims against the Kurdish
parties. In the past, the APC managed to mobilize in the Arab-dominated district and sub-districts
along an ethnic basis, and tribal links. But this time the tribal background worked against them.
Although the tribal links of the APC can generate a strong support base for mobilization, it can also
weaken the support of the APC due to the ingrained nepotism and corruption. This alienated the
Arab population from the APC. The APC relied too much on its tribal networks, and failed to build up
strong support from civilian, religious, political, or media networks. This was a result of bad spending
of money, and a lack of experience, professionalism and lack of leadership.
The APC furthermore suffered from their association with insurgents, and the NBP. This provided its
Kurdish challengers with an excuse to crackdown on them, in addition to incurring harassment from
the USF-I and their contra-terrorist operations. Although the Kurdish parties have significantly larger
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funds than the APC, the APC still had some financial resources from their control of administrative
posts, the Sahwa forces, business contracts with the USF, and alleged outside support, to organize
grass root organizations. But it did not use these financial sources to its benefit due to internal
divisions, lack of leadership, and other factors.
The lack of leadership, and experience, can also be further explained by the fact that Kurdish,
Turkmen and Shiite parties, had time to organize themselves before the fall of the Baath-regime in
neighboring countries, or in the autonomous Kurdistan region since 1991. While the Sunni Arabs
remained deferential to Baghdad and the national organizational structures, and to this day often
relies on Baghdad and national parties for support. This also explains their reliance on tribal
organizations, instead of modern hierarchical parties. The Sunni Arab nationalists in Kirkuk were not
ready for politics yet, after the U.S. invasion in 2003.
Apart from its clear lack of resources, and organizational capabilities, the APC also suffered from a
lack of opportunity structures within the regime. The power struggle between the SLA and the
Iraqiyya list (the main ally of the APC in Kirkuk) served to weaken its support in Baghdad. Both the
SLA and the Iraqiyya list needed the Kurdish parties to form the government, and so the Iraqiyya list
was unwilling to challenge the Kurds over Kirkuk. Furthermore the APC did not have any independent
centers of power in the regime, apart from the small Arab-dominated districts of Kirkuk. The system
was also closed to the APC, due to the fact the major governing positions were controlled by Kurdish
parties who also dominated the security forces. The APC ’s lack of influence over the security forces
in Kirkuk facilitated the repression of its mobilization efforts. All these factors challenged the abilities
of the APC to mobilize its supporters. Although the Tunisian-inspired Arab spring could have been
used by the APC, it turned against them, when Arab youths confronted them.
Therefore I argue in this thesis that there is a need for a non-ethnic approach to Kirkuk and further
research and analysis of the different perceptions within the different communities about their own
representatives, and their perceived ethnic identities in Kirkuk. Since I lacked time, it would be
interesting to see site comparisons within Iraq, with for instance the protests in the Sunni-Arab
dominated province of Mosul, the Kurdish dominated province of Suleymaniyah, and the ethnically
mixed Kirkuk, to see if there are any similarities. Furthermore, due to the lack of time, security limits,
I failed to do my survey in Kirkuk. Additional survey results could shed more light on the different
perceptions among the communities in Kirkuk. More comparative research between the ongoing
contention taking place in Arab countries and Iraq could also provide further insights into the
political mobilization theory. Particularly in light of the fact that part of these demonstrations are
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taking place without clear leadership, or organization.
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UNPUBLISHED PRINTED AND ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS
2010
“Election results by candidate”, Election results of the 2010 March Elections. Data received
from PRT-official Christopher Price.
2010
Election results from the Iraqi elections in 2010 (Kurdish) from Independent High Electoral
Commission of Iraq (IHEC)
2011
Data from demonstrations collected from the Provincial Joint Operations Centre.
2011
Observation notes
INTERVIEWS
Abu Mazen Abdul-Jabbar. 16 July 2011. Interviewed him in his headquarter in Kirkuk. He is the head
of Wifaq in Kirkuk. Wifaq is led by Iyad Allawi (head of the Iraqiyya list. Abdul-Jabbar is originally from
Najaf and works in the North Oil Company and is married to a Kurd. Wifaq did not manage to get a
parliament member from Kirkuk in the Iraqi parliament elections of 2010. Other factions within
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Iraqiyya are stronger.
Achmed Hameed Obeid. 7 June 2011. Interview in his NGO office. He is the leader of the Arabic
Stream Project or Arabic Current. He run for the elections on the Kirkuk Front List. He had
disagreements with other Arab politicians since 2007 and controls two provincial council members,
who are from the same family (Ramla and Hala Obeid). He especially has an argument with the head
of the APC. He controls one radio station, and one NGO.
Ali Ghadeer. 15 July 2011. Interview in public restaurant. He works with the NGO Unrestricted
Writers org. Middle East which is registered both in Baghdad, Erbil (Kurdistan region), and Ankara
(Turkey).
Bill Park. 15 June 2011. Interview by e-mail. Park is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Defence
Studies, King’s College, London University. Writer of a book about Turkish police towards Iraq.
Christopher Price. 1 July, 8 July, 5 August, 8 August 2011. Interviews by e-mail and Skype. Former
Governance Specialist at Kirkuk PRT at U.S. Department of State (Feb 2009 – May 2011). Also helped
Columbia University with information for their report about Kirkuk.
Hassan Torhan. 16 June 2011. Interview him in his office in KPC building. Current Provincial Council
Chairman. Member of the Iraqi Turkmen Front. He is known to be more moderate than other
members of the ITF.
Hussein Salih al-Jibouri (Abu Saddam). 10 July 2011. Interviewed in the KPC building after he
participated in a regular security meeting of Kirkuk’s outerdistricts with village heads, Sahwa militia
leaders, police heads, army heads, and USF-I. He is a powerful member of the Jibouri tribe (subtribe
Al-Shakur) and leads the city council of Hawija and is also a member of the Arab Political Council.
Furthermore he maintains good relations with members of the Iraqiyya list of Iyad Allawi.
Emma Sky. 10 July 2011. Interview by e-mail. Emma Sky left Iraq in September 2010, where she had
served for three years as Political Advisor to General Odierno, the US General commanding all US
forces in Iraq, had worked directly for General Petraeus on reconciliation and had been the
Governorate Coordinator of Kirkuk for the Coalition Provisional Authority back in 2003/2004.
