This morning we are going to explore some modern
concepts in protection management in the built
environment.
The ideas we will discuss are not particularly avantgarde, but they are still emerging and evolving, still open
to review and revision, still being tested and proven out.
What should prove unique and valuable about this
morning’s presentation is that it is a first-hand account of
the development and use of these techniques, in the
busy metropolis of New York City, with the events being
told as they unfolded, in the messy, real-life arena I call
home.
We will look at building information cards, we will look
at managing risk at buildings under construction, we will
look at shelter in place and phased evacuation, and we
will look at alternative tactics for advanced and difficult
fires; all in complex, high-rise buildings.
This is my story, as well as the FDNY’s, New York City’s,
and, I believe, all of ours, as we try to protect and
improve our cities into the increasingly complex future.
Before we begin our journey, I would ask all to ready
themselves by closing their eyes and taking a few deep,
slow breaths.
“It is the greatest mansions and tallest trees that the
gods bring low with bolts and thunder; for the gods love
to thwart whatever is greater than the rest, they do not
suffer pride in any but themselves.”
The architects of this destruction believed they were in
the service of God, but I posit they were in the service of
a lesser god, a god of destruction, of chaos, of change.
One change was how we spent our days off. If you
weren’t at work, volunteering at the pile, you were at a
funeral.
Another change was what was brought in for the
change of tour breakfast; beer and whiskey replacing
coffee and bagels.
Respiratory disease, cancers, addictions, depression,
mental illnesses, and even suicides increased.
But not all the change was bad. Procedures and laws
were seeded and grew out of the fertile ground of need
opened up by the plowshares of change.
The World Trade Center was not a poorly designed or
poorly managed complex. They had learned from the
1993 bombing; that much could be lost in a single event.
They had high security measures and planned and
practiced robust fire and life safety protection methods.
They could not, however, foresee that their enemies,
having read Sun Tzu, or Tom Clancy, or perhaps both;
could imagine the devastating outlier of a plane turned
missile, and that their enemies would have the tactical
finesse, and cold-hearted resolve, to enact their plan.
Once we found our feet, we began to look at the means
to further protect ourselves, and New York City Local Law
26 of 2004 was enacted; a law which placed additional
preparedness and response requirements on owners and
managers of high-rise office space.
One of the provisions was that all high-rise office
building managers prepare, file, and be able to produce a
“Building Information Card” or “BICs”, following a preset
format.
These cards are generous enough in size to be easily
read. They have on one side in narrative pertinent
building information grouped together including
construction features, egress components, ventilation,
utility, and fire prevention systems, communication
capabilities, hazardous materials on site, temporary
conditions of concern, as well as a current list of key inhouse response team personnel.
On the obverse, of more utility if your mind works like
mine, is information presented in graphic form in map
and section views. Standardized use of colors aid in
quick recognition and help differentiate stairs from
elevators, standpipes, and ventilation zones.
The detail that is necessary in construction plans and
architectural sketches is intentionally scrubbed out,
being too distractive during crisis management.
With practice the BICS allows the incident commander
to quickly understand key features of buildings, allowing
safer, better coordinated, and more effective,
evacuation, response, and overall mitigation of incidents.
The gems are the standardization of colors, the editing
out of too much information, and the necessary large
size of the cards.
Let’s take a look at one fire I had that would give any
incident commander cause for concern and see how
without BICS there would be small chance to coordinate
the attack, reinforce efforts, where either success or
failure would have been blind efforts.
Ah, if it was only that easy. In truth The Garden, from a
protection management standpoint, is a difficult space
and operation.
It is circular, which presents orientation challenges. It’s
a city block in area, and sits on top of another complex
space, Penn Station, mega- transportation hub for the
U.S. North East Corridor, and its 12 stories high.
In addition, levels pinch in and out. The first level is
truck access and some building systems, accessible from
the North and South streets. Levels 2 and 3, open to the
East and West, are general entry, ticket sales, restaurants
and bars, as well as some back of house systems areas.
On the West side is the Felt Forum, a theater arena with
echelon seating that inclines across 3 levels.
A labyrinth of office space and building systems rooms
occupies what’s left of level four. An interior road leads
from level 1 up to 5, allowing for Paul McCartney’s
roadies, The Knick’s, or Barney and Bailey’s Circus
Elephants to arrive at the main stage at level 5 without
unduly tying up the elevators.
Levels 6, 7, 8, and 9 all provide concessions and seating;
some of which are more elaborate than others. These
sky boxes and various elite areas mean that the circular
interior corridor pinches in and out on various levels at
various locations.
