Prism Affirmative
1AC
Observation 1 – NSA Overreach
The NSA’s PRISM program is being used to collect surveillance
data from US companies – this overreach undermines US
credibility on internet freedom
Wheeler, 14 - Marcy Wheeler is an independent journalist and PhD from the
University of Michigan. She specializes in civil liberties, technology, and national
security. (Marcy, “The Drama Ahead: Google versus America” 6/16, http://www.catounbound.org/2014/06/16/marcy-wheeler/drama-ahead-google-versus-america
This leaves one central drama to play out, in which Google and other tech
companies (and to a much lesser extent, a few telecoms) begin to push back
against the NSA’s overreach. It’s not just that U.S. cloud (and other tech)
companies stand to lose billions as their clients choose to store data locally
rather than expose it easily to the NSA. It’s also that the NSA violated
several aspects of the deal the Executive Branch made six years ago with the
passage of the FISA Amendments Act (FAA), Section 702 of which authorizes
the PRISM program and domestic upstream collection. Congress passed the
FISA Amendments Act several years after the New York Times’ exposure of the illegal
wiretap program, ostensibly to address a technical problem used to justify that program.
Technology had changed since the analog and radio world in place when FISA was first
passed in 1978. Now, much of the world’s communications – including those of
extremists who were targeting America – were sitting in Google’s and
Yahoo’s and Microsoft’s servers within the United States. So Congress
authorized the NSA to conduct collection inside the United States on targets
located outside of the country (which swept up those who communicated with
those targets, wherever they were located). In exchange, the government and its
supporters promised, it would extend protections to Americans who were
overseas. Yahoo and Google played by the rules, as the PRISM slide released last
June revealed. The data of both Yahoo and Google have been readily available for any of
the broad uses permitted by the law since January 2009. Yet, in spite of the fact that
the NSA has a legal way to obtain this Internet data inside the United States
using PRISM, the government also broke in to steal from Yahoo and Google
fiber overseas. That’s an important implication of Sanchez’ point that “modern
communications networks obliterate many of the assumptions about the importance of
geography.” American tech companies now store data overseas, as well as in the United
States. Americans’ data is mixed in with foreigners’ data overseas. Many of
the more stunning programs described by Snowden’s documents – the
collection of 5 billion records a day showing cell location, NSA partner GCHQ’s
collection of millions of people’s intimate webcam images, and, of course, the theft of
data from Google and Yahoo’s servers – may suck up Americans’ records too. Plus
there’s evidence the NSA is accessing U.S. person data overseas. The agency
permits specially trained analysts to conduct Internet metadata contact chaining
including the records of Americans from data collected overseas. And in a Senate
Intelligence Committee hearing earlier this year, Colorado Senator Mark Udall asked
hypothetically what would happen with a “a vast trove of U.S. person
information” collected overseas; the answer was such data would not get
FISA protection (California Senator Dianne Feinstein, the Intelligence Committee
Chair, asked an even more oblique question on the topic). Udall and Feinstein’s
questions show that a lot of this spying does not undergo the oversight Benjamin Wittes
and Carrie Cordero point to. Last year, Feinstein admitted her committee gets less
reporting on such spying. Even for programs overseen by FISA, the NSA has
consistently refused to provide even its oversight committees and the FISA Court real
numbers on how many Americans get sucked into various NSA dragnets. Moreover, the
government’s threat to tech companies exists not just overseas. When a group of tech
companies withdrew their support for the USA Freedom Act, they argued the bill could
permit the resumption of bulk collection of Internet users’ data domestically. In the
past, that has always meant telecoms copying Internet metadata at telecom switches,
another outside entity compromising tech companies’ services. As with the data
stolen overseas, Internet metadata is available to the government legally
under PRISM. In response to the news that the government at times bypasses the
legal means it has to access Google’s clients’ data, the tech giant and others have found
new ways to protect their customers. That consists of the new encryption Sanchez
described – both of that fiber compromised overseas and of emails sent using Google –
but also the right to publish how much data the government collects. Even within the
criminal context, tech companies (including telecoms Verizon and AT&T) are
challenging the U.S. government’s efforts to use tech companies’ presence in the United
States to get easy access to customers’ data overseas. The conflict between Google and
its home country embodies another trend that has accelerated since the start of the
Snowden leaks. As the President of the Computer & Communications Industry
Association, Edward Black, testified before the Senate last year, the disclosure of
NSA overreach did not just damage some of America’s most successful
companies, it also undermined the key role the Internet plays in America’s
soft power projection around the world: as the leader in Internet
governance, and as the forum for open speech and exchange once
associated so positively with the United States. The U.S. response to Snowden’s
leaks has, to a significant degree, been to double down on hard power, on the imperative
to “collect it all” and the insistence that the best cyberdefense is an aggressive
cyberoffense. While President Obama paid lip service to stopping short of spying
“because we can,” the Executive Branch has refused to do anything – especially
legislatively – that would impose real controls on the surveillance system
that undergirds raw power. And that will likely bring additional costs, not just to
America’s economic position in the world, but in the need to invest in programs to
maintain that raw power advantage. Particularly given the paltry results the NSA has to
show for its domestic phone dragnet – the single Somali taxi driver donating to al-
Shabaab that Sanchez described. It’s not clear that the additional costs from doubling
down on hard power bring the United States any greater security.
Despite reforms within the US Freedom Act, the NSA can still
easily circumvent the new restrictions to access private data of
Americans
Savage, et al. 15
Charlie Savage, Winner of a Pulitzer Prize, Silver Gavel Award, and a Gerald R. Ford
Prize for Distinguished Reporting writing for the New York Times June 4, 2015.
“Hunting for Hackers, N.S.A. Secretly Expands Internet Spying at U.S. Border”
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/05/us/hunting-for-hackers-nsa-secretly-expandsinternet-spying-at-us-border.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&module=firstcolumn-region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news //EM
Without public notice or debate, the Obama administration has
expanded the National Security Agency‘s warrantless surveillance of
Americans’ international Internet traffic to search for evidence of malicious
computer hacking, according to classified N.S.A. documents. In mid2012, Justice
Department lawyers wrote two secret memos permitting the spy agency to
begin hunting on Internet cables, without a warrant and on American soil, for
WASHINGTON —
data linked to computer intrusions originating abroad — including traffic that flows to suspicious Internet addresses or contains malware, the
documents show. The Justice Department allowed the agency to monitor only addresses and “cybersignatures” — patterns associated with computer
the documents also note that the N.S.A. sought
permission to target hackers even when it could not establish any links to
foreign powers. The disclosures, based on documents provided by Edward
J. Snowden, the former N.S.A. contractor, and shared with The New York Times and ProPublica, come at a
intrusions — that it could tie to foreign governments. But
time of unprecedented cyberattacks on American financial institutions, businesses and government agencies, but also of greater scrutiny of secret legal
While the Senate passed legislation this week limiting
some of the N.S.A.’s authority, the measure involved provisions in the
U.S.A. Patriot Act and did not apply to the warrantless wiretapping
program. Government officials defended the N.S.A.’s monitoring of
suspected hackers as necessary to shield Americans from the increasingly
aggressive activities of foreign governments. But critics say it raises
difficult tradeoffs that should be subject to public debate. The N.S.A.’s activities run “smack
justifications for broader government surveillance.
into law enforcement land,” said Jonathan Mayer, a cybersecurity scholar at Stanford Law School who has researched privacy issues and who reviewed
several of the documents. “That’s a major policy decision about how to structure cybersecurity in the U.S. and not a conversation that has been had in
It is not clear what standards the agency is using to select targets. It can
be hard to know for sure who is behind a particular intrusion — a foreign
government or a criminal gang — and the N.S.A. is supposed to focus on foreign intelligence, not law enforcement.
The government can also gather significant volumes of Americans’
information — anything from private emails to trade secrets and business
dealings — through Internet surveillance because monitoring the data
flowing to a hacker involves copying that information as the hacker steals it.
public.”
One internal N.S.A. document notes that agency surveillance activities through “hacker signatures pull in a lot.” Brian Hale, the spokesman for the
It should come as no surprise that the U.S.
government gathers intelligence on foreign powers that attempt to
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, said, “
penetrate U.S. networks and steal the private information of U.S. citizens
and companies.” He added that “targeting overseas individuals engaging in hostile cyberactivities on behalf of a foreign power is a
lawful foreign intelligence purpose.” The effort is the latest known expansion of the N.S.A.’s
warrantless surveillance program, which allows the government to
intercept Americans’ cross border communications if the target is a
foreigner abroad. While the N.S.A. has long searched for specific email addresses and phone numbers of foreign intelligence targets,
the Obama administration three years ago started allowing the agency to search its communications streams for less identifying Internet protocol
addresses or strings of harmful computer code. The surveillance activity traces to changes that began after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks. The
government tore down a wall that prevented intelligence and criminal investigators from sharing information about suspected spies and terrorists. The
barrier had been erected to protect Americans’ rights because intelligence investigations use lower legal standards than criminal inquiries, but policy
makers decided it was too much of an obstacle to terrorism investigations. The N.S.A. also started the warrantless wiretapping program, which caused
an outcry when it was disclosed in 2005. In 2008, under the FISA Amendments Act, Congress legalized the surveillance program so long as the agency
targeted only noncitizens abroad. A year later, the new Obama administration began crafting a new cybersecurity policy. That effort included weighing
whether the Internet had made the distinction between a spy and a criminal obsolete. “Reliance on legal authorities that make theoretical distinctions
between armed attacks, terrorism and criminal activity may prove impractical,” the White House National Security Council wrote in a classified annex
to a policy report in May 2009, which was included in the N.S.A.’s internal files. About that time, the documents show, the N.S.A. — whose mission
includes protecting military and intelligence networks against intruders — proposed using the warrantless surveillance program for cybersecurity
purposes. The agency received “guidance on targeting using the signatures” from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, according to an internal
newsletter. In May and July 2012, according to an internal timeline, the Justice Department granted its secret approval for the searches of cyber
signatures and Internet addresses. The Justice Department tied that authority to a preexisting approval by the secret surveillance court permitting the
government to use the program to monitor foreign governments. That limit meant the N.S.A. had to have some evidence for believing that the hackers
were working for a specific foreign power. That rule, the N.S.A. soon complained, left a “huge collection gap against cyberthreats to the nation” because
Different computer
intruders can use the same piece of malware, take steps to hide their
location or pretend to be someone else. So the N.S.A., in 2012, began
pressing to go back to the surveillance court and seek permission to use the
program explicitly for cybersecurity purposes. That way, it could monitor
international communications for any “malicious cyberactivity,” even if it
did not yet know who was behind the attack. The newsletter described the further expansion as one of the
it is often hard to know exactly who is behind an intrusion, according to an agency newsletter.
“highest priorities” of the N.S.A. director, Gen. Keith B. Alexander. However, a former senior intelligence official said that the government never asked
the court to grant that authority. Meanwhile, the F.B.I. in 2011 had obtained a new kind of wiretap order from the secret surveillance court for
cybersecurity investigations, permitting it to target Internet data flowing to or from specific Internet addresses linked to certain governments. To carry
out the orders, the F.B.I. negotiated in 2012 to use the N.S.A.’s system for monitoring Internet traffic crossing “chokepoints operated by U.S. providers
through which international communications enter and leave the United States,” according to a 2012 N.S.A. document. The N.S.A. would send the
The disclosure that the N.S.A. and the
F.B.I. have expanded their cybersurveillance adds a dimension to a
recurring debate over the post Sept. 11 expansion of government spying
powers: Information about Americans sometimes gets swept up
incidentally when foreigners are targeted, and prosecutors can use that
information in criminal cases. Citing the potential for a copy of data
“exfiltrated” by a hacker to contain “so much” information about
Americans, one N.S.A. lawyer suggested keeping the stolen data out of the agency’s regular repository for information collected by
intercepted traffic to the bureau’s “cyberdata repository” in Quantico, Va.
surveillance so that analysts working on unrelated issues could not query it, a 2010 training document showed. But it is not clear whether the agency or
the F.B.I. has imposed any additional limits on the data of hacking victims. In a response to questions for this article, the F.B.I. pointed to its existing
procedures for protecting victims’ data acquired during investigations, but also said it continually reviewed its policies “to adapt to these changing
threats while protecting civil liberties and the interests of victims of cybercrimes.” None of these actions or proposals had been disclosed to the public.
As recently as February, when President Obama spoke about cybersecurity at an event at Stanford University, he lauded the importance of transparency
but did not mention this change. “The technology so often outstrips whatever rules and structures and standards have been put in place, which means
that government has to be constantly selfcritical and we have to be able to have an open debate about it,” Mr. Obama said.
Observation 2 – Multistakeholder model Good
NSA overreach is destroying the push for a multistakeholder model, which
risks data localization
The perception that the NSA is using Executive Order 12333 to
circumvent section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act is causing a
backlash against US tech companies and driving global data
localization
Eoyang, 14 - Mieke Eoyang is the Director of the National Security Program at Third
Way, a center-left think tank. She previously served as Defense Policy Advisor to
Senator Edward M. Kennedy, and a subcommittee staff director on the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, as well as as Chief of Staff to Rep. Anna
Eshoo (D-Palo Alto) (“A Modest Proposal: FAA Exclusivity for Collection Involving U.S.
Technology Companies” Lawfare, 11/24, http://www.lawfareblog.com/modestproposal-faa-exclusivity-collection-involving-us-technology-companies
Beyond 215 and FAA, media reports have suggested that there have been collection programs that occur outside of the companies’
knowledge. American
technology companies have been outraged about media
stories of US government intrusions onto their networks overseas, and the
spoofing of their web pages or products, all unbeknownst to the companies.
These stories suggest that the government is creating and sneaking through a back door to take the data. As one tech employee said
to me, “the back door makes a mockery of the front door.” As
a result of these allegations, companies
are moving to encrypt their data against their own government; they are
limiting their cooperation with NSA; and they are pushing for reform.
Negative international reactions to media reports of certain kinds of intelligence collection abroad have
resulted in a backlash against American technology companies, spurring
data localization requirements, rejection or cancellation of American
contracts, and raising the specter of major losses in the cloud computing
industry. These allegations could dim one of the few bright spots in the American economic recovery: tech. Without
commenting on the accuracy of these media reports, the perception is still a problem even if the
media reports of these government collection programs are not true---or are only partly true.
The tech industry believes them to be true, and more importantly, their
customers at home and abroad believe them to be true, and that means they have
huge impact on American business and huge impact as well on the
relationship between these businesses and an intelligence community that
depends on their cooperation. So, how should we think about reforms in response to this series of allegations the Executive Branch
can’t, or won’t, address? How
about making the FAA the exclusive means for
conducting electronic surveillance when the information being collected is
in the custody of an American company? This could clarify that the
executive branch could not play authority shell-games and claim that
Executive Order 12333 allows it to obtain information on overseas non-US
person targets that is in the custody of American companies, unbeknownst to those
companies. As a policy matter, it seems to me that if the information to be acquired is in the
custody of an American company, the intelligence community should ask
for it, rather than take it without asking. American companies should be entitled to a higher degree of
forthrightness from their government than foreign companies, even when they are acting overseas. Under the FAA, we
have a statutory regime that creates judicial oversight and accountability to
conduct electronic surveillance outside the US for specific purposes: foreign
intelligence (or traditional espionage), counter-terrorism, and prevention of WMD proliferation. It addresses protections for both
non-US and US persons. It creates a front-door, though compelled, relationship under which the intelligence community can receive
communications contents without individual warrants but with programmatic judicial oversight. FAA
exclusivity
would say to the rest of the world that when the US conducts bulk electronic
surveillance overseas, we are doing so for a particular, national security
purpose. The FAA structure with FISC review provides an independent
check that the statutory purposes are met. Through transparency agreements with the government,
the American companies are able to provide their customers with some sense of how many requests are made. This would
not change the 12333 authorities with respect to non-US companies. It would also
not change 12333 authorities when the Executive Branch seeks to obtain the information in some other way than through the US
company (i.e. breaking into the target’s laptop, parking a surveillance van outside their house, sending a spy, etc.). Some have asked
me what would happen if foreign companies tried to set up shop here in the US to seek these protections. I need to refine this part
further, but would look to other statutory regimes that need to define the nationality of companies, like the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, or the CFIUS process. Executive Order 12333 itself offers a partial answer, defining a US person to include “a
corporation incorporated in the United States, except for a corporation directed and controlled by a foreign government or
governments.” Others may argue that FAA provides inadequate civil liberties protections. This proposal says nothing about the
adequacy of that statute. What it says is that for
data held by an American company about a
target that is not a US person, the checks within FAA are stronger than
those under 12333 acting alone.
That perception prevents the US from stopping data localization
globally and helping those express their thoughts throughout the
world
Kehl, 14 – Policy Analyst at New America’s Open Technology Institute (Danielle,
“Surveillance Costs: The NSA’s Impact on the Economy, Internet Freedom &
Cybersecurity” July, https://www.newamerica.org/oti/surveillance-costs-the-nsasimpact-on-the-economy-internet-freedom-cybersecurity/)
Costs to the Internet Freedom Agenda and U.S. Credibility in Internet Governance “As the birthplace for so many of these
technologies, including the internet itself, we have a responsibility to see them used for good,” declared Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton in January 2010.175 Her speech at the Newseum in Washington DC effectively launched the United States’
Internet Freedom agenda, articulating a leading role for the U.S. in using
the Internet to promote freedom of expression, freedom of worship, and
the freedom to connect around the world. Clinton went on to give two other major addresses on
Internet Freedom, becoming the first global leader to emphasize Internet Freedom as a foreign policy priority and urging “countries
everywhere… to join us in the bet we have made, a bet that an open internet will lead to stronger, more prosperous countries.”176 As
Richard Fontaine and Will Rogers describe in a seminal paper on the subject in June 2011, “Internet
Freedom, broadly
defined, is the notion that universal rights, including the freedoms of expression,
assembly and association, extend to the digital sphere.”177 Although there were questions from the
beginning about whether the United States would hold itself to the same high standards domestically that it holds others to
internationally,178 the
American government has successfully built up a policy and
programming agenda in the past few years based on promoting an open
Internet.179 These efforts include raising concerns over Internet repression
in bilateral dialogues with countries such as Vietnam and China,180 supporting initiatives
including the Freedom Online Coalition, and providing over $120 million in
funding for “groups working to advance Internet freedom – supporting countercensorship and secure communications technology, digital safety training, and policy and research programs for people facing
Internet repression.”181 However,
the legitimacy of these efforts has been thrown into
question since the NSA disclosures began. “Trust has been the principal casualty in this unfortunate
affair,” wrote Ben FitzGerald and Richard Butler in December 2013. “The American public, our
nation’s allies, leading businesses and Internet users around the world are
losing faith in the U.S. government’s role as the leading proponent of a free,
open and integrated global Internet.”182 Prior to the NSA revelations, the United States was already
facing an increasingly challenging political climate as it promoted the Internet Freedom agenda in global Internet governance
conversations. At the 2012 World Conference on International Telecommunications (WCIT), the U.S. and diverse group of other
countries refused to sign the updated International Telecommunications Regulations based on concerns that the
document pushed for greater governmental control of the Internet and
would ultimately harm Internet Freedom.183 Many observers noted that the split hardened the
division between two opposing camps in the Internet governance debate: proponents of a status quo
multistakeholder Internet governance model, like the United States, who
argued that the existing system was the best way to preserve key online
freedoms, and those seeking to disrupt or challenge that multistakeholder
model for a variety of political and economic reasons, including
governments like Russia and China pushing for greater national
sovereignty over the Internet.184 Many of the proposals for more
governmental control over the network could be understood as attempts by
authoritarian countries to more effectively monitor and censor their
citizens, which allowed the U.S. to reasonably maintain some moral high
ground as its delegates walked out of the treaty conference.185 Although few stakeholders seemed particularly pleased by the
outcome of the WCIT, reports indicate that by the middle of 2013 the tone had shifted in a more collaborative and positive direction
following the meetings of the 2013 World Telecommunications/ICT Policy Forum (WTPF) and the World Summit on Information
Society + 10 (WSIS+10) review.186 However,
the Internet governance conversation took a
dramatic turn after the Snowden disclosures. The annual meeting of the Freedom Online
Coalition occurred in Tunis in June 2013, just a few weeks after the initial leaks. Unsurprisingly, surveillance dominated the
conference even though the agenda covered a wide range of topics from Internet access and affordability to cybersecurity.187
Throughout the two-day event, representatives from civil society used the platform to confront and criticize governments about their
monitoring practices.188 NSA
surveillance would continue to be the focus of
international convenings on Internet Freedom and Internet governance for
months to come, making civil society representatives and foreign
governments far less willing to embrace the United States’ Internet Freedom
agenda or to accept its defense of the multistakeholder model of Internet governance as a anything other than self-serving.
“One can come up with all kinds of excuses for why US surveillance is not
hypocrisy. For example, one might argue that US policies are more benevolent than those of many other regimes… And one
might recognize that in several cases, some branches of government don’t know what other branches are doing… and therefore US
policy is not so much hypocritical as it is inadvertently contradictory,” wrote Eli Dourado, a researcher from the Mercatus Center at
George Mason University in August 2013. “But
the fact is that the NSA is galvanizing
opposition to America’s internet freedom agenda.”189 The scandal revived
proposals from both Russia and Brazil for global management of technical
standards and domain names, whether through the ITU or other avenues. Even developing
countries, many of whom have traditionally aligned with the U.S. and prioritize
access and affordability as top issues, “don’t want US assistance because they assume the
equipment comes with a backdoor for the NSA. They are walking straight
into the arms of Russia, China, and the ITU.”190 Consequently, NSA surveillance has shifted the
dynamics of the Internet governance debate in a potentially destabilizing manner. The Snowden revelations
“have also been well-received by those who seek to discredit existing
approaches to Internet governance,” wrote the Center for Democracy & Technology’s Matthew Shears.
“There has been a long-running antipathy among a number of stakeholders to the United States government’s perceived control of
the Internet and the dominance of US Internet companies. There has also been a long-running antipathy, particularly among some
governments, to the distributed and open management of the Internet.”191 Shears points out that evidence of the NSA’s wideranging capabilities has fueled general concerns about the current Internet governance system, bolstering the arguments of those
calling for a new government-centric governance order. At the UN Human Rights Council in September 2013, the representative
from Pakistan—speaking on behalf of Cuba, Venezuela, Zimbabwe, Uganda, Ecuador, Russia, Indonesia, Bolivia, Iran, and China—
explicitly linked the revelations about surveillance programs to the need for reforming Internet governance processes and
institutions to give governments a larger role.192 Surveillance issues continued to dominate the conversation at the 2013 Internet
Governance Forum in Bali as well, where “debates on child protection, education and infrastructure were overshadowed by
widespread concerns from delegates who said the public’s trust in the internet was being undermined by reports of US and British
government surveillance.”193 Further complicating these conversations is the fact that several
of the institutions
that govern the technical functions of the Internet are either tied to the
American government or are located in the United States. Internet governance scholar
Milton Mueller has described how the reaction to the NSA disclosures has become entangled in an already contentious Internet
governance landscape. Mueller argues that, in addition to revealing the scale and scope of state surveillance and the preeminent role
of the United States and its partners, the
NSA disclosures may push other states toward a
more nationally partitioned Internet and “threaten… in a very fundamental way the claim that the US
had a special status as neutral steward of Internet governance.”194 These concerns were publicly voiced in October 2013 by the
heads of a number of key organizations, including the President of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
(ICANN) and the chair of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), in the Montevideo Statement on the Future of Internet
Cooperation. Their statement expressed “strong concern over the undermining of the trust and confidence of Internet users globally
due to recent revelations of pervasive monitoring and surveillance” and “called for accelerating the globalization of ICANN and
Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) functions, towards an environment in which all stakeholders, including all
governments, participate on an equal footing.”195 In particular, the process of internationalizing ICANN—which has had a
contractual relationship with the Commerce Department’s National Telecommunications and Information Association (NTIA) since
1998—has progressed in recent months.196
(Insert Scenarios)
Plan
The United States federal government should limit domestic surveillance of American
corporations exclusively to authority under section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act,
subject to the additional use restrictions in Presidential Policy Directive 28.
Observation 3 – Solvency
The plan’s curtailment of surveillance of U.S. companies to
exclusive section 702 authority is vital to restoring domestic and
international trust in surveillance
Eoyang and Bishai, 15 - *Mieke Eoyang is the Director of the National Security
Program at Third Way, a center-left think tank. She previously served as Defense Policy
Advisor to Senator Edward M. Kennedy, and a subcommittee staff director on the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, as well as as Chief of Staff to Rep. Anna
Eshoo (D-Palo Alto); **Chrissy Bishai is a Fellow at Third Way (“Restoring Trust
between U.S. Companies and Their Government on Surveillance Issues” 3/19,
http://www.thirdway.org/report/restoring-trust-between-us-companies-and-theirgovernment-on-surveillance-issues
Fixing the Problem Means Changing the Existing Legal Framework Currently, the
U.S. collects electronic
communications under four main authorities. Four Main Authorities on Electronic
Communication For collection occurring under both 215 and 702, the companies
would have been served with an order compelling production of their data.
But outside the U.S., Executive Order 12333,15 the long-standing guidance
for foreign intelligence activities, would govern the kind of collection that
has caused international outrage. E.O. 12333, signed by President Reagan, set the ground
rules and authorization for foreign intelligence collection when the nation’s primary
security threat was the Soviet Union. At that time, traditional intelligence activities would have been focused on other nationstates—identifying their spies, trying to recruit spies for the U.S., and trying to steal other countries’ secrets while protecting our
own. But the growth of terrorist groups’ capabilities, and particularly the 9/11 attacks, helped dissolve the separation between
traditional overseas espionage and counter-terrorism. As the nation was grappling with new threats posed by terrorism, people
around the world were sharing more and more of their information online and using mostly American companies to do so. Yet the
legal framework that had once recognized privacy rights was ill-suited to the Internet Age. The Intelligence Community’s traditional
position that constitutional rights like the Fourth Amendment’s privacy protections didn’t apply to non-Americans outside the U.S.
might have been clear when travelling and communicating internationally were more difficult. But
today’s freeflowing movement of people and data means that the “nationality” of an
individual’s communications is far less obvious.16 While extending
constitutional or privacy protections to foreigners abroad is a tricky legal
proposition, for many their data is being held by entities that are entitled to
the due process and privacy protections of the U.S. Constitution: American
companies. Our tech firms often act as custodians of other people’s data, and
as such don’t have the same heightened privacy interests as the targets of that data. But accessing the companies’
data without even giving notice to the owner of the servers raises serious
constitutional questions. As a politician once famously noted, “corporations are people too.”17 As a legal (if
not political) matter, he was right—these American tech companies are “U.S. Persons,”
and they therefore should know when the government seeks to access the
data they possess. The companies should be entitled to notice, especially since they can be compelled to cooperate with
law enforcement requests to hand over user data. Those protections should hold true regardless of whether the user data sought by
the U.S. government is that of Americans or non-Americans. In addition to those privacy protections that all U.S. persons enjoy
under the Constitution, both at home and abroad, surveillance reform should meet the following principles when dealing with
information about or from Americans: The U.S. government should have a process, consistent with the Constitution, to acquire from
companies the information that it needs to secure the country. The U.S. government should have a national security reason to collect
the information that it requests. U.S. companies should not have to fear unauthorized access to their data or products from their
own government. Any process to acquire information from U.S. companies should have safeguards to prevent misuse or intentional
over-collection. The Solution Include Overseas Collection from American Companies in Existing Statutory Frameworks In order to
meet the principles above, we
propose that FAA’s 702 framework be the exclusive
means for conducting electronic surveillance when the information is in the
custody of an American company (“FAA Exclusivity”). Section 702 of FAA provides procedures to authorize
data collection of foreign targets reasonably believed to be outside the U.S. It empowers the Attorney General (AG) and Director of
National Intelligence (DNI) to jointly certify a high volume of targeting and does not require the requesters to identify specific nonU.S. persons who will be targeted. Under this 702 framework, information on foreigners that’s in the custody of a U.S. company
should be subject to the following rules: The data must relate to targets “reasonably believed” to be outside the U.S. (can include
foreign persons, governments or their factions and similar entities). The AG and DNI must jointly submit annual “certifications” to
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC). Certifications must identify categories of foreign intelligence targets that the
Government wants to surveil electronically; they do not need to identify specific persons to be targeted. Certifications may include
information or representations from other federal agencies authorized to cooperate with the AG, DNI, or Director of the NSA.
Certifications must be reviewed by the FISC, which can authorize the targeting if they deem that the statutory requirements have
been met. After the certifications are approved, the AG and DNI issue (written) “directives” to the providers, ordering them to assist
the government. Collection should be executed with the appropriate “minimization procedures” in place to limit the acquisition,
retention, and dissemination of any non–publicly available U.S. person information acquired through the Section 702 program. The
AG, in consultation with the DNI, must adopt FISC-approved targeting and minimization procedures that are “reasonably designed”
to ensure that the Government does not collect wholly domestic communications, and that only persons outside the U.S. are
surveilled. The AG and DNI must also create acquisition guidelines (which are not subject to FISC approval). Advantages of an FAA
Framework Shifting
the legal authority for collection of data in the custody of an
American company from E.O. 12333 to an FAA framework would have a number of
advantages. Most importantly, it would create a way for the government to get the data it
needs from American companies while giving those firms assurances that
their data would not be accessed in other unauthorized ways. In particular, the
FAA framework would create specific purposes for which the information
could be sought, rather than allow the indiscriminate scooping up of every
aspect of a person’s communications. FAA’s stated purpose is to acquire
foreign intelligence information, which it defines as "information that relates to the ability of the U.S. to
protect against an actual or potential attack by a foreign power; sabotage, international terrorism, or the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction by a foreign power; or clandestine intelligence activities by a foreign power." The
FAA framework
would also create a requirement that the Executive Branch explain how the
information sought meets the statutory purposes. And there would be the
additional check of an independent judge who would review the
certifications and issue directives. Though this process is ex parte, and therefore a potential rubber stamp
for the government, there have been no documented instances of intentional abuses of the system in seeking information beyond the
statutory purposes. Finally, the
FAA framework would subject information sought from
U.S. companies to the statutory oversight requirements of the law. These are
extensive and explicit.18 In addition to FAA’s inherent protections, FAA Exclusivity would send a
powerful message to the rest of the world: when the U.S. conducts
electronic surveillance overseas from American companies, it is doing so
for a particular national security purpose. The FAA structure with FISC
review provides an independent check that the statutory purposes are met.
Through transparency agreements with the government, the American
companies would be able to provide their customers with some sense of
how many requests are made. FAA Exclusivity would not change the E.O. 12333 authorities with respect to
non-U.S. companies. It would not change E.O. 12333 authorities when the Executive Branch seeks to obtain the information in some
way other than through a U.S. company that holds the data (i.e. traditional espionage, like breaking into a target’s laptop, parking a
surveillance van outside their house, or sending a spy, would still be permissible). Of course, FAA Exclusivity wouldn’t solve every
problem. It would not prevent foreign governments from collecting information themselves and then providing it to U.S. intelligence
agencies, as U.S. law cannot bind a foreign government. And some
may argue that FAA provides
inadequate civil liberties protections for Americans. This proposal says nothing about the adequacy of
that statute in this respect. What it says is that for
data held by an American company about a
target that is not a U.S. person, the checks within FAA are stronger than
those solely under E.O. 12333. Others have argued that the FAA shifts the burden of cooperation solely onto
the company, which will suffer greater reputational harm as a more witting participant in affirmatively granting the government’s
requests. However, companies have suffered reputational harm as a result of allegations of unwitting cooperation. Making the
cooperation known, even if it’s secret, gives the companies the opportunity to account for it in their own planning. The move by
certain U.S. companies to place subsidiaries in foreign ownership to resist requests by the U.S. government presents an interesting
twist on this idea. In shifting the balance back to increased protections for U.S. companies, this legislation would change the
incentives so that claiming U.S. law would have operational advantages in giving companies uniformity of law for all their data. This
would also encourage the use of a single choice of law for all data governed by a company—that of the nationality of incorporation—
rather than encouraging a choice of law patchwork to govern the data as it flows around the world. Finally, some foreign
multinational companies operating in the U.S. and abroad may argue that this is inconsistent with principles that we treat all
companies operating in the U.S. the same way for purposes of law. While that would remain true under this proposal, it would create
a difference in how the U.S. treats U.S. companies operating abroad compared to how it treats foreign companies abroad. But
stretching the U.S. Constitution to foreign companies abroad is to stretch the document too far. If, on the other hand, those
companies see advantage in changing their nationality to U.S. in order to claim protections of those laws, then that is the corporate
version of the kind of immigration patterns that America has seen since its founding. Conclusion Using
FAA’s
framework as the exclusive means to access data that U.S. companies are
holding will give the Intelligence Community a statutory framework to be
able to get the intelligence information that it needs to protect the nation
while restoring the trust relationship between the companies and our
government. In addition, it will help restore the faith of foreign governments and
customers that when American companies are acting overseas, they bring
with them American values, including those of privacy protections.
Applying the restrictions of PPD-28 to section 702 eliminates all
negative perceptions of overbreadth
Nojeim, 14 - Director, Project on Freedom, Security & Technology at the Center for
Democracy & Technology (Greg, “COMMENTS TO THE PRIVACY AND CIVIL
LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD REGARDING REFORMS TO SURVEILLANCE
CONDUCTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF FISA” 4/11)
To address the problem of overbreadth in Section 702 collection, PCLOB
should recommend that Section 702 surveillance be conducted only for
carefully defined national security purposes. While there are different ways to do this, the
best way would be to turn the “use restrictions” in PPD-28 that govern bulk
collection into the permissible purposes for Section 702 surveillance. This
would require that collection pursuant to Section 702 only occur for
purposes of detecting and countering: (1) espionage and other threats and
activities directed by foreign powers or their intelligence services against the United States and
its interests, (2) threats to the United States and its interests from terrorism, (3) threats to the United States
and its interests from the development, possession, proliferation, or use of weapons of mass
destruction, (4) cybersecurity threats, (5) threats to U.S. or allied Armed Forces
or other U.S or allied personnel, and (6) transnational criminal threats, including illicit finance and
sanctions evasion related to the other purposes named above. This change would provide significant
comfort to non-U.S. persons abroad who are concerned about the impact on
their human rights that Section 702 surveillance would otherwise have. Indeed,
it would increase the likelihood that Section 702 surveillance would meet
human rights standards. It would also focus Section 702 surveillance on
true national security threats and still provide significant leeway to
intelligence officials. We note that each time intelligence officials at the March 19 PCLOB
hearings on Section 702 described the DNI certifications that identify the categories of foreign
intelligence information that may be collected pursuant to Section 702, they
mentioned one of these six categories of information. Another way to limit to national
security the purposes for collection pursuant to Section 702 would be to remove “the conduct of foreign affairs” as a basis for
collection. If adopted, this reform would permit collection under Section 702 for the purpose of obtaining (1) information that
relates to the ability of the U.S. to protect against a hostile attack, espionage, sabotage or international terrorism or proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, or (2) information with respect to a foreign territory or foreign power (a foreign government, political
party, or entity controlled by a foreign government, or a foreign terrorist organization) that relates to the security of the U.S. Such a
change would be consistent with the stated counterterrorism purpose of Section 702. Refining
the purpose for
which surveillance under Section 702 may be conducted would not prevent
the Intelligence Community from gathering information related to the
conduct of foreign affairs, but rather would merely remove the highly
invasive practice of compelled company disclosure of communications
content absent judicial review as a means of doing so.
Curtailing the use of surveillance on US-based servers to
national security interests and increasing transparency
regarding surveillance is vital to restoring trust and US
credibility
Kehl, 14 – Policy Analyst at New America’s Open Technology Institute (Danielle,
“Surveillance Costs: The NSA’s Impact on the Economy, Internet Freedom &
Cybersecurity” July, https://www.newamerica.org/oti/surveillance-costs-the-nsasimpact-on-the-economy-internet-freedom-cybersecurity/
Section 215
and FISA Amendments Act Section 702 and conducted outside the U.S. under Executive Order 12333, have arguably had the
greatest and most immediate impact on America’s tech industry and global
standing. Strictly limiting the scope and purpose of surveillance under
these authorities—not just in regard to surveillance of Americans but of
non-Americans as well—will be critical to regaining the trust of individuals, companies and countries around the
The NSA mass surveillance programs described in the introduction, conducted domestically pursuant to USA PATRIOT Act
world, as well as stemming the economic and political costs of the NSA programs. The President’s NSA Review Group acknowledged the need for such
reform in its report on surveillance programs, affirming that “the right of privacy has been recognized as a basic human right that all nations should
unrestrained American surveillance of non-United States persons might
alienate other nations, fracture the unity of the Internet, and undermine
the free flow of information across national boundaries.”324 In addition to recommending a
variety new protections for U.S. persons, the Review Group urged in its Recommendation 13 that surveillance
of non-U.S. persons under Section 702 or “any other authority”—a reference intended to
respect,” and cautioned that “
should be strictly limited to the purpose of protecting
national security, should not be used for economic espionage, should not be
targeted based solely on a person’s political or religious views, and should
be subject to careful oversight and the highest degree of transparency
possible.326 Fully implementing this recommendation—and particularly restricting Section 702 and Executive Order 12333 surveillance to
include Executive Order 12333325 —
specific national security purposes rather than foreign intelligence collection generally—would indicate significant progress toward addressing the
concerns raised in the recent Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on “The Right to Privacy in the Digital
the common distinction between
“‘foreigners’ and ‘citizens’…within national security surveillance oversight
regimes” has resulted in “significantly weaker – or even non-existent –
privacy protection for foreigners and non-citizens, as compared with those
of citizens.”327 The leading legislative reform proposal in the U.S. Congress, the USA FREEDOM Act, would go a long way to protecting both
Age.” The UN report highlights how, despite the universality of human rights,
U.S. and non-U.S. persons against the bulk collection under Section 215 of records held by American telephone and Internet companies.328 On that
the
bill as originally introduced only added new protections for U.S. persons or for
wholly domestic communications,329 and even those protections were stripped out or weakened in the version of the
basis, passage of the law would very much help address the trust gap that the NSA programs have created. However, with regard to Section 702,
bill that was passed by the House of Representatives in May 2014.330 Meanwhile, neither the bill as introduced nor as passed by the House addresses
surveillance conducted extraterritorially under Executive or 12333. Therefore, even if USA FREEDOM is eventually approved by both the House and
much more will ultimately need to be done to
reassure foreign users of U.S.-based communications networks, services, and products that their rights are
being respected. Provide for increased transparency around government surveillance, both from the government and companies.
Increased transparency about how the NSA is using its authorities, and how
U.S. companies do—or do not—respond when the NSA demands their data is
critical to rebuilding the trust that has been lost in the wake of the Snowden disclosures. In July 2013, a coalition of large
the Senate and signed into law by the President,
Internet companies and advocacy groups provided a blueprint for the necessary transparency reforms, in a letter to the Obama Administration and
Congress calling for “greater transparency around national security-related requests by the US government to Internet, telephone, and web-based
service providers for information about their users and subscribers.”331 Major companies including Facebook, Google, and Microsoft—joined by
organizations such as the Center for Democracy and Technology, New America’s Open Technology Institute, and the American Civil Liberties Union—
demanded that the companies be allowed to publish aggregate numbers about the specific types of government requests they receive, the types of data
requested, and the number of people affected. They also also urged the government to issue its own transparency reports to provide greater clarity
about the scope of the NSA’s surveillance programs.332 “This information about how and how often the government is using these legal authorities is
important to the American people, who are entitled to have an informed public debate about the appropriateness of those authorities and their use, and
to international users of US-based service providers who are concerned about the privacy and security of their communications,” the letter stated.333
Two months later, many of the same companies and organizations issued another letter supporting surveillance transparency legislation proposed by
Senator Al Franken (D-MN) and Representative Zoe Lofgren (D-CA) that would have implemented many of the original letter’s recommendations.334
Elements of both bills, consistent with the coalition’s recommendations, were included in the original version of the USA FREEDOM Act introduced in
the House and the Senate—as were new strong transparency provisions requiring the FISA court to declassify key legal opinions to better educate the
public and policymakers about how it is interpreting and implementing the law. Such strong new transparency requirements are consistent with several
recommendations of the President’s Review Group335 and would help address concerns about lack of transparency raised by the UN High
all of these transparency provisions from the
original USA FREEDOM Act were substantially weakened in the version of
the bill that was passed by the House of Representatives in May 2014.337 Congress will need to
include stronger transparency provisions in any final version of the USA FREEDOM Act if it
intends to meaningfully restore trust in the U.S. Internet and
telecommunications industries and stem the loss of business that has begun
as a result of the NSA programs. As commentator Mieke Eoyang put it, “If reforms do not
deliver sufficient protections and transparency for [tech companies’]
customers, especially those abroad who have the least constitutional
protections, they will vote with their feet.”338 Recommit to the Internet Freedom agenda in a way that directly
addresses issues raised by NSA surveillance, including moving toward international human-rights based standards on surveillance. The United
States must act immediately to restore the credibility of the Internet Freedom
agenda, lest it become another casualty of the NSA’s surveillance programs.
Commissioner for Human Rights.336 Unfortunately,
agencies within the U.S. government have taken initial
steps to demonstrate goodwill in this area, particularly through the NTIA’s announcement that it intends to
As described in Part IV, various
transition stewardship of the IANA functions to a global multistakeholder organization and the State Department’s speech outlining six principles to
However, it will take a broader
effort from across the government to demonstrate that the United States is
fully committed to Internet Freedom, including firmly establishing the nature of its support for the evolving
guide signals intelligence collection grounded in international human rights norms.
multistakeholder system of Internet governance and directly engaging with issues raised by the NSA surveillance programs in international
Supporting international norms that increase confidence in the
security of online communications and respect for the rights of Internet
users all around the world is integral to restoring U.S. credibility in this
area. “We have surveillance programmes that abuse human rights and lack
in transparency and accountability precisely because we do not have
sufficiently robust, open, and inclusive debates around surveillance and national
conversations.
security policy,” writes Matthew Shears of the Center for Democracy & Technology.339 It is time to begin having those conversations on both a national
and an international level, particularly at key upcoming Internet governance convenings including the 2014 Internet Governance Forum, the
International Telecommunications Union’s plenipotentiary meeting, and the upcoming WSIS+10 review process.340 Certainly, the United States will
not be able to continue promoting the Internet Freedom agenda at these meetings without addressing its national security apparatus and the impact of
this presents an opportunity for
the U.S. to assume a leadership role in the promotion of better
international standards around surveillance practices.
NSA surveillance on individuals around the world. Rather than being a problem,
Scenarios
Activism
Middle East Activism
Internet Freedom within many countries in the Middle East set
up political activism to create a democratic world
Fontaine and Rogers, Fontaine is president of the Center for a New American
Security (CNAS) and worked on the National Security Council and Rogers worked
for the CNAS, 6/2011
(Richard and Will, “Internet Freedom: A Foreign Policy Imperative in the Digital Age”,
http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_InternetFreedom_FontaineRogers_
0.pdf , p. 14-19)//NC
III. Internet Freedom and Political Change The Internet’s potential as a tool for political change captivated top foreign policy
officials in 2009 during what was quickly dubbed Iran’s Twitter Revolution. The new
awareness grew as
protestors used the Internet and text messages to spread information and
coordinate efforts, and was crystallized by the viral movement of a video depicting the brutal slaying of a young
Iranian student, Neda Agha-Soltan. The video, which was captured on a mobile phone and uploaded to YouTube, traveled across the
Web and onto local and satellite television, prompting Obama to express his outrage at the killing. When the president of the United
States uses a White House press conference to address material uploaded to YouTube, something fundamental has changed in the
nature of modern communications. The
focus on Internet freedom grew as the Arab Spring
gathered momentum a year and a half later. The wave of revolts across the Arab world, beginning in
Tunisia, then sweeping across Egypt and into Libya, Bahrain, Yemen, Syria and
elsewhere were fueled in part by activists using tools such as Facebook, Twitter, SMS (text messaging) and other platforms.
Several regimes took draconian steps to stop online organizing and
communication. The sense grew that the Internet mattered, but just how it mattered was not totally clear. In a
sense, the Internet represents just the latest part of a story that has unfolded for centuries. Communication
technologies have played significant roles in political movements since antiquity, from the
printing press that empowered the Reformation, cassette tapes distributed by Iranian revolutionaries in 1979, to fax machines used
by Poland’s Solidarity movement and satellite television today. But the global nature of the Internet, its very low barrier to entry, its
speed and the degree to which it empowers the individual all make it qualitatively different from earlier technologies .
The
Internet itself has become the focus of attention by dictators, democracy activists and
observers around the world. Does Internet Freedom Lead to Democracy? The United States promotes
Internet freedom because Americans believe in the freedom of expression, in any medium.
The country also promotes it because American leaders have bet that, on balance, the
increased availability of new, unfettered communications technologies abets the spread
of democracy. But does it? Here we use the term “democracy” to mean a political system that is transparent and accountable
to the public through free and fair elections; includes active political participation by the citizenry; protects human rights; and
maintains a rule of law that is fair to all citizens.25 This is obviously an ideal, and democratic systems exhibit many variations, but
this definition offers a useful standard for measuring potential progress. Experts remain deeply divided, as shown in the text box on
the following page, as to whether unbridled access to the Internet can help transform authoritarian regimes over time and bring
greater freedom to once-closed societies. Most attempts to assess its impact rely on case studies, anecdotes or theory. The novelty of
the phenomenon and the few and widely varying data points pose notable analytical challenges, and assessments require a certain
amount of subjective interpretation. Facebook clearly played a major role in building an opposition to the Hosni Mubarak regime in
Egypt and in organizing protests. But after the government shut off the Internet, protests became bigger, not smaller. So did this
demonstrate the Internet’s limited role as a tool of agitation? Or did the shutoff of cherished online tools itself spur enraged citizens
to demonstrate instead of staying home (possibly in front of a computer)? It has become axiomatic to say that the Internet does not
itself create democracies or overthrow regimes; people do. This is obviously true, but if new communications tools do matter – and
there appears to be at least nascent evidence that they do – then they can play a role in several distinct ways. An important report
issued by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) presented a useful framework for examining how new communications
technologies might affect political action. The paper identifies five distinct mechanisms through which the Internet might promote
(or be used by regimes to block) democratic progress.36 Here we deepen the analysis of these mechanisms and add two additional
factors that affect them. The
Internet may affect individuals, by altering or reinforcing
their political attitudes, making them more attuned to political events, and
enabling them to participate in politics to a greater degree than they could otherwise. This does not
automatically translate into a more activist population; as the USIP study notes, it could actually make citizens more passive by
diverting their attention away from offline political activism and toward less significant online activity.37 Some have called this
“slacktivism,” exemplified by the millions of individuals who signed online petitions to end genocide in Darfur but who took no
further action.38 At the same time, individuals freely expressing themselves on the Internet are exercising a basic democratic right.
As democracy scholar Larry Diamond points out, used in this way, the Internet can help “widen the public sphere, creating a more
pluralistic and autonomous arena of news, commentary and information.”39 It
can also serve as an instrument
through which individuals can push for transparency and government accountability,
both of which are hallmarks of mature democracies.40 New media might also affect
intergroup relations, by generating new connections among individuals, spreading
information and bringing together people and groups. (Some have worried about the opposite effect – the
tendency of the Internet to polarize individuals and groups around particular ideological tendencies.)41 This may occur not
only within countries, but also among them; the protests in Tunisia sparked a
clear rise in political consciousness and activism across the Arab world –
much of it facilitated by Internet-based communications and satellite television.42 It may
also take place over a long period of time; Clay Shirky, an expert at New York University, argues that a “densifying of the public
sphere” may need to occur before an uprising turns into a revolution.43 New communications
technologies
could also affect collective action, by helping change opinion and making it easier
for individuals and groups to organize protests in repressive countries.
Unconnected individuals dissatisfied with the prevailing politics may realize that others
share their views, which might form the basis for collective action.44 Relatively small groups,
elites or other motivated dissidents might use the Internet to communicate or organize
protests. Even if the number of committed online activists is small, they might nevertheless disseminate information to the
general population or inspire more widespread protests.45 Again, it is important to distinguish such action from group
“slacktivism;” as the successful protests in Egypt showed, the regime only began to teeter when thousands of citizens physically
occupied Tahrir Square. Though initial protests may have been organized via Facebook, the Mubarak government would still be in
power if the protests had been confined only to cyberspace. These
new technologies clearly affect regime
policies as well. Governments have employed a huge array of techniques aimed at
controlling the Internet and ensuring that their political opponents cannot use it freely.
This goes well beyond censorship, which garners the bulk of popular attention.
Autocracies also regularly monitor dissident communications; mobilize regime
defenders; spread propaganda and false information designed to disrupt protests and outside groups; infiltrate social
movements; and disable dissident websites, communications tools and databases. These and other practices can also induce selfcensorship and other forms of self-restraint by publishers, activists, online commentators and opposition politicians. Autocrats can
also turn dissidents’ use of the Internet against them. In Iran, for example, users of social media – which linked their accounts to
those of other protestors – inadvertently created a virtual catalogue of political opponents that enabled the government to identify
and persecute individuals. The regime established a website that published photos of protestors and used crowd sourcing to identify
the individuals’ names.46 Similarly, the Revolutionary Guard reportedly sent intimidating messages to those who posted proopposition messages and forced some citizens entering the country to open their Facebook accounts upon arrival.47 In the midst of
the Arab protests, Syria allowed its citizens to access Facebook and YouTube for the first time in three years. Some human rights
activists suspected that the government made the change precisely in order to monitor people and activities on these sites.48
Similarly, shortly after the Egyptian government lifted its Internet blackout in early 2011, pro-Mubarak supporters disrupted
planned demonstrations by posting messages on Facebook and Twitter saying that the protests had been canceled.49 The
government reportedly sent Facebook messages to citizens urging them not to attend protests because doing so would harm the
Egyptian economy.50 In the same vein, the Chinese government employs an estimated 250,000 “50 Cent Party” members who are
paid a small sum each time they post a pro-government message online.51 And after an anonymous post on the U.S.-based Chinese
language website Boxun.com called on activists to stage China’s own “Jasmine Revolution,” no demonstrators turned up at the rally
point – but it was flooded with security teams and plainclothes officers.52 Some speculated that Chinese officials themselves may
have authored the anonymous posting in an effort to draw out political dissidents.53 While no evidence has emerged to support the
claim, it is not hard to imagine such an attempt taking place in the future. Autocracies are engaged in “offline” attempts to repress
Internet use, as well. Saudi Arabia, for example, has not only blocked websites but also placed hidden cameras in Internet cafes
aimed at monitoring user behavior and required cafe owners to give their customer lists to government officials.54 China requires
users to register their identification upon entry to a cybercafe.55 And Libyan officials simply demanded that refugees fleeing the
recent fighting turn over their cellphones or SIM cards at border checkpoints.56 Beyond these effects, new
media can
affect external attention, by transmitting images and information to the outside world,
beyond the control of government-run media and regime censorship and spin. Such
attention can mobilize sympathy for protestors or hostility toward repressive regimes,57
as occurred when the video of Neda Agha-Soltan moved from YouTube to mainstream media. Digital videos and information may
also have a rebound effect; information transmitted out of Egypt and Libya by social networking and videohosting sites during the
protests in those countries made its way back in via widely watched satellite broadcasts. This
effect could be
particularly pronounced in countries like Yemen, where Internet penetration is low but
Al Jazeera is widely viewed. Similarly, print journalists have found sources and stories
through social media and have used the same media to push their articles out to the
world. In addition to the five mechanisms laid out by USIP and noted above, we observe two additional factors that affect them in
various ways. The economic impact of the Internet might affect the degree of
democratization in a country. The Internet has increased labor productivity and
corresponding economic growth, which may help middle classes emerge in developing
countries.58 Because new middle classes tend to agitate for democratic rights, new
technologies could indirectly promote democratization. In 2011, Clinton referenced a related dynamic,
the “dictator’s dilemma,” stating that autocrats “will have to choose between letting the walls fall or
paying the price to keep them standing … by resorting to greater oppression and
enduring the escalating opportunity cost of missing out on the ideas that have been
blocked and people who have been disappeared.”59 In other words, an autocrat can either repress the
Internet or enjoy its full economic benefits, but not both. Whether the “dictator’s dilemma” actually exists remains unknown. There
are certainly clear individual instances where Internet repression has damaged a nation’s economy; Experts from the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) have estimated that Egypt’s five-day Internet shutdown cost the country at
least 90 million dollars, a figure that does not include e-commerce, tourism or other businesses that rely on Internet connectivity.60
But China seems to provide a powerful counterexample since it severely represses the Internet while enjoying extraordinarily high
rates of sustained economic growth. Indeed, China appears to have used its restrictive Internet practices to squeeze out international
competition and generate conditions where only domestic companies – ones that adhere to the government’s stringent censorship
and monitoring practices – can thrive. China’s largest domestic search engine, Baidu, exercises strict controls on content but has
thrived since Google pulled out of China in January 2010. China may be an outlier; the massive financial and human resources it
devotes to online control may not be replicable elsewhere. Other countries may be left with blunter forms of repression that degrade
both the Internet’s economic and political effects. In addition to the political and economic effects described above, new technologies
can accelerate each of them. Google’s Eric Schmidt and Jared Cohen have argued that faster computer power combined with the
“many to many” geometry of social media empowers individuals and groups at the expense of governments and that this, in turn,
increases the rate of change.61 Dissidents can identify one another, share information, organize and connect with leaders and with
external actors, all easier and faster than ever before.62 Indeed, one hallmark of the 2011 Arab Spring was the astonishing rate of
change as popular protests threatened or toppled governments that had been in power for decades in a matter of weeks.63 Again,
the local political context is critical. The medium may be global, but whether and how it enables individuals to foster democratic
change largely depends on a wide array of local variables, including opposition leadership, the existence of civil society institutions,
the willingness of the regime to crack down on dissident activity, and so forth. In Tunisia and Egypt for example, tens of thousands
of protestors responded to protest event pages on Facebook by taking to the streets. Yet in other Arab states, a call on Facebook for a
“day of rage” did not have the same pronounced influence. The degree of openness in the local political system, the discontent
among the population, the willingness of the government to use coercive means to stop democratic activism, the role of minorities
and other local factors all matter greatly. The Internet does not automatically promote democratization; Iran’s Twitter revolution led
to no reforms while Egypt’s Facebook revolution toppled the Mubarak regime. Furthermore, the technology itself is agnostic; the
same online tools that empower dissidents can aid dictators in their oppression. In the short run, at least, a freer
Internet
does not automatically translate into more liberal political systems. Yet some case
studies do demonstrate the Internet’s profound potential: that access to an
open Internet can help countries slide away from authoritarianism and
toward democracy. Events in Iran, Tunisia, Egypt and elsewhere suggest that the Internet and related technologies
(such as SMS) have indeed served as critical tools for organizing protests, spreading information among dissident parties and
transmitting images and information to the outside world – some of which moved onto satellite television channels, further boosting
their influence.64 And while experts
continue to argue about the precise effect, they tend to agree
that social media tools have made revolutions in the Middle East easier and speedier
than they would have otherwise been.65 Perhaps the most compelling link between a free
Internet and democratization is also the simplest: Both dissidents and dictatorships
abroad seem to believe that the Internet can have a transformative role, and they act on
that basis. Dictatorships expend enormous time and resources to clamp down on online activity, and more than 40 countries
actively censor the Internet or engage in other forms of significant Internet repression.66 Meanwhile, millions of individuals use
proxy servers and other circumvention and anonymity tools to evade censorship and monitoring. During the 2009 presidential
campaign in Iran, for example, both President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his opponent, Mir-Hussein Mousavi, cited the Internet
as a tool through which the liberal opposition could mobilize support.67 It is unlikely they were both wrong. While the effect of the
Internet will depend on local conditions, there are indeed reasonable grounds for believing that a free Internet can help empower
individuals to press for more liberal political systems.
Authoritarian rule in Arab societies oppress their people
Ghalioun, a professor of sociology at the Université de Paris III Sorbonne
University in Paris, 2004
(Burhan, The Persistence of Arab Authoritarianism, Journal of Democracy 15.4 (2004) 126-132)//NC
I should begin by saluting Alfred Stepan for steering clear (in his July 2003 essay in these pages) of the notion, widely broadcast in the Western media,
that Islam and Arab culture are incompatible with democracy. Having said that, I wish to make three remarks. The first is that "quantitative" analyses
founded on hard-to-evaluate concepts such as "competitive elections" do not seem pertinent to me, all the more so since the
authoritarianism of Arab regimes is a commonplace of numerous academic studies going back
more than twenty years. My second remark is that the notion of competitive elections reveals little of the cruel realities of the
oppression to which Arab societies have been subjected over the last three decades. In such
societies, the question of power relations cannot be broached in the absence of free elections. Beyond the issue of dictatorship
there is the complex problem of the almost complete rupture between
governments that answer to no one—political predators unrestrained by law or
morality—and those whom they govern, who find themselves reduced to a
state of cruel marginalization and indeed slavery. These oppressed citizenries
are denied the rights to express their opinions, to organize themselves
freely in civic associations, and to take part in the making of decisions that
affect their lives and futures. The sorts of regimes that today predominate in the Arab world have nothing in common with
the populist or nationalist regimes that inaugurated the postindependence era. Despite their authoritarian character, those populist regimes achieved
grand transformations upon the path of democratization and modernization. By eliminating the remnants of feudalism and aristocratic parasitism, by
distributing land to peasants, by founding national state structures and administrative services, and by pushing economic modernization, they
succeeded in gaining the trust and support of large sectors of the population, which saw in such regimes the stuff of emancipation and liberation. Their
newer
regimes enjoy no popular support. They serve only the interests of the clans who hold power, they
communicate in no way whatsoever with their citizenries, and they depend for their
survival solely upon coercion and multiple security services. These regimes go beyond
dictatorship; they put the state in the service of elites corrupted against the nation. Such an organization of power
presupposes and demands the dis-organization—which is to say the oppression—of
society. It is readily apparent that the problem here goes far beyond the absence of free elections. My third remark is that the question of despotic
authoritarianism was almost hidden by their popularity. This is not the case with the regimes that have replaced them. These
power is inseparable from the whole syndrome of sociopolitical ills that afflicts the Arab lands. The democratic deficit that troubles the bulk of these
countries is accompanied by a host of problems in other domains—economic, social, administrative, military, cultural, and educational. earing this in
mind, we must take into view the whole of the system. Perhaps what we are seeing are aspects of that system's crisis or indeed failure. Despotism
appears to be both a consequence of failure and the response favored by rulers faced with the resulting crisis—marked by weak or nonexistent economic
. The culture of
the elites cannot by itself explain the creation or evolution of these sociopolitical
systems, and still less can it explain the crisis that is their consequence and complement.
The failure of these systems—whether in their patriarchal, monarchist version as in
Saudi Arabia or their fascist, republican version as in the Ba'athist states—is the result of
the stagnation of power, meaning the lack of any turnover or renewal of elites. Shielded
from any contestation or even contestability, the existing powerholders of the Arab
world have turned into a kind of hereditary aristocracy. They act as if they are the
growth, the degradation of the political and social climate, the decline of educational systems, and moral and ideological ruin
legitimate proprietors of whole states, whose resources and even populations the rulers
may use according to their whims. This feudalization of modern states has come to such a pass that presidents and other high
officials...
America should embrace Internet Freedom, which will allow
them to help democratic parties to overtake authoritarian rule
Fontaine and Rogers, Fontaine is president of the Center for a New American
Security (CNAS) and worked on the National Security Council and Rogers worked
for the CNAS, 6/2011
(Richard and Will, “Internet Freedom: A Foreign Policy Imperative in the Digital Age”,
http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_InternetFreedom_FontaineRogers_
0.pdf , p. 5-7)//NC
America needs a comprehensive Internet freedom strategy, one that tilts the
balance in favor of those who would use the Internet to advance tolerance
and free expression, and away from those who would employ it for
repression or violence. This requires incorporating Internet freedom as an integral
element of American foreign policy. As recent events in the Middle East demonstrate, the Internet has emerged as
a major force in international affairs, one that will have lasting implications for the United States and the international community.
But new communications technologies are a double-edged sword. They
represent both a medium for
individuals to communicate, form groups and freely broadcast their ideas around the
world, and a tool that empowers authoritarian governments. U.S. policymakers should
better appreciate the complex role new communications technologies play in political
change abroad, and how those technologies intersect with the array of American foreign
policy objectives. Internet freedom typically includes two dimensions. Freedom of the
Internet denotes the freedoms of online expression, assembly and
association – the extension to cyberspace of rights that have been widely recognized to exist outside it. Promoting
freedom of the Internet merely expands to cyberspace a tradition of U.S.
diplomatic and financial support for human rights abroad. Freedom via the
Internet, the notion that new communications technologies aid the establishment of
democracy and liberal society offline, is at once more alluring and hotly contested. Internet freedom in this sense
has captured the imagination of many policymakers and experts who see in these technologies a tool for
individuals to help move their societies away from authoritarianism and
toward democracy. Though the links between democracy and Internet freedom are indirect and complex, nascent
evidence suggests that new communications tools do matter in political change, and that both dissidents and dictators act on that
basis. Most attention has focused on technologies that allow dissidents to penetrate restrictive firewalls and communicate securely.