Gabriel Escobar. 16 June 2011. Interview by e-mail. In the past, Gabriel was the Team Leader of the
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US State Department’s Provincial and Diplomatic Reconstruction Team in Kirkuk Province, Iraq and is
the author of a report about Kirkuk for the Columbia University.
Gavur Fallah Salim. 16 JulY 2011. Interview in PUK-office. One of the deputies of leading PUKmember Rafaat. He used to be a teacher.
Halkawt Abdulla Aziz. 10 July 2011. Interview in PUK’s Asayish office in Kirkuk. He is the head of
PUK’s Asayish. His headquarter is near the PUK-building in Kirkuk.
Hamza Hasan Shawqee. 10 July 2011. Interview in undisclosed location. Leading member of the
Defense Association of Students Rights. Led demonstrations on 25 February against the Hawija City
Council in Hawija.
Ismail Hadidi. 16 June 2011. Interview in his NGO Kirkuk is Our Home. In the past he was part of the
pro-Kurdish Kirkuk Brotherhood List and was an Iraqi MP in Baghdad for the Kurdish supported
alliance. During his post as deputy governor he did not support an Arab boycott against alleged
Kurdish dominance of the provincial council. His tribe is more closer to the Kurds since they are seen
as indigenous by the Kurds.
Jamal Mala Taher. 8 April 2011. Interview in police headquarters in Kirkuk. Major General Jamal Mala
Taher is the head of all the police in Kirkuk. Furthermore he has the Dutch nationality and his family
lives in the Netherlands.
Jawal al-Janabi. 15 June 2011. Interview in the KPC. He is a Provincial Council Members for the Kirkuk
Brotherhood List. He is a member of the Arabic Janabi tribe, and his brother is a tribe leader.
Although he is an Arab, he is part of the PUK.
Joel Wing. 2 June 2011. Interview by mail. Maintains blog Musings on Iraq. He has been reading,
writing and researching about Iraq since 2002. His blog is listed on the New York Times, McClatchy
Newspapers, CSPAN, The Long War Journal, The Foreign Policy Blogs, World Politics Review, Middle
East Institute Editor's Blog, Iraqi Mojo, and others. He has written for the Jamestown Foundation,
American Footprints, and the Ground Truth In Iraq.
Joost Hilterman. 10 June 2011. Interview by mail. Deputy Program Director, Middle East and North
Africa, of the International Crisis Group. He authored many of the ICG reports about the disputed
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territories in Iraq, or participated in their research projects about Kirkuk. Most politicians in Kirkuk
know him.
Khaleed Aleezy (NGO). 26 May 2011. Interview in undisclosed location. Iraq Organization for Human
Rights. Also works with prisoners.
Kholud Abdul Razzak Obeid. 26 May 2011. Interviewed in office of Al-Ghannam newspaper. Editor-in
chief of Iraq Al-Ghannam newspaper. Newspaper used to be supported by the U.S.. They cut the
funding. Her husband killed by insurgents in Rashad.
Mohammed Khalil Jibour. 22 June 2011. Interviewed in his home in Kirkuk. Mohammed Khalil Jibouri
is a KPC member and was excluded from the Iraqiyya list in the 2010 elections by Abu Saddam. He is
seen as a moderate Arab politician in Kirkuk and comes from the Monteka region within the Hawija
district. He is Jibour, but his subtribe is Ughted. This region cooperated with USF-I after 2003, and set
up defence militias against insurgents. He is anti-Baath party due to the fact the Saddam regime
targeted his tribe after a failed uprising of the Jibours in the army against Saddam.
Mohammed Khidir Ghareeb. 19 June 2011. Interviewed in his office in the KPC. He participated in the
2005 elections with the National Iraq List, and is a KPC-member. After 2005 the list was dissolved. He
has a military education.
Mohammed Jiboeri.26 Mei 2011. Interviewed in Erbil. Part of the NGO Al-Haq Organization for
Human Rights Culture which is part of PUK’s Kirkuknet. He is originally from the Jibour tribe. Claims
his NGO needs to be neutral.
Mohammed Jawar. 16 July. Interviewed in building of Dawa party in Kirkuk. Head of media
department of Dawa. Shiite Turkmen in Kirkuk. He says the government is not waiting for
demonstrations.
Najmedin Kareem. 19 June 2011. Interviewed in his office in the KPC. He is a neurosurgeon from the
U.S. who came back to Kirkuk to participate in the Iraqi elections. He is also a member of the PUK.
Narmeen Mutfi. 11 July. Interview in ITF building. Member of the Iraqi Turkmen Front. Works for
Kalaa newspaper too (ITF newspaper in Arabic).
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Nomas Hassan Khlayef. 10 July 2011. Interview in undisclosed location. Works with NGO is NonViolence Youth Will Org youth. He says 25th February demonstrations were for services.
Omar al-Jibouri. 27 June 2011. Interview by telephone. He is a parliament member for the Iraqiyya
list and originally comes from Hawija district. He has good contacts with Abu Saddam.
Qeas J. Abdul-Raheem. 15 July 2011. Interview in public place. He is a Turkmen who works with NGO
Unrestricted Writers.org. NGO guy. His works with Ali Ghadeer In Kirkuk.
Ramla Hameed al-Obeid. 16 June 2011. Interview in Provincial Council building. She is a member of
the Provincial Council and also a member of the Committee for Disappeared Arabs (2005-2008) that
investigated arrest of Arabs by Kurdish security forces, by going to Kurdish prisons in the Kurdistan
region
Rakaan Jibouri. 8 June 2011. Interview in his office in the KPC building. Rakaan Jibour is the Deputy
Governor of Kirkuk and is of the same subtribe (Al-Shakur) as Hussein Salih Jibouri (Abu Saddam). He
is originally from the village of al-Abassi in Hawija district.
Rafaat A. Hamarash. 15 June 2011. Interview in the building of the PUK in Kirkuk. He is one of the
highest members of the PUK in Kirkuk, and member of the Political Bureau of the PUK. This means he
participates in the political meetings of the PUK-leadership in Suleymaniyah.