Above all are several ceiling spaces accessed by
indeterminate catwalks and hallways to spaces where
lighting and other stage and building systems are
operated.
Got all that? Doubtful.
On top of all this, going back to 2010, a major
renovation took place. Massive structural beams and
columns were replaced, stairways reconfigured, all with
the roof still on.
Normally a building would be demolished for this level
of renovation, but The Garden wanted to hold claim to a
good property tax incentive it brokered back with a
1970’s fiscally desperate New York City, so the work had
to commence with the existing structure somewhat inplace.
With the amount of cutting and welding going on, some
small fires were inevitable. I was assigned to collaborate
with Turner Construction to minimize the risk. This was a
new approach by the Fire Department, and like most
change, was born with some pain. We will digress
momentarily here, but the time spent will lay some
foundation for both our CDA management program and
our adoption of the use of BICS. Here is that evolution.
In FDNY if they name a fire after a firefighter that is
bad, that firefighter perished at that fire. If they give the
fire a different name, that is probably even worse,
meaning several firefighters were lost. The fire that led
to this new stance on the management of buildings
under construction was that second, worse category.
As if the violence of the Trade Center Attacks was not
enough, two more brave men would die protecting that
ground.
130 Liberty Street, the former Deutsche Bank Building,
was irreparably damaged by the falling Towers, its skin
and structural members lacerated for most of its 26
stories.
The building was being deconstructed, floor by floor.
The building also had asbestos; so many areas were
sectioned off with heavy plastic. The demolition outfit
had to balance demolition and containment along with
profit. They created a nightmare for the FDNY and a
tragedy for NYC.
After this, FDNY reconsidered its approach to buildings
under construction, demolition, or abatement. The
Department realized the true risk these spaces and
occupancies present.
At this time I was a newly promoted battalion chief,
covering vacancies in Lower Manhattan and Mid-Town;
and was being positioned to get permanently assigned
my current assignment near The Garden at Battalion 7.
One day I reported in and the off-going chief asked if I
could look at The Garden as the construction started.
I didn’t like what I saw. Staff was uncertain as to
standpipe serviceability. Stairway doors, which had level
and location posting, had been removed, with loss of
compartmentalization and orientation support. Lots of
work was being done, much of it hot works, with almost
a thousand workers working on three shifts.
Returning to the firehouse I discussed with all over
lunch. I then sent an internal memo to Battalion 7
expressing my concerns.
Two nights later my phone rang at home. It was the
Captain present at lunch the other day. He said, “Sorry
to call you at home, but thought you should know, we
just had a fire at The Garden and as you predicted it was
not pretty.”
The next morning my boss at the Division called. I
thought it was to tell me that I was moving into the long
term vacancy at Battalion 7, the assignment that I was
anticipating, but, to my discomfort, it was to be detailed
as a regulator to The Garden.
This was something not done before, but the Brass
realized they could have the makings of another
Deutsche Bank Fire. We needed to aggressively manage
the high risk operation.
The construction outfit was initially not happy, but I
assured them I would work with them to address real
risks, and not get bogged down with small concerns.
The risk reduction addressed multiple areas, but one
was the development of BICS cards for the complex
space. They assigned me some young, bright, energetic
engineering interns, I explained the concept, utility, and
format, and they developed an accurate BICS for us.
Over several months many risks were knocked down and
the construction halted to allow the winter venues to
commence.
Sure enough in June of the next year construction
resumed and we had a fire as result of torch work. But
the system worked. The hot work was being done with a
fire watch in place. He transmitted the alarm to the site
safety manager, who following the protocol we had
established, promptly notified the Fire Department.
A fire crew was escorted to roof level and found
expansion joint material had burned adjacent to where
the hot work was being done. The fire extended down a
void near column 31 to break out in a generator room
back of house at level 9. Units extinguished with a 2.5”
line, all sides above and below were examined for
extension, and the smoke was purged with fans.
The value of the BICS was that the access and egress
from the involved areas could be fixed, as well as all
adjacent spaces to be determined if any other extension
had occurred. Support resources could be properly
placed, directed, and coordinated in case the fire was
expanding or the smoke created other threats.
Most importantly, fire and search crews had a safety
redundancy as we knew who was where, how to reach
them, and how to get them out if need be; all which
would be very difficult without the BICS.
When the construction was over the following summer
all involved breathed a sigh of relief. I received this note
from the site safety manager concerning BICS cards and
FDNY’s new stance on CDA projects:
Now, if you are as famous as The Garden, you have
some pretty fancy neighbors as well. Opposite from The
Garden and across the street is Macy’s at Herald Square.
