Punjab Education Sector Programme 2
(PESP 2)
2013-2018
Business Case
November 2012
Table of Contents
Abbreviations & Acronyms .............................................................................................................. 3
Project Intervention Summary ........................................................................................................ 7
1. Strategic Case .......................................................................................................................... 10
A.
Context and Need for DFID Intervention ............................................................................ 10
B.
Impact and Outcome ......................................................................................................... 18
2. Appraisal Case.......................................................................................................................... 21
A.
Critical Success Criteria..................................................................................................... 21
B.
Feasible Options................................................................................................................ 21
C.
Evidence for Impact of Options .......................................................................................... 39
D.
Costs and Benefits of Options .............................................. Error! Bookmark not defined.
E.
Assessment of Value for Money ........................................................................................ 50
F.
Summary Value for Money Statement ............................................................................... 50
3. Commercial Case ..................................................................................................................... 51
A.
Procurement/Commercial Requirements ........................................................................... 51
B.
Value for Money ................................................................................................................ 51
C.
Market Place Response..................................................................................................... 52
D.
Cost Drivers....................................................................................................................... 53
E.
Procurement Process ........................................................................................................ 53
F.
Managing Performance ..................................................................................................... 54
4. Financial Case .......................................................................................................................... 56
A.
How Much Will it Cost? ...................................................................................................... 56
B.
How Will it Be Funded? ..................................................................................................... 57
C.
How Will Funds Be Paid Out?............................................................................................ 57
D.
What is the Assessment of Financial Risk and Fraud? ...................................................... 59
E.
How Will Expenditure Be Monitored, Reported and Accounted For? ................................. 61
5. Management Case .................................................................................................................... 64
A.
Management Arrangements .............................................................................................. 64
B.
Risk Management.............................................................................................................. 67
C.
Conditionality ..................................................................................................................... 73
D.
Monitoring Evaluation and Research ................................................................................. 74
Bibliography .................................................................................................................................. 81
2
Abbreviations& Acronyms
ADP
Annual Development Programme
ASER
Annual Status of Education Report
BAR
Bilateral Aid Review
BCR
Benefit to Cost Ratio
BERs
Budget Execution Reports
BISP
Benazir Income Support Programme
BSG
Basic Services Group
CA
Continuous Audit
CGS
Credit Guarantee Scheme
CIDA
Canadian International Development Agency
CPDP
Continuous Professional Development Programme
CSC
Critical Success Criteria
CSR
Comprehensive Spending Review
CSO
Civil Society Organisations
DLI
Disbursement Linked Indicator
DPI
Directorate of Public Instruction
DSD
Directorate of Staff Development
EA
External Audit
EAD
Economic Affairs Division
EDO
Executive District Officers
EEP
Eligible Expenditure Programme
EFO
Externally Funded Output
EFS
Education Fund for Sindh
EoL
Exchange of Letters
EVS
Education Voucher Scheme
FAS
Foundation Assisted Schools
FCPD
Finance and Corporate Performance Division
FIP
Financial Inclusion Programme
3
FRA
Financial Risk Assessment
GDP
Gross Domestic Product
GoPb
Government of Punjab
IA
Internal Audit
IDA
International Development Association
IDEAL
Intensive District Approach to Education for All
IFC
International Finance Corporation
IFRs
Interim Financial Reports
IRR
Internal Rate of Return
KESP
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Education Sector Programme
LCPS
Low Cost Private Schools
LPDs
Low Performing Districts
LUMS
Lahore University of Management Sciences
MDG
Millennium Development Goal
NER
Net Enrolment Ratio
NGO
Non-Governmental Organisation
NOP
National Outreach Programme
NSP
New Schools Programme
P&D
Planning & Development
PAD
Project Appraisal Document
PCF
Provincial Consolidated Fund
PEAS
Provincial Education Assessment Systems
PEC
Punjab Examination Commission
PEEF
Punjab Education Endowment Fund
PEF
Punjab Education Foundation
PEFA
Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability
PERR
Punjab Education Reform Roadmap
PESP 1& 2
Punjab Education Sector Programme
PESRP
Punjab Education Sector Reform Programme
4
PFM
Public Financial Management
PMIU
Programme Management and Implementation Unit
PPP
Public-Private Partnerships
PrG
Procurement Group
RAM
Risk Assessment Matrix
SBP
State Bank of Pakistan
SBS
Sector Budget Support
SED
School Education Department
SNG
Sub-National Governance
TA
Technical Assistance
TACE
Technical Assistance Consulting Engineering
TAMO
Technical Assistance Management Organisation
TEP
Transforming Education in Pakistan
TFR
Total Fertility Rate
TPV
Third Party Validations
WASH
Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
5
List of Contributors
Department for International Development
Andrew Keith, Economic Advisor
Asghar Ali, Manager, Education Policy and Programme
Debbie Palmer, Head, Basic Services Group
Deirdre Watson, Senior Education Advisor, Afghanistan and Pakistan
Iftikhar Ahmad, Infrastructure Advisor
Mazhar Siraj, Social Development Advisor
Javed Ahmed Malik, Education Advisor
Joanne Simpson, Deputy Head, Basic Services Group
Ross Ferguson, Private Sector Development Advisor
Max Gasteen, Research and Evidence Advisor
Nighat un Nisa, Programme Manager
Omar Mukhtar Khan, Governance Advisor
Sarah Hawkes, Team Leader, Results and Programme Planning
Shakeel Ahmed, Assistant Programme Officer
Victoria Collis, Team Leader, Provincial Delivery (Education)
Zulfiqar Ahmed, Governance Advisor
External Contributors
CIDA Education Team for Pakistan
World Bank Education Team for Pakistan
Arif Naveed, Political Economy Analyst
Arshad Waheed, Social Development Specialist
Ayaz Khan, Infrastructure Specialist
Maliha Hamid Hussain, Economist
Rizwan Mehboob, Governance Specialist
Saleem Malik, Civil Society Specialist
Shafiq Hussain, Infrastructure Specialist
Steve Jones, Consultant
6
Project Intervention Summary
What support will the UK provide?
The Punjab Education Sector Programme (PESP 2) will build on the UK’s previous support to the
Government of Punjab (GoPb), to reform and transform delivery of education in Punjab. It will
complement the UK-supported Punjab Education Reform Roadmap.
In addition to working through government to ensure every child in Punjab has access to a good
quality education, PESP 2 will focus on eleven districts identified as low performing compared with
the rest of the province. Through a range of innovative interventions with the government, private
sector and civil society organisations (CSOs), the programme will deliver equitable access to better
quality education across the whole province.
How much funding does the UK expect to provide?
The UK will provide up to £350.3 million over six years between 2012/13 and 2017/18.
What need are we trying to address?
Punjab is Pakistan’s biggest province and home to over 100 million people – around 56% of the
country’s population. In spite of sustained efforts to reform education over the past decade, the
number of out of school children remains substantial and the quality of education delivered through
the public school system is poor. 22% of girls and 19% of boys are out of school. There is an acute
need to address the challenges arising from multiple forms of social exclusion, particularly in
eleven districts, chiefly located in rural southern Punjab. While there has been progress on gender
equality in education in other parts of the province, girls remain markedly disadvantaged in these
districts, as do the poorest children and those with disabilities.
In spite of recent progress, there are a number of binding constraints to transformative reform of
education in Punjab. These include finding a long term solution to managing politically motivated
teacher transfers, rationalising the distribution of teachers across the province, and establishing a
credible system to assess the quality of teaching and learning. The Chief Minister’s Education
Reform Road Map (led by DFID’s Special Representative for Education in Pakistan) will directly
complement PESP 2’s work to unlock these, by fostering the political will needed for reform.
PESP 2 will comprise seven components. First, a Sector Budget Support (SBS) component will
provide funds to the GoPb to improve access to education and improve its quality in public schools.
The public school system has the largest reach in the province, particularly in rural areas, where
most out of school children, especially girls, live. SBS will be aligned with the World Bank Project
Appraisal Document (PAD) finalised in March 2012 and also supported by the Canadian
International Development Authority (CIDA). Tranche releases will be subject to evidence of
satisfactory progress made by government on a range of agreed indicators, including tackling
binding constraints to systemic reform.
Working through communities and focusing on rural southern Punjab, a school infrastructure
component will upgrade facilities in existing public schools ensuring they are fit for purpose. The
evidence from other provinces is that engaging school councils in infrastructure programmes to
upgrade facilities both reduces costs and increases quality. Infrastructure is not part of the PAD
and using the SBS model for infrastructure is a blunt targeting tool with high corruption risks.
Therefore infrastructure will be managed through a separate technical assistance component.
7
A third component will help build the capacity and quality of Punjab’s burgeoning low cost private
sector, which is mainly concentrated in urban areas. This will focus on significantly expanding the
capacity of the Punjab Education Foundation (PEF), which is currently operating at the limits of its
capacity. Given PEF’s capacity constraints, the programme will also pilot a credit guarantee
scheme through a fourth, access to finance component, focused on expanding low cost private
sector schools in under-served areas.
Recognising that poverty, lack of parental awareness of the value of education, and gender-based
discrimination are all key barriers to education in rural southern Punjab, a fifth component will
explicitly seek to tackle social exclusion and inequity by providing targeted support through civil
society in eleven low performing districts. Other components will also contribute, through a strong
focus on equitable expenditure and delivery, stipends for girls to encourage better rates of
transition to secondary education, including children with disabilities in mainstream schools, and
empowering school councils. The issue of school location for hard to reach children will be tackled
through PEF’s New Schools Programme and support to low-cost private middle schools. The
programme will also explore innovative solutions in rural areas such as community schooling and
transport. A sixth component, a scholarship programme for university level study and girl’s higher
secondary education will target the poorest, creating role models, and demonstrating the value of
education.
A seventh and final component, technical assistance, will underpin delivery of the other six
components.
Who will be implementing this programme?
PESP 2 will be implemented by a number of partners, including the Government of Punjab through
the School Education Department (SED) and its agencies, particularly the Punjab Education
Foundation (PEF). Other key partners will include the private sector and civil society organisations.
Implementing organisations will include two technical assistance teams, one focused on school
infrastructure, and the other on providing support to the government and other partners to help
deliver the broader programme. Both organisations will sub-contract specialist suppliers as
required to deliver the programme.
What will change as a result of our support?
Over six years, the UK’s investment in PESP 2 will help enrol 2.9 million new students, of which
71% will be girls. 1.1 million will be directly attributable to DFID including many of Punjab’s poorest
and most marginalised children, particularly girls. The programme will help increase primary
completion rates from 78% to 90%, build more than 15,000 classrooms, and provide missing
facilities for over 10,000 schools.
In addition, the UK’s support to the Government of Punjab will have a significant impact on tackling
the binding constraints to reform, and improving the quality of teaching and learning outcomes.
Structural reforms will impact positively on future cohorts of children in schools across Punjab.
What outputs will we be able to attribute to UK support?
1. Better managed, more accountable education system.
2. Better teacher performance and better teaching in the classroom.
8
3. Better learning environment in all schools.
4. More schools, with a focus on low performing districts.
5. Enhanced demand for quality education from parents.
How will we determine whether the expected results have been achieved?
PESP 2 will invest in a range of evaluation and research, serving three purposes. It will: (i)
increase understanding of the dynamics of Punjab’s education system, and demonstrate the
impact of DFID’s investment; (ii) test innovative approaches to tackling entrenched issues, and use
this evidence to scale up successful interventions; and (iii) contribute to the global evidence base
on education.
9
1. Strategic Case
A. Context and Need for DFID Intervention
Overarching Context
1.
Pakistan declared an education emergency in 2011.1 Only 88% of the country’s children
enter school on time, while half of those drop out before finishing primary school. Nearly a
quarter of children aged between 7 and 16 have no education at all.2 Many children who are
in school fail to learn, with almost two thirds of rural schoolchildren unable to read a story.3
2.
To reach its education Millennium Development Goal (MDG), Pakistan needs to quadruple
the rate at which it is increasing enrolment, while rapidly improving quality to keep children in
school.4 In particular, it needs to focus on girls, who continue to suffer pronounced
educational disadvantages5 in spite of Pakistan’s commitment to eliminate gender disparity in
education (MDG3).6 At current rates of progress, it is unlikely that the education MDG will be
met in full within 20 years.7
3.
The UK’s top priority in Pakistan is to help deliver better quality education to those who need
it most. It aims to support 4 million children in school by 2015, and be part of a concerted
effort to ensure Pakistan makes rapid progress towards ensuring that all children, particularly
girls and other marginalised groups receive a quality education.
4.
Pakistan cannot hope to end its education emergency without a substantial, rapid, and
sustained increase in the quantity and quality of schooling in Punjab. Punjab is the largest of
Pakistan’s provinces, comprising 56% of the country’s population, and currently contributes
58% of Pakistan’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP).8By improving education, the UK will
increase life chances for children, youth and their families; strengthen Pakistan’s long term
economic competitiveness; and make an important contribution to security. Improving
delivery of basic services and making the state relevant is a core pillar of the UK’s strategy
for engagement in Pakistan.
5.
As a result of its size, Punjab has the highest number of out of school children
(approximately 6 million9) aged 6-16 years, and the highest number of children with low
learning levels in Pakistan. Calculating the impact of the proposed intervention on MDG
progress at provincial level is complex, due to significant numbers of children enrolled in
grades other than the one appropriate to their age, and millions enrolled in low cost private
schools. Data on both is scant.
6.
Simple modelling undertaken by DFID Pakistan suggests that PESP 2 will deliver an
improvement of 6 percentage points in the NER by 2015 with a further 5 percentage points
occurring through growth in private sector enrolment outside of PESP 2. This increase of
2.75 percentage points each year represents a clear break from the trend from 1998 to 2010
when enrolment increased by an average of 1.4 percentage points each year. Based on
progress in the last 18 months, we assess this to be a challenging, but achievable target,
which will raise the NER from 70% in 2011/12 to 81% in 2015/16 and the participation rate
from 85% in 2011/12 to 92% in 2015/16. If this trend can then be sustained, the MDG for
primary education will be met in full by 2023/24.
7.
Successive governments in Punjab have remained committed to education reform
programmes. In the last 18 months, the Punjab Education Reform Roadmap has
10
successfully harnessed this, engaging political leaders personally to support reforms. DFID’s
Special Representative for Education in Pakistan visits every 2 months (pro bono) to review
progress on access, retention, completion and quality with the Chief Minister of Punjab. By
compiling robust data and presenting it visually to the Chief Minister the team has been able
to address tough issues like shifting from patronage to merit based appointments for key
district officials. They have also significantly strengthened Government monitoring systems
and transparency of reporting, ensuring that senior officials are held to account for progress.
Working in partnership with PESP 2, the next iteration of the Roadmap will focus on
education quality and budget issues.
Background
Progress to date
8.
Between 2004 and 2007, the Government of Punjab (GoPb) implemented the Punjab
Education Sector Reform Programme (PESRP), with support from the World Bank. PESRP
delivered systemic improvements in teacher recruitment and placement, competitive
textbook production and public financing of private schools.10 The World Bank, DFID and
CIDA provided further support to GoPb through the Punjab Education Sector Project 1
(PESP 1) between 2009 and 2012. DFID allocated up to £80 million for this programme,
which is currently being evaluated.
9.
Punjab has demonstrated progress against outcome level indicators in education between
2006/07 and 2010/11, including for girls in rural and urban areas. However, progress towards
improved enrolment at secondary level remains slower than at primary and elementary
levels, and transition rates from primary to elementary, and from elementary to secondary
schools remain low.11
Improvements in Net Enrolment Rates
Key:
80%
2010/11
64%
55%
68%
59%
50%
62%
60%
70%
2006/07
70%
13%
20%
9%
30%
30%
36%
40%
10%
0%
Primary
NER
Primary
NER (girls)
Primary NER
(girls in rural
areas)
Middle
school NER
Secondary
school NER
Figure 1: Improvements in NERPSLM Reports, Federal Bureau of Statistics.12
11
10.
Commitment to education reform in Punjab has been consistent since 2004, in spite of
changes in government. This consistency has enabled the development and strengthening of
key new institutions within Punjab’s SED, including the Programme Management and
Implementation Unit (PMIU), Directorate of Staff Development (DSD) and the Punjab
Examination Commission (PEC). Several independent agencies funded by government have
also been established, including the Punjab Education Foundation (PEF), the Provincial
Education Assessment Systems (PEAS), and the Punjab Education Endowment Fund
(PEEF). The combination of enhanced capacity and a sustained ambition to deliver on
education has positioned Punjab as one of the most progressive governments not only in
Pakistan, but in the South Asia region.
11.
In addition to this long term commitment to improving both access to education in Punjab,
and the quality of learning outcomes for girls and boys, GoPb has made progress on tackling
a range of system-level efficiency issues and binding constraints. This work has been
spearheaded by the Punjab Education Reform Roadmap (PERR), launched in April 2011 for
an initial period of two years. The PERR was established at the request of the Chief Minister
to build political commitment to the education sector and drive the pace of reform.
12.
The Roadmap process is built around a system of continuous monitoring and technical
assistance (TA) at district level, punctuated by bi-monthly stocktake meetings between the
Chief Minister and DFID’s Special Representative for Education in Pakistan. Significant
areas of progress to date have included introducing merit based appointment processes for
Executive District Officers (EDOs) for Education, and reducing teacher transfers for political
reasons. At the same time, PMIU data for the Roadmap suggests significant increases for
the year June 2011-June 2012 in student attendance13 (up 4 percentage points across the
province), teacher presence (up 8 percentage points across the province), and replacement
of basic facilities in primary schools where these are lacking (up 19 percentage points across
the province).14
Basis for developing PESP 2
13.
In 2011, GoPb sought the support of the World Bank, DFID and CIDA in the funding and
delivery of PESP 2. The World Bank completed its design work in early 2012, in close
collaboration with DFID and CIDA, and its PAD was approved on 26 April 2012. The World
Bank has allocated up to US$350 million through the International Development
Association’s (IDA) Sector Investment Credit. Based on PSLM data, the World Bank
forecasts an increase of 5 percentage points in net enrolment for girls in Punjab by 2015, and
maintenance of current enrolment levels for boys.
14.
The World Bank’s SBS for Punjab includes six areas of eligible expenditure for DFID funds:
(i) employee related expenses; (ii) grants for school councils; (iii) PEF; (iv) a stipends
programme aimed at encouraging more girls to make the transition from basic to secondary
education; (v) a performance based incentives programme for teachers; and (vi) monitoring
systems. Learning from the experience of PESP 1, the World Bank has capped employee
related expenses at up to 70% of SBS funding, to ensure sufficient resources are available
for other areas. After an initial release of $18 million, further tranches will be released in
arrears against the achievement of ten agreed Disbursement Linked Indicators (DLIs).
15.
The World Bank’s TA for Punjab, which underpins the EEP, is designed to strengthen the
PMIU’s monitoring and evaluation system including: (i) the production and management of
credible data; (ii) strengthening school councils; (iii) decentralisation of financial and
12
management functions to markaz15or school level; (iv) information dissemination and
communication to stakeholders; and (v) public financial management (PFM) and
procurement reforms.
16.
Governance and anti-corruption issues remain crucial to the success of education sector
reform in Punjab. Corruption is perceived to be very common, with some of the most visible
examples including staff absenteeism, ghost employees, illegal payments, malpractices in
procurement to influence selection process, and low quality construction. Similarly, significant
PFM issues still need to be addressed. Government spending in education has been slow
and uncertain. For example, in 2010/11, development spending in Punjab comprised
approximately 35% of allocation, although the situation improved in 2011/12, with
expenditure at around 80% of allocation.16 In recent fiduciary risk assessments, both fiduciary
and corruption risks in the education sector in Punjab have been rated as ‘substantial’.
However, this rating has been improving and is now close to ‘moderate’ which, given the
current reform trajectory, should be achieved before 2015.17
17.
In addition, institutional issues like the devolution of education to provincial and then district
level are still not settled. While there is clear improvement in transparency of recruitment for
education managers (EDOs) and teachers, teacher transfers, particularly on a temporary
basis, remain frequently connected to political affiliations. Tackling these binding constraints
to transformative reform of education will be a central feature of the UK’s on-going
investment in Punjab.
Contribution to UK strategic priorities
18.
The UK Government is committed to playing a leading role in ensuring that the world’s poor
have access to education, healthcare, nutrition, water and sanitation and other basic
services.18 UK priorities include strengthening governance and security in fragile and conflict
affected countries, with a particular focus on Pakistan. The UK is also at the forefront of
international action to improve the lives of girls and women, in particular by empowering and
educating girls.19
19.
Pakistan is a top strategic priority for the UK. In order to address the root causes of conflict
and contribute to the country’s stability and security, DFID is investing greater resources in
Pakistan’s development, while ensuring these are spent through a more coherent and
effective development programme. Education is at the centre of this investment. The UK will
support 4 million children in school by 2015,20 and be part of a concerted effort to ensure
Pakistan makes rapid progress towards ensuring all children receive a quality education.
20.
Transforming education in Pakistan has benefits that cut across the UK’s objectives for the
country. In their joint statement of 5 April 2011, the Prime Ministers of Pakistan and the UK
emphasised that education is crucial to Pakistan’s future and to unlocking opportunities for
ordinary Pakistanis. They underlined the huge potential for transformation and innovation in
schooling, as well as the social and economic benefits this would bring to future generations,
and made a joint commitment to putting education at the heart of the two countries’ bilateral
relationship.
21.
There is also some evidence that poor quality education can increase receptivity to
extremism. A Brookings report on the education system in Pakistan concluded, “Although
hard data on education and its links with militancy in Pakistan are limited, a thorough review
of the evidence indicates that the education sector and low attainment rates most likely do
13
enhance the risk of support for and direct involvement in militancy.”21 Meanwhile, improved
delivery can aid stabilisation by contributing to an improved economy, increased life chances
for children, youth and their families, and social cohesion.
22.
The UK is therefore committed to working with GoPb to help the province make significant
progress on its MDG targets on education, through reform of the sector and the provision of
universal access to quality teaching and learning for girls and boys in all parts of Punjab.
Need for DFID intervention
23.
In spite of recent improvements in enrolment in Punjab, the number of out of school children
is substantial and the quality of education delivered through the public school system
remains poor. According to DFID’s most recent household survey of Punjab, conducted by
Nielsen, 19% of boys are out of school while 22% girls are out of school.
24.
The principal factors that account for this are:(i) weak governance at district and school
levels;22(ii) geographical inequity of public expenditure and provision of schools; (iii) low
levels of teacher accountability and performance, leading to poor learning outcomes;23and
(iv) the education system’s inability to focus on children with low learning achievements or to
address social exclusion issues.
25.