But funding technology comprises just one aspect of America’s Internet freedom agenda. The
United States also
advocates international norms regarding freedom of speech and online
assembly and opposes attempts by autocratic governments to restrict
legitimate online activity. The private sector has a critical role to play in promoting Internet freedom, but, given
corporate interests in maximizing profits rather than promoting online freedom in repressive environments, efforts to expand its
role are difficult. Ethical debates, ranging from whether American companies should be permitted to sell repressive regimes key
technologies to the responsibilities of corporations in the face of an autocracies’ demand for information, remain unresolved. And
the other side of this coin – whether U.S. export controls should prohibit selling technologies that could be used to promote online
freedom – is often overlooked. To date, the U.S. government has shied away from articulating fully the motivations behind its
Internet freedom agenda. Administration
officials emphasize that their policy supports freedom
of the Internet, not freedom via the Internet, and that the Internet freedom agenda is
not part of a broader strategy to support democratic evolution. It should be. Admittedly,
promoting Internet freedom is complicated, and involves inherent tensions with other
U.S. foreign policy, economic and national security interests. This is particularly true in the area of
cyber security. Cyber security experts seek to secure the United States against cyber attacks,
for example, by pushing for greater online transparency and attribution, while Internet
freedom proponents urge greater online anonymity. While tensions between Internet freedom and cyber
security are real, and in some cases will force difficult choices, they should not prevent robust U.S. efforts to advance both. A robust
Internet freedom agenda should reflect the following eight principles: Principle 1: Embrace a Comprehensive Approach U.S.
policymakers should incorporate Internet freedom into their decision-making (especially on
cyber security and economic diplomacy issues); convene private sector professionals, export controls experts,
diplomats and others to explore new ways of promoting Internet freedom; and use
traditional diplomacy to promote Internet freedom. Principle 2: Build an International Coalition to
Promote Internet Freedom The U.S. government should convene a core group of democratic
governments to advocate Internet freedom in key international fora; urge governments to
encourage foreign companies to join the Global Network Initiative (GNI); and ensure that the Secretary of State gives her next major
address on Internet freedom in a foreign country, possibly in Europe alongside key European Union (EU) commissioners. Principle
3: Move Beyond Circumvention Technologies The
U.S. government should continue to fund
technologies other than firewall-evasion tools, including those that help dissidents
maintain digital security, ensure mobile access and reconstitute websites after a cyber
attack. The U.S. government should offer financial awards to foster technological innovation, require that any online tool
receiving U.S. funding be subjected to an independent security audit and expand the sources of technology funding to include
foreign governments, foundations and the private sector. Principle 4: Prioritize Training The State Department, along with the U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID), should continue to foster Internet freedom through targeted training programs,
including education on online safety. Principle 5: Lead the Effort to Build International Norms The
U.S. government
should promote a liberal concept of Internet freedom in all relevant fora, and reject
attempts by authoritarian states to promote norms that restrict freedoms of
information and expression online. It should also pursue an international
transparency initiative to encourage governments to publicize their policies on
restricting online information. Principle 6: Create Economic Incentives to Support Internet Freedom U.S. officials
should continue to articulate the economic case for Internet freedom, backed wherever possible by solid quantitative evidence, and
push for Internet censorship to be recognized as a trade barrier. Principle 7: Strengthen the Private Sector’s Role in Supporting
Internet Freedom Congress should adopt laws that prohibit American corporations from giving autocratic governments the private
data of dissidents when the request is clearly intended to quash legitimate freedom of expression, and that require companies to
periodically disclose requests it receives for such data to the U.S. government. U.S. officials should continue to urge companies to
join the GNI, but also encourage them to develop broad unilateral codes of conduct consistent with the GNI. They should also
publicly highlight specific business practices, both positive and negative. Principle 8: Reform Export Controls The
U.S.
government should relax controls on technologies that would permit greater online
freedom while protecting American national security, and educate companies on the precise nature of
export control restrictions so that companies do not overcomply and deny legal technologies to dissidents abroad. In addition, we
offer several recommendations for technology companies, including providing dissidents basic technical assistance to better use
built-in security functions for software and hardware; better informing users and the public about who may access the data they
control and under what conditions; increasing corporate transparency about foreign government requests; and
for increased Internet freedom.
advocating
XTN
O/V: Currently in the status quo the United States has an Internet Freedom agenda in
which they vouch for a free internet across the world, however, currently US
surveillance programs, such as Prism, are creating a bad perception throughout other
countries throughout the world. This perception is leading to an increase in data
localization, where other countries are attempting to isolate themselves and block any
outside connections to their internal network. Currently there is a global internet that
allows middle eastern activists to communicate with activists around the world and
spread their messages across their country to spark reform. If data is localized, it means
that authoritarian regimes will begin to crack down more on political movements within
countries in the Middle East and be able to completely eliminate these efforts. These
authoritarian regimes dehumanize the people within them and do not allow them to
have access to their basic human rights. Only by embracing Internet Freedom and
curtailing domestic surveillance can we begin to move towards more data globalization
to allow these movements to continue and grow
China Activism
Despite authoritarian restrictions, China still has the ability to
utilize Internet Freedom that allows them to create political
activism and anti-regime protests
Tang and Huhe, Both work at the Shanghai University of Finance and Economics,
2013
(Min and Narisong, Alternative framing: The effect of the Internet on political support
in authoritarian China, International Political Science Review 0(0) , Pg. 1-6)//NC
The recent democratic movements in the Middle East and North Africa have re-energised the longstanding debate over the
democratic potential of the Internet in an authoritarian environment (Farrell, 2012; Howard and Muzammil, 2011; Lynch, 2011;
Tufekci and Wilson, 2012). The evident role of the Internet and its associated social media in the protests of the Arab Spring has
strengthened the belief that digital media can help bring down the remaining authoritarian regimes. However, later developments in
countries such as China, Singapore, Cuba and Iran suggest that the Internet is still effectively controlled by authoritarian
governments and is unable to facilitate any significant political upheavals. Many authoritarian regimes even reacted to the Arab
Spring by fine-tuning and reinforcing their censorship programmes. This contradictory picture of the role of the Internet raises
questions about the Internet’s independent role in authoritarian countries. Is the Internet merely a tool that can benefit both
ordinary citizens and authoritarian states? What is the effect of the Internet in places where there are no Internet-facilitated political
protests? We address these questions by turning attention
to the micro-process through which the daily
use of the Internet changes individuals’ view towards the authoritarian state. In particular, we
argue that ‘alternative framing’, facilitated by the diffusion of the Internet, can strongly affect popular support for an authoritarian
regime. Framing refers to a process of selecting ‘some aspects of a perceived reality and mak[ing] them more salient in a
communicating text’ (Entman, 1993: 52). Compared with framing of the traditional media, a distinctive feature of Internet framing
is the active role of web users in framing news events. Through online comments, blog posts, forum discussions and other
interactive features
of the Internet, dissident opinion leaders and, more often, ordinary web
users have gained venues to express their views on news events and issues. The interpretations
and perspectives expressed by web users often construct social realities in directions that are different from or even opposite to the
ones propagandised by the authoritarian state. This
democratic nature of Internet framing
entails particularly important implications in authoritarian countries such
as China, where overt news reporting is strictly monitored and media framing has traditionally been dominated by the state.
To examine empirically the effect of alternative framing, we conducted a laboratory experiment in a major Chinese university. The
news of China’s recent space programme was chosen to present different frames. While the government framed the space
programme as the manifestation of the nation’s technological advancement and the righteousness of the party’s leadership, a
significant portion of the Internet discussion framed the event as a ‘performance project’ aimed at boosting the regime’s legitimacy
and, more importantly, a misuse of resources that could otherwise have been used to improve the well-being of ordinary citizens.
The experimental results show that exposure to the alternative framing embodied in Internet discussions significantly reduces the
level of participants’ support for the space programme policy and their evaluation of government performance in improving citizens’
well-being. The contribution of this study is twofold. First, it constitutes one of the first attempts to theoretically specify and
empirically test the mechanism through which the Internet influences political attitudes in an authoritarian environment. It offers
empirical support for the independent role of the Internet and suggests that the Internet
is not merely a tool for political activists to organise collective actions or for the state to
consolidate authoritarian rule but, rather, an independent causal factor that generates the makeover of the public’s mindset. Second,
this study bridges the study of the Internet with framing studies in the traditional media. On the one hand, it builds on an
established paradigm of traditional media research to understand the Internet effect. On the other hand, it adds a new dimension to
traditional issue framing by emphasising that the online framing process has been strongly shaped by the emergence of large
numbers of active web users. Literature review: The Internet effect in authoritarian countries The conventional optimism about the
effect of the Internet in authoritarian countries is built mainly upon three tenets (Diamond, 2010; Howard, 2010; Shirky, 2011;
Zheng and Wu, 2005). First, it is believed that the expanded
access to alternative information
offered by the Internet challenges the information control of authoritarian
regimes. The corruption of power, brutality and social injustice can easily
be exposed on the Internet due to its anonymity, fast speed and low cost of
communication (Best and Wade, 2009: 256; Diamond, 2010: 76). Second, digital information
technology is praised for facilitating anti-regime political movements (Chase and
Mulvenon, 2002; Lynch, 2011: 304–306; Shirky, 2009). It has been documented that political activists have
used the Internet to disseminate information, mobilise forces for change
and organise actions in a number of protests (Chowdhury, 2008; Diamond, 2010: 79; McFaul,
2005; Rheingold, 2002), which was notably manifested in the Arab Spring (Lotan et al., 2011). Finally, the Internet can foster the
development of civil society by pluralising the flow of information, widening and intensifying public deliberation, promoting
alternative channels of social interaction, and facilitating networking among activists (Diamond, 2010: 71–72; Hill and Sen, 2000;
Lynch, 2011: 306–307; Mercer, 2004; Murphy, 2009; Yang, G, 2003). Many other scholars, however, question such utopian views of
the Internet. Their scepticism stems mainly from the success of governmental control over the Internet. Through sophisticated
regulation and censorship, the people of China, along with those of Vietnam, Cuba, Iran and Singapore, have not received the benefit
of the democratising effects of the Internet (Boas, 2006; Harwit and Clark, 2001; Kalathil and Boas, 2001, 2003; Rodan, 1998;
Taubman, 1998). By employing technological and institutional means, these authoritarian regimes have managed to use the growth
of the Internet to help economic development, technology innovation and globalisation and, at the same time, to reduce its harmful
political effects (Bueno de Mesquita and Downs, 2005; Morozov, 2011). Researchers have argued that, particularly in China, by
controlling the technological infrastructure, co-opting private Internet companies, documenting the ‘real-name’ access and
developing sophisticated censorship systems, the regime has imposed a close grip on cyberspace and has successfully transformed
itself into a ‘networked authoritarianism’ (Hachigian, 2001; Harwit and Clark, 2001; Hassid, 2008; Hung, 2010). The current debate
over the potential of the Internet in authoritarian countries focuses primarily on the ‘revolutionary’ role of the Internet in
contentious politics and, specifically, its contribution to protests, large-scale upheavals and dramatic cases of regime change (Lynch,
2011: 307; Shirky, 2011: 30). It must be borne in mind, however, that the Internet produces ‘change over years and decades, not
weeks or months’ (Shirky, 2011: 30) by eroding the ability of states to monopolise information and arguments and by exacerbating
people’s ‘dissatisfaction with matters of economics or day-to-day governance’ of the state (Lynch, 2011: 5). Inadequate scholarly
effort, unfortunately, has been spent on theoretically explaining or empirically testing how daily consumption of the Internet can
influence one’s views towards the authoritarian regime in an environment in which digital information is severely filtered and
censored. As pointed out by Farrell (2012: 38), the question of whether the Internet contributes to democracy is unanswerable
because it ‘proposes no specific theory as to the connection’ between the Internet and a political outcome. In fact, the number of
quantitative studies on this topic is very limited. This study explores the causal mechanism of the Internet’s effect on attitudinal
change at the individual level by using China as a critical case. Such an empirical test of the micro-process of the Internet effect can
help disentangle the causal effects of the Internet and provide empirical support for arguments in regard to the political contribution
of the Internet. Specifically, this study argues that even
if there is tight state control over the
access to deviant information, exposure to online discussions of sanctioned
information can still undermine people’s support of the government, and one of
the key mechanisms of this undermining effect is user-generated alternative framing. Issue framing and the Internet Issue framing
has been regarded as an important mechanism through which the traditional media affects public attitudes. Frames refer to the
modes of presentation and interpretation that construct social realities. Media framing works by either presenting logically
equivalent content differently, casting it in a negative or positive light, or selecting some parts of a news item and making them
salient, while ignoring or downplaying other parts (Lecheler and De Vreese, 2011: 961). Media framing involves ‘problem definition,
causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation’ (Entman, 1993: 52). Framing is critical to shaping
people’s political attitudes because it helps individuals make sense of an otherwise meaningless succession of events (Goffman, 1974;
Iyengar, 1991; Kinder and Sanders, 1990; Lecheler and De Vreese, 2011; Nelson et al., 1997; Slothuus, 2008). The news information
on the Internet also contains frames, and some media researchers have examined the framing effect of the Internet (Coleman and
Hall, 2001; Kopacz, 2008; Song, 2007; Xenos and Foot, 2005; Zhou and Moy, 2007; Zillmann et al., 2004). Zillmann et al. (2004),
for instance, argue that compared with traditional media users, Internet magazine viewers have greater freedom to select articles to
read and thus demonstrate a stronger selective-exposure effect of news frames. Kopacz (2008) notes that the Internet provides
candidates with unparalleled opportunities to discuss their issue stances and enables them to escape the traditional filtering by news
reporters and pundits in the conventional media. However, an important aspect of Internet framing – the active role of Internet
users in framing news events – has not received adequate attention. What makes the Internet distinctive is the change in the relative
position of journalists and the audience in constructing news, including frame building. In the traditional media, the role of media
users is very limited due to the prohibitive costs of message delivery and the restrictions imposed by government regulations.
Accordingly, frame researchers have focused mainly on the influence of internal factors, such as journalists’ political orientation,
professional values and organisational constraints (Zhou and Moy, 2007: 81). The rise of the Internet has tremendously increased
the opportunities and the capacities of the public to participate in frame building. Compared with the traditional media, web-based
communication is decentralised. Web users can actively contribute to both information dissemination and issue framing. Through
blogging, commenting, discussing and other means, almost any individual or organisation that has Internet access can discuss
political or policy issues, publicise their thoughts, and promote their ideas, and thus contribute to the framing of news events and
issues. The one-way asymmetric model of traditional communication has been changed to a dialogical type of journalism, through
which news production becomes a collective endeavour (Benkler, 2006; Lowrey and Anderson, 2005; Mitchelstein and Boczkowski,
2009: 573). The meanings and values developed through online discourse and attached to news events by web users are alternatives
to those presented by journalists, politicians and organisations. Internet
framing in China
Accompanied by rapid market reform, the mass media in China have experienced a great deal of change
in recent decades. In terms of the structure of the market, the official media are no longer the only information source.
Commercialisation has led to the growth of a number of media outlets that
are not bankrolled by the government (Tang and Iyengar, 2011; Thomas and Nain, 2005). In terms of
news content, stories about the negative side of society, like corruption, poverty
and violation of norms, and political uprisings in other authoritarian countries have often come to
be seen in TV programmes and newspapers (Hassid, 2008; Shirk, 2010; Stockmann, 2011). However, although the
commercialisation of the traditional media contributes to offering alternative information for the public, it has not yet transformed
the overall pro-regime effect of the media in China. In fact, recent studies of the media effect have consistently revealed that media
consumption is significantly associated with higher levels of political support for the system and its political institutions (Kennedy,
2009; Stockmann and Gallagher, 2011; Tang, 2005; Yang and Tang, 2010). This is largely due to the fact that the official media can
still be effectively controlled by the state. As scholars of the Chinese media have observed, even when some commercial media
outlets do dare to challenge the official directions on major issues, the state is able to quickly step in and steer the deviant reporting
back to the official line (Stockmann, 2011). Compared with the tools of the traditional media, the Internet proves far more difficult to
control given the sheer number of users and their activities on the web. In particular, in this study, we stress that the interactive
features of the Internet enable users to participate in news making by framing social political issues as they prefer. This userparticipated framing entails especially important implications in China, where, among the traditional media, competing frames of
news events were limited or non-existent before the rise of the Internet. First, user-generated frames on the Internet constitute the
most viable, if not the only, alternatives to the official frames provided by the state propaganda machinery. Under the traditional
media environment in China, the authoritarian regime monopolised not only the supply of news information, but also the framing of
information. The regime has attempted to control the interpretation of important events and sensitive issues through reinforcing the
journalists’ mouthpiece role in frame building and/or directly interrupting the deviant framing processes of media coverage (Zhou
and Moy, 2007: 84). As a result, news frames used by Chinese journalists have largely been consistent with the official line (Chang et
al., 1998; Luther and Zhou, 2005; Pan et al., 1999; Yang, J, 2003). The
rise of the Internet enables
ordinary citizens to act as the agents of framing in news making for the first
time in China. With all the interactive features of the Internet, active web users have gained the
most effective platforms to publicise their own understandings of the nature of events
and issues, interpretations of the cause or the consequences of social happenings, evaluations of institutions or politicians, and the
solutions they prefer. At the very least, this means that in the new media environment in China, not only news facts, but also news
frames, no longer have to come from journalists or their political overlords. Ordinary web viewers, on an unprecedentedly large
scale, are exposed to those interpretations and views that are not fabricated by propaganda agencies of the state. Second, the
alternative frames that emerge from online discourse are often different from or opposite to the intention of the authoritarian state.
This is due to the lack of ways to express alternatives through formal institutional approaches or through traditional media outlets.
Overall, in
China’s cyberspace, the tone of discussion forums tends to be negative and even cynical; the
content of discussion often quickly moves from specific news events to
general problems in the political, economic and legal systems (Herold and Marolt,
2011; Sullivan, 2012; Tang and Yang, 2011; Yang, 2009; Zhou, 2009). Either promoted by online activists or
generated through spontaneous and grassroots deliberation, a few counterofficial frames can be identified in online discourse in contemporary China. For
instance, while the official media report a crime that involves officials as a judicial case, netizens tend to frame it as a case about the
abuse of power and social injustice. While the state media characterise the corruption of government officials as an isolated case and
attribute it to a lack of oversight and self-discipline, dissenting individuals on the web associate it with the undemocratic nature of a
political system that lacks checks and balances. Third, the
importance of such alternative framing on the
Internet is further augmented by the fact that the access to alternative information
sources is limited by the control of the Chinese state and the self-censorship of websites.
As widely noted, the Internet in China is severely censored (Boas, 2006; Kalathil and Boas, 2003; Rodan, 1998; Taubman, 1998).
However, the
focus of state control is on limiting the chance of citizens to have access to the
news facts, especially those deemed harmful for regime stability, not on limiting the
interpretations of seemingly safe facts. The government’s ban on online discussions has
targeted mostly sensitive topics, such as the Tiananmen Square protest, Jasmine
Revolution and power struggles of top leaders. A recent comprehensive survey of social media websites in
China conducted by King et al. (2012) confirms this pattern and shows that negative, even vitriolic,
criticism of the state, political elites and public policies is allowed on the web as long as
it has no potential for collective action (Sullivan, 2012; Tang and Yang, 2011; Yang, 2009). Online discussion of
sanctioned issues or seemingly safe topics, however, can go as rogue as do subversive news facts. A case in point is the heated online
discussion triggered by the death of Steve Jobs, the former Chief Executive Officer of Apple Inc. One line of discussion asks why
China does not have an innovator like Steve Jobs. A general theme that emerged from this discussion is that although China is not
short of intelligent minds, there are too many restrictions and interventions, many of which are politically relevant, for these minds
to emerge as a force. The government is blamed for its part in providing education that does not value critical thinking,
monopolising economic resources into the hands of a few with connections and failing to protect property rights and encourage
innovation. A widely shared blog post states, ‘If Apple is a fruit in a tree, its branches are the freedom of thinking and to create, and
the root is the constitutional democracy.’ Such examples are abundant in China’s cyberspace. Due to alternative framing enabled by
the Internet, in a country where politics is supposed to be a taboo, everything can become politically relevant. As long as websites
allow features such as the ability to post comments or to blog, active web users have an opportunity to voice their dissident views,
and ordinary web viewers have an opportunity to come across these alternative views. While Chinese rulers may have been
successful in reducing the amount of subversive news facts on the web, they are still exposed to the challenges posed by the
alternative framing of Internet information.
China is violating human rights in the Squo
Human Rights Watch 2014 (World Report: China, Human Rights Watch,
http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2014/country-chapters/china)//NC
The government censors the press, the Internet, print publications, and
academic research, and justifies human rights abuses as necessary to
preserve “social stability.” It carries out involuntary population relocation
and rehousing on a massive scale, and enforces highly repressive policies in
ethnic minority areas in Tibet, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia. Though primary
school enrollment and basic literacy rates are high, China’s education system
discriminates against children and young people with disabilities. The
government obstructs domestic and international scrutiny of its human rights record,
insisting it is an attempt to destabilize the country. At the same time, citizens are
increasingly prepared to challenge authorities over volatile livelihood issues, such as
land seizures, forced evictions, environmental degradation, miscarriages of justice,
abuse of power by corrupt cadres, discrimination, and economic inequality. Official
and scholarly statistics, based on law enforcement reports, suggest there are
300-500 protests each day, with anywhere from ten to tens of thousands of
participants. Despite the risks, Internet users and reform-oriented media are
aggressively pushing censorship boundaries by advocating for the rule of law and
transparency, exposing official wrongdoing, and calling for political reforms. Civil
society groups and advocates continue to slowly expand their work despite their
precarious status, and an informal but resilient network of activists monitors and
documents human rights cases as a loose national “weiquan” (rights defense)
movement. These activists endure police monitoring, detention, arrest,
enforced disappearance, and torture. The Xi Jinping administration formally
assumed power in March, and proposed several reforms to longstanding policies,
including abolishing one form of arbitrary detention, known as re-education through
labor (RTL), and changes to the household registration system. It staged high-profile
corruption investigations, mostly targeting political rivals. But it also struck a
conservative tone, opposing constitutional rule, press freedom, and “western-style” rule
of law, and issuing harsher restrictions on dissent, including through two legal
documents making it easier to bring criminal charges against activists and Internet
critics. Bo Xilai, once a rising political star, was sentenced to life imprisonment in
September after a show trial that captured public attention but fell short of fair trial
standards and failed to address widespread abuses of power committed during his
tenure in Chongqing. Human Rights Defenders China’s human rights activists
often face imprisonment, detention, torture, commitment to psychiatric
facilities, house arrest, and intimidation. One of the most severe
crackdowns on these individuals in recent years occurred in 2013, with more
than 50 activists put under criminal detention between February and October.
Human rights defenders are detained for ill-defined crimes ranging from
“creating disturbances” to “inciting subversion” for organizing and
participating in public, collective actions. In July, authorities detained Xu
Zhiyong, who is considered an intellectual leader of the New Citizens Movement, a loose
network of civil rights activists whose efforts include a nationwide campaign that calls
on public officials to disclose their assets. In September, Beijing-based activist Cao
Shunli was detained after she was barred from boarding a flight to Geneva
ahead of the United Nations Human Rights Council (HRC) review of China
on October 22. Cao is known for pressing the Chinese government to include
independent civil society input into the drafting of China’s report to the HRC under a
mechanism called Universal Periodic Review (UPR). Another activist, Peng Lanlan, was
released in August after she spent one year in prison for “obstructing official business”
for her role in the campaign. Nobel Peace Prize winner Liu Xiaobo continues his 11-year
jail term in northern Liaoning province. His wife Liu Xia continues to be subjected to
unlawful house arrest. In August, Liu Xiaobo’s brother-in-law, Liu Hui, was given an 11year sentence on fraud charges; it is widely believed the heavy sentence is part of
broader effort to punish Liu Xiaobo’s family. Legal ReformsWhile the government
rejects judicial independence and prohibits independent bar associations, progressive
lawyers and legal scholars continue to be a force for change, contributing to increasing
popular legal awareness and activism. The Chinese Communist Party maintains
authority over all judicial institutions and coordinates the judiciary’s work through its
political and legal committees. The Public Security Bureau, or police, remains the most
powerful actor in the criminal justice system. Use of torture to extract confessions
is prevalent, and miscarriages of justice are frequent due to weak courts
and tight limits on the rights of the defense. In November, the government
announced its intention to abolish re-education through labor (RTL), a form of arbitrary
detention in which the police can detain people for up to four years without trial. There
were about 160,000 people in about 350 camps at the beginning of the year, but
numbers dwindled rapidly as the police stopped sending people to RTL. The official
press, however, reported that some of these facilities were being converted to drug
rehabilitation centers, another form of administrative detention. At time of writing it
was unclear whether the government would fully abolish administrative detention as a
way to deal with minor offenders, or whether it would instead establish a replacement
system that continued to allow detention without trial. China continues to lead the
world in executions. The exact number remains a state secret, but experts estimate it has
decreased progressively from about 10,000 per year a decade ago to less than 4,000 in
recent years.
XTN
China continues to oppress civilian rights
Shu, is a former columnist for the Chinese newspaper Southern Weekly and
the Chinese magazine Yanhuang Chunqiu, 13
(Xiao, China's veil of Civil Rights oppression,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/27/opinion/chinas-veil-of-civil-rightsoppression.html?_r=0)//NC
TAIPEI, TAIWAN The Third Plenum, a gathering of Chinese Communist Party leaders
to set economic policy, ended this month with a raft of economic and social reforms that
were praised by Western observers: giving the market a greater hand in setting prices,
relaxing the one-child policy, strengthening land rights and shoring up the social safety
net. But as far as I’m concerned, the party’s itinerary and timeline for so called
reform are no cause for optimism, because China’s leaders did very little to
bolster rule of law and the rights of ordinary citizens. To the contrary, the
economic reforms may serve as a convenient distraction from the appalling crackdown
on three advocates of civil rights — the legal reformers Xu Zhiyong and Guo Feixiong
and the entrepreneur Wang Gongquan, all participants in the New Citizens’ Movement,
a campaign for civil and human rights — who have been detained since the summer.
Criminal investigations against them are proceeding, and all three men are likely to
receive heavy sentences. Mr. Xu, whose activism helped bring an end to the abusive and
arbitrary detentions of urban migrants without residency permits in 2003, and Mr. Guo,
who helped villagers in Guangdong Province organize a recall election against a corrupt
village chief in 2005, helped initiate this movement. Mr. Wang, who made a fortune in
real estate and technology, financed and supported the movement. The arrests of the
three men, an obvious attempt to decapitate the movement, was preceded by
the arrest of more than 20 rank-and-file members. Unlike the usual silence greeting the
arrest of dissidents, this crackdown has caused many prominent establishment figures
to step forward in protest, and even the risk-averse state media have followed the story
closely. The government’s ruthlessness sent a signal that the authorities will
not tolerate public pressure or any form of opposition — even as moderate and
law-abiding as that of the New Citizens’ Movement. The movement does not aspire to
political power and does not advocate hostile confrontation. It holds that reform is a
multifaceted and gradual process that involves the transformation of society, the
development of autonomous nongovernmental organizations, and the protection of
basic human and civil rights. The movement’s efforts began in 2010 with the signing of a
citizens’ pledge of collective action. It successfully petitioned educational authorities to
allow the children of rural migrants to take the national college entrance exam for
university seats. Last year, the group campaigned for disclosure of government officials’
assets, and promoted dinner gatherings across a dozen cities to discuss civic affairs.
Earlier this year, the movement collected signatures for an appeal to the National
People’s Congress to ratify international human rights conventions. The New Citizens’
Movement operates entirely within the bounds of China’s Constitution and laws, and the
mainstream of society. The movement has no interest in seizing, much less
overthrowing, the government, but rather in creating an environment in which power is
constrained through constitutional government and civil society. This middle road seeks
to transcend the traditional alternatives of passive reform and tumultuous revolution,
and to forgo petty antagonistic politics for a broad-minded politics that addresses the
concerns of ordinary citizens. It draws on gradualist theories of political change, like
Karl Popper’s concept of ‘‘piecemeal social engineering’’ and John Dewey’s model of
democratic experimentation, rather than grand utopian project of overnight solutions.
Its goal is a society in which citizens can associate on the basis of their views, not their
class position or their place in the political system. The Internet, and especially
microblogging platforms, have raised the consciousness of millions of Chinese
who, having met their material needs, are looking for the opportunity to shape
their country’s future. Many of the participants in this ‘‘intermediate society’’ are
professionals who spurn the ideological trappings of class struggle; they want
change, but in an orderly and civilized way, from the ground up. Mr. Wang has
described this movement as ‘‘constructive opposition.’’ Yet this reasoned, moderate
movement has drawn intolerance and hostility from Beijing. As the Third Plenum
shows, the government only wants change on its own timetable, and in accordance with
its needs. Ordinary citizens are sidelined. China’s leaders have declared that ‘‘special
interests’’ are the greatest obstacle to reform, but an even greater problem is the
party elite’s lust to maintain its power, and its terror of a public that wants to help
determine its future. The price of this resistance is steep. Mr. Wang recently celebrated
his 52nd birthday behind bars. When Mr. Xu was arrested, more than four months ago,
his wife was pregnant, and he will almost certainly not be able to see the birth of his
child. Mr. Guo has been detained for the fourth time, and his wife and children have
taken refuge in the United States. Even so, these activists remain unbowed; for all
their moderation, they do not lack courage or tenaciousness, and no
amount of brutality will make them give up their pursuit of a civilized
society as both an end and a means. Can the Chinese government afford complacency
in the face of their quiet activism? How can the so-called reforms succeed if the
government continues to defy the Chinese people’s growing demands for dignity and
justice?
O/V: Currently in the status quo the United States has an Internet Freedom agenda in
which they vouch for a free internet across the world, however, currently US
surveillance programs, such as Prism, are creating a bad perception throughout other
countries throughout the world. This perception is leading to an increase in data
localization, where other countries are attempting to isolate themselves and block any
outside connections to their internal network. In China, there are increased movements
under a globalized data source Chinese political activists are still able to get around
strict Chinese regulations and voice their message. However, if data becomes localized
the Chinese government will crack down and shut down these political activists. The
Chinese have always abused the human rights of their people and they often allow little
things to improve to allow a greater grip on their people. Only with Internet Freedom
can the Chinese political activists continue to object to these human rights violations of
the Chinese gov.
Woman NGO’s
Information and Community Technologies (ICTs) offered within
Internet Freedom will allow Women to empower themselves and
create movements
Bonder, is an Argentine researcher and gender activist and she founded the
Center for Women's Studies (CEM) and coordinator of the International
Working Group on Women and ICT field of the United Nations, November
2002
(Gloria, “From access to appropriation: Women and ICT policies in Latin American and
the Caribbean” http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/egm/ict2002/reports/PaperGBonder.PDF pg. 7-10)//NC
For the preparation of this document, an electronic consultation was carried out among Latin American researchers, educators and
activists involved in projects on / with women / gender and ICT11 . 12 We wanted to learn more about the current situation of
women/ gender and ICTs in the Region, identify new experiences in practice, recognize their needs and demands and consider the
strategic orientations they propose for increasing and strengthening gender fair projects and policies. ¸ All of them show high
appraisal of
the opportunities that ICTs offer to women as a means of
exchanging information, and building and participating in national,
regional and international networks. ¸ According to some of them, the use of ICTs has
brought about a spectacular progress in terms of organization, articulation of
demands, legitimacy, knowledge building , and creation of alliances among
women NGOs over the last decade. ¸ They highlighted the coordination of women NGOs around the preparation for World
Conferences such as the ones in Beijing, Durban and the Social Forum in Porto Alegre; their follow-up as well as the
continuous actions of advocacy and networking around significant topics such as
poverty, sexual and reproductive health, women’s rights, etc. at national and regional
levels. Experiences like community telecenters13 (http://www.tele-centros.org/) thoroughly spread in almost all Latin American
countries14 were presented as positive examples of democratization of the Internet, motivation
for women participation and leadership in these areas, stimulation of the
social uses of the Internet, and active and informed inclusion of
marginalized sectors. Together with community radio stations, telecenters have become important resources for
building a sense of community identity and increasing citizen consciousness
and participation in defense of people’s rights and interests. The use of the Internet by
rural and indigenous groups and communities for the commercialization of handmade products and other experiences aimed to
revalue and disseminating their original cultures were mentioned as relevant achievements. 15 16 The work carried out by APC in the
Region and the GEM17 project in particular were seen as an important step forward in order to produce knowledge on projects in
progress, learn about “goods practices” and thus improve the planning, implementation and evaluation of new projects. ¸ From the
political-institutional point of view, the Brazilian participants highlighted the value of associative projects between NGOs and the
government in the creation of telecenters and other related projects. As an example they mentioned the cooperation between the
government of San Pablo and RITS18 who manage over 100 free and public access telecenters in that city, from which they are
beginning to produce content for ICT educational projects in communities with high level of violence. ¸ While most of them admit
that transnational corporations and their economic interests are the most powerful factors affecting the creation and spreading of
the new technologies, they insist on the fact that Latin American social
movements and women NGOs in
particular are starting to appropriate ICTs for participatory and organizational purposes.
In doing so they are generating a new political culture along with alternative content
on the web. “Today, social movements, groups and individuals publish thousands of bulletins, dossiers, documents,
newsletters, magazines and even newspapers on the Internet. People who may not be able to print their newsletter or magazine are
able to post it on the web, and most of these publications have become good alternatives sources of information to the mainstream
media. In addition, there are independent and community radio stations broadcasting on the web and TV initiatives that use the web
casting to transmit their images and information” 19 ¸ In their view the prevailing problems are: 1. Lack of statistical information
and qualitative research on women and ICTs and on gender differences in access, uses and production of these technologies. 2.
Persistence of connectivity problems due to lack of infrastructure , high costs of equipment and telecommunications, concentration
of resources in urban centers and economic and educational shortcomings of the most marginal populations, and particularly
women. 3. Lack of acknowledgement on the part of governments of gender inequities in all the social areas and particularly in the
technological and scientific fields, and the consequent absence of gender fair public policies. 4. Need to advance, both at the
theoretical and at the strategic levels, from the initial focus on access to the technologies on the part of women, toward the creation
of conditions and resources that favor their appropriation of this tool to meet their needs and those of their communities. 5. Concern
for the penetration of values, models and aspirations representing an hegemonic cultural model which excludes the cultural diversity
of LAC. 6. Concern for the lack of awareness and still weak commitment of the women’s movement and NGOs in the struggle for
ICTs as a fundamental tool for political and cultural transformation. It is widely admitted that the ICT field is one of last areas
influenced by a gender perspective, which explains that gender activists, researchers and educators involved in this field are still very
few and they have not yet achieved a coordination of efforts that enables a stronger incidence on national and regional policies. 7.
Educational programs fostering the use of ICTs among women, particularly girls and young women, are highly instrumental and not
gender sensitive. There is a need to develop educational projects that stimulate critical and creative skills and that encourage greater
participation of women in the design and production of new technologies. 8. Difficulties in order to efficiently administer the
immense flow of information that the Internet offers. This requires an educational and cultural capital that many women lack, and
that cannot be provided through mere access to computers. Intelligent and selective connection demands much more time than
women usually have due to their family and work duties. “It is a third -or even a fourth- work day.” 9. Certain resistance on the part
of women and NGOs to the use of technological tools other than the e-mail. The lack of infrastructure and technological skills, along
with other educational and cultural factors, are preventing women from becoming producers of new contents and of formats that are
attractive and powerful from the communicational point of view. “I believe that women organizations could develop more interactive
sites rather than just electronic ones, as is the case of most of the NGOs websites" Recommended Strategies 1. To consider
ICTs as an essential tool for increasing gender equality while actively
engaging in fostering social and economic development in LAC. 2. To focus the debate
and the political activism in/for ICTs within a frame of human rights and human
development. For many participants, women involvement in programs and policies would
gain force, impact and social relevance if they associated ICTs with the
struggle against poverty, unemployment, violence, racism, discrimination
and the consolidation of democracy and economic growth. 3. To motivate, through educational
programs and other means, women appropriation of ICTs towards increasing their citizen
identity and their active participation in the political and economic life of their
communities. “Women are understanding that in the current informatic society, quick access to relevant information is
essential for an effective intervention, in order to participate in the decisions, propose viable alternatives and establish priorities,
with the purpose of influencing the different spheres of their society.” 20 4. To establish alliances between government, civil society,
business and international organisms to implement effective and sustainable ICT policies and programs that contribute to gender
equality and social equity. 5. To sensitize women in political positions, both in the executive and in parliament, on the gender
dimensions of the new technologies so that they support laws , regulations and projects that address women needs and avoid sexist
biases
Another impact of loss of women’s movements: This patriarchal
orientation causes extinction through environmental
degradation, mass violence and war
Warren and Cady 94—Warren is the Chair of the Philosophy Department at Macalester College and Cady is Professor
of Philosophy at Hamline University (Karen and Duane, “Feminism and Peace: Seeing Connections”, p. 16, JSTOR,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3810167.pdf)
Operationalized, the evidence of patriarchy as a dysfunctional system is found in the behaviors to which it gives rise, (c), and the
unmanageability, (d), which results. For example,
in the United States, current estimates are that one out of every
three or four women will be raped by someone she knows; globally, rape, sexual
harassment, spouse-beating, and sado-masochistic pornography are examples of
behaviors practiced, sanctioned, or tolerated within patriarchy. In the realm of environmentally
destructive behaviors, strip-mining, factory farming, and pollution of the air, water, and soil are
instances of behaviors maintained and sanctioned within patriarchy. They, too, rest on
the faulty beliefs that it is okay to "rape the earth," that it is "man's God-given right" to
have dominion (that is, domination) over the earth, that nature has only instrumental value, that
environmental destruction is the acceptable price we pay for "progress."And the presumption of warism, that war is a natural,
righteous, and ordinary way to impose dominion on a people or nation, goes hand in hand with patriarchy and leads to dysfunctional
behaviors of nations and ultimately to international unmanageability. Much
of the current" unmanageability" of
contemporary life in patriarchal societies, (d), is then viewed as a consequence of a
patriarchal preoccupation with activities, events, and experiences that reflect historically
male-gender identified beliefs, values, attitudes, and assumptions. Included among
these real-life consequences are precisely those concerns with nuclear proliferation,
war, environmental destruction, and violence toward women, which many
feminists see as the logical outgrowth of patriarchal thinking. In fact, it is often only through observing
these dysfunctional behaviors-the symptoms of dysfunctionality that one can truly see that and how patriarchy serves to maintain
and perpetuate them. When patriarchy is understood as a dysfunctional system, this "unmanageability" can be seen for what it is-as
a predictable and thus logical consequence of patriarchy.'1 The theme that global environmental crises, war, and violence generally
are predictable and logical consequences of sexism and patriarchal culture is pervasive in ecofeminist literature (see Russell 1989,
2). Ecofeminist Charlene Spretnak, for instance, argues that "militarism
and warfare are continual features
of a patriarchal society because they reflect and instill patriarchal values and fulfill
needs of such a system. Acknowledging the context of patriarchal conceptualizations that feed militarism is a first step
toward reducing their impact and preserving life on Earth" (Spretnak 1989, 54). Stated in terms of the foregoing model of patriarchy
as a dysfunctional social system, the claims by Spretnak and other feminists take on a clearer meaning:
Patriarchal
conceptual frameworks legitimate impaired thinking (about women, national and
regional conflict, the environment) which is manifested in behaviors which, if
continued, will make life on earth difficult, if not impossible. It is a stark message, but it is
plausible. Its plausibility lies in understanding the conceptual roots of various woman-nature-peace connections in regional,
national, and global contexts.
XTN
O/V: Currently in the status quo the United States has an Internet Freedom agenda in
which they vouch for a free internet across the world, however, currently US
surveillance programs, such as Prism, are creating a bad perception throughout other
countries throughout the world. This perception is leading to an increase in data
localization, where other countries are attempting to isolate themselves and block any
outside connections to their internal network. Currently women, even in developing
countries, are making use of the internet and communication technologies to be able to
spread ideas to rebel against patriarchal customs as well as spread their ideas to other
women to create different movements. To counter (insert impact), there needs to be
globalized data for these women to access information and have increased movements.
This subordination of women amounts to a war against those
who are subjected to gendered violence – their refusal to
acknowledge this as a war is a link
Ray, US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, 2-1997 [Amy, American University Law Review]
Because, as currently constructed, human rights laws can reach only individual perpetrators during times
of war, one alternative is to reconsider our understanding of what constitutes "war" and what constitutes
"peace." <=265> n264 When it is universally true that no matter where in the world a woman lives or with
what culture she identifies, she is at grave risk of being beaten, imprisoned, enslaved, raped, prostituted,
physically tortured, and murdered simply because she is a woman, the term "peace" does not describe
her existence. <=266> n265 In addition to being persecuted for being a woman, many women also are
persecuted on ethnic, racial, religious, sexual orientation, or other grounds. Therefore, it is crucial that our
re-conceptualization of [*837] human rights is not limited to violations based on gender. <=267> n266
Rather, our definitions of "war" and "peace" in the context of all of the world's persecuted groups should
be questioned. Nevertheless, in every culture a common risk factor is being a woman, and to describe the
conditions of our lives as "peace" is to deny the effect of sexual terrorism on all women. <=268> n267
Because we are socialized to think of times of "war" as limited to groups of men fighting over physical
territory or land, we do not immediately consider the possibility of "war" outside this narrow definition
except in a metaphorical sense, such as in the expression "the war against poverty." However, the
physical violence and sex discrimination perpetrated against women because we are women is hardly
metaphorical. Despite the fact that its prevalence makes the violence seem natural or inevitable, it is
profoundly political in both its purpose and its effect. Further, its exclusion from international human rights
law is no accident, but rather part of a system politically constructed to exclude and silence women.
<=269> n268 The appropriation of women's sexuality and women's bodies as representative of men's
ownership over women has been central to this "politically constructed reality." <=270> n269 Women's
bodies have become the objects through which dominance and even ownership are communicated, as
well as the objects through which men's honor is attained or taken away in many cultures. <=271>
n270 Thus, when a man wants to communicate that he is more powerful than a woman, he may beat her.
When a man wants to communicate that a woman is [*838] his to use as he pleases, he may rape her or
prostitute her. The objectification of women is so universal that when one country ruled by men (Serbia)
wants to communicate to another country ruled by men (Bosnia-Herzegovina or Croatia) that it is superior
and more powerful, it rapes, tortures, and prostitutes the "inferior" country's women. <=272> n271 The
use of the possessive is intentional, for communication among men through the abuse of women is
effective only to the extent that the group of men to whom the message is sent believes they have some
right of possession over the bodies of the women used. Unless they have some claim of right to what is
taken, no injury is experienced. Of course, regardless of whether a group of men sexually terrorizing a
group of women is trying to communicate a message to another group of men, the universal sexual
victimization of women clearly communicates to all women a message of dominance and ownership over
women. As Charlotte Bunch explains, "The physical territory of [the] political struggle [over female
subordination] is women's bodies." <=273> n272 Given the emphasis on invasion of physical territory as
the impetus of war between nations or groups of people within one nation, we may be able to reconceive
the notion of "war" in order to make human rights laws applicable to women "in the by-ways of daily life."
<=274> n273 We could eradicate the traditional public/private dichotomy and define oppression of
women in terms traditionally recognized by human rights laws by arguing that women's bodies are the
physical territory at issue in a war perpetrated by men against women. Under this broader definition of
"war," any time one group of people systematically uses physical coercion and violence to subordinate
another group, that group would be perpetrating a war and could be prosecuted for human rights
violations under war crimes statutes.
Soft Power
Warming
PRISM hurts US soft power and cooperation
Arkedis 13, Jim Arkedis a senior fellow at the Progressive Policy Institute. He is the co-author of Political Mercenaries. (Jim Arkedis,
The Atlantic, “PRISM Is Bad for American Soft Power”, 6/19/13, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/06/prism-is-bad-foramerican-soft-power/277015/) //JM
This brings us back to Harry Truman and Jim Crow. Even though PRISM is technically legal, the lack of recent public debate and
support
for aggressive domestic collection is hurting America's soft power. The evidence is rolling in. The China
Daily, an English-language mouthpiece for the Communist Party, is having a field day, pointing out America's
hypocrisy as the Soviet Union did with Jim Crow. Chinese dissident artist Ai Wei Wei made the link explicitly, saying "In the Soviet Union
before, in China today, and even in the U.S., officials always think what they do is necessary... but the lesson that people should learn from
history is the need to limit state power." Even
America's allies are uneasy, at best. German Chancellor Angela
Merkel grew up in the East German police state and expressed diplomatic "surprise" at the
NSA's activities. She vowed to raise the issue with Obama at this week's G8 meetings. The Italian data protection
commissioner said the program would "not be legal" in his country. British Foreign Minister
William Hague came under fire in Parliament for his government's participation. If Americans
supported these programs, our adversaries and allies would have no argument . As it is, the next
time the United States asks others for help in tracking terrorists, it's more likely than not that
they will question Washington's motives. It's not too late. The PATRIOT Act is up for reauthorization in 2015. In the context
of a diminished threat, the White House still has time to push the public debate on still-hidden, controversial intelligence strategies (while
safeguarding specific sources and methods). Further, the administration should seek to empower the FISA court. Rather that defer to the
Supreme Court to appoint its panel of judges, it would be better to have Senate-confirmable justices serving limited terms. President Obama
has said Americans can't have 100 percent security and 100 percent privacy. But you can have an honest public debate about that allows
Americans to legitimately decide where to strike that balance. It's both the right thing to do and American foreign policy demands it.
Cooperation prevents global internet separation
Hill Internet Policy at U.S. Department of Commerce ’12 (Jonah Force Hill works in Internet Policy at the U.S. Department of
Commerce and was a research assistant at the Harvard – Belfer Center, Harvard – John F. Kennedy School of Government,
“Internet Fragmentation Highlighting the Major Technical, Governance and Diplomatic Challenges for U.S. Policy Makers”, Spring
2012, http://ecir.mit.edu/images/stories/internet_fragmentation_jonah_hill.pdf)//KY
The Internet allows for the rapid and inexpensive collection of vast
amounts of personal information and data online. Internet companies and
ISPs collect users’ information through searches, purchases, sign-ins, and HTTP cookies,
and then use that information for any number of purposes, from improved
search engine results to better-targeted advertising. But while the collection of personal
information and data has generated billions of dollars of online revenue and spawned new industries, 120 privacy
advocates around the world are up in arms about the collection and use of
this data, and what they view as a mounting threat to personal privacy and a lack of serious online consumer protections. In
response to these concerns, governments are crafting new rules addressing how digital data are collected, stored
and sold. Whether privacy protections should be enforced through legislation, or through voluntarily
measures by Internet companies, is a matter of intense debate. But if the
recent wave of new proposed privacy rules in the U.S. and internationally is any indication,
the tide of public and government opinion seems to be shifting towards
increased legal protections for Internet users and their personal
information. Hidden within these privacy deliberations, however, lies a real threat to the Internet’s
unity. Amidst the flurry of new privacy legislation under discussion in world
capitals, there has been remarkably little international coordination or agreement about what types of restrictions and
limitations should be put on the acquisition and use of online data. There are mounting concerns that if many countries adopt their
own unique privacy requirements, then
every firm operating on the Internet could
potentially be subjected to a multiplicity of often inconsistent laws. If
companies are unable to meet each country’s differing requirements, either
because those requirements are in conflict with one another or because of the added costs associated with meeting multiple
disparate rules, then we could see firms pulling out of particular markets entirely, essentially
balkanizing the
Internet by firm.
Internet decreases warming effects through decreased carbon
footprint
Reddy 12 ---writer for Huffington Post (Robbie, “The Environmental Impacts of E-Commerce - A Greener Way to
Shop?” 8/8/12, http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/robbie-reddy/the-environmental-impacts_b_1750438.html)//LE
For the time-crunched or the just plain lazy among us, online shopping offers clear rewards. You can buy the week's groceries and
tick everything off of your holiday list without the need to set foot outside the house or even put on pants. Yet there's another
potential benefit to buying from ecommerce shops: it can help save the environment. Don't get overly smug just
yet, because online shopping still uses energy in the form of packaging materials and the fuel used for deliveries. However, overall
ecommerce may be better for the environment. Reduced
Carbon Footprint Online retail outfits use 30 %
less energy than traditional retail operations, according to a study conducted by Carnegie Mellon University. In a brick
and mortar shop, the building needs to have display lighting, temperature regulation,
security lighting, cash registers, and shop fixtures installed. For the staff members to get
to and from work, energy is expended during the commute, and the business also uses
energy during the initial construction of the building. This also doesn't include the
energy that's expended by consumers driving to and from the shop. Choosing to buy your product
online can save these CO2 emissions. Although an ecommerce shop will still use up some degree of energy, this amount can be
significantly reduced. Employees typically work from home, or commute to a more convenient location. No energy must be
expended for customer comfort as it would in a traditional shop. Energy
is still used to deliver purchases to
consumers, but this is more efficient than every single consumer driving to and from the shop. The paper
trail of doing business can be reduced with ecommerce as well, using online newsletters and
electronic receipts.
Independently, climate change causes famine and resource wars
that go nuclear – Pentagon study
McKibben 9.
Bill. is the Schumann Distinguished Scholar at Middlebury College. In 2010, the Boston Globe called him
"probably the nation's leading environmentalist." CLIMATE CHANGE, Bill McKibben. Foreign Policy. Washington: Jan/Feb 2009. ,
Iss. 170; pg. 32.
*** cites Pentagon report as well as Harvard archaeologist Steven LeBlanc "Climate
Change Will Help as Many
Places as It Hurts" Wishful thinking. For a long time, the winners-and-losers calculus was pretty standard: Though
climate change will cause some parts of the planet to flood or shrivel up, other frigid, rainy regions would at least get some warmer
days every year. Or so the thinking went. But more recently, models
have begun to show that after a certain
point almost everyone on the planet will suffer. Crops might be easier to grow in some places for a few
decades as the danger of frost recedes, but over time the threat of heat stress and drought will almost
certainly be stronger. A 2003 report commissioned by the Pentagon forecasts the
possibility of violent storms across Europe, megadroughts across the Southwest United
States and Mexico, and unpredictable monsoons causing food shortages in China. "Envision
Pakistan, India, and China - all armed with nuclear weapons skirmishing at their
borders over refugees, access to shared rivers, and arable land," the report warned. Or
Spain and Portugal "fighting over fishing rights leading to conflicts at sea." Of course, there are
a few places we used to think of as possible winners - mostly the far north, where Canada and Russia could theoretically produce
more grain with longer growing seasons, or perhaps explore for oil beneath the newly melted Arctic ice cap. But even those places
will have to deal with expensive consequences - a real military race across the high Arctic, for instance. Want more bad news? Here's
how that Pentagon
report's scenario played out: As the planet's carrying capacity shrinks,
an ancient pattern of desperate, all-out wars over food, water, and energy supplies
would reemerge. The report refers to the work of Harvard archaeologist Steven LeBlanc,
who notes that wars over resources were the norm until about three centuries ago.
When such conflicts broke out, 25 percent of a population's adult males usually died. As
abrupt climate change hits home, warfare may again come to define human life. Set against
that bleak backdrop, the potential upside of a few longer growing seasons in Vladivostok doesn't seem like an even trade.
XTN
EXTEND Arkedis 13- NSA overreach makes foreign powers
question US motives and ruins cooperation
EXTEND Hill 12- Cooperation and Multilateralism is key to
prevent data loclaization
EXTEND Reddy 12- Internet and e-commerce decrease energy
use and environment damage
EXTEND McKibben 9- Climate change decreases planet’s
carrying capacity --- increase chance of famine and resource war
AT: No decreased on internet
Data localization dramatically harms global communication
Jonah Force Hill (Harvard Kennedy School (HKS), Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs (BCSIA)) 5/1/14, The
Growth of Data Localization Post-Snowden: Analysis and Recommendations for U.S. Policymakers and Business Leaders, The
Hague Institute for Global Justice, Conference on the Future of Cyber Governance, 2014,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2430275, page 5
Today, more than a dozen countries, both developed and developing, have introduced or
are actively contemplating introducing data localization laws. The laws, restrictions,
and policies under consideration are diverse in their strategies and effects. Some proposals would enforce
limitations for data storage, data transfer, and data processing; others require
the local purchasing of ICT equipment for government and private sector
procurements. There are proposals for mandatory local ownership of data storage equipment, limitations on foreign
online retailers, and forced local hiring. Proposals of this sort are not historically
unprecedented. Indeed, forms of data localization policies have been actively in place in many countries for years,
including in the United States, where sensitive government data, such as certain classified materials, must be maintained within the
servers of domestic companies. Broader
localization rules, which apply to all citizen data,
have tended to be pursued by authoritarian governments such as Russia,
China, and Iran, for which data localization laws have been viewed as an
effective means to control information and to monitor the activities of their
citizens. PostSnowden, however, even democratic countries are now
seriously considering these more expansive data localization measures.
Most notably, Brazil, Germany, and India– countries that have witnessed
some of the most virulent anti-NSA reactions –are now contemplating
enacting significant data localization laws. The EU is also contemplating
localization within its area of authority.This is a deeply troubling
development – not just for the technology firms of the United States who stand
to lose customers and contracts as a result of these policies,4 but also for all
the nations, firms, and individual Internet users who rely on the Web for
economic trade and development, communications, and civic organizing.
Not only do data localization policies fail to achieve their stated goals, they
introduce a host of unintended consequences. By restricting data flows and
competition between firms, localization will likely bring up costs for
Internet users and businesses, may retard technological innovation and the
Internet’s “generativity,” 5 may reduce the ability of firms to aggregate
services and data analytics through cloud services, and will surely curb
freedom of expression and transparency globally. Ironically, data
localization policies will likely degrade – rather than improve – data
security for the countries considering them, making surveillance, protection from
which is the ostensible reason for localization, easier for domestic governments (and perhaps even for foreign
powers) to achieve. Restricted routing, often a core component of data localization
rules, may be technically infeasible without initiating a significant overhaul
of the Internet’s core architecture and governance systems, which itself
would have significant negative effects. And perhaps most worrying, data
localization policies – if implemented on a wide international scale – could
have the effect of profoundly fragmenting the Internet,6 turning back the
clock on the integration of global communication and ecommerce, and
putting into jeopardy the myriad of societal benefits that Internet
integration has engendered Unquestionably, online espionage, citizen
privacy, government overreach, and the protection of fundamental rights
are legitimate concerns of states. Advances in surveillance technologies and
offensive cyber capabilities have plainly outpaced the legal, normative, and
diplomatic mechanisms needed to protect digital data. For government
officials hoping to take meaningful action in response, data localization
looks to be a convenient and simple solution. But a close examination
reveals that it is not a viable remedy to any of the privacy, security, or
surveillance problems governments hope to address. This paper discusses these points and
seeks to expose the often dubious and pretextual motivations behind the new push for data localization, to explain how such
measures are profoundly imprudent and often self-defeating, and to offer United States businesses and the United States
government a few key recommendations for how to counter this problematic trend.
AT: Internet has no effect
Internet saves energy
Metz 15---
the editor of Wired Business and Wired Enterprise (Cade, “Google Says the Internet of Things Will Save Energy,”
4/29/15, http://www.wired.com/2015/04/google-says-internet-things-will-save-electricity/)//LE
(***iot---intenet of things)
AS THE INTERNET of Things expands, with everything from thermostats to cameras to cars plugging into the net, so does the need
for machines that can handle those connections. The data traveling to and from all those thermostats, cameras, and cars, you see,
must flow through the massive data centers operated by the likes of Google, Apple, and Facebook.
The worry is that powering all this extra hardware will require exponentially larger amounts of electricity—not to mention all the
But Urs Hölzle says this won’t be the problem it may
seem. Hölzle is the man who oversees Google’s worldwide network of data centers, and
he believes that efficiencies brought by devices such as Internet-connected thermostats,
lighting systems, and self-driving cars will balance out the extra power needed to drive
our computing centers.
money and space spent on the hardware itself.
“I’m pretty confident that the Internet of Things is going to have net negative power
consumption,” Hölzle said during a briefing with reporters on Tuesday. “If you control
lights, heat, and cooling in a smarter ways, that’s really substantial.” Even self-driving cars, he
says, will push us towards lower power consumption. “You’ll have fewer cars on the road, fewer parking lots, less congestion,
because every car is a potential carpool.” In other words, he believes we’ll use self-driving cars in much the same way we use Uber
today, calling one whenever we need one.
AT: No Extinction
Climate change causes extinction and outweighs every other
impact
Doebbler 11. Curtis, International Human Rights Lawyer.( Two threats to our existence. Ahram Weekly. July 2011.
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2011/1055/envrnmnt.htm)
Climate change is widely acknowledged to be the greatest threat facing humanity. It will
lead to small island states disappearing from the face of the earth, serious global threats
to our food and water supplies, and ultimately the death of hundreds of millions of the
poorest people in the world over the course of this century. No other threat -- including
war, nuclear disasters, rogue regimes, terrorism, or the fiscal irresponsibility of
governments -- is reliably predicted to cause so much harm to so many people on earth,
and indeed to the earth itself. The International Panel on Climate Change, which won the Nobel Prize for its
evaluation of thousands of research studies to provide us accurate information on climate change, has predicted that under the
current scenario of "business-as-usual", temperatures
could rise by as much as 10 degrees Celsius in
some parts of the world. This would have horrendous consequences for the most
vulnerable people in the world. Consequences that the past spokesman of 136
developing countries, Lumumba Diaping, described as the equivalent of sending
hundreds of millions of Africans to the furnace. Yet for more than two decades, states have failed to take
adequate action to either prevent climate change or to deal with its consequences. A major reason for this is that many wealthy
industrialised countries view climate change as at worst an inconvenience, or at best even a potential market condition from which
they can profit at the expense of developing countries. Indeed, history has shown them that because of their significantly higher
levels of population they have grown rich and been able to enslave, exploit and marginalise their neighbours in developing countries.
They continue in this vein.
Cyberterrorism
PRISM hurts US soft power and cooperation
Arkedis 13, Jim Arkedis a senior fellow at the Progressive Policy Institute. He is the co-author of Political Mercenaries. (Jim Arkedis,
The Atlantic, “PRISM Is Bad for American Soft Power”, 6/19/13, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/06/prism-is-bad-foramerican-soft-power/277015/) //JM
This brings us back to Harry Truman and Jim Crow. Even though PRISM is technically legal, the lack of recent public debate and
support
for aggressive domestic collection is hurting America's soft power. The evidence is rolling in. The China
Daily, an English-language mouthpiece for the Communist Party, is having a field day, pointing out America's
hypocrisy as the Soviet Union did with Jim Crow. Chinese dissident artist Ai Wei Wei made the link explicitly, saying "In the Soviet Union
before, in China today, and even in the U.S., officials always think what they do is necessary... but the lesson that people should learn from
history is the need to limit state power." Even
America's allies are uneasy, at best. German Chancellor Angela
Merkel grew up in the East German police state and expressed diplomatic "surprise" at the
NSA's activities. She vowed to raise the issue with Obama at this week's G8 meetings. The Italian data protection
commissioner said the program would "not be legal" in his country. British Foreign Minister
William Hague came under fire in Parliament for his government's participation. If Americans
supported these programs, our adversaries and allies would have no argument . As it is, the next
time the United States asks others for help in tracking terrorists, it's more likely than not that
they will question Washington's motives. It's not too late. The PATRIOT Act is up for reauthorization in 2015. In the context
of a diminished threat, the White House still has time to push the public debate on still-hidden, controversial intelligence strategies (while
safeguarding specific sources and methods). Further, the administration should seek to empower the FISA court. Rather that defer to the
Supreme Court to appoint its panel of judges, it would be better to have Senate-confirmable justices serving limited terms. President Obama
has said Americans can't have 100 percent security and 100 percent privacy. But you can have an honest public debate about that allows
Americans to legitimately decide where to strike that balance. It's both the right thing to do and American foreign policy demands it.
International cooperation prevents cyber attacks
Nye 10, Ph.D. in political science from Harvard University (Joseph S. Nye Jr., “Cyber Power”, p17, May 2010) //JM
Cbyer terrorism is a harder case. As we have seen, cyber
attacks are not the most attractive route
for terrorists today, but as groups develop their capacity to wreak great
damage against infrastructure over the coming years, the temptation will
grow. Since attribution will be difficult, improved defenses such as pre-emption and human intelligence become important. At a
more fundamental level, many experts believe that the long term solution is a program to re-engineer the internet to make such
attacks more difficult than under today’s structure that emphasizes ease of use rather than security. Some suggest special “opt in”
incentives for private owners of critical infrastructure (eg., finance and electricity) to join secure systems rather than rely on the
open internet (which would continue to exist for those with lower stakes and willing to tolerate greater risks.) Cyber crime can also
be reduced by similar approaches that make access to some systems more difficult than they are today. In addition, it
may be
possible to develop degrees of international cooperation to limit cyber
crime analogous to efforts to discourage piracy at an earlier era. At one time, many
governments found it convenient to tolerate some pirates and even charter privateers ( until the Declaration of Paris in 1856), and
today some governments have similar attitudes toward crime on the internet. Russia and China, for example, have refused to sign
the Council of Europe Convention on Cyber Crime which has been signed by
27 countries. But attitudes may change over time if costs exceed benefits. For example, “Russian cyber-criminals no longer
follow hands-off rules when it comes to motherland targets, and Russian authorities are beginning to drop the laisser faire policy.”73
While the immediate prospects for the convention are not promising, it is possible to imagine coalitions of the willing that set a
higher standard, and work together to raise the costs for those who violate an emergent norm, much as occurs with financial money
laundering regulations or the proliferation security initiative.