World’s largest department store until 2009, it still has
some street cred over South Korea’s Shinsegae as it has
been in operation for over 115 years!
That’s good and that’s bad. The New York City
landmark is very successful and is high on tourist’s lists as
places to see and spend. It is well built with time proven
passive fire defenses.
But it also needs major renovation, and, like its
neighbor The Garden, the owners are unwilling to move
or shut down during the process.
And it’s a lot of real estate to protect. Up to 6000
employees and 20,000 plus customers are in the 1 million
square feet of retail space, with multiple corporate office
floors above and several below grade levels below as
well.
The normal risks of a retail space, stock coming in,
packaging rubbish going out, building systems, is all
compounded as renovation work occurs, all with
enormous crowds over a tremendous area.
But Macy’s has good collaboration with the F.D.N.Y.,
following a fatal firefighter death in the vast space back
in 1979. A closed sprinkler section valve, a repeat
offender, allowed the fire to spread. Firefighter Walter
Smith ran out of air in a complicated re-stocking area,
and perished.
As area increases by the product of the length and
width of a building, so the danger to response teams
increases exponentially. Additional aid is needed to keep
crews safe and manage the risks that mega-spaces
present.
And Macy’s has been progressive in developing that aid.
They embraced our need for a BICS card and in
collaboration with the Fire Department created an
electronic version.
Sometimes it is the simple features of a device that
prove most effective. In this instance it’s the size and
prominence of the display that prove most valuable.
And just about 2 years ago today that EBICS gave me
the support I needed to handle a potentially serious fire
at this mammoth building.
At a little after 8 pm Battalion 7 was returning from a
nearby alarm when a call came in for Macy’s stating,
“smoke condition lower level F & G stairway”.
Entering the Fire Command Station, I was met by a
safety officer for the construction outfit who told me,”
we have a heavy smoke condition at the G stairs
basement level. Let’s let the handi-talkie tape roll and
see how this unfolds.
Using the EBICS, combined with the handi-talkie
reports, I was able to get enough accurate situational
awareness to select a strategy and develop supporting
tactics. I was able to locate, confine, and extinguish this
fire.
The prominence of the EBICS, with its standardized
color highlighting important building features, allowed
me as the IC to piece together the reports and get a clear
picture of the situation. This awareness caused me to
support the tactic of using a direct water application
from our apparatus.
It allowed me to place crews on all sides, above and
below, to rapidly and decisively check for extension and
evaluate urgent life concerns. And those crews, as they
reported in to get briefed and be given assignments were
able to overlap that information onto the visual
information on the large EBICS, giving clarification to the
uncertain situation.
And we had, as at the Madison Square Garden Fire,
that important safety back-up, we knew who was where,
in case we needed rapid intervention if a surprise
condition put a crew at peril.
The second learning point from this operation was that
of our evacuation choice, which was a phased
evacuation.
Now many would argue that full building evacuations
are best, protecting all the building’s occupants. They
would cite that the building’s exit paths are designed to
handle the full building dump.
Macy’s has many egress stairways, and they have
generous proportions, and I give you that there are
circumstances when a full building evacuation may be
prudent, but I will argue that the decision must be made
only after some consideration.
First, the objective is to save people from harm, the
most people from the most serious harm first.
Those in the fire area, and smoke areas, cannot have
their immediate evacuation slowed by those who may,
be at risk at some future point.
We chose to evacuate the fire area, and adjacent
space, then above, then those floors, and then the entire
building. A planned, controlled (as best we could) whole
building evacuation- a phased evacuation, of 20,000
people, getting those most exposed out, followed by
then next at risk, all accomplished with no injuries.
The argument for a full building evacuation as the
automatic rests on three assumptions that I say must be
verified before committing.
First- all evacuees will move at an average rate, that is,
floor 7 will not interfere with floor 8. In truth, we have
sprinters, amblers, and even those who double back for
prized possessions.
These folks will cause results to differ widely from
Monte Carlo Method predictions, and will not conscribe
to Gaussian Law.
Second, not all stairways and egress paths are equally
favored. At Macy’s, although generous, well labeled, and
well distributed, most of the exits are in areas normally
restricted, where egress is not allowed except during
emergencies. It is unlikely that people will go through
these stairways as readily as routes they may have used
and those open for normal every day travel.
Lastly, without feedback loops, be it mechanical or
manual, we cannot rely on the stairways being intact.
Our experience shows that in “tight” buildings the
hallways and stairways can help to create flowpaths for
fire, heat, and smoke; putting people at risk hundreds of
feet from original fire areas, both down hallways and up
stairs.