PMIU data, supported by DFID field investigations, reflects a need for more than 27,000
additional classrooms in public schools to house children already enrolled. Basic facilities are
also required, including drinking water (in about 4,000 schools), sanitation (in over 5,000
thousand schools), electricity (in over 16,000 schools), boundary walls, particularly for girls’
schools (in over 6,000 schools), and basic furniture (for nearly 4 million children). The
government’s development budget for education (currently PKR 4 billion) will not be able to
meet this demand for the foreseeable future. DFID will build 15,059 additional classrooms in
existing schools and provide missing facilities to 10,187 schools during the programme. The
government will meet the remaining gap and provide additional funds for maintenance. The
government will maintain its existing annual budget for additional classrooms and missing
facilities and will also increase non-salary recurrent expenditure to make more money
available at school level.
26.
At provincial level there is strong political commitment to reform and the potential for positive
change, but efficiency savings and/or real increases in expenditure are required. Punjab
currently allocates a higher share of its provincial budget to education than any other
province in Pakistan, at around 30%.24 This percentage also compares favourably with
international norms. Yet analysis by the World Bank has shown that real expenditure on
education in Punjab stagnated between 2003/04 and 2009/10. Moreover, the upturn in the
provincial education budget for the past two years is largely accounted for by increases in
teacher salaries.
27.
In spite of recent progress there remain a number of binding constraints to systemic reform.
These include a lasting solution to politically motivated transfers, and rationalising the
distribution of teachers across the province. Average class sizes of approximately 30
students for Punjab mask an extremely wide range of teacher to student ratios. In addition, a
unified and credible approach is needed for assessing learning outcomes. One option is to
adapt PEF's Quality Assurance Test to produce a simplified, uniform and transparent testing
regime that allows parents, officials and politicians to judge the quality of schools and make
comparisons across public and private schools.
14
28.
Teacher presence, ability to deliver quality lessons, time on task and monitoring of learning
levels will remain an essential part of the programme. PERR data suggests an 8% increase
in teacher attendance in public schools since June 2011 as result of improved monitoring
and increased accountability among EDOs. The evidence on the quality of teaching is less
encouraging. A recent PEAS report found that the quality of the system had improved from
‘poor’ to ‘basic’, but the Annual Status of Education Report (ASER) in 2011 found that seven
out of ten children at Class 3 level are unable to read a story. A recent DFID study carried
out under the PERR suggests that only 33% of primary school teachers make use of
structured lesson plans. Recent recruitment of 120,000 younger and better qualified
government teachers has already made inroads into improving the quality of teaching.
Improved monitoring of low performing schools and better use of teacher mentors, both
successfully piloted under the PERR and about to be rolled out, should also help improve
learning at school level over the next few years.
29.
Meanwhile, private sector education is burgeoning and now accounts for an estimated 48%
of provision.25 GoPb recognises the potential of the sector to help it achieve universal
education, and supports PEF which provides education to 1.3 million poor and
disadvantaged children by partnering with the low cost private sector. There is also scope to
work with education entrepreneurs, particularly in under-served districts, to increase parent
choice further and drive up standards.
30.
Given the number of children in Punjab who remain out of school (see Figure 1), there is also
an acute need to address the challenges arising from multiple forms of social exclusion.
While there have been improvements, Net Enrolment Ratio (NER) statistics demonstrate a
significant gender gap, especially in rural areas.26 In eleven under-performing districts, chiefly
clustered in South Punjab, this gap widens and attendance across the board declines.
Gender inequality, as well as group-based disadvantages (particularly language and caste),
poverty, household location and disability are some of the most widespread factors that have
significantly affected school participation and achievement in Punjab.27In addition, many
areas of South Punjab are currently underserved by public and private schools alike, as
public finance resource allocations favour other parts of the province. As a result, public
schools in these districts often have worse facilities than elsewhere in the province, and/or
insufficient classrooms.
31.
Together, these factors cause particularly serious levels of educational deprivation in a
number of districts.28Figures 2 and 3 below, taken from DFID’s July 2012 household survey,
illustrate the disparity between enrolment in South Punjab and the rest of the province.
15
Figure 2: Gross primary enrolment by district 2012, comparison between urban and rural communities 29
Figure 3: Gross primary enrolment by district 2012, by gender 30
32.
According to DFID’s household survey for Punjab,31 the leading reason why parents do not
enrol their child in school is poverty (33% of responses for all ages). This accounts for 22%
of responses among parents with out of school children aged between 4 and 6, rising to 42%
for parents with out of school children aged 7-9, and 43% of parents with out of school
children aged 10-16. A number of other reasons are also linked to poverty. The third most
commonly cited reason is that schools are too far away and/or transport is unavailable (10%
of responses for all ages); the fourth is that the child has poor health and/or a disability (9%
of responses for all ages); while the sixth is that the child is needed to work at home (7% of
responses for all ages). Pakistan’s 1998 census suggests that at least 7% of school age
children live with physical disabilities. Most of these children are not in school. DFID
supported research suggests that 60% of these children could attend mainstream schools.32
16
33.
The second most common reason for parents’ failure to enrol their child in school is a
perception that the child is too young (23% of responses for all ages). This accounts for fully
47% of responses to the question among parents with out of school children aged between 4
and 6. The fifth most commonly cited reason is that elders do not want the child to study (8%
of responses for all ages, increasing as children get older). This data suggests that in some
parts of Punjab, particularly rural communities in the South, there is a need to develop
parental demand for, and understanding of the value of, education especially for girls.
34.
The current status of the education sector, particularly in underperforming districts
characterised by multiple poverty and exclusion indicators, suggest that DFID should not only
continue to invest at provincial level through GoPb, but also to focus on delivering
educational equity in those districts that currently lag the rest of Punjab. This will have a
significant impact on girls’ access to education, as well as for other marginalised groups.
DFID’s intervention should also include a focus on supporting development of the private
sector, which GoPb has recognised as an important player in the delivery of universal
education for the province.
What will happen if DFID does not intervene?
35.
Punjab is Pakistan’s most populous province. If DFID chooses not to invest further in
education in Punjab, it will not be able to meet its strategic goal of supporting 4 million
children in school, and transforming the education system in Pakistan.
36.
DFID has already invested £80 million in education in Punjab, through PESP 1 and the
Roadmap. The final review of both PESP 1 and the PERR are pending33, but an evaluation
commissioned in late 201134 found that while PESP 1 has helped improve access and to
some extent quality of education, further support is needed to deepen reform and improve
learning outcomes. The UK’s investments to date have delivered impact in areas including
student enrolment, teacher attendance, better quality facilities and a range of improvements
in the management of public schools, including the introduction of independent district level
monitoring. They have also helped improve the quality of teaching and learning, including the
introduction of lesson plans. Gender parity indicators have improved, and parental choice,
through the work of PEF, has increased. Withdrawing from Punjab at this stage would mean
DFID would be unable to build on the impact its investment has already achieved.
37.
The introduction of the Roadmap has greatly increased DFID’s access to and influence with
the politicians and officials who are the drivers of reform in the education system. In the last
18 months alone, DFID has held 14 meetings with the Chief Minister on education issues.
This combination of the Roadmap with SBS and TA provided through PESP 1 has allowed
DFID to harness political will to speed up structural reform of the sector and start to confront
binding constraints to progress. Withdrawing from Punjab would mean DFID would be unable
to pursue this strategy, with the result that the pace of reform would be likely to decline.
38.
DFID’s support to PESP 1 has been built on a successful partnership with GoPb, the World
Bank and CIDA. This has provided DFID an opportunity to emphasise the importance of
outcome level results as indicators of success, rather than inputs. It has also enabled DFID
to influence the ambition of targets being set for the World Bank PAD during the design
process. Withdrawing from Punjab would risk damaging relationships with other donors and
GoPb.
17
39.
Finally, this strategic case has identified a range of issues that require additional investment
to achieve equitable results for the poorest girls and boys in Punjab, going beyond those
outlined in the World Bank PAD and GoPb’s future reform programme. These include the
provision of classrooms and missing facilities in existing schools, as well as scaling up work
to support development of private sector schooling, to increase access, boost parental
choice and drive standards in education up through competition. These issues are important
across the province, but most of all in 11 districts, chiefly located in South Punjab, where all
education indicators currently lag the rest of the province. If DFID does not continue to work
in Punjab, it will not be able to ensure the equality of educational opportunities for the poorest
children in the province, particularly girls.
B. Impact and Outcome
40.
The impact for the programme is: ‘More educated people in Punjab, making a positive
social and economic contribution.’ DFID’s investment in PESP 2 will contribute
significantly towards this high level goal. It will work alongside other DFID-funded
programmes in basic services, governance, and economic growth,35 all of which are crucial
to the UK’s ability to deliver effectively on education in Pakistan. Innovation, together with the
harnessing of political will for substantive reform will be at the heart of enabling the UK’s
investment in education in Punjab to contribute to this impact statement.
41.
The outcome for the programme is: ‘More children in school, staying longer and learning
more.’ Potential beneficiaries of this programme are all the children of Punjab, through
continued strengthening of the public education system, with a particular focus on the
poorest girls and boys and their families in districts where education indicators lag the rest of
the province.
42.
On access to education, PESP 2 will deliver an incremental increase in enrolment of 2.9
million children (71% girls), of which 1.1 million will be attributable to DFID’s interventions. In
year 6, the programme will be supporting 2.4 million children in school (71% girls), of which
952,000 will be attributable to DFID’s interventions. Half a million children enrolled under the
programme will have completed their education by then. The programme’s strong focus on
marginalised groups, excluded districts in southern Punjab and additional measures
including locating out of school children and mobilising their parents and communities, as
well as providing stipends at secondary level and systematically tracking district progress on
enrolment through the PERR, will increase enrolment in government schools and improve
the NER.
43.
On quality of education, PESP 2 will deliver a measurable increase in learning outcomes at
the critical early grade foundation stage by 2014/15. The programme will also raise learning
standards across the school system, achieving an increase in test results at Grade 4 and 5 of
5 percentage points by 2014/15. The programme will improve the effectiveness of the
provincial assessment and examination system, with a focus on: (i) statistically valid and
reliable assessment data; (ii) capacity to lead assessments and examinations; and (iii) use of
data to inform policy, budgets, and teaching practice. PESP 2 will aim to get learning
outcomes in the public and private sector to a minimum threshold to be agreed with GoPb.
18
44.
PESP 2 will achieve this outcome through five outputs:
1. Better managed, more accountable education system.
2. Better teacher performance and better teaching in the classroom.
3. Better learning environment in all schools.
4. More schools, with a focus on low performing districts (LPDs).
5. Enhanced demand for quality education from parents.
45.
Outputs will be achieved using a range of investment approaches and activities summarised
below at Figure 4. 55% of the UK’s investment in PESP 2, particularly with respect to
achieving Outputs 1 and 2, but also contributing to 3, 4, and 5, will be channelled through
direct funding to GoPb in the form of SBS and targeted financial aid to PEF. The UK’s SBS to
GoPb will be aligned to the World Bank PAD and will deliver results in eight areas with a
focus on systemic reform and improvements in teaching: (i) strengthening field based
advisory support available to teachers including support to monitoring and use of lesson
plans in low-performing public schools; (ii) introducing test-based recruitment of teachers and
their certification; (iii) rationalising the distribution of teachers in schools across Punjab; (iv)
formulating and delivering school based budgets for non-salary expenses based on
enrolment and development needs; (v) devolving administrative and financial decision
making to school level; (vi) linking teacher compensation more closely with student learning
outcomes; (vii) increasing the authority and capacity of School Councils to support and
monitor the performance of schools; and (viii) strengthening the collection of credible data on
school, teacher and student performance.
46.
DFID will also fund parallel programmes to boost impact against Outputs 3, 4 and 5. The
strategic reasons for funding these additional investments are discussed in the section on the
need for intervention, and may be summarised as: (i) achieving DFID’s goal for supporting 4
million children requires faster progress than the targets currently indicated in the World
Bank PAD; (ii) working through the private sector is a proven way of providing access to
higher quality education than is currently available in the public system; and (iii) educational
deprivation remains acute in a number of districts, principally located in South Punjab, in
spite of a decade of work towards system level reform. DFID will therefore use a range of
parallel investments to develop equitable access to education in these districts, ensuring its
investment in PESP 2 has a strong focus on the poorest girls and boys in the province, as
well as those with disabilities.
47.
DFID’s investment in PESP 2 will be supported by TA. This will underpin delivery against all
five outputs and focus on tackling binding constraints that inhibit transformational reform.
19
Impact
More educated people in Punjab making a positive
economic and social contribution
Outcome
More children in school, staying longer, and learning more
1
2
Contributes to Outputs:
Activities
Better teacher
performance, and
better teaching
in the classroom
Better managed,
more accountable
education system
Outputs
1
2
3
5
Sector Budget
Support through
World Bank PAD
3
2
4
5
Financial Aid for
Punjab Education
Foundation
4
Better learning
environment
in all schools
3
4
5
3
TACE programme
focusing on LPDs
5
More schools, with a
focus on LPDs and
areas
4
5
Access to finance
for LCPS via State
Bank of Pakistan
5
Enhanced demand for
quality education
from parents
1 (indirect)
Community based
advocacy
programme in
LPDs
5
Tertiary level
scholarships
programme for
poor girls and boys
Underpinned by sister programmes focusing on political will and popular demand for reform (Roadmap & TEP)
Inputs
£350.3 million over 6 years
Figure 4: Overview ofprogrammes under consideration for PESP 2
2. Appraisal Case
A. Critical Success Criteria
48.
Table 1 below sets out the weighting of a range of Critical Success Criteria (CSCs) for PESP
2 against each of the six types of activity included in the overview of programmes (see Figure
4 above). CSCs have been used throughout this Appraisal Case to inform design choices
and the weighting of potential component programmes.
B. Feasible Options
Identification of Feasible Options
49.
Assuming a counterfactual option of ‘do nothing’ (Option 0), the range of feasible options set
out in Figure 5 revolve around a fundamental decision about whether or not to invest solely
through SBS aligned to the World Bank PAD. As discussed in the Strategic Case, Option 1
below would not enable DFID to deliver on its results agenda for transforming education in
Pakistan, given the scale of ambition set out in the PAD.
Desired Outcome:
More children in school, staying longer, and learning more
Option 1:
Engage solely through SBS
aligned to World Bank PAD
Option 2:
Commit 34% of budget to SBS
aligned to World Bank PAD, and
66% to other programmes
Decision:
Combine SBS aligned to World
Bank PAD with additional
programmes
Option 3:
Commit 64% of budget to SBS
aligned to World Bank PAD, and
36% to other programmes
Option 4:
Commit 90% of budget to SBS
aligned to World Bank PAD, and
10% to other programmes
Figure 5: Summary of feasible options
Potential Component Programme
CSCs
1SBS
Wt Score
2PEF-EVS
3PEF-NSP
4PEF-FAS
5Finance
6 Facilities
7LPDs
8Scholarships
Wt
Score
Wt
Score
Wt
Score
Wt
Score
Wt
Score
Wt
Score
Wt
Score
Score
Score
Score
Score
Score
Score
Score
Wt
Score
1 More girls in school
staying longer
5
5
25
5
25
5
25
5
25
5
25
5
25
5
25
4
20
2 More boys in school
staying longer
4
3
12
5
20
5
20
5
20
5
20
5
20
5
20
3
12
3 Better learning outcomes
4
4
16
4
16
4
16
5
20
4
16
4
16
3
12
5
20
4 Reach the poor and
excluded
5
3
15
5
25
5
25
4
20
4
20
4
20
5
25
5
25
5 Minimise fiduciary risk
5
1
5
4
20
4
20
4
20
2
10
3
15
4
20
5
25
6 Sustainability beyond
PESP 2
4
5
20
4
16
4
16
4
16
4
16
4
16
4
16
3
12
7 Influence broader policy
agenda
4
5
20
3
12
3
12
3
12
2
8
3
12
4
16
2
8
8 Harmonise donors
around province-led
agenda
3
5
15
3
9
3
9
3
9
2
6
2
6
2
6
2
6
9 Minimise transaction
costs for DFID
3
2
6
4
12
4
12
4
12
3
9
2
6
2
6
5
15
TOTAL
134
155
155
154
130
136
146
139
Table 1: Critical Success Criteria for PESP 2 scored against potential programmes for inclusion (weight 1-5, score 1-5)
50.
Given a design recommendation to reject Option 1 on the grounds that it cannot deliver
sufficiently on DFID’s commitment to support additional children in school, four feasible
options for appraisal remain: Option 0, the counterfactual (do nothing), and three options
based on an approach that mixes SBS to GoPb aligned to the World Bank PAD with a
variable investment in a range of parallel programmes taken from those identified in Figure 4.
51.
In order to compare Options 2, 3 and 4 as they are set out in Figure 5, with SBS set at 34%
of total budget (Option 2); 64% of total budget (Option 3); and 90% of total budget (Option 4),
the business case includes an initial appraisal followed by a more detailed appraisal. The
initial appraisal (A) focuses on the question: “Which overall approach would best achieve the
outcome of ‘more children in school, staying longer and learning more’?” This appraisal
considers each of Options 0, 2, 3 and 4 on the basis of the budget share allocated to SBS.
52.
The subsequent, more detailed appraisal (B) focuses on the question: “Given a fixed share of
budget allocated to SBS, what balance of other component programmes would best achieve
the outcome of ‘more children in school, staying longer and learning more’?” This second
appraisal, based on available evidence for the likely impact of each type of intervention
summarised below, combined with the qualitative assessment set out in the CSCs table
above, completes the comparison of Options 2, 3 and 4, summarised in Figure 6 below.
Taken together with financial aid to PEF, funds to be channelled through GoPb would
comprise a minimum of 55% (Option 2) and a maximum of 95% (Option 4). In all cases,
allocations for TA have been made on a pro rata basis for every component part of the
programme for the purposes of the appraisal.
Comparison of Options 2, 3 and 4
100%
90%
Key:
GoPb funding
1
80%
1
70%
1
60%
Parallel programmes
2
50%
40%
3
30%
4
2
20%
Sector budget support
aligned to World Bank PAD
2
Financial aid for PEF
3
Access to finance
4
School infrastructure/
facilities
5
Low performing districts
6
Scholarships
3
10%
0%
1
5
6
4
5
Option 2
2
5
Option 3
Option 4
Please note this allocation includes an allowance for technical assistance, assigned pro rata across all parts of the programme
Figure 6: Comparison of Options 2, 3 and 4
Initial Appraisal of Options (A)
53.
Options for this initial appraisal comprise Option 0 (do nothing), Option 2 (34% SBS), Option
3 (64% SBS) and Option 4 (90% SBS). The question to be answered is “Which overall
approach would best achieve the outcome of ‘more children in school, staying longer and
learning more’?”
Option 0 ‘Do nothing’
54.
This is the counterfactual option for appraisal, and assumes that DFID will not continue to
invest in education reform in Punjab. Given the arguments put forward in the Strategic Case
substantiating the need for DFID intervention in this area, and strong commitments made to
helping transform Pakistan’s education sector by the former Secretary of State, the Prime
Minister and others, this option is difficult to defend. Punjab comprises 56% of Pakistan’s
population, and without intervening in this province, DFID will not be able to meet its
ambitious results agenda for education in Pakistan, set out in the Pakistan Operational Plan
2010.
55.
Moreover, DFID, working in partnership with the World Bank and other donors, has
contributed to significant reforms in education in Punjab over the past three years. It has also
worked closely with the Chief Minister on the creation and establishment of the Roadmap
process, building significant high level political will and access, as well as publicity for
education reform in Punjab. In the last 18 months alone, DFID has had 14 meetings with the
Chief Minister on education. The Roadmap had delivered important results in its first year,
particularly in the area of merit based recruitment of EDOs, as well as improvements in
teacher presence, student attendance, upgrading of basic facilities, and regular visits to
schools by district officials.
56.
GoPb is by far the biggest provider of education services in Punjab, with 10.63 million
children (46% of whom are girls) in public primary, middle and secondary schools.36 Public
schools exist in all districts, tehsils and markaz (and in many villages) in the province, and
the government's long-term and sustained support for education is not in doubt.37If DFID
wishes to invest in education in Punjab, it must work with the public sector, which is where
most children go to school. While approximately 48% of children in Punjab attend private
schools,38 the World Bank estimates that 83% of parents with children in public schools
cannot afford to pay for their children’s education. The public sector is therefore particularly
important in providing education for the poorest children in the province, especially in rural
areas.
57.
These arguments against the counterfactual are strong, while arguments for withdrawing
from Punjab are weak. The strength of our policy dialogue with GoPb augurs against any
option that does not include SBS to GoPb, and delivers all funds through other channels. If
DFID withdraws from working with GoPb, either through a ‘do nothing’ option, or one that
does not work with government, the progress made by its investment to date in Punjab will
be lost, and the UK will no longer be able to influence education sector reform at system
level in this huge and crucial province. Withdrawal from working in education with
government would be likely to have a negative impact on other DFID funded programmes
that partner with GoPb.
24
Options 2-4: Identifying the optimal proportion of SBS aligned to World Bank PAD
58.
Given the recommendation against a programme that invests either all or no UK funds
through SBS, the fundamental consideration for this initial appraisal concerns the optimal
proportion of PESP 2 that should be spent directly through GoPb compared to other
channels.
59.
The starting point for analysis was a 90% allocation of funds to SBS and 10% to PEF and
low performing districts (LPDs). The proportions were adjusted to explore the mix of
components would best help us achieve PESP 2’s objectives, including improving quality of
education and reaching the poorest and most marginalised children. The analysis considered
significantly increasing the proportion of funds for low cost private schooling and reducing
that for the public school system. It also explored the extent to which significant investments
through off-budget mechanisms including infrastructure, scholarships, and direct support to
low performing districts might improve the public education systems. The analysis found
there is no simple trade-off between investing through government channels and the private
sector. Achieving PESP 2’s ambitious goals requires a mixed approach.
60.
Investing in SBS aligned with the World Bank PAD presents a range of advantages and
disadvantages. These are summarised in Table 2. The principles of working through SBS
include strengthening institutions, and holding regular dialogue with government to build
system level reform, leading to improved sector accountability and PFM systems, and the
removal of critical constraints to service delivery. At the same time an effective SBS
programme means governments are not required to identify donor funding separately in their
budgets.39 SBS provided as part of PESP 2 will be earmarked against a range of areas of
eligible expenditures, outlined in the Strategic Case, to enable donors to track their
contribution through annual audited statements.
61.
While SBS offers many benefits in terms of policy dialogue and long run influence on system
level reforms, it can also expose donors to substantial fiduciary risks, especially in countries
with weak PFM systems. In addition, inefficient spending, and political economy risks may
dilute the benefits of SBS.
25
62.
With approximately 58,000 schools and 309,000 teachers40 in the system, even small
reforms in the public sector can result in major changes. World Bank-led education sector
reforms since 2004 have resulted in a marked improvement in a number of areas, with NER
increasing in primary, middle and secondary schools by 10% and NER of girls in primary
schools increasing by 15% in rural areas (see Figure 1 above). GoPb’s forthcoming
education sector programme for 2013-15 is expected to stabilise boys’ enrolment and
increase girls’ enrolment in public schools by approximately 5% (600,000 more girls in
school).
63.