Ronak Ali. 20 July 2011. Interview in her NGO office. Head of Federation of NGOs in Kirkuk. NGO
owned by the KDP. She runs 17 NGOs.
Sheikh Abduh Raman Munshid al-Assi. 9 June, 26 June 2011. Interview in his house. He is the head of
the Arab Political Council and spent around 10 months in jail in 2007 by the USF-I. After his release he
founded the Arab Political Council. This is an alliance of tribes, former Baathists, and Arab
nationalists.
Sheikh Burhan al-Assi. 19 June 2011. Interview in the KPC building. He is part of the Al-Assi family like
Sheikh Abduh Rahman. He founded the Republican Gathering to participate in the 2005 elections
after his brother Ghassam al-Assi left politics. Orignally he comes from the village Mizhir al-Assi..
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Soran al-Daudey. 10 June 2011. Interview in Al-Hurra office. Editor of Al-Hurra TV in Kirkuk. Also
works with the Kurdish NRT channel.
Sean Kane. 9 June, 6 August 2011. Interview by e-mail and Skype. He is a Senior Program Officer with
USIP's Iraq Programs. He worked as a Political Affairs Officer with the United Nations Assistance
Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) in Baghdad, Erbil, Mosul and Kirkuk from 2006 to 2009.
Thomas Ambrosio. 13 June 2011. Interview by email. He is an associate professor of political science
in the Criminal Justice and Political Science Department at North Dakota State University. He has
written several articles about Iraq and the Kurdistan region.
Unnamed respondent 1. 12 June. Arab man(30-40). Undisclosed location. Accepts presence of
Kurdish security agency Asayish.
Unnamed respondent 2. 15 June. Arab young man (25-30). Interviewed at undisclosed location.
Works at a Western NGO. Says he is harassed by the Asayish.
Unnamed respondent 3. 16 July 2011. Arab student (24). Undisclosed location. Works as a
government agency, and journalist. Interview done in Kirkuk.
Unnamed respondent 4. 16 July 2011. Turkmen. Undisclosed location. Works in a government
institution.
Unnamed respondent 5. 9 July, 15 July 2011. Undisclosed location. Works for PRT.
Xidir Hamdani (Abu Ibrahim). 26 May, 11 June 2011. Abu Ibrahim used to be a communist. He was
with the PUK in the mountains as an insurgent fighting the Baath-regime. Now he is the deputy of
PUK Kirkuk chief Rafaat A. Hamarash and runs magazines.
Surveys
Cordesman, Anthony H. (2007), “Iraqi Perceptions of the War: Public Opinion by City and Region”,
Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 2, 2007.
ABC/BBC/ARD/NHK (2008), “Iraq Five Years Later: Where Things Stand”, ABC news, 17 March, 2008.
IRI (2005), “Survey of Iraqi Public Opinion”, International Republican Institute, ? carried out on April
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74
11-20, 2005.
IRI (2006), “Survey of Iraqi Public Opinion”, International Republican Institute, ? carried on March 2332, 2006.
IRI (2010), “Survey of Iraqi Public Opinion”, International Republican Institute, 16 September 2010,
carried out on June 3-July 3, 2010.
IRI (2010), “Survey of Iraqi Public Opinion”, International Republican Institute, 30 August 2010,
carried out on November 23 –December 1, 2009, December 3 –9 and 25 –31, 2009.
IRI (2011), “Survey of Northern Triangle Public Opinion, International Republican Institute, 16 June
2011, carried out on April 13-18, 2011.
IREX (2010), “Iraq Media Study National Audience Analysis”, IREX, 21 April, 2010 (irex.org).
IRQCRSS (2005), “Public Opinion Survey in Iraq”, Iraq Centre for Research & Strategic Studies,
November 2005 (www.irqcrss.org).
Secondary sources
PUBLISHED AND UNPUBLISHED SOURCES
Anderson, Liam and Gareth Stansfield (2009) Crisis in Kirkuk: The Ethnopolitics of Conflict and Compromise.
Philadelphia PA: UPenn Press.
Amnesty International, “Hope and Fear, Human rights in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq”, Amnesty International,
April 2009. (http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/MDE14/006/2009/en).
International Crisis Group (2009) “Iraq and the Kurds, Trouble along the trigger line”, Middle East Report N°88 –
8 July 2009
Bakker, Paulien (2010), ‘Een romantisch volk: verslag uit een Iraakse oliestad’, (Amsterdam/Antwerpen:
Uitgeverij Atlas), p. 87.
CPJ (2007), ‘Al-Sharqiya ordered closed in Baghdad’, CPJ, 12 January 2007
(http://www.cpj.org/2007/01/alsharqiya-ordered-closed-in-baghdad.php).
Demmers, Jolle. (2011). Theories of Violent Conflict, (London and New York: Routledge 2011). Draft
version.
Gurr, Ted Robert (1993) “Why Minorities Rebel: A Global Analysis of Communal Mobilization and
Conflict Since 1945”, International Political Science Review 14, No. 2 (Apr., 1993), pp. 161-201.
Harlz, Benedikt (2010) “Preachers of Hatred and Deformation of History: The Case of EthnoMobilization in Kosovo”, Southeastern Europe, Vol 34 (2010) 38–54
HRW (2004), “Claims in Conflict: Reversing Ethnic Cleansing in Northern Iraq”, Human Rights Watch,
2 August, 2004 (http://www.hrw.org/en/node/11985/section/1).
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HRW (2007), “Caught in the Whirlwind Torture and Denial of Due Process by the Kurdistan Security
Forces”, Human Rights Watch, July 2, 2007 (http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2007/07/02/caughtwhirlwind).
King, Charles (2007), “Power, social violence and civil wars”, in C.A. Crocker. F.O. Hampson, and P.
Aaal, eds (2007) Leashing the Dogs of War, (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press),
pp 115-130.
Leezenburg, Michiel. "Crisis in Kirkuk: Ethnopolitics of Conflict and Compromise (review)", The Middle
East Journal, Volume 64, Number 1, Winter 2010
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(Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronot, Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, INC.).
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Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings (Cambridge:
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pp. 433 – 443.