Cyber attacks can easily damage US infrastructure
Assante ‘ 14. (Michael Assante, director of Industrial Control Systems as well as Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
Networks for the SANS Institute. “America's Critical Infrastructure Is Vulnerable To Cyber Attacks” 11/11/2014.
http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2014/11/11/americas-critical-infrastructure-is-vulnerable-to-cyber-attacks/ //JJ
America’s critical infrastructure—the utilities, refineries, military defense
systems, water treatment plants and other facilities on which we depend
every day—has become its soft underbelly, the place where we are now most
vulnerable to attack. Over the past 25 years, hundreds of thousands of
analog controls in these facilities have been replaced with digital systems.
Digital controls provide facility operators and managers with remote visibility and control over every aspect of their operations,
including the flows and pressures in refineries, the generation and transmission of power in the electrical grid, and the temperatures
in nuclear cooling towers. In doing so, they have made industrial facilities more efficient and more productive.
But the
same connectivity that managers use to collect data and control devices
allows cyber attackers to get into control system networks to steal sensitive
information, disrupt processes, and cause damage to equipment. Hackers, including
those in China, Russia and the Middle East, have taken notice. While early control system breaches
were random, accidental infections, industrial control systems today have
become the object of targeted attacks by skilled and persistent adversaries.
Industrial control systems are being targeted The recently discovered Industrial Control System
modules of the HAVEX trojan are one example. The malware infiltrated an indeterminate
number of critical facilities by attaching itself to software updates
distributed by control system manufacturers. When facilities downloaded
the updates to their network, HAVEX used open communication standards
to collect information from control devices and send that information to the
attackers for analysis. This type of attack represents a significant threat to
confidential production data and corporate intellectual property and may
also be an early indicator of an advanced targeted attack on an
organization’s production control systems. Other hacks represent a direct threat to the safety of U.S.
citizens. Earlier this year, the FBI released information on Ugly Gorilla, a Chinese attacker who invaded the control systems of
utilities in the United States. While the FBI suspects this was a scouting mission, Ugly Gorilla gained the cyber keys necessary for
access to systems that regulate the flow of natural gas. Considering
that cyber attackers are
numerous and persistent—for every one you see there are a hundred you
don’t—those developments should sound alarms among executives at companies using industrial controls and with the people
responsible for protecting American citizens from attacks. To their credit, both businesses and the U.S. government have begun to
take action; however, neither is adequately addressing the core of the issue. The
threat isn’t static
Businesses continue to believe that cybersecurity issues can be addressed
solely through technology. The problem was created by technology so the solution must be more technology, they
reason, ignoring the spirit of Einstein’s observation that “no problem can be solved from the same level of consciousness that created
it.” Technology is static and the threat is not. Hackers will always find a way to beat technology-based solutions. That’s why we have
to do more than create barriers to keep out intruders. We have to man our digital borders with people who have the same skill and
determination as the attackers.
An attack on critical infrastructure causes economic collapse
Hayden et al 14 (Michael,- former director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency. Curt
Hébert is a former chairman of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. And Susan Tierney is a former assistant secretary of
Energy. All three are co-chairs of the Bipartisan Policy Center's Electric Grid Cyber Security Initiative “How to protect our electric
grid: Column”) //JJ
Rather, cyber
threats to critical infrastructure -- for example, water, energy and
telecommunications — are important to our national security. There is evidence that
energy systems, in particular, are becoming a popular target. The Department of
Homeland Security recently reported responding to 198 cyber-incidents in 2012 across all critical sectors. Forty-one percent of these
incidents involved the energy sector, particularly electricity. Although to date there are no reports of a
successful cyber
attack on the electric grid, we believe it is more a question of "when" than "if." A targeted
cyber attack — either alone or combined with a physical attack — on the power system could lead to huge
costs, with sustained outages over large portions of the electric grid and prolonged
disruptions in communications, health care delivery and food and water supplies. Unlike traditional threats to electric grid
reliability, such as extreme weather events, a cyber attack is less predictable in its timing and potentially more difficult to diagnose
and address. Such an attack could come from various sources and target many potential vulnerabilities. The North American
electricity grid is sprawling, with approximately 5,800 major power plants and more than 450,000 miles of high-voltage
transmission lines. And our economy is pervasively dependent upon its functioning.
Efforts to prevent and respond to cyber attacks on the electric grid are complicated by a complex governance structure. In addition
to the countless companies involved with pieces of the grid and actions to protect it, numerous federal, state and local agencies are
involved in some aspect of cybersecurity. Successfully managing cybersecurity risks and recovering from a destructive cyber attack
will require effective coordination at several levels, including U.S. energy companies, the intelligence community and emergency
management agencies; between relevant federal government and state and local authorities involved in energy, law enforcement,
essential services and other issues; and between U.S. energy regulatory and security agencies and their counterparts in Canada and
Mexico. To address new and evolving threats of cyber attacks on the grid, the Bipartisan Policy Center convened an expert advisory
group to develop policy
approaches that would improve protection of the grid and
increase preparedness in the case of an attack. We believe there must be a series of new, innovative approaches to
address the evolving threat. Recommendations include: Public-private partnerships that mobilize the respective
assets and expertise of industry and government agencies, and improve the flow of information among
government and companies -- such as this month's GridEx exercise, which joins industry and government in an
extensive simulation of a cyber attack.
XTN
EXTEND Arkedis 13- NSA overreach makes foreign powers
question US motives and ruins cooperation
EXTEND Nye 10- International cooperation can be used to fight
against cyberterrorism
EXTEND Assante 14 and Hayden 14- Cyber attacks can easily
target and damage US infrastructure, like industrial control
systems, and ruin the US economy
At: No Cyber attacks
Cyber attack risk high --- ISIS hacking ability
Silber and Garrie 4/17 Silber is executive managing director of K2 Intelligence and former director of intelligence
analysis for the New York Police Department. Garrie is the founder and editor in chief of the Journal of Law and Cyber Warfare
(Silber and Garrie, “Guarding Against a ‘Cyber 9/11’”, http://www.wsj.com/articles/guarding-against-a-cyber-9-11-1429138821
,4/17/15) //JM
The Internet provides an easy, low-cost and low-risk means for nonstate
actors or terrorist groups to amplify the impact of any attack. But a large-scale
cyberattack on critical infrastructure could prove devastating. Whether it’s called “Cyber 9/11” or “Cyber Pearl Harbor,”
senior U.S.
officials, including the president, have warned of the possibility of attacks
launched by foreign hackers that could cripple the country by taking down the power grid, water infrastructure,
transportation networks and the financial system. Islamic State, aka ISIS,
recently released a video
threatening another 9/11-magnitude attack on the U.S. Clearly well-funded, ISIS has
proved to be the most sophisticated terrorist group so far when it comes to
utilization of digital media for recruitment and propaganda. Last week a French
television network, TV5 Monde, was digitally commandeered by ISIS-inspired hackers
who cut the transmission of 11 channels and took over the station’s website and
social-media accounts for 24 hours.
AT: Cyber secure
The NSA makes backdoors --- weakens encryption
Reuters ’13. “Exclusive: Secret contract tied NSA and security industry pioneer” BY
JOSEPH MENN. December 20, 2013. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/21/ususa-security-rsa-idUSBRE9BJ1C220131221 //JJ
As a key part of a campaign to embed encryption software that it could
crack into widely used computer products, the U.S. National Security
Agency arranged a secret $10 million contract with RSA, one of the most
influential firms in the computer security industry, Reuters has learned.
Documents leaked by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden show that the NSA
created and promulgated a flawed formula for generating random numbers
to create a "back door" in encryption products, the New York Times reported in
September. Reuters later reported that RSA became the most important
distributor of that formula by rolling it into a software tool called Bsafe that
is used to enhance security in personal computers and many other
products. Undisclosed until now was that RSA received $10 million in a deal
that set the NSA formula as the preferred, or default, method for number
generation in the BSafe software, according to two sources familiar with the
contract. Although that sum might seem paltry, it represented more than a third of the
revenue that the relevant division at RSA had taken in during the entire previous year,
securities filings show. The earlier disclosures of RSA's entanglement with the NSA
already had shocked some in the close-knit world of computer security experts. The
company had a long history of championing privacy and security, and it played a leading
role in blocking a 1990s effort by the NSA to require a special chip to enable spying on a
wide range of computer and communications products. RSA, now a subsidiary of
computer storage giant EMC Corp, urged customers to stop using the NSA formula after
the Snowden disclosures revealed its weakness. RSA and EMC declined to answer
questions for this story, but RSA said in a statement: "RSA always acts in the best
interest of its customers and under no circumstances does RSA design or enable any
back doors in our products. Decisions about the features and functionality of RSA
products are our own." The NSA declined to comment. The RSA deal shows one way
the NSA carried out what Snowden's documents describe as a key strategy
for enhancing surveillance: the systematic erosion of security tools. NSA
documents released in recent months called for using "commercial
relationships" to advance that goal, but did not name any security
companies as collaborators. The NSA came under attack this week in a landmark
report from a White House panel appointed to review U.S. surveillance policy. The panel
noted that "encryption is an essential basis for trust on the Internet," and called for a
halt to any NSA efforts to undermine it. Most of the dozen current and former
RSA employees interviewed said that the company erred in agreeing to such
a contract, and many cited RSA's corporate evolution away from pure
cryptography products as one of the reasons it occurred. But several said that
RSA also was misled by government officials, who portrayed the formula as a secure
technological advance. "They did not show their true hand," one person briefed on the
deal said of the NSA, asserting that government officials did not let on that they knew
how to break the encryption. STORIED HISTORY Started by MIT professors in the
1970s and led for years by ex-Marine Jim Bidzos, RSA and its core algorithm were both
named for the last initials of the three founders, who revolutionized cryptography. Little
known to the public, RSA's encryption tools have been licensed by most large technology
companies, which in turn use them to protect computers used by hundreds of millions
of people. At the core of RSA's products was a technology known as public
key cryptography. Instead of using the same key for encoding and then decoding a
message, there are two keys related to each other mathematically. The first, publicly
available key is used to encode a message for someone, who then uses a second, private
key to reveal it. From RSA's earliest days, the U.S. intelligence establishment
worried it would not be able to crack well-engineered public key
cryptography. Martin Hellman, a former Stanford researcher who led the
team that first invented the technique, said NSA experts tried to talk him
and others into believing that the keys did not have to be as large as they
planned. The stakes rose when more technology companies adopted RSA's methods
and Internet use began to soar. The Clinton administration embraced the Clipper Chip,
envisioned as a mandatory component in phones and computers to enable officials to
overcome encryption with a warrant. RSA led a fierce public campaign against the effort,
distributing posters with a foundering sailing ship and the words "Sink Clipper!" A key
argument against the chip was that overseas buyers would shun U.S.
technology products if they were ready-made for spying. Some companies say
that is just what has happened in the wake of the Snowden disclosures.
Nuclear war Add-on
A massive cyber-attack would be an act of war
Mandia 13, the founder and chief executive of Mandiant, discusses cyber-attacks on US companies and organizations.
(Kevin Mandia, “Successful hacker attack could cripple U.S. infrastructure, experts say”,
http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/02/19/17019005-successful-hacker-attack-could-cripple-us-infrastructure-expertssay?lite) //JJ
A report tying the Chinese military to computer attacks against American interests has sent a chill through cyber-security
experts, who worry that the very lifelines of the United States — its energy pipelines, its
water supply, its banks — are increasingly at risk. The experts say that a successful hacker
attack taking out just a part of the nation’s electrical grid, or crippling
financial institutions for several days, could sow panic or even lead to loss
of life. “I call it cyberterrorism that makes 9/11 pale in comparison,” Rep. Mike Rogers, a
Michigan Republican and chair of the House Intelligence Committee, told NBC News on Tuesday. An American computer security
company, Mandiant, reported with near certainty that members of a sophisticated Chinese hacking group work out of the
headquarters of a unit of the Chinese army outside Shanghai. The report was first detailed in The New York Times, which said that
the hacking group’s focus was increasingly on companies that work with American infrastructure, including the power grid, gas lines
and waterworks. The Chinese embassy in Washington told The Times that its government does not engage in computer hacking. As
reported, the Chinese attacks constitute a sort of asymmetrical cyberwarfare, analysts said, because they bring the force of the
Chinese government and military against private companies. “To us that’s crossing a line into a class of victim that’s not prepared to
withstand that type of attack,” Grady Summers, a Mandiant vice president, said on the MSNBC program “Andrea Mitchell Reports.”
The report comes as government officials and outside security experts alike are sounding ever-louder alarms about the vulnerability
of the systems that make everyday life in the United States possible. A new report confirmed by U.S. intelligence officials has
pinpointed a building in Shanghai where those working for the Chinese military launched cyberattacks against 141 US companies
spanning 20 industries. NBC's Andrea Mitchell reports. Outgoing Defense Secretary Leon Panetta warned in October that the United
States was facing a threat that amounted to “cyber Pearl Harbor” and raised the specter of intentionally derailed trains,
contaminated water and widespread blackouts. “This
is a pre-9/11 moment,” Panetta told
business executives in New York. “The attackers are plotting.” The Times report
described an attack on Telvent, a company that keeps blueprints on more than half the oil and gas pipelines in North and South
America and has access to their systems. A Canadian arm of the company told customers last fall that hackers had broken in, but it
immediately cut off the access so that the hackers could not take control of the pipelines themselves, The Times reported. Dale
Peterson, founder and CEO of Digital Bond, a security company that specializes in infrastructure, told NBC News that these attacks,
known as vendor remote access, are particularly worrisome. “If you are a bad guy and you want to attack a lot of different control
systems, you want to be able to take out a lot,” he said. “The
dirty little secret in these control
systems is once you get through the perimeter, they have no security at all.
They don’t even have a four-digit pin like your ATM card.” Locals walks in front of 'Unit 61398', a secretive Chinese military unit, in
the outskirts of Shanghai. The unit is believed to be behind a series of hacking attacks, a U.S. computer security company said. The
34-minute blackout at the Super Bowl earlier this month highlighted weak spots in the nation’s power system.
A National
Research Council report declassified by the government last fall warned
that a coordinated strike on the grid could devastate the country. That
report considered blackouts lasting weeks or even months across large
parts of the country, and suggested they could lead to public fear, social
turmoil and a body blow to the economy. Vital systems do not have to be
taken down for very long or across a particularly widespread area, the
experts noted, to cause social disorder and to spread fear and anxiety
among the population. Last fall, after Hurricane Sandy battered the Northeast, it took barely two days for reports of
gasoline shortages to cause hours-long lines at the pumps and violent fights among drivers. Peterson described being in Phoenix,
Ariz., during a three-day gas pipeline disruption “when people were waiting in line six hours and not going to work. You can imagine
someone does these things maliciously, with a little more smarts, something that takes three months to replace.” Similarly, hacking
attacks last fall against major American banks — believed by some security experts and government officials to be the work of Iran —
amounted to mostly limited frustration for customers, but foreshadowed much bigger trouble if future attacks are more
sophisticated. What worries Dmitri Alperovitch, co-founder of the computer security company CrowdStrike, is a coordinated attack
against banks that modifies, rather than destroys, financial data, making it impossible to reconcile transactions. “You
could
wreak absolute havoc on the world’s financial system for years,” he said. “It would
be impossible to roll that back.” While the report Tuesday focused on China, the experts
also highlighted Iran as a concern. That is because China, as a “rational actor” state, knows that a
major cyberattack against the United States could be construed as an act of
war and would damage critical economic cooperation between the U.S. and China. “With
the Iranians in the game,” Rogers said, “what’s worrisome is they don’t care.
They have no economic lost opportunity.” Security experts have for years expressed concern, if not
outrage, that the nation’s critical infrastructure remains so vulnerable so long after Sept. 11, 2001. But the escalating threats from
hackers in China and Iran, in addition to Russia and North Korea, appear to be lending new urgency to efforts to make sure
companies and government agencies are better prepared. President Barack Obama announced in his State of the Union message last
week that he had signed an executive order directing federal agencies to share certain unclassified reports of cyber threats with
American companies. The next day, Rogers and Rep. Dutch Ruppersberger, a Maryland Democrat, reintroduced legislation designed
in part to help companies share information. The bill passed the House last year but stalled in the Senate. State
Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland said Tuesday that the United
States has “substantial and growing” concerns about threats to the U.S.
economy and national security posed by cyberattacks. “I think as recent public reports make
clear, we’re obviously going to have to keep working on this,” she said. “It’s a serious concern.” Peterson said that oil, gas and electric
companies had led the way in developing security perimeters, with water companies “kind of in the middle” and transportation and
mining companies lagging. But even the protections enacted by companies so far leave too many holes, he said. “They’re all in the
same situation,” Peterson said. “If you get through the perimeter, you can do whatever you want.”
A U.S. security
firm has exposed the role of the Chinese military in an overwhelming
number of cyber-attacks on U.S. infrastructure, government agencies, and
corporations, resulting in the theft of information from military
contractors and energy companies. Mandiant Vice President Grady Summers and Chris Johnson of the
Center for Strategic and International Studies discusses.
One nuke is all it takes
Betts 2k [Richard Professor and the Director of the Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia, “Universal Deterrence or
Conceptual Collapse? Liberal Pessimism and Utopian Realism,” The Coming Crisis: Nuclear Proliferation, U.S. Interests, and World
Order, ed. Utgoff p. 82] //JJ
Quite opposite reactions are imaginable. The shock might jar sluggish statesmen into taking the danger seriously, cutting through
shock might
prompt panic and a rush to stock up on WMD, as the possibility of use
underlines the need for deterrent capability, or the effectiveness of such
weapons as instruments of policy One seldom-noticed danger is that breakage of the taboo
could demystify the weapons and make them look more conventional than our
post-Hiroshima images of them. It helps to recall that in the 1930s, popular images of conventional
strategic bombing were that it would be apocalyptic, bringing belligerent countries to their
diplomatic and military red tape, and undertaking dramatic actions to push the genie back in the bottle. Or the
knees quickly. The apocalyptic image was fed by the German bombing of Guernica, a comparatively small city in Spain. When World
War II came in Europe, both British
and Germans initially refrained from bombing
attacks on cities. Once city bombing began and gathered steam, however, it
proved to be far less decisive than many had expected. British and German populations
managed to adjust and absorb it. Over time, however, the ferocity of Allied bombing of Germany and Japan did
approach the apocalyptic levels originally envisioned. In short, dire assumptions about the awesomeness of
strategic bombing deterred its initiation, but once initiated did not prevent gradual
escalation to the devastating level originally envisioned. Nuclear weapon inventories of
countries like India and Pakistan are likely to remain small in number and yield for some time. According to press reports, by some
U.S. estimates the yields of the 1998 tests were only a few kilotons. If the first weapon detonated in combat is a low-yield device in a
large city with uneven terrain and lots of reinforced concrete, it might only destroy a small part of the city A bomb that killed 10,000
to 20,000 people would be seen as a stunning catastrophe, but there are now many parts of the world where that number would be
less than 1 percent of a city’s population. The disaster could seem surprisingly limited, since in the
popular imagination (underwritten by the results in the small and flimsy cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki), nuclear weapons mean
‘one bomb, one city” Awful destruction that yet seems surprisingly limited could prompt revisionist reactions among lay elites in
some countries about the meaning of nuclear ordnance.
Bilateral Dialogues
SCS
*NSA surveillance is worsening American economy
Forbes ’13. “NSA Snooping's Negative Impact On Business Would Have The Founding
Fathers 'Aghast'” Mieke Eoyang & Gabriel Horwitz. 12/20/2013
http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2013/12/20/nsa-snoopings-negative-impact-onbusiness-would-have-the-founding-fathers-aghast/ //JJ
James Madison would be “aghast.” That was one of the incendiary charges leveled at the
National Security Agency and its mass surveillance activities by Judge Richard Leon in
his December 16 opinion ordering the government to stop collecting some of the data
that it’s been gathering on private citizens here and abroad. But Thomas Jefferson might
be horrified as well, because the NSA collection efforts are having a fairly profound
effect on American business and its efforts to sell goods and services abroad. Jefferson, a
big believer in the American “taste for navigation and commerce,” would be dismayed
that our government was doing things that could hurt our competitiveness and our
ability to set the terms of global trade. To be sure, there has always been some tension
between U.S. high-tech industries and our national security. In the 90s, the rules were
fairly primitive, such as limitations on exports of high-performance computing designed
to prevent countries from developing weapons of mass destruction. Those restrictions
were quickly rendered outdated by Moore’s Law, but had they remained they would
have prevented the exports of game consoles like Xbox. Since then, increased
globalization and the rise of terrorist organizations operating in the
shadows and across national boundaries have complicated both the
security and economic issues. The current debate about Edward Snowden’s
intelligence revelations may seem like an unlikely place to see that tension emerge, but
beyond the discussions of civil liberties and counterterrorism, it is becoming clear
that the post-9/11 surveillance apparatus may be at cross-purposes with our
high-tech economic growth. The revelations about the scope and scale of
NSA’s surveillance both at home and abroad have made many uneasy about
the security of their data. This loss of trust could have ongoing
consequences for the U.S. economy and for the future development of the
Internet. Policymakers must understand these implications as they make decisions on
how to reform our surveillance efforts. First, what will this mean for American
competitiveness? For years, the Internet has been largely “Made in America”,
but the technical architecture and data transcend national borders.
European, Chinese, Russian, and other global competitors are vying for the billions of
consumers who currently use U.S. Internet services every day—from Google to Facebook
to Ebay. One major competitive global advantage for U.S. companies is that
America’s openness and freedoms have brought an implied level of trust in
the security and privacy of the data flowing through their servers. But when
the U.S. government asserts that it can exploit electronic data abroad for intelligence
purposes, it creates an international reaction with profound economic consequences.
For example, Europe’s Commissioner for digital affairs, Neelie Kroes, predicts the
fallout from Snowden’s leaks will have “multi-billion Euro consequences” for US
businesses. The EU Commission’s Vice President, Viviane Reding, is pushing for Europe
to adopt more expansive privacy laws that will help build market share for regional
companies—thereby shutting American companies out. The economic
consequences could be staggering. Studies by leading Internet researchers at ITIF,
Gartner, and Forrester examining the NSA surveillance revelations’ impact project
potential lost revenue for U.S. cloud computing companies ranging from $35
billion to $180 billion over the next three years. More than half of the overseas
members of a cloud industry group, the Cloud Security Alliance, said they were less
likely to use U.S. cloud providers in the future. Ten percent of such members said they
had cancelled a U.S. cloud services project as a result of the “Snowden Incident”. While
the true costs of the loss of trust are hard to quantify, and will be reported in future
quarters, the potential losses are enormous.
The technology industry is vital to the American Economy
Brookings Institution February 3, 2015. “America's Advanced Industries”
http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports2/2015/02/03-advancedindustries#/M10420
The need for economic renewal in the United States remains urgent. Years of
disappointing job growth and stagnant incomes for the majority of workers
have left the nation shaken and frustrated. At the same time, astonishing new
technologies—ranging from advanced robotics and “3-D printing” to the “digitization of
everything”—are provoking genuine excitement even as they make it hard to see where
things are going. Hence this paper: At a critical moment, this report asserts the
special importance to America’s future of what the paper calls America’s
“advanced industries” sector. Characterized by its deep involvement with
technology research and development (R&D) and STEM (science,
technology, engineering, and math) workers, the sector encompasses 50
industries ranging from manufacturing industries such as automaking and
aerospace to energy industries such as oil and gas extraction to high-tech services such
as computer software and computer system design, including for health applications.
These industries encompass the nation’s “tech” sector at its broadest and
most consequential. Their dynamism is going to be a central component of
any future revitalized U.S. economy. As such, these industries encompass the
country’s best shot at supporting innovative, inclusive, and sustainable
growth. For that reason, this report provides a wide-angle overview of the advanced
industry sector that reviews its role in American prosperity, assesses key trends, and
maps its metropolitan and global competitive standing before outlining high-level
strategies to enhance that. The overview finds that: 1. Advanced industries
represent a sizable economic anchor for the U.S. economy and have led the
post-recession employment recovery. Modest in size, the sector packs a
massive economic punch. As an employer and source of economic activity the
advanced industry sector plays a major role in the U.S. economy. As of 2013, the
nation’s 50 advanced industries (see nearby box for selection criteria) employed
12.3 million U.S. workers. That amounts to about 9 percent of total U.S.
employment. And yet, even with this modest employment base, U.S. advanced
industries produce $2.7 trillion in value added annually—17 percent of all
U.S. gross domestic product (GDP). That is more than any other sector,
including healthcare, finance, or real estate. At the same time, the sector employs
80 percent of the nation’s engineers; performs 90 percent of private-sector
R&D; generates approximately 85 percent of all U.S. patents; and accounts
for 60 percent of U.S. exports. Advanced industries also support unusually
extensive supply chains and other forms of ancillary economic activity. On a per
worker basis, advanced industries purchase $236,000 in goods and services
from other businesses annually, compared with $67,000 in purchasing by other
industries. This spending sustains and creates more jobs. In fact, 2.2 jobs are created
domestically for every new advanced industry job—0.8 locally and 1.4 outside of the
region. This means that in addition to the 12.3 million workers employed by
advanced industries, another 27.1 million U.S. workers owe their jobs to
economic activity supported by advanced industries. Directly and indirectly,
then, the sector supports almost 39 million jobs—nearly one-fourth of all U.S.
employment.
The US economy is driving global economy, a slowdown in the us
would mean a slowdown around the world
Bloomberg January 9, 2015. “U.S. Retakes the Helm of the Global Economy” Rich
Miller. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-01-09/u-s-retakes-the-helmof-the-global-economy//JJ
(Bloomberg) -- The U.S. is back in the driver’s seat of the global economy after
15 years of watching China and emerging markets take the lead. The world’s biggest
economy will expand by 3.2 percent or more this year, its best performance
since at least 2005, as an improving job market leads to stepped-up consumer
spending, according to economists at JPMorgan Chase & Co., Deutsche Bank AG and
BNP Paribas SA. That outcome would be about what each foresees for the
world economy as a whole and would be the first time since 1999 that
America hasn’t lagged behind global growth, based on data from the
International Monetary Fund. “The U.S. is again the engine of global
growth,” said Allen Sinai, chief executive officer of Decision Economics in New York.
“The economy is looking stellar and is in its best shape since the 1990s.” In the latest
sign of America’s resurgence, the Labor Department reported on Jan. 9 that payrolls
rose 252,000 in December as the unemployment rate dropped to 5.6 percent, its lowest
level since June 2008. Job growth last month was highlighted by the biggest gain in
construction employment in almost a year. Factories, health-care providers and
business services also kept adding to their payrolls. About 3 million more Americans
found work in 2014, the most in 15 years and a sign companies are optimistic
U.S. demand will persist even as overseas markets struggle. U.S. government
securities rose after the report as investors focused on a surprise drop in hourly wages
last month. Ten-year Treasury yields declined seven basis points to 1.95 percent at 5
p.m. in New York on Jan. 9. “We are still waiting to see the kind of strengthening of
wage numbers we would expect to be consistent with what we are seeing elsewhere in
terms of growth and the absolute jobs numbers,” Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta
President Dennis Lockhart said in a Jan. 9 interview. Breaking Away The U.S. is
breaking away from the rest of the world partly because it has had more success working
off the debt-driven excesses that helped precipitate the worst recession since the Great
Depression. “The progress has been far greater in the U.S.,” Glenn Hubbard, dean of the
Columbia Business School in New York and a former chief White House economist, told
the American Economic Association annual conference in Boston on Jan. 3.
Delinquencies on consumer installment loans fell to a record-low 1.51 percent in the
third quarter, the American Bankers Association said on Jan. 8. That’s “well under” the
15-year average of 2.3 percent on such loans, which include credit cards and borrowing
for car purchases and home improvements, it said. U.S. households have benefited from
the strengthening job market and the collapse in oil prices. The nationwide average cost
of a gallon of regular gasoline was $2.13 on Jan. 11, the cheapest since May 2009,
according to figures from motoring group AAA. Wage Gains While wage gains have
lagged -- average hourly earnings fell 0.2 percent last month from November -- they will
accelerate as the labor market continues to tighten, according to Mohamed El-Erian, a
Bloomberg View columnist and an adviser to Munich-based Allianz SE. “It’s just a
matter of time before wage growth picks up,” he told Bloomberg Television’s “In The
Loop” program on Jan. 9. Spending is already strengthening. Households splurged on
new cars, appliances, televisions and clothing as spending climbed 0.6 percent in
November, double the gain in October, according to figures from the Commerce
Department in Washington. Light-vehicle sales totaled 16.5 million in 2014, the most
since 2006. “The economy picked up a nice tailwind at the end of the year,” Bill Fay,
group vice president for Toyota Motor Corp.’s U.S. sales arm, said on a Jan. 5
conference call. “This strength will carry the auto industry to a sixth straight year of
growth in 2015 with analyst projections ranging as high as 17 million.” Consumer
Spending At $11.5 trillion in 2013, U.S. personal consumption expenditures
were larger than the gross domestic product of any other country that year,
including China, according to statistics from the IMF in Washington. The figures aren’t
adjusted to reflect price discrepancies for the same goods in different nations -- so-
called purchasing power parity -- which tends to inflate the output of developing nations
where consumers pay less for everything from haircuts to coffee. Deutsche Bank
economists led by David Folkerts-Landau in London forecast U.S. GDP will expand 3.7
percent this year, after climbing 2.5 percent in 2014. The U.S. will contribute close
to 18 percent to global growth of 3.6 percent in 2015, compared with 11 percent for
all other industrial countries combined, they wrote in a Jan. 9 report. While the U.S.
is gathering strength, the BRIC nations -- Brazil, Russia, India and China -are facing tougher times after spending much of the past 15 years basking in the
attention of global investors. BRICs Faltering Brazil’s debt was downgraded last year for
the first time in a decade while Russia is heading into recession, its economy pummeled
by the collapse of oil prices and U.S. and European sanctions. Growth in China and
India has slowed as both countries grapple with revamping their
economies. “Close the book on emerging markets driving global growth,” Nancy Lazar,
co-founder and a partner at Cornerstone Macro LP in New York, wrote in a Jan. 8 report
to clients. Even Jim O’Neill, the former Goldman Sachs Group Inc. chief economist who
coined the BRIC acronym, has soured on some of its members, saying in an e-mail that
he would be tempted to remove Brazil and Russia from the group if they fail to revive
their flagging economies. “It is tough for the BRIC countries to all repeat their
remarkable growth rates” of the first decade of this century, said O’Neill, a
Bloomberg View columnist and former chairman of Goldman Sachs Asset Management
International.
Economic growth is key to prevent U.S-China Conflict
HSU 11-[“Economic Ties Could Help Prevent US-China War” Jeremy Hsu, Innovation
NewsDaily Senior Writer; 01 November 2011 05:32 PM ET;
http://www.innovationnewsdaily.com/660-china-military-cyber-nationalsecurity.html]
As the U.S. faces China's economic and military rise, it also holds a
dwindling hand of cards to play in the unlikely case of open conflict.
Cyberattacks aimed at computer networks, targeted disabling of satellites
or economic warfare could end up bringing down both of the frenemies.
That means ensuring the U.S. economy remains strong and well-balanced,
with China's economy possibly representing the best deterrent, according to a
new report. The Rand Corporation's analysts put low odds on a China-U.S. military
conflict taking place, but still lay out danger scenarios where the U.S. and China
face greater risks of stumbling into an unwanted war with one another.
They point to the economic codependence of both countries as the best bet
against open conflict, similar to how nuclear weapons ensured mutually assured
destruction for the U.S. and Soviet Union during the Cold War. War Militaria Collectors
www.JCAmericana.comWe Buy War Artifacts & Militaria Free Appraisals for
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$729,000 with $0 Down. Ads by Google "It is often said that a strong economy is the
basis of a strong defense," the Rand report says. "In the case of China, a strong U.S.
economy is not just the basis for a strong defense, it is itself perhaps the
best defense against an adventurous China." Such "mutually assured
economic destruction" would devastate both the U.S. and China, given how
China represents America's main creditor and manufacturer. The economic
fallout could lead to a global recession worse than that caused by the
financial crisis of 2008-2009. The U.S. still spends more than five times on defense
compared with China, but Rand analysts suggest that China's defense budget could
outstrip that of the U.S. within the next 20 years. The U.S. Air Force and Navy's current
edge in the Pacific has also begun to shrink as China develops aircraft, ships,
submarines and missiles capable of striking farther out from its coast. Existing U.S.
advantages in cyberwar and anti-satellite capabilities also don't offset the fact that the
U.S. military depends far more heavily on computer networks and satellites than China's
military. That makes a full-out cyberwar or satellite attacks too risky for the U.S., but
perhaps also for China. "There are no lives lost — just extensive harm, heightened
antagonism, and loss of confidence in network security," Rand analysts say. "There
would be no 'winner.'" Open military conflict between China and the U.S. could
also have "historically unparalleled" economic consequences even if neither
country actively engages in economic warfare, Rand analysts say. The U.S.
could both boost direct defense in the unlikely case of war and reduce the
risk of escalation by strengthening China's neighbors. Such neighbors,
including India, South Korea, Japan and Taiwan, also represent possible
flashpoints for China-U.S. conflict in the scenarios laid out by the Rand
report. Other possible danger zones include the South China Sea, where
China and many neighboring countries have disputes over territorial
claims, as well as in the murkier realm of cyberspace. Understandably, China
has shown fears of being encircled by semi-hostile U.S. allies. That's why Rand analysts
urged the U.S. to make China a partner rather than rival for maintaining international
security. They also pointed out, encouragingly, that China has mostly taken "cautious
and pragmatic" policies as an emerging world power. "As China becomes a true
peer competitor, it also becomes potentially a stronger partner in the
defense as well as economic field," the Rand analysts say.
Nuclear war causes extinction
Robock 11 [Alan – Prof Environmental Science @ Rutgers. “Nuclear Winter is a Real
and Present Danger” Nature, Vol 473. Summer 2011 Ebsco]
In the 1980s, discussion and debate about the possibility of a ‘nuclear winter’ helped to end the arms race between the United States
and the Soviet Union. As former Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev said in an interview in 2000: “Models made by Russian and
American scientists showed that a
nuclear war would result in a nuclear winter that
would be extremely destructive to all life on Earth; the knowledge of that was a great stimulus
to us, to people of honour and morality, to act.” As a result, the number of nuclear weapons in the world started to fall, from a peak
of about 70,000 in the 1980s to a total of about 22,000 today. In another five years that number could go as low as 5,000, thanks to
the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) between the United States and Russia, signed on 8 April 2010. Yet the
environmental threat of nuclear war has not gone away. The world faces the
prospect of a smaller, but still catastrophic, nuclear conflict. There are now
nine nuclear-weapons states. Use of a fraction of the global nuclear arsenal
by anyone, from the superpowers to India versus Pakistan, still presents the
largest potential environmental danger to the planet by humans. That
threat is being ignored. One reason for this denial is that the prospect of a
nuclear war is so horrific on so many levels that most people simply look
away. Two further reasons are myths that persist among the general public: that the nuclear
winter theory has been disproved, and that nuclear winter is no longer a
threat. These myths need to be debunked. The term ‘nuclear winter’, coined by Carl Sagan and his
colleagues in a 1983 paper1 in Science, describes the dramatic effects on the climate caused by smoke from fires ignited by nuclear
attacks on cities and industrial areas. In the 1980s my colleagues and I calculated, using
the best climate
models available at the time, that if one-third of the existing arsenal was used,
there would be so much smoke that surface temperatures would plummet
below freezing around the world for months, killing virtually all plants and
producing worldwide famine. More people could die in China from starvation than in the nations actively
bombing each other. As many countries around the world realized that a superpower nuclear war would be a disaster for them, they
pressured the superpowers to end their arms race. Sagan did a good job of summarizing the policy impacts2 in 1984: although
weapons were continuing to be built, it would be suicide to use them. The idea of climatic catastrophe was fought against by those
who wanted to keep the nuclear-weapon industry alive, or who supported the growth of nuclear arsenals politically3.
Scientifically, there was no real debate about the concept, only about the
details. In 1986, atmospheric researchers Starley Thompson and Stephen Schneider wrote a piece in Foreign Affairs appraising
the theory4 and highlighting what they saw as the patchiness of the effect. They coined the term ‘nuclear autumn’, noting that it
wouldn’t be ‘winter’ everywhere in the aftermath of a nuclear attack. They didn’t mean for people to think that it would be all raking
leaves and football games, but many members of the public, and some pro-nuclear advocates, preferred to take it that way. The fight
over the details of the modelling caused a rift between Sagan and Schneider that never healed. When I bring up the topic of nuclear
winter, people invariably tell me that they think the theory has been disproved. But research continues to support the original
concept. By
2007, models had began to approximate a realistic atmosphere up
to 80 kilometres above Earth’s surface, including the stratosphere and
mesosphere. This enabled me, and my coauthors, to calculate for the first time that
smoke particles would be heated by the Sun and lifted into the upper
stratosphere, where they would stay for many years5,6. So the cooling would
last for much longer than we originally thought. DARK DAYS Many of those who
do accept the nuclear-winter concept think that the scenario applies only to
a mass conflict, on a scale no longer conceivable in the modern world. This
is also false. A ‘small’ nuclear war between India and Pakistan, with each
using 50 Hiroshima-size bombs (far less than 1% of the current arsenal), if
dropped on megacity targets in each country would produce climate change
unprecedented in recorded human history 5. Five million tonnes of black
carbon smoke would be emitted into the upper troposphere from the burning cities, and
then be lofted into the stratosphere by the heat of the Sun. Temperatures would be lower than during
the ‘Little Ice Age’ (1400–1850), during which famine killed millions. For several years, growing seasons would be
shortened by weeks in the mid-latitudes (see ‘A decade of cooling). Brian Toon at the University of Colorado in Boulder, Richard
Turco at the University of California, Los Angeles, Georgiy Stenchikov at Rutgers University in New Brunswick, New Jersey, and I,
all of whom were pioneers in nuclear-winter research in the 1980s, have tried, along with our students, to publicize our results. We
have published refereed journal articles, popular pieces in Physics Today and Scientific American, a policy forum in Science, and
now this article. But Foreign Affairs and Foreign Policy, perhaps the two most prominent foreign-policy magazines in English, would
not even review articles we submitted. We have had no luck getting attention from the US government. Toon and I visited the US
Congress and gave briefings to congressional staff on the subject two years ago, but nothing happened as a result. The US President’s
science adviser John Holdren has not responded to our requests — in 2009 and more recently — for consideration of new scientific
results in US nuclear policy. The only interest at a national level I have had was somewhat surreal: in September 2010, Fidel Castro
summoned me to a conference on nuclear winter in Havana, to help promote his new view that a
nuclear conflict
would bring about Armageddon. The next day, my talk — the entire 90 minutes including questions — was
broadcast on nationwide television in prime time, and appeared on the front page of the two national newspapers in Cuba. As in the
1980s, it is still too difficult for most people to fully grasp the consequences of a nuclear conflict. But it must be grasped. We
scientists must continue to push our results out to the public and to policymakers, so they can in turn push political will in the
direction of disarmament. Just as Gorbachev, armed with the knowledge of nuclear winter, helped to end the cold war, so too can the
politicians of today use science to support further reductions in arms. The New START treaty is not enough.
XTN
1) Overreach has killed USA company competitiveness that’s
Forbes 13
2) USA econ key to advancing global econ that’s Bloomberg
3) Econ growth prevents China miscalc which causes extinction,
that’s Robock 11
IF NEEDED:
NSA surveillence has hampered the tech industry and is driving
companies away and increasing data localization
Dou 6/17/15 (Eva Dou. June 17, 2015. The Wall Street Journal. Wsj.com “Cisco Unveils
$10 Billion China Plan” [http://www.wsj.com/articles/cisco-unveils-10-billion-chinaplan-1434540957])
BEIJING— Cisco
Systems Inc. said it will make investments and partnerships
worth more than $10 billion in China over the next several years, as the networkinggear maker looks to strengthen its position in the market amid geopolitical
headwinds. WSJ.D WSJ.D is the Journal’s home for tech news, analysis and product reviews. FCC Plans to Fine A&T $100
Million Over Speed Caps Uber Driver Was an Employee, California Commission Says Former Nokia CEO Stephen Elop Is Leaving
Microsoft Cisco unveiled the plan on Wednesday, after outgoing Chief Executive John Chambers and his replacement Chuck
Robbins met with Chinese Vice Premier Wang Yang and other government leaders in Beijing. In its statement, Cisco
didn’t
outline specific investments or other targets, such as a time frame. Cisco
also said it signed a memorandum of understanding with China’s top
economic-planning body, the National Development and Reform Commission, to invest in areas
that will help the country achieve its long-term goal of innovation-driven
development. “Cisco is deeply committed to our Chinese partners,” said Mr.
Robbins in the statement. Cisco and other U.S. technology suppliers face a challenging
business environment in China after former U.S. National Security Agency
contractor Edward Snowden alleged the NSA used U.S. technology products
to help it spy overseas. China has upped its use of domestic technology in
response and is drafting stricter technology security rules to govern foreign
suppliers. Cisco has said it had no knowledge of any NSA spying activities. The announcement also comes amid broader
strategic changes at Cisco due to the change of CEO, which is set to take place next month. Mr. Robbins has flattened the global
executive structure, and the company said internally last week that several Chinese senior executive positions would be removed.
Mr. Chambers will become executive chairman. Cisco’s China sales fell 20% in the quarter ended April 25 from a year earlier.
Several other U.S. tech companies have announced large China investments
in the past year. Qualcomm Inc. said in July last year it would invest up to $150 million in Chinese startups. Intel Corp.
said in September it bought about 20% of Tsinghua Unigroup Ltd., which owned the China’s second- and third-largest chip-design
firms, for $1.5 billion.
Past NSA spying techniques has threatened relations with US allies
John Vidal and Suzanne Goldenberg 14 (January 30, 2014. TheGaurdian.com
“Snowden revelations of NSA spying on Copenhagen climate talks spark anger”
[http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/jan/30/snowden-nsa-spyingcopenhagen-climate-talks])
Developing countries have reacted angrily to revelations that the United
States spied on other governments at the Copenhagen climate summit in
2009. Documents leaked by Edward Snowden show how the US National Security Agency (NSA)
monitored communication between key countries before and during the
conference to give their negotiators advance information about other
positions at the high-profile meeting where world leaders including Barack Obama, Gordon Brown and Angela
Merkel failed to agree to a strong deal on climate change. Jairam Ramesh, the then
Indian environment minister and a key player in the talks that involved 192 countries and 110 heads of state, s aid: "Why
the hell did they do this and at the end of this, what did they get out of
Copenhagen? They got some outcome but certainly not the outcome they
wanted. It was completely silly of them. First of all, they didn't get what they
wanted. With all their hi-tech gizmos and all their snooping, ultimately the
Basic countries [Brazil, South Africa, India and China] bailed Obama out.
With all their snooping what did they get?" Martin Khor, an adviser to developing
countries at the summit and director of the South Centre thinktank, said: "Would you play poker with
someone who can see your cards? Spying on one another like this is
absolutely not on. When someone has an upper hand is very disconcerting.
There should be an assurance in negotiations like this that powerful players
are not going to gain undue advantage with technological surveillance. "For
negotiations as complex as these we need maximum goodwill and trust. It is absolutely
critical. If there is anything that prevents a level playing field, that stops
negotiations being held on equal grounds. It disrupts the talks," he said. The NSA
would keep US negotiators abreast of their rivals' positions, the document says. "Leaders and negotiating teams from around the
world will undoubtedly be engaging in intense last-minute policy formulating; at the same time, they will be holding sidebar
discussions with their counterparts, details of which are of great interest to our policymakers … Signals intelligence will undoubtedly
play a significant role in keeping our negotiators as well informed as possible throughout the negotiations," it reads. The
document shows the NSA had provided advance details of the Danish plan
to "rescue" the talks should they founder, and also had learned of China's efforts to
coordinate its position with India before the conference. The talks – which ended
in disarray after the US, working with a small group of 25 countries, tried to ram through an agreement that other developing
countries mostly rejected – were marked by subterfuge, passion and chaos. Members of the
Danish negotiating team told the Danish newspaper Informationthat both the US and Chinese delegations were "peculiarly wellinformed" about closed-door discussions. "They simply sat back, just as we had feared they would if they knew about our document,"
one source told Information. British negotiators at the summit declined to say whether their negotiating positions had been
informed by US intelligence. "It is a longstanding policy that we do not comment on intelligence matters," said a spokesman for the
Department of Energy and Climate Change, the UK government department that led the negotiations in Copenhagen. Ed Miliband,
who as energy secretary led the political negotiations for Britain, declined to comment. However, at the time, he was furious that the
Danish text which the US had received advance information about, had been leaked to the Guardian. But one key
negotiator for the G77 group of 132 developing countries, who asked not to be named, said at the time
that he strongly believed
that the US was eavesdropping on his meetings and
would only talk in a secure back room that he thought was not bugged. "I was well aware that they
seemed to know what our position was before we did," he told the Guardian. But Ramesh said that he had no idea that the US was
spying on him. "I didn't get a sense that I was being followed. I didn't get a sense that my phones were tapped," he said. Civil
society groups from around the world condemned the US. "The UN climate
talks are supposed to be about building trust – that's been under threat for years because of the US
backward position on climate action – these revelations will only crack that trust further," said
Meena Raman, negotiations expert from the Malaysian-based Third World Network. "Fighting climate change is
a global struggle, and these revelations clearly show that the US government
is more interested in crassly protecting a few vested interests," said Brandon Wu,
senior policy analyst with development organisation ActionAid in the United States. US climate activist and founder of 350.org,
Bill McKibben, called the spying revelations "insane and disgusting". US
diplomatic cables made public by WikiLeaks in 2010 showed that the CIA had sought intelligence from UN diplomats about the
negotiations in advance of the summit, and Snowden documents published last year revealed the US had spied on Indonesia at the
Bali climate summit in 2007
Due to concerns about the NSA, American companies are losing
billions
New York Times. March 21. 2014. “Revelations by Snowden damage U.S. tech
industry: Worried about privacy, foreign clients start to take business elsewhere”.
CLAIRE CAIN MILLER. /JJ
Technology companies abroad say they are gaining customers who are
shunning United States companies because of security concerns. Microsoft
has lost customers, including the government of Brazil. IBM is spending more than a
billion dollars to build data centers overseas in order to reassure foreign customers that
their information is safe from prying eyes in the United States government. And
technology companies abroad say they are gaining customers who are
shunning United States companies, suspicious because of the revelations by
Edward J. Snowden of the National Security Agency's vast surveillance
program. Even as Washington grapples with the diplomatic and political
fallout of Mr. Snowden's leaks, the more urgent issue, companies and
analysts say, is economic. It is impossible to see now the full economic ramifications
of the spying revelations -- in part because most companies are locked in multiyear
contracts -- but the pieces are beginning to add up as businesses question the
trustworthiness of American technology products. Meanwhile, the confirmation hearing
last week for the new N.S.A. chief, the appearance by video link of Mr. Snowden at a
technology conference in Texas and the drip of new details about government spying
have kept attention focused on an issue that many technology executives had hoped
would go away. "It's clear to every single tech company that this is affecting
their bottom line," said Daniel Castro, a senior analyst at the Information
Technology and Innovation Foundation, who predicted that the United States
cloud computing industry could lose $35 billion by 2016. Forrester, a
technology research firm, said the losses could be as high as $180 billion, or 25
percent of industry revenue, based on the size of the cloud computing, web hosting
and outsourcing markets and the worst-case scenario for damages. The business effect
of the Snowden revelations is felt most in the daily conversations between technology
companies with products to pitch and their wary customers. The topic of surveillance,
which rarely came up before, is "the new normal" in these conversations, as one
technology company executive described it. "We're hearing from customers, especially
global enterprise customers, that they care more than ever about where their content is
stored and how it is used and secured," said John Frank, deputy general counsel at
Microsoft, which has been publicizing that it allows customers to store their data in
Microsoft data centers in their own countries. At the same time, Mr. Castro said,
companies feel the United States government is only making a bad situation worse.
"Most of the companies in this space are very frustrated because there
hasn't been any kind of response that's made it so they can go back to their
customers and say, 'See, this is what's different now, you can trust us
again,"' he said. In some cases, that has meant forgoing potential revenue. Though it is
hard to quantify missed opportunities, American businesses are being left off some
requests for proposals from foreign customers who previously would have included
them, said James Staten, a cloud computing analyst at Forrester who has read clients'
requests for proposals. There are German companies, Mr. Staten said, "explicitly not
inviting certain American companies to join." He added, "It's like, 'Well, the very best
vendor to do this is IBM, and you didn't invite them."' The result has been a boon for
foreign companies. Brazil and Europe, which had used American undersea cables for
intercontinental communication, decided last month to build their own cable between
Brazil and Portugal and gave the contract to Brazilian and Spanish companies. The
Brazilian government also abandoned Microsoft Outlook for its own email system,
which uses Brazilian data centers. Runbox, a Norwegian email service that
markets itself as an alternative to American services like Gmail and says it
does not comply with foreign court orders seeking personal information,
reported a 34 percent annual rise in customers after the N.S.A. revelations.
Large European telecommunications companies like Deutsche Telekom of Germany
have introduced services like an email product that keeps users' data inside Germany in
direct response to customers' concerns about the N.S.A. scandal. Others like Orange of
France have seen an increase in business customers asking about privacy when
discussing potential cloud computing contracts. While the company's 15 data centers in
Europe, which has stronger data protection laws than the United States, are a major
selling point, Orange says it still has to provide services that compete with what
American rivals can offer. "The Snowden story is putting the pendulum between
European and American companies back into the middle," said Axel Haentjens, vice
president of cloud computing at Orange. "Before, the pendulum favored the
Americans. The competitive advantage is now more balanced." Mark J.
Barrenechea, chief executive of OpenText, Canada's largest software company, said an
anti-American attitude took root after the passage of the Patriot Act. But "the volume of
the discussion has risen significantly post-Snowden," he said. Of OpenText's clients, for
instance, a large German auto company required data to reside in Germany,
and a global steel manufacturer based in Britain demanded that its data not
cross United States borders. "Issues like privacy are more important than
finding the cheapest price," said Matthias Kunisch, a German software executive
who spurned United States cloud computing providers for Deutsche Telekom. "Because
of Snowden, our customers have the perception that American companies have
connections to the N.S.A." Security analysts say that ultimately the fallout from Mr.
Snowden's revelations could mimic what happened to Huawei, the Chinese
software company, which was forced to abandon major acquisitions and
contracts amid accusations by American lawmakers that the company's
products contained a backdoor for China's People's Liberation Army, even
though this claim was never definitively verified. Silicon Valley companies have
complained to government officials that their actions are hurting business. But
companies clam up on specifics about economic harm, whether to avoid frightening
shareholders or because it is too early to produce concrete evidence. "The companies
need to keep the priority on the government to do something about it, but they don't
have the evidence to go to the government and say billions of dollars are not coming to
this country," Mr. Staten said. Some American companies say the business hit has been
minor at most. John Chambers, the chief executive of Cisco Systems, said in an
interview that the N.S.A. disclosures had not affected Cisco's sales "in a major way."
Although deals in Europe and Asia have been slower to close, he said, they are still being
completed -- an experience echoed by several other computing companies. Still, the
business blowback can be felt in other ways than lost business. Security analysts say
technology companies have collectively spent millions and possibly billions
of dollars adding state-of-the-art encryption features to consumer services,
like Google search and Microsoft Outlook, and to the cables that link data
centers at Google, Yahoo and other companies. IBM said in January that it
would spend $1.2 billion to build 15 new data centers, including centers in London,
Hong Kong and Sydney, Australia, to lure foreign customers who are sensitive about the
location of their data. Salesforce.com announced similar plans this month.
Meanwhile, lawmakers in Germany and Brazil are considering legislation
that would make it costly or even technically impossible for American
technology companies to operate inside their borders. In Brazil, for example, a
proposed law would require that Brazilian users' data be kept in data centers in the
country. If it passes, companies like Google "could be barred from doing
business in one of the world's most significant markets," said Richard Salgado,
director of law enforcement and information security at Google. The company has said it
is technically nearly impossible to provide its services without sending data crisscrossing
the globe. Some government officials say laws like this could have a motive other than
protecting privacy. "Localization of data means more business for local
companies," Richard Clarke, the former United States cyberchief, said last month.
AT No war:
Yes War
Pillsbury 14 (Michael Pillsbury is a director of the Center on Chinese Strategy at the
Hudson Institute. “China and the United States Are Preparing For War”. Foreign Policy. November
13, 2014. http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/11/13/china -and-the-united-states-are-preparing-forwar/).
Should we really be worried about war between the United States and China? Yes.
Over the last four decades of studying China, I have spoken with hundreds of
members of China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and read
countless Chinese military journals and strategy articles. Chinese military and
political leaders believe that their country is at the center of American war
planning. In other words, Beijing believes that the United States is readying itself
for the possibility of a conflict with China — and that it must prepare for that
eventuality.
Pakistan
The perception of the NSA spying on Pakistan has increased
resentment and distrust
Economic Times. ’14. (“Pakistan People's Party condemns snooping by National
Security Agency”
PTI Jul 3, 2014. http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-0703/news/51057439_1_party-condemns-internal-affairs-pakistan-people )//AF
ISLAMABAD: Pakistan People's Party on Wednesday condemned as totally
unacceptable the US National Security Agency's snooping over it and asked the
government to take up the issue at diplomatic level. According to media reports the
declassified documents show that Pakistan People's Party (PPP) was under
scanner of the US secret agency. PPP spokesman Farhatullah Babar
condemned it and called upon the government to take up the issue at
diplomatic level and seek guarantees that such grave violations of
international law do not take place in the future. "The revelation of spying on a
major political party of Pakistan is a grave, unwarranted and totally unacceptable
interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign country and is condemned," the
spokesperson said. Babar said that PPP is proud of its record of always acting in
supreme national interest, it owes no explanation to any foreign agency and no other
country, regardless of its might and power, has any right to spy on it. "Such
insensitive operations and unacceptable interference in the affairs of a political
party of a sovereign country will serve no purpose except to increase
resentment and distrust," he said. He said that those who have violated the norms of
responsible behavior by spying on the political institutions of a sovereign country owe
an apology. PPP is the main opposition party and is considered as major
democratic force in Pakistan.’
Trust is needed in order to negotiate a nuclear agreement with
Pakistan
Williams 14. (“Trust and Distrust in the Global Nuclear Community” Heather
Williams. Nuclear Specialist at Chatham House. 2014.
http://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/16475# )//JJ
On 8-9 December the Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs hosted a conference, the
third of its kind, on the humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons, which was
attended by nearly 160 states. The conference differed from its predecessors in being
more politically charged but it continued to ask paradigmatic and practical questions of
the global nuclear order. In closing, Austria offered a comprehensive pledge to
share the findings of the conference and to work with all relevant
stakeholders ‘in efforts to stigmatize, prohibit and eliminate nuclear
weapons in light of their unacceptable humanitarian consequences and
associated risks.’ Nuclear weapons are back on the agenda with North Korean
belligerence, the Iran nuclear talks, and the crisis with Russia and concerns about its
compliance with arms control agreements. There have also been changes in the nuclear
discourse, largely due to the humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons initiative,
launched in 2012. With around 160 participants, the Vienna Conference was bigger than
its predecessors (128 states attended the 2013 conference in Oslo, Norway and 146
attended Nayarit, Mexico in 2014) and there was a greater diversity of views. The United
States and United Kingdom joined this conference for the first time, along with an
unofficial representative from China. Perhaps the biggest difference between Vienna
and its predecessors, however, was that the conference dealt more directly with strategic
and political issues. The Oslo and Nayarit conferences avoided debates over deterrence
and geopolitical balancing, aside from occasional comments about regional security
concerns. At the talks in Vienna, numerous countries used the diplomatic opportunity to
express opposition to Russian aggression. In particular, Ukraine made a statement
about Russian ‘military dominance’ and its capability and desire to demonstrate nuclear
superiority over NATO and the US. In addition, while the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) was mentioned in previous conferences, it was at the forefront in Vienna
in the lead-up to the NPT Review Conference in May 2015. Expectations are low for the
Review Conference, but many states, such as Germany, referred to the ’joint interest’ in
strengthening and sustaining the NPT. Hopefully, this effort and focus will
broaden to include India and Pakistan, which have participated in all the
conferences, as well as Israel and North Korea. In addition, the statements by the US
and UK and their presence in Vienna demonstrated that countries with nuclear
deterrence policies are willing to participate in a humanitarian approach. The
permanent five members of the UN Security Council (P5) previously accused the
humanitarian impacts approach of being a ‘distraction’ from the step-by-step process
towards disarmament and of risking undermining the NPT. At the Vienna Conference,
four questions and themes emerged for the global nuclear order, as it evolves in
response to the Iran talks, a resurgent Russia, and pressure from non-nuclear weapon
states (NNWS) for further progress on disarmament. First, is there an acceptable level
of risk in living with nuclear weapons? According to the chair’s summary, the risks of
nuclear weapons are ‘unacceptable’ and ‘increase over time’ and ‘limiting nuclear
weapons to a deterrence role does not eliminate the risk of their use.’ With
the end of the Cold War, nuclear weapons shifted from the forefront to the
back-burner of political and public thought. As a result, much of the
expertise on the
from national security and created a situation where they really exist on their own, and
then slowly they can be—as is suggested in (inaudible) from the joint enterprise. And
that's really not the case in South Asia. They're very much part, particularly for Pakistan,
but to some extent, for India vis-a-vie its relationship with China. They're very much a
part of the national security calculus and very much part of how we might face a future
crisis and the signaling and the posturing that goes on in that part of the world. So
you're quite right to identify it as the sort of—the major sticking point. I think that, as
we've said about the other regions, it's a long, slow process of building
confidence between the two, of putting in place measures which will reduce
the danger of accidental use, and also push back the moment when use
might happen if there is a conventional conflict and a sort of broader approach
to dealing with the risks associated with nuclear weapons has stagnated.
These risks include accidents, miscalculation, and the escalation of crises in
regions where nuclear weapons are present. The Vienna meeting captured the
scale of the risks and the increasing worries about the cyber vulnerabilities of nuclear
forces. Second, the humanitarian impacts of nuclear testing were in the forefront at
Vienna with a panel of victims of nuclear testing in the Marshall Islands, Australia, and
the US and, later from the floor, a contribution from Kazakhstan. This theme offers a
way ahead for the initiative, particularly for the P5, along with India and
Pakistan, to acknowledge the humanitarian impacts of nuclear testing and
to promote the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,
building on the prohibition of nuclear testing in the atmosphere and underground.
Third, hearing the testimony of victims of nuclear bombings and testing has a deep
emotional impact, and raises awareness of the consequences of nuclear weapons
detonation with potential policy impact. Ethical and moral questions were both implicit
in hearing about children playing in the ‘snow’ in the Marshall Islands, and explicit with
a message from Pope Francis questioning the ethical framework of nuclear deterrence
and calling on us to stay true to the tenets of the peace and love in the human heart.
Fourth, ‘trust’ was a frequent theme in Vienna. India discussed the need to
increase trust on the path towards disarmament within the context of the
Conference on Disarmament. Activists, such as Michelle Thomas, a victim of US
nuclear testing, spoke of distrust towards their governments. And the UK stated that
trust, confidence, and verification measures are needed on the path to
disarmament in order to maintain strategic stability. Distrust seems
pervasive in the current global nuclear order, particularly the deteriorating
situation with Russia and lack of opportunities for further US-Russia arms control,
along with Russia’s announcement that it will not attend the 2016 Nuclear Security
Summit. This is compounded by the end of cooperation with the US to secure Russian
nuclear materials. What the Vienna Conference demonstrated, however, was that the
majority of countries understand what is at stake. They want to build trust and take
seriously their nuclear responsibilities, to move forward within the global nuclear
community.
Nuclear Tensions between India and Pakistan are
reaching a tipping point
Council on Foreign Relations April 24, 2015. “Assessing Global Nonproliferation
in 2015 Approaching the Tipping Point: Nuclear Nonproliferation in 2015” Speakers:
Peter Hayes Executive Director, Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability Peter
Jones Annenberg Distinguished Visiting Fellow, Hoover Institution; Associate
Professor, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa
Steven Pifer Director, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative, Brookings
Institution Presider: David C. Speedie Senior Fellow and Director of the U.S.
Engagement Program, Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs.
http://www.cfr.org/proliferation/assessing-global-nonproliferation-2015/p36449)//JJ
The one region none of you have talked about—for obviously reasons, because you don't
specialize in it—but the one where a nuclear tipping point may come into play is South
Asia, where we are watching a Pakistani program that seems to know no bounds and is
threatening to, you know, get larger than Britain's. India responding, and that obviously
is going to raise problems in Beijing down the road. Would you talk about that a little?