The most direct way in which DFID can achieve further reform of the education system in
Punjab is by working with the World Bank to address key structural priorities in the broad
areas of governance and quality, including: (i) poor performance of teachers and their lack of
capacity to deliver quality education; (ii) reform of the examination system; (iii) ensuring
transparent, objective and non-politicised transfer systems for teachers and education
managers; and (iv) enhancing the management capacity and professionalism of EDOs, other
education officials, and head teachers. GoPb has amply demonstrated its appetite for
innovation through the Roadmap, and its use of SBS to date. Key innovations in recent years
include the scaling up of DSD to improve pre-service and in-service teacher training and
quality control, as well as investing in low cost private schools (LCPS) through PEF, and
providing scholarships for disadvantaged children through PEEF.
Advantages
Disadvantages
Scale of operation and sustainability
Relatively poor quality and value for money
compared with the private sector
Political support and leadership
Politicised system, lacking accountability and
transparency
Ability to do interventions at provincial scale
Limited evidence of needs based allocation of
resources between districts
Political buy-in for the development/
infrastructure expenditure
Lack of responsiveness to local needs and
empowerment of school councils
Using government systems strengthening
partnership principles
Delays in release of funds to schools
Institutional strengthening
Lack of progress to date on tackling issues of
social exclusion
Strengthening of sector accountability and
PFM systems
Substantial fiduciary and corruption risks
Raising standards in public schools may drive
improvements in standards in the private
sector
The worst performing public schools fail their
children on a catastrophic level: almost no
learning takes place in these schools.
Sets normative educational standards through
revision of textbooks in line with the 2006
curriculum, assessment and examination
system, and teaching standards
Somewhat limited evidence that public sector
teachers have sufficient incentives to improve
learning outcomes
Donor harmonisation
Issues of substitution, additionality and fungibility
Table 2: Advantages and disadvantages of SBS
26
64.
In spite of improvements, the public education system in Punjab is more expensive than
LCPS, while providing poorer quality education to students. 93% of current expenditure is on
teacher salaries, with the result that little money is left for development or repair and
maintenance. In the 2012/13 provincial budget, for example, public school teachers received
a 20% salary increase. In addition, expenditures against development budget allocations are
typically low. In 2010/11, just 35% of allocated funds for development were used, although
this improved to around 80% in 2011/12.
65.
The public education system also remains highly politicised. Political patronage, interference
and corruption, for example, on posting and transfer of teachers, particularly through
temporary attachments to schools of individuals’ choice, are widespread. There is little
accountability in the system and it does not reward good, or punish poor, teaching
performance. Teacher absenteeism also remains an issue, although the Roadmap has
begun to address this issue publicly.
66.
Fiduciary and corruption risks are substantial for the education sector in Punjab. Issues
include lack of budget credibility, inefficient procurement, illegal payments, lack of payroll
audits, weak audit mechanisms, and weak legislative scrutiny. All funds channelled through
SBS therefore require high levels of scrutiny and risk mitigation measures. DFID’s
investment in SBS to GoPb will include considerable work in this area, including institutional
strengthening of both PMIU and PEF, as well as organisational assessment and restructuring
of other organisations including PEC, the Punjab Education Assessment System (PEAS),
and the Directorate of Public Instruction (DPI).
67.
At the same time, SBS funding will also be used to engage in policy debate on the issue of
complete devolution of education to district level. GoPb recently developed the District
Education Authority Act, expressing its commitment to complete devolution. However, the
political economy of this issue is complex, and the Act has still to be tabled before the
Provincial Assembly. Similarly, it will be important for work through SBS to GoPb to focus on
institutionalising the current work led by the Roadmap on the merit based appointment of
EDOs and teachers.
68.
Aside from the governance of the sector, one of the most important functions of government
in education is standard setting: for learning outcomes, teacher competence, and school
quality conditions. This role should encompass the entire education system, both public and
private. One of the key aspects of SBS is the entry point it provides to structured policy
dialogue on all aspects of the educational system. There are four critical advantages to SBS
in relation to securing better learning outcomes.
69.
First, in Punjab learning outcomes are low, and there is no reliable measurement that
demonstrates clear improvement in absolute learning standards. The majority of children are
in public schools and nearly all of the very poorest quintile are found in the worst performing
public schools. Engaging through SBS and associated policy dialogue enables the UK to
effect improvements at scale, and, in addition, to target the worst performing schools to raise
their standards. Teacher bonus incentives linked to improvements in test scores and the
remedial mentoring for poor performing teachers are two excellent examples of government
reforms that will raise standards in the worst performing schools.
70.
Second, there are currently shortcomings in Punjab’s assessment and examinations system,
and the World Bank PAD has committed to a series of detailed and robust reforms of the
assessment system and functions. These should be fully fit for purpose by 2014/15, while an
27
independent school assessment survey is planned for the three intervening years that has
Government’s ownership. Raising standards in public schools should help drive competition
for better quality in both public and private schools. There is some evidence that
improvements in government school test scores in India caused migration back from the
private sector into the public sector, and resulted in closure of worse performing private
schools.
71.
Third, while there is somewhat limited evidence that public sector teachers have sufficient
incentives to improve learning outcomes, it is plausible that human resource management
reforms included in the World Bank PAD will succeed in changing incentives for public sector
teachers. If this is combined with a deepened focus on testing and implementing effective
pedagogical strategies for reading and learning as DSD plans, then Punjab’s public schools
could see a substantial improvement in early grade reading, and a substantive improvement
in the later grades where learning outcomes are harder to shift.
72.
Fourth, UK investment in Punjab through SBS to GoPb is likely to deliver substantial
development benefits in systemic reform, with a focus on governance and institution building,
and on the quality of education delivered through the public sector, and potential private
schools. However, it is important to note that GoPb’s projections for additional children in
school are relatively modest, and that reforms are long range and incremental in nature.
73.
While improving the functioning of the public sector has the potential to benefit all children in
the system, particularly in terms of the quality of education they receive, now and in the
future, it is unlikely that increasing the level of investment in SBS from Option 2 levels to
Option 4 will lead to a commensurate increase in the speed of reform. For this reason, the
recommendation on the basis of qualitative appraisal is that funding for SBS, should be set at
£119.5 million (34% of total funding), and DFID should invest in a range of parallel
programmes with the specific purpose of raising enrolment rates in Punjab, with a particular
focus on LPDs and the most marginalised children in the province.
Options 2-4: Potential use of other channels to delivery
Working through low cost private sector
74.
One important development in education in Punjab has been the dramatic growth in LCPS
across the province over the past decade primarily in urban areas. In 2010/11, 31% and 21%
of children aged between 6 and 10, and 11 and 15 attended private schools, a growth of 7
and 6 percentage points for these age groups from 2004/05. In net terms, virtually all growth
in school participation in Punjab for the period 2004/05–2010/11, particularly at primary level,
is due to increased LCPS participation41.
75.
GoPb has already recognised the role the low cost private sector has to play in achieving the
education MDG in the province. It supports roughly 1.2 million children enrolled in more than
2,000 LCPS free of charge through school subsidy and student voucher programmes
administered by PEF. It should be noted that PEF is currently operating at the limits of its
capacity and PESP 2 will support its expansion to reach more children.
76.
As with SBS, working through the private sector presents both advantages and
disadvantages for DFID. These are summarised in Table 3.
Advantages
Disadvantages
28
More accountability than in the public sector
Poorly paid and qualified teachers
Incentives for entrepreneurs to establish schools
Poor infrastructure and overcrowding
Potential to plug gaps in under-served areas
Limited outreach in remote areas at present
Better learning outcomes (at least 1.5 years) than
in average public schools
Low profit margins and sustainability
Quality adjusted cost of private schools as
measured by test scores is three to five times
lower than public schools
Less fiduciary risk than in the public sector
No current incentive for private schools to raise
quality further
Residual risk of poor financial management and
corruption
Table 3: Advantages and disadvantages of the low cost private sector
77.
LCPS achieve, on average, better learning outcomes than their public sector counterparts.
They do this at approximately half the cost per student completing primary school compared
with public institutions. Moreover private schools are more accountable to parents than is the
case in public schools. Incidence of teacher absenteeism, and low student attendance are
almost negligible.42
78.
In the case of the 2,000+ LCPS partnering with PEF at present, formal accountability is
higher than for the rest of the sector. Independent third party learning assessment
organisations conduct tests twice yearly in PEF schools, requiring that at least 75% of
children enrolled in each school score at least 40%. In cases where a school fails to meet
this threshold twice, partnership with PEF is discontinued. This independent audit
mechanism has led to significant improvements in student and teacher attendance, the
provision of basic facilities, and delivery of better learning outcomes.43
79.
PEF-affiliated schools comprise only a tiny proportion of all LCPS in Punjab, and an
important ambition of PESP 2 is to establish partnerships with private sector schools more
broadly. PESP 2 will pilot a credit guarantee scheme to encourage the expansion of LCPS in
underserved areas and expand access to these schools for the poorest. This is new work
and highly innovative – for Pakistan and globally – so learning, and then scaling up will take
time. While LCPS on average deliver better results and are more efficiently managed than
the public sector, this masks huge variance in the sector, which is completely unregulated,
and mostly comprises single schools run as small enterprises. The profitability of these small
businesses depends on hiring young teachers, usually women who have recently left
secondary school and have no training as teachers. Employees frequently lack employment
contracts and are typically paid between 25 and 50% of the minimum wage of PKR 8,000 per
month. LCPS also generally have poor infrastructure and overcrowded classrooms.
80.
Detailed work will be required to develop a sustainable business model for LCPS, help
improve the conditions and career trajectory for teachers and develop a uniform, transparent
learning assessment system so that parents can make informed choices about public and
private schools. In partnership with GoPb, DFID will consult teachers on reforms, and invest
in research on the public and LCPS labour markets.
81.
At present LCPS are concentrated in urban areas with the result that there is relatively little
choice for poor parents in peri-urban and rural areas. While there is scope for PESP 2 to
incentivise entrepreneurs to establish more private sector schools in under-served areas, this
29
alone will not solve low enrolment levels. The reasons for children being out of school are not
a binary reaction to school location or even quality. They are complex and deeply entwined
with poverty and social attitudes. Many parents cannot afford to pay even minimal fees or
other associated costs. Others are unwilling to do so, particularly for their daughters. There is
a significant need for good quality free schooling for the poorest. The private sector can help,
but the scale of the required intervention underscores the importance of finding sustainable
financial models rather than donor dependent interventions. This means working closely with
government. Ignoring the thousands of existing public schools in low performing districts
would not be cost effective.
Working through Civil Society Organisations
82.
A final potential approach to DFID’s investment in Punjab is to work with civil society to
improve efficiency of government schools. Civil society brings skills in social mobilisation and
community engagement, which both government and the private sector lack. There is some
evidence to support working through CSOs in this area, especially in conjunction with
government. According to one 2011 study, “Governments often become more capable,
accountable and responsive when state-led reform and social mobilisation occur
simultaneously”.44 Research in El Salvador has found that “offering vulnerable community
groups the opportunity to influence and shape the direction of service delivery has a positive
impact on uptake and use of services in the education sector.”45
83.
The key disadvantage of working through CSOs, in addition to significant fiduciary risk, is
that it is difficult to achieve scale or sustainability. The scale of DFID’s ambitions for
transforming education in Pakistan mean it would not be feasible to work through CSOs
alone.
Appraisal Summary
84.
The advantages and disadvantages of working through SBS, the private sector and CSOs
suggests that DFID should spread its investment across a range of components, promoting
synergies and encouraging competition. This approach would enable DFID to: (i) remain at
the forefront of provincial policy dialogue on education reform through its investment in SBS;
(ii) deliver results quickly, in alignment with the Education Sector Reform Roadmap process;
(iii) embed a focus on value addition, by tackling deficiencies in both public and private
sectors; (iv) minimise risk by balancing cost efficiency and sustainability through a mixed
portfolio of investment; and (v) maximise opportunities for joining PESP 2 up with other DFID
Pakistan programmes, including the Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP),
Transforming Education in Pakistan (TEP), the Sub-National Governance Programme (SNG)
and the KP Output Based Budgeting Programme.
85.
The challenge of this mixed approach is that PESP 2 will be a complex programme, requiring
implementation by multiple partners, increasing transaction costs to DFID. DFID will need to
ensure adequate programme management capacity in house, as well as a multi-disciplinary
skills mix.
86.
The recommendation of the qualitative first stage appraisal is to adopt Option 2. This
option, with a total of 55% of the UK’s investment committed to GoPb through SBS and
targeted financial aid for PEF, offers the strongest opportunity to spread investment among
different sectors in Punjab, including government and the private sector, but also civil society
and higher education institutions.
30
Detailed Appraisal of Options (B)
87.
In this more detailed appraisal of the options, the question to be answered is “Given a fixed
share of budget allocated to SBS, what balance of other component programmes would best
achieve the outcome of ‘more children in school, staying longer and learning more’?”
88.
Options include: (i) supporting the expansion and development of proven PEF programmes,
including Education Voucher Scheme (EVS), NSP (New Schools Programme) and
Foundation Assisted Schools (FAS), with a focus on low performing districts (LPDs) and
poor, peri-urban areas of cities; (ii) investing in a schools infrastructure programme,
established outside GoPb, with a focus on LPDs and under-served rural areas; (iii) piloting
public private partnership models to stimulate development of the low cost private sector
market in LPDs and under-served rural areas; (iv) working with CSOs to pilot a community
led approach to stimulating parental demand in LPDs and other rural areas; and (v)
launching a graduate scholarships programme in conjunction with PEEF and Lahore
University of Management Sciences (LUMS) to offer a route to higher education for poor
children, producing role models to encourage parents to send their children to school.
89.
There is a strong focus in the design of PESP 2 on working in LPDs in Punjab, for the
reasons outlined in the Strategic Case. Lower than average educational achievement in
these districts, and educational deprivation among girls and other marginalised groups, is
caused by a range of factors including: (i) historically low levels of funding from the provincial
government; (ii) generally lower quality of teachers and education managers compared to
other parts of Punjab; (iii) generally ineffective school councils and frequently poor parental
attitudes, especially to the education of girls; (iv) lack of school infrastructure and facilities;
(v) social exclusion of some groups; and (vi) fewer functioning schools than average for
Punjab, often located at a distance from the communities they are meant to serve. The range
of parallel programmes recommended for inclusion in PESP 2 is designed to address these
constraints.
90.
In the detailed appraisal below, the programmes are briefly described and then each is
assessed against key success criteria to determine the best allocation of funds among the
different programmes.
Support to PEF
91.
The dramatic rise of LCPS has reshaped the educational landscape of Pakistan and offered
greater choice to low income families.46 Currently, 48% of children enrolled in primary
schools are enrolled in private schools.47 The median fee of a rural private school is PKR
1,000 per month, compared with a minimum wage of PKR 8,000 per month.48 In villages with
private schools, total enrolment is significantly higher than average (61% versus 46%) as is
enrolment of girls (56% versus 35%).
92.
Most of the growing demand for education over the next decade is expected to be met by
growth in the private sector. GoPb supports the growth of LCPS through PEF, which was
restructured in 2004 to promote public-private partnerships in education. PEF is able to
deliver results and creates healthy competition between the public and private education
systems. However, the organisation is currently operating at the limits of its capacity, and
DFID is working with the management team to build capacity to expand its reach, particularly
into underserved districts, and improve its targeting of poor children.
31
93.
DFID will provide between £21.7 million (Option 4) and £72.5 million (Option 2) to PEF
through targeted financial aid to enable it to expand its main programmes (EVS and NSP in
particular and targeted, re-designed FAS) in 11 LPDs, mainly in South Punjab, and in rapidly
expanding low income, peri-urban areas. This is expected to increase enrolment, mainly at
primary level, by between 275,000 and 365,000 children. About 60% of those additional
enrolments will be girls. Quality improvements under the EVS, NSP and FAS programmes
will be achieved by supporting PEF’s Continuous Professional Development Programme
(CPDP) for teachers, and improving its approach to quality assurance.
EVS
94.
PEF has been providing education vouchers to poor families since 2006. Vouchers can be
redeemed at a selected range of local LCPS, which meet PEF quality standards. Voucher
schools give free tuition to students and PEF conducts regular standardised testing to check
that students are making progress. As part of GoPb’s education sector reform programme for
2013-15, PEF will expand its outreach to all 36 districts in the province. Additional DFID
funding of between £21.7 million and £43.4 million would enable PEF to provide vouchers to
between 160,000 and 200,000 more children. The EVS will have an additional focus on
LPDs, and on supporting more girls in these districts to reduce gender disparity in enrolment.
GoPb has agreed to meet the continuing costs of children who start school during PESP 2,
but do not complete primary education by the end of the programme.
95.
The principal area of concern for EVS is that it is open to corruption. Strong audit and
monitoring controls would therefore be a condition of DFID’s support in this area. To date,
independent reports have consistently validated PEF’s control systems, programme targeting
and management methodologies.49 The crucial challenge would be to maintain and improve
the existing quality of work.
96.
A recent independent evaluation showed that 97% of EVS students belong to families
earning less than US$1 a day and that there is high demand for vouchers among poor
families.50There is strong evidence from DFID’s 2011 survey and other studies that poverty is
one of the main reasons for parents not enrolling children in school and for high dropout
rates.51 According to BISP’s Poverty Scorecard data, 70% children in the poorest households
in Pakistan are out of school, including in Punjab.52 Poor families can afford neither the direct
nor the opportunity costs of sending children to school.53 For example, the total cost for
private education for a Grade 10 female student in government schools in rural Punjab is
approximately PKR 7,560, which could be much higher than the total household income
earned in a month by many poor families.54
NSP
97.
PEF started NSP in 2008 to encourage entrepreneurs to establish LCPS in remote and
currently under-served parts of the province. Currently PEF has 200 schools operating in 16
districts. NSP increases enrolment of out of school children and ensures their retention
through quality assurance and capacity building of teachers and head teachers. Schools may
only be opened where there is no other public or private school within a radius of 2 km.
98.
Currently, PEF does not support many schools in LPDs and GoPb is not likely to build any
new schools in the next three years. DFID therefore proposes to provide £6.9 million for PEF
to incentivise entrepreneurs to build new schools in LPDs under Options 2 and 3 at an
assumed unit cost of £17,000. This will increase enrolment by up to 80,000 new students
32
from poor families. This support will enable PEF to serve the most deprived populations in
rural areas and hamlets which currently have poor or no access to public or private schools.
99.
Although there is strong evidence that PEF programmes are targeted well and that children
in PEF schools achieve higher scores than other children,55 as yet there has been no
independent evaluation of the NSP. A rigorous independent evaluation will be undertaken
during the inception phase to inform the detailed design of this component.
FAS
100. The flagship FAS model targets existing LCPS for expansion with PEF support to
accommodate a much larger number of children. Typically, FAS schools have between 50
and 100 students, expanding by 5 or 6 times through PEF’s assistance. However, most FAS
students have historically migrated from government and other private schools and do not
necessarily come from the out of school category.
101. DFID proposes to support the FAS model in socially excluded areas where there is high
demand for LCPS that is not matched by supply. This will include support for improving
targeting of children from poorer families and provision of middle schools, especially for girls,
to address the issue of school location. Between 150 and 250 FAS schools will be supported,
based on criteria agreed with the GoPb, at a cost of £22 million under Options 2 and 3, with
each increasing its enrolment by about 300 students. The programme will increase overall
enrolment by up to 225,000 students. The FAS programme has been criticised, in the past
for drawing children away from public schools.56 This will not be permitted as a condition of
PESP 2 support.
Access to Finance Programme
102. The Access to Finance programme will be a pilot intervention, building on experience of
DFID’s Financial Inclusion Programme (FIP). FIP identified a lack of collateral as a major
barrier to accessing finance for small businesses and responded by introducing a credit
guarantee that would compensate the lender for much of the risk, should the borrower
default.
103. A recent International Finance Corporation (IFC) study on Education in Pakistan has already
identified business financing needs of low cost private educational institutions57 and work is
now needed to ascertain the real demand for credit, selection of the most suitable products
and institutions to extend and work with a diverse market. Some broad scoping work has
already been undertaken during the design phase.58 However more consultative work and
strategic dialogue on viability and proposed effectiveness of the programme is required. The
programme will include a detailed assessment of all these questions during the inception
phase before producing a final product and mechanism for implementation.
104. The pilot will provide access to finance for education entrepreneurs in the low cost sector,
chiefly running sole proprietorships or family businesses through a credit guarantee scheme
(CGS) of £10 million under Option 2. The CGS will be used to underwrite a proportion of
loans provided by microfinance and commercial banks on a cash-flow (non-collateralised)
basis, thereby reducing the risk of lending to education entrepreneurs.
105. On the supply side, support will be structured around a series of interventions identified in a
LCPS demand-for-credit survey funded by the programme in the inception phase, with these
33
interventions helping financial services develop new education specific products and a long
term sustainable and scalable business model for lending to LCPS. The programme will work
with selected financing institutions to develop the model, design products for the new market
and pilot these. Partner institutions will be required to demonstrate robust credit assessment
procedures, as well as to commit to focusing loans on the low cost sector.
106. On the demand side, LCPS are characterised by low profitability and start-up costs, with
education entrepreneurs possessing rudimentary formal business skills, with little succession
planning and both horizontally and vertically constrained by the limited supply of secondary
education female teachers. LCPS are also reluctant to seek finance, a position that is
mirrored by financial institutions and the absence of education specific lending products. The
access to finance programme may therefore include demand generation and outreach
activities, together with business training for potential borrowers.
107. The FIP Credit Guarantee Scheme is managed by the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP), and we
will consider channelling education guarantee through this programme, or a similar
governance arrangement. Preliminary discussions with the State Bank have indicated
support for the pilot, and SBP is considered a competent, able manager of the existing facility
with significant leverage over the banking and microfinance sectors.
108. This is an innovative and high risk programme. In structuring the guarantee (a non-grant
financial instrument), further work will establish options for the management and governance
structure, including fee structures, participating financial institutions (commercial banks,
microfinance providers or both), risk cover on the guarantee, the level and nature of incentive
grants to support borrowers and lenders, eligibility, monitoring mechanisms, as well as
issues around leverage, additionality and sustainability.
109. Financial modelling conducted by the PESP 2 design team indicates that the vast majority of
private schools will represent a marginal business opportunity for commercial lenders, but a
significant one for microfinance banks, and for both an important social opportunity. There is
evidence that loans work: the Aga Khan Rural Support Programme offered loans of around
£700 to communities to establish LCPS. Education entrepreneurs were quick to respond,
setting up community based schools across the Northern Areas.59
110. The extent of latent demand for finance to improve and expand these schools is unproven.
However, our estimates suggest that across Punjab demand may be between £39 million
and £116 million.60 Unlocking this demand could benefit millions of school children. By
helping LCPS access finance to expand and improve, DFID will help increase access to
affordable education for students otherwise excluded from private provision by relative
poverty and contribute to improved learning outcomes.