Romano, David (2007) “Future of Kirkuk”, Ethnopolitics, 6: 2, 265 — 283
Romano, David (2006) The Kurdish Nationalist Movement. Opportunity, Mobilization and Identity
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)
Rydgren, Jens & Sofi, Dana (2011: 37) “Interethnic relations in Northern Iraq. Brokerage, social capital
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v5.pdf)
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Uslu, Emre (2007), The Transformation of Kurdish Political Identity in Turkey, Impact of
Modernization, Democratization and Globalization, MA dissertation Political Science/Middle East
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Needs of Iraqi Asylum-Seekers”, August 2007 (http://www.unhcr.org/cgibin/
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ANNEX A.
ANNEX A. IRAQI MEDIA IN KIRKUK
Where
TV Channel
Kirkuk
Kirkuk TV
Kirkuk
Naba TV
Kirkuk
Dag u Yol
Kirkuk
Turkmen Eli
National
Baghdad TV
National
Al-Sharqiya
National
Rafidain or Al- Rafiden
National
Al Hurra TV / Al-Hurra IRAQ
National
National
Local
Hurriye TV (Freedom TV)
Al Rasheed or Al Rashid
PUK TV- Kirkuk TV
National
Iraqiya
National
National
Al Babelia
Arrai
National
Al Forat
National
National
National
National
National
National / Kurdistan
National / Kurdistan
National / Kurdistan
National / Kurdistan
National / Kurdistan
National / Kurdistan
Al-Alam
Al-Sumaria
Al Ayen TV
Afak TV
Ashtar TV
Kurdistan TV
Kurdsat
Zagros TV
KNN
Roj TV
NRT
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77
Background
PUK
Shiite Turkmen
Islamic
Turkmen front
Hizbi Islami – Iraqi Islamic
Party. Known as Baathist TV
among Shiites.
Sunni based in Dubai. Also
known as Al-Baath. Supportive
of Iraqiyya list. Al Bazzaz / Saudi
money. Close dby BAGHDAD.
Sunni Islamic Party /
Association Muslim Scholars
American supported Arabic
channel.
Supported by PUK and Talabani
Sunni Arab Saad Janabi
Supported by PUK / BARHAM
SALIH
Government IRAQ / now seen
as Shiite.
Salih al-Mutlak
Mashaan Jibour based in SYRIA
– Baathist
SHIITE al-Hakim – Islamic
Revolution / BACKing SISTANI
Iran Shiite
Iraq TV from Lebanon (Sunni)
Unknown
Unknown
Assyrian
KDP
PUK
KDP
Gorran opposition
PKK
Kurdish channel (semi-
National / Kurdistan
National / Kurdistan
National / Kurdistan
National
National/ Turkmen Front from
Kirkuk
International
International
National
National
Peyam TV
Speda TV
GK news
Karbala TV
Turkomenli TV
National
National
National
National
Al masar TV
Ahlul Bayt TV
Baghdadia TV
Afaq TV
National
Shafak TV
National
International
National
Al-Baghdad TV
Rusiya Today
Al-Fayhyaa TV
Local
Local
Local
Local
Local
Salah el-Din
Al Mowselya
Al Musilya
Al Masar TV
Al-Anbar TV
Al Forqan
independent). Also reports
from Kirkuk.
Komal
Yekirtu
PUK
Shia TV
Turkmen front
Al Jazeera
AL Arabiya
Al Salam TV
Al Ghadeer TV
Qatar not in Iraq
Saudi
Sadr movement
Higher Council of Islamic
Revolution
Dawa (Shia)
Hadi Al Moderassi
Sunni
Sunni Iraqi Islamic Party and
SADR
KRG govt supported channel in
Arabic.
Sunni
Russian ARABIC
Sunni
American [sunni
American [sunni]
Governor [Sunni]
American [ sunni]
Islamic party
ANNEX B. DEMONSTRATIONS IN KIRKUK 2004-2011
Information based on data collected from the Provincial Joint Operations Centre (PJCC) and newspapers.
1.
Date/time
4-1-2011
Ethnic or non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
2.
8-1-2011
Non-ethnic
3.
17-1-2011
Non-ethnic
4.
24-1-2011
Non-ethnic
Where
KIRKUK city
Rahimawah
[Kurdish]
KIRKUK city
Qasim
KIRKUK city
Alton bridge
Hawija
Page
78
Number
50
Casualties
50-60
500-1000
40-50
Additional info
Electricity
Electricity
8 police
wounded
Electricity
Vendors
5.
25-1-2011
Non-ethnic
6.
7.
26-1-2011
6-2-2011
Non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
8.
7-2-2011
Non-ethnic
9.
11-2-2011
Non-ethnic
10.
12-2-2011
Non-ethnic
11.
14-2-2011
Ethnic
12.
14-2-2011
Non-ethnic
13.
15-2-2011
Non-ethnic
14.
17-2-2011
Non-ethnic
15.
17-2-2011
16.
17.
(outside)
[Arab]
KIRKUK city
Rahimawah
[Kurdish]
Kirkuk/Dubiz
KIRKUK city
Centre Kirkuk
KIRKUK city
City Council
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
200
Electricity
Services
90-100
100-120
Services/against
undersecretary
governor
Lawyers for
better job
conditions
Northern Oil
Company
?
KIRKUK city
Northern Oil
comp ARAFA
Al-Bashir
90-100
20-30
100
/jobs/security
120
Non-ethnic
KIRKUK city
Governerate
Building
KIRKUK city
Governerate
building
KIRKUK city
Health
Directorate
Hawija
Return disputed
territories [Shia
Turkmen
against Arabs.
Security
17-2-2011
21-2-2011
Non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
80-90
18.
23-2-2011
Non-ethnic
Kirkuk
23
19.
20.
21.
22.
23-2-2011
23-2-2011
25-2-2011
25-2-2011
Non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
Hawija
23.
25-2-2011
Non ethnic
Abassi
40-50
40-50
460-1500
200-300
(police)
3000
(newspap
ers)
60-75
24.
25-2-2011
Non ethnic
Riyadh
400
right of
orphans/martyr
s
ration
cards/salary
awakening
Street vendors
Students for
better services
at university
For better
gasoline
Exams school
Truck drivers
Services
Arab-dominated
district. But
demonstration
against Arab
politicians.
Arab-dominated
district.
Arab-district.