JONES: You know, I actually do some Track II work in South Asia specifically on the
nuclear question. And you're quite right. I mean, it is area of the world that I lose sleep
over, much more so than Iran, for example. I think the most worrisome thing to
my mind about the nuclear dynamic in South Asia is Pakistan's decision to go
ahead and deploy, whether you call them theater, tactical, low yield, whatever they
call them nuclear weapons and to essentially couple them with its
conventional deterrent. The idea being that if India attacks, well, it's
probably in response to a terrorist provocation, the threshold for the use of
nuclear weapons will be much reduced. They will be near the front and they'll be
low yield. And of course, this is exactly what the Pakistanis are doing. And then they say
well, this is what NATO did during the cold war. It was the conventionally-inferior
alliance vis-a-vis the Soviety—the Warsaw Pact, and therefore— Of course, it's very
different. I mean, the Warsaw Pact, NATO was not sponsoring groups to go across the
borders of East Germany and blow things up. So it's a different situation. But
nevertheless, there is a real problem there, and I'm not sure that the NPT as such is
equipped to deal with it. Not just because these two countries aren't members. It's more
than that. It's because the fundamental logic of the NPT has been sort of over time decoupled nuclear weapons issues between India and Pakistan. But also in the cases of
South Asia, it's a trilateral problem. Because the Indians, they say their primary cause of
their nuclear expansion, or the nuclear expansion they could undertake if they chose to
do so, is China. And therefore, there's a need to bring them in, as well. It's really a
trilateral problem. PIFER: And this might be a case where the Pakistanis might pay
attention to the NATO experiences was as NATO began to reduce its tactical nuclear
weapons, the first things it got rid of were the atomic demolition munitions, the
artillery, the short-range stuff. Because they understood that in a conventional conflict,
the pressure to use or lose those would be so great that you might have nuclear use
which was not intended by higher-level command authorities. JONES: But I think the
Pakistani—they will tell you that that's exactly the point. They want to confront the
Indians with this problem. If you cross the line, you know, we'll both find
out what happens. Because we don't know either. So just don't cross the line. I
mean, that's the sort of—you know, and the Indians are saying well, if you're going to
sort of take that attitude but continue to sponsor terror groups, we can't promise not to
cross the line because that's the only way we can—so that whole dynamic. So it becomes
a broader political question of the future, Pakistan and—I mean, I think I do take a little
bit of heart from the fact that I go there quite frequently and I talk to people and work
with them in these Track II settings. There is a growing recognition in Pakistan that this
sponsorship of substate actors has come back to bite them. Quite seriously. Primarily,
their sponsorship of substate actors on their northern border with Afghanistan. They
still perhaps—or some people think of the substate actors on the southern border with
India as national assets. But even there, there's much more of a robust discussion about,
you know, can we really control these people and are they doing things that are not
congruent with our interests? I wouldn't say it's a decisive conversation yet; they're still
supporting these groups. But I think it's at least the beginning of a conversation that
there is this tail—a tiger that's biting. SPEEDIE: I think we need more cricket matches
within India and Pakistan. There's a confidence... JONES: They always ends peacefully,
yeah. SPEEDIE:—confidence-building measure, especially if they end in a draw.
HAYES: David, can I say this very quickly? SPEEDIE: Yes. HAYES: And I'll be very brief.
Basically, unless China is drawn into a nuclear weapons-free zone in Northeast Asia, it
will be that much more difficult in South Asia to resolve those issues that you just
referred to. But the reciprocal is also the case. I mean, the nuclear weapon-free zones
that exist, or the potential ones, now actually affect each other. And the U.N.'s position
on this is that we need to think about this as a global mosaic, not just as one separate
from the other. Because they do actually interplay quite importantly and can be
synergistic as well as possibly undermine each other in some respects. But it is an
important part of the issue. SPEEDIE: The gentleman next to Lee Siegel (ph).
QUESTION: Trevor Stewart (ph), Deloitte. I'd be interested in what the panel thinks
about are we reaching a different kind of tipping point potentially with non-state actors?
Thinking about Al-Qaeda, ISIS, you know, some rogue faction in Libya or whatever.
With all the amount of nuclear technology that's bouncing around, what's the—what's
the risk? SPEEDIE: Non-state actors. Who's the—who worries most about non-state
actors? We all do. PIFER: Well, I think that's actually the nightmare scenario in a sense
that, you know, deterrence at some level works between states because you have
something to hold at risk. If you're dealing with Al-Qaeda, what can you hold at risk?
And Al-Qaeda may be so committed to terrorism that, you know, they may not care in
the end. And the flip side is also true, is that, you know, how in a deterrence relationship
will you assure a group like Al-Qaeda, who knows we're coming at them as much as we
can, that if they didn't do certain things we might back off. The good news I think is that
acquiring nuclear materials is something that non-state actors can't do on their own.
They're going to have to either get it willingly or steal it from a state actor.
Heightened tensions between India and Pakistan could lead to
miscalculation and nuclear war
Council on Foreign Relations April 24, 2015. (The Nautilus Institute's Peter
Hayes, the Hoover Institution's Peter Jones, and the Brookings Institution's Steven Pifer
join David C. Speedie, senior fellow at the Carnegie Council for Ethics in International
Affairs, to discuss the state of nuclear nonproliferation in 2015.) “Assessing Global
Nonproliferation in 2015” CFR./JJ
The one region none of you have talked about—for obviously reasons, because you don't
specialize in it—but the one where a nuclear tipping point may come into play is South
Asia, where we are watching a Pakistani program that seems to know no bounds and is
threatening to, you know, get larger than Britain's. India responding, and that obviously
is going to raise problems in Beijing down the road. Would you talk about that a little?
JONES: You know, I actually do some Track II work in South Asia specifically on the
nuclear question. And you're quite right. I mean, it is area of the world that I lose sleep
over, much more so than Iran, for example. I think the most worrisome thing to my
mind about the nuclear dynamic in South Asia is Pakistan's decision to go ahead and
deploy, whether you call them theater, tactical, low yield, whatever they call them
nuclear weapons and to essentially couple them with its conventional deterrent. The
idea being that if India attacks, well, it's probably in response to a terrorist
provocation, the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons will be much
reduced. They will be near the front and they'll be low yield. And of course, this is
exactly what the Pakistanis are doing. And then they say well, this is what NATO did
during the cold war. It was the conventionally-inferior alliance vis-a-vis the Soviety—the
Warsaw Pact, and therefore— Of course, it's very different. I mean, the Warsaw Pact,
NATO was not sponsoring groups to go across the borders of East Germany and blow
things up. So it's a different situation. But nevertheless, there is a real problem there,
and I'm not sure that the NPT as such is equipped to deal with it. Not just because these
two countries aren't members. It's more than that. It's because the fundamental logic of
the NPT has been sort of over time de-coupled nuclear weapons from national security
and created a situation where they really exist on their own, and then slowly they can
be—as is suggested in (inaudible) from the joint enterprise. And that's really not the case
in South Asia. They're very much part, particularly for Pakistan, but to some
extent, for India vis-a-vie its relationship with China. They're very much a
part of the national security calculus and very much part of how we might
face a future crisis and the signaling and the posturing that goes on in that
part of the world. So you're quite right to identify it as the sort of—the major sticking
point. I think that, as we've said about the other regions, it's a long, slow
process of building confidence between the two, of putting in place
measures which will reduce the danger of accidental use, and also push back
the moment when use might happen if there is a conventional conflict and a sort of
broader approach to dealing with the issues between India and Pakistan. But also in the
cases of South Asia, it's a trilateral problem. Because the Indians, they say their
primary cause of their nuclear expansion, or the nuclear expansion they
could undertake if they chose to do so, is China. And therefore, there's a
need to bring them in, as well. It's really a trilateral problem. PIFER: And this
might be a case where the Pakistanis might pay attention to the NATO experiences was
as NATO began to reduce its tactical nuclear weapons, the first things it got rid of were
the atomic demolition munitions, the artillery, the short-range stuff. Because they
understood that in a conventional conflict, the pressure to use or lose those
would be so great that you might have nuclear use which was not intended
by higher-level command authorities. JONES: But I think the Pakistani—they will
tell you that that's exactly the point. They want to confront the Indians with this
problem. If you cross the line, you know, we'll both find out what happens. Because we
don't know either. So just don't cross the line. I mean, that's the sort of—you
know, and the Indians are saying well, if you're going to sort of take that
attitude but continue to sponsor terror groups, we can't promise not to
cross the line because that's the only way we can—so that whole dynamic. So
it becomes a broader political question of the future, Pakistan and—I mean, I think I do
take a little bit of heart from the fact that I go there quite frequently and I talk to people
and work with them in these Track II settings. There is a growing recognition in
Pakistan that this sponsorship of substate actors has come back to bite
them. Quite seriously. Primarily, their sponsorship of substate actors on their northern
border with Afghanistan. They still perhaps—or some people think of the substate actors
on the southern border with India as national assets. But even there, there's much more
of a robust discussion about, you know, can we really control these people and are they
doing things that are not congruent with our interests? I wouldn't say it's a decisive
conversation yet; they're still supporting these groups. But I think it's at least the
beginning of a conversation that there is this tail—a tiger that's biting.
XTN
The NSA has overstepped its bounds by purposefully spying on
members of the media
Stapp 12 May 2015. – Graduate of Columbia School of Journalism. Stapp, Kitty.
Global Information Network
http://search.proquest.com/docview/1680261159/C0A09E0AD8864900PQ/9?account
id=44751)//JJ
NEW YORK, May 12, 2015 (IPS/GIN) - Ahmad Muaffaq Zaidan doesn't deny that he's
had contact with terrorist groups. In fact, it would have been rather difficult to do his job
otherwise. But the fact that Zaidan is a respected investigative journalist and the
Islamabad bureau chief for Al Jazeera didn't seem to faze the U.S. National
Security Agency, which not only spied on him, but went as far as to brand him
a likely member of Al Qaeda and put him on a watch list. The revelations of
NSA spying emerged late last week as part of the thousands of classified documents
leaked by former NSA employee Edward Snowden. "Given that Pakistan has been
consistently ranked as one of the most dangerous countries for journalists, the news of
Zaidan's surveillance further adds to the fear, restricting press freedom,"
said Furhan Hussain, manager of the Digital Rights and Freedom of Expression
programme at Bytes for All, a Pakistani human rights group. "Equally alarming, in this
case, is the fact that by compromising the information of respected journalists, such
spying also weakens the safety of their sources and media networks," he told IPS.
"Zaidan's communications intercept took place through the invasive
gathering and analysis of his metadata, a technique which has been frequently
responsible for drone-led non-transparent persecution of hundreds of people. Hussain
continued: "While it is often claimed that the state of Pakistan has failed to effectively
protest against these violations, it may also be important to raise questions about the
possible role of the state in facilitating the NSA to access vast amounts of data of those
residing within its borders, in the context of its third-party SIGINT partnership." Other
press freedom groups said the case was just one more in a long-running pattern of civil
liberties abuses. "Given the flood of disclosures over the past two years about the NSA's
vast range of mass and intrusive surveillance techniques and targets, it is unsurprising,
but nevertheless shocking, that the intelligence agency thought it appropriate
to use its capabilities to spy on an eminent journalist," Carly Nyst, Legal
Director of Privacy International, told IPS. "This case is illustrative of the grave
dangers of allowing security services to exercise immense powers in the
absence of proper scrutiny. By placing members of the media, who themselves play
an essential accountability role, particularly in areas of conflict, under surveillance, the
NSA has undermined the very values it is charged with promoting - security,
democracy, and free flow of information. "Without democratic accountability, spy
agencies will continue to sacrifice civil liberties in the name of strategic gain, without
sparing a thought to the critical journalistic freedom caught in the cross hairs," she
added. It's not the first time the NSA has targeted Al Jazeera. Based on leaked
documents, the German magazine Der Spiegel reported in 2009 that it had hacked into
the news agency's internal communication system. According to the Committee to
Protect Journalists, NSA whistleblower Russell Tice claimed in 2009 that in fact,
the agency makes it a point to target journalists and news agencies. Zaidan was
targeted under the ominously titled SKYNET programme, which monitors bulk call
records and searches the metadata for particular patterns. "It's this kind of big,
sweeping data gathering that worries us the most," Bob Dietz, Asia programme
coordinator for the New York-based Committee to Protect Journalists, told IPS. "If
someone were to track my behavior and all the people I've come into contact with over
the last 20 years, I imagine I would come up on some sort of chart ranking very high,"
he said wryly. Dietz doesn't expect the situation to change anytime soon, regardless of
who occupies the White House. "This is the reality under which we live. Government
agencies are relatively autonomous and attempts to control them are
ludicrous...whether or not there are laws protecting us," he said. Thomas Hughes,
executive director of the London-based ARTICLE 19, said his group is deeply concerned
by the news of NSA spying on Zaidan. "According to statements from Al Jazeera and
colleagues from other networks, Zaidan is a journalist of longstanding professional
reputation. Surveillance of journalists has a serious chilling effect on freedom of
expression, impeding the crucial role journalists play in uncovering wrongdoing and
holding governments to account for their actions," he told IPS. "Compromising the
confidentially of sources also seriously undermines the ability of journalists to perform
their work and potentially endangers the wellbeing and safety of those sources." Indeed,
as noted by the Intercept, which broke the allegations, Zaidan's reporting focused on the
Taliban and Al Qaeda, including several high-profile interviews with senior Al Qaeda
leaders. In strenuously denying the allegations, he patiently explained, "For us to be able
to inform the world, we have to be able to freely contact relevant figures in the public
discourse, speak with people on the ground, and gather critical information. "Any hint of
government surveillance that hinders this process is a violation of press freedom and
harms the public's right to know," he wrote in a response to the Intercept. "To assert
that myself, or any journalist, has any affiliation with any group on account of their
contact book, phone call logs, or sources is an absurd distortion of the truth and a
complete violation of the profession of journalism."
1) Killed Pakistan bilateral dialogues w/ US that’s Ecotimes
2) Need dialogues for negotiating nuclear deal that’s Williams
14
Impact is huge:
IndoPak war kills billions
Diep July 18, 2014 (Francis Diep is a science journalist based in Santa Babara, CA.
“Computer Models Show Exactly What Would Happen to Earth after A Nuclear World
War”. July 18 2014. Popular Science.
http://www.popsci.com/article/science/computer-models-show-what-exactly-wouldhappen-earth-after-nuclear-war)//AF
After the Indian-Pakistani nuclear exchange… Five megatons of black carbon enter the atmosphere
immediately. Black carbon comes from burned stuff and it absorbs heat from the sun before it can reach
the Earth. Some black carbon does eventually falls back to Earth in rain. After one year, the average
surface temperature of the Earth falls by 1.1 kelvin, or about two degrees Fahrenheit. After five years,
the Earth is, on average, three degrees colder than it used to be. Twenty years on, our home planet
warms again to about one degree cooler than the average before the nuclear war. Earth's falling
temperatures reduces the amount of rain the planet receives. Year five after the war, Earth will have 9
percent less rain than usual. Year 26 after the war, Earth gets 4.5 percent less rain than before the war.
In years 2-6 after the war, the frost-free growing season for crops is shortened by 10 to 40 days,
depending on the region. Chemical reactions in the atmosphere eat away Earth's ozone layer, which
protects Earth's inhabitants from ultraviolet radiation. In the five years after the war, the ozone is 20 to
25 percent thinner, on average. Ten years on, the ozone layer has recovered so that it's now 8 percent
thinner. The decreased UV protection may lead to more sunburns and skin cancers in people, as well as
reduced plant growth and destabilized DNA in cropssuch as corn. In a separate study, published in 2013,
International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War estimated 2 billion people would starve in
the wake of a 100-A-bomb war.
AT: Relations Good
India-Pakistan relations bad now
Nauman June 26 15 (Nauman is a Writer at The Wall Street Journal and Editor at
Newsweek. “Who’s to blame for Pakistan’s Heat Wave? Taliban Says Power
Companies, Government Minister Blames India”. The Wall Street Journal. June 26
2015. http://wsj.com/indiarealtime/2015/06/26/whos-to-blame-for-pakistans-heat-wavetaliban-says-power-companies-government-blames-india/)//AF
Agence France-Presse/Getty Images
ISLAMABAD — The Pakistani Taliban joined the chorus of criticism over response to the
devastating heat wave that has left more than 1,000 people dead in the country’s southern
Sindh province. But instead of blaming the government – their usual target – the militant group
blamed the power company in Karachi, the country’s largest city, for the heat-related deaths. The
group, formally known as the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, said on Friday that it holds K-Electric
responsible for the “human tragedy.” Most of the deaths in the heat wave, in which southern
Pakistan saw temperatures in triple digits for seven days straight, were reported from Karachi.
“Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan considers K-Electric fully responsible because of undue load shedding
[power outages] and greed for profits,” said Muhammad Khurasani, the Pakistani Taliban
spokesman, referring to the privately-owned power utility. Privately owned K-Electric said earlier this
week that the outages in Karachi were because of a spike in demand for electricity because of high
temperatures, as well as illegal connections. The city saw prolonged blackouts during the heat wave,
which began last Wednesday. Temperatures reached a high of 113 degrees Fahrenheit (45 degrees
Celsius) on Sunday. If K-Electric fails to improve its service, “in the interest of the oppressed people,
Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan will not hesitate to take proper steps against K-Electric,” said the group’s
spokesman. “This is obviously a concern for K-Electric that the TTP [Pakistani Taliban] have issued
a release like this,” said Taha Siddiqui, a spokesman for the utility. “As far as faults are concerned,
they have been reduced, and we have also reduced load shed [power cuts] in the last two days.”
The government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and the provincial government of Sindh
also have blamed the power outages in Karachi on K-Electric, accusing it of not investing
in improved infrastructure and generation. The national and provincial government
blamed each other for lack of oversight. While the Taliban focused their ire on K-Electric,
a senior government official said a more familiar enemy may be responsible: India.
Mushahidullah Khan, Pakistan’s climate change minister, was reported by the daily Dawn as saying
coal power plants in the neighboring Indian state of Rajasthan could also be responsible for
the heat wave
AT: No Pakistani proliferation
Pakistan has enough weapons to go to war- sparked by US-India
deal
Bano June 22 15 (Saira Bano is a foreign relations reporter at The Stimson Center in Washington,
D.C. “Pakistan: Lessons from the U.S. –India Nuclear Deal.” June 22 2015.
http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/pakistan-lessons-from-the-india-us-nuclear-deal/)//AF
Following the India-U.S. nuclear deal, Pakistan accelerated efforts to take measures, both internally and
externally, to catch up to India’s nuclear capacity. Externally, apart from demanding a similar nuclear
deal, Pakistan signed a nuclear agreement with China in which the latter committed to provide two
nuclear reactors in apparent violation of NSG guidelines. After granting India a waiver, the NSG did not
condemn the Chinese deal with Pakistan. The lack of generality in the India NSG waiver has encouraged
China and Pakistan to seek a deal outside the NSG, but this approach has limitations and cannot be
sought on a regular basis. Pakistan has also repeatedly blocked consensus to start negotiations on the
FMCT (Fissile Material Control Treaty) due to its security concerns, despite pressure from major powers.
It fears that India would be able to increase its fissile material stockpiles as a result of the NSG waiver.
However, early conclusion of an FMCT is in fact in the interest of Pakistan, as it would freeze the
increasing asymmetry at a point where Pakistan already has enough nuclear weapons for its deterrence
against India.
Internally, Pakistan is stepping up production of enriched uranium and plutonium for weapons and is
considered to have the fastest-growing nuclear weapons program in the world. Pakistan also opted for
“Full Spectrum Deterrence,” which provides strategic and tactical tools to confront emerging threats
such as new offensive doctrines like India’s Cold Start doctrine.
AT: No Escalation
One nuke is all it takes
Betts 2k [Richard Professor and the Director of the Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia, “Universal Deterrence or
Conceptual Collapse? Liberal Pessimism and Utopian Realism,” The Coming Crisis: Nuclear Proliferation, U.S. Interests, and World
Order, ed. Utgoff p. 82] //JJ
Quite opposite reactions are imaginable. The shock might jar sluggish statesmen into taking the danger seriously, cutting through
shock might
prompt panic and a rush to stock up on WMD, as the possibility of use
underlines the need for deterrent capability, or the effectiveness of such
weapons as instruments of policy One seldom-noticed danger is that breakage of the taboo
could demystify the weapons and make them look more conventional than our
post-Hiroshima images of them. It helps to recall that in the 1930s, popular images of conventional
strategic bombing were that it would be apocalyptic, bringing belligerent countries to their
diplomatic and military red tape, and undertaking dramatic actions to push the genie back in the bottle. Or the
knees quickly. The apocalyptic image was fed by the German bombing of Guernica, a comparatively small city in Spain. When World
War II came in Europe, both British
and Germans initially refrained from bombing
attacks on cities. Once city bombing began and gathered steam, however, it
proved to be far less decisive than many had expected. British and German populations
managed to adjust and absorb it. Over time, however, the ferocity of Allied bombing of Germany and Japan did
approach the apocalyptic levels originally envisioned. In short, dire assumptions about the awesomeness of
strategic bombing deterred its initiation, but once initiated did not prevent gradual
escalation to the devastating level originally envisioned. Nuclear weapon inventories of
countries like India and Pakistan are likely to remain small in number and yield for some time. According to press reports, by some
U.S. estimates the yields of the 1998 tests were only a few kilotons. If the first weapon detonated in combat is a low-yield device in a
large city with uneven terrain and lots of reinforced concrete, it might only destroy a small part of the city A bomb that killed 10,000
to 20,000 people would be seen as a stunning catastrophe, but there are now many parts of the world where that number would be
less than 1 percent of a city’s population. The disaster could seem surprisingly limited, since in the
popular imagination (underwritten by the results in the small and flimsy cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki), nuclear weapons mean
‘one bomb, one city” Awful destruction that yet seems surprisingly limited could prompt revisionist reactions among lay elites in
some countries about the meaning of nuclear ordnance.
2AC ADDON- FRANCE
France finds the recent wikileaks “unacceptable” and is moving to localize
their data
By ALISSA J. RUBIN and SCOTT SHANE 6/24 (JUNE 24, 2015. NYTimes.com.
“Hollande Condemns Spying by U.S., but Not Too Harshly”
[http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/25/world/europe/wikileaks-us-spyingfrance.html])HW
PARIS — The
French government on Wednesday reacted with carefully calibrated anger
to revelations about extensive eavesdropping by the United States government on the
private conversations of senior French officials — including three presidents.
The modulated reaction suggested that the surveillance, by the National Security Agency, was
not a surprise and several French lawmakers and officials said as much, even noting that it was part of the diplomatic
game. In the immediate aftermath of news reports on the eavesdropping, which surfaced overnight Tuesday, President François
Hollande called an emergency meeting of the Defense Council to discuss documents published by the French news website
Mediapart, the left-leaning newspaper Libération and the anti-secrecy organization WikiLeaks, which obtained the documents.
Continue reading the main story RELATED COVERAGE The
lower house of the French parliament
held a vote on Tuesday to adopt new surveillance rules.Lawmakers in France Move to
Vastly Expand SurveillanceMAY 5, 2015 Chancellor Angela Merkel said in 2013, Germany, Too, Is Accused of Spying on FriendsMAY
5, 2015 Declassified Report Shows Doubts About Value of N.S.A.’s Warrantless Spying APRIL 24, 2015 Mr. Hollande spoke with
President Obama on Wednesday afternoon and later said in a statement that he had received assurances that such intelligence
gathering was no longer going on. NEWS CLIPS By The Associated Press 1:39 French Government Reacts to U.S. Spying Continue
reading the main storyVideo French Government Reacts to U.S. Spying Stéphane Le Foll, the French government spokesman, spoke
on Wednesday about documents released by WikiLeaks that alleged that the National Security Agency spied on French presidents
and officials. By The Associated Press on Publish Date June 24, 2015. Photo by Dominique Faget/Agence France-Presse — Getty
Images. The
French foreign minister, Laurent Fabius, also registered his
dissatisfaction, calling in Jane D. Hartley, the United States ambassador to
France, to protest the surveillance. The first French government statement released
Wednesday was spare but strongly worded, saying that the eavesdropping was
“unacceptable” and that the government would not “tolerate any actions
that put French security and the protection of French interests in danger.” Yet
subsequent statements took a milder tone. A statement from the Élysée Palace later spoke of intelligence officials traveling to
Washington to “deepen cooperation,” although earlier in the day, there had been talk of the officials going to verify that the
surveillance had truly stopped. The
revelations come as France is debating legislation
that would allow the mass collection of data, as well as more targeted
eavesdropping, by its intelligence services. Continue reading the main story RELATED IN OPINION
Editorial: Domestic Spying, French StyleDEC. 13, 2013 The new information, gleaned from electronic surveillance data, focuses on
French officials from 2006 to 2012. WikiLeaks did not say where it had obtained it. Julian Assange, a founder of WikiLeaks, is listed
as one of the authors of the Mediapart and Libération articles. Leaked N.S.A. documents have previously upended American
diplomatic ties with a close ally. Relations between Washington and Berlin cooled significantly after reports in October 2013 accused
the agency of monitoring one of Chancellor Angela Merkel’s cellphones. France has a long history of spying on both friends and foes,
especially in the arena of industrial intelligence, although it draws the line — as most countries do — at spying on national leaders.
Still, it seems less inclined to condemn the United States unequivocally for engaging in surveillance. The Mediapart and Libération
articles featured conversations involving three French presidents: Jacques Chirac, Nicolas Sarkozy and Mr. Hollande. The
information that was released was largely predictable, although it was not the kind that anyone involved would want distributed to a
wider audience. Notes written by unnamed analysts about conversations in 2012 between Mr. Hollande and his prime minister at
the time, Jean-Marc Ayrault, show that Mr. Hollande was already worried about the economic situation in Greece. Fearing that Ms.
Merkel was too rigid in her approach, he reached out to the Social Democrats in Germany, who were in the opposition at the time.
Mr. Hollande is a member of the Socialist Party in France, but as a national leader he would be expected to deal with his counterpart
rather than with an opposition party. Mr. Sarkozy comes across in the documents as grandiose, expressing the view that he was the
one who could “solve the world financial crisis,” according to one cable. Mr. Sarkozy is expected to be a candidate for the 2017
presidential elections. The only cable that features Mr. Chirac suggests that his highly detailed instructions for his foreign minister,
Philippe Douste-Blazy, were the product of worries that the minister was unreliable. The comment in the cable reads: “Chirac’s
detailed orders may be in response to the foreign minister’s propensity, amply demonstrated in the past and the impetus behind a
number of presidential reprimands, for making ill-timed or inaccurate remarks.” Mr. Chirac could not be reached for comment. The
spying report intruded at a Washington news conference with Secretary of State John Kerry on Wednesday at the close of a meeting
with senior Chinese officials. Mr. Kerry alluded to his own “terrific relationship" with Mr. Fabius, and, like Mr. Obama, insisted that
no spying was going on now, even as he was silent about the past. Mr. Kerry dismissed the published material as “an old WikiLeaks
document.” In a statement released early Wednesday, the National Security Council said, “We are not targeting and will not target
the communications of President Hollande.” “Indeed, as we have said previously, we
do not conduct any
foreign intelligence surveillance activities unless there is a specific and
validated national security purpose. This applies to ordinary citizens and
world leaders alike,” the statement said. Mr. Sarkozy’s office said he would not comment. Several of his former
ministers and top aides denounced the practice, but Mr. Sarkozy’s former diplomatic counselor, Jean-David Levitte, said he was “not
surprised” by the articles, adding that as ambassador to the United Nations, he always knew that someone was listening. Although it
was not clear what method the N.S.A. used to gather the data that was disclosed overnight Tuesday, most of the leaked cables have
the word “unconventional” typed below the text, and one includes the notation “foreign satellite.” While WikiLeaks did not identify
the source of the documents, they predated the spring of 2013, when the N.S.A. contractor Edward J. Snowden took an archive of
intelligence documents to Hong Kong and gave them to several journalists. WikiLeaks has subsequently assisted him, although it has
not been heavily involved in the publication of those documents.
Historically, with few exceptions, the N.S.A.
has intercepted all foreign communications it could get access to if they
were of conceivable intelligence interest. But the Snowden disclosures meant that for the first time,
American officials had to balance the potential intelligence value of a target against the possible diplomatic fallout if the intercept
was publicly revealed. Matthew M. Aid, an intelligence historian and author of books on national security, said WikiLeaks’ failure to
say whether the new documents came from Mr. Snowden’s collection raised the possibility that a different insider was the source of
the leak. “If it’s a second leaker, it’s a nightmare for the agency,” he said. Since 2013, N.S.A. officials have spent millions of dollars to
improve the agency’s internal security to prevent leaks and to detect and trace them if they occur.
Econ
Over reach and loss of multistakerism collapses American economy
Eoyang and Horwitz ’13. (Gabriel Horwitz and Mieke Eoyang who is the Director of
the National Security Program at Third Way, a center-left think tank. She previously
served as Defense Policy Advisor to Senator Edward M. Kennedy, and a subcommittee
staff director on the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, as well as as
Chief of Staff to Rep. Anna Eshoo (D-Palo Alto) “NSA Snooping's Negative Impact On
Business Would Have The Founding Fathers 'Aghast'” Mieke Eoyang & Gabriel Horwitz.
12/20/2013 http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2013/12/20/nsa-snoopingsnegative-impact-on-business-would-have-the-founding-fathers-aghast/ //JJ
James Madison would be “aghast.” That was one of the incendiary charges leveled at the
National Security Agency and its mass surveillance activities by Judge Richard Leon in
his December 16 opinion ordering the government to stop collecting some of the data
that it’s been gathering on private citizens here and abroad. But Thomas Jefferson might
be horrified as well, because the NSA collection efforts are having a fairly profound
effect on American business and its efforts to sell goods and services abroad. Jefferson, a
big believer in the American “taste for navigation and commerce,” would be dismayed
that our government was doing things that could hurt our competitiveness and our
ability to set the terms of global trade. To be sure, there has always been some tension
between U.S. high-tech industries and our national security. In the 90s, the rules were
fairly primitive, such as limitations on exports of high-performance computing designed
to prevent countries from developing weapons of mass destruction. Those restrictions
were quickly rendered outdated by Moore’s Law, but had they remained they would
have prevented the exports of game consoles like Xbox. Since then, increased
globalization and the rise of terrorist organizations operating in the
shadows and across national boundaries have complicated both the
security and economic issues. The current debate about Edward Snowden’s
intelligence revelations may seem like an unlikely place to see that tension emerge, but
beyond the discussions of civil liberties and counterterrorism, it is becoming clear
that the post-9/11 surveillance apparatus may be at cross-purposes with our
high-tech economic growth. The revelations about the scope and scale of
NSA’s surveillance both at home and abroad have made many uneasy about
the security of their data. This loss of trust could have ongoing
consequences for the U.S. economy and for the future development of the
Internet. Policymakers must understand these implications as they make decisions on
how to reform our surveillance efforts. First, what will this mean for American
competitiveness? For years, the Internet has been largely “Made in America”,
but the technical architecture and data transcend national borders.
European, Chinese, Russian, and other global competitors are vying for the billions of
consumers who currently use U.S. Internet services every day—from Google to Facebook
to Ebay. One major competitive global advantage for U.S. companies is that
America’s openness and freedoms have brought an implied level of trust in
the security and privacy of the data flowing through their servers. But when
the U.S. government asserts that it can exploit electronic data abroad for intelligence
purposes, it creates an international reaction with profound economic consequences.
For example, Europe’s Commissioner for digital affairs, Neelie Kroes, predicts the
fallout from Snowden’s leaks will have “multi-billion Euro consequences” for US
businesses. The EU Commission’s Vice President, Viviane Reding, is pushing for Europe
to adopt more expansive privacy laws that will help build market share for regional
companies—thereby shutting American companies out. The economic
consequences could be staggering. Studies by leading Internet researchers at ITIF,
Gartner, and Forrester examining the NSA surveillance revelations’ impact project
potential lost revenue for U.S. cloud computing companies ranging from $35
billion to $180 billion over the next three years. More than half of the overseas
members of a cloud industry group, the Cloud Security Alliance, said they were less
likely to use U.S. cloud providers in the future. Ten percent of such members said they
had cancelled a U.S. cloud services project as a result of the “Snowden Incident”. While
the true costs of the loss of trust are hard to quantify, and will be reported in future
quarters, the potential losses are enormous.
The technology industry is vital to the American Economy
Muro et all. ’15. (Mark Muro, Jonathan Rothwell, Scott Ande, Kenan Fikri, Siddharth
Kulkarni, Mark Muro, a senior fellow and director of policy for the Metropolitan Policy
Program, manages the program's economic work and key policy projects. Jonathan
Rothwell is a fellow at the Metropolitan Policy Program. His research focuses on labor
market economics, social mobility, access to education, and the sources of economic
growth. Scott Andes is a senior policy analyst at the Metropolitan Policy Program. His
work focuses on advanced industries, innovation and technology, and economic
development. Kenan Fikri is a senior policy analyst with the Metropolitan Policy
Program. His work focuses on regional economic development policy and practice.
Siddharth Kulkarni is a senior research assistant at the Metropolitan Policy Program.
His research focuses on tracking economic recovery and regional manufacturing
industries) Brookings Institution February 3, 2015. “America's Advanced Industries”
http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports2/2015/02/03-advancedindustries#/M10420
The need for economic renewal in the United States remains urgent. Years of
disappointing job growth and stagnant incomes for the majority of workers
have left the nation shaken and frustrated. At the same time, astonishing new
technologies—ranging from advanced robotics and “3-D printing” to the “digitization of
everything”—are provoking genuine excitement even as they make it hard to see where
things are going. Hence this paper: At a critical moment, this report asserts the
special importance to America’s future of what the paper calls America’s
“advanced industries” sector. Characterized by its deep involvement with
technology research and development (R&D) and STEM (science,
technology, engineering, and math) workers, the sector encompasses 50
industries ranging from manufacturing industries such as automaking and
aerospace to energy industries such as oil and gas extraction to high-tech services such
as computer software and computer system design, including for health applications.
These industries encompass the nation’s “tech” sector at its broadest and
most consequential. Their dynamism is going to be a central component of
any future revitalized U.S. economy. As such, these industries encompass the
country’s best shot at supporting innovative, inclusive, and sustainable
growth. For that reason, this report provides a wide-angle overview of the advanced
industry sector that reviews its role in American prosperity, assesses key trends, and
maps its metropolitan and global competitive standing before outlining high-level
strategies to enhance that. The overview finds that: 1. Advanced industries
represent a sizable economic anchor for the U.S. economy and have led the
post-recession employment recovery. Modest in size, the sector packs a
massive economic punch. As an employer and source of economic activity the
advanced industry sector plays a major role in the U.S. economy. As of 2013, the
nation’s 50 advanced industries (see nearby box for selection criteria) employed
12.3 million U.S. workers. That amounts to about 9 percent of total U.S.
employment. And yet, even with this modest employment base, U.S. advanced
industries produce $2.7 trillion in value added annually—17 percent of all
U.S. gross domestic product (GDP). That is more than any other sector,
including healthcare, finance, or real estate. At the same time, the sector employs
80 percent of the nation’s engineers; performs 90 percent of private-sector
R&D; generates approximately 85 percent of all U.S. patents; and accounts
for 60 percent of U.S. exports. Advanced industries also support unusually
extensive supply chains and other forms of ancillary economic activity. On a per
worker basis, advanced industries purchase $236,000 in goods and services
from other businesses annually, compared with $67,000 in purchasing by other
industries. This spending sustains and creates more jobs. In fact, 2.2 jobs are created
domestically for every new advanced industry job—0.8 locally and 1.4 outside of the
region. This means that in addition to the 12.3 million workers employed by
advanced industries, another 27.1 million U.S. workers owe their jobs to
economic activity supported by advanced industries. Directly and indirectly,
then, the sector supports almost 39 million jobs—nearly one-fourth of all U.S.
employment.
The US economy is driving global economy, a slowdown in the us
would mean a slowdown around the world
Miller January 9, 2015. (Rich Miller reporter for Bloomberg. “U.S. Retakes the Helm
of the Global Economy” Rich Miller. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201501-09/u-s-retakes-the-helm-of-the-global-economy//JJ
(Bloomberg) -- The U.S. is back in the driver’s seat of the global economy after
15 years of watching China and emerging markets take the lead. The world’s biggest
economy will expand by 3.2 percent or more this year, its best performance
since at least 2005, as an improving job market leads to stepped-up consumer
spending, according to economists at JPMorgan Chase & Co., Deutsche Bank AG and
BNP Paribas SA. That outcome would be about what each foresees for the
world economy as a whole and would be the first time since 1999 that
America hasn’t lagged behind global growth, based on data from the
International Monetary Fund. “The U.S. is again the engine of global
growth,” said Allen Sinai, chief executive officer of Decision Economics in New York.
“The economy is looking stellar and is in its best shape since the 1990s.” In the latest
sign of America’s resurgence, the Labor Department reported on Jan. 9 that payrolls
rose 252,000 in December as the unemployment rate dropped to 5.6 percent, its lowest
level since June 2008. Job growth last month was highlighted by the biggest gain in
construction employment in almost a year. Factories, health-care providers and
business services also kept adding to their payrolls. About 3 million more Americans
found work in 2014, the most in 15 years and a sign companies are optimistic
U.S. demand will persist even as overseas markets struggle. U.S. government
securities rose after the report as investors focused on a surprise drop in hourly wages
last month. Ten-year Treasury yields declined seven basis points to 1.95 percent at 5
p.m. in New York on Jan. 9. “We are still waiting to see the kind of strengthening of
wage numbers we would expect to be consistent with what we are seeing elsewhere in
terms of growth and the absolute jobs numbers,” Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta
President Dennis Lockhart said in a Jan. 9 interview. Breaking Away The U.S. is
breaking away from the rest of the world partly because it has had more success working
off the debt-driven excesses that helped precipitate the worst recession since the Great
Depression. “The progress has been far greater in the U.S.,” Glenn Hubbard, dean of the
Columbia Business School in New York and a former chief White House economist, told
the American Economic Association annual conference in Boston on Jan. 3.
Delinquencies on consumer installment loans fell to a record-low 1.51 percent in the
third quarter, the American Bankers Association said on Jan. 8. That’s “well under” the
15-year average of 2.3 percent on such loans, which include credit cards and borrowing
for car purchases and home improvements, it said. U.S. households have benefited from
the strengthening job market and the collapse in oil prices. The nationwide average cost
of a gallon of regular gasoline was $2.13 on Jan. 11, the cheapest since May 2009,
according to figures from motoring group AAA. Wage Gains While wage gains have
lagged -- average hourly earnings fell 0.2 percent last month from November -- they will
accelerate as the labor market continues to tighten, according to Mohamed El-Erian, a
Bloomberg View columnist and an adviser to Munich-based Allianz SE. “It’s just a
matter of time before wage growth picks up,” he told Bloomberg Television’s “In The
Loop” program on Jan. 9. Spending is already strengthening. Households splurged on
new cars, appliances, televisions and clothing as spending climbed 0.6 percent in
November, double the gain in October, according to figures from the Commerce
Department in Washington. Light-vehicle sales totaled 16.5 million in 2014, the most
since 2006. “The economy picked up a nice tailwind at the end of the year,” Bill Fay,
group vice president for Toyota Motor Corp.’s U.S. sales arm, said on a Jan. 5
conference call. “This strength will carry the auto industry to a sixth straight year of
growth in 2015 with analyst projections ranging as high as 17 million.” Consumer
Spending At $11.5 trillion in 2013, U.S. personal consumption expenditures
were larger than the gross domestic product of any other country that year,
including China, according to statistics from the IMF in Washington. The figures aren’t
adjusted to reflect price discrepancies for the same goods in different nations -- socalled purchasing power parity -- which tends to inflate the output of developing nations
where consumers pay less for everything from haircuts to coffee. Deutsche Bank
economists led by David Folkerts-Landau in London forecast U.S. GDP will expand 3.7
percent this year, after climbing 2.5 percent in 2014. The U.S. will contribute close
to 18 percent to global growth of 3.6 percent in 2015, compared with 11 percent for
all other industrial countries combined, they wrote in a Jan. 9 report. While the U.S.
is gathering strength, the BRIC nations -- Brazil, Russia, India and China -are facing tougher times after spending much of the past 15 years basking in the
attention of global investors. BRICs Faltering Brazil’s debt was downgraded last year for
the first time in a decade while Russia is heading into recession, its economy pummeled
by the collapse of oil prices and U.S. and European sanctions. Growth in China and
India has slowed as both countries grapple with revamping their
economies. “Close the book on emerging markets driving global growth,” Nancy Lazar,
co-founder and a partner at Cornerstone Macro LP in New York, wrote in a Jan. 8 report
to clients. Even Jim O’Neill, the former Goldman Sachs Group Inc. chief economist who
coined the BRIC acronym, has soured on some of its members, saying in an e-mail that
he would be tempted to remove Brazil and Russia from the group if they fail to revive
their flagging economies. “It is tough for the BRIC countries to all repeat their
remarkable growth rates” of the first decade of this century, said O’Neill, a
Bloomberg View columnist and former chairman of Goldman Sachs Asset Management
International.
XTN
US China Ext:
Economic growth is key to prevent U.S-China Conflict
HSU 11-[“Economic Ties Could Help Prevent US-China War” Jeremy Hsu, Innovation
NewsDaily Senior Writer; 01 November 2011 05:32 PM ET;
http://www.innovationnewsdaily.com/660-china-military-cyber-nationalsecurity.html]
As the U.S. faces China's economic and military rise, it also holds a
dwindling hand of cards to play in the unlikely case of open conflict.
Cyberattacks aimed at computer networks, targeted disabling of satellites
or economic warfare could end up bringing down both of the frenemies.
That means ensuring the U.S. economy remains strong and well-balanced,
with China's economy possibly representing the best deterrent, according to a
new report. The Rand Corporation's analysts put low odds on a China-U.S. military
conflict taking place, but still lay out danger scenarios where the U.S. and China
face greater risks of stumbling into an unwanted war with one another.
They point to the economic codependence of both countries as the best bet
against open conflict, similar to how nuclear weapons ensured mutually assured
destruction for the U.S. and Soviet Union during the Cold War. War Militaria Collectors
www.JCAmericana.comWe Buy War Artifacts & Militaria Free Appraisals for
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$729,000 with $0 Down. Ads by Google "It is often said that a strong economy is the
basis of a strong defense," the Rand report says. "In the case of China, a strong U.S.
economy is not just the basis for a strong defense, it is itself perhaps the
best defense against an adventurous China." Such "mutually assured
economic destruction" would devastate both the U.S. and China, given how
China represents America's main creditor and manufacturer. The economic
fallout could lead to a global recession worse than that caused by the
financial crisis of 2008-2009. The U.S. still spends more than five times on defense
compared with China, but Rand analysts suggest that China's defense budget could
outstrip that of the U.S. within the next 20 years. The U.S. Air Force and Navy's current
edge in the Pacific has also begun to shrink as China develops aircraft, ships,
submarines and missiles capable of striking farther out from its coast. Existing U.S.
advantages in cyberwar and anti-satellite capabilities also don't offset the fact that the
U.S. military depends far more heavily on computer networks and satellites than China's
military. That makes a full-out cyberwar or satellite attacks too risky for the U.S., but
perhaps also for China. "There are no lives lost — just extensive harm, heightened
antagonism, and loss of confidence in network security," Rand analysts say. "There
would be no 'winner.'" Open military conflict between China and the U.S. could
also have "historically unparalleled" economic consequences even if neither
country actively engages in economic warfare, Rand analysts say. The U.S.
could both boost direct defense in the unlikely case of war and reduce the
risk of escalation by strengthening China's neighbors. Such neighbors,
including India, South Korea, Japan and Taiwan, also represent possible
flashpoints for China-U.S. conflict in the scenarios laid out by the Rand
report. Other possible danger zones include the South China Sea, where
China and many neighboring countries have disputes over territorial
claims, as well as in the murkier realm of cyberspace. Understandably, China
has shown fears of being encircled by semi-hostile U.S. allies. That's why Rand analysts
urged the U.S. to make China a partner rather than rival for maintaining international
security. They also pointed out, encouragingly, that China has mostly taken "cautious
and pragmatic" policies as an emerging world power. "As China becomes a true
peer competitor, it also becomes potentially a stronger partner in the
defense as well as economic field," the Rand analysts say.
US Economic failure kills SQ check on Chinese miscalc
Glaser 5/2/12 “China is Reacting to Our Weak Economy” Bonnie S. Glaser (senior fellow at the Center for Strategic
and International Studies.) 5/2/2012 http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/05/02/are-we-headed-for-a-cold-war-withchina/china-is-reacting-to-our-weak-economy
To maintain peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and secure American interests,
the United States must sustain its leadership and bolster regional
confidence in its staying power. The key to those goals is reinvigorating the U.S.
economy. Historically, the Chinese have taken advantage of perceived American weakness and shifts in the global balance of
power. In 1974 China seized the Paracel Islands from Saigon just after the United States and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam
signed the Paris Peace Treaty, which signaled the U.S. withdrawal from the region. When the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev met
one of Deng Xiaoping’s “three obstacles” requirements for better ties and withdrew from Can Ranh Bay, Vietnam, in 1988, China
snatched seven of the Spratly Islands from Hanoi. Two decades later, as the United States-Philippines base agreement was
terminated, China grabbed Mischief Reef from Manila. Beijing must not be allowed to conclude that an economic downturn means
our ability to guarantee regional stability has weakened. The
Chinese assertive behaviors against its
neighbors in recent years in the East China Sea, the South China Sea and the Yellow Sea were in part a consequence
of China’s assessment that the global financial crisis signaled the beginning of U.S. decline and a shift in the
balance of power in China’s favor. The Obama administration’s “rebalancing” or “pivot” to Asia
will help prevent Chinese miscalculation and increase the confidence of U.S. partners in U.S.
reliability as the ballast for peace and stability in the region. But failure to follow through with actions
and resources would spark uncertainty and lead smaller countries to accommodate Chinese interests in
the region. Most important, the United States must revive its economy. China will inevitably overtake
the United States as the largest economy in the world in the coming decade or two. The United States must not
let Beijing conclude that a relative decline in U.S. power means a weakened
United States unable to guarantee regional peace and stability. The Chinese
see the United States as mired in financial disorder, with an alarming budget deficit, high
unemployment and slow economic growth — which, they predict, will lead to America's demise as the
sole global superpower. To avoid Chinese miscalculation and greater
United States-China strategic competition, the United States needs to
restore financial solvency and growth through bipartisan action.
One nuke is all it takes
Betts 2k [Richard Professor and the Director of the Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia, “Universal Deterrence or
Conceptual Collapse? Liberal Pessimism and Utopian Realism,” The Coming Crisis: Nuclear Proliferation, U.S. Interests, and World
Order, ed. Utgoff p. 82] //JJ
Quite opposite reactions are imaginable. The shock might jar sluggish statesmen into taking the danger seriously, cutting through
shock might
prompt panic and a rush to stock up on WMD, as the possibility of use
underlines the need for deterrent capability, or the effectiveness of such
weapons as instruments of policy One seldom-noticed danger is that breakage of the taboo
could demystify the weapons and make them look more conventional than our
post-Hiroshima images of them. It helps to recall that in the 1930s, popular images of conventional
strategic bombing were that it would be apocalyptic, bringing belligerent countries to their
diplomatic and military red tape, and undertaking dramatic actions to push the genie back in the bottle. Or the
knees quickly. The apocalyptic image was fed by the German bombing of Guernica, a comparatively small city in Spain. When World
War II came in Europe, both British
and Germans initially refrained from bombing
attacks on cities. Once city bombing began and gathered steam, however, it
proved to be far less decisive than many had expected. British and German populations
managed to adjust and absorb it. Over time, however, the ferocity of Allied bombing of Germany and Japan did
approach the apocalyptic levels originally envisioned. In short, dire assumptions about the awesomeness of
strategic bombing deterred its initiation, but once initiated did not prevent gradual
escalation to the devastating level originally envisioned. Nuclear weapon inventories of
countries like India and Pakistan are likely to remain small in number and yield for some time. According to press reports, by some
U.S. estimates the yields of the 1998 tests were only a few kilotons. If the first weapon detonated in combat is a low-yield device in a
large city with uneven terrain and lots of reinforced concrete, it might only destroy a small part of the city A bomb that killed 10,000
to 20,000 people would be seen as a stunning catastrophe, but there are now many parts of the world where that number would be
less than 1 percent of a city’s population. The disaster could seem surprisingly limited, since in the
popular imagination (underwritten by the results in the small and flimsy cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki), nuclear weapons mean
‘one bomb, one city” Awful destruction that yet seems surprisingly limited could prompt revisionist reactions among lay elites in
some countries about the meaning of nuclear ordnance.
Nuclear war causes extinction
Robock 11 [Alan – Prof Environmental Science @ Rutgers. “Nuclear Winter is a Real
and Present Danger” Nature, Vol 473. Summer 2011 Ebsco]
In the 1980s, discussion and debate about the possibility of a ‘nuclear winter’ helped to end the arms race between the United States
and the Soviet Union. As former Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev said in an interview in 2000: “Models made by Russian and
American scientists showed that a
nuclear war would result in a nuclear winter that
would be extremely destructive to all life on Earth; the knowledge of that was a great stimulus
to us, to people of honour and morality, to act.” As a result, the number of nuclear weapons in the world started to fall, from a peak
of about 70,000 in the 1980s to a total of about 22,000 today. In another five years that number could go as low as 5,000, thanks to
the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) between the United States and Russia, signed on 8 April 2010. Yet the
environmental threat of nuclear war has not gone away. The world faces the
prospect of a smaller, but still catastrophic, nuclear conflict. There are now
nine nuclear-weapons states. Use of a fraction of the global nuclear arsenal
by anyone, from the superpowers to India versus Pakistan, still presents the
largest potential environmental danger to the planet by humans. That
threat is being ignored. One reason for this denial is that the prospect of a
nuclear war is so horrific on so many levels that most people simply look
away. Two further reasons are myths that persist among the general public: that the nuclear
winter theory has been disproved, and that nuclear winter is no longer a
threat. These myths need to be debunked. The term ‘nuclear winter’, coined by Carl Sagan and his
colleagues in a 1983 paper1 in Science, describes the dramatic effects on the climate caused by smoke from fires ignited by nuclear
attacks on cities and industrial areas. In the 1980s my colleagues and I calculated, using
the best climate
models available at the time, that if one-third of the existing arsenal was used,
there would be so much smoke that surface temperatures would plummet
below freezing around the world for months, killing virtually all plants and
producing worldwide famine. More people could die in China from starvation than in the nations actively
bombing each other. As many countries around the world realized that a superpower nuclear war would be a disaster for them, they
pressured the superpowers to end their arms race. Sagan did a good job of summarizing the policy impacts2 in 1984: although
weapons were continuing to be built, it would be suicide to use them. The idea of climatic catastrophe was fought against by those
who wanted to keep the nuclear-weapon industry alive, or who supported the growth of nuclear arsenals politically3.
Scientifically, there was no real debate about the concept, only about the
details. In 1986, atmospheric researchers Starley Thompson and Stephen Schneider wrote a piece in Foreign Affairs appraising
the theory4 and highlighting what they saw as the patchiness of the effect. They coined the term ‘nuclear autumn’, noting that it
wouldn’t be ‘winter’ everywhere in the aftermath of a nuclear attack. They didn’t mean for people to think that it would be all raking
leaves and football games, but many members of the public, and some pro-nuclear advocates, preferred to take it that way. The fight
over the details of the modelling caused a rift between Sagan and Schneider that never healed. When I bring up the topic of nuclear
winter, people invariably tell me that they think the theory has been disproved. But research continues to support the original
concept. By
2007, models had began to approximate a realistic atmosphere up
to 80 kilometres above Earth’s surface, including the stratosphere and
mesosphere. This enabled me, and my coauthors, to calculate for the first time that
smoke particles would be heated by the Sun and lifted into the upper
stratosphere, where they would stay for many years5,6. So the cooling would
last for much longer than we originally thought. DARK DAYS Many of those who
do accept the nuclear-winter concept think that the scenario applies only to
a mass conflict, on a scale no longer conceivable in the modern world. This
is also false. A ‘small’ nuclear war between India and Pakistan, with each
using 50 Hiroshima-size bombs (far less than 1% of the current arsenal), if
dropped on megacity targets in each country would produce climate change
unprecedented in recorded human history 5. Five million tonnes of black
carbon smoke would be emitted into the upper troposphere from the burning cities, and
then be lofted into the stratosphere by the heat of the Sun. Temperatures would be lower than during
the ‘Little Ice Age’ (1400–1850), during which famine killed millions. For several years, growing seasons would be
shortened by weeks in the mid-latitudes (see ‘A decade of cooling). Brian Toon at the University of Colorado in Boulder, Richard
Turco at the University of California, Los Angeles, Georgiy Stenchikov at Rutgers University in New Brunswick, New Jersey, and I,
all of whom were pioneers in nuclear-winter research in the 1980s, have tried, along with our students, to publicize our results. We
have published refereed journal articles, popular pieces in Physics Today and Scientific American, a policy forum in Science, and
now this article. But Foreign Affairs and Foreign Policy, perhaps the two most prominent foreign-policy magazines in English, would
not even review articles we submitted. We have had no luck getting attention from the US government. Toon and I visited the US
Congress and gave briefings to congressional staff on the subject two years ago, but nothing happened as a result. The US President’s
science adviser John Holdren has not responded to our requests — in 2009 and more recently — for consideration of new scientific
results in US nuclear policy. The only interest at a national level I have had was somewhat surreal: in September 2010, Fidel Castro
summoned me to a conference on nuclear winter in Havana, to help promote his new view that a
nuclear conflict
would bring about Armageddon. The next day, my talk — the entire 90 minutes including questions — was
broadcast on nationwide television in prime time, and appeared on the front page of the two national newspapers in Cuba. As in the
1980s, it is still too difficult for most people to fully grasp the consequences of a nuclear conflict. But it must be grasped. We
scientists must continue to push our results out to the public and to policymakers, so they can in turn push political will in the
direction of disarmament. Just as Gorbachev, armed with the knowledge of nuclear winter, helped to end the cold war, so too can the
politicians of today use science to support further reductions in arms. The New START treaty is not enough.
Business Confidence Ext
There has been a major decline in business confidence due to a
breach in trust with the tech industry
Cofino, ’15 (Writer for the Guardian January 21, 2015. “Public trust in business hits
five-year low” Jo Confino in Davos. http://www.theguardian.com/sustainablebusiness/2015/jan/21/public-trust-global-business-government-low-decline //JJ
For how many years do business leaders need to hear that their customers do not trust
them nor the companies they lead before they do something about it? To coincide with
the opening of the World Economic Forum in Davos, public relations company Edelman
has just released its 15th annual trust barometer, which signals that a short recovery in
people’s faith in the corporate sector has gone into reverse. In fact, trust in
business declined in two-thirds of the 27 markets the survey covers and is now
below 50% in 14 markets, the worst showing since 2008. The largest drops occurred in
Canada, Germany, Australia and Singapore. Even the once impregnable
technology industry, which is still the most trusted sector, saw declines in the
majority of countries for the first time. The fall in trust in CEOs as credible
spokespeople continued for the third consecutive year, with levels now at one third in
developed markets. Globally, CEOs (at 43%) and government officials (at 38%) continue
to be the least credible information sources, lagging far behind academic or industry
experts, who are rated at 70%. Only a fifth of respondents thought business leaders were
the most trusted influencers to communicate purpose and engagement. It’s not difficult
to see why the 33,000 people who took part in the Edelman survey have so little
confidence in CEOs. For example, nearly half say that there is not enough regulation of
business. Across major industries surveyed, a similar percentage have little faith in
policymakers to develop and implement appropriate regulations. Contrast this with the
PwC global CEO survey released in Davos yesterday, which showed that 78% of business
leaders see too much regulation as the biggest risk to growth – the highest level ever
seen in the 15 year history of the study. Concern about over-regulation reached 90% in
the US, 87% in the UK and 85% in China. Simon Zadek, visiting scholar at
Tsinghua School of Economics and Management in Beijing and co-director
of the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) Inquiry, says the low
trust scores show that businesses have to increase their levels of
accountability. Speaking in Davos, Zadek said: “Citizens effectively give corporations
a license to operate and, in return, companies need to align themselves
demonstrably to the public interest.
Tech Leadership Loss Ext
*Revelations of NSA spying is making the US lose its tech
leadership as companies choose to business with other
countries.
Phipps ’13 Former Chief Open Source Officer at Sun Microsystems. (Simon, “The
NSA's other victim: U.S. business competitiveness” Infoworld.
http://www.infoworld.com/article/2609611/open-source-software/the-nsa-s-othervictim--u-s--business-competitiveness.html /JJ
This week, a review panel commissioned by the White House determined that the NSA
needs reining in to prevent overreaching and damaging America. The day before the
panel released its recommendations, a delegation of technology business leaders visited
the White House to register its concerns about the NSA. Are the latter's concerns purely
patriotic? Clearly not. The consequences of the unconstitutional overreach of
the NSA and other parts of America's security apparatus on American technology
business are already being felt. Last week saw an investor lawsuit against
IBM for its collaboration with the NSA, and it seems likely similar cases will
follow as other technology companies, such as Microsoft, have also been found
collaborating with the NSA. But far more serious is the destabilization of trust
in these businesses. One element is the jurisdictional gravity imposed, as foreign
customers are subjected to U.S. oversight. Another is the commitment of many
American companies to proprietary solutions. When backdoors are suspected, the
only recourse is to trust the word of the supplier since the source is closed.
If that can't be relied upon -- either for ethical reasons or because the
company is jurisdictionally subject to gagging orders -- then customers will
flee. Who benefits from that concern? Companies in independent jurisdictions and
companies working with open source software. Switzerland in particular seems to offer
the same haven for the digital world that it's traditionally offered the financial world.
Swiss domain names cut the connection to U.S. control and give confidence that
government interference in routing customers to one's business is less likely. More
significantly, cloud providers are now emphasizing the benefits of doing business in
Switzerland. Swiss cloud account The problem with cloud computing, in a nutshell, is
that the savings you gain from both scale and outsourced operation may come at a cost
later in the cycle. Cloud solutions bring economies of scale achieved by grouping the
needs of many different businesses into a common data center, which also means the
minutiae of operations and the management of logistical and practical issues are
outsourced. This is all good. But the source of the benefits is also the source of the
problems. The company you trade with has your needs not as its exclusive priority, but
as one of many. In the end, if your needs become exceptional, letting you down will
simply be part of their cost of doing business. Their jurisdiction gets added to your
operating parameters as well. It's no longer enough to understand the legal boundaries
of trading in your own state; you now also have to take into account the consequences of
your data being processed in your cloud provider's state. The state-owned telco
SwissCom is offering a range of cloud offerings, all managed in and from
Switzerland and marketed on the basis of avoiding NSA intrusion. While they
admit to having little control over spying on their services from abroad, the insulation
provided by Swiss law seems an important benefit. It's not just SwissCom who want to
be the Switzerland of cloud. Open source developers at Kolab have similar aspirations.
They have a better deal, too; their software is open source, so it's not just
lock-in by a different party. They are offering a full suite of productivity
solutions equivalent to Google's and Microsoft's offerings -- mail, calendar,
file storage, and more -- all hosted in and from Switzerland and
implemented in open source software. In addition to the confidence Swiss hosting
instills, it's also possible to take the same open source software the Swiss deploy and
host it yourself if you prefer, so that in the event trust is lost you still have an alternative
-- you can rehost and carry on. That's not true of services based on proprietary
software. If you stop trusting the provider, you'll need to migrate to a
completely different solution. These are just examples; there are more. The point
is that the behavior of the NSA and other government agencies is damaging
America's reputation, undermining business opportunity, and creating
opportunities abroad in areas that might be expected to be natural markets
for U.S. leadership. The impact of NSA intrusion on our civil liberties can't be
overstated, but the impact of this overreach on our technology businesses is
serious, too. It's time for change, both for our rights as citizens to be protected in the
way the Constitution intends, and to rebuild the reputation of America as a source of
trustworthy technology.
*NSA surveillance is killing US internet leadership
Forbes ’13. “NSA Snooping's Negative Impact On Business Would Have The Founding
Fathers 'Aghast'” Mieke Eoyang & Gabriel Horwitz. 12/20/2013
http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2013/12/20/nsa-snoopings-negative-impact-onbusiness-would-have-the-founding-fathers-aghast/ //JJ
Second, what will this mean for the future of Internet governance? Since its earliest
days, the U.S.-based Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers (ICANN) has governed the web. As the Internet has expanded, several
nations, especially China, have been pressing to end American dominance and transfer
control of Internet governance to the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), a
specialized agency within the United Nations. Worse still for prospects of
continued American dominance, the NSA revelations have prompted calls
for extensive regional control of the Internet. For example, Brazil, which has
long called for such regional control, will host an important Internet governance
conference in April that could challenge America’s role. Unless the U.S. government
takes steps to restore some degree of trust, the groundswell of international
interest in a new approach to Internet governance could undermine or end
U.S. Internet leadership. This could leave management of the Internet to nations
like China or Russia that do not share America’s commitment to safety, openness,
competition, and growth. Recommendations for change are coming from many
corners. President Obama’s advisory group on NSA reform is calling for an
end to bulk collection of Americans’ metadata and other steps to restore
protections abroad. Major Internet companies have called for greater
restrictions on surveillance activities, saying the balance has tipped too far
from the individual. The government should heed these calls for reflection and
reform. Without understanding the economic implications of our security policies and
taking reasonable steps to restore trust in America’s surveillance efforts, our Internet
dominance and our economy could pay the price.
Tech Off Shoring Ext
*Due to NSA concerns, companies are moving their operations
overseas
Harkness February 25, 2015. (Tim,“Offshoring data: Twitter moves non-US
accounts to Ireland” Lexology. Litigation partner based in New York Tim received his JD, cum
laude, from the University of Michigan, where he was Contributing Editor to the Law
Review, and his BA, cum laude, from Yale University.