School Infrastructure Component
111. The school infrastructure component of PESP-II is designed to address almost 50% of the
need for additional classrooms in the province (by building 15059 classrooms) and meet the
need for essential facilities in existing schools, by 2018. By the end of the programme 4,000
schools will be provided with drinking water supply, 5,000 schools will be provided with
sanitation facilities, around 3,000 schools will have their boundary walls built, around 10,000
schools will get electricity supply together with over 2 million children having access to
furniture in school.
34
112. Innovation will be central to this programme. Working with GoPb, it will test new approaches
and seek to challenge the norms of government practices through devolving contracting to
local communities, bringing in innovative and energy efficient designs, building earthquake &
natural disaster resistant structures, using climate-friendly local materials, and engaging
School Councils in planning, design and contract management. The approach will draw on
experience in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, where a DFID programme has helped devolve
construction and school councils are delivering better results at half the cost of direct
government procurement. The programme will also explore opportunities for private finance
and pilot public private partnership (PPP) models.
113. There is evidence that poor school facilities are an important reason for low enrolment and
high drop-out rates. In one study in Pakistan, 83% of the respondents cited this as the main
cause of drop-outs. 68% cited the poor condition of school buildings as a key reason for
students leaving school at primary level.61 Moreover, children with physical disabilities face
particular challenges in accessing schools and school buildings.
114. Focus group discussions organised by the design team also identified the lack of separate
toilets as a major cause of absenteeism among girls. One study in Bangladesh established a
link between school facilities and learning outcomes62finding that the availability of toilet
facilities and water supplies in schools increased girls’ attainment at school. Similarly, a
World Bank global study identified latrines as one of the key policy interventions needed to
increase girls’ participation in education.63The presence of separate toilets was also found to
raise the transition rates of girls to higher levels of education by almost five percent. More
broadly, a global synthesis study concluded that a basic minimum package of school
infrastructure that is accessible, durable, functional, safe, hygienic and easily maintained
should be part of any strategy to meet the education MDG.64
115. While the principal focus of the programme will be on ensuring basic facilities are available to
every student in Punjab, this intervention also needs to address the poor state of school
maintenance and facilities management. At current rates, it would take GoPb over 20 years
to provide missing facilities, but most of these would have deteriorated beyond use before
then due to poor maintenance. PPPs offer the potential to support the government’s
commitment65 to establish systems for the effective and regular operation and maintenance
of facilities in step with DFID’s investment.
116. The infrastructure programmes will therefore pilot interventions that test transformational
changes in the state’s role, and help government to focus on how school design, building,
operation and maintenance are commissioned, and therefore on ensuring equity and
education outcomes, and less on managing and operating a building portfolio that currently
exceeds 59,000 separate establishments. DFID will use this programme as the basis for
opening up policy dialogue with GoPb on improving both the quality and the cost
effectiveness of its own work in this area.
117. The fiduciary and corruption risks in the infrastructure component will be managed through a
multi-tiered approach. On the supply side, the mechanisms will include regular Government
monitoring system through EDOs, monitoring through Chief Minister Monitoring Task Force
as well as through continuous monitoring through TA and TPVs commissioned by DFID. On
the demand side, the accountability and transparency will be boosted through strengthening
School Councils and involving communities in construction activities. These safeguards will
35
be further supported by annual external audits by Auditor General’s office and continuous
audits by DFID.
118. The infrastructure component will be managed through specialist TA, working closely with
the SED. The managing organisation will be mandated to explore innovative approaches to
contracting and DFID will dedicate staff time to help bolster an already supportive policy
environment. DFID will also work with potential investors and financiers to develop viable
PPP models that help the reform and modernisation of public services, improve value-formoney procurement, increase contestability in delivery of public services, deliver improved
transparency of costs of public services delivery and facilitate arrangements for sustainable
models of operation and maintenance over the longer term.
CSO-Led Programme in Low Performing Districts
119. While parental demand for education in Pakistan is generally high, this lags in the districts of
Rajanpur, Rahim Yar Khan, Lodhran, Dera Ghazi Khan, Bahawalpur, Pakpattan,
Bahawalnagar, Chiniot, Muzaffargarh, Bhakkar and Layyah due to: (i) community and
parental attitudes to education; (ii) high levels of illiteracy; and (iii) low awareness of the
benefits of education. These factors are especially strong among the poorest and most
vulnerable groups which, compounded by inadequate facilities in schools and the low quality
of teaching, make parents reluctant to send their boys, and especially girls, to school.
120. PESP 2 will therefore include a programme to encourage children from these groups who
have dropped out to return to school, and to encourage children who have never attended
school to do so. It will be implemented as the Every Child in School programme by CSOs.
Activists will target the parts of each district with the highest numbers of out of school
children through programmes to: (i) establish the number of children out of school; (ii)
mobilise communities to encourage parents to send girls and boys to school; (iii) tracking
these children to check they stay in school and are learning; and (iv) following up with school
councils, communities and parents, as necessary. The tracking system will help in identifying
and targeting various social groups of girls and boys do not enrol or drop out from school.
This information will be used to match the provision of schooling with differential needs of
various types of out-of-school and at-risk children.
121. Every Child in School will be implemented by the PESP 2 TA team, in conjunction with GoPb
and the DFID funded TEP programme that seeks to stimulate parental and community
demand for quality education, as well as to build political will for reform of the sector. Every
Child in School will include a component of ‘second chance education’ for those children who
have dropped out using innovative programmes like supporting a community to have one
teacher and run a basic school close to places where they live. Teacher performance will be
enhanced through training, monitoring and mentoring, jointly with DSD. The programme will
cost £16.9 million and is expected to bring 54,000 more children into school, principally girls
and other marginalised groups, including those living with disabilities, over the life of PESP 2,
and many others in the future, given the programme’s focus on fundamentally changing
attitudes to education.
122. This is an innovative programme and will be carefully evaluated during implementation to
learn lessons and improve implementation. The model is based on the Intensive District
Approach to Education for All (IDEAL) Project in Bangladesh, which introduced community
participation, school catchment area mapping and school planning, and reportedly led to
36
higher enrolment of children aged between 6 and 10, as well as more regular attendance,
and effective school management.66
123. There is also evidence from Pakistan and internationally that strong community mobilisation
helps locate the core issues that lead to high drop-out rates and incidence of out of school
children,67 and results in increases in enrolment.68 Evidence from the Empowering Village
Education programme in South Sudan indicates that community-based approaches led to a
2.8% increase in enrolment and a 7% increase in retention of girls in schools between 2008
and 2010.69 It also creates awareness and builds interest. Idara-e-Taleem-o-Aagahi, a NonGovernmental Organisation (NGO), reports from its own field experience in Pakistan that
enrolment increased by 41% to 57% in the girls’ school and 14% to 31% in the boys’ school,
in a small-scale community mobilisation project.70Offering vulnerable community groups the
opportunity to influence and shape the direction of service delivery has also shown a positive
impact on uptake and use of services in the education sector.71
Scholarships Programme
124. Children from poor and disadvantaged backgrounds often find it difficult to continue their
education beyond secondary school because of the higher costs of attending high schools
and universities. In most cases, such students have no option but to start working to help
support their families which makes the opportunity cost for studying much higher for already
poor families. Education as a result becomes much less relevant to parents who are unable
to see the benefits education can bring to both their and their children’s lives.
125. As part of PESP 2, scholarships will be provided to the best students from the poorest and
most disadvantaged backgrounds using an existing programme run by the Punjab Education
Endowment Fund (PEEF), and on a pilot basis with the Lahore University of Management
Sciences (LUMS). It will include a communications campaign to publicise the success of
such students in schools in poor districts encouraging good students from poor backgrounds
to enrol and stay in education. The programme will include affirmative action to ensure
women and girls benefit equally. Recipients of scholarships will act as ‘Education
Ambassadors’ back in their communities.
126. PEEF is a not for profit company which runs scholarship programmes for secondary and
higher education, funded from an endowment fund of PKR 10 billion donated by GoPb. Over
the past three years, PEEF has supported more than 30,000 students to attend reputable
educational institutions. LUMS is the country’s leading university and its financial aid and
National Outreach Programme (NOP) for excluded groups is widely recognised and unique
in Pakistan. Many previous scholarship recipients are now working in global private sector
firms, or studying in leading international universities including Harvard, Oxford and
Columbia72. PESP 2 will support 1,000 graduate level scholars during the life of the
programme with no contingent liability beyond 2018.
127. PESP 2 will work with LUMS on a trial basis, reviewing results after one year and considering
the merits of opening up the programme to other private higher education institutions. PESP
2 will support the poorest but best students on the basis of transparent eligibility criteria. The
programme will not add to endowments for either LUMS or PEEF.
128. In addition, the scholarships programme will support around 27,000 higher secondary girls in
the 11 low performing districts so that these girls can continue education beyond secondary
level. Realising the ability to bridge the social gap and transforming a promising student’s
37
social mobility and economic opportunities will make education relevant for poor people. A
recent DFID funded Nielson survey in the area cites parent’s lack of awareness and not
placing a high value on education as one of the top two reasons for not sending their children
to school.
129. There is also strong evidence on the private and social returns of higher education, including
the benefits, especially to women, of more than 10 years of schooling when they join the
workforce.73 Similarly, a positive relationship between earnings and level of education with
the relationship strongest at tertiary level has been established.74 Last, while the
demonstration effect of these scholars on their communities is an under explored area, there
is strong evidence on the impact of female role models on education attainment of female
students7576. PESP 2 will commission research to ascertain the impact of this component and
guide delivery..
Appraisal Summary
130. Given that the access to finance, CSO-led and scholarships programmes cannot be
expanded beyond the scale outlined by the PESP 2 design team, and together could only
account for a maximum 12% of total investment, the principal design choices, assuming SBS
is set at 34% of total investment, are to: (i) reduce investment in the innovative and therefore
higher risk school infrastructure programme and invest more in the proven and therefore
medium risk PEF programmes; or (ii) within PEF, invest more in EVS, which has a lower unit
cost than NSP and FAS.
131. There are two reasons why the former is not advisable. First, PEF is currently operating at
the limit of its capacity and an investment beyond the proposed £72.5 million level under
Option 2 would increase risks. Second, the school infrastructure programme would achieve
comparable unit costs to PEF (in the order of £300-£350) if higher levels of enrolment
continue for only 5 to 6 years beyond the end of PESP 2, which is feasible.
132. The latter is problematic in that there is an insufficient supply of LCPS in target LPDs. New
and Foundation Assisted Schools will be required to fill gaps in provision. It is unlikely that
GoPb will construct new schools in the next six years, so it will be important to incentivise the
private sector to do so.
133. For these reasons, the appraisal supports the design team’s proposed levels of investment in
each component programme (Option 2). These estimates were based on extensive
discussions with a wide range of stakeholders and an in-depth assessment of the potential of
each component. Proposed allocations to each component programme are summarised in
Figure 5 and set out in detail in the economic appraisal, the commercial and Financial Cases.
Summary of Appraisals A & B
134. Two qualitative appraisals, using available evidence and the range of CSCs identified in
Table 1 sought to answer the related design questions: “Which overall approach would best
achieve the outcome of “more children in school, staying longer and learning more”?” and
“Given a fixed share of budget allocated to SBS, what balance of other component
programmes would best achieve the outcome of “more children in school, staying longer and
learning more?”
38
135. The balance of evidence for both appraisals suggests that Option 2 offers the optimal
balance for DFID’s investment in PESP 2. This conclusion is further tested below using a
cost benefit analysis.
C. Evidence for Impact of Options
Summary of evidence
136. Table 4 summarises the quality of evidence available to support each of the four options for
appraisal, rated as either strong, medium, or weak.
Option
Evidence rating
0
Weak
2
Strong
3
Medium
4
Weak
Table 4: Summary of evidence for feasible options
Climate change assessment
137. Table 5 below categorises each of the feasible options for the level of climate change risk it
poses. Options are categorised between A (high potential risk/opportunity) and D (core
contribution to a multilateral organisation.
Option
Climate change and environment risks and
impacts, Category (A, B, C, D)
Climate change and environment
opportunities, Category (A, B, C, D)
0
B
C
2
C
B
3
B
C
4
B
C
Table 5: Climate change assessment summary
138. Pakistan is expected to experience higher temperatures and temperature extremes, more
erratic rainfall, increased run-off, increased glacial melt and higher sea level rises, as a result
of climate change, though there is, as yet, uncertainty, about the nature and scale of likely
impacts.77 In recent years, the country has experienced increased weather variability and
more frequent and intense extreme events with significant implications for development.78
The 2010 floods devastated areas of southern Punjab and neighbouring parts of Sindh and
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces, disrupting lives and livelihoods. Schools were closed for
months, often being used as temporary homes for victims of the floods who lost their
homes.79
139. More frequent extreme climatic events, such as flooding, could threaten the successful
implementation of PESP 2 in the short term, especially in the more vulnerable parts of South
Punjab, which will be a focus of many programme activities.
140. Other environmental risks are low. PESP 2 will involve new construction, but is committed to
doing so using high quality environmentally friendly materials and innovative approaches that
39
minimise negative impacts on the environment. As there is a risk that increased numbers of
children in school could put pressure on water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) facilities and
generate more solid waste, which would need to be properly managed. Similarly, poorly
designed or improperly functioning WASH schemes could generate stagnant pools of water
that could increase disease and undermine boundary walls and other constructions.
Therefore, while designing these infrastructure components, a holistic solution will be sought
and implemented to ensure that the environmental hazards are addressed.
141. The climate change related opportunities within PESP 2 include:
142. Climate smart infrastructure and facilities. By working with the SED to ensure all schools
in the province have high quality and environmentally-friendly infrastructure facilities, PESP 2
will be able to ensure that construction and renovation is planned and implemented in climate
and environmentally-smart ways, influencing in the process the way SED specifies and
undertakes other construction programmes, now and in the future.
All works included in the school infrastructure programme will be screened for environmental
impact to ensure that:

Construction and renovation is resilient to natural disasters, taking account of risks
from both flooding and seismic activity, as well as of very high summer
temperatures in southern Punjab (for example: through the provision of verandas,
adequate ceiling-height for ventilation and cross-ventilation, and use of local
building materials with better insulation qualities than brick and reinforced concrete).
Drinking water schemes are designed to ensure a clean supply free from harmful
minerals such as arsenic, meeting WHO water quality standards, and have
adequate drainage to avoid accumulation of waste water; and

Sanitation facilities are planned to be sufficient for the number of children who will
be expected to use them at any time.
PEF’s NSP schools in under-served peri-urban areas and LPDs (most of which are in
southern Punjab) will also include environmental impact screening to ensure that buildings
are sited and constructed in similarly environmentally sound and climate resilient ways.
D. Costs and Benefits of Options
143. This section sets out the economic appraisal of the four feasible options identified for
analysis and summarised in Figure 5 above.
Costs
144. The costs of the six year programme (2012/13-2017/18) are set out in Table 6. In all cases,
an allocation for TA has been included on a pro rata basis across all included component
programmes. A more detailed budget for the preferred option, profiled annually, is provided
in the Financial Case.
Option 2
Option 3
Option 4
Component
£m
Sector Budget Support
119.5
%
34
£m
222.9
%
64
£m
319.5
%
90
40
Punjab Education Foundation
72.5
21
72.5
21
21.7
6
Education Voucher Scheme
43.4
12.4
43.4
12.4
21.7
6
Foundation Assisted Schools
22.2
6.3
22.2
6.3
0
0
6.9
2.7
6.9
2.7
0
0
10.2
3
10.2
3
0
0
111.7
32
27.9
8
0
0
Low Performing Districts
16.9
4.5
16.9
4.5
16.9
4.5
Scholarships
19.4
5.5
0
0
0
0
350.3
100
350.4
100
358.1
100
New Schools Programme
Access to Finance
School Infrastructure
TOTALS
Table 6: Summary of costs for Options 2-4
Note: Because of ‘lumpiness’ of the investments under the three options, the total costs of each vary slightly.
Benefits
145. The key long term benefit of PESP 2 will be an increase in the number of ‘educated people in
Punjab making a positive social and economic contribution.’ This will be achieved by: (i)
reducing the number of out of school children, especially girls, at primary level; (ii) improving
transition to and retention at elementary and secondary level; and (iii) significantly improving
learning outcomes. PESP 2 will benefit girls and boys from poor households who depend on
the public school system and LCPS in particular. In addition, the programme will focus on
LPDs in Punjab, in response to the high concentration of poverty and low enrolment rates in
these parts of the province.
146. The principal quantitative benefit that has been used in the cost benefit analysis is the
incremental lifetime earnings that graduates from primary, elementary and secondary levels
of education are expected to achieve. The analysis takes into account the different wage
levels and labour force participation rates of men and women, and includes a premium for
the better quality of education that graduates will received as a result of PESP 2.
147. The estimate of quantitative benefits of PESP 2 is conservative, because the wider impacts
of education have not been included in the analysis (for example, the impact of educating
girls on fertility rates, improving child health and survival, and reducing the inter-generational
transmission of poverty). These non-quantified benefits are discussed at the end of the
section.
Assumptions
148. Assumptions made in the cost benefit analysis for all parts of PESP 2, and the supporting
evidence for these are set out in Table 7:
Assumptions
Evidence
General assumptions
Exchange rate (£1)
PKR 150
41
Discount rate
Target children per class
10%
Standard discount rate for all
DFID Pakistan projects
40
Government of Pakistan target.
Primary school graduates over no education
£100 per
annum
Middle school graduates over primary graduates
£79 per
annum
Secondary school graduates over middle school
graduates
£91 per
annum
Pakistan Social and Living
Standards Measurement
Survey80 data for 2005/06
adjusted for inflation, as
estimated by the IMF, following
Irfan (2008).81
Wage premiums when entering labour force
Attribution of wage premiums by year of education
Attribution for each year of primary education attained
0.2 of £100
Attribution for each year of middle education attained
0.33 of £79
Attribution for each year of secondary education attained
0.5 of £91
Labour force participation rates in Punjab
Men
80%
Women
27%
Average duration of working life
40 years
Real annual growth in wage rates
0.7%/year
Real wage growth due to experience
Women’s wage rates as % men’s wage rates
Annual cost of sending a child to a LCPS
5%/year
75%
Pakistan Labour Force
Survey.82
Life expectancy is currently 65
years in Pakistan. It is
assumed that children
benefitting from PESP 2 will
work for 40 years after leaving
school.
Irfan (2008).
This is a mid-range estimate
between the ‘4% and declining
with age’ finding of Shah
(2010)83 and the 7.26%
estimated in the World Bank
Punjab Education Sector
Project, Project Appraisal
Document (2009).84
Pakistan Labour Force Survey.
PKR 2,000
Annual opportunity cost of sending child to school
Boy
PKR 6,000
Girl
PKR 3,000
Annual starting salary for a teacher
£1,200
Transition rates
Primary to middle (boys and girls)
50%
Middle to secondary (boys and girls)
50%
42
Quality premium limit of 20% of total wage premium
per year
£4
Quality premium weighting for 1 year of improved
education
0
Quality premium weighting for 2 years of improved
education
1
Quality premium weighting for 3 years of improved
education
2
Quality premium weighting for 4 years of improved
education
3
Quality premium weighting for 5 years of improved
education
4
Quality premium weighting for 6 years of improved
education
5
Table 7: Assumptions used in cost benefit analysis for all parts of PESP 2
Results
149. Key results of the cost benefit analysis for Options 2, 3 and 4 are provided in Table 8, with
more detailed results by component programmes in Tables 9, 10, and 11.
Analysis by Option
150. Table 8 shows that Option 2 presents the highest internal rate of return (IIR) and a
significantly higher net present value (NPV) and benefit to cost ratio (BCR) than either Option
3 or 4.
151. Under all three options, additional enrolments during the lifetime of PESP 2 will be in excess
of 2 million children. However, attribution of additional enrolments to DFID is significantly
lower for Option 4 (89% SBS) than for Options 2 and 3, and therefore a significantly higher
cost to the UK per attributable additional child enrolled.
152. While Option 2 offers the highest number of additional enrolments over the lifetime of the
programme, the share attributable to DFID is slightly lower than for Option 3. This is
connected to DFID’s methodology for calculating attribution of results, which does not focus
purely on getting more out of school children into education. When more money is put into
SBS (under Option 3), attribution to DFID increases. However, Option 2 delivers around
327,000 more out of school children into education overall than Option 3, even though fewer
of these are attributable to DFID. Because the total number of additional children entering
school is higher under Option 2 we judge Option 2 to be preferable.
Option
2
3
4
IRR
%
NPV
£m
12.61
12.08
11.53
605.87
391.52
259.07
Benefit to
Cost
Ratio
1.50
1.39
1.28
Additional Children in School
Additional
Girls
DFID share of
enrolments over six
additional enrolments
years
2,969,926
0.71
1,149,372
2,660,854
0.77
1,231,651
2,159,894
0.86
853,370
Table 8: Summary of Options Analysis
43
Analysis by Component Programme
153. Table 9 breaks down the economic costs and benefits of each component programme under
each of the three options. In particular, it demonstrates diminishing returns as more funding
is committed to SBS under the current set of assumptions and predicted results. In addition,
some of the component programmes showing the highest IIR and BCR, for example
scholarships and the LPD programme, cannot be scaled up further, as discussed in the
qualitative appraisal of options. Table 9 also shows a higher IIR and BCR for PEF’s EVS
than for its other two programmes.
154. Table 10 sets out the projected incremental enrolments for each of the relevant component
programmes, for each option included in the appraisal. Scholarships are not assessed, as
they will not lead directly to increased enrolment. In particular, the table demonstrates the
effect of putting more funding into SBS on enrolments attributable to DFID. However, the
slow rate of increase in total enrolments as more DFID funding is channelled into this form of
funding, combined with diminishing IIR and BCR for Options 3 and 4 illustrates the reasons
why a modest increase in attributable enrolments is not sufficient to select this option over
Option 2.
Option 3
Option 2
Component
IRR %
Sector Budget Support
NPV
£m
BCR
IRR
NPV
£m
Option 4
BCR
IRR
NPV
£m
11.33
211.17
1.24
28.84
2.07
BCR
12.44
328.3
1.47
11.81
267.3
1.34
Education Voucher Scheme
15.18
59.4
2.10
15.05
57.64
2.07
New School Programme
14.15
7.5
1.9
14.15
7.5
1.9
n/a
n/a
n/a
Foundation Assisted Schools
14.10
21.0
1.85
14.1
21.0
1.85
n/a
n/a
n/a
School Infrastructure
11.46 101.9.
1.27
11.46
25.4
1.27
n/a
n/a
n/a
Low Performing Districts
14.92
19.8
1.99
14.92
19.8
1.99
14.92
19.8
1.99
LUMS
15.42
8.8
2.02
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
PEEF
10.19
0.2
1.03
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
PEEF Matriculation
28.17
66.3
4.56
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
Punjab Education Foundation
Scholarships
Table 9: Summary of NPV and IIR by component programme and option
Note: Access to finance is not assessed, given the requirement for additional design work for this pilot. However,
given low levels of investment in this area, we do not anticipate that results in this area would change the shape
of the programme.
