The (Im?)possibility of Horizontal Accountability
By
Mark Jarvis and Karine Levasseur1
A paper presented to the Canadian Association for Programs in Public Administration (CAPPA) Fourth
Annual Research Conference in Public Management and Public Policy on May 25 - 26, 2015 at Glendon
College, York University in Toronto, ON.
Introduction
While not a new phenomena, contemporary public administration and governance theory continues to be
marked by a sense that "the preponderance of critical management and policy issues have become
horizontal rather than vertical” (Bakvis and Juillet 2004, 5). That is, that the policy issues and initiatives of
the day -- and modern service delivery in particular -- demand alternative governance arrangements
exemplified by structures, culture and human resource practices geared towards individuals and
organizations working collaboratively, across organizational divisions, whether inside or outside of
government or both (see Dickinson and Sullivan 2014, for example). This "goes beyond just government";
it “involves working across boundaries within the public sector or between the public sector and private or
voluntary sector... [and]... focuses attention on a set of actors that are drawn from, but also beyond, the
formal institutions of government” (Stoker 1998, 93). Theoretically, at least, these arrangements represent
working relationships between equals, where "partners" share authority and responsibility, in contrast to
superior-subordinate relationships associated with traditional governance relationships where authority
may be delegated but responsibility and authority is ultimately held by superiors (Aucoin and Jarvis 2005).
The key point of differentiation here is a move towards, if not fully achieving, joint decision-making
between partners (Rodal and Mulder 1993, 36-37). This amounts to more than just a consultative
exercise.
Amongst the institutional arrangements said to be essential in responding to the so-called 'horizontal
challenge' is the establishment of accountability arrangements that reflect this horizontal approach. As the
range and number of collaborative arrangements expands, so has the belief that traditional forms of
hierarchical accountability are ill-equipped to cope with these new governance practices that celebrate
increasingly delegated, dispersed and collaborative decision-making (for discussion see Behn 2001;
Aucoin 2003; Schillemans 2008). It is argued that these new accountability practices must recognize the
limited control that any single individual or entity can muster over decisions or outcomes in the context of
these decentralized governance arrangements (Considine 2002; Behn 2001). Some have even gone so
for as to suggest that hierarchy is anachronism (see Considine 2002).
Rather than rely on a relic of a bygone era of democratic governance and public administration dominated
by command and control approaches, the parties to these collaborative arrangements may see
themselves as accountable to one another (equal-to-equal) for their decisions, use of resources and/or
achievement of results. Others have provided a more nuanced perspective. Instead of viewing horizontal
accountability as simply displacing hierarchical accountability, these authors have recognized
complementarity between the horizontal and hierarchical accountability approaches, even as the
emphasis on collaborative arrangements and horizontal accountability increases. In theory, hierarchical
accountability remains whereby partners are accountable to their superior within their home organization;
but, horizontal accountability now exists whereby partners are accountable to other partners for their
actions in the partnership (MacDonald and Levasseur 2014; Howard and Phillips 2012; Schillemans
2009; Levasseur and Phillips 2004).
1
Mark Jarvis is the Practice Lead for Government Transformation at the Mowatt Centre. Karine
Levasseur is Associate Professor in the Department of Political Studies at the University of Manitoba.
1
Yet, despite the enthusiasm, horizontal accountability remains somewhat a mirage. This raises the
question why, despite the increased emphasis – not to mention the now considerable volume of writing
on the topic! – has horizontal accountability remained so elusive conceptually and in practice? It is not our
goal to confirm or dispel debates about the complementarity of horizontal and hierarchical accountability.
We do not see any disjuncture between the two. As Klijn and Koppenjan (2014, 247) argue “the fact that
tensions arise between the two forms of accountability is not so much a confirmation that governance
networks and their horizontal accountability mechanisms are hard to combine with representational
democracy, but rather an indication that adequate arrangements to combine both horizontal and vertical
accountability are lacking”. Instead, this paper argues that richer conceptualization of horizontal
accountability is needed to answer key questions: Who is accountable in horizontal accountability
arrangements? To whom? For what? When? How? What is the nature of the obligation? With stronger
conceptualization, there may exist the possibility that more robust mechanisms to secure horizontal
accountability can emerge.