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=ea86ed3a-5777-45ef-999fda56fa0fa406 //JJ
Twitter has announced that, effective next month, its Dublin-based entity
will take over all services for non-US users. Accordingly, all non-US user data
will be moved to servers in Ireland and governed by Irish privacy and data
protection laws. By making this move, Twitter is taking the lead from other
major tech companies that have also recently offshored their non-US user
data to Ireland. The move has two main consequences: First, Twitter’s non-US
user data may now be beyond the reach of NSA surveillance programs. And
second, Ireland’s Data Protection Commissioner (one of the European
privacy regulators with a balanced approach to compliance and
enforcement), will assume responsibility for overseeing Twitter’s handling
of information for approximately 300 million users. Whether Twitter’s move of
non-US data to Ireland will shield it from US government warrants is an
issue that may be decided this summer in a New York appellate court.
Microsoft Corporation has challenged a warrant for its user data stored in Ireland,
arguing that the Stored Communications Act doesn’t apply to private data on foreign
servers. The government asserts that the foreign data targeted by the
warrant is fair game because, even though it is stored abroad, Microsoft has
control over the data and is based in the United States.
Key for Trade Ext
*If the US wants to ink a trade deal, it will alleviate fears of NSA spying
Motherboard ’14. “The World's Next Major Trade Agreement Will Make NSA Spying
Even Easier” July 16, 2014. Justin Ling. http://motherboard.vice.com/read/the-transpacific-partnership-will-make-nsa-spying-easier //JJ
With paranoia over NSA surveillance reaching a fever pitch, foreign
governments are making a reasonable plea: bring our data home. But the
Americans are doing their best to ensure that the world’s Internet data
stays on U.S. soil, well within the reach of their spies. To do so, American
negotiators are leveraging trade deals with much of the developed world,
inserting language to ensure “cross-border data flows”—a euphemism that
actually means they want to inhibit foreign governments from keeping data hosted
domestically. The trade deals they’re influencing—the Trans-Atlantic
Partnership (TPP), the Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA), and the
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)—are all so
secretive that nobody but the governments themselves are privy to the
details. But thanks to the Australians and Wikileaks, both of whom have leaked details
on TPP, we have a pretty good idea of what’s going on in the latest Trans-Pacific
Partnership—a trade agreement that will act as a sort of NAFTA for Asia-Pacific region
nations. America is, essentially, the world’s data server. Since the dawn of
the internet itself, every database of import has been hosted in the grand US
of A. But now, foreign governments are starting to see the benefit of
patriating their citizens’ private information. Canada was an early adopter of the
idea. Federal procurement regulations often require government departments to insert
local data requirements, stating that businesses who wish to administer or host
Canadians’ information must keep the information within Canadian borders. Most
recently, the Canadian Government put out a tender for a company to merge and host
the email servers for all their departments. In doing so, they stuck in a national security
exemption, forbidding foreign contractors from applying. Nova Scotia and British
Columbia went a step further, flatly requiring any government-hosted personal data to
be physically located in Canada. Australia has taken similar steps, including setting up
firm requirements for how companies store offshore data. But the American
government is not having any of it and is using TPP negotiations to strongarm new provisions that favour American hosted data. “In today’s informationbased economy, particularly where a broad range of services are moving to ‘cloud’ based
delivery where U.S. firms are market leaders; this law hinders U.S. exports of
a wide array of products and services,” reads a report on Canada from the office of
the United States trade commissioner. The only reason the world is aware of the
provisions in TPP on data hosting, is because the Australian negotiators,
facing American insistence on the matter, leaked it to the press. Along with
the New Zealanders, the Aussies are proposing changes to the agreement to short-circuit
America’s proposal. The TPP negotiations are top-secret, and highly controversial. As
VICE reported earlier this month, provisions of the agreement could force American
anti-piracy provisions onto the signatory countries. “We know there is an ecommerce chapter and the general understanding is that the U.S. is
pressing for a provision that would bar the ability to require localization of
data,” says University of Ottawa professor Michael Geist, who is also the Canada
Research Chair in Internet and E-commerce Law. “That has big implications.” The
Americans aren’t even making secret their insistence on the matter. On the American
website for the trade deal, it clearly states there’s a priority for the TPP to
include: “requirements that support a single, global Internet, including
ensuring cross-border data flows, consistent with governments’ legitimate
interest in regulating for purposes of privacy protection.”
Solvency Ext
*Only tangible restrictions on the NSA will fix the problem
TF ’14 [Tech Freedom, April 1, 2014, TF, CDT, and 40 others tell Congress what real
NSA reform should look like, http://techfreedom.org/post/81391689035/tf-cdt-and40-others-tell-congress-what-real-nsa]
The White House has expressed support for reining in the NSA’s bulk
collection of Americans’ phone records, but with multiple bills in Congress it’s
uncertain which specific reforms will be included in the debate moving forward. To
ensure whichever NSA reform bill advances is as strong as possible,
TechFreedom and 41 other nonprofits and businesses have sent a joint letter to
key policymakers outlining what any bill aiming to reform bulk surveillance
should include. Read the text below, and see the full letter for the list of signatories
and recipients: We the undersigned are writing to express support for ending the
government’s bulk collection of data about individuals. We strongly urge swift markup
and passage of the USA FREEDOM Act (H.R.3361), which would enact appropriate
surveillance reforms without sacrificing national security. This letter focuses on
bulk collection, but overbroad NSA surveillance raises many more privacy
and security issues that Congress and the Administration should address.
We appreciate that Congress and the Administration are converging on consensus that
the National Security Agency’s (NSA) bulk *collection of telephone records must end.
Among other things, legislation on bulk collection should: Prohibit bulk
collection for all types of data, not just phone records. Section 215 of the
PATRIOT Act applies broadly to business records, and the Department of Justice has
claimed authority for bulk collection of any records that reveal relationships between
individuals. Legislation that focuses only on phone records may still allow for the bulk
collection of, for example, Internet metadata, location information, financial records,
library records, and numerous other records that may help “identify unknown
relationships among individuals.” Prohibit bulk collection under Section 214 as
well as Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act, or under any other authority. While
the NSA’s bulk collection of telephone records under the purported authority of Section
215 has received considerable attention, the NSA engaged in the bulk collection of
Internet metadata using the Pen/Trap authority under Section 214 until
2011. Legislation that focuses solely on Section 215 would still fail to
prohibit the bulk collection of phone and Internet metadata using Section 214, the
National Security Letter (NSL) statutes, or another authority. Require prior court
approval for each record request. Under current law, the government must
obtain approval from the FISA court before it can force private entities to
turn over records (in bulk or otherwise) under Sections 215 and 214 of the PATRIOT
Act. In addition, President Obama, in his January 17th policy announcement,
established that a judicial finding is required before the government can query the
phone records that the NSA collected in bulk. Congress should leave this key
safeguard in place. If there is concern that the FISA Court would move too
slowly to authorize domestic surveillance beforehand, then the solution
should be to provide the FISA Court with sufficient resources.
A2: Us Econ strong
Global economy on the brink now and it’s only getting worse
Daiber ‘14, freelance economic analysts
(Lee, “18 Signs That The Global Economic Crisis Is Accelerating As We Enter The Last
Half Of 2014,” Freedom Informant Network: Economy and Worldview,
http://www.freedominfonet.net/18-signs-global-economic-crisis-accelerating-enterlast-half-2014/)//JB
A lot of people that I talk to these days want to know “when things are going to start
happening”. Well, there are certainly some perilous times on the horizon, but
all you have to do is open up your eyes and look to see the global economic
crisis unfolding. As you will see below, even central bankers are issuing
frightening warnings about “dangerous new asset bubbles” and even the
World Bank is declaring that “now is the time to prepare” for the next
crisis. Most Americans tend to only care about what is happening in the United States,
but the truth is that serious economic trouble is erupting in South America, all
across Europe and in Asian powerhouses such as China and Japan. And the
endless conflicts in the Middle East could erupt into a major regional war at
just about any time. We live in a world that is becoming increasingly
unstable, and people need to understand that the period of relative stability that
we are enjoying right now is extremely vulnerable and will not last long.
The following are 18 signs that the global economic crisis is accelerating as
we enter the last half of 2014… #1 The Bank for International Settlements has
issued a new report which warns that “dangerous new asset bubbles” are
forming which could potentially lead to another major financial crisis. Do
the central bankers know something that we don’t, or are they just trying to place the
blame on someone else for the giant mess that they have created? #2 Argentina has
missed a $539 million debt payment and is on the verge of its second major debt
default in 13 years. #3 Bulgaria is desperately trying to calm down a massive
run on the banks that threatens of spiral out of control. #4 Last month,
household loans in the eurozone declined at the fastest rate ever recorded.
Why are European banks holding on to their money so tightly right now? #5 The
number of unemployed jobseekers in France has just soared to another
brand new record high. #6 Economies all over Europe are either showing
no growth or are shrinking. Just check out what a recent Forbes article had to say
about the matter… Italy’s economy shrank by 0.1% in the first three months of 2014,
matching the average of the three previous quarters. After expanding 0.6% in Q2 2013,
France recorded zero growth. Portugal shrank 0.7%, following positive
numbers in the preceding nine months. While figures weren’t available for Greece and
Ireland in Q1, neither country is showing progress. Greek GDP dropped 2.5% in
the final three months of last year, and Ireland limped ahead at 0.2%. #7 A few days
ago it was reported that consumer prices in Japan are rising at the fastest
pace in 32 years. #8 Household expenditures in Japan are down 8 percent
compared to one year ago. #9 U.S. companies are drowning in massive
amounts of debt, but the corporate debt bubble in China is so bad that the
amount of corporate debt in China has actually now surpassed the amount of
corporate debt in the United States. #10 One Chinese auditor is warning that up
to 80 billion dollars worth of loans in China are backed by falsified gold
transactions. What will that do to the price of gold and the stability of Chinese
financial markets as that mess unwinds? #11 The unemployment rate in Greece is
currently sitting at 26.7 percent and the youth unemployment rate is 56.8
percent. #12 67.5 percent of the people that are unemployed in Greece have
been unemployed for over a year. #13 The unemployment rate in the
eurozone as a whole is 11.8 percent - just a little bit shy of the all-time record
of 12.0 percent. #14 The European Central Bank is so desperate to get money
moving through the system that it has actually introduced negative interest
rates. #15 The IMF is projecting that there is a 25 percent chance that the
eurozone will slip into deflation by the end of next year. #16 The World
Bank is warning that “now is the time to prepare” for the next crisis. #17
The economic conflict between the United States and Russia continues to
deepen. This has caused Russia to make a series of moves away from the U.S. dollar
and toward other major currencies. This will have serious ramifications for the
global financial system as time rolls along. #18 Of course the U.S. economy
is struggling right now as well. It shrank at a 2.9 percent annual rate during the
first quarter of 2014, which was much worse than anyone had anticipated. But if
U.S. economic numbers look a bit better for the second quarter, that doesn’t mean that
we are out of the woods. As I have stressed so many times, the long-term trends and
the long-term balance sheet numbers are far, far more important than the
short-term economic numbers. For example, if you went to the mall today and
spent a thousand dollars on candy and video games, your short-term “economic activity”
would spike dramatically. But your long-term financial health would take a significant
turn for the worse. Well, when we are talking about the health of the U.S. economy or
the entire global financial system we need to keep the same kinds of considerations in
mind. As for the United States, whether the level of our debt-fueled short-term
economic activity goes up a little bit or down a little bit is not what is truly important.
Rather, the fact that we are nearly 60 trillion dollars in debt as a society is what really
matters. The same thing applies for the globe as a whole. Right now, the citizens of
the planet are more than 223 trillion dollars in debt, and “too big to fail”
banks around the world have at least 700 trillion dollars of exposure to
derivatives. So it doesn’t really matter too much whether the short-term economic
numbers go up a little bit or down a little bit right now. The whole system is an
inherently flawed Ponzi scheme that will inevitably collapse under its own
weight. Let us hope that this period of relative stability lasts for a while longer. It is a
good thing to have time to prepare. But you would have to be absolutely insane to
think that the biggest debt bubble in the history of the world is never going
to burst.
A2: NSA Trust
*The NSA paid off companies to weaken encryption so they could
create backdoors
Menn ’13. (Reporter for Reuters Magazine. Joseph Menn. “Exclusive: Secret contract
tied NSA and security industry pioneer” BY JOSEPH MENN. December 20, 2013.
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/21/us-usa-security-rsaidUSBRE9BJ1C220131221 //JJ
As a key part of a campaign to embed encryption software that it could
crack into widely used computer products, the U.S. National Security
Agency arranged a secret $10 million contract with RSA, one of the most
influential firms in the computer security industry, Reuters has learned.
Documents leaked by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden show that the NSA
created and promulgated a flawed formula for generating random numbers
to create a "back door" in encryption products, the New York Times reported in
September. Reuters later reported that RSA became the most important
distributor of that formula by rolling it into a software tool called Bsafe that
is used to enhance security in personal computers and many other
products. Undisclosed until now was that RSA received $10 million in a deal
that set the NSA formula as the preferred, or default, method for number
generation in the BSafe software, according to two sources familiar with the
contract. Although that sum might seem paltry, it represented more than a third of the
revenue that the relevant division at RSA had taken in during the entire previous year,
securities filings show. The earlier disclosures of RSA's entanglement with the NSA
already had shocked some in the close-knit world of computer security experts. The
company had a long history of championing privacy and security, and it played a leading
role in blocking a 1990s effort by the NSA to require a special chip to enable spying on a
wide range of computer and communications products. RSA, now a subsidiary of
computer storage giant EMC Corp, urged customers to stop using the NSA formula after
the Snowden disclosures revealed its weakness. RSA and EMC declined to answer
questions for this story, but RSA said in a statement: "RSA always acts in the best
interest of its customers and under no circumstances does RSA design or enable any
back doors in our products. Decisions about the features and functionality of RSA
products are our own." The NSA declined to comment. The RSA deal shows one way
the NSA carried out what Snowden's documents describe as a key strategy
for enhancing surveillance: the systematic erosion of security tools. NSA
documents released in recent months called for using "commercial
relationships" to advance that goal, but did not name any security
companies as collaborators. The NSA came under attack this week in a landmark
report from a White House panel appointed to review U.S. surveillance policy. The panel
noted that "encryption is an essential basis for trust on the Internet," and called for a
halt to any NSA efforts to undermine it. Most of the dozen current and former
RSA employees interviewed said that the company erred in agreeing to such
a contract, and many cited RSA's corporate evolution away from pure
cryptography products as one of the reasons it occurred. But several said that
RSA also was misled by government officials, who portrayed the formula as a secure
technological advance. "They did not show their true hand," one person briefed on the
deal said of the NSA, asserting that government officials did not let on that they knew
how to break the encryption. STORIED HISTORY Started by MIT professors in the
1970s and led for years by ex-Marine Jim Bidzos, RSA and its core algorithm were both
named for the last initials of the three founders, who revolutionized cryptography. Little
known to the public, RSA's encryption tools have been licensed by most large technology
companies, which in turn use them to protect computers used by hundreds of millions
of people. At the core of RSA's products was a technology known as public
key cryptography. Instead of using the same key for encoding and then decoding a
message, there are two keys related to each other mathematically. The first, publicly
available key is used to encode a message for someone, who then uses a second, private
key to reveal it. From RSA's earliest days, the U.S. intelligence establishment
worried it would not be able to crack well-engineered public key
cryptography. Martin Hellman, a former Stanford researcher who led the
team that first invented the technique, said NSA experts tried to talk him
and others into believing that the keys did not have to be as large as they
planned. The stakes rose when more technology companies adopted RSA's methods
and Internet use began to soar. The Clinton administration embraced the Clipper Chip,
envisioned as a mandatory component in phones and computers to enable officials to
overcome encryption with a warrant. RSA led a fierce public campaign against the effort,
distributing posters with a foundering sailing ship and the words "Sink Clipper!" A key
argument against the chip was that overseas buyers would shun U.S.
technology products if they were ready-made for spying. Some companies say
that is just what has happened in the wake of the Snowden disclosures.
A2: Tech sector strong
*Due to concerns about the NSA, American companies are losing
billions
Miller ’14 (writer for the New York Times. March 21. 2014. “Revelations by Snowden
damage U.S. tech industry: Worried about privacy, foreign clients start to take business
elsewhere”. CLAIRE CAIN MILLER.
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/22/business/fallout-from-snowden-hurtingbottom-line-of-tech-companies.html /JJ
Technology companies abroad say they are gaining customers who are
shunning United States companies because of security concerns. Microsoft
has lost customers, including the government of Brazil. IBM is spending more than a
billion dollars to build data centers overseas in order to reassure foreign customers that
their information is safe from prying eyes in the United States government. And
technology companies abroad say they are gaining customers who are
shunning United States companies, suspicious because of the revelations by
Edward J. Snowden of the National Security Agency's vast surveillance
program. Even as Washington grapples with the diplomatic and political
fallout of Mr. Snowden's leaks, the more urgent issue, companies and
analysts say, is economic. It is impossible to see now the full economic ramifications
of the spying revelations -- in part because most companies are locked in multiyear
contracts -- but the pieces are beginning to add up as businesses question the
trustworthiness of American technology products. Meanwhile, the confirmation hearing
last week for the new N.S.A. chief, the appearance by video link of Mr. Snowden at a
technology conference in Texas and the drip of new details about government spying
have kept attention focused on an issue that many technology executives had hoped
would go away. "It's clear to every single tech company that this is affecting
their bottom line," said Daniel Castro, a senior analyst at the Information
Technology and Innovation Foundation, who predicted that the United States
cloud computing industry could lose $35 billion by 2016. Forrester, a
technology research firm, said the losses could be as high as $180 billion, or 25
percent of industry revenue, based on the size of the cloud computing, web hosting
and outsourcing markets and the worst-case scenario for damages. The business effect
of the Snowden revelations is felt most in the daily conversations between technology
companies with products to pitch and their wary customers. The topic of surveillance,
which rarely came up before, is "the new normal" in these conversations, as one
technology company executive described it. "We're hearing from customers, especially
global enterprise customers, that they care more than ever about where their content is
stored and how it is used and secured," said John Frank, deputy general counsel at
Microsoft, which has been publicizing that it allows customers to store their data in
Microsoft data centers in their own countries. At the same time, Mr. Castro said,
companies feel the United States government is only making a bad situation worse.
"Most of the companies in this space are very frustrated because there
hasn't been any kind of response that's made it so they can go back to their
customers and say, 'See, this is what's different now, you can trust us
again,"' he said. In some cases, that has meant forgoing potential revenue. Though it is
hard to quantify missed opportunities, American businesses are being left off some
requests for proposals from foreign customers who previously would have included
them, said James Staten, a cloud computing analyst at Forrester who has read clients'
requests for proposals. There are German companies, Mr. Staten said, "explicitly not
inviting certain American companies to join." He added, "It's like, 'Well, the very best
vendor to do this is IBM, and you didn't invite them."' The result has been a boon for
foreign companies. Brazil and Europe, which had used American undersea cables for
intercontinental communication, decided last month to build their own cable between
Brazil and Portugal and gave the contract to Brazilian and Spanish companies. The
Brazilian government also abandoned Microsoft Outlook for its own email system,
which uses Brazilian data centers. Runbox, a Norwegian email service that
markets itself as an alternative to American services like Gmail and says it
does not comply with foreign court orders seeking personal information,
reported a 34 percent annual rise in customers after the N.S.A. revelations.
Large European telecommunications companies like Deutsche Telekom of Germany
have introduced services like an email product that keeps users' data inside Germany in
direct response to customers' concerns about the N.S.A. scandal. Others like Orange of
France have seen an increase in business customers asking about privacy when
discussing potential cloud computing contracts. While the company's 15 data centers in
Europe, which has stronger data protection laws than the United States, are a major
selling point, Orange says it still has to provide services that compete with what
American rivals can offer. "The Snowden story is putting the pendulum between
European and American companies back into the middle," said Axel Haentjens, vice
president of cloud computing at Orange. "Before, the pendulum favored the
Americans. The competitive advantage is now more balanced." Mark J.
Barrenechea, chief executive of OpenText, Canada's largest software company, said an
anti-American attitude took root after the passage of the Patriot Act. But "the volume of
the discussion has risen significantly post-Snowden," he said. Of OpenText's clients, for
instance, a large German auto company required data to reside in Germany,
and a global steel manufacturer based in Britain demanded that its data not
cross United States borders. "Issues like privacy are more important than
finding the cheapest price," said Matthias Kunisch, a German software executive
who spurned United States cloud computing providers for Deutsche Telekom. "Because
of Snowden, our customers have the perception that American companies have
connections to the N.S.A." Security analysts say that ultimately the fallout from Mr.
Snowden's revelations could mimic what happened to Huawei, the Chinese
software company, which was forced to abandon major acquisitions and
contracts amid accusations by American lawmakers that the company's
products contained a backdoor for China's People's Liberation Army, even
though this claim was never definitively verified. Silicon Valley companies have
complained to government officials that their actions are hurting business. But
companies clam up on specifics about economic harm, whether to avoid frightening
shareholders or because it is too early to produce concrete evidence. "The companies
need to keep the priority on the government to do something about it, but they don't
have the evidence to go to the government and say billions of dollars are not coming to
this country," Mr. Staten said. Some American companies say the business hit has been
minor at most. John Chambers, the chief executive of Cisco Systems, said in an
interview that the N.S.A. disclosures had not affected Cisco's sales "in a major way."
Although deals in Europe and Asia have been slower to close, he said, they are still being
completed -- an experience echoed by several other computing companies. Still, the
business blowback can be felt in other ways than lost business. Security analysts say
technology companies have collectively spent millions and possibly billions
of dollars adding state-of-the-art encryption features to consumer services,
like Google search and Microsoft Outlook, and to the cables that link data
centers at Google, Yahoo and other companies. IBM said in January that it
would spend $1.2 billion to build 15 new data centers, including centers in London,
Hong Kong and Sydney, Australia, to lure foreign customers who are sensitive about the
location of their data. Salesforce.com announced similar plans this month.
Meanwhile, lawmakers in Germany and Brazil are considering legislation
that would make it costly or even technically impossible for American
technology companies to operate inside their borders. In Brazil, for example, a
proposed law would require that Brazilian users' data be kept in data centers in the
country. If it passes, companies like Google "could be barred from doing
business in one of the world's most significant markets," said Richard Salgado,
director of law enforcement and information security at Google. The company has said it
is technically nearly impossible to provide its services without sending data crisscrossing
the globe. Some government officials say laws like this could have a motive other than
protecting privacy. "Localization of data means more business for local
companies," Richard Clarke, the former United States cyberchief, said last month.
2AC
Case Extensions
Inherency
O/V
Extend the savage 15 evidence because the USA Freedom Act
does nothing to curtail warrentless wiretapping so NSA
overreach is still happening in the status squo
Extend the Wheeler 14 evidence- The NSA is violating it’s
agreement under the FAA and stealing data from yahoo and
google this causes tech companies to fight back against their
government and is hurting the US’s key role as a leader in
internet freedom
Generic
NSA reforms are insufficient and place too much of a burden on the
telecommunication industry
Francis 15
David Francis award winning staff writer writing for Foreign Policy June 5, 2015. “With
the Passage of NSA Reforms, Telecoms Say the Buck Has Been Passed to Them”
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/06/05/with-the-passage-of-nsa-reforms-telecoms-saythe-buck-has-been-passed-to-them/ //EM
The two-year fight to overhaul the National Security Agency ended this
week with President Barack Obama’s signing of the USA Freedom Act. But it
will take months of tough negotiations with telecom companies for the
White House to actually implement the required reforms, and privacy groups are still
smarting over what they consider watered-down changes to how the NSA does business. The bill requires telecom
companies to store U.S. phone data instead of the NSA, which can access it with a warrant
from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance (FISA) Court. Right now, telecom companies only store
this information for 18 months. This presents an immediate problem — and an
unfunded mandate — that the Obama administration and communications firms must work out during the six-month grace period
permitted by the bill: The
NSA wants data stored for five years. Former federal prosecutor Robert
Cattanach told FP he expects the White House and companies like AT&T to be able to come to terms on storage length. The
more challenging problem is that cell phone providers don’t store all of the
metadata on phone usage that the NSA does. During the years-long debate
over surveillance reform, cellular providers quietly pushed back at adding
capacity simply because the NSA wants it. Jot Carpenter, vice president of government affairs for
CTIA-The Wireless Association, a group that represents cell-phone companies, said cell providers are opposed
to adding any additional data collection on behalf of the NSA. It could cost
$60 million alone for the phone companies to get existing data from the
NSA. “I don’t know if the telecoms are going to start aggregating and retaining info from wireless companies they don’t otherwise
retain,” Cattanach said. “Both the telecoms and the NSA, they can each make each others lives miserable.” Meanwhile,
privacy groups that have been pressing lawmakers for reform since Edward
Snowden revealed NSA’s secrets to the world also walk away disappointed.
Their main point of contention is that the bill failed to address Section 702
of the Patriot Act, which sweeps up data on non-U.S. citizens outside of the
United States. Advocates say this provides a backdoor to collecting
American data. “It’s not a win, but we didn’t lose,” Daniel Schuman, policy director of the progressive group Demand
Progress, said Thursday. “It wasn’t an entire sellout to the intelligence community.” Reauthorization for Section 702 expires in two
years, meaning the debate over the NSA surveillance tools is far from over. Nadia Kayyali, an activist with the digital privacy
advocates the Electronic Frontier Foundation — a group who withdrew their support for the USA Freedom Act because it didn’t go
far enough to curb the NSA — said efforts are already underway to get lawmakers to kill the authority prior to its expiration.
Freedom Act
USA Freedom Act is actually an overall net benefit for the NSA;
this makes plan even more critical
Harris 15
Shane Harris, winner of a Gerald R. Ford Prize for Distinguished Reporting writing for
the The Daily Beast May 14, 2015. “‘Big Win’ for Big Brother: NSA Celebrates the Bill
That’s Designed to Cuff Them”
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/05/14/nsa-loves-the-nothing-burgerspying-reform-bill.html //EM
Civil libertarians and privacy advocates were applauding yesterday after the
House of Representatives overwhelmingly passed legislation to stop the
National Security Agency from collecting Americans’ phone records. But
they’d best not break out the bubbly. The really big winner here is the NSA. Over at its headquarters in
Fort Meade, Maryland, intelligence officials are high-fiving, because they know things could have turned
out much worse. “What no one wants to say out loud is that this is a big win
for the NSA, and a huge nothing burger for the privacy community,” said a
former senior intelligence official, one of half a dozen who have spoken to
The Daily Beast about the phone records program and efforts to change it.
Here’s the dirty little secret that many spooks are loath to utter publicly, but have been admitting in private for the past two years:
The program, which was exposed in documents leaked by Edward Snowden
in 2013, is more trouble than it’s worth. “It’s very expensive and very
cumbersome,” the former official said. It requires the agency to maintain
huge databases of all Americans’ landline phone calls. But it doesn’t
contribute many leads on terrorists. It has helped prevent few—if any—
attacks. And it’s nowhere near the biggest contributor of information about
terrorism that ends up on the desk of the president and other senior
decision makers. If, after the most significant public debate about balancing
surveillance and liberty in a generation, this is the program that the NSA
has to give up, they’re getting off easy. The bill that the House passed
yesterday, called the USA Freedom Act, doesn’t actually suspend the phone
records program. Rather, it requires that phone companies, not the NSA,
hold on to the records. “Good! Let them take them. I’m tired of holding on to this,” a current senior U.S. official told
The Daily Beast. It requires teams of lawyers and auditors to ensure that the NSA is complying with Section 215 of the Patriot Act,
which authorizes the program, as well as internal regulations on how the records can and can’t be used, he said. The phone records
program has become a political lightning rod, the most controversial of all the classified operations that Snowden exposed.
If
the NSA can still get access to the records but not have to hold on to them
itself, all the better, the senior official said. “It’s a big win for common sense
and for the country,” Joel Brenner, the NSA’s former inspector general,
told The Daily Beast. “NSA can get to do what it needs to do with a higher
level of scrutiny and a little more trouble, but it can do what needs to do. At
same time the government is not going to hold the bulk metadata of the
American people.” “What no one wants to say out loud is that this is a big win for the NSA, and a huge nothing burger
for the privacy community.” “The NSA is coming out of this unscathed,” said the former
official. If the USA Freedom Act passes the Senate—which is not a foregone conclusion—it’ll be signed by President Obama and
create “a more efficient and comprehensive tool” for the NSA. That’s because under the current regime, only
the logs of landline calls are kept. But in the future, the NSA would be able
to get cell phone records from the companies, too. “That’s great,” the former official said. “I
think no one thought it was in the realm of the possible before this bill.” And
there’s another irony. Before the Snowden leaks, the NSA was already looking for
alternatives to storing huge amounts of phone records in the agency’s
computers. And one of the ideas officials considered was asking Congress to
require phone companies to hang onto that information for several years.
The idea died, though, because NSA leaders thought that Congress would never agree, current and former officials have said. Enter
Snowden. Suddenly the NSA found itself under orders from the White House to come up with some alternative to the phone records
program that preserved it as a counterterrorism tool, but also put more checks on how the records are used. That’s
when
General Keith Alexander, then the agency’s director, dusted the old idea off
the shelf and promoted it on Capitol Hill. “The USA Freedom Act”—the
supposed reining in of the NSA—“was literally born from Alexander,” the former
official said. So the NSA effectively got what it wanted. But that doesn’t mean privacy activists got
nothing, or that they’d count the law’s passage as a loss. Consider their significant victories. Before Snowden, the NSA was secretly
collecting records on hundreds of millions of Americans, a program that some members of Congress didn’t even understand they
were voting for when they renewed the Patriot Act, and that an appeals court ruled last week is illegal. Now the world knows what
the agency exposed hundreds of millions of innocent people to potential scrutiny. “These are reforms NSA ultimately was prepared
to accept; it’s not as though the agency had been secretly wishing for these changes all along and was finally able to get them only
now,” Julian Sanchez, a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, told The Daily Beast. “So it seems a little odd to call it a ‘win’ for them.”
“But,” Sanchez continued, “I’d certainly agree it’s not a loss for NSA in any meaningful way.
Indeed, there are
some respects in which a shift to the carrier-centric model is likely to give
them greater flexibility by allowing them to query on data the FISC order
doesn’t permit them to collect.” For instance, billing addresses, which the
NSA database doesn’t have now, but that the phone companies could, in
principle, provide. The FISC is the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, which has been secretly authorizing the
program for years. Under the new law, the NSA would have to get court approval to query the phone records. That adds
another layer of oversight to the intelligence operations, but it doesn’t
suspend them. And there’s no guarantee it would curtail them, either. The
court has repeatedly found that the phone records program is legal.
Presumably it’s not going to stop granting NSA’s requests just because the
records now sit in an AT&T database instead of one owned by the U.S.
government. “The NSA is coming out of this unscathed... No one thought it was in the realm of the possible.” But the NSA is
not out of the woods, because surveillance critics don’t see the USA Freedom Act as the last chapter. “The only downside for privacy
advocates would be if the passage of this bill were invoked to claim we’ve now accomplished ‘surveillance reform’ and there’s no
work left to be done,” Sanchez said. Now, advocates will turn their sights on another controversial portion of surveillance law,
Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. That’s what lets the NSA collect email and other electronic data from big
tech companies like Google, Facebook, and Yahoo, including under the so-called Prism program that was the subject of the second
big leak from Snowden. That program does provide the NSA with a huge amount of information. According to intelligence officials,
it’s the single largest source of intelligence included in the president’s daily national security briefing. And it also allows the NSA to
collect large amounts of global communications as they course through equipment in the United States. Take those authorities away,
and it’d be like putting out one of the NSA’s eyes. Section 702 is slated to sunset in 2017. If members of Congress and privacy
activists mount an effort to restrict or repeal those authorities, the NSA will go to the barricades to stop them. But that’s another day.
For now, the NSA is taking its lumps, and thanking its lucky stars.
USA Freedom Act does not alter perceptions of US surveillance
Knibbs 15
Kate Knibbs Bachelor's of Arts, English major, and Political Science minor from McGill
University writing for Gizmodo June 3, 2015. “Obama Took a Tiny Step Towards
Reform By Signing the USA Freedom Act” http://gizmodo.com/congress-just-took-ababy-step-towards-limiting-governm-1708547987 //EM
After a tense battle over renewing key provisions of the Patriot Act, the US Senate passed the USA Freedom Act, a bill meant to limit
the government’s surveillance apparatus. President Obama signed the bill last night. The USA Freedom Act renews Section 215 of
the Patriot Act, which has been used (under dubious legal circumstance) to justify the NSA’s bulk metadata collection program. In
renewing Section 215, the bill prohibits the NSA from using it to justify its bulk data collection program. The bill also declassifies
major FISA court opinions, throwing an extra iota of sunshine on a shadowy corner of the legal system. After Congress blew its
deadline and Section 215 “sunsetted” this weekend, the Senate got serious about compromising, with hardcore Patriot Act supporter
and former USA Freedom opponent Sen. Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) flipping his vote, preferring to support legislation he didn’t like
rather than see Section 215 go away completely. McConnell attempted to insert a few amendments into the USA Freedom Act to
water it down, but none passed. Still, the bill is seen as a big compromise for privacy activists, since the limits it places on
surveillance don’t bring sweeping reform. Privacy-minded
groups weren’t uniformly
supportive of the bill, with many concerned it didn’t go far enough. “This
bill would make only incremental improvements, and at least one
provision—the material-support provision—would represent a significant
step backwards,” ACLU deputy legal director Jameel Jaffer said in a
statement while it went through Congress. “The disclosures of the last two
years make clear that we need wholesale reform.” And while supporters like Sen. Ron Wyden
(D-Ore.) voted for and praised the bill, there’s recognition that it’s an incremental victory at best. “The fight to protect Americans’
constitutional rights against government overreach is not over,” Wyden said in a statement. “I’m
committed to
plugging the backdoor search loophole that the government uses to review
Americans’ communications without a warrant, to beat back efforts to build
security weaknesses into our electronic devices and to require the
government to get a warrant before tracking Americans’ movements
electronically.” This is a good step towards reform! The bill might seem like a strident win because of the Congressional
strife it caused, but it’s important to remember that it’s just a tiny little baby step,
and not any kind of blanket protection against continued intelligence
overreach.
Multistakeholder Model
2AC-O/V
Group the Eoyang 14 and Kehl 14 cards- The belief that the NSA
is using the Executive order 12333 to go around section 702 of
the FAA is costing the tech industry millions and leading to a
disconnect with the intelligence community, this specifically
hampers the United State’s ability to uphold the Internet
Freedom Agenda and would lead to global data localization.
Multistakeholderism
Multi-Stakeholder Good
Multi-Stakeholderism encourages innovation and risks are
mitigated through private sector investment
Berejka was Senior Advisor for Technology Policy ’12 ( Marc Berejka was Senior Advisor
for Technology Policy to the U.S. Secretary of Commerce from 2009 to 2011, “A CASE FOR
GOVERNMENT PROMOTED MULTI-STAKEHOLDERISM”, p. 2-3, Heinonline)//KY
The prominence of the Internet in today's society and the persistence of
certain challenges online provide good justification for greater
governmental engagement. Looking more deeply and, in particular, by
building on lessons from Complexity Theory, 3 this paper offers more
fundamental reasons for employing a multi-stakeholder strategy.
Observations from Complexity Theory suggest that we can improve welfare
at the individual and societal level by building up mutual trust over time. 4
Extrapolating, the multi-stakeholder framework fleshed out here is
consciously aimed at cultivating formal and informal institutions that focus
on fostering trust among industry, civil-society, and government
stakeholders. Complexity Theory also reminds us of the impossibility of
predicting future innovations. Therefore, the multi-stakeholder framework
eschews rules and rulemaking that might dampen innovation. Instead, it
urges policymakers to identify the public imperatives they wish to protect at
a high, principles-based level. Using those principles as a foundation,
stakeholders ought to then convene themselves to develop context-specific
methods for meeting the imperatives. Institutions, whether governmentally led or
not, must be able to detect and deter cheating against the agreed-upon goals
to maintain trust in the system. Finally, lessons from such oversight should
be fed back into the norm development process to keep practices up to date.
There are several risks to the success of multi-stakeholderism. To a great
extent, those risks can be mitigated by deep investment, largely from the
private sector. The overarching point is that a new paradigm such as the one outlined
here is necessary if we are to continue to enjoy the fruits of Internet-based innovation
while at the same time avoiding the threat
Multi-Stakeholderism creates incentives for collaboration
Antonova Professor of Management and International Business ‘7(Slavka Antonova,
p.12-13, “Power and Multistakeholderism in Internet Global Governance. Towards a
synergetic theoretical framework”, Massey University, 2007,
http://muir.massey.ac.nz/bitstream/handle/10179/653/pmig2007.pdf?sequence=1)
//KY
In response to the need for a more dynamic process-oriented mode of
investigation in inter-organizational relations, Barbara Gray (1989) developed
an empirical theory of (multistakeholder) collaboration. It combined perspectives of
organizational behavior and political science, and departed from the traditional model
of inter-organizational relations that had hitherto dominated the literature. Gray
suggested that collaboration was enabling organizations to manage their increasing
interconnectedness (Gray, 1989, p. 226). In a collaboration, stakeholders
“constructively explore their differences”. The aim is “to create a richer, more
comprehensive appreciation [common understanding] of the problem… than any one of
them could construct alone” (Gray, 1989, p. 5), and resolve conflicts, or advance shared
visions on the collective good (Gray, 1989, p. 5).14 As Gray noticed, dissatisfaction with
the status quo, and the desire to avert unwanted costs that it induces, constitute a
major motivation for the principal stakeholders to turn to collaboration.
There are stakeholders, though, who would be prompted to join a collaboration because
of the attractive cultural norms it embodies (consensus decision-making vs.
topdown governmental regulation), or the credibility of the convening party(ies). Thus,
the expectation that through collaborative efforts some positive outcomes would be
produced is a powerful incentive for participation in a collaboration.
Multi-Stakeholder governance is key to a free, open and robust
internet
Stacy Physical Science News Officer @ Brown 2/13 (Kevin Stacy is a Physical Science
News Officer, Brown News, “Multistakeholder governance for the global Internet”,
2/13/15, https://news.brown.edu/articles/2015/02/savage) //KY
The governance debate over the last year or so has largely boiled down to
two camps. The U.S. and Western governments endorse a multistakeholder
model, one in which Internet policy is set collectively by representatives
from technology, business, and public policy sectors. On the other hand, Russia,
China, and other nations favor turning control of the Internet over the
United Nations under the auspices of the International
Telecommunications Union. The ITU option would put world governments
in control of the Internet, with each nation having one vote. While the “one nation,
one vote” model may sound healthy and democratic, putting governments in
charge of the Internet could have troubling consequences, Savage says. “The
Internet’s capacity to empower individuals has caused a lot of governments
to become alarmed. If they have the chance, many governments — potentially a
majority of them — would prefer to limit the free flow of information and
ideas. That would have negative consequences for individuals, businesses, and the
scientific community.” The best option for maintaining a free, open, and
robust Internet, Savage argued, is a multistakeholder model of some kind. The
problem, however, is that the concept of “multistakeholder” is often loosely
defined. “It’s a very fuzzy idea,” Savage said. “Advocates have expressed a
desire for decisions to be made in a way that’s open, transparent, and
inclusive, but beyond that there’s little conception of what a
multistakeholder model would actually look like.” Further complicating
matters is the huge breadth of issues involved in governing the Internet. For
some, Internet governance refers to the technical operations of the network,
including traffic routing and domain names. For others, it means regulating
content, combating cybercrime and terrorism, or protecting freedom of
expression online. In a recent paper, Savage and co-author Bruce McConnell
outlined some broad recommendations for what shape multistakeholder
governance might take. First, they suggested not conflating all aspects of
Internet governance under one organization. “The likelihood of reaching
agreement increases if we can simplify the landscape,” Savage said. “That means
disaggregating governance into a small set of important issues.” In many
cases, he argues, existing international organizations could be brought to
bear in dealing with nontechnical public policy issues related to the
Internet. “So many of the issues people are looking to govern predate the
Internet — crime, human rights terrorism, et cetera. For human rights, there exists the
Human Rights Council. For crime, there exists Interpol. We think that these
existing organizations should deal with those governance matters that fall
within their respective areas.” One problem is that many of these
organizations might not be up to speed on the Internet. But that’s easily
remedied, Savage says. Each group could assemble a multistakeholder
advisory panel of Internet experts to help guide decision-making. Technical
issues including network architecture, domain names, and the like, could also be
handled by a model that involves multistakeholder oversight, Savage says. But
care must be taken to make sure that technical decisions are ultimately made by those
most qualified to do so. For example, the Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers (ICANN) has successfully expanded the domain name system
to more than 3 billion users. There’s no reason it should not continue to do so,
but adding a properly crafted multistakeholder oversight panel could
bolster ICANN’s legitimacy. Such a panel should operate on the principle that
policymakers can offer opinions concerning technical decisions, but that those with
technical expertise should make final decisions on them. “We think that a model of
decentralized governance with multistakeholder oversight is a plausible
structure for governing the Internet,” Savage said. “It’s a way of
strengthening the multistakeholder model, which we think is key to
maintaining a free, open, safe and robust Internet.”
Multi-Stakeholderism provides the necessary model for cooperation to
prevent global internet separation
Hill Internet Policy at U.S. Department of Commerce ’12 (Jonah Force Hill works in
Internet Policy at the U.S. Department of Commerce and was a research assistant at the
Harvard – Belfer Center, Harvard – John F. Kennedy School of Government, “Internet
Fragmentation Highlighting the Major Technical, Governance and Diplomatic
Challenges for U.S. Policy Makers”, Spring 2012,
http://ecir.mit.edu/images/stories/internet_fragmentation_jonah_hill.pdf)//KY
The Internet allows for the rapid and inexpensive collection of vast
amounts of personal information and data online. Internet companies and
ISPs collect users’ information through searches, purchases, sign-ins, and
HTTP cookies, and then use that information for any number of purposes,
from improved search engine results to better-targeted advertising. But
while the collection of personal information and data has generated billions of dollars of
online revenue and spawned new industries,120 privacy advocates around the
world are up in arms about the collection and use of this data, and what they
view as a mounting threat to personal privacy and a lack of serious online consumer
protections. In response to these concerns, governments are crafting new rules
addressing how digital data are collected, stored and sold. Whether privacy protections
should be enforced through legislation, or through voluntarily measures by
Internet companies, is a matter of intense debate. But if the recent wave of
new proposed privacy rules in the U.S. and internationally is any indication, the
tide of public and government opinion seems to be shifting towards
increased legal protections for Internet users and their personal
information. Hidden within these privacy deliberations, however, lies a real threat
to the Internet’s unity. Amidst the flurry of new privacy legislation under
discussion in world capitals, there has been remarkably little international
coordination or agreement about what types of restrictions and limitations should be
put on the acquisition and use of online data. There are mounting concerns that if many
countries adopt their own unique privacy requirements, then every firm operating
on the Internet could potentially be subjected to a multiplicity of often
inconsistent laws. If companies are unable to meet each country’s differing
requirements, either because those requirements are in conflict with one another or
because of the added costs associated with meeting multiple disparate rules, then we
could see firms pulling out of particular markets entirely, essentially balkanizing the
Internet by firm.
Multi-Stakeholderism is key to prevent silencing of free
expression
Clingaert Vice-president for policy and external relations at Freedom House ’11
(Daniel Calingaert is vice-president for policy and external relations at Freedom House,
which receives funding from the State Department, Google, and other sources to
promote Internet freedom. He also teaches in Georgetown University’s M.A. Program in
Democracy and Governance and at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced
International Studies, Stanford CDDRL, “CHALLENGES FOR International Policy”,
7/12/11,
http://cddrl.fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/calingaert_challenges_for_internation
al_policy_0.pdf)//KY
The Obama administration has developed a sophisticated, multifaceted policy to
protect and advance Internet freedom. This policy reflects a serious U.S.
commitment to support online freedom of expression and to push back on
the restrictions imposed by authoritarian regimes. It promotes respect for
international human-rights principles of free expression, defends the open
multistakeholder structure of global Internet governance, supports digital
activists, and makes substantial funding available to develop and apply new
technologies to curb Internet censorship and surveillance. The Dutch and
Swedish governments have launched similar policy initiatives and led the debate in the
European Union to step up efforts to promote Internet freedom. Current international
policy on Internet freedom, however, is insufficient to stem the rising tide of
authoritarian censorship and control over digital media and
communications around the world. The proliferation of these controls is
outpacing the efforts of citizens and democratic governments to expand the
space for free expression on the Internet. The United States and the EU can have
greater impact in their efforts to push back against Internet-related repression by
challenging restrictive Internet laws and practices abroad, standing up for technology
companies that are pressured into assisting authoritarian regimes with Internet
censorship or surveillance, and enacting legislation to curb sales of U.S. and
European technology that is used to violate human rights.
AT: Authoritarian countries support Multistakeholderism
Authoritarian multi-stakeholderism differs from current multistakeholder implementations – gives governments sole power
over the internet
Dourado Director of Technology Policy Program @ George Mason U ’13 (Eli Dourado is
a research fellow at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University and director of its
Technology Policy Program, ForeignPolicy, “Too Many Stakeholders Spoil the Soup” , 5/15/13,
http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/05/15/too-many-stakeholders-spoil-the-soup/)//KY
Authoritarian governments have been quick to remind the world that they
are stakeholders, too. Since the Tunis Agenda urges all stakeholders to work
together "in their respective roles," the most illiberal countries have simply
argued that national governments should have the biggest and most preeminent roles, while other stakeholders should have smaller subordinate
ones. Russia in particular is aggressively pushing this definition for the role
of governments. Its proposed edits to the multi-stakeholder opinion invites
member states "to exercise their rights on Internet Governance … at the
national level," by which it means that national governments should
preempt ICANN. In other words, Russia — and its allies like China and Saudi
Arabia — are adopting the language of multi-stakeholderism to support
something rather like its opposite. The position they are advancing is
virtually indistinguishable from one which accords no role to other
stakeholders.
China
China cooperating with 14 other countries for governmental
control of the internet
Seghal Council of Foreign Relations ’14 (Adam Seghal is on the Council of Foreign
Relations, Indiana University, “A Field of Intense Struggle: China and the International
Politics of the Internet, Cyberspace, and Cybersecurity”, Spring 2014,
http://www.indiana.edu/~reeiweb/newsEvents/2014/Segal_response.pdf)//KY
Chinese officials frame network security as a global problem that requires international
cooperation, but while the United States, United Kingdom and other liberal democracies
prefer a multistakeholder model of Internet governance, China supports a more
state-centric approach anchored in the United Nations and the
International Telecommunications Union. In a 2013 speech, Lu Wei of the State
Internet Information Office argued that information services could cross borders, “but
cyberspace cannot live without sovereignty.”6 States should proceed from the principles
of the UN Charter, and Lu suggested that China would work with others to
develop a multilateral framework for the governance of the Internet under
the UN. 3 On questions of international law and cybersecurity, the United States and
the United Kingdom have consistently argued that cyberspace should not be considered
an entirely new domain and that the laws of armed conflict (proportionality and
neutrality, for example) apply. Chinese analysts by contrast have stated that
international law has not kept up with technological changes, that it is too narrow, and
that it should be supplemented with new treaties, including perhaps arms
control treaties for cyber weapons. In June of 2013, China, along with
fourteen other countries, signed off on a report by UN Group of Government
Experts (GGE) that argued “international law, and in particular, the United Nations
Charter” applies to cyberspace and that there was a norm of state responsibility—states
must meet their international obligations regarding internationally wrongful acts
attributable to them.7 Since the report’s publication, the State Department has tended
to stress the perceived consensus around international law and state responsibility. In
contrast, the public statements by Chinese officials have centered on the norms of state
sovereignty. For many Chinese analysts, the overall security trends are negative.8
New technologies mean new threats, and the impact of cyber events is growing.
The United States, Australia, UK, India, and Canada have used security concerns to
block the import of Chinese products. Western countries, and the United States in
particular, are increasing their “Internet containment of China” through diplomatic
efforts such as cyber defense consultations with Japan, South Korea, and Australia.
Spending on cyber offense by the Pentagon is increasing, and the Snowden revelations
have reinforced the sense that the United States occupies the preeminent position in
cyberspace. These challenges give a sense of Chinese policy priorities over the next five
years. The development of domestic technology and indigenous innovation will remain
critical. Within China, the institutional, legal, and policy frameworks for
cybersecurity must be developed. Some analysts have also called for the public
development of active defense and offensive capabilities. There is also a sense that China
needs to step up its international efforts to promote the concept of national sovereignty
in cyberspace within the UN framework. In short, many in China are likely to see the
country engaged in intense competition with the liberal democracies. Or as Major
General Wu Jiangxing, the president of the PLA Information Engineering University,
put it in an interview: “Cyberspace has become a field of intense struggle, and the state,
government, and army must take extraordinary measures to enhance its security.”
China cooperating with other countries to push governmental
control of the internet
Shackelford et al 6/25 (Scott J. Shackelford, JD, PhD is an Assistant Professor of
Business Law and Ethics at Indiana University. He is a Senior Fellow at the Indiana
University Center for Applied Cybersecurity Research and the W. Glenn Campbell and
Rita Ricardo-Campbell National Fellow at the Stanford University Hoover Institution.
Enrique Oti is a National Security Affairs Fellow at the Stanford University Hoover
Institution. Jaclyn A. Kerr is a Cybersecurity Postdoctoral Fellow at Stanford
University’s Freeman Spogli Institute. Elaine Korzak, LLM, PhD is a Cybersecurity
Postdoctoral Fellow Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute. Andreas Kuehn is a
Zukerman Cybersecurity Predoctoral Fellow Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli
Institute, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, “SPOTLIGHT ON CYBER V:
BACK TO THE FUTURE OF INTERNET GOVERNANCE?”, 6/25/15,
http://journal.georgetown.edu/back-to-the-future-of-internet-governance/)//KY
China has not changed its positions on promoting cybersecurity as a subset
of national sovereignty since WCIT-12, nor on establishing an international
Internet management system, but it seems to be modifying its tactics. The
Chinese government first formalized its desire for a new Internet
governance mechanism in 2006 when it drafted the “2006-2020 National
Strategy for Informatization Development.”[22] In this document, China
made clear that in order to enable domestic Internet development and
cybersecurity, they needed to actively engage in international exchanges in
order to “contribute to building up an international Internet management
mechanism characterized by sovereign equality among different
countries.”[23] Over the next six years, China continued to refine its
position. In its 2010 white paper, “The Internet in China,” the government
declared, “China holds that the role of the UN should be given full scope in
international Internet administration. China supports the establishment of
an authoritative and just international Internet administration
organization under the UN system through democratic procedures on a
worldwide scale.”[24] This position was translated into action in 2011 when
China, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan jointly proposed a UN resolution
that encouraged “the establishment of a multilateral, transparent and
democratic international Internet management system,” and promoted
“the important role of the United Nations in formulating international
norms, peaceful settlements of international disputes and improvements in
international cooperation.”[25]
Russia
Russia is leading other governments towards governmental
control model for the internet
Dourado Director of Technology Policy Program @ George Mason U ’13 (Eli
Dourado is a research fellow at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University and
director of its Technology Policy Program, The Guardian, “So Much for America's
Internet Freedom Agenda” , 8/7/13, http://mercatus.org/expert_commentary/somuch-americas-internet-freedom-agenda)//KY
The National Security Agency's surveillance of innocent Americans without
a warrant is illegal and unconstitutional. In a narrowly defeated amendment,
congressman Justin Amash (a Michigan Republican) and a bipartisan group of over 200
members of Congress recently voted to defund the NSA's warrantless spying on US
citizens. But obscured by the debate over domestic spying is the fact that
virtually no one in the United States is questioning the NSA's total
surveillance of the rest of the world. Foreign surveillance programs, unlike
domestic ones, are clearly legal and constitutional, but that doesn't make them
good policy. After all, most of the nearly seven billion non-Americans in the
world are just as innocent as most Americans. They resent US government
surveillance as much as, or perhaps more than, Americans do. To see how foreign
resentment over surveillance is hurting US interests, look at the international
politics of internet governance. Unsavory regimes have long sought a
preeminent role for the United Nations on internet matters. This past
December in Dubai, the United States and many of its allies refused to sign a
UN telecommunications treaty that would have implicated the internet in
part on the grounds that it would have harmed Internet freedom. Led by
Russia, some regimes want to split the internet into 193 separate "states"
(pdf), managed by national governments, which interconnect according to
the rules of a treaty. These countries want such arrangements because they want to
more effectively surveil and censor their own citizens. The US State Department
always rightly opposed such activities, but now that leaked documents are
revealing the NSA's domestic and global surveillance programs, the United States
looks hypocritical. One can come up with all kinds of excuses for why US
surveillance is not hypocrisy. For example, one might argue that US policies
are more benevolent than those of many other regimes, which is true. And
one might recognize that in several cases, some branches of government don't
know what other branches are doing – also true – and therefore US policy is
not so much hypocritical as it is inadvertently contradictory. Fine. But the
fact is that the NSA is galvanizing opposition to America's internet freedom
agenda. The scandal is reinvigorating Russian proposals for the
International Telecommunication Union, a UN agency, to take over internet
technical standards and management of the domain name system. Brazil
insists that the role of governments and intergovernmental agencies in
managing the internet be discussed at ITU meetings in November and
March. These are not major policy changes, but they now find a more
sympathetic ear from the developing countries that make up the majority at
the ITU, which conducts business on the basis of one vote per country. In truth, most
developing countries don't care very much about the management of the
internet per se. What they really want is more access to the internet – more
foreign investment and more aid to set up internet exchange points. In the
past, the United States always offered more development resources as a way
to smooth over its hard-line stance on preserving existing Internet
institutions. But now, developing countries don't want US assistance because
they assume the equipment comes with a backdoor for the NSA. They are
walking straight into the arms of Russia, China, and the ITU, and when the
time comes to decide how the internet should be managed, who do you think
they'll side with? This is not to suggest that the United States shut down all of its
intelligence operations. After all, other countries spy, and spying – for better or
worse – is part of international politics. But the United States is one of very
few countries with the capability to monitor absolutely everything that is
going on in the world. This means that the kind of indiscriminate, total
surveillance that the United States is presently engaged in is not strictly
necessary, and unilateral disarmament is an option. No doubt the
intelligence establishment will dismiss the suggestion out of hand. US
intelligence hegemony has its advantages, particularly if you are a US intelligence
officer. Yet as the politics of internet governance shows, it also has significant
costs. By surveilling harmless and innocent foreigners alongside America's enemies, the
United States is alienating the world and projecting an arrogant disregard
for the perfectly ordinary aspirations of billions of people to maintain some
semblance of privacyin their personal lives. Eventually, that alienation could
destroy the free, global Internet that we all love. Is it worth it?
Russia is working with 7 other countries to get more
governmental control over the internet
Shackelford et al 6/25 (Scott J. Shackelford, JD, PhD is an Assistant Professor of
Business Law and Ethics at Indiana University. He is a Senior Fellow at the Indiana
University Center for Applied Cybersecurity Research and the W. Glenn Campbell and
Rita Ricardo-Campbell National Fellow at the Stanford University Hoover Institution.
Enrique Oti is a National Security Affairs Fellow at the Stanford University Hoover
Institution. Jaclyn A. Kerr is a Cybersecurity Postdoctoral Fellow at Stanford
University’s Freeman Spogli Institute. Elaine Korzak, LLM, PhD is a Cybersecurity
Postdoctoral Fellow Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute. Andreas Kuehn is a
Zukerman Cybersecurity Predoctoral Fellow Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli
Institute, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, “SPOTLIGHT ON CYBER V:
BACK TO THE FUTURE OF INTERNET GOVERNANCE?”, 6/25/15,
http://journal.georgetown.edu/back-to-the-future-of-internet-governance/)//KY
Russia’s positions expressed at PP-14 were relatively consistent with its WCIT-12
strategy. In his five-minute Member State Policy Statement on the opening
day of the conference, the head of the Russian delegation, Nikolay Nikiforov,
Russia’s Minister of Telecom and Mass Communications, praised the ITU’s 150 year
history, but called on it to respond to a changing world, particularly to the
security challenges created by the spread of new information and
communication technologies.[32] He noted that “medals always have two
sides” in thanking the United States for the creation of the Internet, but also
argued that an international convention on Internet governance is needed
to protect against the use of ICTs for cross-border criminal purposes
contrary to the UN Charter, which can endanger individual privacy or
national stability.[33] International norms and rules regulating the
Internet must “be based on international law” and include a “commitment
to non-interference in the internal affairs of states [and to] their equality in
Internet governance, [including] the sovereign right of states to control the
Internet in their national information space.”[34] In essence, Russia has
long argued that the state is the guarantor of its citizens’ rights, and must
also decide the fate of the domestic Internet in a stance similar to China’s
historic position. Russia has emerged in recent years as a proponent of
greater control by states over the Internet within their territories and,
relatedly, supporting a more prominent role for the UN and particularly the
ITU in global Internet governance processes.[35] They have consistently
sought to reduce the influence of private sector organizations such as
ICANN, which is seen as controlled by the United States, and to increase the
role of intergovernmental state-centric processes over and above the multistakeholder status quo. At WCIT-12, Russia led a group of seven countries
(Russia, Saudi Arabia, China, Sudan, Egypt, Algeria, and the UAE) in submitting a
controversial proposal for alterations to the International
Telecommunication Regulations that would have given national
governments more legal authority over the Internet within their
borders.[36] The proposal was widely interpreted by Internet rights
activists as a bid to gain international legal legitimacy for domestic
censorship and other infringements on Internet access or content.[37]
However, this position, after enjoying widespread support at WCIT-12, has now been
largely repudiated at both NETmundial and PP-14.[38]
Surveillance kills Internet freedom
NSA surveillance wrecks US cred in promoting Internet Freedom
and spills over to larger foreign policy cred
Kehl, 14 – Policy Analyst at New America’s Open Technology Institute (Danielle,
“Surveillance Costs: The NSA’s Impact on the Economy, Internet Freedom &
Cybersecurity” July, https://www.newamerica.org/oti/surveillance-costs-the-nsasimpact-on-the-economy-internet-freedom-cybersecurity/
Mandatory data localization proposals are just one of a number of ways that foreign
governments have reacted to NSA surveillance in a manner that threatens U.S. foreign
policy interests, particularly with regard to Internet Freedom. There has been a quiet
tension between how the U.S. approaches freedom of expression online in
its foreign policy and its domestic laws ever since Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton effectively launched the Internet Freedom agenda in January 2010.170
But the NSA disclosures shined a bright spotlight on the contradiction: the
U.S. government promotes free expression abroad and aims to prevent
repressive governments from monitoring and censoring their citizens while
simultaneously supporting domestic laws that authorize surveillance and
bulk data collection. As cybersecurity expert and Internet governance scholar Ron
Deibert wrote a few days after the first revelations: “There are unintended consequences
of the NSA scandal that will undermine U.S. foreign policy interests – in particular,
the ‘Internet Freedom’ agenda espoused by the U.S. State Department and its
allies.”171 Deibert accurately predicted that the news would trigger reactions from both
policymakers and ordinary citizens abroad, who would begin to question their
dependence on American technologies and the hidden motivations behind the United
States’ promotion of Internet Freedom. In some countries, the scandal would be
used as an excuse to revive dormant debates about dropping American
companies from official contracts, score political points at the expense of
the United States, and even justify local monitoring and surveillance.
Deibert’s speculation has so far proven quite prescient. As we will describe in this
section, the ongoing revelations have done significant damage to the
credibility of the U.S. Internet Freedom agenda and further jeopardized the
United States’ position in the global Internet governance debates. Moreover,
the repercussions from NSA spying have bled over from the Internet policy
realm to impact broader U.S. foreign policy goals and relationships with
government officials and a range of other important stakeholders abroad.
In an essay entitled, “The End of Hypocrisy: American Foreign Policy in the Age of
Leaks,” international relations scholars Henry Farrell and Martha Finnemore argue that
a critical, lasting impact of information provided by leakers like Edward Snowden is “the
documented confirmation they provide of what the United States is actually doing and
why. When these deeds turn out to clash with the government’s public rhetoric, as they
so often do, it becomes harder for U.S. allies to overlook Washington’s covert behavior
and easier for U.S. adversaries to justify their own.”172 Toward the end of the essay,
Farrell and Finnemore suggest, “The U.S. government, its friends, and its foes can no
longer plausibly deny the dark side of U.S. foreign policy and will have to address it
head-on.” Indeed, the U.S. is currently working to repair damaged bilateral
and multilateral relations with countries from Germany and France to Russia and
Israel,173 and it is likely that the effects of the NSA disclosures will be felt for
years in fields far beyond Internet policy.174
Wrecks overall internet freedom globally
Kehl, 14 – Policy Analyst at New America’s Open Technology Institute (Danielle,
“Surveillance Costs: The NSA’s Impact on the Economy, Internet Freedom &
Cybersecurity” July, https://www.newamerica.org/oti/surveillance-costs-the-nsasimpact-on-the-economy-internet-freedom-cybersecurity/
The effects of the NSA disclosures on the Internet Freedom agenda go
beyond the realm of Internet governance. The loss of the United States as a
model on Internet Freedom issues has made it harder for local civil society
groups around the world—including the groups that the State Department’s
Internet Freedom programs typically support203—to advocate for Internet
Freedom within their own governments.204 The Committee to Protect
Journalists, for example, reports that in Pakistan, “where freedom of expression is
largely perceived as a Western notion, the Snowden revelations have had a damaging
effect. The deeply polarized narrative has become starker as the corridors of
power push back on attempts to curb government surveillance.”205 For some
of these groups, in fact, even the appearance of collaboration with or support
from the U.S. government can diminish credibility, making it harder for them to
achieve local goals that align with U.S. foreign policy interests.206 The gap in trust is
particularly significant for individuals and organizations that receive
funding from the U.S. government for free expression activities or
circumvention tools. Technology supported by or exported from the United
States is, in some cases, inherently suspect due to the revelations about the
NSA’s surveillance dragnet and the agency’s attempts to covertly influence product
development.