155. In the case of the infrastructure programme, it is not sufficient to consider additional
enrolments solely over the lifetime of PESP 2, given that improved infrastructure will continue
to benefit children into the future. An assessment on the conservative assumption that this
44
work will continue to have benefits for an additional 9 years, finds that investment in this
area, under the Option 2 scenario and under the same set of assumptions, would result in an
additional 1,188,046 children enrolling in school.
156. Table 11 summarises the annual cost per additional child enrolled in school for each part of
PESP 2 and for all three options. It does so on the basis of excluding additional costs to
households, although these calculations have also been done as part of the background
analysis for the programme and are fully captured in the cost benefit analysis for all options.
45
Option 2
Component
Sector Budget Support
Additional
enrolments
over six
years
Girls
Option 3
Additional
DFID share
enrolments
of
over six
enrolments
years
Girls
Option 4
Additional
DFID share
enrolments
of
over six
enrolments
years
DFID share
of
enrolments
Girls
1,500,000
0.92
217,261
1,685,947
0.92
400,761
1,871,894
0.92
583,458
Education Voucher Scheme
435,000
0.50
435,000
435,000
0.50
435,000
217,500
0.50
217,500
Foundation Assisted Schools
224,400
0.50
224,400
224,400
0.50
224,400
n/a
n/a
n/a
80,000
0.50
80,000
80,000
0.50
80,000
n/a
n/a
n/a
660,026
0.50
140,300
165,006
0.50
35,078
n/a
n/a
n/a
70,500
0.50
52,411
70,500
0.50
52,411
70,500
0.50
52,411
Punjab Education Foundation
New School Programme
School Infrastructure
Low Performing Districts
Table 10: Summary of additional children in school by component programme and option
Component
Annual cost (£) per additional child
enrolled in school
Option 2
Sector Budget Support
Option 3
Option 4
180
179
178
Education Voucher Scheme
40
40
40
New School Programme
41
41
n/a
Foundation Assisted Schools
48
48
n/a
School Infrastructure over 15 years
74
74
n/a
Low Performing Districts
103
104
104
TOTAL
128
152
172
Punjab Education Foundation
Table 11: Summary of unit cost per additional child per year by component programme and option
157. The detailed economic analysis of the component programmes proposed for inclusion in
PESP 2 suggests that:
158. SBS provides a modest impact on enrolment given the scale of the investment relative to
other components programmes. Benefit in this part of PESP 2 arises principally from raising
the quality of education for those children already in school (the quality premium) rather than
new enrolments (the wage premium), in addition to the focus of the World Bank PAD on
institutional and governance reforms.
159. PEF provides a range of cost effective ways of increasing enrolment, given lower salaries of
teachers compared with the public sector. These interventions also offer a reasonably good
standard of education. Lower BCR and IIR for FAS and NSP are a reflection of the fact that
for both there are no new enrolments in Year 1 of PESP 2 for either of these programmes, in
contrast with EVS. In the case of NSP, this is compounded by the fact that all enrolments
take place in Grade 1, pushing the start point for benefits further into the future.
160. The school infrastructure programme is less cost effective at increasing enrolment than PEF
because of the indirect costs associated with extra teachers paid Government salaries.
However, as the benefits extend well beyond the life of the project, this component
programme is assumed to get an additional 1,188, 046 children in school after the end of
PESP 2, over a 9 year period. This number is likely to be higher in reality as assets produced
by this programme will last longer than 15 years if managed well.
161. The LPD programme is more cost effective than infrastructure at increasing enrolment but
less cost effective than PEF, again, because of the need for new public sector teachers. Also
less cost effective because conservative assumptions have been made for the enrolment
impact of social mobilisation at just 10% of children targeted. The reason for this
conservative assumption is a lack of evidence, reflecting the innovative nature of the
programme.
162. The scholarships programme does not increase enrolment directly, and offers a range of
economic returns on investment. In the case of LUMS, unit costs are higher than for PEEF,
but the return is also higher on the basis of a perceived wage premium, given the institution’s
elite status. PEEF scholarships are borderline acceptable, given a high unit cost for
scholarships relative to assumed wage return. However, PEEF Matriculation scholarships
offer the highest rate of return, because the return to completing matric is high relative to the
cost of doing so. If this activity supported boys as well the returns would be higher, given
much higher participation rates in the labour market for boys.
163. Given the range of evidence and assumptions made, Option 2 is identified as the preferred
option based on the economic analysis, as well as on the basis of the CSCs and evidence
based analysis. It would result in a higher NPV, more out of school children in education, and
lower unit costs compared with Options 3 and 4.
Wider Economic Benefits
164. The cost benefit analysis estimates the economic benefits of PESP 2, based on the future
earning capacity of additional children enrolling in and completing primary, elementary and
secondary school, as well as improvements in the quality of education in the public sector
and some LCPS. The wider economic benefits of education on gender equity, health and
society that could be expected in Punjab as a result of the programme, summarised here,
were not included in this analysis.
165. Girls’ education has been shown to be strongly associated with reduced fertility, improved
child health and rates of child survival, as well as reductions in inter-generational poverty.
There is strong global evidence on this, corroborated by research in Pakistan (see Box 1).
PESP 2 has a strong focus on ensuring more girls enrol in school, learn more and make the
transition to elementary and secondary schools and is therefore likely to result in significant
economic benefits in these areas.
48
Impact on livelihoods and earning opportunities
Education of girls increases the prospects of their participation in productive labour force and expands
opportunities for paid work. This drives the space for their empowerment and autonomy. Girls with an
extra year of schooling earn 10% to 20% more than their peers without that level of schooling 85. In
Pakistan, the return to an additional year of schooling ranges between 7 and 11 per cent for men and
between 13 and 18 per cent for women. However, total labour market returns are much higher for men,
despite returns to education being higher for women if wider benefits of lowered fertility rate and impact
on child health etc. are considered.86
Impact on fertility rates
Evidence from the Pakistan Demographic and Health Survey and a study on educational status and
women's fertility in Karachi corroborates the correlation between improved education for women and
fertility decline.
The results show that mean age at marriage, the educational attainment of both sexes and the age of
women are the most important factors affecting Total Fertility Rate (TFR).87Enrolling in school also
delays marriage age and reduces prospects of adolescent fertility in a country where girls get married
young. Fertility rates vary by educational status. Women with no formal education have, on average,
two more children than women with at least some secondary education. TFR is 2.3 among women with
tertiary education or higher, compared with 4.8 among women with no formal education. 88
Impact on child health and survival rates
Adolescent fertility adversely affects not only young women’s health, education and employment
prospects but also that of their children. Births to 15–19 year olds are associated with the highest risk
of infant and child mortality as well as a higher risk of morbidity and mortality for the mother. 89Crossnational regressions indicate that higher fertility increases poverty both by retarding economic growth
and by skewing distribution against the poor. 90
Women with education are also far more likely to immunise their children and seek ante-natal care.
They are much more likely to control their reproductive health in ways that minimise risk during
pregnancy.91 Studies in Pakistan corroborate the finding that increased education reduces infant and
child mortality and morbidity. 92Household survey data also provides evidence of a strong association
between maternal education and child health. Each additional year of maternal education can reduce
the risk of child death by 7% to 9%.93 A recent estimate suggests that improvements in women’s
education explained half of the reduction in child deaths between 1990 and 2009. Children born to
educated mothers are also less likely to be stunted or underweight, or to suffer from micronutrient
deficiencies.
In Pakistan, mothers’ education was found to have strongly positive effects on children’s height and
weight even after other important determinants such as household income were controlled for. On
average, children of mothers who had completed middle school were significantly taller and heavier
than children of illiterate mothers.94
Box 1: Evidence for wider economic benefits
49
E. Assessment of Value for Money
166. The assessment of value for money is based on this cost/benefit appraisal, together with
global rates of return on education. Overall, we have confidence that PESP 2 offers good
value for money. Our analysis of value for money under this programme falls into two
categories:
i)
Private returns to the individuals who will benefit from PESP 2. These benefits are
explored in the cost benefit analysis.
ii) Social benefits to the population of Punjab as a result of a more educated population.
The Business Case considers these in a qualitative sense, but long term social benefits
are not considered in the economic appraisal.
VFM considerations are discussed in detail in the Commercial Case.
F. Summary Value for Money Statement
167. The programme design addresses aspirations and DFID and GoPb strategic aims in
education. PESP 2 has been structured to ensure the best possible balance of working
through GoPb, with civil society and with the local and international private sector. The
choice and balance of funding mechanisms is the optimal one in terms of degree of control,
projected results, opportunity to transfer risk away from DFID, and value for money.
50
3. Commercial Case
A. Procurement/Commercial Requirements
168. DFID’s investment in PESP 2 will cost up to £350.3 million over six financial years, with the
aim of transforming education for girls and boys throughout Punjab, and a particular
emphasis on reaching the poorest and most disadvantaged children in the province.
169. 34% of DFID’s funding for PESP 2 (£119.5 million over six years) will be committed to SBS
through GoPb, and coordinated with the World Bank and CIDA through the World Bank PAD.
This part of the programme will share a common results framework with partners, and will be
subject to joint reviews. An additional 21% of funding under PESP 2 (£72.5 million) will be
committed to financial aid through GoPb and earmarked for PEF. This part of the programme
will be subject to DFID’s own results and monitoring and evaluation frameworks for PESP 2.
170. In total, 55% of PESP 2 funding will therefore take the form of direct funding to GoPb. The balancing
45% of total funding will be committed to parallel programming. The total available budget for TA
will be £35 million, to include a budget of £7 million for research and evaluation.
171. The range of programmes included in PESP 2, and options for financial implementation,
have been analysed as part of the Appraisal Case. Table 12 summarises the component
programmes, their value over six financial years, and implementation and procurement
routes that will be adopted.
B. Value for Money
172. PESP 2 has been structured to ensure the best possible balance of working through GoPb,
with civil society and with the local and international private sector. The choice and balance
of funding mechanisms is the optimal one in terms of degree of control, projected results,
opportunity to transfer risk away from DFID, and value for money.
Programme
SBS to GoPb to implement its Education
Sector Reform Programme
Value (£m) Implementation/Procurement Route
119.5
Finance direct to GoPb through SBS
(see indirect procurement)
Financial aid to GoPb, earmarked for PEF
72.5
Finance direct to GoPb through financial
aid (see indirect procurement)
Funding of existing access to finance
programme through a Fund Manager.
10.2
Finance direct to Fund Manager (see
indirect procurement)
Funding of infrastructure programme to
improve school environment
Direct procurement of Technical
Assistance Consulting Engineering Firm
111.7
(TACE) who will manage this project
budget
Funding of civil society led programme in
low performing districts to stimulate
demand for quality education
Direct procurement of Technical
16.9 Assistance Management Organisation
(TAMO) and/or contribution to TEP
Funding of scholarship programme
providing access to higher education
through quality higher education
institutions
Grant to LUMS (50%)
19.4 Finance direct to GoPb through financial
aid for PEEF (see indirect procurement)
Table 12: Summary of component programmes
51
173. Technical Assistance to support PESP 2 implementation will be provided by a ‘Technical
Assistance Management Organisation’ (TAMO). The infrastructure component will be
implemented through an independent service provider, or ‘Technical Assistance Consulting
Engineering’ (TACE) Firm. Both will be selected through transparent international competitive
bidding processes, and DFID will directly manage both contractors. Both TAMO and TACE
will be required to work closely with government counterparts, but delivery of infrastructure
support will take place outside government procurement and management systems, in order
to manage risks. TACE will identify, manage and oversee major civil work contracts, awarded
mainly to local construction firms and specialised civil society organisations through a
competitive bidding processes carried out in country. Small civil works will be carried out by
school councils with technical support from TACE. A dedicated Climate and Environment
Adviser in TACE will scrutinise every proposed intervention to assess the potential
environmental impact and recommend a suitable solution with appropriate mitigation plan.
174. This approach, based on direct procurement, will give DFID Pakistan access to a strong
network of international and national expertise for both TAMO and TACE, combined with an
efficient approach to exercising fiduciary control, particularly in managing risk and ensuring
interventions deliver both effective and high quality outputs, and demonstrate value for
money. At the bidding stage, all potential service providers will be required to describe (with
evidence) their proposed approach to managing risk, and the mitigation measures against
corruption at the bidding stage.
175. In the case of SBS, fiduciary and corruption risk will be managed using a range of
instruments, including Financial Risk Assessments (FRA), continuous audit (CA), internal
and external audit, and third party validations (TPVs). Similar risks in working with CSOs,
independent agencies and other partners will be mitigated through due diligence, financial
and commercial audits. Details of these are set out in the Financial Case.
176. Additional value for the programme will be driven by competitive tendering using OJEU or a
suite of competitively let DFID frameworks, allowing direct comparisons to be made to
achieve the best proportionate balance of commercial and technical expertise. PESP 2 is
built on the premise that all bidders are subject to the same set of criteria, but recognises
financial credibility is essential to protecting DFID’s significant investment in this area.
177. All contracts will be sufficiently flexible to enable resources to be allocated to the range of
programmes in PESP 2, and to scale up or down based on evidence from monitoring and
evaluation, to improve both results and value for money. In addition, both principal providers
of TA will be required to develop their own comprehensive monitoring and evaluation
approaches, based on relevant areas of the PESP 2 log frame, during inception phases. This
will ensure service providers take ownership of performance indicators and service level
agreements, to be agreed in advance with DFID. DFID will monitor VFM in individual
components through a range of instruments including programme reviews, periodic
independent assessments, TPVs and standard DFID programme cycle management
procedures.
C. Market Place Response
178. Recent experience indicates the existence of a responsive market to meeting the needs of
PESP 2. DFID expects high level political will invested in its programme to enable
collaboration with a range of key stakeholders, and that service providers will be keen to take
up the challenge of improving the education rights of millions of girls and boys in Punjab.
52
179. With political influencing central to achieving impact, DFID Pakistan will apply the experience
and lessons learned from recent programmes including PESP 1 and the Roadmap, as well
as the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Education Sector Programme (KESP), TEP and the Education
Fund for Sindh (EFS). These include ensuring a clear emphasis on robust financial
management and other governance related reforms in education programmes, to build
sustainable progress in the sector.
180. DFID will work with relevant stakeholders to ensure the market is made aware of the
opportunity, and that it understands the nature and complexity of the working environment
and education sector in Punjab. Due consideration will be given to pre-bid meetings, both to
ensure the market is fully informed of the expectations of the programme, and to ensure the
best possible technical and commercial responses.
181. DFID’s Framework for Conflict and Affected States may provide an option for direct access to
pre-qualified technical suppliers who have expressed an interest in working in Pakistan. Mini
competitions offer the opportunity for DFID to use an appropriate balance of commercial and
technical criteria that will maintain competition and drive value add for project investment.
DFID Pakistan has recent experience of using the framework, and will ensure dedicated
resource and continued dialogue and support with Procurement Group (PrG) at the earliest
opportunity.
D. Cost Drivers
182. The primary cost drivers for PESP 2 will be the associated fees, expenses and overheads of
service providers, including specialist technical support, associated and necessary goods,
equipment, premises and related travel, accommodation and local transportation. A number
of recent competitions run by DFID Pakistan will offer direct access to cost comparisons, and
all service providers will be expected to demonstrate their competitiveness by illustrating how
they benchmark their costs in a national and/or international context. In addition, service
providers will be required to demonstrate how budgets and financing can be linked to DFID’s
model for managing economy, efficiency and effectiveness.
183. Pakistan is generally perceived as a difficult working environment, with access to many areas
circumscribed by security restrictions. Duty of Care will be the sole responsibility of appointed
service providers, and security will attract a cost premium. DFID Pakistan will complete a
Risk Assessment Matrix (RAM) for the project, which will be circulated to all bidders as part
of tender packages. The technical evaluation team will assess responses qualitatively with
regard to bidders’ understanding of the known and foreseeable risks, risk management and
security procedures, as well as their knowledge, experience and resources to manage the
demands of the programme.
184. DFID is confident that this approach will deliver value for money for UK taxpayers, while also
safeguarding outcomes and benefits for the beneficiaries of the programme.
E. Procurement Process
Direct Procurement
185. Direct procurement will take place either through new competitive tenders under the
European Public Procurement Directive, or via sources of technical expertise already
identified in DFID and/or other government department frameworks. The decision about
53
which approach to pursue will be made by DFID Pakistan on the basis of which offers the
better spread of technically capable suppliers to respond to the demands of the requirements
defined.
186. Direct procurement will focus on two primary suppliers of TA to PESP 2, one focused on the
school infrastructure component (TACE), and the other on support across the programme
(TAMO). The procurement process will begin in January 2013, at the start of the programme,
with the expectation that both suppliers will be mobilised by July 2013.
Indirect Procurement
187. If DFID wishes to support the education sector in Punjab it must work with the public sector,
which is where most girls and boys, particularly the poorest, go to school. However,
government schools will not achieve DFID’s ambitious targets for getting more of Punjab’s
children into school alone. The proposed blend of support through GoPb, the private sector
and civil society is therefore the most effective approach to producing the results that the UK
wishes to achieve in education in Pakistan.
188. The current Chief Minister of Punjab is highly committed to reform of the education sector,
launching the Roadmap process in 2010. To date, considerable progress has been made
through the Roadmap in reforming aspects of the management of the sector, including the
introduction of merit based recruitment of EDOs. However, much remains to be achieved,
including de-politicisation of the teaching profession, and a range of PFM and corruption
reforms. The latter, and steps proposed to mitigate them, are discussed in the Financial
Case, and reference is made in the Management Case to conditionalities that will be applied
to DFID’s SBS to GoPb.
F. Managing Performance
189. DFID Pakistan will maintain management and due diligence of appointed service providers,
but will outsource management of the downstream supply base, with the aim of maximising
supplier responsibility for managing PESP 2.
190. All organisations that compete for contracts let by DFID Pakistan are subject to rigorous prequalification, a process that assesses bidders’ capability, capacity and resource to meet
identified requirements. Suppliers are required to disclose details of previous convictions or
proceedings against them, including in respect of fraud, bribery and corruption. Appointed
service providers will be expected to manage downstream supply, including due diligence in
the same manner, as well as to demonstrate that they will achieve and maintain continuous
quality improvement and cost reduction for the duration of PESP 2.
191. Service providers will be managed through the identification of high level outputs (including
key performance indicators) for the duration of contracts. These will be agreed during the
three month inception period at the start of the contracts. Service providers will be required to
demonstrate through work plans how they propose to achieve successful delivery. Payment
will be made on the basis of achievement and results. A risk management log will be
maintained, proactively recording risks associated with programme delivery and identifying
mitigation measures designed to keep work on track.
192. Independent annual reviews and continuous independent auditing will track delivery, while
independent monitoring and validation of programme outputs will provide assurances that
54
DFID funding is being used for its intended purposes. For reasons of continuity, the
preference is that the same service provider would be used on each occasion, provided
previous performance is of sufficiently high quality.
193. DFID will make clear in terms of reference that funds may be scaled up or down, based on
results achieved. Contracts will allow for DFID monies to be reduced at our discretion if we
consider that programmes are not delivering the intended outputs, whether this is due to the
performance of service provider, or to external factors.
194. Terms of reference will also specify that DFID may, wholly at its discretion, increase its total
investment in PESP 2 up to a maximum of £400 million. Any increase on original contract
budgets will be subject to separate approval, but stating this up front will offer greater
flexibility, and avoid the necessity to re-tender at high associated costs in terms of
administration resource, as well as potential delays in programme continuity.
195. Given the six year duration of PESP 2, contracts will include adequate provision for variation
to adapt to changes that occur during the lifetime of the programme. There will be a phased
approach to contract implementation, to allow DFID to review priorities, and incentivise
suppliers to deliver successfully. DFID Pakistan shall, as a condition of proceeding from one
phase to the next, have the right to request changes to contracts, including in respect of
services, terms of reference and contract price, to reflect lessons learned, or changes in
circumstances, policies or objectives relating to, or affecting, the programme.
196. Key contract review points will be post inception, at annual review, and mid-term evaluation.
55
4. Financial Case
A. How Much Will it Cost?
197. The total expected budget requirement for this programme will be £350.3 million over the
next six years (2012/13 – 2017/18). This will be broken down and profiled annually according
to Table 13. Please note that this table includes budgets for TA, which will be disaggregated
and profiled in detail following approval of the Business Case.
Activity
SBS to GoPb
Financial aid for PEF
Pilot access to
finance component
Infrastructure
component
Civil society
component in LPDs
Scholarship
component
Sub Total
Technical Assistance
Total
Year 1
20
7
0
Year 2
17
11
4.5
Year 3
17
12
0
Year 4
16
13
4.5
Year 5
15
15
0
Year 6
15
10.6
0
Total
100
68.6
9
10
26
31
37
0
0
104
2
3.1
3
2.7
0
0
10.8
2
3.2
3.6
4.2
4.2
1
18.2
36
6
42
53.8
7
60.8
60.6
7.2
67.8
70.4
7.5
77.9
54.2
6
60.2
35.6
6
41.6
310.6
39.7
350.3
Table 13: Cost and annual profile for PESP 2 (£ million)
Note: This table disaggregates funds for technical assistance from programme funds. For the purposes of the economic
appraisal, these funds are allocated pro rata across programme funds in the Appraisal Case.
198. DFID’s support to GoPb through SBS will contribute to the total estimated cost of US$8.8
billion attached to Punjab’s education sector programme over the next six years. According
to the World Bank PAD, the total cost of the programme between 2013 and 2015 will be
$4.407 billion, including contribution from GoPb, donors, the private sector and beneficiaries.
The World Bank has committed to a loan of US$350 million and CIDA to funding of US$19
million over this period respectively.
199. DFID’s support to GoPb through SBS will be committed to the following eligible expenditure
programmes, in line with the World Bank PAD: (i) employee related expenses of primary and
secondary education sub-functions of provincial and all district governments (recurrent
budget, capped at 70% of total expenditure to promote expenditure in other areas); (ii) grants
for school councils (recurrent budget); (iii) girls’ stipend programme (recurrent budget); (iv)
performance based incentive programme (recurrent budget); (vi) inclusive education
programme for children with disabilities with the help of the Special Education department;
and (v) monitoring systems (recurrent budget).
200. DFID’s support to PEF through financial aid will be used in three defined areas, EVS, NSP
and FAS. These budget heads will contain work on CPDP, development of a quality
assurance test for all PEF schools, with the potential to be extended to other private and
government schools, and a range of vocational training modules for use in schools supported
by PEF.
Programme
Education Voucher Scheme
DFID funding over six years
£43,353,030
56
New Schools Programme
Foundation Assisted Schools
£6,948,117
£22,215,395
Table 14: DFID funding to PEF
B. How Will It Be Funded?
201. Funding for the first three years of this programme will be drawn from the £650m funding
agreed for the Education Sector Portfolio in Pakistan for the period 2011/12 – 2014/15, which
has been secured within the current spending round allocation, following the approval of
DFID Pakistan’s Bilateral Aid Review (BAR) offer. DFID will secure HM Treasury agreement
for the programme allocations for the years 2015 – 2017.