Defining Accountability
As a first step towards arriving at a more precise conceptualization of horizontal accountability, it is
essential to conceptualize accountability itself. Accountability is best understood narrowly defined as a
mechanism. Conceptualized as a mechanism (see Bovens 2010), accountability focuses on the
relationships and institutional arrangements, whether formal or informal, that allow an actor or
organization to be held to account by some other individual or organization (Day and Klein 1987, 5;
Romzek and Dubnick 1998, 6; Lerner and Tetlock 1999, 255; McCandless 2001, 22; Pollit 2003, 89;
Mulgan 2003; Aucoin and Jarvis 2005). In this tradition, accountability is a process in which an actor is
obliged to render an account to another individual or body who, in turn, is empowered to scrutinize and
debate the account provided and, finally, to form a judgment of the actors behavior, decisions or
performance. The actor to which the account is due, is also able to impose rewards or sanctions, as well
as corrective action, based on their assessment of the account(s) as they deem required (Aucoin and
Jarvis 2005, 7). As Bovens (2010, 951) notes, accountability defined in this way operates as an external
constraint, rather than an internal check adopted by a particular individual (see the classic debate
between Friedrich 1940 and Finer 1941).
This conceptualization results in a different focus of inquiry than competing conceptualizations that treat
accountability as a virtue.2 Accountability investigated as a mechanism shifts focus to “the way in which
these institutional arrangements operate… not whether the agents have acted in an accountable way, but
whether they are or can be held accountable ex post facto by accountability forums” (Bovens 2010, 948).
This leads to a series of basic questions at the root of understanding accountability mechanisms: Who is
accountable to whom? For what? How? And, when? The answers to these questions, of course will vary
from accountability arrangement to accountability arrangement.
While this mechanistic approach to understanding and studying accountability is often associated with
hierarchy, this need not be the case. Hierarchical accountability refers specifically to those accountability
relationships where a superior actor delegates authority to a subordinate and the “commensurate
accountability from subordinate to superior…The relationship between the subordinate and the superior—
the accountable actor and the forum to whom the account is due—speaks to who is accountable to whom
and for what, while allowing for variations in the specific ways that account-giving and scrutiny occurs”
(Jarvis 2014, 410). What sets hierarchical accountability apart is the nature of what Bovens, Schillemans
and Goodwin (2014, 12) refer to as the “nature of the obligation” to account, which “largely relates to the
2
Accountability as a mechanism can be differentiated from accountability treated as a virtue (Bovens
2010). Treated as a virtue, accountability is used to convey a set of normative standards that public
officials or organizations are expected to, and can be deemed to, either meet, or not. As Bovens (2010;
see also Gallie 1962) notes, accountability as a virtue is necessarily broad and contestable. Because
there is no singled standard of ‘being accountable’ that transcends roles, institutional contexts, eras and
political perspectives, different groups or individuals associate accountability with a range of other virtues
(e.g., transparent, responsive, effective).
2
nature of the relationship between the [accountable] actor and the forum” to which the account is due.
The “superior-subordinate relationship makes the obligation to provide an account clear—the
accountability forum to whom the account is due is in a place of direct and immediate authority over the
accountable actors for the authority they have conferred upon them (Jarvis 2014, 410).” While hierarchy
is not the only type of accountability where the accountable actor is formally compelled to provide an
account (e.g., some legal and regulatory arrangements compel actors to account), it is perhaps the
accountability mechanism with the most obvious power to enforce accountability arrangements, at least in
theory.
Conceptualizing Horizontal Accountability
In turn, horizontal accountability is often defined by what it is not: hierarchical. For example, according to
Schillemans (2011, 390) “horizontal accountability then in contrast refers to forms of accountability where
the accountee is not hierarchically superior to the accountor.” Similarly, horizontal accountability is
defined by Aucoin and Jarvis (2005, 36) as “parties involved [in] shared authority and responsibility . . .
[considered] . . . accountable to one another for the discharge of their respective responsibilities in the
collective undertaking.”