Our last fire, regrettably, illustrates this point with
deadly accuracy. One man perished from heat and
smoke 10 floors above the fire apartment in the stairway,
and another just barely survived, while those who
sheltered in place were safe.
Early winter 2014 welcomed the mid-latitudes of the
North American continent with an extended deep freeze
as artic air escaped from the bounds of a weak polar
vortex. Average temperatures fell to minus 10 degrees
Celsius for weeks. The response to frozen pipes, as well
as to serious fires, rose dramatically.
January 5th was just such a day, clear and cold with lots
of solid ice. Battalion 7 was operating at a high-rise fire
on 50th street, and had just been released and was
driving south back to its first due area. Many units were
still operating at the 50th street fire making sure all areas
of possible extension had been checked and all CO had
been removed.
At just about 11 am, a few minutes later, an alarm
came in for “a fire in a multiple dwelling, 18th floor”, in a
tower building known as “The Strand”.
This was the scene I was faced with on arrival- a very
serious fire, 20 floors up, with 20 more floors above that.
New buildings like this are deemed “fireproof”, that is if
correctly designed, built, used, and maintained, can
effectively contain or delay the spread of fire, heat, and
smoke for significant periods.
The self-closing-self-latching door assemblies must be
present and operate, walls and ceilings must not be
penetrated or modified without proper fire stopping,
return air shafts must have fire and smoke dampers that
work. Kitchens, bathrooms, and hallways must not share
make-up air or vents without dampers.
With the provisions in place, and functioning, the
proper defense from fire is shelter in place for all those
outside the fire area.
We found that in part because of the large frontages
and great height these buildings have strong wind
pressure, and the “tight building”- fire-proof finishes,
while containing fire, can also funnel, shape, and direct
heat and flame, creating well-driven “flow-paths”, where
fire can go great distances down hallways and up
stairways if doors are missing or chocked open. The
apartment (that is other than the fire apartment) affords
another layer of defense, and so is a safer area than
these shared spaces.
Back in 1985, in a residential complex where I would
later work as a captain, 3 residents died and a 4th was
rescued just short of death 180 feet down the hall from
the fire apartment. Lt. Joe Cavalleri, a friend who I was
promoted to lieutenant with, died along with 2 new
firefighters more than 90’ down the hallway in the exact
same phenomena at the Vandalia Avenue fire in 1998.
Each day as I walked to class to my master’s program I
passed the building next to the college where young
actor Macauly Culkin, experimenting with fire, started a
blaze that killed 4 residents 10 floors above his 19th floor
apartment.
At the Strand Fire, one man died, and one barely
survived after a valiant rescue effort, all occurring 10
floor above the fire apartment in the stairway.
So we learned and law now mandated signage in the
apartment instructing occupants to stay put, unless
smoke or fire is in the apartment. People within
apartments and on floors can tell what their local
conditions are, but cannot reliably forecast conditions in
other hallways or stairways or at other times.
If you have door interlock indicators and positive
pressure stairs- with feedback loops- either mechanical
or manual, that can tell you the egress routes are safe,
then you can make good assumption as to the best
evacuation strategy- but not before.
Is the fire floor in an open space occupancy and being
evacuated successfully? Then get the floor above clearbut do not allow vital stairways to get jammed, allowing
crowd crush or delaying evacuation from critical areas
based on the assumption that all will flow.
Point being- evacuation strategies must be evaluated
against current conditions. Plan and exercise full building
evacuation, phased or partial evacuation, in-building
relocation, and shelter-in-place. But select and execute
based on good data after some consideration of actual
conditions.
Last point this morning concerns preplanning and
mitigation efforts for that “black swan” of events- the
truly serious fire. Most of the F.D.N.Y.’s present fire
prevention and changes in strategy and tactical response
has grown out of an appreciation of flow paths in tight
buildings and wind driven fires. Let’s watch this video
and consider the fire triangle as you watch.
In sizing up a fire condition several factors must be
weighed. First is what is burning. It is a mistake to treat
all products the same. A car fire that has the gas tank or
fuel system involved will react very differently and pose a
more serious condition than a regular car fire. A
commercial fryer fire will present a real surprise for a
responder who thinks a “quick hit with the extinguisher”
will knock down the fire. Ordinary combustibles, ground
to small pieces, can ignite and spread with explosive
force.
Next consider the arrangement of the material, the
configuration. A stack of pallets arranged as a ziggurat
has greater potential for rapid fire spread than similar
amount of pallets spread horizontally. Curtains, pizza
boxes stacked up to the ceiling, tires in flat fix shops, are
all examples where the configuration of the material has
great effect on potential fire development. Appraise the
potential of the fuel side of the fire triangle.