C. How Will Funds Be Paid Out?
Sector Budget Support
202. DFID will sign an Exchange of Letters (EoL) with GoPb for the provision of SBS to PESP 2.
According to federal procedures, funding tranches will be paid via the State Bank of
Pakistan. Prior to releasing the first tranche payment, DFID will agree with the federal
government that SBP will transfer funds directly to the Punjab Government Account No.1
(non-food), without first routing monies through the federal government.
203. While the World Bank loan will be disbursed annually, DFID funding tranches to GoPb and
PEF will be released twice annually on a reimbursement basis. PMIU and PEF will
separately initiate their six monthly requests for funds. PMIU will pass these requests to the
Finance Department, GoPb, for countersigning and submitting to DFID through the Economic
Affairs Division (EAD). DFID will release funds on the basis of bi-annual Interim Financial
Reports (IFRs), and on satisfactory outcomes of mid-year and annual joint monitoring
reviews to be carried out by DFID and other donors supporting the programme.
204. The only exception to this basis for reimbursement will be the first tranche of £20 million,
which will be paid on signing of the EoL by DFID, EAD and GoPb, on the basis of the results
of the World Bank’s first review mission to be carried out in January 2013. Funding flows are
summarised in Figure 7 below.
57
Money
released by
DFID
Salaries are directly
drawn by Accountant
General Punjab office
from PCF.
For non-salary expenses,
procurement is done by
relevant departments/
units and bills are
submitted to Accountant
General office for
payment through
cheques and the cheques
are then given to supplier
of services.
SBP Nostro Account
State Bank of
Pakistan
Once deposited in PCF DFID
monies same as other monies
One line transfer
AG Punjab
Provincial
Consolidated Fund
Punjab Education
Foundation
Transferred by FD as per Provincial Finance
Commission or otherwise to Districts
One line transfer
Account # 4 of
districts (DCO is
principal Accounting
officer)
With approval from DCO office,
DDOs execute budgets under
supervision of District Account
officer, the rep of Accountant
General in District.
Special Drawing
Account
SDAs are in every District of Punjab for
specific purposes e.g. upgradation/
missing facilities component of PERSP
so that the funds can’t be mis-allocated
to other expenditures.
Schools
AG OFFICE
Salaries
DCO/EDO OFFICE
Non salary/ Development
SPECIAL DRAWING ACCOUNT
Upgradation
Figure 7: Flow of SBS and direct financial aid to PEF
58
Money
released by
DFID
SBP Nostro Account
State Bank of
Pakistan
Provincial
Consolidated Fund
LUMS
PEEF
DFID will provide financial aid to PEEF and LUMS from the graduate scholarship
programme. While the funding to PEEF may be direct from DFID, funding to LUMS can
either be through PEEF or direct (to be decided during inception phase).
Figure 8: Flow of funds for scholarship programme
Parallel Programmes & Technical Assistance
205. Direct funding flows for the scholarships programme are set out in Figure 8. While DFID will
provide financial aid to PEEF directly without involving the Provincial Consolidated Fund
(PCF) and Finance Department, funding for LUMS could be made directly, or through PEEF
which already has a mechanism for providing financial support to LUMS. The final decision in
this regard will be taken after due deliberations with GoPb and other stakeholders, with a
view to managing both value for money and transaction costs.
206. Both TA suppliers will claim their management fees and costs associated with parallel
programmes included in PESP 2 on a reimbursable basis according to the agreement
reached with PrG during contract negotiations.
D. What is the Assessment of Financial Risk and Fraud?
207. The World Bank and DFID have recently undertaken a Public Expenditure and Financial
Accountability (PEFA) and an FRA for Punjab respectively. The World Bank has agreed and
approved the PEFA assessment with GoPb. The overall risk rating in DFID’s draft FRA
remains ‘substantial’, but this assessment is currently being updated in the light of the World
Bank’s revised PEFA document. Similarly, DFID’s corruption risk rating remains ‘substantial’,
although it is anticipated this will be revised to ‘moderate’ within the next few years. Given
59
these fiduciary and corruption risk ratings, PESP 2 includes a substantive mitigation plan
against both financial and corruption risks.
208. DFID Pakistan has a strong focus across its portfolio on improving PFM to safeguard its
investments and has recently finalised its anti-corruption strategy. The education team
responsible for PESP 2 will work with DFID Pakistan’s PFM Adviser, the DFID funded SubNational Governance (SNG) Programme, and the World Bank team to minimise financial
risks. These efforts will not only safeguard the investments of DFID and other donors in
reform of Punjab’s education sector, but will also maximise value for money across the
programme, including the use of GoPb funds. DFID will work with GoPb to pilot output based
budgeting (OBB) in its education sector reform programme. Drawing on experience from
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and subject to government agreement, DFID will consider providing
additional conditional grants for the purpose of upgrading and replacing facilities, working
through the school councils in some districts of South Punjab.
209. PEF is an autonomous organisation whose accounts are audited by the Director General
Commercial Audit and an independent audit company. Grant Thornton has recently carried
out a full performance audit, which rated PEF as ‘satisfactory’. Since DFID funding,
combined with that of other donors, will significantly increase PEF’s operation and outreach,
DFID is carrying out a risk assessment of the organisation with regard to fraud and
corruption.
210. The design for PESP 2 has examined closely the risk of corruption associated with the range
of eligible expenditure programmes included in SBS to GoPb. All funds channelled through
SBS will be subject to high levels of scrutiny, and both the World Bank and DFID have stated
their financing will be contingent on results, to safeguard investment and ensure additionality.
This analysis is summarised in Figure 9.
60
AC-IV + SDAa for 3 low
performing Districts
Punjab Education
Foundation
PLA Account
IA, EA
Provincial
Consolidated Fund
Account # 1
(Non-food)
District
Consolidated
Fund
Account # 4
IA, EA
Teachers
Performance
Incentives
District
Consolidated
Fund
Account # 4
District
Consolidated
Fund
Account # 4
TPV, IA, EA
TPV, IA, EA
Pay Roll
Audit
Pay Roll
Audits, TPV
Salaries
CM Monitoring
System
Girls Stipends
Grants to School
Councils
AG office/ AC-IV
AG office
AC-IV- to postal saving
account to money orders
AC-IV- specific special
drawing accounts
-TPV (Third Party Validation), IA (Internal Audit), EA (External Audit)
-These safeguards will be further reinforced by Continuous Audit by PWC
Figure 9: Risk mitigation strategy for SBS
211. Mitigation of corruption risks for other parts of PESP 2 is covered in detail in the Commercial
Case, particularly in respect of the school infrastructure programme. Other, more minor risks
of corruption and mitigation strategies are included in the draft Financial & Corruption Risk
Management Plan. Once this plan (available at Table 17) has been agreed with GoPb, it will
be used as the basis of regular monitoring by DFID Pakistan, both through PESP 2 and the
SNG programme.
212. DFID Pakistan’s education team has recently carried out due diligence on two large CSOs,
as part of the Education For All programme, and is developing due diligence guidance for all
operations in Pakistan. This guidance will be provided to TAMO to enable it to undertake
effective due diligence checks for prospective civil society partners involved in the
programme focused on LPDs.
E. How Will Expenditure Be Monitored, Reported and Accounted For?
Monitoring & Reporting
213. As set out in the Management Case below, DFID will, in conjunction with other donors, carry
out mid-year and annual Joint Monitoring Reviews of SBS to assess progress against DLIs,
results, and to monitor programme finances. DFID will also work closely with PMIU and its
TA teams to carry out periodic reviews and TPVs of aspects of the programme. DFID has
included a budget of £7 million in its allowance for TA to cover monitoring and evaluation.
214. Both TAMO and TACE will submit quarterly reports on results and finances, and will meet
regularly with DFID to discuss progress across all components of PESP 2. As set out in the
Commercial Case, these organisations will be responsible for good commercial and financial
61
conduct of sub-contractors (commercial companies or CSOs), as well as their adherence to
climate, environment and disaster mitigation plans.
215. In the case of direct funding to GoPb, financial reporting arrangements agreed in the World
Bank PAD will also apply to DFID’s funding. Reports and financial statements will identify the
use of funds according to agreed areas of eligible expenditure, financed by donors and
GoPb. Adequate notes and disclosures consistent with international practice will be provided
in annual financial statements.
216. GoPb will submit twice yearly IFRs, prepared by PMIU, to DFID within 30 days of the end of
April and October for each year of the programme, as agreed during World Bank loan
negotiations. PEF will provide PMIU with information related to eligible expenditures incurred
within 15 days of the end of each period, to enable submission of IFRs in a timely fashion,
including actual expenditure, budget, and reasons for variances +/- 10%.
217. IFRs will be supported by quarterly Budget Execution Reports (BERs), which will form the
basis of documentation of expenditures against advances and disbursements for eligible
expenditure programmes for the full extent of DFID funding. In addition, BERs for the full
education sector, accompanied by a covering note summarising budget allocations and
utilisation for each area of eligible expenditure will be submitted within 30 days of the end of
each calendar quarter, to enable continuous monitoring of expenditures, and the progress of
the programme.
218. The PMIU will prepare annual financial statements in accordance with the Cash Basis
International Public Sector Accounting Standard. These will provide details of expenditure
against eligible areas, together with sources of funding, to include GoPb, IDA, DFID, CIDA
and any other development partner. PEF and PEEF (in the event that funds are channelled
through GoPb) will cooperate fully with PMIU, submitting information in a timely fashion, and
coordinating with the Auditor General of Pakistan.
219. In addition to regular reporting requirements, GoPb will be required to deliver other reports
that DFID may request from time to time on the financial management of its investment in
education in Punjab.
Audit
Internal Audit
220. DFID Pakistan will continue to work to strengthen the IA function of SED, particularly as it
applies to PESP 2 to safeguard DFID and other donor funds and to improve the quality of
PFM in the province. It will do this through on-going dialogue with GoPb and other donors,
and with assistance from the TAMO, as well as the DFID-funded SNG Programme.
Annual Audit
221. Financial statements for SBS, including comprehensive disclosure of the operations,
resources and expenditures of the programme will be prepared, audited and submitted to
DFID and the World Bank within 6 months of the close of each financial year (by 31
December annually). The Auditor General of Pakistan will conduct an audit of financial
statements.
62
222. Audit activity will principally be carried out by the Director General (Civil) Audit for provincial
expenditure, Director General (District) Audit for district government expenditure, and the
Director General (Commercial) Audit for PEF. The audit report will be based on the findings
of all parties involved, and the management letter will include all material observations.
223. All spending agencies within Punjab’s education sector will provide auditors with full access
to relevant documents and records. The World Bank and DFID will monitor compliance to
audit requirements. GoPb systems for resolution and settlement of audit observations apply
to this programme.
224. In addition to the annual audit report for PESP 2, audit reports for GoPb and all 36 district
governments (including SED) will be submitted to the World Bank and DFID for information
within one month of receipt from the Auditor General of Pakistan each financial year.
225. DFID will require that any and all audit observations, especially those pertaining to financial
misappropriation, be resolved as a matter of priority. DFID operates a zero tolerance policy
on corruption, and will focus on resolving any corruption related observations before release
of further SBS. GoPb will ensure that a minimum of 80% of all observations are resolved for
each year before SBS proceeds.
Continuous Audit
226. GoPb has agreed that DFID will carry out continuous audit of all funds provided through SBS
for the programme.
227. GoPb has agreed that DFID will carry out continuous audit of all funds provided through SBS
for the programme. DFID will work with the World Bank and TAMO on this issue, producing
assessments throughout the life of the programme. These will focus on the IFRs, audited
financial statements, budget execution and audit reports of the provincial and district
governments; and (ii) the programme’s financial and disbursement arrangements, to ensure
compliance with agreed standards. During implementation, the World Bank, together with
DFID and TAMO will review: (i) the IFRs, audited financial statements, budget execution and
audit reports of the provincial and district governments; and (ii) the programme’s financial
and disbursement arrangements to ensure compliance with the agreed requirements.
Procurement
228. All equipment costing more than £1,000 purchased by TAMO, TACE or any other partner in
PESP 2 using DFID funds will be recorded in the asset registers of that organisation. DFID
will make use of a monitoring mission to check records and assets themselves. At the end of
the programme, DFID will decide on disposal of assets according to Blue Book guidance.
229. LUMS and all CSOs sub-contracted by TAMO will submit quarterly expenditure reports to
DFID and TAMO respectively. They will also provide annual financial statements audited by
an independent chartered accountancy firm within six months of end of their financial year.
63
5. Management Case
A. Management Arrangements
230. DFID Pakistan’s provincial delivery (education) team will deliver PESP 2, with support from
two principal sources of TA. An overview of the management arrangements is provided at
Figure 10.
DFID
Implemented
by DFID
Implemented
through TA
TACE
School
Infrastructure
Programme
Implemented
through TA
Government of
Punjab (SED)
Government of
Punjab (PEF)
State Bank of
Pakistan
PEEF
LUMS
SBS
Education
Sector Reform
Programme
Financial Aid
for PEF
Access to
Finance
Programme
Scholarships
Programme
TAMO
SUPPORTS
DFID IN
IMPLEMENTING
AND
MONITORING
OTHER
COMPONENTS
TAMO
TA & Roadmap
Civil Society
Programme (in
conjunction
with TEP)
Figure 10: Management arrangements for PESP 2
231. DFID Pakistan will implement the following components of PESP 2 directly: (i) sector budget
support to GoPb; (ii) additional sector budget support to PEF; (iii) the access to finance
programme for LCPS, to be implemented through SBP; and (iv) the tertiary level
scholarships programme, to be implemented through PEEF and LUMS. The first of these
components will be implemented in close cooperation with GoPb, the World Bank and CIDA.
232. DFID Pakistan’s Provincial Delivery (Education) team, located in Basic Services Group
(BSG), led by an A1 team leader, will be responsible for oversight and delivery of PESP 2.
The structure of this team and the time they will spend on the programme is summarised
below at Figure 11. In addition, DFID Pakistan is recruiting a B1 programme manager to
manage the infrastructure component.
64
A1 Team Leader
(50%)
A2L Social
Development
Adviser (20%)
A2L Governance
Adviser (45%)
A2 Education
Adviser (100%)
A2 Private Sector
Adviser (10%)
A2 Infrastructure
Adviser (25%)
B2 Programme
Officer (100%)
A2 Economic Adviser
(20%)
A2L Programme
Manager (100%)
C1 Programme
Officer (50%)
Figure 11: DFID Pakistan team supporting PESP 2
Technical Assistance Management Organisation
233. The TAMO will support and manage the implementation of the following components of the
programme: (i) support to DFID Pakistan in the management of the four components set out
above; (ii) management of the civil society led programme focused on LPDs; and (iii)
management of technical assistance for all programme components, including consideration
for innovative solutions such as transport for hard to reach children to address the issue of
school location. The last of these requirements will include provision of support to the
Roadmap, as well as monitoring progress for all parts of PESP 2 by commissioning studies
and third party reviews as required, and providing support to joint monitoring missions on
SBS provided to GoPb. A joint committee including representatives of GoPb, DFID, the
World Bank and CIDA will provide advice on TA requirements for SBS on a quarterly basis.
234. The TAMO will be led by an international company or consortium working in partnership with
Pakistan based organisations. It will establish a programme office in Lahore and a branch
office in Multan, which will coordinate PESP 2’s focus on LPDs given their concentration in
South Punjab. GoPb has agreed to locate a senior SED official in Multan to work with the
TAMO.
235. The TAMO will work closely with DFID Pakistan, as well as with PMIU, SED and a range of
other GoPb departments, including Finance and Planning & Development (P&D). In addition,
the TAMO will work alongside the TA team responsible for the World Bank programme, as
well as the TA team responsible for DFID’s TEP programme on the civil society led
programme in LPDs.
65
236. The TAMO will be headed by a senior professional with: (i) proven experience in managing
complex educational development programmes; (ii) a track record of delivering results and
working effectively at a senior level with governments, donors, the private sector and civil
society; and (iii) proven strategic planning, diplomatic, facilitation and management skills.
This team leader will be responsible for: (i) efficient and effective implementation of the
programme to deliver results and demonstrate value for money; (ii) leading a multidisciplinary team in implementing the programme; (iii) coordinating and maintaining effective
relationships with all key stakeholders; and (iv) ensuring the programme is evaluated and
lessons are learnt and disseminated effectively in Pakistan and globally.
237. The team leader will be supported by specialists with a range of expertise including: (i)
education, to include teacher training and mentoring; teacher supervision; teacher incentive
systems; learning assessment and monitoring; school management and finances; school
councils and community participation in schools; stipends and vouchers systems; and LCPS;
(ii) monitoring, evaluation and impact assessment; (iii) financial management, budgeting and
procurement; and (iv) social development, social exclusion and gender. When determining
TA needs, care will be taken not to duplicate those to be provided under the World Bank’s
SBS, or any other donor initiative supporting the Education Sector Programme in Punjab.
238. The TAMO office in Multan will be headed by a deputy team leader who will be responsible
for delivery of the civil society led programme focused on LPDs and for ensuring the effective
contribution of other PESP 2 programmes in these priority districts. The deputy team leader
will be supported by a small team, including a nutrition specialist together with accounts and
monitoring staff to oversee implementation. The Multan based team will work closely with
DFID, including with the nutrition adviser, given high incidence of multiple poverty indicators
in South Punjab, as well as with the designated SED official. This team will also collaborate
extensively with the TA team responsible for TEP, making use of this national advocacy
programme’s strategies and approaches to build civil society support for quality education in
LPDs.
Technical Assistance Consulting Engineering Organisation
239. DFID Pakistan will also procure the services of a technical assistance consulting engineering
organisation (TACE), through an international competitive bidding process to be led by PrG.
This organisation will manage and implement the school infrastructure programme.
240. The TACE will be headed by a senior engineering professional with: (i) proven experience in
managing large programmes focused on small scale infrastructure and facilities
development; (ii) a track record of delivering results and working effectively at a senior level
with governments, donors, the private companies, NGOs and school councils; and (iii)
proven strategic planning, diplomatic, facilitation and management skills.
241. The TACE team leader will be supported by a team of engineers and other specialists,
including those with expertise in monitoring and evaluation, climate & environmental
management, finance and procurement, social development, and gender and community
participation. The TACE team will work closely with the PMIU, SED, EDOs, school councils
and TAMO. The team leader will work with TAMO to ensure the school infrastructure
component is coordinated carefully with other parts of PESP 2, and that lessons are learned
and disseminated effectively in Pakistan and globally. The two will be evaluated together. In
addition, the TACE team will consult with counterparts working on similar construction
focused programmes in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, including KESP and PRP.
66
242. TACE will ensure that construction and infrastructure development adheres to climate,
environment and disaster resilience norms and that associated risks are monitored and
managed during implementation
Reporting
243. Operational plans for PESP 2 components will be revised on a rolling six monthly basis. Both
TAMO and TACE will report to DFID quarterly, and will produce six-monthly and annual
reports, which will review progress against the logical framework indicators. TAMO and
TACE will commission, with GoPb approval and in coordination with the World Bank TA
management team, evaluations and TPV on key topics to feed into annual reviews
conducted by DFID.
Pre-Implementation Arrangements
244. PESP 2 will begin in January 2013. Both TAMO and TACE TA teams will be appointed
through an international competitive process, and will therefore be in place by mid-2013.
Given this requirement, a six month pre-implementation period will be required, during which
time work will focus on those parts of PESP 2 that will be directly managed by DFID.
245. DFID will work throughout this period with a small consultancy team, in consultation with the
range of stakeholders outlined above, to produce a range of pre-implementation outputs,
including: (i) detailed programme implementation guidelines; (ii) detailed, costed operational
plans for each component programme within PESP 2 for Year 1, to be led by GoPb, PEF, the
SBP, PEEF and LUMS respectively; (iii) a revised logical framework with a complete set of
baselines and comprehensive methodologies for gathering data to populate annual
milestones; (iv) a fully developed evaluation plan, including timing and topics for
commissioned studies; and (v) continued support to the Roadmap process.
246. The consultancy team for pre-implementation will include a range of relevant specialists, to
be contracted as required on a draw down basis, which may include individuals involved in
the design of PESP 2.
B. Risk Management
247. DFID is prepared to take risks in order to achieve its key targets. The overall risk to this
programme is medium, but it is central to helping DFID achieve its ambitious targets for
education reform in Pakistan.
248. While a fuller assessment of risk will be undertaken during the inception phase, for this
business case, we have focused on the following categories of risk: (i) political risk
connected to vested interests and the outcome of the 2013 election; (ii) fiduciary and
management capacity risks at provincial and sub-provincial level; (iii) risk connected to the
response of the private sector; (iv) reputational risks; and (v) risks posed by the short term
economic outlook.
249. The probability of risks are rated as follows: (i) high: very likely to occur and/or limited ability
to manage the risk; (ii) medium: likely to occur and/or some ability to manage the risk; and
(iii) low: less likely to occur and/or risk can be effectively managed.
250. The impact of risks are rated as follows (with ratings measuring inherent risk, before
mitigating steps are taken): (i) high: will have a considerable impact on the ability to deliver
67
the desired outcome; (ii) medium: will have a moderate impact on the ability to deliver the
desired outcome; and (iii) low: will have a minor impact on the ability to deliver the desired
outcome. The main risks to PESP 2 are summarised in Table 15. The risk matrix is at Table
16, with a risk mitigation plan and residual risk matrix (that is, risk remaining after mitigation
measures have been adopted) at Tables 17 and 18.
Risks
1
Mitigation Strategies
DFID will address this risk by ensuring that politicians from all
parties, as well as the media, are fully briefed on the importance
of education to the development and security of Punjab, and the
Reduced political will role PESP 2 will play. This work will be carried out through the
for education reform
TEP programme, and regular briefings at senior level.
following 2013
elections
DFID is currently addressing the specific risk of a new
administration’s view of the Roadmap through a special briefing
programme for senior politicians and officials.
Probability/
Impact
L/H
DFID will address this risk using a range of strategies.
2
These will include piloting controversial measures before
widespread implementation, supporting the development of
stronger school councils to exert upward accountability,
participatory involvement of all stakeholders in design and
Opposition to reform implementation or interventions, and ensuring that the
on the basis of vested programme is based on a thorough understanding of political
interests
economy to inform its interventions.
H/M
Teachers unions will be kept involved in reform designs and
implementation to ensure their interests are properly
represented and taken care of with an aim to cultivate ownership
of reforms. In addition, PESP 2 will benefit from public messages
being communicated through the TEP programme.
DFID will address this risk in three principal ways. The first two
are designed to reduce fiduciary and corruption risks for the long
term, while the third focuses on design decisions.