Horizontal accountability is generally associated with the development of more collaborative forms of
governing. This emphasis on collaboration — or co-labouring as Wanna (2011, 3) suggests — reflects a
style of governing whereby the lines between the public, private, and non-profit sectors have become
blurred according to Stoker (1998, 17). Collaborative governance does not “rest on recourse to the
authority and sanction of government” (Stoker 1998, 17), but rather treats government as a partner
working alongside partners from other levels of government and from other sectors, notably the for-profit
and non-profit sectors (Wanna 2011, 3). Working as partners, the emphasis is on the development of
“constructive and supportive” relationships whereby “partners negotiate structures that allow open, frank,
and respectful dialogue with a commitment to work consensually wherever possible” (MacDonald and
Levasseur 2014, 100; see also Ansell and Gash 2008). With the emphasis on collaborative partnerships,
partners become accountable to each other for their involvement in the partnership.
We should be cognizant, however, that there are different types of collaborative arrangements that can
emerge. In Wanna’s (2011, 4) estimation, collaborative arrangements can look and feel different
depending on the scale of the collaborative effort and motivation to collaborate. Scale and motivation
leads to an “escalating ladder of commitment — from the lowest level of perfunctory collaboration to the
highest and most elaborate level of integration…similar to Arnstein’s ladder of consultation” (Wanna
2011, 4). As outlined in Table 1, the lowest level is not really collaboration per se, but consultation. At this
level, one partner — normally government — retains power over the decision-making process, but
engages partners in some sort of consultative processes to obtain feedback on a program, service and/or
policy. Comparatively, the highest level of collaboration involves a sharing of power, cooperation and joint
decision-making amongst government and non-government partners and is thought to generate
transformative change. The benefit of higher forms of collaboration according to Paquet (1999) is the
opportunity for organizations to gain new or insightful knowledge from other partners who have expertise
or front-line experience to better respond to public policy problems. As summarized in Table 1, between
these two end-points are a range of collaborative arrangements with varying degrees of consultation and
meaningful collaboration.
Understanding horizontal accountability fully means understanding how, explicitly, accountability actually
works. Short of rejecting a mechanistic view of accountability, the basic questions of horizontal
accountability still demand an answer: Who actually accounts to whom? For what? How? When? From
where do partners gain the power to compel one another to be held to account? Answers to these
questions will depend, of course, on the type of collaborative arrangement in play. While specific
accountability arrangements will differ from partnership arrangement to partnership arrangement, we
attempt to provide a more theoretical answer to each of these questions below by applying Wanna’s
continuum of collaboration arrangements. We employ Wanna’s continuum because it provides a helpful
framework that can concretely speak to the differences in partnerships. By examining how partnership
3
arrangements vary, we can hypothesize about the different implications for horizontal accountability as a
result of varying forms of collaborative arrangements. In applying Wanna’s typology, we collapse the
three medium levels of collaboration Wanna outlines for straightforwardness sake.3
Table 1: Wanna’s (2011) scale of collaboration
Degree of collaboration
Highest level
Medium–high level
Medium level
Medium–low level
Lowest level
What is involved – activities
Interaction between partners that generates
transformative change with substantial engagement,
empowerment and power sharing. Decisions are made by
consensus and cooperation.
Significant engagement of partners in the decisionmaking process (both policy formulation and
implementation). Decision-making is devolved to clients.
Commitment to consultation and collaboration that may
involve joint programming and joint funding strategies.
Consultation with clients, but also emphasis on coproduction whereby clients are directly involved to
improve service delivery. Change generally leads to
technical improvements in service delivery.
Akin to consultative exercises at the operational level
where the state retains power over the decision-making
process generally leading to incremental changes.
Source: Wanna 2011: 4.
‘Who’ is accountable and ‘to whom’?
The first questions are of course, who is actually accountable? and to whom are they accountable? in the
context of a partnership arrangement (see table 2 below). The simplest answer here is that all partners
may well consider the other partners they collaborate with to be accountable to them, whether formally or
informally, for how they discharge some aspect of their respective roles and responsibilities in the
arrangement, regardless of how limited the scale of the collaboration is.
The lowest levels of collaboration can be partially formalized to help frame who is accountable and to
whom. Recalling that the lowest level of collaboration is really akin to a consultation exercise, there is a
noticeable power differential. In consultation processes, government generally asks for feedback related
to a specific issue or problem. In these instances, there is no sharing of power, nor is there the same level
of risk or reward that occurs at higher levels of collaboration. So rather than speak of ‘partners’, the
language used for these levels of collaboration is ‘stakeholders’. In these instances, government solicits
the feedback of stakeholders and retains power to decide how the feedback is used — or not used — to
develop public policy. Given its monopoly on power in these relationships, it is perhaps not surprising that
government is, at least in theory, held to account for its role in developing and implementing consultation
exercises. Some governments may devise government-wide or department-specific documents to guide
3
As such, we can expect further variability in the horizontal accountability practices in the middle-levels of
collaborations summarized in Wanna’s framework.