Wind is another factor that has recently been
highlighted as a serious component to fire development.
A small, seemingly easily controllable fire, can blowtorch
by the introduction of a good breeze. Large frontage
buildings can block wind and even light winds can
develop large pressure gradients between the outside
and inside. Open a window or balcony door and that
pressure difference can create a fast moving breeze
through the opening (think of what happens when you
place your finger over a garden hose- the velocity of the
flow increases as the pressure drives the same amount of
water through the smaller opening). Buildings with great
height can be affected by winds as those altitudes.
Buildings adjacent wide open expanses such as near
open fields, bays, and the oceans can be subject to
unimpeded winds. Consider the potential of the oxygen
side of the fire triangle.
Lastly, the state of the fire itself must be considered. If
large amounts of material have ignited and are producing
lots of heat, the fire can begin to ignite materials that we
don’t normally consider to be combustible. Normally
dependable materials can degrade and crumble.
Convection, conduction, and even radiant heat can cause
fire to expand faster than we expect and if we are not
aware we can over-estimate our ability to control the
fire. It was this last condition- that of signs that we had a
well-developed fire throwing off lots of heat that made
me think we had the potential for a very deadly condition
that day. Luckily, it was easy to see that we had a small
conflagration. Look at the amount of flame, the number
of windows involved, the “push” of the flame, the
amount of smoke, and the draft of the smoke. All these
signs broadcast that we had a well-developed fire. The
type of fire that expands by all methods and means, that
burns all types of combustibles, the type that is difficult
and dangerous to control. Consider the potential of the
heat side of the fire triangle.
We are going back to our roots, looking at that most
basic of fire science mental models, the fire triangle. The
fuel, the air, the heat- if any are hypertrophied, then we
have to be ready to take action that our standard
operating procedure may not work- we may need
alternative tactics.
Standard F.D.N.Y. tactics for a high-rise fireproof
building is to stretch a 2.5” line from the outlet on the
floor below with a flow gauge and a member stationed
there. Given adequate flow and control of the hallway
we advance and extinguish the fire.
Normally a second line is stretched below the first,
ready to reinforce the first or control extension. At this
fire report came in that this tactic should work.
However, seeing the tremendous heat release rate I
could not trust the success of the conventional
aggressive interior attack. If the first team had to
retreat, I wanted the hallway clear, and not have a
second team in the way ready to have their chance to be
burned.
Instead the second team was directed to the floor
below to set up an alternative tactic using a floor below
nozzle while another team was directed above to ready
the placement of a window curtain to limit air supply to
the fire should it be necessary following the first two
tactics.
Presently in the F.D.N.Y. some 60 engine companies
carry the floor below nozzle and the fourth engine
assigned to the incident is responsible to bring the tool to
the operation.
All ladder companies carry the 8’ by 6’ window curtain,
and it is brought to the floor above by a member of the
first unit. Battalions carry the bigger window blanket, 10’
by 12’. The incident commander would direct a team to
set the larger device into operation.
The standard tactics worked at this fire despite the
potential. Recognizing severe possible development by
putting the components into the framework of the fire
triangle must prompt the incident commander to
prepare for alternative tactics. Use the triggers to start
developing the alternative attack early or you may suffer
as you scramble to get ahead of the blaze.
Normal Accident Theory predicts that mishaps will
occur, that our ordered universe is always tempted to
spin and wobble, to accelerate and slow down. Nasim
Taleb warns us that black swans are out there- the truly
severe, un-foreseen, rare events.
Complex, tightly-coupled systems have high
sensitivities to component failures; and these fascinating
modern spaces, using economy of scale to support their
existence, are prone to known unknowns and unknown
unknowns alike.
It is as Herotodus warned us as we opened, the
greatest mansions that the gods hurl their thunder bolts
at.
In conclusion we will take another draught of ancient
Greek wisdom; the ordeal of Theseus and the Minotaur
of the Minoans.
As a condition of surrender, the Athenians had to send
annually, 7 young men and 7 maidens to wander the
labyrinth of the Minotaur. The Minotaur was powerful
and ferocious, and even the most valiant had little
chance in the confusion of the maze.
Theseus, however, had a thread, which he used to keep
his bearings, and by which, he was able to come upon
the sleeping Minotaur, and after great struggle, slayed
the beast.
It is hoped that what was discussed here today, the
mindset, the instruments, the methodology, will be as
the thread given to Theseus, that your protection
management labyrinths will be easier to navigate, and
that you may seize your Minotaurs before they seize you.