The Roadmap process will continue to address a range of issues
connected to fiduciary and corruption risks, including teacher
attendance, merit based appointments and teacher transfers.
3
Fiduciary and
corruption risks
PESP 2 SBS to GoPb in collaboration with SNG Programme will
provide technical assistance to GoPb to support better PFM
especially in areas of procurement, budget expenditure, anticorruption, and pay roll audit. DFID has already prepared a draft
plan on mitigation of financial risk.
M/H
PESP 2 has been designed with this risk in mind. For example,
the school infrastructure component will be implemented outside
the GoPb procurement and management systems, while loans
made under the access to finance programme will be subject to
stringent criteria.
68
4
Risks
Mitigation Strategies
Insufficient capacity
to implement the
programme at
provincial level
DFID will address this risk through the Roadmap and its ongoing interactions with GoPb to encourage politicians and
officials to build on progress towards developing flexible, merit
based management of the education system (for example, open
recruitment practices).
Probability/
Impact
M/M
Mitigation of this risk will be managed partially through the steps
taken at programme level to reduce fiduciary and corruption
risks.
5
6
Insufficient capacity
to implement the
programme at district
In addition, TA for PESP 2 will include building the capacity of
and sub district level
officials at district and sub district level. There will be a particular
focus on capacity building in LPDs.
Conditions in low
cost private schools
pose a reputational
risk to DFID
M/M
Mitigation of this risk will be managed by attaching conditions to
DFID’s financial aid to PEF-run programmes, and to loans made
as part of the access to finance programme.
DFID will work with PEF to encourage management of LCPS
supported by DFID to employ qualified teachers where possible
and further explore the dynamics of the business model of low
cost private schools to understand the reasons why teachers are
accepting low wages.
M/M
Mitigation of this risk will be managed by attaching conditions to
DFID’s financial aid to PEF, and to loans made as part of the
access to finance programme.
7
The private sector
does not respond to
incentives to
establish schools in
under-served areas
8
DFID will address this risk by ensuring that work in LPDs is
Support to low
performing districts is implemented in close cooperation with GoPb, to mitigate the
seen as DFID support impression that this work is driven by the UK.
for Southern Punjab,
causing reputational Bhakkar and Chiniot districts in Central Punjab will also benefit
damage
from this focus within PESP 2.
Conditions will focus on ensuring that private entrepreneurs
expand or open their operations in under-served areas, with a
focus on LPDs. DFID will pilot and monitor a range of
approaches (for example, the development of incentive
packages) to encourage entrepreneurs to focus in those areas
where more schools are most clearly needed.
L/H
M/M
DFID will address this risk in two principal ways.
9
Scholarships
programme attracts
negative press in
Pakistan and the UK
First, DFID will commission regular evaluation of the private and
societal returns of the programme and ensure course correction.
Second, DFID will design a proactive communications strategy,
working through TEP, focusing on increasing parental demand
for education, awareness of private and societal returns, the
importance of role models and their impact on raising the
educational aspirations of poor girls and boys.
M/M
69
Risks
Probability/
Impact
Mitigation Strategies
Poor economic
conditions limit job
opportunities and
10
restrict the fiscal
space needed for
sector reform
DFID will address this risk by monitoring closely the economic
situation in Punjab and Pakistan, and taking appropriate action.
The team will develop close links between PESP 2 and other
DFID funded programmes on pro-poor growth.
M/M
These mitigating actions will be further supported by campaigns
run through TEP to highlight the importance of maintaining and
increasing spend on education for the long term economic
development of Pakistan.
Table 15: Risk analysis for PESP 2
Impact
High
High
Probability
Medium
Low
Medium
Low
[2]
[3]
[4] [5] [6] [8]
[9] [10]
[1] [7]
Table 16: Risk rating matrix for PESP 2
70
Eligible Expenditure
Programme
Sub-Activity
Employee related
expenditures
Distribution
Punjab Education
Foundation
Salary payment
Risks
Mitigation
Ghost payments/bribes
Ghost payments/bribes
Frequency
Cheque payments
Payroll audit
TPV/ EA
Annually
Annually
Cheque payments
Payroll audit
TPV/CA/EA
Annually
Annually
Equipment
purchases
Procurement
TPV/CA/EA
Annually
Vouchers/FAS/NSP
schemes
Duplication, biased
selection, extra payments
TPV/CA
Anti-corruption study
Annually
PEF will also be covered by annual external audit by both Auditor General’s office as well as internationally
recognised third party auditing firms. Work will be undertaken to strengthen PEF’s internal audit function.
Girls Stipends
Distribution
Extra payments/bribes
Mobile/ATM payments
TPV/EA/CA
Annually
Stipends will ultimately be distributed via branchless banking, following a pilot in the early years of the programme.
Grants to School
Councils
Grant payment
Purchases/
Construction
Teacher performance Incentive payments
Incentives
Delays/Ghost payments
Online payments
TPV
Annually
Procurement risk
TPV/CA
Annually
Ghost payments/biased
selection
EA/TPV/IA
Annually
Conditions for teacher performance incentives will include robust measures and standards expected to trigger
payments.
Monitoring System
Salary payments
Ghost payments
EA/ TPV/IA/ Payroll
Audit
Annually
Purchases
Procurement risks
EA/TPV/IA
Annually
The Roadmap will continue to develop the quality of the PMIU led monitoring system.
Table 17: Fiduciary Risk Mitigation Plan
71
Support to Punjab Education Reform Roadmap
Team: Provincial delivery of education
Status
Funding route Geography
Implementation Private sector
Punjab
Inherent (gross) Risk:
Value £m
Value risk
Sector Fraud risk
2.10
1.00
4.00
Partner risk Delivery risk Total risk score
3.00
3.00
11
Risk rating
MEDIUM
Mitigating actions: High level engagement on both sides, cost and performance negotiations, regular reporting, managing election transition, regular stocktakes
Residual (net) Risk:
Value risk Sector Fraud risk Partner risk Delivery risk Total risk score Risk rating
1
Punjab Education Sector Programme 2
Team: Provincial delivery of education
Status
Funding route Geography
Design
Provincial govt
Punjab
3
2
2
8
Inherent (gross) Risk:
Value £m
Value risk
Sector Fraud risk
350.3
5
4
Partner risk Delivery risk Total risk score
5
4
18
Mitigating actions: EA, Pay Roll Audit, TPV, CA, AR, FRA
Residual (net) Risk:
Value risk Sector Fraud risk Partner risk Delivery risk Total risk score
5
Transforming education (DFID direct spend)
Team: Education outreach and innovation
Status
Funding route Geography
Current
Private sector
National
LOW
3
5
3
16
Risk rating
HIGH
Risk rating
MED/HIGH
Inherent (gross) Risk:
Value £m
Value risk
Sector Fraud risk
7.00
2
4
Partner risk Delivery risk Total risk score
3
4
13
Mitigating actions: CA, Annual Commercial and Financial Audits, TPV
Residual (net) Risk:
Sector Fraud
Value risk
Partner risk
Delivery risk Total risk score
risk
2
3
5
3
13
Risk rating
MEDIUM
Risk rating
LOW
Table 18: Residual Risk Matrix
72
C. Conditionality
Financial Aid to Government
251. 55% of the total budget for PESP 2 will be paid to GoPb , divided between SBS attached to
the World Bank PAD (34% of the total budget) and targeted financial aid for the development
of PEF’s activities with the private sector (21% of the total budget).
252. In the case of SBS attached to the World Bank PAD of March 2012, all covenants, DLIs and
conditions set out in that document will apply to DFID’s funding. In addition, GoPb will
increase its development budget for education, and ensure that DFID funds are programmed
in addition to GoPb and World Bank funds, and that DFID’s financial aid does not displace
government funds. Further, GoPb will undertake that no more than 70% of DFID funds shall
be used for employee related expenditure, and that all remaining funds are used in the
pursuit of other areas of eligible expenditure identified.
253. In the case of financial aid earmarked for development of PEF and PEEF’s activities, GoPb
will undertake that this financial aid will be allocated to PEF and PEEF in its entirety. In
addition, it will undertake to ensure that DFID funds earmarked for PEF and PEEF are
programmed in addition to GoPb funds, and that DFID’s financial aid does not displace
government funds. PEF will further undertake to commit funds received through financial aid
from DFID to EVS, FAS and NSP in the proportions set out in this business case.
254. PEEF will undertake to commit an annual tranche of DFID funds to the award of new
scholarships in the same financial year. These funds will not be transferred to its Endowment
Fund.
255. The SBP will undertake to transfer the full balance of DFID funds to GoPb Account No.1
(non-food) within two days of receipt of each tranche payment. GoPb will undertake to
transfer the full balance of DFID funds allocated to PEF and PEEF within one week of receipt
of each tranche payment.
256. GoPb will undertake to provide an adequate budget to the PMIU, to enable it to continue to
provide high quality support and data, with a focus on continuing to develop a merit based
approach to the management of Punjab’s education system. GoPb will also undertake to
provide an adequate budget to DSD to ensure that all DTE vacancies are filled via a merit
based recruitment process at the start of PESP 2.
257. As agreed in July 2012, GoPb will establish an office, headed by a senior official, in Multan,
to work with the TAMO with the aim of focusing on delivery in LPDs.
258. GoPb will undertake responsibility for all liabilities on and after completion of the programme.
Where DFID provides missing facilities and additional classrooms the GoPb will allocate a
fixed amount of expenditure for annual operation and maintenance. The sums involved will
be agreed following discussions with TACE on estimated costs. Where DFID enrols
additional children into PEF schools, the GoPb will ensure funding for these schools
continues at least at the same level following completion of the programme.
School Infrastructure Component
259. 32% of the total budget for PESP 2 will be committed to a programme of improving the
infrastructure of Punjab’s schools, with an emphasis on low performing and under-served
districts. This programme will be located outside GoPb, but will work closely with it.
260. Conditionality attached to DFID’s funding of this programme is as follows. GoPb will
undertake to maintain its own Annual Development Programme (ADP) budget for missing
facilities, currently at PKR 4 billion annually. In addition, GoPb will undertake to make
adequate budgetary provision for repair and maintenance of all schools across the province.
D. Monitoring Evaluation and Research
261. The £7 million monitoring and evaluation framework for PESP 2 will: (i) strengthen existing
monitoring systems, enabling DFID and its partners to provide evidence for delivery of
outputs; (ii) test innovative approaches, delivering high quality evidence, to enable direct
attribution of outcomes and impacts to DFID support, as well as decision making to scale up
successful interventions; (iii) deliver robust, system-wide process evaluation that will
underpin results and DFID’s narrative on impact; and (iv) contribute to the global evidence
base on education.
262. The evidence and evaluation framework is focused on priority themes, based on the design
team’s assessment of current evidence gaps, including: (i) teacher performance and learning
outcomes; (ii) market dynamics of the low cost private sector (finance, regulation and labour
market, as well as access and interaction with the public sector); (iii) the role of stipends and
vouchers in improving access to education; (iv) accountability, decentralisation and School
Councils (v) linkages between school facilities/ environment and student enrolment/ learning
outcomes; and (vi) inequality and ways of reaching the most marginalised girls and boys.
263. Primary users of the monitoring and evaluation outputs will be the GoPb, DFID, the World
Bank, CIDA, education NGOs and other civil society groups. Information will be useful for
accounting for the delivery of results (for example, number of children in school, and changes
in learning outcomes), as well as highlighting implementation issues and risks that need to
be addressed during the course of the programme. It will also assist with learning lessons
about programme effectiveness.
Monitoring
264. PESP 2 will include three main monitoring mechanisms. First, DFID and partners will
strengthen the capacity of the education system in Punjab to collect reliable and timely data
on key education indicators. This will include technical assistance to the Annual School
Census and the monthly inspection system of the Chief Minister's Monitoring Force. Data
from these systems will be routinely monitored for changes by the Punjab Roadmap process
and we will use system-wide evaluation (see below) to explore reasons for both positive and
negative changes.
265. Second, routine monitoring of SBS will be carried out jointly by the World Bank, DFID and
CIDA, managed by the World Bank. This monitoring will include the regular commissioning of
TPVs, led by the World Bank. 10 DLIs have already been agreed, to be used by all partners
including GoPb to assess progress. In addition, DFID will agree a further short set of DLIs
with GoPb, to cover a range of structural reforms including political interference in transfers
74
and other aspects of corruption; improved school and district education management;
effectiveness of exams and learning assessments; and efficiency of PFM systems. This
monitoring will cover DFID's SBS to GoPb, as well as some aspects of its additional financial
aid earmarked for the development of PEF and PEF's activities. Political oversight and
monitoring will continue through the Roadmap process.
266. Completion of the logical framework, including the establishment of all baselines,
methodologies for collecting data, and annual milestones will be a key focus for the preimplementation phase of PESP 2. Some information on outputs will be collected routinely
from the following data sources:
Dataset
Method
Frequency
Pakistan Social and
Living Standards
Measurement Survey
(PSLM)
Representative national
survey of 78,000
households,
disaggregate to district
and provincial level
Some data collected
annually. Reports
published on alternate
years
DFID Nielsen Punjab
Education Survey
Representative survey of Bi-annually
36,000 households,
disaggregation possible
to district level
Output Indicator
Net Enrolment Rate
Participation Rate
Multiple Indicator
Internationally tested
Cluster Survey (MICS) approach to measuring
different dimensions of
wellbeing
Every 3 years
Next wave 2014
Primary completion rate
Programme
Management and
Implementation Unit
(PMIU)
Annual
Absolute # of children in
school. Teacher
absenteeism. Resources
to school councils
Census of schools in
Punjab
Table 19: Summary of routine data sources for PESP 2 outputs
Other indicators will require commissioning of periodic surveys by the evaluation service
provider to be appointed by DFID and managed by the TAMO. These include developing
appropriate methodologies, and regular data collection, for: (i) an educational management
index to capture changes and improvements to district level and province wide education
management; (ii) an estimate of the average number of instructional hours received by
students; (iii) an estimate of the percentage of schools with adequate reading materials in
use for a sufficient time; (iv) a children's participation and happiness index; (v) a parental will
tracker to measure changes in parents’ willingness to push for improved education in their
community;95and (vi) an estimate of the number of additional children brought into school per
additional classroom built in Punjab under the infrastructure programme.
267. DFID, together with the TAMO and TACE, will be responsible for monitoring progress against
all other programmes within PESP 2, including the monitoring of additional DFID support to
PEF's work through EVS, NSP and FAS.
268. Monitoring for all parts of PESP 2, including SBS, will be based on quarterly, six monthly and
annual reports against the logical framework, to be produced by TAMO (for all components
except infrastructure) and TACE (school infrastructure component) in conjunction with the
75
evaluation supplier. DFID will plan bi-annual monitoring of components apart from SBS, and
will invite the World Bank and CIDA to collaborate on joint monitoring. Annual reports
produced by both TA teams will form a key input to annual reviews for PESP 2. In addition,
TPVs will be commissioned regularly by the TAMO and TACE from independent evaluation
specialists to audit the accuracy of monitoring data for all parts of the programme running
parallel to SBS.
Evaluation
269. The business case identifies several areas where evidence gaps exist and DFID’s
programming is innovative including: (i) the role of political will in shaping education reform;
(ii) mobilising communities to improve education; and (iii) provision of access to finance for
LCPS under PEF, and the financial assistance programme for LCPS start-ups.
270. Therefore, PESP 2 will support three main types of evaluation: (i) three programme
evaluations that will test innovation and results delivered outside SBS, through the
community based advocacy programme; the access to finance for the LCPS programme;
and PEF’s NSP programme; (ii) four impact evaluations, led and managed by the World
Bank, testing innovative interventions included in SBS to GoPb; and (iii) a system wide
evaluation that will improve evidence on and understanding of the dynamics of Punjab’s
education system, drivers of progress, obstacles to change, and drawing together lessons
from all monitoring and evaluation work conducted for the programme.
Programme Evaluations
Objective
Questions
Method
Timing
Comments
Generate quality
evidence on the
performance and
effectiveness of
community
mobilisation pilot
“What changes in
parental attitudes
and enrolment in
schools can be
attributed to
community
mobilisation efforts?”
Collaborative design
with implementing
CLOs. Use of preand post-design,
assigning treatment
and control groups
that are as similar as
possible to enable
examination of
counterfactual,
preferably through
random selection.
During and after Year
2 pilot of programme,
and final evaluation
at the end of the
programme
Change in parental
attitudes and
enrolment will be
hard to measure,
capture and attribute,
and requires a long
time frame.
Evaluation results will
guide the decision to
scale this programme
up or down.
Generate quality
evidence on the
performance and
effectiveness of
access to finance
pilot
“What is the uptake
of commercial loans
for establishing new
schools; how and
why are
entrepreneurs using
the loans; and how
sustainable is the
commercial loan
product?"
“How many new
schools have been
established; how
many children
Use of routine
During and after Year
monitoring data
1 pilot of the
combined with
programme.
qualitative work with
entrepreneurs,
teachers and
students.
Evaluation makes
use of data from loan
providers on loans
disbursed and
repayment rates,
school data on new
schools built,
Evaluation results will
guide the decision to
scale this programme
up or down.
Complexity and costs
that establish a
robust counterfactual
would outweigh the
benefits because the
main outcome of
interest in this
programme is
providing new
financial resources to
76
Objective
Questions
Method
Timing
previously not in
enrolment figures
school are now
and testing data on
attending; and what learning outcomes.
is the quality of these
schools in terms of
teaching and learning
outcomes?”
Generate quality
evidence on the
performance and
effectiveness of
NSP
“Have schools under
this programme been
built in areas where
no schooling was
previously
available?”
“What effect has this
had on the ability of
children to access
quality education?”
Comments
expand the low cost
private sector.
Use of qualitative
Year 1 of programme
methods to
understand
perceptions of
students, parents
and teachers.
Evaluation will draw
on available learning
data and/or
administer tests.
Assessment of the
institutional
mechanisms of NSP,
including criteria for
locating schools.
Table 20: Summary of programme evaluations (budget £0.75 million over six years from TA allocation)
Impact Evaluations
271. The second strand of the evaluation approach is support to the World Bank's proposed
impact evaluations of innovative interventions within the SBS component. These are all
experimental or quasi-experimental designs which will enable DFID to attribute changes in
the outcome of interest to the supported intervention. Further, as they are testing innovations
they will identify potential programmes that could be scaled up. The World Bank is well
placed to design and implement these evaluations given the world class research they have
been conducting in this field in Pakistan over the past four years.
272. Impact evaluations will cover the following areas: (i) learning outcomes, using an
experimental approach to examine the causal effect and cost-effectiveness of group-based
teacher bonuses on performance with respect to changes in enrolment and learning
outcomes; (ii) access to public schools, using an experimental approach to look at the effects
and cost-effectiveness of different delivery mechanisms for stipends and additional stipend
for households with more than one child out of school; (iii) access to private schools, using
an experimental and quasi-experimental approach to examine the impact of vouchers on
participation and achievement and on different rules for distributing vouchers within qualifying
households respectively; (iv) gendered impact on teachers, girls and boys, and community
demand for education in low-cost private schools (if any improvements in the salaries,
conditions and career trajectory for LCPS teachers occur); and (v) participation, using an
experimental approach to test whether using SMS, robo-calls, and call agents to exchange
information with School Council and community members about their roles, responsibilities,
rights, and avenues for recourse in relation to the government school system has an impact
on school council operations, teacher performance and student enrolment; and (vi) the
impact of the scholarship component, in particular the demonstration effect.
77
273. The budget for impact evaluations will be £1.5 million over six years, included in the TA
allocation.
System Wide Evaluation
274. Given the complexities and universal nature of SBS, an approach to attributing impact to
DFID support is not technically feasible. Therefore, the system wide evaluation design will
draw on existing monitoring data, robust longitudinal qualitative data and additional survey
data as required to describe credibly how and why changes are happening in the Punjab
education system.
275. The objectives of the system wide evaluation will be: (i) to provide timely assessments of the
roll out of the programme, enabling course correction as needed; (ii) to understand system
wide dynamics in Punjab education sector, and build a qualitative understanding of how
change happens through the system and how these relate to changes in key outcomes
(including both enrolment and learning outcomes); and (iii) to provide information for the
formal annual reviews required by the DFID project management cycle.
276. The key types of question the process evaluation will answer are: (i) Have schools received
adequate non-salary budgets for their operational needs? How are they spending them?
How does this relate to observable changes in key outcomes such as enrolment, attendance
and learning outcomes?; (ii) To what extent have administrative and financial power been
devolved to schools and to school councils? How have these changes affected school
management and teacher performance? Do parents feel that schools are more responsive to
local needs as a result?; (iii) How far have teaching posts been rationalised and depoliticised? Are teachers turning up where they are needed? What can we say about how
this affects teaching quality?; (iv) What is the coverage of field-based advisory support to
teachers? How do teachers perceive the change this support has made to their capacities?
How has this changed children's perceptions of the quality of teaching and can links be made
to changes in learning outcomes?; (v) What role does political leadership and will play in
systemic change? What else is required to bring about change?; (vi) What role does the
political influencing work supported by DFID play in bringing about effective system wide
changes? What are the respective roles of campaigns, media, lobbying, and donors?; (vii)
What are the dynamics that drive the Punjab provincial education system, where are the
bottlenecks to change/reform, what incentives are needed to unblock progress?; (viii) In a
provincial education system, what roles do different tiers of the system play in implementing
change/reform? Does increasing empowerment at lower levels of the system bring about
change or resistance to change?; and (ix) To what extent are political and policy reforms
institutionalised at all levels of the bureaucracy to ensure sustainable change?
277. This will be a complex process evaluation covering many aspects of a large education sector
programme. The evaluation supplier will be expected to develop an appropriate mixed
methods approach using a contribution analysis or realist evaluation approach to answer
these questions credibly. Possible approaches might include: (i) identification of a panel of
bureaucrats and politicians at various levels in the political and education system for regular
interview; (ii) drawing on administrative data and surveys already commissioned to assess
the changes in outcomes of interest; (iii) developing appropriate quantitative methods for
assessing changes in children's learning experience and parental engagement in schools,
including new indicators to be developed for the logical framework; (iv) undertaking
qualitative work with a panel of parents and children to understand more fully perceptions of
78
changes that have happened, why they have happened and with what results; (v) conducting
thematic analysis of qualitative data to draw out key lessons and changes; and (vi)
synthesising data from all aspects of the evaluation framework for PESP 2 to present an
annual report on progress in the Punjab education sector with key recommendations.
278. The budget for system wide evaluation is £1.5 million over 6 years, included in the allocation
for TA.
Research
279. Exploratory and descriptive research commissioned as part of PESP 2 will include work on
two key topics.