4
the consultation process, but such documents may also indicate who within government is accountable
and their roles and responsibilities.
Such documents are often established by central government agencies, but their implementation falls to
line departments and as such there may still be variability in adherence to the central agency protocol.
One such example is the Government of the United Kingdom’s (2012) consultation document. While
lacking in legal or statutory authority, this guide is intended to shape the norms and behaviours
associated with consultation exercises. In terms of ‘who is accountable’, this document explicitly holds
“departments and other public bodies” accountable for the design and implementation of consultation
exercises at the outset of the document: “This guidance sets out the principles that Government
departments and other public bodies should adopt for engaging stakeholders when developing policy and
legislation” (Government of the UK, 2012, 1).
While government is clearly accountable, it is presumably accountable to the broad range of
stakeholders. In the consultation document advanced by the Government of the United Kingdom (2012)
described above, departments and other government bodies are held accountable to stakeholders.
Stakeholders themselves, however, may also be accountable, but in less formal ways. Even those
stakeholders who are simply being consulted by government may be deemed accountable for respecting
the rules under which the consultative exercise takes place or how they manage and utilize information
that they become privy to through the process, especially if it is confidential.
At mid-levels of collaboration, discussions of who is accountable and to whom vary. In the instance that
partners engage in joint programming or shared funding, but no involvement in public policy development,
there may be formalized mechanisms vis-à-vis shared agreement to indicate which partners are
accountable and to whom they are accountable. In the instance where one partner — likely government
— provides contributory funding then there may not be a shared agreement per se, but a contractual or
legal document to provide said funding to hold the partner to account for outputs, outcomes and plans.
At higher levels of collaboration, it is important to remember that partnerships are not simply ad hoc
arrangements. Rather, partnerships at this level are durable with a deep commitment to working together
over the long term (O’Flynn 2008). As such, collaboration at the this level is generally more formalized
“which involves creating new structures within which to embed authority, developing a common mission,
engaging in comprehensive and shared planning, and in which formal communication across multiple
levels occurs. Collaboration includes pooling and jointly acquiring resources, sharing rewards, but also
[sharing] increased risk” (O’Flynn 2008, 185). Working in such a joint manner, with shared risks and
rewards, we might expect that as a result of these complex arrangements, accountability relationships will
be formalized and specified through documents like terms of references or roles and responsibilities,
indicating who is accountable to whom, and for what (which we turn our attention to in the following
section). An important question to ask here is: how is accountability formalized to indicate ‘who’ is
accountable and ‘to whom’? One option is the development of a signed agreement by the partners and
could be considered as a framework or a compact or an accord. In such a document, which is not a legal
document or contract, but a document that outlines how the partnership will work, a section may exist that
outlines the partners to whom each is accountable. By way of example, the Voluntary Sector Initiative
(2000-2002) was a $97 million initiative prompted by the federal government to improve its relationship
with, and the capacity of, the non-profit and voluntary organizations. One of the by-products of this
initiative was the development of ‘Voluntary Sector Initiative Accord’ (2001). The Accord is a shared
framework agreement between the Government of Canada and the voluntary sector. It outlines the
principles and values by which the partners – federal government and the voluntary sector – will build
their relationship. While the Accord is a framework agreement, Susan Phillips (2001, 3) argues it much
more than this:
“An accord is both a framework document and a process. As a framework, an accord cannot be
understood simply as another form of a legally binding contract…but [established] on the creation
of a shared vision and principles and a commitment to mutual undertakings based on
responsibilities of equal partners”.
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As for discussions of accountability, it is perhaps not surprising that the Voluntary Sector Initiative Accord
(2001, 9) holds both partners — Federal Government of Canada and the voluntary sector — accountable
for their role in developing the relationship, noting that “success in building the relationship will depend on
the actions and practices of both the Government of Canada and the voluntary sector for the benefit of all
Canadians”. The Accord goes further to explicitly outline the shared commitments agreed by both
partners, and the commitments made by each partner. These commitments identify which partner is
accountable, for what and to whom (the other partner).