Entered govt
Page
79
400
4 killed
30-50
2-4 killed
?
25.
26-2-2011
Non ethnic
Rashaad
?
26.
26-2-2011
Non-ethnic
Riyadh
400-450
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
8-3-2011
14-3-2011
16-3-2011
18-3-2011
19-3-2011
Non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
Ethnic
Kirkuk
Kirkuk/Arafa
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
Hawija
20
30
40-50
100
200-250
32.
33.
29-3-2011
30-3-2011
Non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
50-60
75-100
34.
35.
36.
31-3-2011
4-4-2011
10-4-2011
Non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
30
25-35
250-300
37.
38.
11-4-2011
20-4-2011
Non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
15
60-70
39.
40.
23-4-2011
30-4-2011
Non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
Daquq
Kirkuk /
square
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
41.
1-5-2011
Non-ethnic
Kirkuk
?
42.
1-6-2011
Non ethnic
Kirkuk
200
43.
1-6-2011
Non ethnic
Kirkuk /
shorja
100-150
Page
80
50-60
60
/
building
Arab-district.
Services and
firing city
council
Arab-district.
services/dissolvi
ng
NOC jobs
Taxi drivers
SHIA for Bahrain
Participants
Rakaan Saad
Jibouri, Hussein
Salih, Ibrahim
Nayif, Omar
Jibouri and
Abdullah (MPS)
and Tribes
Abdel-Rahman,
Yasser Dhari alAwad and
Mohammed
Hassan alJumaili) against
Kurds
shop owners
pharmacies/lab
otaory
cement factory
salary cement
electricity
students
Services
services
services
Services by
NGOs
Small
demonstration
against
corruption and
for services
For release of
kidnapped
Kurdish sheikh
(religious figure)
services
44.
2-6-2011
Non-ethnic
Kirkuk /
40-50
45.
46.
47.
2-6-2011
2-6-2011
5-6-2011
Non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
50-60
100-125
45-50
48.
49.
8-6-2011
10-6-2011
Non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
Kirkuk/dumiz
Kirkuk
35-40
75-100
50.
23-6-2011
Ethnic
Kirkuk/
90-100
51.
26-6-2011
Non-ethnic
60-70
52.
53.
54.
55.
28-6-2011
29-6-2011
30-6-2011
10-1-2010
Non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
Kirkuk/road
erbil
Kirkuk
Kirkuk/arafa
Kirkuk/arafa
Hawija
30
80-100
600
56.
9-2-2010
Non-ethnic
Hawija
?
57.
58.
59.
12-2-2010
18-2-2010
21-2-2010
Non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
20-25
?
100-150
60.
27-2-2010
Non-ethnic
Kirkuk
?
61.
62.
63.
9-3-2010
14-3-2010
29-3-2010
Non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
Ethnic
Kirkuk
Kirkuk/Taze
Kirkuk
15-20
?
12 injured
64.
29-4-2010
Non-ethnic
Hawija
50
65.
66.
2-5-2010
13-5-2010
Non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
100-125
30-40
67.
20-5-2010
Non-ethnic
Kirkuk
40-50
Page
81
Services/electric
ity/water
Electricity
Generators
For release of
Sheikh
Services/anticorruption
TURKMEN
schools
Services
Repair wires
Bus drivers
Bus drivers
Against
cancelling of
NATIONAL
dialogue front
candidate
[debaathificatio
n]
For salary of
Sahwa
Services
Against
statements of
canceling
martyr ministry
Christian for
Christian
Salary
electricity
Clash/protest
Turkmen and
Kurdish
students at
technical
institute
Release of
prisoners
electricity jobs
Protest against
killing student
Zardast Osman
by Kurds
Services/electric
ity
68.
30-5-2010
Non-ethnic
Kirkuk
50
69.
70.
71.
31-5-2010
3-6-2010
3-6-2010
Non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
100
1500
200
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
19-7-2010
21-7-2010
22-7-2010
22-7-2010
28-7-2010
30-7-2010
30-7-2010
1-8-2010
3-8-2010
Non ethnic
Non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
UNCLEAR
Non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
150-200
200-250
200-250
200-250
200-250
60-70
40-50
100
?
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
10-8-2010
12-8-2010
13-8-2010
13-8-2010
13-8-2010
14-8-2010
Non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
Kirkuk/shorji
a
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
87.
88.
89.
90.
15-8-2010
16-8-2010
20-8-2010
29-8-2010
Non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
35-45
200
100-125
?
91.
92.
93.
94.
17-9-2010
26-9-2010
2-10-2010
3-10-2010
Non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
UNCLEAR
Non-ethnic
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
20-25
45-50
?
20
95.
8-10-2010
Non-ethnic
Kirkuk
50-60
96.
24-10-2010
Non-ethnic
Kirkuk
?
97.
7-11-2010
UNCLEAR
Kirkuk
700
98.
25-11-2010
Non-ethnic
Kirkuk
60-70
99. 30-11-2010
100. 19-12-2010
Non-ethnic
Ethnic
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
15-20
750-1000
Page
82
35
500
30-40
75-100
200-300
?
Water/electirict
y
Water/services
Electricity
Attack on GAZA
Israel
denounced
Islamic party
Against Israel
Street vendors
Vendors
Electricity
Kurds for
services
Services
Services
Services
Electricity
Services
Kurds
demonstrate for
services
Services
Services
Services
Kurds for
services
Services
Services
Radio
Students
reexamination
Demand
formation of
government
Against private
security
company
Blackwater
Outstanding
land claims
Against violence
against women
Students
Turkmen
demonstrate for
making Hassan
Torhan
provincial
council
chairman.
101. 22-12-2010
102. 26-12-2010
Non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
150-200
300
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
Non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
Hawija
150-250
250-300
350-400
350-400
?
50-75
109. 26-6-2009
Ethnic
Kirkuk
300-400
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
26-6-2009
28-6-2009
14-7-2009
22-7-2009
26-7-2009
Non-ethnic
Non ethnic
Non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
Hawija
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
??
20-30
500-700
60-65
?
115. 5-8-2009
116. 10-8-2009
Non-ethnic
Ethnic
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
?