280. Work will be commissioned through the World Bank on learning outcomes, with the aim of
assessing current learning levels and how these are changing over time. Student
achievement will be measured by administering independently multiple rounds of
competency-based assessments to Grade 4 and Grade 5 students in a representative
sample of government and publicly-supported LCPS in the province. Given the critical
importance of detecting any shortfalls early on and taking remedial action, an early reading
readiness and skills assessment to be administered to students in lower grades in school
(and possibly similarly-aged and younger children at home) is expected to be integrated into
the exercise. In addition, Grade 4 and Grade 5 assessments are expected to include literacy
and numeracy test items from the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study
(TIMSS) and the Progress in International Reading Literacy Study (PIRLS and pre-PIRLS),
allowing the results of tested students to be benchmarked against those of tested students
from elsewhere.
281. DFID will also commission research on LCPS, with the aim of building evidence to inform the
scale up of operations over the life of the programme. This area of research will cover: (i)
whether, why and how the low cost private sector achieves higher learning outcomes than
the public system; (ii) the profile of students attending LCPS and the barriers they face to
accessing education in both public and private sectors; (iii) an assessment of the LCPS
business models used and the likely sustainability and growth potential of the sector,
identifying key constraints including regulation, access to finance, and the skills/labour
market; (iv) an overview of the range of LCPS types operating in Punjab, and how the sector
is developing over time; and (v) an exploration of the dynamics between the private and
public sector, particularly for poor students: are poor students leaving the public sector to
enrol in the private sector, or are out of school children enrolling? What impact is this having
on enrolment in the public sector? What effect is this having on out of school children?
282. Both programmes will be conducted by independent researchers, and will produce annual
surveys and reports. Work on learning outcomes will be commissioned and supervised by
the World Bank, while DFID will lead on the low cost private sector. The LCPS research will
be joined up with the evaluations of the access to finance programme and the NSP
evaluation. Both programmes will be financed by DFID through PESP 2, using a research
budget of £1.5 million included in the allocation for TA.
283. PESP 2 will also engage with the DFID funded Education Innovation Fund to shape research
demands in education in Punjab and benefit from research conducted under this and the
Voice & Accountability Fund.
79
Procurement of Evaluation
284. World Bank research and evaluation will be supported through an Externally Funded Output
(EFO) with the World Bank. For all other evaluation work, DFID Pakistan will develop terms
of reference for one large evaluation contract to be tendered through the Global Evaluation
Framework. This will go out to tender at the same time as the TAMO and TACE tenders so
that work on research and evaluation can begin in parallel with programme design work. The
terms of reference will cover the lifetime of the programme, with a break clause included if
needed at the end of the Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR) period as the programme
extends beyond 2014/15.
285. The scope of work will cover the following: (i) lead on design and implementation of
indicators and measurement tools for key indicators from the logical framework; (ii) lead on
the design and implementation of the system wide evaluation; (iii) lead on the design and
implementation of the three programme evaluations; (iv) coordination with World Bank
research, ensuring learning is fed to management agents and DFID; (v) use of evidence to
complete annual reviews for DFID; (vi) synthesis of evidence into annual reports on key
evaluation questions, with recommendations for programme delivery/management as
necessary; and (vii) communication of key findings in Punjab, Pakistan and more widely.
286. Ideally, a consortium of firms and institutions will bid for the work offering a mixture of
expertise in education delivery and research/evaluation, education economics, poverty and
vulnerability, and qualitative and quantitative expertise as well as deep knowledge and
experience in conducting research in Pakistan.
287. Contracting the evaluation using one large contract and the existing global DFID framework
will help to reduce transaction costs and improve the quality of bids, as well as ensure the
independence of the evaluation teams. Independence of evaluation will further be ensured
through an Evidence Working group that DFID will convene alongside the World Bank, GoPb
and other partners on the design and methodology of all evaluations, and on the
dissemination of findings in Pakistan and globally. In addition each evaluation will be
expected to establish its own advisory panel of thematic and technical experts to provide a
quality assurance function.
Stakeholder Engagement and Communications
288. Key stakeholders who will be involved in this process through the proposed Evidence and
Evaluation Steering Committee and other mechanisms include: (i) Politicians and officials
from GoPb; (ii) DFID, the World Bank and CIDA; (iii) Key NGOs; (iv) researchers; and (v)
representatives of civil society such as parent groups.
289. DFID will produce a comprehensive communications strategy for PESP 2 research and
evaluation, working with the TAMO and TACE, and the TA team working on TEP, to
communicate results to key stakeholders including GoPb, donors, the private sector, and
opinion leaders in Punjab and across Pakistan. Communications will include regular
seminars, presentations at annual Pakistan education summits, and production of policy
briefs. All research and evaluation reports, including policy briefs summarising key findings
will be uploaded to the TEP Data Observatory, for free download and use, as well as to
Research4Development, DFID's open access research portal.
80
Bibliography
Africa Education Trust (undated), Empowering Village Education: Improving Enrolment and
Retention of Girls in Primary Schools in South Sudan. Available
atwww.africaeducationaltrust.org/userfiles/AET%20EVE.pdf
Aoki, A., et al. (2002), ‘Education’, in J. Klugman (ed.), A Sourcebook for Poverty Reduction
Strategies, World Bank, New York, pp.231-275.
Andrabi, T., J. Das, A.I Khwaja, T. Vishwanath, and T. Zajonic (2007), Learning and Educational
Achievements in Punjab Schools (LEAPS): Insights to inform the education policy debate, LEAPS,
Pakistan.
Andrabi, et al. (2008), The Possibilities and Limits of Private Schooling in Pakistan, Comparative
Education Review, 52(3).
Arif, G.M. (2004), 'Child Health and Poverty', The Pakistan Development Review, 43:3,
Autumn, pp/ 211-238.
Aslam, M. and G. Kingdon (2010), Parental Education and Child Health: Understanding the
Pathways of Impact in Pakistan. CSAE Working Paper 16. Research Consortium on Educational
Outcomes and Poverty, Cambridge.
Aslam, Monazza, Geeta Kingdon, Anuradha De, and Rajeev Kumar (2010), Economic returns to
Schooling and Skills – An analysis of India and Pakistan, RECOUP Working Paper No.38,
University of Cambridge. Available at http://recoup.educ.cam.ac.uk/publications/WP38returns_to_education.pdf
Aslam, Monazza (undated), Rates of Return to Education by Gender in Pakistan. Global Poverty
Research Group Working Paper Series 064
Barrera-Osorio, F. and D. Raju (2011),The Impacts of Test-Based Subsidies to Low-Cost Private
Schools on Student Achievement: Regression-Discontinuity Evidence from Pakistan. Manuscript.
Beaman, Lori, Esther Duflo, Rohini Pande, Petia Topalova (2012), Female Leadership Raises
Aspirations and Educational Attainment for Girls: A Policy Experiment in India, Science Express
Report
British High Commission Islamabad (2010), ‘Andrew Mitchell visits Pakistan’, 10 June 2010.
Available at http://ukinpakistan.fco.gov.uk/en/news/press-centre1/media-library/ministerialvisits/dfid-visit
Caldwell, J. C. (1986), ‘Routes to low mortality in poor countries’, Population and Development
Review, Vol. 12, No. 2, pp. 171–220.
Chaurd, D. and A. Mingat (1996), An Analysis of Dropout and Student Leaving in Primary
Education in Pakistan. Asian Development Bank, Manila.
81
Cleland, J.G. and J.K. Van Ginneken (1988), ‘Maternal education and child survival in
developing countries: The search for pathways of influence’, Social Science and
Medicine 27(12):1357-1368.
Cohen, J. E. (2008),‘Make secondary education universal’, Nature, Vol. 456, No. 7222, pp. 572–3.
Department for International Development (2012), Operational Plan 2011-2015. Available
athttp://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications1/op/pakistan-2011.pdf
Department for International Development & Nielson (2011), Punjab Education Survey, first wave
report. Department for International Development, Pakistan.
Department for International Development (2010), Business Plan 2011-2015. Available at
http://www.number10.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/DFID-Business-Plan.pdf
Eastwood, Robert and Michael Lipton (1999), ‘The Impact of Changes in Human Fertility on
Poverty’, The Journal of Development Studies, 1999, vol. 36, issue 1, pp1-30.
Federal Bureau of Statistics, Government of Pakistan (2011), Pakistan Social And Living
Standards Measurement Survey 2010 – 2011.
Federal Bureau of Statistics, Government of Pakistan (2009), Pakistan Social And Living
Standards Measurement Survey 2008 – 2009.
Federal Bureau of Statistics, Government of Pakistan (2007), Pakistan Social and Living Standards
Measurement Survey 2006 – 2007.
Federal Bureau of Statistics, Government of Pakistan (2006), Pakistan Social and Living Standards
Measurement Survey 2005 – 2006.
Federal Bureau of Statistics, Government of Pakistan (various), Pakistan Labour Force Survey.
Ferguson, R (undated), Supporting Low Cost Private Schooling through Credit Guarantee
Schemes.
Ghafoor and Baloch (1990), Relationship Between Five-Year Schooling and Literacy Status on
Parents, Islamabad: Academy of Educational Planning and Management, Literacy and Mass
Education Commission.
Glewwe, P. (1999), ‘Why Does Mother’s Schooling Raise Child Health in Developing
Countries? Evidence from Morocco’, The Journal of Human Resources, Vol. 34 (1), pp. 124159.
Greenspan, A. (1992), Effects of Education on Reproductive Behavior: Lessons from Pakistan,
Asia Pac Pop Policy. Dec; (23):1-4. US National Library of Medicine National Institutes of Health.
Hooper, Emma and Agha Imran Hamid (2003), Scoping Study on Social Exclusion in Pakistan,
Department for International Development, Pakistan.
82
Hussain, A. et al. (2011), Causes of Student Drop Out at Primary Level in Pakistan: An Empirical
Study, International Journal of Humanities and Social Science, 1(2).
Idara-e-Taleem-o-Aagahi (ITA) (2011), Strengthening the Evidence Based Practice of Education
Civil Society Organizations Initiative, p.24.
International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (2007),Fourth Assessment Report of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Contribution of Working Group II, Chapter 10 – Asia.
Irfan, Dr Mohammad (2008), Pakistan’s Wage Structure During 1990/91 – 2006/07, Pakistan
Institute of Development Economics.
Jaffry, Shabbar, Yasen Ghulam and Vyoma Shah (2007), ‘Returns to Education in Pakistan’
Pakistan Development Review 46:4 Part II (Winter 2007) pp 833-852. Available at
http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/41261199?uid=3738032&uid=2129&uid=2&uid=70&uid=4&si
d=21101054063223
Jimenez, Emmanuel and Yasuyuki, Sawada (1998), Do Community-Managed Schools Work? An
Evaluation of El Salvador’s EDUCO Program. Impact Evaluation of Education Reforms Working
Paper no. 8. Development Research Group (DECRG). World Bank, Washington.
Khandker, S. (1996), Education Achievements and School Efficiency in Rural Bangladesh, World
Bank Discussion Paper 319, World Bank, New York.
Khattak, Naeem Ur Rehman Khattak et al. (2011), ‘The Impact of Education on Total Fertility Rate
in Pakistan (1981-2008)’, European Journal of Social Sciences, Volume 19, Number 1.
Leathes W. (2010), Delivering Cost Effective and Sustainable School Infrastructure. Guidance
Note, The TI-UP Resource Centre.
Lewis, M. and M. Lockheed (2008), Social Exclusion and the Gender Gap in Education. Policy
Research Working Paper 4562. World Bank, Washington.
Lion’s Head Global Partners (2012), Catalysing Support and Investment for Low Cost Private
Schools in Pakistan. Lion’s Head Global Partners, London.
McKinsey & Company (2012), Punjab Education Roadmap presentation, June 2012
Mountain Institute for Educational Development (MIED) (2010), Annual report MIED 2009-10, p.7.
Available at: http://www.mied.org/admin/fdata/mied_ar11_2.pdf
Mozumder, P. and N. Halim (2006), Social Capital Fostering Human Capital: the Role of
Community Participation in Primary School Management in Bangladesh.
Nasir, Zafar Mueen and Hina Nazli (undated), Education and Earnings in Pakistan. Available at
http://www.pide.org.pk/research/Report177.pdf
83
National Institute of Population Studies (NIPS) [Pakistan], and Macro International Inc.
(2008),Pakistan Demographic and Health Survey 2006–07, Islamabad, Pakistan: National Institute
of Population Studies and Macro International Inc.
Nixon, Lucia A, Michael D. Robinson (1999), The education attainment of young women, the role
model effects of female high school faculty, www.jstor.org.
Overseas Development Institute (ODI) (2010), Sector Budget Support in Practice. Available at
http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/details.asp?id=4733&title=sector-budget-support
Psacharopoulos, G. and Patrinos, H.A. (2002) Returns to investment in education: a further update
World Bank Policy Research working Paper Series 2882
PESP 2 Design Mission (2012), PESP 2 –Infrastructure and Environment.
Planning Commission, Government of Pakistan (2010), Pakistan Millennium Development Goals
Report 2010: Development Amid Crisis, Islamabad. Available at
http://www.planningcommission.gov.pk/mdgs-pak2010.html
Punjab Economic Research Institute and Govt of the Punjab (2007), Punjab Economic Report
2007. Available at http://www.pndpunjab.gov.pk/user_files/File/PunjabEconomicReport2007-08.pdf
Salman, Ali (2009), Liberate to Learn: A Study of the Education Voucher Scheme in Lahore.
Alternate Solutions Institute, Lahore.
Sandiford, P., J. Cassel, M. Montenegro and G. Sanchez (1995), ‘The Impact of
Women’s Literacy on Child Health and its Interaction with Access to Health Services’,
Population Studies, 49 (1), pp. 5-17.
Shah, Vyoma (2010), ‘Inter-industry Wage Differentials and Returns to Education in Pakistan’, PhD
Thesis, University of Portsmouth. Available at http://eprints.port.ac.uk/4146/1/PhDThesisVyoma_Shah.pdf
Singh-Manoux, A., A. Dugravot, G.D. Smith, M. Subramanyam and S.V. Subramanian (2008),
‘Adult education and child mortality in India: the influence of caste, household wealth and
urbanization’, Epidemiology, Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 294–301.
South Asian Forum for Education Development (2011), Annual Status of Education Report (Rural):
ASER-Pakistan 2010. Available at
http://www.safedafed.org/aser/document/aser/2011/Total%20PDF%20Aser%20Report.pdf
The Citizenship Development Research Centre (DRC) (2011), Blurring the Boundaries: Citizen
Action Across States and Societies, Department for International Development, London. Available
at http://www.dfid.gov.uk/r4d/PDF/Outputs/CentreOnCitizenship/cdrc.2011-blurring.pdf
The Pakistan Education Task Force (2011), Education Emergency Pakistan 2011, Pakistan.
Available at http://educationemergency.com.pk/publications/
Thornton, G. (2012), Third Party Audit Report, Punjab Education Foundation.
84
Trana, Amandeep (2012), Pakistan - Second Improvement to Financial Reporting and Auditing
Project: P076872 - Implementation Status Results Report: Sequence 11. World Bank,
Washington.
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) (2010), EFA Global
Monitoring Report 2010: Reaching the Marginalized, UNESCO, Paris.
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) (2005), Winning
People’s Will; For Girl Child Education: Community Mobilisation for Gender Equality in Basic
Education, Paris, p.6 & p.31. Available at http://www3.unesco.org/iycp/Report/142944e.pdf
Watkins, Kevin (2010), When Learning Saves Lives: Education and Child Mortality, Director of the
Education for All Global Monitoring Report.
Winthrop R and C. Graff (2010). Beyond Madrasas: assessing the link between education and
militancy in Pakistan, Brookings, Centre for Education, Washington.
World Bank (2012), Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Credit in the Amount of SDR 225
Million (US$350 Million Equivalent) to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan for a Second Punjab
Education Sector Project, March 30, 2012. Available at http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2012/04/09/000333037_201204
09233739/Rendered/PDF/662910PAD0P125000official0use0only0.pdf
World Bank (2011), Reproductive Health at a Glance in Pakistan, April 2011. Available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPRH/Resources/3763741303736328719/Pakistan42211web.pdf
World Bank (2009), Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Credit in the Amount of SDR 234.1
Million (US$350 Million Equivalent) to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan Punjab Education Sector
Project, May 6, 2009. Available at http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2009/05/19/000333038_200905
19014935/Rendered/PDF/475910PAD0P102101Official0Use0Only1.pdf
Yes Pakistan (2002), ‘Why Pakistani primary school students dropout’. Available at:
http://www.yespakistan.com/education/prim_dropout.asp
Youngmeyer, David (2011), ‘In Pakistan, flood-displaced families endure dire conditions in
crowded school shelter’, UNICEF. Available at
http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/pakistan_60006.html
85
1
British High Commission Islamabad (2010)
UNESCO (2010)
3 South Asian Forum for Education Development (2011)
4 Planning Commission, Government of Pakistan (2010)
5 ibid, p45
6 South Asian Forum for Education Development (2011)
7 The Pakistan Education Task Force (2011)
8 Punjab Economic Research Institute and Govt of Punjab (2007). NB: Punjab has not produced any subsequent
economic reports, while Pakistan Economic Surveys do not report disaggregated provincial GDPs.
9 UNESCO Institute of Statistics (2012). Local estimates are far higher.
10 World Bank (2009)
11 Federal Bureau of Statistics (2007); Federal Bureau of Statistics (2009); Federal Bureau of Statistics (2011)
12 Ibid, World Bank (2012); Federal Bureau of Statistics (2007); Federal Bureau of Statistics (2011) - The 2010/11 PSLM
is the latest available survey.
13 NB: Improvements in student attendance measured by the PERR are calculated on the basis of gross enrolment.
Progress towards the MDG is calculated on the basis of net enrolment, that is, of students enrolled in the grade
appropriate to their age.
14 McKinsey & Company (June 2012)
15 There are three administrative tiers below the province in Punjab: district, tehsil, and markaz. There are 36 districts,
144 tehsils, and 584 markaz in Punjab
16 Trana (2012)
17 Punjab Education Sector FRA (2012)
18 Department for International Development (2010), Vision, p 1
19 Department for International Development (2010), Coalition Priorities, p 2
20 Department for International Development (2012)
21 Winthrop and Graff (2010)
22 In late 2011, monitoring visits to schools by district officials were at 22%/month, and teacher absenteeism was running
at 19% on average. PMIU (Aug 2012) Chief Minister’s Roadmap Presentations, Government of Punjab.
23 Only three out of ten children read learn a basic story in Urdu. South Asian Forum for Education Development (2011)
and PEAS (2012).
24 Note that provincial budget expenditure does not cover areas funded at the federal budget level such as defence.
25 Nielsen Household Survey (February 2012)
26
Various issues of PSLM data indicate that mean Gender Parity Index (GPI) for gross primary enrolment in R.Y. Khan,
Bhakkar, Chiniot, Mianwali, Rajanpur, D.G.Khan and Muzaffargarh range between 0.73 and 0.79.
27 UNESCO (2010)
28 Hooper and Hamid (2003)
29 Nielsen Household Survey (September 2012). Data are for children aged 4-16 and for both public and private sector
schools.
30 ibid
31 ibid
32 DFID-Eve Sina (2011). Disability Assessment in Pakistan
33 DFID has commissioned Semiotics to undertake this evaluation. A draft report is expected in November 2012.
34 Semiotics Consultants (Private) Limited Report “Programme Evaluation of Punjab Education Sector Programme
(PESP) February 2012
35 For example, Transforming Education in Pakistan, Sub-National Governance and the Benazir Income Support
Programme.
36 Annual School Census 2011/12
37 Punjab education expenditure has gone increased from PKR 59 billion in 2006-7 to PKR 92 billion in 2010-11. Finance
Department and PMIU 2010-11.
38 DFID & Nielson (2011)
39 ODI (2010)
40 ibid
41 Note that with population growth, the number of government school students would have increased. In addition,
although the share has stayed more or less unchanged, the composition of students in government schools could have
changed.
42 Punjab Education Foundation’s base line from partner schools.
43 Barrera-Osorio and Raju (2011)
44 Citizenship DRC (2011)
45 Jimenez & Sawada (1998)
46 Andrabi et al (2008)
47 Nielsen (2012)
48 Andrabi et al (2007)
49Thornton (2012); Salman (2009)
50 Salman (2009)
51 Hussain et al (2011)
52 DFID (2012a)
2
86
53
Ghafoor and Baloch (1990), found that poverty is the main problem, which does not permit children of poor families
either to join or continue their education. Chaurd and Mingat (1996) found that the dropout rate was lowest for schools
that offered second shifts. It allows them the flexibility of time to send children to school without affecting their earnings,
which in most cases are vital to the survival of the family. A 1977 study indicated that 79% of dropouts were from lowincome households, where children also play the role of breadwinner, Human Development Foundation (2004). They
must work to support their families or their families can no longer afford to send them to school, Yes Pakistan (2002).
54 The estimate of private costs is based on PSLM 2006/07 and 2010/11. The calculations are made by the World Bank
team for a concept note on PESP 2 girls’ stipends programme.
55 Barrera-Osorio and Raju (2011)
56 Raju (2012)
57 Education Sector Study (2012), IFC-WB
58 Lion’s Head Global Partners (2012)
59 Under the twelve-year Aga Khan Rural Support Program, more than 70% of communities in the Northern Areas
already have established an active "village organisation". While the organisations were originally mobilised primarily for
irrigation and income-generating activities, they were quick to respond when the Government offered them an
endowment of PKR.100,000 to establish community-based schools.
60 Ferguson (undated)
61
Hussain et al (2011)
62 Khandker (1996)
63 Aoki et al (2002)
64 Leathes (2010)
65 GoPb has agreed to maintain and increase annual development allocation of roughly PKR 4 billion in the budget.
66 Mozumder and Halim (2006)
67 UNESCO (2005)
68 MIED (2010)
69Africa Education Trust (undated)
70 ITA (2011)
71 Jimenez and Sawada (1998)
72 Lahore University of Management Sciences, National Outreach Programme – more information available at
http://nop.lums.edu.pk/#
73
Jaffry et al (2007)
74
Aslam et al (2010)
75 ‘The education attainment of young women, role model effects of female high school faculty’, Lucia A. Nixon et al
76 ‘Female leadership raises aspirations and educational attainment by girls’, Lori Beaman et al
77 IPCC (2007)
78 World Bank (2009); Working Group on Climate Change and Development (2007). Drawing on, interalia, IPCC
forecasts and reports
79 Youngmeyer (2011)
80 Federal Bureau of Statistics, Government of Pakistan (2006)
81 Irfan (2008)
82 Federal Bureau of Statistics, Government of Pakistan (various)
83 Shah (2010)
84 World Bank (2009)
85 Psacharopoulos, G. and Patrinos, H.A. (2002) Returns to investment in education: a further update World Bank Policy
Research working Paper Series 2882
86 Aslam (undated)
87 Khattak et al (2011)
88 World Bank (2011)
89 NIPS and Macro International Inc. (2008)
90
Eastwood and Lipton(1999)
91 Watkins (2010)
92 Greenspan (1992)
93 Caldwell (1986)
94 Aslam and Kingdon (2010)
95 This tracker will be commissioned as part of the TEP programme. Results for Punjab will be used in the evaluation of
PESP 2.
87