‘For what’ is accountability owed?
Howard and Phillips (2012, 317) suggest that determining what partners are accountable for in a
collaborative arrangement is not entirely clear in part because the literature has not established the core
components of horizontal accountability. While we agree with that horizontal accountability is underconceptualized, there is literature that helps us grapple with the important question of what parties that
collaborate are accountable for.
Table 2: Accountability and level of collaboration
Level of
collaboration
‘Who’ is
accountable?
‘To whom’
is accountability
owed?
‘For what’ is
account-ability
owed?
‘How’ is
account-ability
owed?
‘When’ is
account-ability
owed?
Informally (i.e. onsite visits) and
formally (i.e.
discussions
supported through
documents like
benchmarking)
At episodic
and/or predefined meeting
points
Partners
engaged in a
formalized
partnership
Other
partners
Empowering
and supporting
other partners
and policy
formulation and
implementation
Medium
Organizations or
partners
Other
organizations
or partners
Policy
implementation
(i.e. outputs)
Mix of ex-post
account and
informal and
formal accounts
Low
Usually
government
Range of
consulted
stakeholders
Role in
consultation
exercise
Ex-post account
High
Mix of episodic,
pre-defined
meetings and
upon closing of
the project
Within an
appropriate
timeframe of
closing the
consultative
exercise
Again, at least in part, accountability ‘for what’ will depend on the degree of collaboration as per the
continuum constructed by Wanna in Table 2 above. At the lowest level of collaboration, we would expect
to see government and stakeholders accountable for their role in the consultative process. For example,
governments who actively consult stakeholders and clients might be expected to account for how the
consultation process was established and executed. The consulting entity — generally government —
may be further held to account for its role in developing appropriate consultative exercises that allow an
opportunity to provide feedback without placing an undue burden on those whom they are consulting (i.e.,
consultation or survey fatigue). Moreover, it would likely also be expected to account for how – and
whether – it manages and uses the information gained. In this respect, the consulting entity would be
expected to engage the other stakeholders upon completion of the consultation exercise and report the
findings (i.e., percentage of clients who expressed certain needs) and explain how and why the findings
were or weren’t used (i.e., findings were used to support certain changes in program delivery such as
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hours of operation). In addition, the consulting partner may be held to account for what it chooses to
consult on and what it chooses not to consult on. Finally, government, stakeholders and clients may seek
to hold one another to account for how they share information in the context of a consultative exercise.
As the UK Government’s (2012) consultation document illustrates, many of these areas are grounds for
accountability. Specifically, the consultation document indicates that departments and other government
bodies are accountable for: clearly communicating the objectives of the consultation; developing
appropriate timelines for stakeholders to respond; identificating which stakeholders should be consulted;
providing documents in plain language and take necessary steps to work with vulnerable populations;
avoiding unnecessary costs or burdens to either government or stakeholders; and, being transparent with
responses (i.e. number of responses and types of feedback provided by stakeholders).
At mid-levels of collaboration, we begin to see differing degrees of consultation and integration that
emphasize public policy implementation. At this level, we expect to see an emphasis on accountability for
the implementation or improvement of policy such as programs or services based on inputs, outputs and
outcomes. In this instance, we might expect to see the development of metrics and data collection or
evaluation strategies for measuring outputs and assessing outcomes. Partners could be held to account
for their role in providing appropriate inputs (i.e. staff, funding), delivering on commitments and their role
in achieving desired outcomes. By extension, partners may be expected to account for the
responsiveness of services to recipients, maintaining quality standards, appropriate use of authority and
resources within a collaborate enterprise, and/or partners fulfillment of agreed upon performance
expectations (see Schillemans 2008).
Moving up the table to the highest level of collaboration, we expect that partners are accountable for how
they engage and empower other partners and work towards consensus. To be sure, there likely remains
an emphasis for being accountable for the implementation of public policy as found in the mid-levels of
collaboration. However, there is limited space at that mid-level of collaboration to ask the question of
whether this was the appropriate public policy response (MacDonald and Levasseur 2014, 99). The
difference between mid-levels and high levels of collaboration may rest on the involvement of partners
throughout or at different stages of the development, implementation and evaluation of public policy. At
mid-levels, the emphasis is on implementation, but at high-levels, the emphasis is on policy formulation
and implementation. To that end, partners would be accountable for how they share power in the
decision-making aspects of formulation and implementation of public policy at this level of collaboration.