Moreover, revelations of what the NSA has been doing in the past decade are
eroding the moral high ground that the United States has often relied upon
when putting public pressure on authoritarian countries like China, Russia,
and Iran to change their behavior. In 2014, Reporters Without Borders added the
United States to its “Enemies of the Internet” list for the first time, explicitly linking the
inclusion to NSA surveillance. “The main player in [the United States’] vast surveillance
operation is the highly secretive National Security Agency (NSA) which, in the light of
Snowden’s revelations, has come to symbolize the abuses by the world’s
intelligence agencies,” noted the 2014 report.207 The damaged perception of
the United States208 as a leader on Internet Freedom and its diminished
ability to legitimately criticize other countries for censorship and
surveillance opens the door
for foreign leaders to justify—and even expand—their own efforts.209 For
example, the Egyptian government recently announced plans to monitor social media
for potential terrorist activity, prompting backlash from a number of advocates for free
expression and privacy.210 When a spokesman for the Egyptian Interior Ministry, Abdel
Fatah Uthman, appeared on television to explain the policy, one justification that he
offered in response to privacy concerns was that “the US listens in to phone calls, and
supervises anyone who could threaten its national security.”211 This type of rhetoric
makes it difficult for the U.S. to effectively criticize such a policy. Similarly, India’s
comparatively mild response to allegations of NSA surveillance have been seen by some
critics “as a reflection of India’s own aspirations in the world of surveillance,” a further
indication that U.S. spying may now make it easier for foreign governments to quietly
defend their own behavior.212 It is even more difficult for the United States to credibly
indict Chinese hackers for breaking into U.S. government and commercial targets
without fear of retribution in light of the NSA revelations.213 These challenges
reflect an overall decline in U.S. soft power on free expression issues.
Data localization kills internet
Mandatory data localization wrecks US internet company
competitiveness and US internet freedom – also threatens the
functioning of the internet itself
Kehl, 14 – Policy Analyst at New America’s Open Technology Institute (Danielle,
“Surveillance Costs: The NSA’s Impact on the Economy, Internet Freedom &
Cybersecurity” July, https://www.newamerica.org/oti/surveillance-costs-the-nsasimpact-on-the-economy-internet-freedom-cybersecurity/
Some analysts have questioned whether data localization and protection proposals are
politically motivated and if they would actually enhance privacy and security for
ordinary individuals living in foreign countries,160 especially given the existence of
similar laws in a number of countries and Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs)
between nations that provide cross-border access to data stored for lawful
investigations.161 Yet there is no doubt that American companies will pay a steep
price if these policies move forward. Mandatory data localization laws
could lead to soaring costs for major Internet companies such as Google,
Facebook, and Twitter, who would be faced with the choice of investing in
additional, duplicative infrastructure and data centers in order to comply
with new regulations or pulling their business out of the market
altogether.162 In testimony before Congress last November, for example, Google’s
Director of Law Enforcement and Information Security suggested that requirements
being discussed in Brazil could be so onerous that they would effectively bar
Google from doing business in the country.163 The penalties that companies face
for violating these new rules are also significant. In some cases, unless U.S. policy
changes, it may be virtually impossible for American companies to avoid
violating either domestic or foreign laws when operating overseas.164 The
costs and legal challenges could easily prevent firms from expanding in the first place or
cause them to leave existing markets because they are no longer profitable.165 ITIF’s
Daniel Castro has suggested that data privacy rules and other restrictions could slow the
growth of the U.S. technology-services industry by as much as four percent.166
Data localization proposals also threaten to undermine the functioning of
the Internet, which was built on protocols that send packets over the fastest
and most efficient route possible, regardless of physical location. If actually
implemented, policies like those suggested by India and Brazil would subvert those
protocols by altering the way Internet traffic is routed in order to exert more national
control over data.167 The localization of Internet traffic may also have significant
ancillary impacts on privacy and human rights by making it easier for countries to
engage in national surveillance, censorship, and persecution of online dissidents,
particularly where countries have a history of violating human rights and ignoring rule
of law.168 “Ironically, data localization policies will likely degrade – rather
than improve – data security for the countries considering them, making
surveillance, protection from which is the ostensible reason for
localization, easier for domestic governments, if not foreign powers, to
achieve,” writes Jonah Force Hill.169 The rise in data localization and data
protection proposals in response to NSA surveillance threatens not only
U.S. economic interests, but also Internet Freedom around the world.
Data localization kills internet freedom
Data localization threatens internet freedom – creates a
bordered internet
Kehl, 14 – Policy Analyst at New America’s Open Technology Institute (Danielle,
“Surveillance Costs: The NSA’s Impact on the Economy, Internet Freedom &
Cybersecurity” July, https://www.newamerica.org/oti/surveillance-costs-the-nsasimpact-on-the-economy-internet-freedom-cybersecurity/
The NSA disclosures have prompted some foreign leaders to propose new
policies for data localization and data protection that could have serious
ramifications for the Internet ecosystem. In the name of strengthening
privacy and security, many of these changes could hurt American tech
companies, impact the future growth of the network as a whole, and
endanger human rights and Internet Freedom.99 In particular, proposals that
would require data localization or strengthen data protection laws could
fundamentally alter the way traffic flows over the Internet and create
significant additional compliance costs for American technology companies operating
overseas. Major economic powers such as Germany, Brazil, and India have discussed
requiring that all Internet traffic be routed or stored locally. Various leaders in these
countries have also urged government agencies and their citizens to stop
using American tools altogether because of concerns about backdoors or
other arrangements with the NSA.100 Meanwhile, legislators in the European
Union have passed strict new data protection rules for the continent and considered
various privacy-focused proposals, including the development of “national clouds”
and the suspension of key trade agreements with the United States.101 “The
vast scale of online surveillance revealed by Edward Snowden is leading to the breakup
of the Internet as countries scramble to protect privacy or commercially sensitive emails
and phone records from UK and US security services,” reported The Guardian in
November 2013.102 In combination, these various proposals could threaten the
Internet economy while endangering privacy and free expression.
Mandatory Data Localization and the Costs of a Bordered Internet
Internet jurisdiction and borders were contentious issues long before the Snowden
leaks, but the debate has become significantly more complex in the past year. For
decades, the borderless nature of cyberspace103 has raised concerns about
sovereignty and how governments can regulate and access their citizens’ personal
information or speech when it is stored on servers that may be located all over the
world.104 Various data localization and national routing proposals have
been put forth by governments that seek greater control of the information
that flows within their borders, often in order to make censorship and
surveillance over the local population easier.105 On the other side, free speech
advocates, technologists, and civil society organizations generally advocate for a
borderless cyberspace governed by its own set of internationally-agreed upon rules that
promote the protection of human rights, individual privacy, and free expression.106 The
revelations about NSA surveillance have heightened concerns on both sides of this
debate. But the disclosures appear to have given new ammunition to proponents
of greater governmental control over traffic and network infrastructure,
accelerating the number and scope of national control proposals from both long-time
advocates as well as governments with relatively solid track records on human
rights.107
There are now more than a dozen countries that have introduced or are actively
discussing data localization laws.108 Broadly speaking, data localization can be defined
as any measures that “specifically encumber the transfer of data across national
borders,” through rules that prevent or limit these information flows.109 The data
localization proposals being considered post-Snowden generally require that foreign ICT
companies maintain infrastructure located within a country and store some or all of
their data on that country’s users on local servers.110 Brazil, for example, has proposed
that Internet companies like Facebook and Google must set up local data centers so that
they are bound by Brazilian privacy laws.111 The Indian government’s draft policy would
force companies to maintain part of their IT infrastructure in-country, give local
authorities access to the encrypted data on their servers for criminal investigations, and
prevent local data from being moved out of country.112 Germany, Greece, Brunei, and
Vietnam have also put forth their own data sovereignty proposals. Proponents argue
that these policies would provide greater security and privacy protection because local
servers and infrastructure can give governments both physical control and legal
jurisdiction over the data being stored on them—although the policies may come with
added political and economic benefits for those countries as well. “Home grown and
guaranteed security in data storage, hardware manufacture, cloud computing services
and routing are all part of a new discussion about ‘technological sovereignty,’” write
Mascolo and Scott. “It is both a political response and a marketing opportunity.” 113 At
the same time, data localization can also facilitate local censorship and
surveillance, making it easier for governments to exert control over the
Internet infrastructure.
Data localization kills cybersecurity
Data localization wrecks cybersecurity
Chandler and Le, 15 - * Director, California International Law Center, Professor of
Law and Martin Luther King, Jr. Hall Research Scholar, University of California, Davis;
A.B., Harvard College; J.D., Yale Law School AND **Free Speech and Technology
Fellow, California International Law Center; A.B., Yale College; J.D., University of
California, Davis School of Law (Anupam and Uyen, “DATA NATIONALISM” 64 Emory
L.J. 677, lexis)
Closely related to the goal of avoiding foreign surveillance through data localization is
the goal of protecting the privacy and security of personal information against
nongovernmental criminal activities. As the country studies above show, the laws of
many countries make it difficult to transfer personal data outside of national borders in
the name of privacy and security. While these laws are not explicitly designed to localize
data, by creating significant barriers to the export of data, they operate as data
localization measures.
[*719] The irony is that such efforts are likely to undermine, not strengthen, the
privacy and security of the information. n195 First, localized data servers
reduce the opportunity to distribute information across multiple servers in
different locations. As we have noted above, the information gathered together
in one place offers a tempting jackpot, an ideal target for criminals. As some
computer experts have noted, "Requirements to localize data ... only make it impossible
for cloud service providers to take advantage of the Internet's distributed infrastructure
and use sharding and obfuscation on a global scale." n196 Sharding is the process in
which rows of a database table are held separately in servers across the world - making
each partition a "shard" that provides enough data for operation but not enough to reidentify an individual. n197 "The correct solution," Pranesh Prakash, Policy Director
with India's Centre for Internet and Society suggests, "would be to encourage the
creation and use of de-centralised and end-to-end encrypted services that do not store
all your data in one place." n198
Second, as we noted above, the Protected Local Provider offering storage and
processing services may be more likely to have weak security infrastructure
than companies that continuously improve their security to respond to the
ever-growing sophistication of cyberthieves. As a recent cover feature of the
IEEE Computer Society magazine observes, "The most common threats to data in
the cloud involve breaches by hackers against inadequately protected
systems, user carelessness or lack of caution, and engineering errors." n199
Information technology associations from Europe, Japan, and the United States have
echoed this observation, arguing that "security is a function of how a product is made,
used, and maintained, not by whom or where it is made." n200 When Australia was
contemplating a rule requiring health data to [*720] remain in the country (a rule that
was subsequently implemented), Microsoft made a similar argument. Microsoft argued
that the rule might undermine the security of Australian health information by limiting
consumer choice among potential providers and wrote, "Consumers should have the
ability to personally control their [personal electronic health records] by choosing to
have their [personal electronic health records] held by an entity not located within
Australia's territorial boundaries if they believe that entity can provide to them a service
that meets their individual needs." n201
Indeed, countries pushing for data localization themselves are sometimes
hotbeds of cybercrimes. According to experts, "Cyber security is notoriously weak in
Indonesia." n202 Indeed, the nation has been called a "hacker's paradise." n203 One
2013 report on Vietnam suggests that "2,045 agency and business websites were hacked
this year, but the number of cyber security experts was too small to cope with all of
them." n204 Another account suggests that "Brazil is among the main targets of virtual
threats such as malware and phishing." n205 For example, in 2011, hackers stole one
billion dollars from companies in Brazil, as Forbes put it, the "worst prepared nation to
adopt cloud technology." n206 At times, a cybertheft can begin with a domestic
burglary, as in the case of one recent European episode. n207 Or cyberthefts can [*721]
be accomplished with a USB "thumb" drive. In January 2014, information about more
than 100 million South Korean credit cards was stolen, likely through an "inside job" by
a contractor armed with a USB drive. n208
Most fundamentally, there is little reason to believe that the personal information of
British Columbians is more secure just because it is stored on a government computer in
Vancouver than one owned by IBM, a few miles further south.
AT: Data localization solves surveillance
Data localization increases the risk of surveillance
Chandler and Le, 15 - * Director, California International Law Center, Professor of
Law and Martin Luther King, Jr. Hall Research Scholar, University of California, Davis;
A.B., Harvard College; J.D., Yale Law School AND **Free Speech and Technology
Fellow, California International Law Center; A.B., Yale College; J.D., University of
California, Davis School of Law (Anupam and Uyen, “DATA NATIONALISM” 64 Emory
L.J. 677, lexis)
Fourth, far from making surveillance more difficult for a foreign
government, localization requirements might in fact make it easier. By
compelling companies to use local services rather than global ones, there is a
greater likelihood of choosing companies with weak security measures. By
[*717] their very nature, the global services are subject to intense worldwide
competition, while local services - protected by the data localization
requirements - might have less need to offer stronger security to attract
customers, and fewer resources to do so, than companies with a global
scale. Weaker security makes such systems easier targets for foreign
surveillance. This is what we call the "Protected Local Provider" problem.
Fifth, data localization might actually facilitate foreign surveillance.
Centralizing information about users in a locality might actually ease the
logistical burdens of foreign intelligence agencies, which can now concentrate
their surveillance of a particular nation's citizens more easily. We call this the "Jackpot"
problem.
AT: Data localization helps law enforcement
Data localization doesn’t aid law enforcement
Chandler and Le, 15 - * Director, California International Law Center, Professor of
Law and Martin Luther King, Jr. Hall Research Scholar, University of California, Davis;
A.B., Harvard College; J.D., Yale Law School AND **Free Speech and Technology
Fellow, California International Law Center; A.B., Yale College; J.D., University of
California, Davis School of Law (Anupam and Uyen, “DATA NATIONALISM” 64 Emory
L.J. 677, lexis)
Equally important, it seems unlikely that data localization will prove an
effective means to ensure that data about their residents is available to law
enforcement personnel when they want it. Moreover, other alternatives are
reasonably available to assist law enforcement access to data - alternatives that are both
less trade restrictive and more speech-friendly than data localization.
Data localization will not necessarily provide law enforcement better access
to a criminal's data trail because localization requirements are extremely
hard to enforce. They might simply end up driving potential wrongdoers
abroad to less compliant and more secretive services. Indeed, the most lawabiding companies will follow costly data localization rules, while others
will simply ignore them, comforted by the knowledge that such laws are difficult to
enforce. Any success with gaining information from these companies will
likely prove temporary, as, over time, potential scofflaws will become aware
of the monitoring and turn to services that intentionally skirt the law. The
services avoiding the law will likely be foreign ones, lacking any [*733]
personnel or assets on the ground against which to enforce any sanction.
Thus, understood dynamically, the data localization requirement will only
hamper local and law-abiding enterprises, while driving some citizens
abroad.
Law enforcement is, without doubt, a laudable goal, so long as the laws themselves do
not violate universal human rights. Many governments already have authority under
their domestic laws to compel a company operating in their jurisdictions to share data of
their nationals held by that company abroad. A recent study of ten countries concluded
that the government already had the right to access data held extraterritorially in the
cloud in every jurisdiction examined. n268 Although the process varied, "every single
country ... vests authority in the government to require a Cloud service provider to
disclose customer data in certain situations, and in most instances this authority enables
the government to access data physically stored outside the country's borders." n269
Even if companies refuse to comply with such orders, or if the local subsidiary lacks the
authority to compel its foreign counterpart to share personal data, governments can
resort to information-sharing agreements. For example, the Convention on Cybercrime,
which has been ratified by forty-four countries including the United States, France, and
Germany, n270 obliges Member States to adopt and enforce laws against cybercrimes
and to provide "mutual assistance" to each other in enforcing cyberoffenses. n271 Many
states have entered into specific Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs) with foreign
nations. These treaties establish a process that protects the rights of [*734] individuals
yet gives governments access to data held in foreign jurisdictions. Currently, the United
States has MLATs in force with fifty-six countries. n272 The United States also entered
into a Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement (MLAA) with China and Taiwan. n273 All the
countries discussed in the country studies above, with the exception of Indonesia,
Kazakhstan, and Vietnam, have MLAT arrangements in force with the United States.
Generally, MLATs "specify which types of requested assistance must be provided, and
which may be refused." n274 Requests for assistance may be refused typically when the
execution of such request would be prejudicial to the state's security or public interest;
the request relates to a political offense; there is an absence of reasonable grounds; the
request does not conform to the MLAT's provisions; or the request is incompatible with
the requested state's law. n275 The explanatory notes to the MLAT between the United
States and the European Union observe that a request for data shall only be denied on
data protection grounds in "exceptional cases." n276 At the same time, there are
procedural requirements to help ensure that the information gathering is supporting a
proper governmental investigation. For example, Article 17 of the U.S.-Germany MLAT
provides that the government requesting assistance must do [*735] so in writing and
must specify the evidence or information sought, authorities involved, applicable
criminal law provisions, etc. n277
An effective MLAT process gives governments the ability to gather information held on
servers across the world. The International Chamber of Commerce has recognized the
crucial role of MLATs in facilitating the lawful interception of cross-border data flow
and stressed the need to focus on MLATs instead of localization measures. n278
Similarly, the European Commission has recently stressed that the rebuilding of trust in
the U.S.-E.U. relationship must focus in part on a commitment to use legal frameworks
such as the MLATs. n279 Mutual cooperation arrangements are far more likely
to prove effective in the long run to support government information
gathering efforts than efforts to confine information within national
borders.
AT: PPD 28 solves
Obama PPD doesn’t solve section 702 perception problems – it’s
not applied to it
Nojeim, 14 - Director, Project on Freedom, Security & Technology at the Center for
Democracy & Technology (Greg, “COMMENTS TO THE PRIVACY AND CIVIL
LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD REGARDING REFORMS TO SURVEILLANCE
CONDUCTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF FISA” 4/11)
The Presidential Policy Directive that President Obama issued on January 17, 2014
(PPD-28),7 while remarkable in many ways, does not sufficiently address this
problem. It prohibits the government from collecting signals intelligence
for the purpose of suppressing or burdening criticism or dissent, but that
prohibition permits the continued collection of information about such
expressive activities merely because they are relevant to U.S. foreign affairs.
On the other hand, PPD-28 does include very important restrictions on the use of
information collected in bulk for foreign intelligence purposes. They seem carefully
thought out, and each permitted use of information collected in bulk would directly
advance U.S. national security interests. These are among the most significant
provisions of PPD-28, but they do not apply to Section 702 because it is not
considered a bulk collection program.8
AT: USA Freedom Act solves
The Freedom Act doesn’t change section 702
Froomkin, 6/2/15 - Dan Froomkin is a reporter, columnist, and editor with a focus on
coverage of U.S. politics and media. During a nearly three-decade long career in
journalism, which started in local news, he has served as the senior Washington
correspondent and bureau chief for The Huffington Post, as editor of
WashingtonPost.com, and as deputy editor of NiemanWatchdog.org (Dan, “USA
FREEDOM ACT: SMALL STEP FOR POST-SNOWDEN REFORM, GIANT LEAP FOR
CONGRESS” The Intercept, https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/06/02/one-smallstep-toward-post-snowden-surveillance-reform-one-giant-step-congress/
And while the Freedom Act contains a few other modest reform provisions‚
such as more disclosure and a public advocate for the secretive Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court, it does absolutely nothing to restrain the vast majority of
the intrusive surveillance revealed by Snowden.
It leaves untouched formerly secret programs the NSA says are authorized
under section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act, and that while ostensibly
targeted at foreigners nonetheless collect vast amounts of American communications. It
won’t in any way limit the agency’s mass surveillance of non-American communications.
Solvency
O/V
Extend the Eoyang and Bishai 15 card- Restricting surveillence to
section 702 is K2 getting trust back from customers, tech
companies, and the international community. BUT
Applying PPD 28 to these restrictions is vital to ensuring that
NSA overreach doesn’t happen again, and eliminates any
negative connotaitions of PRISM, that’s our Nojeim 14 card
Extend the Kehl 14 evidence- The transparency garnered off the
plan is K2 restoring US credibility which allows the US to
prevent global data localization.
Global modeling
The plan restores US cred as a global leader on privacy by
limiting the FAA
Edgar, 4/13/15 - visiting fellow at the Institute and adjunct professor of law at the
Georgetown University Law Center (Timothy, “The Good News About Spying”
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2015-04-13/good-news-aboutspying
NEXT STEPS
Has surveillance reform gone far enough? Hardly. Obama has taken the first steps,
but the government should take six more to enhance public confidence in
surveillance programs.
First, the intelligence community should do even more to increase transparency. IC on
the Record is a good start, but it is mostly reactive, providing context to programs that
Snowden had already leaked. The intelligence community should continue to release as
much as it possibly can about surveillance programs without compromising sources and
methods—even if they have not been leaked. Given Snowden’s widespread public
acclaim, coming clean about such controversial intelligence programs is not just good
government, but also provides the surest way to preserve vital intelligence capabilities.
With greater transparency, intelligence agencies can stay one step ahead of
future leakers and earn back the trust of a skeptical public.
The United States should also pivot from its defensive position and take the
lead on global privacy. The United States has an impressive array of privacy
safeguards, and it has even imposed new ones that protect citizens of every country.
Despite their weaknesses, these safeguards are still the strongest in the world. The U.S.
government should not be shy about trumpeting them, and should urge other countries
to follow its lead. It could begin by engaging with close allies, like the United Kingdom,
Germany, and other European countries, urging them to increase transparency and
judicial supervision of their own communications surveillance activities.
The government also needs to finish the job on telephone records. The law that allows
for bulk collection of telephone records is set to expire on June 1, 2015. Congress
should act now to pass sensible reforms that would replace bulk collection
with a privacy-preserving alternative. The only truly viable option remains the bill
that died in November last year.
Washington also needs to work with U.S. technology companies to reform
PRISM and other surveillance programs that have been an embarrassment
for U.S. companies. Congress should narrow the FISA Amendments Act of
2008 that authorizes PRISM. That law allows the government to obtain
secret court orders targeting communications that include foreign
participants of interest to the NSA with the compelled assistance of U.S.
companies. Congress could start by limiting such orders to the same six
specific serious security threats that are included in Obama’s policy
directive for bulk signals intelligence collection.
AT: Companies suffer reputational costs
FAA exclusivity on balance protects companies from
reputational consequences
Eoyang and Bishai, 15 - *Mieke Eoyang is the Director of the National Security
Program at Third Way, a center-left think tank. She previously served as Defense Policy
Advisor to Senator Edward M. Kennedy, and a subcommittee staff director on the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, as well as as Chief of Staff to Rep. Anna
Eshoo (D-Palo Alto); **Chrissy Bishai is a Fellow at Third Way (“Restoring Trust
between U.S. Companies and Their Government on Surveillance Issues” 3/19,
http://www.thirdway.org/report/restoring-trust-between-us-companies-and-theirgovernment-on-surveillance-issues
Others have argued that the FAA shifts the burden of cooperation solely
onto the company, which will suffer greater reputational harm as a more
witting participant in affirmatively granting the government’s requests. However,
companies have suffered reputational harm as a result of allegations of
unwitting cooperation. Making the cooperation known, even if it’s secret,
gives the companies the opportunity to account for it in their own planning.
AT: Foreign servers
Plan reverses incentives for companies to shift to foreign
subsidiaries
Eoyang and Bishai, 15 - *Mieke Eoyang is the Director of the National Security
Program at Third Way, a center-left think tank. She previously served as Defense Policy
Advisor to Senator Edward M. Kennedy, and a subcommittee staff director on the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, as well as as Chief of Staff to Rep. Anna
Eshoo (D-Palo Alto); **Chrissy Bishai is a Fellow at Third Way (“Restoring Trust
between U.S. Companies and Their Government on Surveillance Issues” 3/19,
http://www.thirdway.org/report/restoring-trust-between-us-companies-and-theirgovernment-on-surveillance-issues
The move by certain U.S. companies to place subsidiaries in foreign
ownership to resist requests by the U.S. government presents an interesting
twist on this idea. In shifting the balance back to increased protections for
U.S. companies, this legislation would change the incentives so that
claiming U.S. law would have operational advantages in giving companies
uniformity of law for all their data. This would also encourage the use of a
single choice of law for all data governed by a company—that of the nationality
of incorporation—rather than encouraging a choice of law patchwork to
govern the data as it flows around the world.
AT: Exclude PPD-28
Section 702 is overbroad – can’t solve reputational costs without
curtailing surveilance
Nojeim, 14 - Director, Project on Freedom, Security & Technology at the Center for
Democracy & Technology (Greg, “COMMENTS TO THE PRIVACY AND CIVIL
LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD REGARDING REFORMS TO SURVEILLANCE
CONDUCTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF FISA” 4/11)
Section 702 permits the government to compel communications service
providers to assist with intelligence surveillance that targets non-U.S.
persons (persons other than U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents) reasonably
believed to be abroad. Though it is defended as a necessary counterterrorism and
national security power, Section 702 broadly authorizes collection, retention,
and use of communications content unnecessary for national security and unrelated
to counterterrorism. The overbroad use of Section 702 infringes upon the privacy
rights of both U.S. persons, and of non-U.S. persons abroad, has already caused
some damage to the American tech industry globally, and could cause much
more.3
Section 702 monitors any foreign target regardless of national
security interest – creates an enormous perception of abuse
Nojeim, 14 - Director, Project on Freedom, Security & Technology at the Center for
Democracy & Technology (Greg, “COMMENTS TO THE PRIVACY AND CIVIL
LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD REGARDING REFORMS TO SURVEILLANCE
CONDUCTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF FISA” 4/11)
The FISA provisions that govern intelligence surveillance of targets in the U.S. permit
the government to engage in electronic surveillance to collect “foreign intelligence
information.” For purposes of surveillance that targets a non-U.S. person, it is defined
broadly as: (1) information that relates to the ability of the U.S. to protect against a
hostile attack, espionage, sabotage or international terrorism or proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction; or (2) information with respect to a foreign territory or
foreign power (a foreign government, political party, or entity controlled by a foreign
government, or a foreign terrorist organization) that relates to the security of the U.S. or
to the conduct of U.S. foreign affairs.4 When the government applies to the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) for permission to conduct surveillance of targets
in the U.S., it must certify that a significant purpose of the surveillance it will conduct is
to collect foreign intelligence information.5
Because “foreign intelligence information” is defined so broadly, and because the FISC
never actually rules on whether the significant purpose test is met, the purpose
limitation that governs FISA surveillance of targets in the U.S. is easily met. FISA
surveillance in the U.S. is instead effectively constrained by an additional
requirement: the requirement that the government prove to the FISC that
there is probable cause to believe the target of surveillance is a terrorist,
spy, or other agent of a foreign power. Thus, Congress effectively constrained
FISA surveillance of targets in the U.S. by permitting that surveillance to target only a
narrow class of persons and entities.
For surveillance of people reasonably believed to be outside the U.S., Section 702
adopts the broad purpose requirement, but couples it with a broad class of
surveillance targets. Section 702 is not constrained by the requirement that
the target be an agent of a foreign power. Instead, the target need only be a
non-U.S. person reasonably believed to be abroad. Effectively, Congress
borrowed the broad purpose for FISA intelligence surveillance (collect “foreign
intelligence information”) and applied it to surveillance abroad without limiting the
class of potential targets to “agents of a foreign power.”
This has prompted concern globally that surveillance under Section 702 is
broadly directed at individuals not suspected of wrongdoing, and could
include targeting based at least in part on political activities. A peaceful protest at a U.S.
base in Germany or a demonstration against rising food prices in India “relate to” U.S.
foreign policy; non-U.S. persons involved in those protests could be monitored under
Section 702. A 2012 cloud computing report to the European Parliament included a
finding that under Section 702, it is lawful in the U.S. to conduct purely political
surveillance on non-U.S. persons’ data stored by U.S. cloud companies.6
Such actions raise serious human rights concerns. Further, fear of the mere
possibly that this overbroad surveillance is occurring has significantly
damaged the U.S. tech industry abroad.
Off-Case Answers
Topicality
Domestic - Territories
C/IA US person is a citizen, corporation, or lawful permanent
resident
Jordan, 6 - LL.M., New York University School of Law (2006); cum laude, Washington
and
Lee University School of Law (2003) (David, “Decrypting the Fourth Amendment:
Warrantless NSA Surveillance and the Enhanced Expectation of Privacy Provided by
Encrypted Voice Over Protocol” 47 B.C.L. Rev. 505 (2006),
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol47/iss3/2
8 FISA's provisions require the government to obtain a FISA warrant when seeking to
surveil a "United States person." A U.S. person is defined as a U.S. citizen, a
permanent resident, a corporation incorporated in the United States, or an
unincorporated association consisting of mostly U.S. citizens or permanent
residents. FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1801(1) (2000).
The N.S.A. defines domestic surveillance as associated with
United States persons
Cassidy 13
(John, a 20 year staff writer at the New Yorker, N.S.A. Latest: The Secret History of
Domestic Surveillance, http://www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/n-s-a-latestthe-secret-history-of-domestic-surveillance )//NC
On a day when President Obama said “I’m not going to be scrambling any jets to get a twenty-nine-year-old hacker”—thank
goodness for that—theGuardian’s Glenn Greenwald and Spencer Ackerman have published another set of N.S.A.
documents that detail how the Agency’s domestic-surveillance programs
have evolved over the past decade or so. The documents presumably came from Edward Snowden,
although the Guardian reports don’t say so explicitly. The headline news is that, for two years of the Obama Administration—from
2009 to 2011—the N.S.A. continued a previously undisclosed Bush-era program that enabled the Agency to sweep up vast amounts
of information about American citizens’ Internet use. This included whom they were e-mailing with and which computers they were
using. The program, which went under the code name “Stellar Wind,” was ended in 2011, and hasn’t been restarted, a senior
Administration official told the newspaper. For those of us who are concerned about this stuff, it’s depressing to think that the
Administration, in addition to allowing the N.S.A. to collect vast amounts of metadata about Americans’ personal phone calls, also
preserved a program to track U.S. citizens’ Internet usage. (In the case of an e-mail, metadata includes the names of the sender and
all of the recipients, plus the I.S.P. address of the device used to access the Internet. The subject line and what the e-mail says are
considered “content,” and under operation Stellar Wind, at least, they weren’t collected.) On the other hand, the online metadatacollection program was ended in 2011, although exactly why that happened isn’t clear. Shawn Turner, the Obama Administration’s
director of communications for national intelligence, told the Guardian that operation Stellar Wind was stopped for “operational and
resource reasons,” but he didn’t specify what these were. In a separate story, Greenwald and Ackerman reported that the new
documents confirm that the N.S.A., in targeting suspects overseas and those they communicate with, still mines vast amounts of
online data from American citizens. Thanks to the previous revelations about Operation Prism, we sort of knew this. But the new
documents add some telling details about the scale of the online snooping. For example, by the end of last year, one particular N.S.A.
Internet tracking program called ShellTrumpet (there appear to have been many others) had already processed a trillion
(1,000,000,000,000) metadata records. If you, like me, are wondering how things came to this, the documents, which include a topsecret draft of a 2009 historical review by the N.S.A.’s Inspector General, provide some of the answers. Indeed, that may well be
their most lasting contribution. As you might have guessed, it all goes back to the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, when
George W. Bush issued an internal order with this title: AUTHORIZATION FOR SPECIFIED ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
ACTIVITIES DURING A LIMITED PERIOD TO DETECT AND PREVENT ACTS OF TERRORISM WITHIN THE UNITED STATES
According to the Inspector General’s report, the order was drafted by David Addington, the chief counsel to Vice-President Dick
Cheney. General Michael Hayden, who was the director of the N.S.A. from 1999 until 2005, “suggested that the ability to collect
information with one end in the United States without a court order would increase NSA’s speed and agility,” the report says.
“General Hayden stated that after two additional meetings with the Vice President, the Vice President asked him to work with his
counsel, David Addington.” In retrospect, what’s most notable about the order President Bush signed are the restrictions it
contained. Originally, it lasted for just thirty days, and was limited to online communications in which at least one of the
communicants was located outside the United States. Moreover, it was explicitly based on “the President’s determination that after
the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, an extraordinary emergency existed for national defense purposes.”
Over time, though, the “extraordinary emergency” was deemed a permanent state of affairs, and the scope of the authorization was
broadened until, eventually, it came to include even the collection of data from communications between American citizens located
inside the United States. For a few years, the online surveillance didn’t have any court approval. “NSA determined that FISA
authorization did not allow sufficient flexibility to counter the terrorist threat,” the Inspector General’s report said. In March, 2004,
senior officials at the Justice Department, including James Comey, who was then the acting Attorney General, and who has recently
been nominated to head the F.B.I., objected to this system, prompting the White House and the N.S.A. to bring Stellar Wind to a
halt. But things didn’t end there. As the documents show, and as a must-read pieceby Spencer Ackerman explains, the N.S.A. and the
White House quickly found a way to bring the online-surveillance operations under the ambit of regular intelligence laws, and barely
three months later, in July, 2004, the chief judge in the FISA courts, Colleen Kollar-Kotelly, granted the N.S.A. authority to once
again begin collecting online metadata. “Although NSA lost access to the bulk metadata from 26 March 2004 until the order was
signed, the order essentially gave NSA the same authority to collect bulk internet metadata that it had,” the Inspector General’s
report says, “except that it specified the datalinks from which NSA could collect, and it limited the number of people that could
access the data.” Still, the N.S.A. chafed at the remaining legal restrictions on accessing data from American citizens communicating
online with other American citizens. In a November,
2007, memorandum, which the Guardian has also posted online,
a lawyer at the Justice Department, Kenneth Wainstein, told Michael Mukasey, the New York judge who
had recently taken over as Attorney General, that the N.S.A. wanted a new set of procedures that would give the Agency considerably
broader authorization. The memo said: The Supplemental Procedures, attached at Tab A, would clarify
that the
National Security Agency (NSA) may analyze communications metadata
associated with United States persons and persons believed to be in the United
States…We conclude that the proposed Supplemental Procedures are consistent with the applicable law and we recommend that
you approve them. The memo argued that the new set of procedures, because they covered online metadata rather than actual
content, didn’t violate the Fourth Amendment’s right to privacy, and neither did they need the approval of the FISA courts: “To fall
within FISA’s definition of ‘electronic surveillance,’ an action must satisfy one of the four definitions of that term. None of these
definitions cover the communications metadata analysis at issue here.” Evidently, Mukasey approved the new procedures, and they
formed the legal basis of operation Stellar Wind, which continued until 2011. But it also seems that the FISA courts did, eventually,
approve the program. According to theGuardian’s account, a FISA judge issued a legal order every ninety days approving the
collection, in bulk, of online metadata. Why the court did this, and whether it registered any objections to or demanded any changes
in the N.S.A.’s actions, we don’t know. The FISA court’s deliberations, unlike a lot of other things, remain shrouded in secrecy.
Prefer our interp – Just because these U.S. companies do
business outside of U.S. territories does not mean that they are
not U.S. companies, these companies are still based within the
U.S. which means that we are domestic surveillance within
territory
Standards
Limits: The opposing teams definition overlimits. overlimiting
guts true education on the topic. In order to learn about federal
government domestic surveillance we must address the biggest
form of domestic surveillance which comes from the PRISM
program and the current law governing domestic surveillance.
All forms of govt surveillance has foreign and domestic parts of
their surveillance within it. If we are truly going to learn about
domestic surveillance, if we want the judges, the crowd, the
debaters, and the debate community to truly advance their
knowledge on the topic we must allow PRISM to be part of the
topic. To declare it untopical means you prevent us from truly
understanding the ins and outs of the topic
PRISM is the biggest issue within domestic surveillance
CFR 13 (Council on Foreign Relations, an independent, nonpartisan membership
organization, think tank, and publisher, U.S. Domestic Surveillance,
http://www.cfr.org/intelligence/us-domestic-surveillance/p9763 )//NC
In the wake of the September 11 attacks, Congress passed sweeping legislation to bolster U.S. counterterrorism efforts. Some of the
most controversial measures, including the 2001 USA PATRIOT Act, significantly enhanced the federal government's ability to
collect and analyze private information related to U.S. citizens. Proponents argue that the broader surveillance authorities are
required to uncover and neutralize terrorism plots, while critics say the expanded powers infringe on civil liberties. In 2005, the
Bush administration came under fire from Democrats and activist groups after press reports disclosed the National Security
Agency's warrantless wiretapping program. In 2013, the Obama administration similarly attracted criticism from watchdog groups
upon leaks related to its far-reaching domestic surveillance activities under the NSA. The episode has revived debate over privacy
and national security and raised calls for reform. What
is the domestic surveillance controversy
under Obama? Two NSA surveillance programs were exposed in press
reports in June 2013. First, a Guardian report disclosed a classified Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court (FISC) order instructing Verizon, one of the largest U.S. telecommunications firms, to hand
over phone records of millions of Americans to the NSA. Another secret
program, code-named PRISM, accessed troves of communication data—audio/video chats,
emails, photos, and other media—from several U.S. technology companies, according to the
Washington Post. Subsequent leaks revealed details on additional programs that gave the NSA extensive electronic surveillance
tools, both domestic and international, allowing the government to track and tap into conversations of suspected terrorists, civilians,
and even friendly foreign heads of state. Amid criticism from civil rights groups, the Obama administration initially defended the
surveillance program, saying it is legal, limited, and effective in preventing terrorist attacks. Director of National Intelligence James
Clapper said the program does not monitor phone calls, but acquires telephony metadata to be queried only when there is a
"reasonable suspicion" of links to a foreign terrorist organization. Experts say the White House is likely relying on Section 215 of the
Patriot Act, a provision that says government can mandate the turnover of "any tangible things" from any entity as long as the items
are for an investigation to defend against international terrorism or spying. In congressional testimony, NSA chief Gen. Keith
Alexander credited his agency's surveillance with helping prevent "dozens" of terrorist attacks, and said he welcomed a debate on the
legality of the programs. In August, President Obama created a task force of intelligence and legal experts to review NSA operations
and recommend potential reforms. The inquiry is reportedly part of a comprehensive White House review of signals intelligence.
What was the domestic surveillance controversy under Bush? After 9/11, the Bush administration opted not to seek approval from
the FISC before intercepting "international communications into and out of the United States of persons linked to al-Qaeda (PDF) or
related terrorist organizations." The special secret court, set up in 1978 following previous administrations' domestic spying abuses,
was designed to act as a neutral overseer in granting government agencies surveillance authorization. After the NSA program was
revealed by the New York Times in late 2005, former attorney general Alberto R. Gonzales argued (PDF) that President Bush had
the legal authority under the constitution and congressional statute to conduct warrantless surveillance on U.S. persons "reasonably
believed to be linked to al-Qaeda." The 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), without specifically mentioning
wiretapping, grants the president broad authority to use all necessary force "against those nations, organizations, or persons he
determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the [9/11] terrorist attacks." This includes, administration officials say, the
powers to secretly gather domestic intelligence on al-Qaeda and associated groups. The Bush administration maintained that the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) was an outdated law-enforcement mechanism that was too time-consuming given the
highly fluid, modern threat environment. Administration officials portrayed the NSA program as an "early warning system" (PDF)
with "a military nature that requires speed and agility." Moreover, the White House stressed that the program was one not of
domestic surveillance but of monitoring terrorists abroad, and publicly referred to the operation as the "Terrorist Surveillance
Program." Opponents of the program referred to it as "domestic spying." Under congressional pressure, Gonzales announced in
January 2007 plans to disband the warrantless surveillance program and cede oversight to FISC, but questions about the legality of
the program lingered in Congress and Gonzales resigned months later. But Washington's vow to seek FISA approval for domestic
surveillance was short-lived. In July 2007--weeks before Gonzales stepped down--intelligence officials pressed lawmakers for
emergency legislation to broaden their wiretapping authority following a ruling by the court overseeing FISA that impacted the
government's ability to intercept foreign communications passing through telecommunications "switches" on U.S. soil. In August,
President Bush signed the Protect America Act of 2007, which gave the attorney general and the director of national intelligence
temporary power to approve international surveillance, rather than the special intelligence court. It also said warrants are
unnecessary for surveillance of a person "reasonably believed" to be located overseas. This six-month stopgap measure expired in
early 2008, but the FISA Amendment Act passed just months later contained similar provisions. President Obama reauthorized this
legislation for five more years in December 2012. Why did this become an issue in mid-2013? Edward Snowden, the ex-CIA and
former NSA contractor who leaked news of the two NSA programs, cited concerns over civil liberties violations as his primary
motive. "The NSA has built an infrastructure that allows it to intercept almost everything. With this capability, the vast majority of
human communications are automatically ingested without targeting. If I wanted to see your emails or your wife's phone, all I have
to do is use intercepts. I can get your emails, passwords, phone records, credit cards," he said in an interview with the Guardian.
However, DNI Director Clapper publicly denied initial media reports (PDF) that the PRISM surveillance program was "an
undisclosed collection or data mining program" that unilaterally taps into servers of U.S. telecoms. Rather, he stated the NSA
program was limited and had been "widely known and publicly discussed since its inception in 2008." Specifically, Clapper said the
program operated under Section 702 of FISA that permits the targeting of non-U.S. persons abroad without individualized court
orders. As noted above, President Obama has reauthorized this legislation until 2017. Many U.S. lawmakers have pressed for
Snowden's prosecution, and the Obama administration referred his case to the Justice Department. Snowden fled to Hong Kong in
May and was granted temporary asylum in Russia in August after spending weeks at the Moscow airport. What are the challenges to
domestic surveillance policy? Both Democratic and Republican lawmakers have called for a reexamination of the government's
broad surveillance powers in the wake of disclosures regarding NSA activities. Top-ranking Senators Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) and
John McCain (R-AZ) supported requests for congressional hearings on NSA surveillance, despite their support for the controversial
programs. Sen. Ron Wyden (D-OR), an outspoken critic of NSA's broad authorities, has called on the White House to detail the
extent to which Americans were monitored. In the past, the NSA said it lacked the technical ability to quantify this data. Critics
allege that even if the programs are operating within the letter of law, as the Obama administration says, they violate the law's intent
and the values of democratic society. Some civil liberties activists have appealed for a thorough review of several provisions in the
Patriot Act and FISA Amendments Act that provide controversial surveillance authorities. Civil libertarians question whether
government surveillance programs violate the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which states: "The right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized." In December, Judge Richard J. Leon of the Federal District Court for the District
of Columbia ruled that the NSA's bulk gathering of U.S. telephone metadata likely violates the Constitution. "Surely, such a program
infringes on 'that degree of privacy' that the founders enshrined in the Fourth Amendment," he wrote. The judge ordered the
government to stop collecting data on calls of the two plaintiffs in the case, but stayed the injunction to allow the government a
chance to appeal. Other legal challenges are in early phases, including suits by the American Civil Liberties Union and the Electronic
Frontier Foundation. The Obama administration's task force also released its findings in December, recommending dozens of
changes to current surveillance practice. Significant proposed reforms include: ending the government's indiscrimate collection of
U.S. telephone metadata and requiring authorities to obtain a court order to query this information, held in the private sector;
placing new limits on the monitoring of foreign leaders and ordinary non-Americans; and supporting new encryption standards and
technologies. But legal analysts say that while the recommendations, if implemented, would require greater executive, congressional,
and judicial review of surveillance activities, they would end few programs. Meanwhile, in Congress, two bills that would forbid the
NSA from collecting phone data on Americans not suspected of a crime are still in the early legislative process. The USA Freedom
Act, which would reform the Patriot Act to address privacy concerns, has enough support to pass, but lawmakers are uncertain when
it will be ready for a vote. Still, many Democrats and Republicans say the NSA programs are essential counterterrorism tools that
have proved effective in preventing potential attacks.
Ground: You can still garner all your DA’s or CP, because we are
still within U.S. territories, does not prevent neg from running
any arguments
Other args
AT: Franceschi-Bicchierai - They only mention one company, the
Prism program also goes through the data of US companies
based in the US
AT: Wilson - Yes foreign data goes through US servers and
PRISM surfs through this evidence as well as domestic data,
PRISM doesn’t know the difference when the data first comes in
what we do is make sure that the NSA can’t take info from US
companies regarding domestic persons
Domestic – U.S. Persons
We Meet: We are specifically restricting domestic surveillance of
U.S. corporations, which means that we are using it for coercive
purposes and then we are surveilling U.S. citizens, because
companies are citizens
C/I: A US person is a citizen, corporation, or lawful permanent
resident
Jordan, 6 - LL.M., New York University School of Law (2006); cum laude, Washington
and
Lee University School of Law (2003) (David, “Decrypting the Fourth Amendment:
Warrantless NSA Surveillance and the Enhanced Expectation of Privacy Provided by
Encrypted Voice Over Protocol” 47 B.C.L. Rev. 505 (2006),
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol47/iss3/2
8 FISA's provisions require the government to obtain a FISA warrant when seeking to
surveil a "United States person." A U.S. person is defined as a U.S. citizen, a
permanent resident, a corporation incorporated in the United States, or an
unincorporated association consisting of mostly U.S. citizens or permanent
residents. FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1801(1) (2000).
Standards
Limits: The neg overlimits, which are bad for debate and kills
education, because it does not allow us to truly learn about
affirmative plans that are main parts of the literature bases and
really understand the topic. Our aff is an example of domestic
surveillance of U.S. person and is an integral part of all U.S.
domestic surveillance
PRISM is the biggest issue within domestic surveillance
CFR 13 (Council on Foreign Relations, an independent, nonpartisan membership
organization, think tank, and publisher, U.S. Domestic Surveillance,
http://www.cfr.org/intelligence/us-domestic-surveillance/p9763 )
In the wake of the September 11 attacks, Congress passed sweeping legislation to bolster U.S. counterterrorism efforts. Some of the
most controversial measures, including the 2001 USA PATRIOT Act, significantly enhanced the federal government's ability to
collect and analyze private information related to U.S. citizens. Proponents argue that the broader surveillance authorities are
required to uncover and neutralize terrorism plots, while critics say the expanded powers infringe on civil liberties. In 2005, the
Bush administration came under fire from Democrats and activist groups after press reports disclosed the National Security
Agency's warrantless wiretapping program. In 2013, the Obama administration similarly attracted criticism from watchdog groups
upon leaks related to its far-reaching domestic surveillance activities under the NSA. The episode has revived debate over privacy
and national security and raised calls for reform. What
is the domestic surveillance controversy
under Obama? Two NSA surveillance programs were exposed in press
reports in June 2013. First, a Guardian report disclosed a classified Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court (FISC)
order instructing Verizon, one of the largest U.S. telecommunications firms, to hand
over phone records of millions of Americans to the NSA. Another secret
program, code-named PRISM, accessed troves of communication data—audio/video chats,
emails, photos, and other media—from several U.S. technology companies, according to the
Washington Post. Subsequent leaks revealed details on additional programs that gave the NSA extensive electronic surveillance
tools, both domestic and international, allowing the government to track and tap into conversations of suspected terrorists, civilians,
and even friendly foreign heads of state. Amid criticism from civil rights groups, the Obama administration initially defended the
surveillance program, saying it is legal, limited, and effective in preventing terrorist attacks. Director of National Intelligence James
Clapper said the program does not monitor phone calls, but acquires telephony metadata to be queried only when there is a
"reasonable suspicion" of links to a foreign terrorist organization. Experts say the White House is likely relying on Section 215 of the
Patriot Act, a provision that says government can mandate the turnover of "any tangible things" from any entity as long as the items
are for an investigation to defend against international terrorism or spying. In congressional testimony, NSA chief Gen. Keith
Alexander credited his agency's surveillance with helping prevent "dozens" of terrorist attacks, and said he welcomed a debate on the
legality of the programs. In August, President Obama created a task force of intelligence and legal experts to review NSA operations
and recommend potential reforms. The inquiry is reportedly part of a comprehensive White House review of signals intelligence.
What was the domestic surveillance controversy under Bush? After 9/11, the Bush administration opted not to seek approval from
the FISC before intercepting "international communications into and out of the United States of persons linked to al-Qaeda (PDF) or
related terrorist organizations." The special secret court, set up in 1978 following previous administrations' domestic spying abuses,
was designed to act as a neutral overseer in granting government agencies surveillance authorization. After the NSA program was
revealed by the New York Times in late 2005, former attorney general Alberto R. Gonzales argued (PDF) that President Bush had
the legal authority under the constitution and congressional statute to conduct warrantless surveillance on U.S. persons "reasonably
believed to be linked to al-Qaeda." The 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), without specifically mentioning
wiretapping, grants the president broad authority to use all necessary force "against those nations, organizations, or persons he
determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the [9/11] terrorist attacks." This includes, administration officials say, the
powers to secretly gather domestic intelligence on al-Qaeda and associated groups. The Bush administration maintained that the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) was an outdated law-enforcement mechanism that was too time-consuming given the
highly fluid, modern threat environment. Administration officials portrayed the NSA program as an "early warning system" (PDF)
with "a military nature that requires speed and agility." Moreover, the White House stressed that the program was one not of
domestic surveillance but of monitoring terrorists abroad, and publicly referred to the operation as the "Terrorist Surveillance
Program." Opponents of the program referred to it as "domestic spying." Under congressional pressure, Gonzales announced in
January 2007 plans to disband the warrantless surveillance program and cede oversight to FISC, but questions about the legality of
the program lingered in Congress and Gonzales resigned months later. But Washington's vow to seek FISA approval for domestic
surveillance was short-lived. In July 2007--weeks before Gonzales stepped down--intelligence officials pressed lawmakers for
emergency legislation to broaden their wiretapping authority following a ruling by the court overseeing FISA that impacted the
government's ability to intercept foreign communications passing through telecommunications "switches" on U.S. soil. In August,
President Bush signed the Protect America Act of 2007, which gave the attorney general and the director of national intelligence
temporary power to approve international surveillance, rather than the special intelligence court. It also said warrants are
unnecessary for surveillance of a person "reasonably believed" to be located overseas. This six-month stopgap measure expired in
early 2008, but the FISA Amendment Act passed just months later contained similar provisions. President Obama reauthorized this
legislation for five more years in December 2012. Why did this become an issue in mid-2013? Edward Snowden, the ex-CIA and
former NSA contractor who leaked news of the two NSA programs, cited concerns over civil liberties violations as his primary
motive. "The NSA has built an infrastructure that allows it to intercept almost everything. With this capability, the vast majority of
human communications are automatically ingested without targeting. If I wanted to see your emails or your wife's phone, all I have
to do is use intercepts. I can get your emails, passwords, phone records, credit cards," he said in an interview with the Guardian.
However, DNI Director Clapper publicly denied initial media reports (PDF) that the PRISM surveillance program was "an
undisclosed collection or data mining program" that unilaterally taps into servers of U.S. telecoms. Rather, he stated the NSA
program was limited and had been "widely known and publicly discussed since its inception in 2008." Specifically, Clapper said the
program operated under Section 702 of FISA that permits the targeting of non-U.S. persons abroad without individualized court
orders. As noted above, President Obama has reauthorized this legislation until 2017. Many U.S. lawmakers have pressed for
Snowden's prosecution, and the Obama administration referred his case to the Justice Department. Snowden fled to Hong Kong in
May and was granted temporary asylum in Russia in August after spending weeks at the Moscow airport. What are the challenges to
domestic surveillance policy? Both Democratic and Republican lawmakers have called for a reexamination of the government's
broad surveillance powers in the wake of disclosures regarding NSA activities. Top-ranking Senators Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) and
John McCain (R-AZ) supported requests for congressional hearings on NSA surveillance, despite their support for the controversial
programs. Sen. Ron Wyden (D-OR), an outspoken critic of NSA's broad authorities, has called on the White House to detail the
extent to which Americans were monitored. In the past, the NSA said it lacked the technical ability to quantify this data. Critics
allege that even if the programs are operating within the letter of law, as the Obama administration says, they violate the law's intent
and the values of democratic society. Some civil liberties activists have appealed for a thorough review of several provisions in the
Patriot Act and FISA Amendments Act that provide controversial surveillance authorities. Civil libertarians question whether
government surveillance programs violate the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which states: "The right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized." In December, Judge Richard J. Leon of the Federal District Court for the District
of Columbia ruled that the NSA's bulk gathering of U.S. telephone metadata likely violates the Constitution. "Surely, such a program
infringes on 'that degree of privacy' that the founders enshrined in the Fourth Amendment," he wrote. The judge ordered the
government to stop collecting data on calls of the two plaintiffs in the case, but stayed the injunction to allow the government a
chance to appeal. Other legal challenges are in early phases, including suits by the American Civil Liberties Union and the Electronic
Frontier Foundation. The Obama administration's task force also released its findings in December, recommending dozens of
changes to current surveillance practice. Significant proposed reforms include: ending the government's indiscrimate collection of
U.S. telephone metadata and requiring authorities to obtain a court order to query this information, held in the private sector;
placing new limits on the monitoring of foreign leaders and ordinary non-Americans; and supporting new encryption standards and
technologies. But legal analysts say that while the recommendations, if implemented, would require greater executive, congressional,
and judicial review of surveillance activities, they would end few programs. Meanwhile, in Congress, two bills that would forbid the
NSA from collecting phone data on Americans not suspected of a crime are still in the early legislative process. The USA Freedom
Act, which would reform the Patriot Act to address privacy concerns, has enough support to pass, but lawmakers are uncertain when
it will be ready for a vote. Still, many Democrats and Republicans say the NSA programs are essential counterterrorism tools that
have proved effective in preventing potential attacks.
Ground: You can still garner all your DA’s or CP, because we are
still about U.S. citizens and we do not encroach on anything the
neg can run
Extra Topicality – In all types of surveillance there are domestic
and foreign surveillance intertwined within, so it is almost
impossible to curtail only domestic surveillance without foreign
surveillance. Again this definition overlimits because it would be
impossible for an aff to come up with something that only affects
the domestic side of the ball
Curtail – complete stop
C/I – Definition reduce:
Curtail means to reduce
American Heritage, 15 (‘curtail’,
https://www.ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=curtail
cur·tail (kər-tāl
)
tr.v. cur·tailed, cur·tail·ing, cur·tails
To cut short or reduce: We curtailed our conversation when other people entered the
room. See Synonyms at shorten.
C/I - Definition Regulate:
Curtail means impose a restriction
Oxford Dictionaries, 15 (“curtail”,
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/curtail)
Definition of curtail in English: verb [WITH OBJECT] 1Reduce in extent or
quantity; impose a restriction on: civil liberties were further curtailed
Curtail means place restrictions on
Vocabulary.com, 15 (‘curtail’ http://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/curtail
DEFINITIONS OF: curtail v place restrictions on “curtail drinking in school”
Synonyms: curb, cut back, restrict
The Levi Guidelines ‘curtailed’ domestic intelligence gathering
Berman, 14 - Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School (Emily
Berman, Regulating Domestic Intelligence Collection, 71 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 3,
http://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol71/iss1/5
Since the FBI’s inception, there has been tension embedded in its mission. It is charged
not only with solving crimes but also with preventing them.26 While the two goals often
complement one another, they call for very different types of investigative activities.
Focus on crime solving argues for a set of investigative powers enabling inquiries into
specific acts, with an eye toward successful prosecution of the perpetrators.27
Preventive work, by contrast, requires the collection of much broader swaths of
information—information about illicit organizations, their members, their goals, their
capacities, and their sources of funding as well as information about possible targets.28
Over time, both the Bureau’s focus and the rules governing its activities have swung
back and forth along the spectrum between the targeted investigations of crime solving
and the broader intelligence gathering associated with prevention. The Guidelines
themselves are the product of the FBI’s early-1970s move away from intelligence
collection. After the United States Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, commonly known as the Church
Committee for its chair Senator Frank Church (D-ID), revealed that decades of
unregulated intelligence collection by the FBI had resulted in widespread abuses of the
government’s investigative powers,29 Congress determined that the FBI should
be subject to a legislative charter setting out strict limits on its intelligencecollection authority.30 In an effort to stave off potentially more restrictive
legislative action, President Gerald Ford’s Attorney General, Edward Levi,
issued in 1976 the first set of Attorney General’s Guidelines—known as the Levi
Guidelines.31
The Levi Guidelines strictly curtailed domestic intelligence investigations
through a basic regulatory structure that subsequent versions of the Guidelines
have largely retained.32 This structure consists of multiple investigative levels. For each
successive level, a higher threshold of suspicion is necessary to proceed; the
investigative tools agents may use are more intrusive; and procedural safeguards, such
as the need for supervisory approval and limits on the temporal length of investigations,
are more robust.33 The Guidelines continue to function as the primary
constraint on the FBI’s operations and remain a justification for the lack of a
statutory charter governing the FBI’s activities, but they have not remained static.34
Multiple modifications made in the years between 1976 and 2001 eased, though
ultimately retained, restrictions on intelligence collection.35
AT: Friman and Andreas – no where in these cards does it say
that curtail requires a complete stop of flow within the internet.
Prefer our definition actually specifies that curtail is a
restriction
Standards
Limits: The neg overlimits, overlimits are bad for debate because
it does not allow us to truly learn about affirmative plans that are
main parts of the literature bases and really understand the
topic. Our aff is an example of curtailment, there is not one aff
that completely stops domestic surveillance
PRISM is the biggest issue within domestic surveillance
CFR 13 (Council on Foreign Relations, an independent, nonpartisan membership
organization, think tank, and publisher, U.S. Domestic Surveillance,
http://www.cfr.org/intelligence/us-domestic-surveillance/p9763 )//NC
In the wake of the September 11 attacks, Congress passed sweeping legislation to bolster U.S. counterterrorism efforts. Some of the
most controversial measures, including the 2001 USA PATRIOT Act, significantly enhanced the federal government's ability to
collect and analyze private information related to U.S. citizens. Proponents argue that the broader surveillance authorities are
required to uncover and neutralize terrorism plots, while critics say the expanded powers infringe on civil liberties. In 2005, the
Bush administration came under fire from Democrats and activist groups after press reports disclosed the National Security
Agency's warrantless wiretapping program. In 2013, the Obama administration similarly attracted criticism from watchdog groups
upon leaks related to its far-reaching domestic surveillance activities under the NSA. The episode has revived debate over privacy
and national security and raised calls for reform. What
is the domestic surveillance controversy
under Obama? Two NSA surveillance programs were exposed in press
reports in June 2013. First, a Guardian report disclosed a classified Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court (FISC) order instructing Verizon, one of the largest U.S. telecommunications firms, to hand
over phone records of millions of Americans to the NSA. Another secret
program, code-named PRISM, accessed troves of communication data—audio/video chats,
emails, photos, and other media—from several U.S. technology companies, according to the
Washington Post. Subsequent leaks revealed details on additional programs that gave the NSA extensive electronic surveillance
tools, both domestic and international, allowing the government to track and tap into conversations of suspected terrorists, civilians,
and even friendly foreign heads of state. Amid criticism from civil rights groups, the Obama administration initially defended the
surveillance program, saying it is legal, limited, and effective in preventing terrorist attacks. Director of National Intelligence James
Clapper said the program does not monitor phone calls, but acquires telephony metadata to be queried only when there is a
"reasonable suspicion" of links to a foreign terrorist organization. Experts say the White House is likely relying on Section 215 of the
Patriot Act, a provision that says government can mandate the turnover of "any tangible things" from any entity as long as the items
are for an investigation to defend against international terrorism or spying. In congressional testimony, NSA chief Gen. Keith
Alexander credited his agency's surveillance with helping prevent "dozens" of terrorist attacks, and said he welcomed a debate on the
legality of the programs. In August, President Obama created a task force of intelligence and legal experts to review NSA operations
and recommend potential reforms. The inquiry is reportedly part of a comprehensive White House review of signals intelligence.