225-250
117. 31-8-2009
118. 5-9-2009
Non-ethnic
Ethnic
Kirkuk
Hawija
90-100
1000-1500
119. 8-9-2009
120. 11-9-2009
121. 12-9-2009
Non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
Ethnic
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
60-100
150-200
450-500
1-1-2009
3-1-2009
8-1-2009
16-1-2009
25-3-2009
21-6-2009
Page
83
Graduate
students
Shia
Shia
Against Israel
Against Israel
athletes
Against city
council and for
release of
prisoners
Pro-Turkmen
protect
Turkmen
Farmers
Generator
Farmers/worker
s
Services
(assembly
Cultural Council
tribes) have
ranged in
number
between the
(225 250)
people in the
neighborhood
Wasiti near the
filling station
(friends) to form
an advisory
council Arab
Sunni and
Shiites in Kirkuk)
– no demo
Salary
Arab against
joint forces
services
water
Turkomen
protest against
joint forces
122. 1-10-2009
123. 1-10-2009
Non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
?
400-450
124. 6-10-2009
125. 8-10-2009
Non-ethnic
Ethnic
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
?
75-100
126. 10-10-2009
Non-ethnic
Kirkuk
100
127. 19-10-2009
Ethnic
Kirkuk
128. 22-10-2009
129. 24-10-2009
130. 31-10-2009
Non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
Ethnic
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
75-100
60-75
131. 1-11-2009
Non-ethnic
Kirkuk
100-150
132.
133.
134.
135.
12-11-2009
18-11-2009
24-11-2009
9-12-2009
Non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
Kirkuk/Taze
60
>?
60
50
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
9-12-2009
11-12-2009
20-12-2009
22-12-2009
22-12-2009
Non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
Hawija
50-60
?>
50-60
40-50
200
141. 24-12-2009
Non-ethnic
Kirkuk
200
142. 12-1-2008
Ethnic
Kirkuk
40-50
143. 27-1-2008
144. 29-1-2008
Non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
?
50+29
145. 3-2-2008
Ethnic
Kirkuk
100-150
146. 19-2-2008
147. 19-2-2008
148. 20-2-2008
Non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
Ethnic
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
200-250
40
800
Page
84
Jobs at NOC
Religious/ethini
c? Shia for
execution of
terrorists
bus drivers
Turkomen
language license
plates
Shia for Sistani
and elections
Against transfer
Kurdish schools
Workers
Water
Arab in front of
PUK-office
reject
postponement
elections.
Electricity and
water
Students
Students
Taxis
Compensation
terrorist attack
(by Kurds)
Power
Vendors
Gas
Against Iranian
occupation
FAKKAH
Students against
dean
Against Turkish
bombing (by
Kurds)
Wages
For return
police chief
Kurdish for
article 140
Shops
Students
Kurdish art 140
/ against Turkish
aggression
149. 26-2-2008
Ethnic
Kirkuk
90-150
150. 27-2-2008
Ethnic
Kirkuk
30-35
151. 27-2-2008
Ethnic
Kirkuk
100-125
152. 28-2-2008
Ethnic
Kirkuk
150-200
153. 1-3-2008
Ethnic
Kirkuk/Arafa
200-290
154. 5-3-2008
Ethnic
Kirkuk
150-200
155. 9-3-2008
Ethnic
Kirkuk
300
156. 10-3-2008
Ethnic
Kirkuk
?
157. 11-3-2008
Ethnic
Kirkuk
40-50
158. 23-3-2008
Ethnic
Kirkuk
80-100
159. 10-4-2008
160. 20-5-2008
Non-ethnic
Ethnic
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
125-150
50
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
26-5-2008
30-5-2008
1-6-2008
9-6-2008
17-6-2008
30-6-2008
14-7-2008
Non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
Non ethnic
Non-ethnic
Ethnic
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
Hawija
100-120
100-110
40-50
65-75
25-30
125-150
1500
168. 22-7-2008
169. 24-7-2008
Non-ethnic
Ethnic
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
100-150
75-100
170. 28-7-2008
Ethnic
Kirkuk
150200.000
171. 28-7-2008
Ethnic
Hawija
?
Page
85
Kurdish Against
Turkey
Kurdish Against
Turkey
Kurdish Against
Turkey
KDP Women
Union against
Turkey
Turkmen
allegedly against
Turkish
intervention,
likely Kurdish
Kurdish - Art
140 union
workers
Kurdish - Art
140
Demo against
Kurdish control
Kirkuk Kurdish
art 140
Kurdish –
Massacre –
language at
schools.
23-25
killed, 56
wounded
Turkomen for
seats
Sadrists
Jobs
Salary
Jobs
Jobs
Power
Against
inclusion of
Kirkuk Kurdistan
and joined by
chairman Abu
Saddam.
Rejecting
elections
students jobs
Ethnic against
prov law
Kurdish ,
suicide bomber.
Against art 24,
Against Kirkuk
172. 2-8-2008
Ethnic
Kirkuk
800-900
173. 6-8-2008
Ethnic
Kirkuk
?
174. 7-8-2008
Non-ethnic
Kirkuk
45-50
175. 08-8-2008
Ethnic
Kirkuk
?
176. 12-10-2008
Non-ethnic
Kirkuk
60-70
177. 19-10-2008
Non-ethnic
Kirkuk
?
178. 15-11-2008
Ethnic
Hawija
2500-3000
179. 22-11-2008
180. 26-11-2008
Non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
?
150
181. 16-12-2008
Non-ethnic
Hawija
125-150
182. 17-12-2008
Non-ethnic
Hawija
400-500
183. 17-12-2008
184. 21-12-2008
185. 28-12-2008
Non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
Non ethnic
Riyad
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
250-300
50-75
200
186. 30-12-2008
187. 30-12-2008
Non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
Hawija
Kirkuk
40-50
200
188. 28-1-2007
189. 7-2-2007
Non-ethnic
Ethnic
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
150
150-200
190. 8-2-2007
Ethnic
Kirkuk
?
191. 15-2-2007
Ethnic
Kirkuk
500
Page
86
becoming part
of Kurdistan
Arabs Against
annexing Kirkuk
to Kurdistan. In
favour of article
24.