While a full review of the commitments made in the Accord (2001,9) are not possible here, the
Government of Canada and the voluntary sector committed themselves to and thus form the foundation
to be held to account. In that shared framework agreement, the partners committed to work according to
the values and principles outlined in the Accord, work together to implement the Accord and achieve
shared goals’ and promote awareness of the role that each partner plays in the governance project.
Further, the Accord commits the federal government to find ways to better allow the voluntary sector to
contribute its expertise and knowledge to the public policy process.
Because high levels of collaboration also emphasize engagement and empowerment, partners are
responsible for supporting the development and autonomy of other partners. By way of example,
government could be accountable for providing enabling legal, regulatory and funding frameworks to
support partners. This may include being accountable for providing sufficient funding to partners
(MacDonald and Levasseur 2014, 103-104) or providing funding that does not impart negative impacts for
the recipient partners such as non-profit organizations and charities (see Levasseur and Phillips 2004).
Further, the government may be held to account for ensuring sufficient discretion to partner organizations
to be able to meet agreed upon policy implementation objectives. By way of illustration, the Government
of Canada’s Voluntary Sector Initiative Accord (2001, 9) explicitly holds the federal government to
account for its role in developing a supportive legal, regulatory and funding regime: “The Government of
Canada commits to: recognize and consider the implications of its legislation, regulations, policies and
programs on voluntary sector organizations including the importance of funding policies and practices for
the further development of the relationship and the strengthening of the voluntary sector’s capacity.”
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‘How’ and ‘when’ is accountability owed?
It is important to emphasize here that accountability demands more than just reporting. As per the
definition earlier in this article, accountability conceived of as a mechanism has a number of constituent
elements. So, for Schillemans (2008; 2011), horizontal accountability generally begins with the
‘information phase’ whereby partners explain their role in the partnership and its outcomes. This is
followed by a ‘debating phase’ that allows partners to engage in discussions, scrutinize the account
provided, pose questions and pass judgment accountor’s behavior, decisions or performance. In
assessing this debate phase, Schillemans (2008, 180) asserts that it allows partners to critically reflect on
their participation in the network. Finally, accountability allows for taking some sort of corrective action or
applying sanctions or rewards as deemed appropriate. Hence in considering “how” and “when”
accountability occurs, we have to keep in mind the iterative nature of accountability.
Where the emphasis is on lower levels of collaboration, one partner – normally government – retains
power over the consultation process. As such, determining how accountability is owed largely rests with
the more powerful actor. Given that there is a limited partnership, accountability is generally owed through
some form of publicly or privately providing an ex-post account of the consultation exercise within an
appropriate timeframe that outlines the consultation process, the range of views heard and the analysis
coupled with recommendations to show how the information gained was used in the decision-making
process. This could occur through a formal report or some other measure. Whether this occurs publicly or
privately, partners can scrutinize this account. In keeping with the example from the Government of the
United Kingdom (2012, 3), its consultation document requires the creation of a response that includes
“what responses they have received and how these have been used in formulating the policy. The
number of responses received should also be indicated.” In terms of timing, the report is expected to be
publicly available within 12 weeks from the closing of the consultation process (Government of the United
Kingdom 2012, 3).
What is often less clear is the capacity of partners to question the dominant partner and the ability to
invoke some form of sanction or reward once they have passed judgment on the account provided (if they
desire to do so). This may be limited to publicly commenting on the consulting partner’s decisions or
behaviors or to withhold participation in future consultative exercises and the legitimacy that may grant to
a government or its policies. Indeed, given the power imbalances inherent in this sort of collaborative
relationship, that an account is provided at all may occur solely at the discretion of the more powerful
actor who holds most, if not all, of the responsibility for the collaborative effort.
Given that mid-levels of collaboration involve a mix of aspects of consultation and collaboration, we would
similarly expect that accountability may occur through similar mechanisms to those described in the
preceding and following paragraphs depending on exactly where they lie on the continuum from more
consultative exercises to more integrative collaborative partnerships.