What was the domestic surveillance controversy under Bush? After 9/11, the Bush administration opted not to seek approval from
the FISC before intercepting "international communications into and out of the United States of persons linked to al-Qaeda (PDF) or
related terrorist organizations." The special secret court, set up in 1978 following previous administrations' domestic spying abuses,
was designed to act as a neutral overseer in granting government agencies surveillance authorization. After the NSA program was
revealed by the New York Times in late 2005, former attorney general Alberto R. Gonzales argued (PDF) that President Bush had
the legal authority under the constitution and congressional statute to conduct warrantless surveillance on U.S. persons "reasonably
believed to be linked to al-Qaeda." The 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), without specifically mentioning
wiretapping, grants the president broad authority to use all necessary force "against those nations, organizations, or persons he
determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the [9/11] terrorist attacks." This includes, administration officials say, the
powers to secretly gather domestic intelligence on al-Qaeda and associated groups. The Bush administration maintained that the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) was an outdated law-enforcement mechanism that was too time-consuming given the
highly fluid, modern threat environment. Administration officials portrayed the NSA program as an "early warning system" (PDF)
with "a military nature that requires speed and agility." Moreover, the White House stressed that the program was one not of
domestic surveillance but of monitoring terrorists abroad, and publicly referred to the operation as the "Terrorist Surveillance
Program." Opponents of the program referred to it as "domestic spying." Under congressional pressure, Gonzales announced in
January 2007 plans to disband the warrantless surveillance program and cede oversight to FISC, but questions about the legality of
the program lingered in Congress and Gonzales resigned months later. But Washington's vow to seek FISA approval for domestic
surveillance was short-lived. In July 2007--weeks before Gonzales stepped down--intelligence officials pressed lawmakers for
emergency legislation to broaden their wiretapping authority following a ruling by the court overseeing FISA that impacted the
government's ability to intercept foreign communications passing through telecommunications "switches" on U.S. soil. In August,
President Bush signed the Protect America Act of 2007, which gave the attorney general and the director of national intelligence
temporary power to approve international surveillance, rather than the special intelligence court. It also said warrants are
unnecessary for surveillance of a person "reasonably believed" to be located overseas. This six-month stopgap measure expired in
early 2008, but the FISA Amendment Act passed just months later contained similar provisions. President Obama reauthorized this
legislation for five more years in December 2012. Why did this become an issue in mid-2013? Edward Snowden, the ex-CIA and
former NSA contractor who leaked news of the two NSA programs, cited concerns over civil liberties violations as his primary
motive. "The NSA has built an infrastructure that allows it to intercept almost everything. With this capability, the vast majority of
human communications are automatically ingested without targeting. If I wanted to see your emails or your wife's phone, all I have
to do is use intercepts. I can get your emails, passwords, phone records, credit cards," he said in an interview with the Guardian.
However, DNI Director Clapper publicly denied initial media reports (PDF) that the PRISM surveillance program was "an
undisclosed collection or data mining program" that unilaterally taps into servers of U.S. telecoms. Rather, he stated the NSA
program was limited and had been "widely known and publicly discussed since its inception in 2008." Specifically, Clapper said the
program operated under Section 702 of FISA that permits the targeting of non-U.S. persons abroad without individualized court
orders. As noted above, President Obama has reauthorized this legislation until 2017. Many U.S. lawmakers have pressed for
Snowden's prosecution, and the Obama administration referred his case to the Justice Department. Snowden fled to Hong Kong in
May and was granted temporary asylum in Russia in August after spending weeks at the Moscow airport. What are the challenges to
domestic surveillance policy? Both Democratic and Republican lawmakers have called for a reexamination of the government's
broad surveillance powers in the wake of disclosures regarding NSA activities. Top-ranking Senators Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) and
John McCain (R-AZ) supported requests for congressional hearings on NSA surveillance, despite their support for the controversial
programs. Sen. Ron Wyden (D-OR), an outspoken critic of NSA's broad authorities, has called on the White House to detail the
extent to which Americans were monitored. In the past, the NSA said it lacked the technical ability to quantify this data. Critics
allege that even if the programs are operating within the letter of law, as the Obama administration says, they violate the law's intent
and the values of democratic society. Some civil liberties activists have appealed for a thorough review of several provisions in the
Patriot Act and FISA Amendments Act that provide controversial surveillance authorities. Civil libertarians question whether
government surveillance programs violate the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which states: "The right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized." In December, Judge Richard J. Leon of the Federal District Court for the District
of Columbia ruled that the NSA's bulk gathering of U.S. telephone metadata likely violates the Constitution. "Surely, such a program
infringes on 'that degree of privacy' that the founders enshrined in the Fourth Amendment," he wrote. The judge ordered the
government to stop collecting data on calls of the two plaintiffs in the case, but stayed the injunction to allow the government a
chance to appeal. Other legal challenges are in early phases, including suits by the American Civil Liberties Union and the Electronic
Frontier Foundation. The Obama administration's task force also released its findings in December, recommending dozens of
changes to current surveillance practice. Significant proposed reforms include: ending the government's indiscrimate collection of
U.S. telephone metadata and requiring authorities to obtain a court order to query this information, held in the private sector;
placing new limits on the monitoring of foreign leaders and ordinary non-Americans; and supporting new encryption standards and
technologies. But legal analysts say that while the recommendations, if implemented, would require greater executive, congressional,
and judicial review of surveillance activities, they would end few programs. Meanwhile, in Congress, two bills that would forbid the
NSA from collecting phone data on Americans not suspected of a crime are still in the early legislative process. The USA Freedom
Act, which would reform the Patriot Act to address privacy concerns, has enough support to pass, but lawmakers are uncertain when
it will be ready for a vote. Still, many Democrats and Republicans say the NSA programs are essential counterterrorism tools that
have proved effective in preventing potential attacks.
Ground: You can still garner all your DA’s or CP, because we are
a reduce which is what these arguments are based off of
Curtail Reduce or decrease
We meet – Our plan specifically claims that we are limiting
domestic surveillance on American companies, which leads to a
reduce of the surveillance we can do upon the domestic
information. Our Eoyang and Kehl evidence both reference that
curtailment by reducing will lead to regaining soft power. So we
are topical
C/I - Definition Regulate:
Curtail means impose a restriction
Oxford Dictionaries, 15 (“curtail”,
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/curtail)
Definition of curtail in English: verb [WITH OBJECT] 1Reduce in extent or
quantity; impose a restriction on: civil liberties were further curtailed
Curtail means place restrictions on
Vocabulary.com, 15 (‘curtail’ http://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/curtail
DEFINITIONS OF: curtail v place restrictions on “curtail drinking in school”
Synonyms: curb, cut back, restrict
The Levi Guidelines ‘curtailed’ domestic intelligence gathering
Berman, 14 - Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School (Emily
Berman, Regulating Domestic Intelligence Collection, 71 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 3,
http://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol71/iss1/5
Since the FBI’s inception, there has been tension embedded in its mission. It is charged
not only with solving crimes but also with preventing them.26 While the two goals often
complement one another, they call for very different types of investigative activities.
Focus on crime solving argues for a set of investigative powers enabling inquiries into
specific acts, with an eye toward successful prosecution of the perpetrators.27
Preventive work, by contrast, requires the collection of much broader swaths of
information—information about illicit organizations, their members, their goals, their
capacities, and their sources of funding as well as information about possible targets.28
Over time, both the Bureau’s focus and the rules governing its activities have swung
back and forth along the spectrum between the targeted investigations of crime solving
and the broader intelligence gathering associated with prevention. The Guidelines
themselves are the product of the FBI’s early-1970s move away from intelligence
collection. After the United States Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, commonly known as the Church
Committee for its chair Senator Frank Church (D-ID), revealed that decades of
unregulated intelligence collection by the FBI had resulted in widespread abuses of the
government’s investigative powers,29 Congress determined that the FBI should
be subject to a legislative charter setting out strict limits on its intelligencecollection authority.30 In an effort to stave off potentially more restrictive
legislative action, President Gerald Ford’s Attorney General, Edward Levi,
issued in 1976 the first set of Attorney General’s Guidelines—known as the Levi
Guidelines.31
The Levi Guidelines strictly curtailed domestic intelligence investigations
through a basic regulatory structure that subsequent versions of the Guidelines
have largely retained.32 This structure consists of multiple investigative levels. For each
successive level, a higher threshold of suspicion is necessary to proceed; the
investigative tools agents may use are more intrusive; and procedural safeguards, such
as the need for supervisory approval and limits on the temporal length of investigations,
are more robust.33 The Guidelines continue to function as the primary
constraint on the FBI’s operations and remain a justification for the lack of a
statutory charter governing the FBI’s activities, but they have not remained static.34
Multiple modifications made in the years between 1976 and 2001 eased, though
ultimately retained, restrictions on intelligence collection.35
Standards
Limits: The neg overlimits, overlimits are bad for debate because
it does not allow us to truly learn about affirmative plans that are
main parts of the literature bases and really understand the
topic. Our aff is an example of curtailment through regulation to
reduce domestic surveillance, most affs require restrictions to
current laws in order to even result in a decrease
PRISM is the biggest issue within domestic surveillance
CFR 13 (Council on Foreign Relations, an independent, nonpartisan membership
organization, think tank, and publisher, U.S. Domestic Surveillance,
http://www.cfr.org/intelligence/us-domestic-surveillance/p9763 )//NC
In the wake of the September 11 attacks, Congress passed sweeping legislation to bolster U.S. counterterrorism efforts. Some of the
most controversial measures, including the 2001 USA PATRIOT Act, significantly enhanced the federal government's ability to
collect and analyze private information related to U.S. citizens. Proponents argue that the broader surveillance authorities are
required to uncover and neutralize terrorism plots, while critics say the expanded powers infringe on civil liberties. In 2005, the
Bush administration came under fire from Democrats and activist groups after press reports disclosed the National Security
Agency's warrantless wiretapping program. In 2013, the Obama administration similarly attracted criticism from watchdog groups
upon leaks related to its far-reaching domestic surveillance activities under the NSA. The episode has revived debate over privacy
and national security and raised calls for reform. What
is the domestic surveillance controversy
under Obama? Two NSA surveillance programs were exposed in press
reports in June 2013. First, a Guardian report disclosed a classified Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court (FISC) order instructing Verizon, one of the largest U.S. telecommunications firms, to hand
over phone records of millions of Americans to the NSA. Another secret
program, code-named PRISM, accessed troves of communication data—audio/video chats,
emails, photos, and other media—from several U.S. technology companies, according to the
Washington Post. Subsequent leaks revealed details on additional programs that gave the NSA extensive electronic surveillance
tools, both domestic and international, allowing the government to track and tap into conversations of suspected terrorists, civilians,
and even friendly foreign heads of state. Amid criticism from civil rights groups, the Obama administration initially defended the
surveillance program, saying it is legal, limited, and effective in preventing terrorist attacks. Director of National Intelligence James
Clapper said the program does not monitor phone calls, but acquires telephony metadata to be queried only when there is a
"reasonable suspicion" of links to a foreign terrorist organization. Experts say the White House is likely relying on Section 215 of the
Patriot Act, a provision that says government can mandate the turnover of "any tangible things" from any entity as long as the items
are for an investigation to defend against international terrorism or spying. In congressional testimony, NSA chief Gen. Keith
Alexander credited his agency's surveillance with helping prevent "dozens" of terrorist attacks, and said he welcomed a debate on the
legality of the programs. In August, President Obama created a task force of intelligence and legal experts to review NSA operations
and recommend potential reforms. The inquiry is reportedly part of a comprehensive White House review of signals intelligence.
What was the domestic surveillance controversy under Bush? After 9/11, the Bush administration opted not to seek approval from
the FISC before intercepting "international communications into and out of the United States of persons linked to al-Qaeda (PDF) or
related terrorist organizations." The special secret court, set up in 1978 following previous administrations' domestic spying abuses,
was designed to act as a neutral overseer in granting government agencies surveillance authorization. After the NSA program was
revealed by the New York Times in late 2005, former attorney general Alberto R. Gonzales argued (PDF) that President Bush had
the legal authority under the constitution and congressional statute to conduct warrantless surveillance on U.S. persons "reasonably
believed to be linked to al-Qaeda." The 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), without specifically mentioning
wiretapping, grants the president broad authority to use all necessary force "against those nations, organizations, or persons he
determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the [9/11] terrorist attacks." This includes, administration officials say, the
powers to secretly gather domestic intelligence on al-Qaeda and associated groups. The Bush administration maintained that the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) was an outdated law-enforcement mechanism that was too time-consuming given the
highly fluid, modern threat environment. Administration officials portrayed the NSA program as an "early warning system" (PDF)
with "a military nature that requires speed and agility." Moreover, the White House stressed that the program was one not of
domestic surveillance but of monitoring terrorists abroad, and publicly referred to the operation as the "Terrorist Surveillance
Program." Opponents of the program referred to it as "domestic spying." Under congressional pressure, Gonzales announced in
January 2007 plans to disband the warrantless surveillance program and cede oversight to FISC, but questions about the legality of
the program lingered in Congress and Gonzales resigned months later. But Washington's vow to seek FISA approval for domestic
surveillance was short-lived. In July 2007--weeks before Gonzales stepped down--intelligence officials pressed lawmakers for
emergency legislation to broaden their wiretapping authority following a ruling by the court overseeing FISA that impacted the
government's ability to intercept foreign communications passing through telecommunications "switches" on U.S. soil. In August,
President Bush signed the Protect America Act of 2007, which gave the attorney general and the director of national intelligence
temporary power to approve international surveillance, rather than the special intelligence court. It also said warrants are
unnecessary for surveillance of a person "reasonably believed" to be located overseas. This six-month stopgap measure expired in
early 2008, but the FISA Amendment Act passed just months later contained similar provisions. President Obama reauthorized this
legislation for five more years in December 2012. Why did this become an issue in mid-2013? Edward Snowden, the ex-CIA and
former NSA contractor who leaked news of the two NSA programs, cited concerns over civil liberties violations as his primary
motive. "The NSA has built an infrastructure that allows it to intercept almost everything. With this capability, the vast majority of
human communications are automatically ingested without targeting. If I wanted to see your emails or your wife's phone, all I have
to do is use intercepts. I can get your emails, passwords, phone records, credit cards," he said in an interview with the Guardian.
However, DNI Director Clapper publicly denied initial media reports (PDF) that the PRISM surveillance program was "an
undisclosed collection or data mining program" that unilaterally taps into servers of U.S. telecoms. Rather, he stated the NSA
program was limited and had been "widely known and publicly discussed since its inception in 2008." Specifically, Clapper said the
program operated under Section 702 of FISA that permits the targeting of non-U.S. persons abroad without individualized court
orders. As noted above, President Obama has reauthorized this legislation until 2017. Many U.S. lawmakers have pressed for
Snowden's prosecution, and the Obama administration referred his case to the Justice Department. Snowden fled to Hong Kong in
May and was granted temporary asylum in Russia in August after spending weeks at the Moscow airport. What are the challenges to
domestic surveillance policy? Both Democratic and Republican lawmakers have called for a reexamination of the government's
broad surveillance powers in the wake of disclosures regarding NSA activities. Top-ranking Senators Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) and
John McCain (R-AZ) supported requests for congressional hearings on NSA surveillance, despite their support for the controversial
programs. Sen. Ron Wyden (D-OR), an outspoken critic of NSA's broad authorities, has called on the White House to detail the
extent to which Americans were monitored. In the past, the NSA said it lacked the technical ability to quantify this data. Critics
allege that even if the programs are operating within the letter of law, as the Obama administration says, they violate the law's intent
and the values of democratic society. Some civil liberties activists have appealed for a thorough review of several provisions in the
Patriot Act and FISA Amendments Act that provide controversial surveillance authorities. Civil libertarians question whether
government surveillance programs violate the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which states: "The right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized." In December, Judge Richard J. Leon of the Federal District Court for the District
of Columbia ruled that the NSA's bulk gathering of U.S. telephone metadata likely violates the Constitution. "Surely, such a program
infringes on 'that degree of privacy' that the founders enshrined in the Fourth Amendment," he wrote. The judge ordered the
government to stop collecting data on calls of the two plaintiffs in the case, but stayed the injunction to allow the government a
chance to appeal. Other legal challenges are in early phases, including suits by the American Civil Liberties Union and the Electronic
Frontier Foundation. The Obama administration's task force also released its findings in December, recommending dozens of
changes to current surveillance practice. Significant proposed reforms include: ending the government's indiscrimate collection of
U.S. telephone metadata and requiring authorities to obtain a court order to query this information, held in the private sector;
placing new limits on the monitoring of foreign leaders and ordinary non-Americans; and supporting new encryption standards and
technologies. But legal analysts say that while the recommendations, if implemented, would require greater executive, congressional,
and judicial review of surveillance activities, they would end few programs. Meanwhile, in Congress, two bills that would forbid the
NSA from collecting phone data on Americans not suspected of a crime are still in the early legislative process. The USA Freedom
Act, which would reform the Patriot Act to address privacy concerns, has enough support to pass, but lawmakers are uncertain when
it will be ready for a vote. Still, many Democrats and Republicans say the NSA programs are essential counterterrorism tools that
have proved effective in preventing potential attacks.
Ground: You can still garner all your DA’s or CP, because we are
a reduce which is what these arguments are based off of
Other definitions for domestic
A US persons standard avoids the problems with geographic
limits on the internet
Donohue, 15 - Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center (Laura,
“SECTION 702 AND THE COLLECTION OF INTERNATIONAL TELEPHONE AND
INTERNET CONTENT” 38 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 117, Winter, lexis)
To the extent that the interception of U.S. persons' communications
constitutes a search or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, it would appear that, at least at the front [*230] end, U.S.
persons are entitled to protections. n456 The inspection and collection of
content falls within the meaning of a search and seizure under the Fourth
Amendment. Just as virtual entry into the United States should not matter for
purposes of setting a threshold for application of the Fourth Amendment to aliens, use
of global communications should not thereby divest U.S. persons of their
constitutional protections. This approach is consistent with the geographic focus of
the Courts in regard to the Fourth Amendment. It does not hinge constitutional
protections on movement along global communications networks--itself an
untenable proposition in light of how information flows over the Internet. If the
courts, for instance, were to construct a rule that said that U.S. persons
sending information outside the United States lose the protections of the
Fourth Amendment in the privacy afforded those communications, it would be
difficult to police. This rule assumes that individuals have control over
whether their communications leave domestic bounds. They do not. The
Internet is constructed to find the most efficient route between two ISP
addresses. This means that even domestic communications may be routed
internationally. Individuals have no control over how their messages are
conveyed. At the back end, the government would have to be able to ascertain which
messages originated within the United States and then left U.S. bounds. But the NSA
claims that it does not have the appropriate technologies to make this call. As a result,
the effect of this rule would essentially be to assume that every time a U.S. person
communicates, she loses constitutional protections in the content of those
communications. This would eviscerate the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. It
would assume that U.S. persons have no reasonable expectation of privacy in their
communications, regardless of whether they flow across international borders. The
Supreme Court can avoid this conclusion by underscoring the status of the
individual as Rehnquist articulated for the majority in Verdugo-Urquidez:
emphasizing membership in the political community. Where established,
the protection of the Fourth Amendment applies.
The NSA intercepts upstream data by tapping directly into US
service providers
Donohue, 15 - Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center (Laura,
“SECTION 702 AND THE COLLECTION OF INTERNATIONAL TELEPHONE AND
INTERNET CONTENT” 38 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 117, Winter, lexis)
A follow-up article two days later printed another slide depicting both PRISM
and "upstream" collection of communications on fiber cables and
infrastructure ("[c]ollection directly from the servers of . . . U.S. Service
Providers.") n8 Upstream interception allowed the NSA to acquire Internet
communications "as they [*121] transit the 'internet backbone' facilities." n9
The NSA could collect all traffic crossing Internet cables--not just
information targeted at specific Internet Protocol (IP) addresses or telephone
number. The potential yield was substantial: in the first six months of 2011, the NSA
acquired more than 13.25 million Internet transactions through its upstream collection.
n10 The slide urged analysts to use both PRISM and upstream collection to obtain
information. n11 Within days of the releases, the intelligence community acknowledged
the existence of the programs. n12 In August 2013 the Director of National Intelligence,
James Clapper, offered further confirmation, noting that PRISM had been in operation
since Congress had passed the 2008 FISA Amendments Act. n13 He declassified eight
documents, n14 and by the end of the month, he had announced that the intelligence
community would release the total [*122] number of Section 702 orders issued, and
targets thereby affected, on an annual basis. n15 NSA interpretation of the FAA means
in practice PRISM targets domestic communications Donohue, 15 - Professor of Law,
Georgetown University Law Center (Laura, “SECTION 702 AND THE COLLECTION OF
INTERNATIONAL TELEPHONE AND INTERNET CONTENT” 38 Harv. J.L. & Pub.
Pol'y 117, Winter, lexis) FAA = 2008 FISA Amendments Act The Article next turns
to statutory issues related to targeting, post-targeting analysis, and the retention and
dissemination of information. It argues that the NSA has sidestepped FAA
restrictions by adopting procedures that allow analysts to acquire
information not just to or from, but also "about" targets. In its foreignness
determination the agency assumes, absent evidence to the contrary, that
the target is a non-U.S. person located outside domestic bounds. And weak
standards mark the foreign intelligence purpose determination. Together,
these elements allow for the broad collection of U.S. persons' international
communications, even as they open the door to the interception of domestic
communications. In regard to post-targeting analysis, the Article draws attention to
the intelligence community's use of U.S. person information to query data
obtained under Section 702, effectively bypassing protections Congress
introduced to prevent reverse targeting. The Article further notes in relation to
retention and dissemination that increasing consumer and industrial reliance on
cryptography means that the NSA's retention of encrypted data may soon
become the exception that swallows the rule. In its constitutional analysis, the
Article finds certain practices instituted under Section 702 to fall outside acceptable
Fourth Amendment bounds. Although lower courts had begun to recognize a domestic
foreign intelligence exception to the warrant clause, in 1978 Congress introduced FISA
to be the sole means via which domestic foreign intelligence electronic intercepts could
be undertaken. Consistent with separation of powers doctrine, this shift carried
constitutional meaning. Internationally, practice and precedent prior to the FAA turned
on a foreign intelligence exception. But in 2008 Congress altered the status quo,
introducing individualized judicial review into the process. Like FISA, the FAA
carried constitutional import. [*124] If that were the end of the story, one could argue
that the incidental collection of U.S. persons' information, as well as the interception of
domestic conversations ought to be regarded in Justice Jackson's third category under
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer. n18 Renewal in 2012, however, points in the
opposite direction. The NSA's actions, for purposes of the warrant clause,
appear to be constitutionally sufficient insofar as foreign intelligence
gathering to or from non-U.S. persons is concerned. The tipping point comes
with regard to criminal prosecution. Absent a foreign intelligence purpose,
there is no exception to the warrant requirement for the query of U.S.
persons' international or domestic communications. Although a warrant is not
required for foreign intelligence collection overseas, the interception of communications
under Section 702 must still comport with the reasonableness requirements of the
Fourth Amendment. A totality of the circumstances test, in which the significant
governmental interest in national security is weighed against the potential intrusion into
U.S. persons' privacy, applies. The incidental collection of large quantities of
U.S. persons' international communications, the scanning of content for
information "about" non-U.S. person targets, and the interception of nonrelevant and entirely domestic communications in multi-communication
transactions, as well as the query of data using U.S. person identifiers, fall
outside the reasonableness component of the Fourth Amendment. The
Article concludes by calling for renewed efforts to draw a line between
foreign intelligence gathering and criminal law and to create higher
protections for U.S. persons, to ensure that the United States can continue
to collect critical information, while remaining consistent with the right to
privacy embedded in the Fourth Amendment.
NSA overreach means it inevitably monitors domestic internet
communications – rerouting, MCTs, and ‘about’
communications
Donohue, 15 - Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center (Laura,
“SECTION 702 AND THE COLLECTION OF INTERNATIONAL TELEPHONE AND
INTERNET CONTENT” 38 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 117, Winter, lexis)
Three points related to the volume and intrusiveness of the resulting surveillance
deserve notice. First, to obtain "about" communications, because of how the
Internet is constructed, the NSA must monitor large amounts of data. n180
That is, if the NSA may [*163] collect not just e-mail to or from the target's email account (badguy@ISP.com), but, in addition, other communications
happening to mention badguy@ISP.com that pass through the collection
point, then the NSA is monitoring a significant amount of traffic. And the
agency is not just considering envelope information (for example, messages in
which the selector is sending, receiving, or copied on the communication) but the
actual content of messages. n181 Second, wholly domestic conversations may
become swept up in the surveillance simply by nature of how the Internet is
constructed. Everything one does online involves packets of information.
Every Web site, every e-mail, every transfer of documents takes the
information involved and divides it up into small bundles. Limited in size,
these packets contain information about the sender's IP address, the
intended receiver's IP address, something that indicates how many packets
the communication has been divvied up into, and what number in the chain
is represented by the packet in question. n182 Packet switched networks ship this
information to a common destination via the most expedient route--one that may, or
may not, include the other packets of information contained in the message. If a
roadblock or problem arises in the network, the packets can then be re-routed, to reach
their final destination. Domestic messages may thus be routed through
international servers, if that is the most efficient route to the final
destination. What this means is that even if the NSA applies an IP filter to
eliminate communications that appear to be within the United States, it may
nevertheless monitor domestic conversations by nature of them being
routed through foreign servers. In this manner, a student in Chicago may
send an e-mail to a student in Boston [*164] that gets routed through a
server in Canada. Through no intent or design of the individual in Chicago, the
message becomes international and thus subject to NSA surveillance. Third,
further collection of domestic conversations takes place through the NSA's
intercept of what are called multi-communication transactions, or MCTs. It
is important to distinguish here between a transaction and a communication. Some
transactions have only single communications associated with them. These are referred
to as SCTs. Other transactions contain multiple communications. If even one of the
communications in an MCT falls within the NSA's surveillance, all of the
communications bundled into the MCT are collected. The consequence is of significant
import. FISC estimated in 2011 that somewhere between 300,000 and 400,000
MCTs were being collected annually on the basis of "about"
communication--where the "active user" was not the target. So hundreds of
thousands of communications were being collected that did not include the
target as either the sender or the recipient of the communication. n183
PRISM allows reverse-targeting: targeting someone outside the
United States to collect information about someone in the United
States
Donohue, 15 - Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center (Laura,
“SECTION 702 AND THE COLLECTION OF INTERNATIONAL TELEPHONE AND
INTERNET CONTENT” 38 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 117, Winter, lexis)
B. Post-Targeting Analysis Section 702 makes it illegal to target someone
outside the United States, where the purpose of the acquisition is to obtain
information about a person known to be within domestic bounds. This
practice, known as "reverse targeting," was central to Congressional
debates. n308 Representative Langevin explained that the insertion of FISC would
"ensure that the government's efforts are not aimed at targeting Americans, the socalled reverse targeting that we're all concerned about; and that if an American's
communications is [sic] inadvertently intercepted, it is dealt with in a manner that
guarantees legal protections." n309 Despite Congress' concern about reverse
targeting, the NSA instituted and the FISC approved a rule change in October
2011 to make it possible to query the content of communications obtained
under Section 702 using U.S. person names and identifiers for information
obtained via PRISM and upstream telephony collection. n310 [*196] The
relevant definition in the 2011 minimization procedures is largely consistent with its
2009 predecessor: Identification of a United States person means the name, unique
title, address, or other personal identifier of a United States person in the context of
activities conducted by that person or activities conducted by others that are related to
that person. A reference to a product by brand name, or manufacturer's name or the use
of a name in a descriptive sense, e.g., "Monroe Doctrine," is not an identification of a
United States person. n311 The NSA may query data obtained under Section 702
by using the names, titles, or addresses of U.S. persons, or any other
information that may be related to the individual and his or her activities. If
the intelligence community would like to query the data based on, for instance,
membership in the Council on Foreign Relations--on the grounds that such queries are
likely to yield foreign intelligence information--it may now do so. In March 2014, the
Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, confirmed in a letter to Senator
Ron Wyden that the [*197] NSA had queried Section 702 data "using U.S.
person identifiers." n312 The following month, the NSA's Privacy and Civil Liberties
Officer reiterated Clapper's statement. n313 Pressed during a June 2014 hearing for the
number of queries using U.S. person identifiers, Clapper responded by noting that in
2013, the NSA approved 198 U.S. person identifiers for querying the content of Section
702 communications, even as it queried Section-702-acquired metadata approximately
9,500 times. n314 FISC has upheld the reading of the statute supporting use of U.S.
person identifiers. n315 In its October 2011 opinion, the Court explained: The
procedures previously approved by the Court effectively impose a wholesale bar on
queries using United States-Person identifiers. The government has broadened Section
3(b)(5) to allow NSA to query the vast majority of its Section 702 collection using United
States-Person identifiers, subject to approval pursuant to internal NSA procedures and
oversight by the Department of Justice. Like all other NSA queries of the Section 702
collection, queries using United States-person identifiers would be limited to those
reasonably likely to yield foreign intelligence information. n316 The Court did not find
this problematic. Because the collection of the information centered on non-U.S.
persons located outside the country, it would be less likely, in the aggregate, "to result in
the acquisition of nonpublic information regarding nonconsenting United States
persons." n317 [*198] As a practical matter, what this rule change means is that
U.S. person information that is incidentally collected via Section 702 can
now be mined using U.S. person information as part of the queries. This
circumvents Congress's requirements in Sections 703 and 704 that prior to
U.S. person information being obtained (and therefore prior to it being analyzed),
the government be required to appear before a court to justify placing a
U.S. person under surveillance.
Section 702 authorizes a broad bulk collection of data –
inevitably includes collection from U.S. persons on a large scale
Donohue, 15 - Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center (Laura,
“SECTION 702 AND THE COLLECTION OF INTERNATIONAL TELEPHONE AND
INTERNET CONTENT” 38 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 117, Winter, lexis)
II. PROGRAMMATIC COLLECTION n143 Almost immediately after passage of the FAA,
members of Congress, scholars, and others began criticizing Section 702 because [*154]
of the potential for the government to use the authorities to engage in programmatic
surveillance. n144 In 2009 prominent national security law Professor William Banks
explained, "the FAA targets do not have to be suspected of being an agent of a
foreign power or, for that matter, they do not have to be suspected of
terrorism or any national security offense, so long as the collection of
foreign intelligence is a significant purpose of the surveillance." n145
Surveillance could be directed at a person, organization, e-mail address, or
even "an entire ISP or area code." n146 He noted, "the surveillance permitted
under the FAA does not require that the Government identify a particular known facility
where the intercepted communications occur." n147 These provisions represented a sea
change from how FISA had previously worked (albeit introducing, for the first time,
statutory restrictions in an area previously governed by Executive Order). U.S.
persons' communications now could be incidentally collected under the
statute, on a large scale, without many of the protections in traditional
FISA. n148 Banks presciently pointed out the most likely way in which the new
authorities would be used: Although details of the implementation of the program . . .
are not known, a best guess is the Government uses a broad vacuum cleanerlike first stage of collection, focusing on transactional data, where wholesale
interception occurs following the development and implementation of filtering criteria.
Then the NSA engages in a more particularized collection of content after analyzing
mined data . . . [A]ccidental or incidental acquisition of U.S. persons inside the United
States [will] surely occur[], especially in light of the difficulty of ascertaining a target's
location. n149 For Professor Banks, part of the problem was that the nature of
international information flows meant that it would be impossible [*155] to
tell if an individual is located overseas or within domestic bounds. n150
The NSA circumvents Section 702 by adopting a presumption
that targets are non-U.S. persons and not determining whether
they are located domestically
Donohue, 15 - Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center (Laura,
“SECTION 702 AND THE COLLECTION OF INTERNATIONAL TELEPHONE AND
INTERNET CONTENT” 38 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 117, Winter, lexis)
[*158] A. Targeting As aforementioned, Section 702 places four limitations on
acquisition, each of which is meant to restrict the amount of information that can be
obtained by the government. n166 The NSA has sidestepped these statutory
restrictions in three important ways: first, it has adopted procedures that
allow analysts to acquire information "about" selectors (that is,
communications modes used by targets) or targets, and not merely
communications to or from targets (or selectors employed by targets), or
information held by targets themselves. Second, it has created a presumption of
non-U.S. person status: That is, if an individual is not known to be a U.S.
person (and thus exempted from Section 702 and treated either under Sections
703 and 704 or under traditional FISA, depending on the location), then the NSA
assumes that the individual is a non-U.S. person. Third, the NSA has failed
to adopt standards that would require it to ascertain whether a target is
located within domestic bounds. Instead, the agency, having looked at the
available evidence, absent evidence to the contrary, assumes that the target is
located outside the United States. These interpretations work together to
undermine Congress's addition of Sections 703 and 704, even as they open
the door to more extensive collection of domestic communications. In 2008
Congress anticipated that U.S. person information would inadvertently be collected
under Section 702. This is in part why it included minimization procedures, as well as
limits on what could be collected. Most Members, however, do not appear to have
contemplated broad, programmatic collection that would undermine protections
introduced in Sections 702 and 703. n167 Those who did articulate this possibility voted
against the bill. [*159] Even if Congress did not initially appreciate the potential for
programmatic collection, however, certainly by 2012 the intelligence community had
made enough information available to Congress for Members to make an informed
decision. This does not mean that all Members were fully informed. But to the extent
that Members selected not to access the material or to take a public stand on the matter,
particularly in light of the legislature's reading of its authorities with regard to
classification, fault lies with Congress. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court failed
to step into the gap. In 2011, FISC realized the implications of the NSA's interpretation
of to, from or about (TFA) collection. However, in light of the seriousness of the NSA's
aim (protecting national security), and the limitations imposed by the types of
technologies being used, the Court read the statute in a manner that found the targeting
procedures to be consistent with the statute. To the extent that NSA's TFA and
assumptions regarding the target's foreignness undermine the law as it is
written, the legislature failed to perform effective oversight. Congress
similarly neglected to uphold the limit placed on the intelligence
community to not knowingly collect domestic conversations. Instead, it
relied on FISC to do so--a task that the Court failed to do. In a classified
environment, when so much information is cloaked from public view, it becomes even
more important for the government to ensure that the authorities as they are publicly
presented are consistent with the manner in which they are being exercised.
PRISM allows the NSA to access the records of US domestic
telecomm companies – also it eliminates a warrant requirement
if people are ‘reasonably believed’ to be outside the USA
Greenwald, 13 – Glenn Greenwald is a fomer columnist on civil liberties and US
national security issues for the Guardian. An ex-constitutional lawyer, he was until 2012
a contributing writer at Salon. (Glenn, “NSA Prism program taps in to user data of
Apple, Google and others” The Guardian, 6/7,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data
The National Security Agency has obtained direct access to the systems of
Google, Facebook, Apple and other US internet giants, according to a top secret
document obtained by the Guardian. The NSA access is part of a previously
undisclosed program called Prism, which allows officials to collect material
including search history, the content of emails, file transfers and live chats,
the document says. The Guardian has verified the authenticity of the document, a 41slide PowerPoint presentation – classified as top secret with no distribution to foreign
allies – which was apparently used to train intelligence operatives on the capabilities of
the program. The document claims "collection directly from the servers" of major US
service providers. Although the presentation claims the program is run with the
assistance of the companies, all those who responded to a Guardian request for
comment on Thursday denied knowledge of any such program. In a statement, Google
said: "Google cares deeply about the security of our users' data. We disclose user data to
government in accordance with the law, and we review all such requests carefully. From
time to time, people allege that we have created a government 'back door' into our
systems, but Google does not have a back door for the government to access private user
data." Several senior tech executives insisted that they had no knowledge of Prism or of
any similar scheme. They said they would never have been involved in such a program.
"If they are doing this, they are doing it without our knowledge," one said. An Apple
spokesman said it had "never heard" of Prism. The NSA access was enabled by
changes to US surveillance law introduced under President Bush and
renewed under Obama in December 2012. The program facilitates extensive,
in-depth surveillance on live communications and stored information. The
law allows for the targeting of any customers of participating firms who live
outside the US, or those Americans whose communications include people
outside the US. It also opens the possibility of communications made
entirely within the US being collected without warrants. Disclosure of the
Prism program follows a leak to the Guardian on Wednesday of a top-secret court order
compelling telecoms provider Verizon to turn over the telephone records of millions of
US customers. The participation of the internet companies in Prism will add to the
debate, ignited by the Verizon revelation, about the scale of surveillance by the
intelligence services. Unlike the collection of those call records, this surveillance can
include the content of communications and not just the metadata. Some of the world's
largest internet brands are claimed to be part of the information-sharing program since
its introduction in 2007. Microsoft – which is currently running an advertising
campaign with the slogan "Your privacy is our priority" – was the first, with collection
beginning in December 2007. It was followed by Yahoo in 2008; Google, Facebook and
PalTalk in 2009; YouTube in 2010; Skype and AOL in 2011; and finally Apple, which
joined the program in 2012. The program is continuing to expand, with other providers
due to come online. Collectively, the companies cover the vast majority of online email,
search, video and communications networks. The document is recent, dating to April
2013. Such a leak is extremely rare in the history of the NSA, which prides itself on
maintaining a high level of secrecy. The Prism program allows the NSA, the
world's largest surveillance organisation, to obtain targeted communications
without having to request them from the service providers and without having
to obtain individual court orders. With this program, the NSA is able to reach
directly into the servers of the participating companies and obtain both
stored communications as well as perform real-time collection on targeted
users. The presentation claims Prism was introduced to overcome what the
NSA regarded as shortcomings of Fisa warrants in tracking suspected
foreign terrorists. It noted that the US has a "home-field advantage" due to housing
much of the internet's architecture. But the presentation claimed "Fisa constraints
restricted our home-field advantage" because Fisa required individual warrants and
confirmations that both the sender and receiver of a communication were outside the
US. "Fisa was broken because it provided privacy protections to people who were not
entitled to them," the presentation claimed. "It took a Fisa court order to collect on
foreigners overseas who were communicating with other foreigners overseas simply
because the government was collecting off a wire in the United States. There were too
many email accounts to be practical to seek Fisas for all." The new measures introduced
in the FAA redefines "electronic surveillance" to exclude anyone "reasonably believed"
to be outside the USA – a technical change which reduces the bar to initiating
surveillance. The act also gives the director of national intelligence and the attorney
general power to permit obtaining intelligence information, and indemnifies internet
companies against any actions arising as a result of co-operating with authorities'
requests. In short, where previously the NSA needed individual
authorisations, and confirmation that all parties were outside the USA, they
now need only reasonable suspicion that one of the parties was outside the
country at the time of the records were collected by the NSA. The document
also shows the FBI acts as an intermediary between other agencies and the tech
companies, and stresses its reliance on the participation of US internet firms, claiming
"access is 100% dependent on ISP provisioning". In the document, the NSA hails the
Prism program as "one of the most valuable, unique and productive accesses for NSA".
It boasts of what it calls "strong growth" in its use of the Prism program to obtain
communications. The document highlights the number of obtained communications
increased in 2012 by 248% for Skype – leading the notes to remark there was
"exponential growth in Skype reporting; looks like the word is getting out about our
capability against Skype". There was also a 131% increase in requests for Facebook data,
and 63% for Google. The NSA document indicates that it is planning to add Dropbox as
a PRISM provider. The agency also seeks, in its words, to "expand collection services
from existing providers". The revelations echo fears raised on the Senate floor last year
during the expedited debate on the renewal of the FAA powers which underpin the
PRISM program, which occurred just days before the act expired. Senator Christopher
Coons of Delaware specifically warned that the secrecy surrounding the various
surveillance programs meant there was no way to know if safeguards within the act were
working. "The problem is: we here in the Senate and the citizens we represent don't
know how well any of these safeguards actually work," he said. "The law doesn't forbid
purely domestic information from being collected. We know that at least one Fisa court
has ruled that the surveillance program violated the law. Why? Those who know can't
say and average Americans can't know." Other senators also raised concerns. Senator
Ron Wyden of Oregon attempted, without success, to find out any information on how
many phone calls or emails had been intercepted under the program. When the law
was enacted, defenders of the FAA argued that a significant check on abuse
would be the NSA's inability to obtain electronic communications without
the consent of the telecom and internet companies that control the data.
But the Prism program renders that consent unnecessary, as it allows the
agency to directly and unilaterally seize the communications off the
companies' servers.
Upstream intercepts foreign data only as it enters domestic
internet connections
Gellman, 14 – staff writer for the Washington Post; won 3 Pullitzer Prizes (Barton,
Washington Post, “In NSA-intercepted data, those not targeted far outnumber the
foreigners who are” 7/5, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/innsa-intercepted-data-those-not-targeted-far-outnumber-the-foreigners-whoare/2014/07/05/8139adf8-045a-11e4-8572-4b1b969b6322_story.html
Taken together, the files offer an unprecedented vantage point on the changes wrought
by Section 702 of the FISA amendments, which enabled the NSA to make freer
use of methods that for 30 years had required probable cause and a warrant
from a judge. One program, code-named PRISM, extracts content stored in user
accounts at Yahoo, Microsoft, Facebook, Google and five other leading Internet
companies. Another, known inside the NSA as Upstream, intercepts data on the
move as it crosses the U.S. junctions of global voice and data networks. No
government oversight body, including the Justice Department, the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court, intelligence committees in Congress or the president’s Privacy and
Civil Liberties Oversight Board, has delved into a comparably large sample of what the
NSA actually collects — not only from its targets but also from people who may cross a
target’s path. Among the latter are medical records sent from one family member to
another, résumés from job hunters and academic transcripts of schoolchildren. In one
photo, a young girl in religious dress beams at a camera outside a mosque. Scores of
pictures show infants and toddlers in bathtubs, on swings, sprawled on their backs and
kissed by their mothers. In some photos, men show off their physiques. In others,
women model lingerie, leaning suggestively into a webcam or striking risque poses in
shorts and bikini tops. “None of the hits that were received were relevant,” two Navy
cryptologic technicians write in one of many summaries of nonproductive surveillance.
“No additional information,” writes a civilian analyst. Another makes fun of a suspected
kidnapper, newly arrived in Syria before the current civil war, who begs for employment
as a janitor and makes wide-eyed observations about the state of undress displayed by
women on local beaches. By law, the NSA may “target” only foreign nationals
located overseas unless it obtains a warrant based on probable cause from a
special surveillance court. For collection under PRISM and Upstream rules,
analysts must state a reasonable belief that the target has information of
value about a foreign government, a terrorist organization or the spread of
nonconventional weapons. Most of the people caught up in those programs
are not the targets and would not lawfully qualify as such. “Incidental
collection” of third-party communications is inevitable in many forms of surveillance,
but in other contexts the U.S. government works harder to limit and discard irrelevant
data. In criminal wiretaps, for example, the FBI is supposed to stop listening to a call if a
suspect’s wife or child is using the phone. There are many ways to be swept up
incidentally in surveillance aimed at a valid foreign target. Some of those in the
Snowden archive were monitored because they interacted directly with a target, but
others had more-tenuous links. If a target entered an online chat room, the NSA
collected the words and identities of every person who posted there, regardless of
subject, as well as every person who simply “lurked,” reading passively what other
people wrote. “1 target, 38 others on there,” one analyst wrote. She collected data on
them all. In other cases, the NSA designated as its target the Internet protocol, or IP,
address of a computer server used by hundreds of people. The NSA treats all content
intercepted incidentally from third parties as permissible to retain, store,
search and distribute to its government customers. Raj De, the agency’s general
counsel, has testified that the NSA does not generally attempt to remove irrelevant
personal content, because it is difficult for one analyst to know what might become
relevant to another. The Obama administration declines to discuss the scale of
incidental collection. The NSA, backed by Director of National Intelligence James R.
Clapper Jr., has asserted that it is unable to make any estimate, even in
classified form, of the number of Americans swept in. It is not obvious why the
NSA could not offer at least a partial count, given that its analysts routinely pick out
“U.S. persons” and mask their identities, in most cases, before distributing intelligence
reports. If Snowden’s sample is representative, the population under scrutiny in
the PRISM and Upstream programs is far larger than the government has
suggested. In a June 26 “transparency report,” the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence disclosed that 89,138 people were targets of last year’s collection under
FISA Section 702. At the 9-to-1 ratio of incidental collection in Snowden’s sample, the
office’s figure would correspond to nearly 900,000 accounts, targeted or not, under
surveillance.
Extra Cards
A US persons standard avoids the problems with geographic
limits on the internet
Donohue, 15 - Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center (Laura,
“SECTION 702 AND THE COLLECTION OF INTERNATIONAL TELEPHONE AND
INTERNET CONTENT” 38 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 117, Winter, lexis)
To the extent that the interception of U.S. persons' communications
constitutes a search or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, it would appear that, at least at the front [*230] end, U.S.
persons are entitled to protections. n456 The inspection and collection of
content falls within the meaning of a search and seizure under the Fourth
Amendment.
Just as virtual entry into the United States should not matter for purposes of setting a
threshold for application of the Fourth Amendment to aliens, use of global
communications should not thereby divest U.S. persons of their
constitutional protections. This approach is consistent with the geographic focus of
the Courts in regard to the Fourth Amendment. It does not hinge constitutional
protections on movement along global communications networks--itself an
untenable proposition in light of how information flows over the Internet.
If the courts, for instance, were to construct a rule that said that U.S. persons
sending information outside the United States lose the protections of the
Fourth Amendment in the privacy afforded those communications, it would be
difficult to police. This rule assumes that individuals have control over
whether their communications leave domestic bounds. They do not. The
Internet is constructed to find the most efficient route between two ISP
addresses. This means that even domestic communications may be routed
internationally. Individuals have no control over how their messages are
conveyed. At the back end, the government would have to be able to ascertain which
messages originated within the United States and then left U.S. bounds. But the NSA
claims that it does not have the appropriate technologies to make this call.
As a result, the effect of this rule would essentially be to assume that every time a U.S.
person communicates, she loses constitutional protections in the content of those
communications. This would eviscerate the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. It
would assume that U.S. persons have no reasonable expectation of privacy in their
communications, regardless of whether they flow across international borders.
The Supreme Court can avoid this conclusion by underscoring the status of the
individual as Rehnquist articulated for the majority in Verdugo-Urquidez:
emphasizing membership in the political community. Where established,
the protection of the Fourth Amendment applies.
The NSA intercepts upstream data by tapping directly into US
service providers
Donohue, 15 - Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center (Laura,
“SECTION 702 AND THE COLLECTION OF INTERNATIONAL TELEPHONE AND
INTERNET CONTENT” 38 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 117, Winter, lexis)
A follow-up article two days later printed another slide depicting both PRISM
and "upstream" collection of communications on fiber cables and
infrastructure ("[c]ollection directly from the servers of . . . U.S. Service
Providers.") n8 Upstream interception allowed the NSA to acquire Internet
communications "as they [*121] transit the 'internet backbone' facilities." n9
The NSA could collect all traffic crossing Internet cables--not just
information targeted at specific Internet Protocol (IP) addresses or telephone
number. The potential yield was substantial: in the first six months of 2011, the NSA
acquired more than 13.25 million Internet transactions through its upstream collection.
n10 The slide urged analysts to use both PRISM and upstream collection to obtain
information. n11
Within days of the releases, the intelligence community acknowledged the existence of
the programs. n12 In August 2013 the Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper,
offered further confirmation, noting that PRISM had been in operation since Congress
had passed the 2008 FISA Amendments Act. n13 He declassified eight documents, n14
and by the end of the month, he had announced that the intelligence community would
release the total [*122] number of Section 702 orders issued, and targets thereby
affected, on an annual basis. n15
NSA interpretation of the FAA means in practice PRISM targets
domestic communications
Donohue, 15 - Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center (Laura,
“SECTION 702 AND THE COLLECTION OF INTERNATIONAL TELEPHONE AND
INTERNET CONTENT” 38 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 117, Winter, lexis) FAA = 2008
FISA Amendments Act
The Article next turns to statutory issues related to targeting, post-targeting analysis,
and the retention and dissemination of information. It argues that the NSA has
sidestepped FAA restrictions by adopting procedures that allow analysts to
acquire information not just to or from, but also "about" targets. In its
foreignness determination the agency assumes, absent evidence to the
contrary, that the target is a non-U.S. person located outside domestic
bounds. And weak standards mark the foreign intelligence purpose
determination. Together, these elements allow for the broad collection of
U.S. persons' international communications, even as they open the door to
the interception of domestic communications. In regard to post-targeting
analysis, the Article draws attention to the intelligence community's use of U.S.
person information to query data obtained under Section 702, effectively
bypassing protections Congress introduced to prevent reverse targeting. The
Article further notes in relation to retention and dissemination that increasing
consumer and industrial reliance on cryptography means that the NSA's retention of
encrypted data may soon become the exception that swallows the rule.
In its constitutional analysis, the Article finds certain practices instituted under Section
702 to fall outside acceptable Fourth Amendment bounds. Although lower courts had
begun to recognize a domestic foreign intelligence exception to the warrant clause, in
1978 Congress introduced FISA to be the sole means via which domestic foreign
intelligence electronic intercepts could be undertaken. Consistent with separation of
powers doctrine, this shift carried constitutional meaning. Internationally, practice and
precedent prior to the FAA turned on a foreign intelligence exception. But in 2008
Congress altered the status quo, introducing individualized judicial review
into the process. Like FISA, the FAA carried constitutional import.
[*124] If that were the end of the story, one could argue that the incidental collection of
U.S. persons' information, as well as the interception of domestic conversations ought to
be regarded in Justice Jackson's third category under Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer. n18 Renewal in 2012, however, points in the opposite direction. The NSA's
actions, for purposes of the warrant clause, appear to be constitutionally
sufficient insofar as foreign intelligence gathering to or from non-U.S.
persons is concerned. The tipping point comes with regard to criminal
prosecution. Absent a foreign intelligence purpose, there is no exception to
the warrant requirement for the query of U.S. persons' international or
domestic communications.
Although a warrant is not required for foreign intelligence collection overseas, the
interception of communications under Section 702 must still comport with the
reasonableness requirements of the Fourth Amendment. A totality of the circumstances
test, in which the significant governmental interest in national security is weighed
against the potential intrusion into U.S. persons' privacy, applies. The incidental
collection of large quantities of U.S. persons' international
communications, the scanning of content for information "about" non-U.S.
person targets, and the interception of non-relevant and entirely domestic
communications in multi-communication transactions, as well as the query
of data using U.S. person identifiers, fall outside the reasonableness
component of the Fourth Amendment.
The Article concludes by calling for renewed efforts to draw a line between
foreign intelligence gathering and criminal law and to create higher
protections for U.S. persons, to ensure that the United States can continue
to collect critical information, while remaining consistent with the right to
privacy embedded in the Fourth Amendment.
NSA overreach means it inevitably monitors domestic internet
communications – rerouting, MCTs, and ‘about’
communications
Donohue, 15 - Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center (Laura,
“SECTION 702 AND THE COLLECTION OF INTERNATIONAL TELEPHONE AND
INTERNET CONTENT” 38 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 117, Winter, lexis)
Three points related to the volume and intrusiveness of the resulting surveillance
deserve notice. First, to obtain "about" communications, because of how the
Internet is constructed, the NSA must monitor large amounts of data. n180
That is, if the NSA may [*163] collect not just e-mail to or from the target's email account (badguy@ISP.com), but, in addition, other communications
happening to mention badguy@ISP.com that pass through the collection
point, then the NSA is monitoring a significant amount of traffic. And the
agency is not just considering envelope information (for example, messages in
which the selector is sending, receiving, or copied on the communication) but the
actual content of messages. n181
Second, wholly domestic conversations may become swept up in the
surveillance simply by nature of how the Internet is constructed. Everything
one does online involves packets of information. Every Web site, every email, every transfer of documents takes the information involved and
divides it up into small bundles. Limited in size, these packets contain
information about the sender's IP address, the intended receiver's IP
address, something that indicates how many packets the communication
has been divvied up into, and what number in the chain is represented by
the packet in question. n182
Packet switched networks ship this information to a common destination via the most
expedient route--one that may, or may not, include the other packets of information
contained in the message. If a roadblock or problem arises in the network, the packets
can then be re-routed, to reach their final destination. Domestic messages may thus
be routed through international servers, if that is the most efficient route to
the final destination.
What this means is that even if the NSA applies an IP filter to eliminate
communications that appear to be within the United States, it may
nevertheless monitor domestic conversations by nature of them being
routed through foreign servers. In this manner, a student in Chicago may
send an e-mail to a student in Boston [*164] that gets routed through a
server in Canada. Through no intent or design of the individual in Chicago, the
message becomes international and thus subject to NSA surveillance.
Third, further collection of domestic conversations takes place through the
NSA's intercept of what are called multi-communication transactions, or
MCTs. It is important to distinguish here between a transaction and a communication.
Some transactions have only single communications associated with them. These are
referred to as SCTs. Other transactions contain multiple communications. If even one of
the communications in an MCT falls within the NSA's surveillance, all of the
communications bundled into the MCT are collected.
The consequence is of significant import. FISC estimated in 2011 that somewhere
between 300,000 and 400,000 MCTs were being collected annually on the
basis of "about" communication--where the "active user" was not the target.
So hundreds of thousands of communications were being collected that did
not include the target as either the sender or the recipient of the
communication. n183
PRISM allows reverse-targeting: targeting someone outside the
United States to collect information about someone in the United
States
Donohue, 15 - Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center (Laura,
“SECTION 702 AND THE COLLECTION OF INTERNATIONAL TELEPHONE AND
INTERNET CONTENT” 38 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 117, Winter, lexis)
B. Post-Targeting Analysis
Section 702 makes it illegal to target someone outside the United States,
where the purpose of the acquisition is to obtain information about a
person known to be within domestic bounds. This practice, known as
"reverse targeting," was central to Congressional debates. n308 Representative
Langevin explained that the insertion of FISC would "ensure that the government's
efforts are not aimed at targeting Americans, the so-called reverse targeting that we're
all concerned about; and that if an American's communications is [sic] inadvertently
intercepted, it is dealt with in a manner that guarantees legal protections." n309
Despite Congress' concern about reverse targeting, the NSA instituted and
the FISC approved a rule change in October 2011 to make it possible to query
the content of communications obtained under Section 702 using U.S.
person names and identifiers for information obtained via PRISM and
upstream telephony collection. n310 [*196] The relevant definition in the 2011
minimization procedures is largely consistent with its 2009 predecessor:
Identification of a United States person means the name, unique title, address, or other
personal identifier of a United States person in the context of activities conducted by
that person or activities conducted by others that are related to that person. A reference
to a product by brand name, or manufacturer's name or the use of a name in a
descriptive sense, e.g., "Monroe Doctrine," is not an identification of a United States
person. n311
The NSA may query data obtained under Section 702 by using the names,
titles, or addresses of U.S. persons, or any other information that may be
related to the individual and his or her activities. If the intelligence community
would like to query the data based on, for instance, membership in the Council on
Foreign Relations--on the grounds that such queries are likely to yield foreign
intelligence information--it may now do so.
In March 2014, the Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, confirmed in a
letter to Senator Ron Wyden that the [*197] NSA had queried Section 702 data
"using U.S. person identifiers." n312 The following month, the NSA's Privacy and
Civil Liberties Officer reiterated Clapper's statement. n313 Pressed during a June 2014
hearing for the number of queries using U.S. person identifiers, Clapper responded by
noting that in 2013, the NSA approved 198 U.S. person identifiers for querying the
content of Section 702 communications, even as it queried Section-702-acquired
metadata approximately 9,500 times. n314
FISC has upheld the reading of the statute supporting use of U.S. person identifiers.
n315 In its October 2011 opinion, the Court explained:
The procedures previously approved by the Court effectively impose a wholesale bar on
queries using United States-Person identifiers. The government has broadened Section
3(b)(5) to allow NSA to query the vast majority of its Section 702 collection using United
States-Person identifiers, subject to approval pursuant to internal NSA procedures and
oversight by the Department of Justice. Like all other NSA queries of the Section 702
collection, queries using United States-person identifiers would be limited to those
reasonably likely to yield foreign intelligence information. n316
The Court did not find this problematic. Because the collection of the information
centered on non-U.S. persons located outside the country, it would be less likely, in the
aggregate, "to result in the acquisition of nonpublic information regarding
nonconsenting United States persons." n317
[*198] As a practical matter, what this rule change means is that U.S. person
information that is incidentally collected via Section 702 can now be mined
using U.S. person information as part of the queries. This circumvents
Congress's requirements in Sections 703 and 704 that prior to U.S. person
information being obtained (and therefore prior to it being analyzed), the
government be required to appear before a court to justify placing a U.S.
person under surveillance.
Section 702 authorizes a broad bulk collection of data –
inevitably includes collection from U.S. persons on a large scale
Donohue, 15 - Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center (Laura,
“SECTION 702 AND THE COLLECTION OF INTERNATIONAL TELEPHONE AND
INTERNET CONTENT” 38 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 117, Winter, lexis)
II. PROGRAMMATIC COLLECTION n143
Almost immediately after passage of the FAA, members of Congress, scholars, and
others began criticizing Section 702 because [*154] of the potential for the government
to use the authorities to engage in programmatic surveillance. n144
In 2009 prominent national security law Professor William Banks explained, "the FAA
targets do not have to be suspected of being an agent of a foreign power or,
for that matter, they do not have to be suspected of terrorism or any national
security offense, so long as the collection of foreign intelligence is a
significant purpose of the surveillance." n145 Surveillance could be directed
at a person, organization, e-mail address, or even "an entire ISP or area
code." n146 He noted, "the surveillance permitted under the FAA does not require that
the Government identify a particular known facility where the intercepted
communications occur." n147 These provisions represented a sea change from how FISA
had previously worked (albeit introducing, for the first time, statutory restrictions in an
area previously governed by Executive Order). U.S. persons' communications now
could be incidentally collected under the statute, on a large scale, without
many of the protections in traditional FISA. n148
Banks presciently pointed out the most likely way in which the new authorities would be
used:
Although details of the implementation of the program . . . are not known, a best guess is
the Government uses a broad vacuum cleaner-like first stage of collection,
focusing on transactional data, where wholesale interception occurs following the
development and implementation of filtering criteria. Then the NSA engages in a more
particularized collection of content after analyzing mined data . . . [A]ccidental or
incidental acquisition of U.S. persons inside the United States [will] surely occur[],
especially in light of the difficulty of ascertaining a target's location. n149
For Professor Banks, part of the problem was that the nature of international
information flows meant that it would be impossible [*155] to tell if an
individual is located overseas or within domestic bounds. n150
The NSA circumvents Section 702 by adopting a presumption
that targets are non-U.S. persons and not determining whether
they are located domestically
Donohue, 15 - Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center (Laura,
“SECTION 702 AND THE COLLECTION OF INTERNATIONAL TELEPHONE AND
INTERNET CONTENT” 38 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 117, Winter, lexis)
[*158] A. Targeting
As aforementioned, Section 702 places four limitations on acquisition, each of
which is meant to restrict the amount of information that can be obtained by the
government. n166 The NSA has sidestepped these statutory restrictions in
three important ways: first, it has adopted procedures that allow analysts to
acquire information "about" selectors (that is, communications modes used by
targets) or targets, and not merely communications to or from targets (or
selectors employed by targets), or information held by targets themselves. Second, it
has created a presumption of non-U.S. person status: That is, if an
individual is not known to be a U.S. person (and thus exempted from
Section 702 and treated either under Sections 703 and 704 or under traditional FISA,
depending on the location), then the NSA assumes that the individual is a nonU.S. person. Third, the NSA has failed to adopt standards that would
require it to ascertain whether a target is located within domestic bounds.
Instead, the agency, having looked at the available evidence, absent evidence to the
contrary, assumes that the target is located outside the United States. These
interpretations work together to undermine Congress's addition of Sections
703 and 704, even as they open the door to more extensive collection of
domestic communications.
In 2008 Congress anticipated that U.S. person information would inadvertently be
collected under Section 702. This is in part why it included minimization procedures, as
well as limits on what could be collected. Most Members, however, do not appear to
have contemplated broad, programmatic collection that would undermine protections
introduced in Sections 702 and 703. n167 Those who did articulate this possibility voted
against the bill.
[*159] Even if Congress did not initially appreciate the potential for programmatic
collection, however, certainly by 2012 the intelligence community had made enough
information available to Congress for Members to make an informed decision. This does
not mean that all Members were fully informed. But to the extent that Members selected
not to access the material or to take a public stand on the matter, particularly in light of
the legislature's reading of its authorities with regard to classification, fault lies with
Congress.
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court failed to step into the gap. In 2011, FISC
realized the implications of the NSA's interpretation of to, from or about (TFA)
collection. However, in light of the seriousness of the NSA's aim (protecting national
security), and the limitations imposed by the types of technologies being used, the Court
read the statute in a manner that found the targeting procedures to be consistent with
the statute.
To the extent that NSA's TFA and assumptions regarding the target's
foreignness undermine the law as it is written, the legislature failed to
perform effective oversight. Congress similarly neglected to uphold the
limit placed on the intelligence community to not knowingly collect
domestic conversations. Instead, it relied on FISC to do so--a task that the
Court failed to do. In a classified environment, when so much information is cloaked
from public view, it becomes even more important for the government to ensure that the
authorities as they are publicly presented are consistent with the manner in which they
are being exercised.
PRISM allows the NSA to access the records of US domestic
telecomm companies – also it eliminates a warrant requirement
if people are ‘reasonably believed’ to be outside the USA
Greenwald, 13 – Glenn Greenwald is a fomer columnist on civil liberties and US
national security issues for the Guardian. An ex-constitutional lawyer, he was until 2012
a contributing writer at Salon. (Glenn, “NSA Prism program taps in to user data of
Apple, Google and others” The Guardian, 6/7,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data
The National Security Agency has obtained direct access to the systems of
Google, Facebook, Apple and other US internet giants, according to a top secret
document obtained by the Guardian.
The NSA access is part of a previously undisclosed program called Prism,
which allows officials to collect material including search history, the
content of emails, file transfers and live chats, the document says.
The Guardian has verified the authenticity of the document, a 41-slide PowerPoint
presentation – classified as top secret with no distribution to foreign allies – which was
apparently used to train intelligence operatives on the capabilities of the program. The
document claims "collection directly from the servers" of major US service providers.
Although the presentation claims the program is run with the assistance of the
companies, all those who responded to a Guardian request for comment on Thursday
denied knowledge of any such program.
In a statement, Google said: "Google cares deeply about the security of our users' data.
We disclose user data to government in accordance with the law, and we review all such
requests carefully. From time to time, people allege that we have created a government
'back door' into our systems, but Google does not have a back door for the government
to access private user data."
Several senior tech executives insisted that they had no knowledge of Prism or of any
similar scheme. They said they would never have been involved in such a program. "If
they are doing this, they are doing it without our knowledge," one said.
An Apple spokesman said it had "never heard" of Prism.