Kurds against
Provincial
Election Law 23
Against transfer
of Iraqi army
brigadier-gen
Turkmen
against UNAMI,
accused UNAMI
pro-Kurdish
Christian against
terrorist attacks
in Mosul
Kurds in support
of Christians
In support of
Isnad councils of
Maliki and
against art 140
Agriculture
salary police
NOC
For release
journalist
Release
journalist
Journalist
Journalist
Islamic party
against Israel gaza
Against Israel
Against building
mosque
Power
Against article
140. Arab or
Turkoman?
Celebration
square.
Kurds for article
140
Arab tribes
march against
192. 22-2-2007
193. 24-2-2007
Non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
50
50
194. 3-3-2007
Non-ethnic
Abassi
500
195. 4-3-2007
Non-ethnic
Kirkuk/Taze
100-150
196. 15-3-2007
197. 19-3-2007
198. 6-5-2007
Non-ethnic
Ethnic
Non-ethnic
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
50
300
?
199. 6-5-2007
Ethnic
Kirkuk
?
200. 6-5-2007
Non-ethnic
Kirkuk/Taza
150
201. 9-5-2007
202. 9-5-2007
Non-ethnic
Ethnic
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
150
203. 14-5-2007
Non-ethnic
Kirkuk
150-200
204. 11-7-2007
205. 28-8-2007
206. 18-10-2007
Non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
Ethnic
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
?
100-200
50-100
207. 21-10-2007
Ethnic
Kirkuk
40-50
208. 22-10-2007
Ethnic
Kirkuk
2500
209. 17-11-2007
210. 16-12-2007
211. 17-12-2007
Non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
Ethnic
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
100
100
212. 1-1-2006
213. 1-1-2006
214. 22-1-2006
Non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
Ethnic
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
Kirkuk/Taze
300
?
?
215. 28-1-2006
Non-ethnic
Kirkuk
?
Page
87
decision to
deport Arabs
Street vendors
Against arrest of
Ammar alHakim. Probable
Shiites.
Arab district.
Against arrest of
detainee by U.S.
Release
prisoner
Wages
?
Against former
regime 1982
Kurdistan
Women Union
Against
terrorism
Transactions
Arab for legal
rights of Arabs
in prisons
Against U.S.
forces killing
citizen
Shops
Grocers
Against Turkish
incursion by
Kurds
Against Turkish
incursion by
Kurds
Against Turkish
incursion by
Kurds
Shops
Teachers
Kurds for
Kurdistan
Health services
?
Kurdish for
preserving 4th
division Iraqi
army
Islamist / AntiDenmark /
prophet
216. 3-2-2006
Non-ethnic
Kirkuk
250
217. 7-2-2006
Non-ethnic
Kirkuk
125
218. 8-2-2006
Non-ethnic
Kirkuk
600
219. 8-2-2006
Non-ethnic
Kirkuk
1000
220. 11-2-2006
Non-ethnic
Kirkuk
60
221. 12-2-2006
222. 15-2-2006
Non-ethnic
Ethnic
Kirkuk/Arafa
Kirkuk
?
?
223. 17-2-2006
Non-ethnic
Kirkuk
?
224. 17-2-2006
Non-ethnic
Kirkuk
?
225. 22-2-2006
Non-ethnic
Kirkuk
100
226. 22-2-2006
Non-ethnic
Kirkuk
400
227. 22-2-2006
Non-ethnic
Kirkuk
2000
228. 24-2-2006
Non-ethnic
Kirkuk
?
229. 1-3-2006
230. 28-3-2006
Non-ethnic
Ethnic
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
50-60
400-500
231. 8-4-2006
Non-ethnic
Kirkuk
300-350
232. 14-6-2006
Non-ethnic
Kirkuk/Taze
100-150
233. 14-7-2006
Non-ethnic
Kirkuk
400
Page
88
cartoons
Islamist / AntiDenmark /
prophet
cartoons
Islamist / AntiDenmark /
prophet
cartoons
Shiite march
Hussein
Shiite march
Hussein
Islamist / AntiDenmark /
prophet
cartoons
?
PKK – Turkish
Kurds for Öcalan
Islamist / AntiDenmark /
prophet
cartoons
Islamist / AntiDenmark /
prophet
cartoons
Shiite against
bombing of
Shiite shrine
Shiite against
bombing of
Shiite shrine
Shiite against
bombing of
Shiite shrine
Shiite against
bombing of
Shiite shrine
Gas owners
Turkmen
against Kurds
(Turkmen
martyr day)
Sadr movement
for PM
Against
terrorists
Against Israeli
offense against
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
16-7-2006
28-7-2006
12-8-2006
15-8-2006
21-8-2006
7-9-2006
Non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
Ethnic
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
Kirkuk/Shorja
Hawija
?
?
?
?
?
1200
240. 11-10-2006
Ethnic
Kirkuk
?
241. 17-10-2006
Ethnic
Hawija
500
242. 5-11-2006
Ethnic
Hawija
80-100
243. 5-11-2006
Ethnic
Riyadh
900-1000
244. 6-11-2006
Ethnic
Hawija
100-200
245. 7-11-2006
Ethnic
Hawija
300-350
246. 8-11-2006
247. 27-11-2006
Ethnic
Ethnic
Kirkuk
Hawija
50-60
250
248. 27-11-2006
Ethnic
Kirkuk/Arafa
450-500
249. 12-12-2006
Ethnic
Kirkuk
250-300
250. 19-12-2006
251. 24-12-2006
Ethnic
Ethnic
Hawija
Kirkuk
75-90
?
252. 30-12-2006
Ethnic
Kirkuk
?
253. 29-12-2006
Ethnic
Kirkuk/Taze
250-300
Page
89
Hezbollah
Taxi drivers
Drivers
Services
Benzine
?
Against death
sentence
Saddam &
dividing Iraq
Turkmen
against article
140/normalizati
on
Arab tribes
against Kurdish
demands
federalism/sadd
am trial
Against death
sentence
Saddam
Against death
sentence
Saddam
Against death
sentence
Saddam
Against death
sentence
Saddam
Kurdish school
Against arrest
warrant of
Sheikh Harith alDari
Women
union/Kurds
demanding
article 140
implementation
Art 140 /
against Baker
report by Kurds
Services
Kurdish march
for article 140
Turkmen
Woman march
Support death
sentence
254. 31-12-2006
Ethnic
Hawija
?