At the other end of the spectrum at high levels of collaboration, partners may be held to account for their
behavior and achievement of tasks through two phases. MacDonald and Levasseur (2014, 112) gently
remind us that partnerships are negotiated arrangements between partners such that “no one size would
fit all scenarios, nor should it.” It is important to keep this in mind, then, because how and when partners
are held to account may differ from one collaborative arrangement to the next. For example, the
informational and debating phases may be highly formalized where the partners agree to meet at regular
intervals (e.g., four times per year) to provide an account of their performance. Other arrangements may
make vague reference to meetings like the one found within the Accord (2001, 19) that states, “A regular
meeting between Ministers and sector representatives to discuss the results that have been achieved”.
While collaborative arrangements may employ formal accountability mechanisms, they may also rely on
more iterative, less formal interactions (e.g., on-site visits to each partner) and scrutiny may be achieved
through a discussion-based approach rather than a more contested or debate-like approach.
Accountability, in this sense, is ongoing rather than driven by events (episodic) or restricted to particular
points of the partnership (fixed). Given that accountability is negotiated, there are a variety of formats that
may be used to include information provided in documents such as annual reports, progress reports,
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benchmarking, strategic planning documents. Accountability may also be secured through, user- or
partner-assessments (Klijn and Koopenjan 2014).
What is the ‘nature of the obligation’ to account?
In conceptualizing horizontal accountability, a key challenge is to identify what obliges one partner to
allow themselves to be held accountable by the other and submit themselves to having their account of
their decisions/behaviour/performance to the questioning, scrutiny judgment and potentially sanctions -the constituent elements of accountability -- of the other partner and vice versa.
Thus far, we have delineated horizontal accountability according to the three levels of collaboration
proposed by Wanna in Table 2. We will depart with this approach at this point in the discussion because
the obligation to provide an account shares some similarities across the three levels of collaboration.
In vertical or hierarchical accountability relationships, which involve asymmetrical power relations
between accountor and accountees, “the superior-subordinate relationship makes the obligation to
provide an account clear – the individual or body to whom the account is due is in a place of direct and
immediate authority over the accountable actor for the authority they have conferred upon them” (Jarvis
2014, 410). While Jarvis (2014, 414) cautions that there is some risk of overstating the lucidity of
hierarchical accountability relationships, the superior-subordinate relationship makes clear “who should
be accountable (the individual to whom authority was delegated) to whom (the individual or body who
delegated the authority) and for what (how that authority was subsequently exercised, including how
lower ranks were held to account where further delegation occurred).” In contrast, horizontal
accountability may look inadequate or even impossible. Collaborative partnerships, particularly at the
higher level of collaboration are often freely-formed arrangements that lack coercion to compel partners to
provide an account (Howard and Phillips 2012, 317).
We identify four constraints by which partners may be compelled to account for their role in a partnership.
First, partnerships may include formalized contractual arrangements that actually specify who is
accountable for what, to whom and how within the context of the partnership. Frankel and Levasseur
(forthcoming) provide an example of a service purchase agreement to illustrate the nature of a contractual
obligation. A service purchase agreement is a form of contracting with a specific emphasis on service
delivery. As a form of contracting, DeHoog and Salamon (2002) define this as a tool of government
whereby government establishes a contract with a non-profit or for-profit organization to deliver services
for a specific amount of funding. This partnership, Frankel and Levasseur (forthcoming) argue, requires
accountability to be owed from the non-profit or for-profit organization to government. The contract,
signed between both entities, generally outlines what the non-profit of for-profit are accountable for
exactly (e.g., the number of clients served, anticipated outcomes), sanctioning, how reporting to
government will occur and how often reporting will occur to government.
Second, there may exist quasi-hierarchical relationships. Indeed, some studies that acknowledge the
limits of hierarchy also recognize that “the relatively ‘weak’ mechanisms” affiliated with horizontal
accountability “gain in influence through their connection with hierarchical powers,” (Schillemans 2008,
191; see also Howard and Phillips 2012). In this sense, horizontal accountability reinforces and is
reinforced by vertical accountability such that the two are not mutually exclusive. If a partner has a
relationship with another partner whom has a degree of hierarchical power or influence, then the
motivation to provide an account of one’s actions may be driven both horizontally and vertically.
A third force that may compel actors to subject themselves to be held to account is mutual dependence.
The obligation to account here is the desire to foster better relationships and deepen the bonds of trust
between partners (Howard and Phillips 2012, 317). Schillemans (2008, 186) states that providing an
account actually reinforces trust among the partners:
[I]rrespective of the motives of accountors and accountees for developing a cooperative and
reflective relationship, this reflection-enhancing role strengthens a bond of trust between
9
accountor and accountee. This creates a form of accountability wherein the social distance
between accountor and accountee decreases…The repeated dialogue between the two
parties fosters trust and cooperation and this may challenge explicit or implicit policy
assumptions. Over time, their repeated dialogue stimulates learning processes. In accordance
with this view it is clear that the different accountees all aim to formulate lessons for future
improvements.
This sense of mutual responsibility comes from the understanding that working in isolation is not always
feasible. Public policy issues are often complex, often require working with multiple partners whose
expertise and experience cuts across governments and sectors like Aboriginal, municipal, provincial and
federal government departments, funders, voluntary organizations, industry, members, communities,
users, stakeholders and others (see Phillips and Levasseur 2004). In this sense, the obligation to provide
an account is not driven by hard power (for example, statutory authority) as we find in hierarchical
accountability or horizontal accountability based or contractual arrangements or relationships that gain
power from their association of hierarchy. Rather, it is internally— not coercively— driven. The
sanctioning power in horizontal accountability is generally described as weak (see Schillemans 2011,
391) ranging from publication of results that may harm the credibility or organizational legitimacy of one
partner to removal from the partnership (see Schillemans 2008, 189; Schillemans 2011, 391-392).
And, finally, a fourth influence that may compel actors to allow themselves to be held to account is to
reputational concerns. Collaboration, particularly at higher levels, requires partners to work together to
solve complex problems since no one actor has the knowledge or resources to work in isolation (Stoker
1998). The implication is that there is growing interdependency amongst partners whereby partners need
other partners. At its most cynical, this may amount to little more than an opportunity to launder
accountability by involving more organizations or individuals to share blame, whether or not they actually
held any power or influence in decision making. However, this need not be the case. The need for
partners is only one part of the equation. Presumably, partners need partners who are credible, can work
effectively with and can contribute to the partnership. In this sense, being seen as a ‘good’ partner is
maintaining their reputation within and outside the partnership. Some times, partners may be driven by
their need to strengthen a partnership arrangement or to maintain and advance their reputation and
provide an account of one’s action within the partnership. At other times a stronger partner may decide
that they can absorb potential reputational damage of not subjecting themselves to being held to account
more easily then they might absorb the damage of what might be exposed by being scrutinized by their
collaborators.
These four constraints vary in terms of how coercive they can be – both across the four constraints and
with respect to a single constraint in different contexts. While we probably tend to think of formal
contractual arrangements or being attached to the formal hierarchy as per Schilleman's 'standing in the
shadow of hierarchy' as being the most coercive, at times mutual dependence or reputational concerns
can be just as, or perhaps even more coercive, politically.
Conclusion
While our article examines horizontal accountability, it is important to recognize that it is only one form of
accountability and that other forms can and do exist thereby further complicating the accountability
regime. It is worth noting that while we focus in this article on accountability between partners, in addition
it is often the case that organizations – or subunits of organizations – participating in a collaborative
arrangement may also have separate accountability relationships within their ‘home’ organizations for
their decisions and performance within the partnership arrangement. Further, all partners are likely to
have their own, perhaps overlapping, external stakeholders who may seek to hold accountable, including
for the outcomes achieved by the collaborative relationship or the partner’s role it in.
Given the increased attention to collaborative governance, and by extension the horizontal nature of
accountability, it is a puzzle as to why horizontal accountability has remained conceptually elusive. This
paper sought to fill this gap in the literature by providing a richer and deeper conceptualization of
horizontal accountability. To be sure, there are important debates as to whether horizontal accountability
10
can really be achieved, but before that debate can occur, we suggest, the literature must improve its
understanding of the concept. As found in the hierarchical accountability literature, the paper sought to
answer the most basic questions related to accountability in collaborative forms of partnering: Who is
accountable in horizontal accountability arrangements? To whom? For what? When? How? What is the
nature of the obligation? It is our hope that strengthening our understanding of horizontal accountability
can yield better processes and mechanisms to cultivate this form of peer-to-peer accountability.
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