255. 3-1-2005
256. 1-2-2005
257. 2-2-2005
Non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
Ethnic
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
Hawija
?
150
10,00015,000
258. 11-2-2005
259. 26-2-2005
Non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
Kirkuk
Hawija
500-600
100
260. 2-3-2005
Ethnic
Hawija
?
261. 3-3-2005
Ethnic
Kirkuk
25
262. 5-3-2005
Ethnic
Kirkuk
60
263. 13-2-2005
Ethnic
Kirkuk
264. 6-3-2005
265. 9-3-2005
Ethnic
Non-ethnic
Kirkuk
Hawija
?
?
266. 15-3-2005
267. 18-3-2005
Non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
200
?
268. 4-4-2005
Non-ethnic
Kirkuk
250
269. 23-5-2005
Ethnic
Kirkuk
?
270. 25-5-2005
Non-ethnic
Kirkuk
271. 4-7-2005
Non-ethnic
Kirkuk
1500
272. 3-8-2005
Non-ethnic
Kirkuk
50
273. 3-8-2005
Non-ethnic
Kirkuk
?
Page
90
Against
execution
Bus drivers
?
Non-arrival
election papers
[Arab blame
Kurds for this]
Shiite
Protest against
arrest of
director by
coalition forces
Arabs
demonstrate
against Kurds
[elections]
Martyrs of
Turkmen
Kurds for rights
deported Kurds
Turkmen
against election
results (against
Kurds)
Turkmen
University
protest
Shiite march
Against school
director
Badr against
release of
former
members
regime (Shiite
protest)
Arabs and
Turkmen
against Kurds
Shiites march
against Sunni
Arabs
Release general
arrested by
coalition forces
Strike for
salaries at
hospital
Strike for
salaries at
274. 20-8-2005
Ethnic
Kirkuk
400-500
275. 15-8-2005
Ethnic
Kirkuk
?
276. 20-8-2005
Ethnic
Hawija
200
277. 25-8-2005
Ethnic
Rashaad
2000
278. 25-8-2005
Ethnic
Kirkuk
500
279. 26-8-2005
Ethnic
Riyadh
2000
280. 26-8-2005
Non-ethnic
Kirkuk
500-600
281. 27-8-2005
UNCLEAR
Kirkuk
1000
282. 9-7-2005
283. 11-8-2005
284. 25-8-2005
Non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
Ethnic
Kirkuk
25
Kirkuk/Daquq 60-70
Hawija
?
285. 20-10-2005
Non-ethnic
Hawija
200
286. 25-10-2005
287. 27-10-2005
288. 30-10-2005
Non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
Ethnic
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
?
45
?
289. 19-12-2005
290. 29-12-2005
Non-ethnic
Ethnic
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
150-200
300 of 350
Page
91
hospital
Rejection of
federalism
(probable Arab
or Turkmen)
Kurds march to
annex Kirkuk to
Kurdistan
Against
constitution and
federalism
[against Kurdish
demand for
federalism by
Arabs]
Against
federalism
[against Kurds
by Arabs]
Turkmen
demanding
lands back
stolen by
former regime
Against
federalism
[against Kurds
by Arabs]
Shiites for
services
Probable ethnic
(ask for
participation in
referendum)
Salaries
Services
Arabs and Sadr
movement
against Kurdish
demands.
Against Saddam
trial
Shiites
Students
Students march
for Kurdish
education in
schools.
Services
Rerun elections
by Arabs or
Turkmen
Services/gas
Arab and
Turkmen
protest against
election results
[Kurdish
achieved
majority seats]
Sadr/Arabs
against Kurdish
claims
300 Arab tribal
chiefs march
against
federalism
291. 29-12-2005
292. 31-12-2005
Non-ethnic
Ethnic
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
100
Hundreds
293. 1-1-2004
Ethnic
Kirkuk
Thousands
294. 27-1-2004
Ethnic
Kirkuk
300
295. 1-4-2004
296. 2-4-2004
Non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
?
?
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
UNCLEAR
UNCLEAR
UNCLEAR
Non-ethnic
Ethnic
Riyadh
Hawija
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
?
?
?
302. 7-8-2003
Non-ethnic
Kirkuk
303.
304.
305.
306.
13-8-2004
18-8-2004
22-8-2004
23-8-2004
Non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
Ethnic
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
?
?
?
307. 25-9-2004
Non-ethnic
Kirkuk
?
308.
309.
310.
311.
11-6-2004
11-10-2004
16-12-2004
17-12-2004
Non-ethnic
UNCLEAR
Non-ethnic
Ethnic
Kirkuk
Hawija
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
?
?
?
?
312. 19-12-2004
Non-ethnic
Kirkuk/shorja
150-200
313. 29-12-2004
314. 29-12-2004
315. 18-3-2003
Non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
Non-ethnic
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
300-350
100
316. 23-8-2003
Ethnic
Kirkuk
?
?
317. 22-9-2003
Ethnic
Hawija
500
1 killed
2-4-2004
2-4-2004
2-4-2004
7-5-2004
11-5-2004
Page
92
Students/educa
tion
Kurds against
terror targeting
Christians
Christians
against
terrorism
Turkmen Front
against Kurd
Shiite
Arab district
Shiites
Kurds for article
TAL 58
Services/by
Kurds
Services
Against
American forces
Turkmen
against Kurdish
claims
Pro-Saddam
318. 22-12-2003
Ethnic
Kirkuk
?
319. 30-12-2003
Ethnic
Kirkuk
?
3 killed, 1520
wounded
Hussein
Kurds for article
10 and
Kurdistan
annexation
Turkmen party
against Kurds
(PUK)
Non-ethnic protests: Protests not related to ethnic identity (Arab, Turkmen or Kurdish) or the disputes between
Kurdish nationalists and actors opposing them. Kurdish nationalist demonstrations against Turkey were also
included. Confessional demonstrations (for instance Shiite demonstrations against Sunnis, Christians against antiChristian violence or Islamist demonstrations against Israel) are not counted.
Additional information about demonstrations was collected from newspapers. According to police information
there were 277 demonstrations between 2004-2011.
Page
93