The NSA access was enabled by changes to US surveillance law introduced
under President Bush and renewed under Obama in December 2012.
The program facilitates extensive, in-depth surveillance on live
communications and stored information. The law allows for the targeting of
any customers of participating firms who live outside the US, or those
Americans whose communications include people outside the US.
It also opens the possibility of communications made entirely within the US
being collected without warrants.
Disclosure of the Prism program follows a leak to the Guardian on Wednesday of a topsecret court order compelling telecoms provider Verizon to turn over the telephone
records of millions of US customers.
The participation of the internet companies in Prism will add to the debate, ignited by
the Verizon revelation, about the scale of surveillance by the intelligence services. Unlike
the collection of those call records, this surveillance can include the content of
communications and not just the metadata.
Some of the world's largest internet brands are claimed to be part of the informationsharing program since its introduction in 2007. Microsoft – which is currently running
an advertising campaign with the slogan "Your privacy is our priority" – was the first,
with collection beginning in December 2007.
It was followed by Yahoo in 2008; Google, Facebook and PalTalk in 2009; YouTube in
2010; Skype and AOL in 2011; and finally Apple, which joined the program in 2012. The
program is continuing to expand, with other providers due to come online.
Collectively, the companies cover the vast majority of online email, search, video and
communications networks.
The document is recent, dating to April 2013. Such a leak is extremely rare in the history
of the NSA, which prides itself on maintaining a high level of secrecy.
The Prism program allows the NSA, the world's largest surveillance organisation,
to obtain targeted communications without having to request them from
the service providers and without having to obtain individual court orders.
With this program, the NSA is able to reach directly into the servers of the
participating companies and obtain both stored communications as well as
perform real-time collection on targeted users.
The presentation claims Prism was introduced to overcome what the NSA
regarded as shortcomings of Fisa warrants in tracking suspected foreign
terrorists. It noted that the US has a "home-field advantage" due to housing much of
the internet's architecture. But the presentation claimed "Fisa constraints restricted our
home-field advantage" because Fisa required individual warrants and confirmations
that both the sender and receiver of a communication were outside the US.
"Fisa was broken because it provided privacy protections to people who were not
entitled to them," the presentation claimed. "It took a Fisa court order to collect on
foreigners overseas who were communicating with other foreigners overseas simply
because the government was collecting off a wire in the United States. There were too
many email accounts to be practical to seek Fisas for all."
The new measures introduced in the FAA redefines "electronic surveillance" to exclude
anyone "reasonably believed" to be outside the USA – a technical change which reduces
the bar to initiating surveillance.
The act also gives the director of national intelligence and the attorney general power to
permit obtaining intelligence information, and indemnifies internet companies against
any actions arising as a result of co-operating with authorities' requests.
In short, where previously the NSA needed individual authorisations, and
confirmation that all parties were outside the USA, they now need only
reasonable suspicion that one of the parties was outside the country at the
time of the records were collected by the NSA.
The document also shows the FBI acts as an intermediary between other agencies and
the tech companies, and stresses its reliance on the participation of US internet firms,
claiming "access is 100% dependent on ISP provisioning".
In the document, the NSA hails the Prism program as "one of the most valuable, unique
and productive accesses for NSA".
It boasts of what it calls "strong growth" in its use of the Prism program to obtain
communications. The document highlights the number of obtained communications
increased in 2012 by 248% for Skype – leading the notes to remark there was
"exponential growth in Skype reporting; looks like the word is getting out about our
capability against Skype". There was also a 131% increase in requests for Facebook data,
and 63% for Google.
The NSA document indicates that it is planning to add Dropbox as a PRISM provider.
The agency also seeks, in its words, to "expand collection services from existing
providers".
The revelations echo fears raised on the Senate floor last year during the expedited
debate on the renewal of the FAA powers which underpin the PRISM program, which
occurred just days before the act expired.
Senator Christopher Coons of Delaware specifically warned that the secrecy surrounding
the various surveillance programs meant there was no way to know if safeguards within
the act were working.
"The problem is: we here in the Senate and the citizens we represent don't know how
well any of these safeguards actually work," he said.
"The law doesn't forbid purely domestic information from being collected. We know that
at least one Fisa court has ruled that the surveillance program violated the law. Why?
Those who know can't say and average Americans can't know."
Other senators also raised concerns. Senator Ron Wyden of Oregon attempted, without
success, to find out any information on how many phone calls or emails had been
intercepted under the program.
When the law was enacted, defenders of the FAA argued that a significant
check on abuse would be the NSA's inability to obtain electronic
communications without the consent of the telecom and internet
companies that control the data. But the Prism program renders that
consent unnecessary, as it allows the agency to directly and unilaterally
seize the communications off the companies' servers.
Upstream intercepts foreign data only as it enters domestic
internet connections
Gellman, 14 – staff writer for the Washington Post; won 3 Pullitzer Prizes (Barton,
Washington Post, “In NSA-intercepted data, those not targeted far outnumber the
foreigners who are” 7/5, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/innsa-intercepted-data-those-not-targeted-far-outnumber-the-foreigners-whoare/2014/07/05/8139adf8-045a-11e4-8572-4b1b969b6322_story.html
Taken together, the files offer an unprecedented vantage point on the changes wrought
by Section 702 of the FISA amendments, which enabled the NSA to make freer
use of methods that for 30 years had required probable cause and a warrant
from a judge. One program, code-named PRISM, extracts content stored in user
accounts at Yahoo, Microsoft, Facebook, Google and five other leading Internet
companies. Another, known inside the NSA as Upstream, intercepts data on the
move as it crosses the U.S. junctions of global voice and data networks.
No government oversight body, including the Justice Department, the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court, intelligence committees in Congress or the president’s
Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, has delved into a comparably large sample
of what the NSA actually collects — not only from its targets but also from people who
may cross a target’s path.
Among the latter are medical records sent from one family member to another, résumés
from job hunters and academic transcripts of schoolchildren. In one photo, a young girl
in religious dress beams at a camera outside a mosque.
Scores of pictures show infants and toddlers in bathtubs, on swings, sprawled on their
backs and kissed by their mothers. In some photos, men show off their physiques. In
others, women model lingerie, leaning suggestively into a webcam or striking risque
poses in shorts and bikini tops.
“None of the hits that were received were relevant,” two Navy cryptologic technicians
write in one of many summaries of nonproductive surveillance. “No additional
information,” writes a civilian analyst. Another makes fun of a suspected kidnapper,
newly arrived in Syria before the current civil war, who begs for employment as a janitor
and makes wide-eyed observations about the state of undress displayed by women on
local beaches.
By law, the NSA may “target” only foreign nationals located overseas unless
it obtains a warrant based on probable cause from a special surveillance
court. For collection under PRISM and Upstream rules, analysts must state
a reasonable belief that the target has information of value about a foreign
government, a terrorist organization or the spread of nonconventional
weapons.
Most of the people caught up in those programs are not the targets and
would not lawfully qualify as such. “Incidental collection” of third-party
communications is inevitable in many forms of surveillance, but in other contexts the
U.S. government works harder to limit and discard irrelevant data. In criminal wiretaps,
for example, the FBI is supposed to stop listening to a call if a suspect’s wife or child is
using the phone.
There are many ways to be swept up incidentally in surveillance aimed at a valid foreign
target. Some of those in the Snowden archive were monitored because they interacted
directly with a target, but others had more-tenuous links.
If a target entered an online chat room, the NSA collected the words and identities of
every person who posted there, regardless of subject, as well as every person who simply
“lurked,” reading passively what other people wrote.
“1 target, 38 others on there,” one analyst wrote. She collected data on them all.
In other cases, the NSA designated as its target the Internet protocol, or IP, address of a
computer server used by hundreds of people.
The NSA treats all content intercepted incidentally from third parties as
permissible to retain, store, search and distribute to its government
customers. Raj De, the agency’s general counsel, has testified that the NSA does not
generally attempt to remove irrelevant personal content, because it is difficult for one
analyst to know what might become relevant to another.
The Obama administration declines to discuss the scale of incidental collection. The
NSA, backed by Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper Jr., has asserted
that it is unable to make any estimate, even in classified form, of the
number of Americans swept in. It is not obvious why the NSA could not offer at
least a partial count, given that its analysts routinely pick out “U.S. persons” and mask
their identities, in most cases, before distributing intelligence reports.
If Snowden’s sample is representative, the population under scrutiny in the
PRISM and Upstream programs is far larger than the government has
suggested. In a June 26 “transparency report,” the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence disclosed that 89,138 people were targets of last year’s collection under
FISA Section 702. At the 9-to-1 ratio of incidental collection in Snowden’s sample, the
office’s figure would correspond to nearly 900,000 accounts, targeted or not, under
surveillance.
Ex Post CP
Multi Plank CPs Bad
Interpretation: The neg should not have access to multiplank CPs.
Violation: The Neg proposes a counterplan with three planks.
Standards:
1. Explodes Neg Ground – Get the ability to read any number of planks and kick them
individually (fairness).
2. Depth over breadth – they explode the amount of subjects in the debate – depth
gives us better research skills – we have to find specific evidence and various warrants
(education).
3. Multiple CP’s check – they can run all of their CP’s, they just have to be separate
Voter: Fairness and education.
Reject the team not the argument.
Ex Post DA
Secrecy makes meaningful ex post review impossible
Setty, 15 - Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Faculty Development & Intellectual
Life, Western New England University School of Law (Sudha, “Surveillance, Secrecy,
and the Search for Meaningful Accountability” 51 Stan. J Int'l L. 69, Winter, lexis)
The extent of congressional knowledge regarding the NSA Metadata Program is not fully
known to the public and has been the subject of significant debate. Nonetheless, even
assuming that Congress was sufficiently informed as to the potential reach of the
PATRIOT Act with regard to surveillance n59 and, therefore, that the statutory authority
for the bulk data collection and storage was sound, the ability of Congress to effect
significant and meaningful ex post oversight appears to be severely limited.
Historically, congressional hearings and investigations have been a
powerful tool to rein in executive branch overreaching. n60 However, it
seems that the extreme secrecy surrounding the NSA surveillance programs
undermined the efficacy of these oversight powers, to the point that they
may have been reduced to an ersatz form of accountability. One prominent
example stems from a Senate oversight hearing on March 12, 2013, in which Senator
Ron Wyden specifically asked Director of National Intelligence James Clapper if the
NSA was systematically gathering information on the communications of millions of
Americans. n61 Clapper denied this, yet subsequent revelations confirmed that the
broad scope of the data collection included metadata for telephonic communications, as
well as content data for emails, texts, and other such writings. n62 After public
discussion of the discrepancy in his testimony, Clapper commented that he gave the
"least most untruthful" answer possible under the circumstances. n63 Senator Wyden
expressed disappointment and frustration that even while under oath at an oversight
hearing, Clapper misled the Senate. n64
The ability for congressional oversight is further hampered by a general
lack of access to information about the details of the NSA Metadata
Program n65 and [*82] lack of ability to discuss publicly whatever
knowledge is shared with Congress. n66 In fact, it remains unclear whether
senators, including Dianne Feinstein, Chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee, knew
of the lapses in NSA procedure until after such information was leaked to news sources.
n67 Further revelations indicate that administration statements made to Congress even
after the Snowden disclosures were not entirely accurate. n68 These examples are not
determinative, but taken together, they raise significant doubt to the extent of
accurate information regarding surveillance programs being made
available to congressional oversight committees, and whether the oversight
committees can function as effective accountability measures n69 without
the benefit of illegally leaked information such as the Snowden disclosures.
Ex post fails – hindsight bias and secrecy
Morgan, 8 - Law Clerk to the Honorable Samuel H. Mays, Jr., United States District
Court for the Western District of Tennessee. J.D., 2007, New York University School of
Law (Alexander, “A BROADENED VIEW OF PRIVACY AS A CHECK AGAINST
GOVERNMENT ACCESS TO E-MAIL IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED
KINGDOM” 40 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 803, Spring, lexis)
Ex post judicial review is compromised by hindsight bias. n192 Strict
reliance on ex post approaches presupposes that judges charged with
determining the sufficiency of original [*836] search justifications are
capable of ignoring potentially inculpatory evidence since uncovered. As
with the notion of a disinterested Home Secretary, this appears at odds with
human nature. n193
The delay or outright denial of notice to search targets minimizes the
efficacy of judicial review. Without notice, "the majority of interferences with
privacy will be undetected," and most will only learn that they were surveillance targets
if criminal charges follow. n194 By implication, the true extent of surveillance (and
any abuse) remains unknown. n195 Untimely notice also compromises the value of
judicial review because the court will be privy to the fruits of a search already conducted
and thus susceptible to hindsight bias. In the United Kingdom, the Home Secretary
never gives notification, n196 and delayed notice is fast growing in the United States
through the use of "sneak and peek" warrants. n197 Gauging the scope of surveillance in
the United Kingdom is further frustrated by non-responsive Tribunal decisions which
"simply state whether the determination is favourable ... thus, not necessarily revealing
[if] there has been any interception or its details." n198
[*837] Independent monitors such as the Interception of Communications
Commissioner are prone to hindsight bias and also suffer from distinct shortcomings
due to their generalized function. Their general charge allows them to uncover and
address (through recommendations to Parliament) systemic defects more easily, unlike
courts, which are limited to case-by-case review. The converse is that monitors lack
authority to remedy any specific abuses they uncover. n199 Above all, commentators
characterize monitors as helpless because there are too many authorizations to oversee,
such that "not all authorisations are subject to scrutiny; only those selected at random."
n200 In sum, the government's power to withhold notice precludes targets
from seeking judicial review, and the result is that many authorizations are
never held "to any form of independent scrutiny." n201
Ex post is impossible to enforce and amounts to a rubber stamp
Berman, 14 - Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School (Emily
Berman, Regulating Domestic Intelligence Collection, 71 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 3,
http://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol71/iss1/5
The suggestion that the FISC approximate the role of traditional judicial review of
agency decision making to impose constraints on discretion will also fail to result in the
preservation of civil liberties. As an initial matter, it is unclear what the extent of the
FISC’s review might be. Traditional judicial review of administrative rules asks whether
an agency’s action is consistent with the Constitution and its statutory mandate or
whether it is arbitrary or capricious.319 But when it comes to most intelligencecollection rules, there is no constitutional or statutory standard against
which a court could measure agency compliance.320 One proposed solution
to this baseline problem is to have the FISC review policy for whether it is
consistent with the intelligence agencies’ own stated objectives.321 Again,
this proposal fails to account for the fact that when the intelligence
community is left to determine the rules of its own conduct, concerns other
than security will get short shrift. By asking intelligence agencies to identify their own
objectives and then subjecting their efforts to meet those objectives to judicial review
would replicate the current situation—where the constraints on agencies are limited to
those that they agree to place on themselves—but with the added legitimating feature of
judicial imprimatur.
Another barrier to enlisting the FISC in intelligencecollection governance is that the
intelligence-collection activities governed by the Guidelines extend beyond the scope of
the FISC’s jurisdiction. The FISC oversees electronic foreign intelligence surveillance
and physical searches of premises connected with foreign powers.322 It has no role in
overseeing purely domestic surveillance of Americans absent probable cause that those
Americans are agents of a foreign power.323 The content of the Guidelines and the
activities they regulate—such as physical surveillance of Americans, infiltration of
religious or political groups, the use of informants, requests for internet history— rarely
fall within the FISC’s jurisdiction. Individuals who wish to challenge FBI activity—if they
can establish standing—do not have access to the FISC.324 Thus, it is unclear what role
the FISC could play in reviewing many activities in which the FBI engages.
The FISC, too, is likely to share the FBI and ODNI’s bias toward the security
mission. Unless a recipient of a FISC order challenges the legitimacy of that
order, proceedings in the FISC are not subject to an adversarial process.325
Instead, like magistrate judges considering whether to issue traditional
search warrants, FISC judges review unopposed government applications
for surveillance orders.326 The FISC thus receives only the Justice Department’s
perspective—heavily informed by the FBI’s perspective—about any given rule. This
concern is compounded by the fact that even the judges themselves largely hail from the
law enforcement community—twelve of the fourteen judges who have served this year
are former prosecutors and one is a former state police director.327 Moreover, once
selected by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court for FISC service, these judges are
exposed to a constant stream of government applications to engage in foreign
intelligence collection detailing just how dangerous the world can be and the important
role that intelligence collection plays in combating those dangers.328 FISC
involvement thus serves only to reinforce the pro-security perspective
already embedded in the development of domesticintelligence- collection
policies.
Empirically true
Brand, 15 - Dean and Professor Emeritus and Chairman of the Center for Law and
Global Justice, University of San Francisco School of Law (Jeffrey, “Eavesdropping on
Our Founding Fathers: How a Return to the Republic's Core Democratic Values Can
Help Us Resolve the Surveillance Crisis” 6 Harv. Nat'l Sec. J. 16 Harv. Nat'l Sec. J. 1,
lexis)
That prediction also came to pass. In 2005, the New York Times revealed the
Bush Administration's Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP) that
authorized warrantless surveillance on a massive scale that clearly violated
the dictates of FISA and the Patriot Act. Initially, the Bush Administration argued that
the program was legal, citing the 9/11 attacks and national security emergencies.
Ultimately, a simpler path was taken: the Administration went to and received ex
post facto approval from the FISA court. n189 A moment of accountability-the Bush Administration's acknowledgement that it had engaged in illegal
surveillance--was side-stepped by simply seeking the approval of the court
charged with monitoring the illegal activity, thereby making the Executive
Branch unaccountable yet again. n190
The structure of the FISA court--shrouded in secrecy and devoid of any
opposition to the government's position--also took its toll on the
accountability of the Executive Branch to the Congress, a consequence that also
had been roundly predicted during the FISA debates. Senators Abourezk, Hart, and
Mathias candidly acknowledged throughout the debates over S. 3197, "In depth
congressional oversight is a crucial element of the safeguards which justify embarking
on the [FISA] legislative scheme." n191 Representative Ertel hoped that [*47] FISA's
congressional reporting requirements would serve that end. n192
Public FISC Advocate DA
FISC review only has a weak effect on executive deterrence
Setty, 15 - Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Faculty Development & Intellectual
Life, Western New England University School of Law (Sudha, “Surveillance, Secrecy,
and the Search for Meaningful Accountability” 51 Stan. J Int'l L. 69, Winter, lexis)
The FISC differs from Article III courts in numerous ways: Its statutory scope
is limited to matters of foreign intelligence gathering; its judges are appointed in the
sole discretion of the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court; its
proceedings are secret; its opinions are often secret or are published in
heavily [*83] redacted form; and its process is not adversarial as only government
lawyers make arguments defending the legality of the surveillance being contemplated.
n70 Many of these differences bring into doubt the legitimacy of the court,
its ability to afford adequate due process regarding civil liberties concerns, and
its ability to uphold the rule of law in terms of government accountability.
Compounding this legitimacy deficit is the FISC's own loosening of the
relevance standard under Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act such that the FISC has
found that bulk data collection without any particularized threat or
connection to terrorism is legally permissible. n71
Historically, the FISC has rejected NSA surveillance applications too infrequently to be
considered a substantial check on government overreach as an ex ante matter. n72 As
an ex post matter, it is unclear to what extent the FISC's work guarantees
any meaningful accountability over NSA surveillance activities. On the one
hand, because the FISC lacks an adversarial process and has no independent
investigatory authority, the FISC only addresses ex post compliance problems when the
government itself brings the problem to the court's attention. n73 As such, FISC
judges rely on the statements of the government as to the government's own
behavior and lack the authority to investigate the veracity of the
government's representations. n74 For example, in 2011, the FISC found one
aspect of the surveillance program - brought to its attention months after the program
went into effect n75 - to be unconstitutional. n76 Additionally, in one declassified
opinion, the FISC critiques the NSA's sloppy over-collection of metadata of U.S.
communications, and questions the efficacy of bulk data collection as a national security
measure. n77 At one point, the FISC sanctioned the NSA for overreaching in [*84]
saving all metadata and running daily metadata against an "alert list" of approximately
17,800 phone numbers, only 10% of which had met FISC's legal standard for reasonable
suspicion. n78 On such occasions, the administration has modified problematic aspects
of the surveillance and continued forward without further impediment by the FISC. n79
On the other hand, the fact that the NSA itself has brought potential
compliance incidents to the notice of the FISC n80 indicates at least some
internal policing of these programs. However, this is hardly an effective
substitute for external review and accountability mechanisms that would
ensure that consistent controls are in place. Further, the self-reporting of these
compliance incidents does not in any way allow for discourse over the
larger structural questions surrounding the surveillance programs.
Finally, the ability of the FISC to act as an effective check on NSA
overreaching is severely limited by the secrecy and lack of information
available to the FISC judges. Judge Reggie B. Walton, formerly the Chief Judge of
the FISC, lamented that "the FISC is forced to rely upon the accuracy of the information
that is provided to the Court ... . The FISC does not have the capacity to investigate
issues of noncompliance ... ." n81 The ability of the NSA to not only gather and retain
bulk metadata, but also to build in backdoor access into data files despite private
encryption efforts has been largely sanctioned by the FISC based on NSA
representations as to the seriousness of the security threats posed to the nation. n82 In
an environment in which there is a tremendous fear of being held responsible for any
future terrorist attack that might occur on U.S. soil, n83 and in which there is a [*85]
information deficit for those outside of the intelligence community, the FISC has
consistently deferred to the NSA's assertions and has not been able to act as an
effective accountability mechanism.
A public advocate in the FISC will not change anything
Pangburn 14
DJ Pangburn staff writer for VICE, Boing Boing and Makeshift writing for Motherboard.
“The Problem with Obama's New Public Privacy Advocate”
http://motherboard.vice.com/blog/the-problem-with-obamas-new-public-privacyadvocate //EM
If libertarians are right about any large politico-philosophical issue, it is that more
bureaucracy hardly ever helps, especially over time. And so it's likely to be
when President Obama appoints a public privacy advocate, as the Los Angeles
Times reported today. How will this privacy ombudsman remain independent in
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) hearings, when the court's
judges were supposed to essentially fill the exact same role in the first
place? Who the hell knows. It seems quite a bit like government PR that won't
have any real, substantive privacy impact in the short or long term. The
only way the position could come close to working is if some distinguished
privacy activist with no cozy government or tech company ties were
appointed to the post. It won't work if the advocate is a career bureaucrat or
tech evangelist for companies that live off of data mining dollars. That means
no ex-Google, Facebook, Microsoft, or Apple executives, and certainly no ex-NSA or other
intelligence professionals. There are plenty of folks in and around the fringes of the tech world
that would do a marvelous job in critiquing surveillance measures and ensuring privacy. Look
back to the late Roman republic for a moment. The Tribune of the People system was
developed to give the people an advocate against aristocratic, Senatorial control of public life.
For a time, it worked. But when tribunes like the brothers Gracchi wielded too much populist
power, they ran into the merciless anvil of the state. Eventually, the tribunes became vehicles
for manipulation, rarely discharging any of their original duties. Obama knows how such
populist maneuvers can placate the masses, so isn't it rather foolish to buy into his designs? Is it
fair to compare Obama's public advocate to Roman history? Perhaps not, but there is ample
evidence of citizen protection bureaucrats and public advocates being
nearly worthless. The New York City public advocate position, for instance, has been under
fire for years. Look at the Environmental Protection Agency's timidity in going after fracking
during an election year, as detailed in the Gasland documentaries. The Justice Department
failed to put subprime mortgage and credit default swap criminals in prison out of some selfpreservational move to appease Wall Street. And what became of the privacy
protections set up as a buffer against the Patriot Act's surveillance powers?
Clearly, they didn't work. If we reject Obama's move, where does this leave us? Well,
the best outcome is a legislative one. Ron Wyden's Intelligence Oversight and Surveillance
Reform Act bill is the better option. On the other hand, the Supreme Court deciding the matter
is even worse than Obama's public advocate move. But, can there be any real hope with Obama
on surveillance and privacy, or just some more of the same? I wouldn't bet on the former. If
Obama wants a real public advocate in FISC hearings, why not give Edward Snowden a call? Yes,
he's ex-NSA, but who has been a better critic of surveillance and advocate for privacy?
Perm
Perm do both – the FAA includes ex post review mechanisms
that solve the link
Blum, 9 (Stephanie, “WHAT REALLY IS AT STAKE WITH THE FISA AMENDMENTS
ACT OF 2008 AND IDEAS FOR FUTURE SURVEILLANCE REFORM” 18 B.U. Pub. Int.
L.J. 269, Spring, lexis)
If the Note's assertions are true, the FAA has one advantage over the traditional
FISA in that the FAA relies more on ex post mechanisms. For example, the
FAA imposes reporting requirements to Congress n253 and inspector
general reviews, n254 rather than relying solely on ex ante warrants issued
by a secret court. While under the FAA the FISC issues ex ante certifications
concerning the executive's targeting and minimization procedures, these
are programmatic reviews and not based on individualized suspicion of
suspects as is required by traditional FISA. Given the arguably limited
effectiveness of ex ante warrants issued by a secret court based on one-sided evidence,
the FAA's greater reliance on ex post review mechanisms could be viewed as a
significant improvement over traditional FISA. As Georgetown law professor Neal
Katyal observed, "reporting requirements are powerful devices" that promote external
checks on excessive executive power. n255
In contrast, the high degree of judicial deference in ex ante review may simply result
from quality applications. Applications for traditional FISA warrants must survive
considerable review by the executive branch prior to submission to the FISC; hence, it
can be presumed that some, if not many, applications are not brought. As Alan
Dershowitz notes, "although the FISA court has only rarely denied requests for national
security wiretaps, the very existence of this court and the requirement of sworn
justification serves as a check on the improper use of the powerful and intrusive
technologies that are permitted in national security cases." n256 Hence, there are two
ways to look at ex ante review: one could either argue that FISA "forces the executive to
self-censor its requests," or that the judiciary is "acting merely as a 'rubber stamp.'"
n257 The reality is probably a little of both.
The FAA contains both ex ante and newly imposed ex post review
mechanisms. While the ex ante review under the FAA is not based on individualized
determinations about suspects, but rather focuses on programmatic reviews, because of
its heavy ex post reporting mechanisms, it seems that the FAA creates [*308] a
balanced structure that may prevent executive branch abuse while still
protecting the nation from another terrorist attack.
Ex post review alone fails – courts lack institutional expertise to
review surveillance risks
Harvard Law Review, 8 – no author cited, “SHIFTING THE FISA PARADIGM:
PROTECTING CIVIL LIBERTIES BY ELIMINATING EX ANTE JUDICIAL APPROVAL”
http://cdn.harvardlawreview.org/wpcontent/uploads/pdfs/shifting_the_FISA_paradigm.pdf
2. Judicially Ordered Notice to Wrongfully Surveilled Persons. — Another approach
would provide a stronger statutory cause of action for improper surveillance, adding
an ex post review function to the FISC. Such a scheme would “provide
compensation to individuals subject to the most grievous instances of
unlawful electronic surveillance” by giving the FISC power to “screen for these
violations and discretionarily notify an individual,” and then compensate him or her if
appropriate.82 This approach is commendable for attempting to remedy the lack of
adversariality and the fact that improper surveillance that occurs after a FISC order is
issued — when either changed circumstances or invalid governmental motives never
come to light because the government does not attempt criminal prosecution — may go
unchecked.83 But the suggested remedy, to broaden notice by making a “distinction
. . . between disclosure that concretely threatens national security and disclosure that
would merely embarrass the government,” 84 seems unworkable. Such line
drawing necessarily involves crucial policy determinations that the courts
are in a bad institutional position to make. Moreover, the ability of the
remedy to provide a check on the government seems at best dubious and
could even be viewed as permitting the government to purchase the ability
to invade constitutional liberties.
Presidential powers DA
The perception of protection alone prevents a larger backlash
against presidential power
Small, 8 - United States Air Force Academy (Matthew, “His Eyes are Watching You:
Domestic Surveillance, Civil Liberties and Executive Power during Times of National
Crisis” http://cspc.nonprofitsoapbox.com/storage/documents/Fellows2008/Small.pdf
In fact, reasonable arguments can be made that there is no clearly formed public
mandate demanding the consideration of an American citizen’s right to privacy as
important, if not more so, than national security. There exists only a concern of
abridgement of their right, but this concern does not equate to motivating factor for
government constraint. Studies show that from 1974 to 1983 Americans perceived little
impact of privacy invasion, in its rare instances, on their lives (Katz and Tassone 1990,
125). Simultaneously, however, Americans did not, and still do not,17 favor wiretaps
regardless of the presence of warrants (Katz and Tassone 1990, 130-131). Despite this, it
appears that the public realizes the necessity of the power of the president to abridge
certain rights in order to ensure national security. The public voices its concern but
stops far short of forcing the government to restrain itself. Legislatures listen to the
“broad climate of opinion” (Gandy Jr. 2003, 285) and that climate allows President
Bush to act as he did.18 Like Abraham Lincoln, President Bush realized inadequacy
within the government institutions tasked with keeping America safe through the
collection of information on internal threats. In order to effectively combat terrorism,
the NSA needed the ability to expand operations within the US. President Bush, in the
manner of his Civil War predecessor, expanded his power to better equip the NSA to
handle the threat. Court cases and legislation concerning wiretapping and
intrusive domestic surveillance techniques only establish guidelines to give
degrees of protection, but more importantly the perception of protection.19
This still leaves the president with the room to maneuver within these
guidelines to maintain national security at the expense of complete civil liberty.
Justice Black’s dissensions shed more light on this paradox that even though the courts
deemed warrantless wiretaps an invasion of privacy, they still continue. There remains
those of the persuasion that wiretapping is a viable information gathering tool and
admissible in court with or without an accompanying warrant because the Forth
Amendment is not a protection of privacy. In American history, domestic surveillance,
later to include electronic surveillance, proved necessary to enforce those laws passed by
Congress that quelled rebellion and silenced dissidents. Presently, the USA Patriot Act
and other similar legislation requires an increase in domestic electronic surveillance in
order to combat terrorism; so in the interest of adhering to the letter and the spirit of
the law, President Bush must expand the use of domestic electronic surveillance.
President Bush took the precedent set by his predecessors and acted accordingly when
the United States plummeted into turmoil. What is important now is for the
president to realize when his power has reached its limit. The crux of the
problem lies in justifying the remainder of a threat to American citizens. While the
attacks of 9/11 still linger within the American psyche and legislation supports executive
action, this task is less daunting. American citizens can stand some breaches in privacy
but those breaches must not be permanent. Popular sentiment and legislation may
currently favor expanded presidential power but President Bush, or any subsequent
president, would be remiss in assuming that it will remain as such for the duration of
the struggle against international terrorism. The fickle nature of public and
Congressional support in the domestic intelligence realm thus requires a
great deal of prudence on the part of the president.
There are some indicators, albeit vague ones, of when domestic surveillance policy
should yield to citizens’ right to privacy. Following the progression witnessed during the
Cold War it would be reasonable to expect that opposition to presidential power would
first come in the form of Supreme Court rulings striking down certain powers as
unconstitutional followed by public opinion more heavily favoring the right to privacy
and finally, legislation codifying judicial rulings in accordance with public opinion.
Court cases challenging the president’s power under the USA Patriot Act have already
surfaced. Both the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the Center for
Constitutional Rights (CCR) have already filed formal complaints against the executive
branch. The CCR, in particular, directly attacked the president’s power to conduct
electronic surveillance without a court order as criminal under the provisions of FISA.
Similarly, the Electronic Frontier Foundation sued AT&T for violating free speech and
the right to privacy by aiding the NSA. Although the president has fought these
allegations, fighting most vehemently in the AT&T case, none of the cases reached the
Supreme Court. The legal actions precipitated neither legislative response nor changes
in executive policy. If, however, the populous feels so compelled as to bring the matter
before the Supreme Court, the president risks losing the policy initiative as one
or more unfavorable rulings may force Congress to act on behalf of the right
to privacy. The president must take care to ensure that domestic
surveillance policies are commensurate with the actual national security
threat.
Although the war has no foreseeable end, the president’s actions must have one. That
end must be in concert with Congress and must demonstrate to the American people
that the security of the US, and by default their own freedom, is better because of it. If
not, the president risks losing all legitimacy and having his power
constrained to the point where neither he nor the agencies below him can
effectively protect the nation.
Terror DA
2AC - Short
No Link: The use restrictions in PPD28 include terrorism, means
that the surveillance necessary to prevent terror is still available.
Link turn: Surveillance makes counter-terror tools ineffective
Corrigan 2015 (Ray [senior lecturer in mathematics, computing, and technology at the
Open University, U.K.]; Mass Surveillance Will Not Stop Terrorism; Jan 25;
www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/new_scientist/2015/01/mass_surveillanc
e_against_terrorism_gathering_intelligence_on_all_is_statistically.html; kdf)
Police, intelligence, and security systems are imperfect. They process vast amounts of
imperfect intelligence data and do not have the resources to monitor all known suspects 24/7. The French authorities lost track of
these extremists long enough for them to carry out their murderous acts.
You cannot fix any of this by
treating the entire population as suspects and then engaging in
suspicionless, blanket collection and processing of personal data. Mass data collectors can dig
deeply into anyone’s digital persona but don’t have the resources to do so
with everyone. Surveillance of the entire population, the vast majority of whom are innocent,
leads to the diversion of limited intelligence resources in pursuit of huge
numbers of false leads. Terrorists are comparatively rare, so finding one is a needle-in-a-haystack problem. You
don’t make it easier by throwing more needleless hay on the stack. It is statistically impossible for total
population surveillance to be an effective tool for catching terrorists. Even if
your magic terrorist-catching machine has a false positive rate of 1 in
1,000—and no security technology comes anywhere near this—every time
you asked it for suspects in the U.K. it would flag 60,000 innocent people. Law
enforcement and security services need to be able to move with the times, using modern digital technologies intelligently and
through targeted data preservation—not a mass surveillance regime—to engage in court-supervised technological surveillance of
individuals whom they have reasonable cause to suspect. That is not, however, the same as building an infrastructure of mass
surveillance. Mass
surveillance makes the job of the security services more
difficult and the rest of us less secure.
No Impact: NSA’s bulk surveillance does nothing anyway circumvention is only necessary to prevent delays, but the
government delays later on in the process
Cahall et al ’14 (Bailey Cahall is a Policy Analyst @ New America and went to the
Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University. David Sterman is
a program associate at New America and holds a master's degree from Georgetown’s
Center for Security Studies. Emily Schneider has a J.D. from Syracuse University, a M.A.
degree in English from the University of Rochester, and a B.A. degree in English from
Pennsylvania State University and she is an advisory council member for the Global
Accountability Initiative. Peter Bergen is CNN's national security analyst, a Professor of
Practice at Arizona State University and a fellow at Fordham University's Center on
National Security, New America, 1/13/14, “DO NSA'S BULK SURVEILLANCE
PROGRAMS STOP TERRORISTS?”, https://www.newamerica.org/internationalsecurity/do-nsas-bulk-surveillance-programs-stop-terrorists/)//KY
Surveillance of American phone metadata has had no discernible impact on
preventing acts of terrorism and only the most marginal of impacts on
preventing terrorist-related activity, such as fundraising for a terrorist group.
Furthermore, our examination of the role of the database of U.S. citizens’
telephone metadata in the single plot the government uses to justify the
importance of the program – that of Basaaly Moalin, a San Diego cabdriver who
in 2007 and 2008 provided $8,500 to al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Somalia
– calls into question the necessity of the Section 215 bulk collection
program. According to the government, the database of American phone
metadata allows intelligence authorities to quickly circumvent the
traditional burden of proof associated with criminal warrants, thus
allowing them to “connect the dots” faster and prevent future 9/11-scale
attacks. Yet in the Moalin case, after using the NSA’s phone database to link
a number in Somalia to Moalin, the FBI waited two months to begin an
investigation and wiretap his phone. Although it’s unclear why there was a
delay between the NSA tip and the FBI wiretapping, court documents show
there was a two-month period in which the FBI was not monitoring
Moalin’s calls, despite official statements that the bureau had Moalin’s
phone number and had identified him. , This undercuts the government’s
theory that the database of Americans’ telephone metadata is necessary to
expedite the investigative process, since it clearly didn’t expedite the
process in the single case the government uses to extol its virtues.
Additionally, a careful review of three of the key terrorism cases the
government has cited to defend NSA bulk surveillance programs reveals
that government officials have exaggerated the role of the NSA in the cases
against David Coleman Headley and Najibullah Zazi, and the significance of
the threat posed by a notional plot to bomb the New York Stock Exchange.
Aff outweighs the DA: Soft power relations are key to
cooperation to take down terror
Alt Causes: economic, social, and political problems ensure
terrorism continues despite surveillance
2AC Long
No Link: The use restrictions in PPD28 include terrorism, means
that the surveillance necessary to prevent terror is still available.
Link turn: Surveillance makes counter-terror tools ineffective
Corrigan 2015 (Ray [senior lecturer in mathematics, computing, and technology at the
Open University, U.K.]; Mass Surveillance Will Not Stop Terrorism; Jan 25;
www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/new_scientist/2015/01/mass_surveillanc
e_against_terrorism_gathering_intelligence_on_all_is_statistically.html; kdf)
Police, intelligence, and security systems are imperfect. They process vast amounts of
imperfect intelligence data and do not have the resources to monitor all known suspects 24/7. The French authorities lost track of
these extremists long enough for them to carry out their murderous acts.
You cannot fix any of this by
treating the entire population as suspects and then engaging in
suspicionless, blanket collection and processing of personal data. Mass data collectors can dig
deeply into anyone’s digital persona but don’t have the resources to do so
with everyone. Surveillance of the entire population, the vast majority of whom are innocent,
leads to the diversion of limited intelligence resources in pursuit of huge
numbers of false leads. Terrorists are comparatively rare, so finding one is a needle-in-a-haystack problem. You
don’t make it easier by throwing more needleless hay on the stack. It is statistically impossible for total
population surveillance to be an effective tool for catching terrorists. Even if
your magic terrorist-catching machine has a false positive rate of 1 in
1,000—and no security technology comes anywhere near this—every time
you asked it for suspects in the U.K. it would flag 60,000 innocent people. Law
enforcement and security services need to be able to move with the times, using modern digital technologies intelligently and
through targeted data preservation—not a mass surveillance regime—to engage in court-supervised technological surveillance of
individuals whom they have reasonable cause to suspect. That is not, however, the same as building an infrastructure of mass
surveillance. Mass
surveillance makes the job of the security services more
difficult and the rest of us less secure.
No Impact: NSA’s bulk surveillance does nothing anyway circumvention is only necessary to prevent delays, but the
government delays later on in the process
Cahall et al ’14 (Bailey Cahall is a Policy Analyst @ New America and went to the
Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University. David Sterman is
a program associate at New America and holds a master's degree from Georgetown’s
Center for Security Studies. Emily Schneider has a J.D. from Syracuse University, a M.A.
degree in English from the University of Rochester, and a B.A. degree in English from
Pennsylvania State University and she is an advisory council member for the Global
Accountability Initiative. Peter Bergen is CNN's national security analyst, a Professor of
Practice at Arizona State University and a fellow at Fordham University's Center on
National Security, New America, 1/13/14, “DO NSA'S BULK SURVEILLANCE
PROGRAMS STOP TERRORISTS?”, https://www.newamerica.org/internationalsecurity/do-nsas-bulk-surveillance-programs-stop-terrorists/)//KY
Surveillance of American phone metadata has had no discernible impact on
preventing acts of terrorism and only the most marginal of impacts on
preventing terrorist-related activity, such as fundraising for a terrorist group.
Furthermore, our examination of the role of the database of U.S. citizens’
telephone metadata in the single plot the government uses to justify the
importance of the program – that of Basaaly Moalin, a San Diego cabdriver who
in 2007 and 2008 provided $8,500 to al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Somalia
– calls into question the necessity of the Section 215 bulk collection
program. According to the government, the database of American phone
metadata allows intelligence authorities to quickly circumvent the
traditional burden of proof associated with criminal warrants, thus
allowing them to “connect the dots” faster and prevent future 9/11-scale
attacks. Yet in the Moalin case, after using the NSA’s phone database to link
a number in Somalia to Moalin, the FBI waited two months to begin an
investigation and wiretap his phone. Although it’s unclear why there was a
delay between the NSA tip and the FBI wiretapping, court documents show
there was a two-month period in which the FBI was not monitoring
Moalin’s calls, despite official statements that the bureau had Moalin’s
phone number and had identified him. , This undercuts the government’s
theory that the database of Americans’ telephone metadata is necessary to
expedite the investigative process, since it clearly didn’t expedite the
process in the single case the government uses to extol its virtues.
Additionally, a careful review of three of the key terrorism cases the
government has cited to defend NSA bulk surveillance programs reveals
that government officials have exaggerated the role of the NSA in the cases
against David Coleman Headley and Najibullah Zazi, and the significance of
the threat posed by a notional plot to bomb the New York Stock Exchange.
Aff outweighs the DA: Soft power relations are key to
cooperation to take down terror
Alt Causes: economic, social, and political problems ensure
terrorism continues despite surveillance
Dabrowski ’97 (Mariusz Dabrowski from the Public Politics Project @ Towson State
University, “Causes of Modern Terrorism”, 5/13/97,
http:///www.towson.edu/polsci/ppp/terror/causes.html)//KY
The current global wave of terrorism, in many ways, originated and was
fueled by events in the Middle East, particularly the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict.
Some of the world's most violent terrorist acts have been committed in the name of
Palestinian self determination and the destruction of Israel. Israel's official creation in
1948 began an intermittent conflict which lasts to this day. Palestinians maintain Israeli
lands were promised to them by British colonial authorities. Israel's Arab neighbors
failed to destroy Israel by conventional military means, so radical Palestinians believed
terror tactics were the only other choice. Even prior to Israel's formation, Jewish settlers
used terrorism against British colonial authorities and Palestinian Arabs living in the
area to affect the creation of a Jewish state. Consequently, Arabs reciprocated. In 1964,
the major Palestinian terrorist groups formed a coalition called the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) under the leadership of Yasser Arafat. The PLO's stated mission
included the annihilation of Israel and establishment of a Palestinian state. The terror
escalated to a global scale after the 1967 Six Day War when Israel annexed Palestinian
lands on the west bank of the Jordan River and Gaza Strip near the Sinai Peninsula.
The causes of Middle East terrorism are mainly political. The dispute is over
possession of land. Palestinians considered the territory occupied by Israel rightfully
theirs. Aside from the land dispute, a social element is also present in this
situation. Israel is the only non-Muslim nation in the Middle East, therefore it vividly
stands out as "different," or an "invader." Islam is more than just a religion to its
faithful. It is a prescription for life; dictating social norms in addition to civil and
criminal law. The existence of Israel is viewed as an invasion of the western world's
"corrupting" influence. To fundamentalist Muslims the West, led by the United States,
is characterized by the inequity and exploitation of capitalism, a philosophy
centered on the individual. Islam on the other hand, is based on a more egalitarian
and group-focused philosophy. But the main reason Muslims are opposed to
Western influence concerns the attractiveness of capitalism. While Marxists have
attempted to paint capitalism as evil and decadent, they have failed to account for its
comparative efficiency in allocating resources and generally raising living standards.
Coupled with the fact that life in the West is often glamorously portrayed by the media,
religious leaders fear Muslims will be corrupted by Western greed and forsake their
Muslim faith. This fact is one explanation for the increase in Muslim fundamentalism in
the Middle East. Fundamentalist terrorist groups like Hizballah and Hamas are
infamous for their fanatical tactics, most notably suicide bombings. Religious zealots
will be recruited by these groups to take explosives, either strapped to their bodies or in
vehicles, and detonate those explosives, killing themselves, and destroying the
assigned target. In 1983, a Hizballah suicide bomber drove the bomb-laden truck
which destroyed the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon killing over 200 Marines.
More recently, Hamas suicide bombers have blown-up a number of buses in Israel. The
Muslim fanatics are convinced killing themselves in the process of killing their enemies
is a path to martyrdom and eternal salvation. Middle East terrorism has fueled the
global wave of terrorism because a variety of terrorist groups (IRA, ETA,
Japanese Red Army, Baader-Meinhof Gang, etc.) have received training and support
from Palestinian terrorist groups, particularly the PLO.
Their “experts” have motive to exaggerate the likelihood of an
attack
Weiss 2015 (Leonard [visiting scholar at Stanford University’s Center for International
Security and Cooperation]; On fear and nuclear terror; Mar 3; Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists 2015, Vol. 71(2) 75–87; kdf)
There is a tendency on the part of security policy advocates to hype security
threats to obtain support for their desired policy outcomes. They are free to do so in a
democratic society, and most come by their advocacy through genuine conviction that a real security threat is receiving insufficient attention. But
there is now enough evidence of how such advocacy has been distorted for
the purpose of overcoming political opposition to policies stemming from
ideology that careful public exposure and examination of data on claimed
threats should be part of any such debate. Until this happens, the most
appropriate attitude toward claimed threats of nuclear terrorism, especially when accompanied by advocacy of policies intruding
on individual freedom, should be one of skepticism. Interestingly, while all this attention to nuclear terrorism goes on, the
United States and other nuclear nations have no problem promoting the use of nuclear power and national nuclear programs (only for friends, of
course) that end up creating more nuclear materials that can be used for weapons. The use of civilian nuclear programs to disguise national weapon
ambitions has been a hallmark of proliferation history ever since the Atoms for Peace program (Sokolski, 2001), suggesting that the real nuclear threat
resides where it always has resided-in national nuclear programs; but placing the threat where it properly belongs does not carry the public-relations
frisson currently attached to the word “terrorism.”
Terrorists lack the motivation, even if they got weapons, there’d
be no attack
Weiss 2015 (Leonard [visiting scholar at Stanford University’s Center for International
Security and Cooperation]; On fear and nuclear terror; Mar 3; Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists 2015, Vol. 71(2) 75–87; kdf)
A recent paper (Friedman and Lewis, 2014) postulates a scenario by which terrorists
might seize nuclear materials in Pakistan for fashioning a weapon. While jihadist sympathizers are
known to have worked within the Pakistani nuclear establishment, there is little to no evidence that
terrorist groups in or outside the region are seriously trying to obtain a
nuclear capability. And Pakistan has been operating a uranium enrichment plant for its weapons program for nearly
30 years with no credible reports of diversion of HEU from the plant. There is one stark example of a terrorist organization that
actually started a nuclear effort: the Aum Shinrikyo group. At its peak, this religious cult had a membership estimated in the tens of
thousands spread over a variety of countries, including Japan; its members had scientific expertise in many areas; and the group was
well funded. Aum Shinrikyo obtained access to natural uranium supplies, but the nuclear weapon effort stalled and was abandoned.
The group was also interested in chemical weapons and did produce sarin nerve gas with which they attacked the Tokyo subway
system, killing 13 persons. AumShinrikyo is now a small organization under continuing close surveillance. What about highly
organized groups, designated appropriately as terrorist, that have acquired enough territory
to enable them to operate in a quasigovernmental fashion, like the Islamic State (IS)?
Such organizations are certainly dangerous, but how would nuclear terrorism fit in with a
program for building and sustaining a new caliphate that would restore
past glories of Islamic society, especially since, like any organized government, the Islamic State would itself be vulnerable
to nuclear attack? Building a new Islamic state out of radioactive ashes is an
unlikely ambition for such groups. However, now that it has become notorious, apocalyptic
pronouncements in Western media may begin at any time, warning of the possible acquisition and use of nuclear weapons by IS.
Even if a terror group were to achieve technical nuclear proficiency, the
time, money, and infrastructure needed to build nuclear weapons creates
significant risks of discovery that would put the group at risk of attack. Given
the ease of obtaining conventional explosives and the ability to deploy them, a terrorist group is unlikely to exchange a big part of its
operational program to engage in a risky nuclear development effort with such doubtful prospects. And, of course, 9/11
heightened sensitivity to the need for protection, lowering further the
probability of a successful effort.
has
2AC – Cyberterror
No Link: The use restrictions in PPD28 include terrorism, means
that the surveillance necessary to prevent terror is still available.
Link Turn – Cyber terror is comparatively worse than regular
terror.
Purpura ‘7 (Phillip Purpura has been a criminal justice educator for more than 20
years. He has directed criminal justice, security, and paralegal programs, and has
practical experience as a security consultant, expert witness, security manager,
corporate investigator, and police officer, Butterworth-Heinemann Boston, 07 Dec
2006, “Terrorism and homeland security : an introduction with applications”)//KY
CYBERTERRORISM Cyberterrorism refers to the exploitation and attack of cyberspace
targets by terrorists as a method to cause harm to reach terrorist goals. Because of our
widespread dependence on information technology, telecommunications, and the
Internet, cyberspace is a tempting target for terrorists. The targets for attack
are endless-disruption of electrical power grids, international financial
transactions, air traffic controls, drinking water systems, and so forth. Our
infrastructure, busi- nesses, and institutions are already battling viruses and worms
from hackers. If terrorists expand the assault, then creativity, boldness, and lethality are
likely to take on new meanings. Although there have been few cyberterrorism attacks
(Denning, 2001: 281), terrorists are notorious for locating target weaknesses to exploit
for spectacular losses. If cyberwarfare is an indication of what will occur in the
future, the threat of cyberterrorism appears more ominous. The military of
many countries has expanded operations to cyberspace and “cold cyberspace battles”
have been fought. Israeli and Palestinian hackers have attacked each other‘s Internet
infrastructures (Kabay and Walsh, 2000: 34). As a world power, US. government sites
are attacked repeatedly. In 2001, following the loss of a Chinese fighter jet in a collision
with a US. reconnaissance aircraft, pro-Chinese hackers defaced or crashed 100 US.
government and commercial Web sites. American hackers retaliated by
damaging 300 Chinese Web sites (National Infrastructure Protection Center, 2001)
Like hackers, cyberterrorists have the advantage of attacking from almost anywhere, by
them- selves, at minimal expense, without risk of harm, and with limited risk of
detection. Furthermore, cyberterrorists can cover their tracks and, with the use of
encryption programs that are almost unbreakable, make the attack appear as if it
originated from another source. These encryption programs also provide more
secure communications among terrorists (Denning, 2001)
No Impact: NSA’s bulk surveillance does nothing –
circumvention is only necessary to prevent delays, but the
government delays later on in the process
Cahall et al ’14 (Bailey Cahall is a Policy Analyst @ New America and went to the
Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University. David Sterman is
a program associate at New America and holds a master's degree from Georgetown’s
Center for Security Studies. Emily Schneider has a J.D. from Syracuse University, a M.A.
degree in English from the University of Rochester, and a B.A. degree in English from
Pennsylvania State University and she is an advisory council member for the Global
Accountability Initiative. Peter Bergen is CNN's national security analyst, a Professor of
Practice at Arizona State University and a fellow at Fordham University's Center on
National Security, New America, 1/13/14, “DO NSA'S BULK SURVEILLANCE
PROGRAMS STOP TERRORISTS?”, https://www.newamerica.org/internationalsecurity/do-nsas-bulk-surveillance-programs-stop-terrorists/)//KY
Surveillance of American phone metadata has had no discernible impact on
preventing acts of terrorism and only the most marginal of impacts on
preventing terrorist-related activity, such as fundraising for a terrorist group.
Furthermore, our examination of the role of the database of U.S. citizens’
telephone metadata in the single plot the government uses to justify the
importance of the program – that of Basaaly Moalin, a San Diego cabdriver who
in 2007 and 2008 provided $8,500 to al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Somalia
– calls into question the necessity of the Section 215 bulk collection
program. According to the government, the database of American phone
metadata allows intelligence authorities to quickly circumvent the
traditional burden of proof associated with criminal warrants, thus
allowing them to “connect the dots” faster and prevent future 9/11-scale
attacks. Yet in the Moalin case, after using the NSA’s phone database to link
a number in Somalia to Moalin, the FBI waited two months to begin an
investigation and wiretap his phone. Although it’s unclear why there was a
delay between the NSA tip and the FBI wiretapping, court documents show
there was a two-month period in which the FBI was not monitoring
Moalin’s calls, despite official statements that the bureau had Moalin’s
phone number and had identified him. , This undercuts the government’s
theory that the database of Americans’ telephone metadata is necessary to
expedite the investigative process, since it clearly didn’t expedite the
process in the single case the government uses to extol its virtues.
Additionally, a careful review of three of the key terrorism cases the
government has cited to defend NSA bulk surveillance programs reveals
that government officials have exaggerated the role of the NSA in the cases
against David Coleman Headley and Najibullah Zazi, and the significance of
the threat posed by a notional plot to bomb the New York Stock Exchange.
AT: Nuclear Terror
No risk of nuclear terror – leading expert
Weiss 2015 (Leonard [visiting scholar at Stanford University’s Center for International
Security and Cooperation]; On fear and nuclear terror; Mar 3; Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists 2015, Vol. 71(2) 75–87; kdf)
Fear of nuclear weapons is rational, but its extension to terrorism has been a vehicle for fearmongering that is unjustified by available data. The debate on nuclear
terrorism tends to distract from events that raise the risk of nuclear war,
the consequences of which would far exceed the results of terrorist attacks.
And the historical record shows that the war risk is real. The Cuban Missile Crisis and other confrontations have demonstrated that
miscalculation, misinterpretation, and misinformation could lead to a ‘close call’ regarding nuclear war. Although there has been
much commentary on the interest that Osama bin Laden, when he was alive, reportedly expressed in obtaining nuclear weapons,
evidence of any terrorist group working seriously toward the theft of
nuclear weapons or the acquisition of such weapons by other means is
virtually nonexistent. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by terrorists
requires significant time, planning, resources, and expertise, with no
guarantees that an acquired device would work. It requires putting aside at
least some aspects of a groups more immediate activities and goals for an
attempted operation that no terrorist group has accomplished. While absence of
evidence does not mean evidence of absence, it is reasonable to conclude that the fear of
nuclear terrorism has swamped realistic consideration of the threat.
AT: Lone Wolves
No lone wolf terror
Becker, 12/14/14 [The Foreign Policy Essay: Wolves Who Are Lonely By Michael
Becker Sunday, December 14, 2014 at 10:00 AM, Michael Becker is a Ph.D. student in
political science at Northeastern University. His research focuses on international
security, conflict, and terrorism. He can be reached at
becker.m@husky.neu.edu.http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/12/the-foreign-policyessay-wolves-who-are-lonely/]
the fear surrounding lone wolves is unwarranted and based on
ignorance of how they operate.
-actor terrorists tend to conform to
certain distinct patterns that can be useful in preventing attacks
lone wolves are not nearly as threatening as either their name or the
hype around them suggest.
But much of
My research shows that lone
future
. Perhaps more important, my
findings indicate that
Becker photoThe concern about lone-wolf terrorism pervades much of the U.S. national security establishment. President Obama, former Secretary of Homeland Security
Janet Napolitano, and current DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson, among others, have cited lone wolves as one of the gravest potential threats to U.S. security. They point to the rise of social media and terrorist propaganda, like the sophisticated videos produced by the
It is true that lone-wolf terrorism against
the United States has become more common in the past several years
Islamic State, and express concern that socially isolated individuals can become radicalized with troubling ease.
. And several lone-actor
attacks—including the 2011 shooting of Representative Gabrielle Giffords, which left six dead, and the 2009 Fort Hood shooting, which killed 13—have had deadly and tragic consequences. Concurrently, there has been little success in terms of identifying a lone wolf
“profile.” They can be young or old; black or white; radical Islamists, right-wing extremists, anti-Semites, militant environmentalists, or of another ideological persuasion altogether. Given the diversity of their backgrounds, how can such a protean enemy be
I recently undertook an analysis of 84 lone-wolf attacks that occurred in
the United States between 1940 and 2012 in an effort to identify patterns
First, similar to our recent experience
with the Ebola outbreak, the fear of the thing is usually worse than the thing
itself. Few lone-wolf attacks in the United States actually kill anyone, and
many others only succeed in killing one person the lone wolf himself
Many lone wolves are incompetent loners with no experience
discharging a bomb or firearm; oftentimes they exhibit behavior that, in
retrospect, is more bizarre and sad than frightening Take Dwight Watson,
a.k.a. the “Tractor Man.” In 2003, Watson drove his tractor to Washington,
D.C., and threatened to blow up explosives
After two days, he
surrendered unceremoniously and it was revealed that he never had any
weapons Part of the reason for the low casualty rate in lone-wolf attacks is
that unlike groups such al-Qaeda that have significant resources at their
disposal and, even more important, a sophisticated division of labor lone
wolves have to do all the work of terrorism themselves finding a target,
planning an attack, gathering supplies, doing reconnaissance, actually
carrying out the attack, and possibly executing an escape plan This
disadvantage is reflected in the weapons most lone wolves choose:
firearms. Globally
most terrorist attacks are bombings
a lone
gunman
likely to produce fewer fatalities
Another significant characteristic of lone wolves is their limited ability to
select meaningful targets The expertise needed to conduct a successful
attack on a hardened target—not an easy task—is reflected in the targets
most lone wolves choose and how they conduct themselves Lone wolves
countered?
in the
targets that lone wolves chose. I came away with several findings that have important national security implications.
:
(they are almost
invariably men).
.
near the National Mall.
at all.
,
—
.
, at the organizational level,
, but lone wolves mainly choose guns. In part,
this is because guns can more easily be attained than bombs in the United States, but lone wolves’ preference for firearms obtains globally as well, suggesting it is driven by their lack of facility with explosives. And
—while still potentially able to cause multiple casualties—is
than a well-made and well-placed bomb.
.
.
tend to choose unhardened, undefended targets
suspect that this tendency is due to two factors: the more
personal motives that—alongside their political ideologies—inform lone
wolves’ violent tendencies; and the desire to carry out a successful attack
The targets lone wolves choose tend to be congruent with the
ideologies that they say motivate them: so anti-abortion lone wolves
like college campuses, churches, and local government buildings. Only rarely do they opt for
significant or symbolic targets like the National Mall. I
, a task
made easier by choosing a softer target.
go after clinics or doctors
who perform abortions, while right-wing extremists target government buildings and officials. What is even more striking is that these small-ball targets tend to be found in or near places well known to perpetrators—the square in their hometown, the synagogue they
What should all these patterns mean to
counterterrorism officials? They indicate most notably that lone wolves are
not as fearsome as they are often made out to be. Lone wolves are only
rarely deadly. What is more, when they do manage to kill people, their
incompetence and reliance on firearms usually limit the number of deaths
concern about lone wolves is probably overblown,
Even if the threat were more severe, there
are too many potential targets and too many potential lone wolves to expect
law enforcement to monitor, detect, and interdict them all.
pass on their way to work, etc. Their daily routines, in other words, are usually the scene of the crime.
. As a
result, policymakers’
take account of this. In some sense, this requires us to learn to live with the existence of lone-wolf terrorism.
and the allocation of resources for counterterrorism purposes should
AT: ISIS
ISIS is structurally incapable of being a threat
Matthews and Preble 2015 (Dylan and Christopher [Cato's vice president for
defense and foreign policy studies]; Ignore the headlines. The world is getting safer all
the time.; Jan 15; www.vox.com/2015/1/14/7546165/world-getting-safer; kdf)
DM: Did ISIS change your thinking on this at all? ISIS fighter An ISIS fighter in Syria.
(AFP/Getty Images) CP: Not really, for a couple reasons. ISIS may be a terrorist
organization, and may be an insurgency, and may be a quasi-nation-state or
attempting to become a quasi-nation-state, but it's hard to be all of those things
simultaneously. Austin Long writes about this in his chapter, about the differences
between insurgents and terrorists. Most terrorists operate in the shadows. The hard part
is not killing them, it's finding them. That's why traditional counterterrorism is an
intelligence and information-gathering process. It's a lot like police work. By declaring
itself a state and raising a flag over territory it seizes and holds, ISIS is
trading away one of its key advantages, and opening itself up to more
traditional military attacks. It's a virulent, reprehensible state, but it's not clear
to me that it's a greater terrorist threat than other organizations that are
continuing to operate in the shadows.
Extra Cards
The perception of NSA overreach destroys law enforcement
cooperation – it’s a larger internal link to terrorism
Schulhofer, 13 – professor of law at NYU (Stephen, ““Making Sense of the NSA
Metadata Collection Program (Part II)”, 11/8, http://justsecurity.org/2985/makingsense-nsa-metadata-collection-program-part-ii/)
Efforts like the NSA sweeps actually undermine the counterterrorism effort
itself. The reason is that these types of programs generate profound mistrust
of government in general and of law enforcement in particular. We have already
seen dramatic examples in the way that the Snowden revelations of our spying on allies
has angered European leaders and endangered our working relationships with them.
Although this breach eventually will be healed, alienation and mistrust among ordinary
citizens is equally important, and it will not be so easily remedied. That mistrust, in
turn, has a strong chilling effect on the willingness of law-abiding, loyal
citizens to cooperate in the counterterrorism effort – for example by working
with officials in local counterterrorism programs or by alerting law enforcement to
various kinds of suspicious behavior. This dynamic has been demonstrated in
several decades of extensive law enforcement research, including research
focused specifically on counterterrorism policies and their impact on
Muslim communities in the West. In one study, for example, Muslim-Americans in
New York City were 61% less likely to report potentially suspicious precursors of
terrorism when they felt that counterterrorism policies were being unfairly set and
implemented. (See Schulhofer, Tyler & Huq, American Policing at a Crossroads:
Unsustainable Policies and the Procedural Justice Alternative, 101 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 335, 364-74 (2011).)
This last point underscores the most important, but least appreciated, “given” of the
counterterrorism enterprise. Because the consequences of a terrorist attack could be so
catastrophic, citizens and public officials alike tend to support strong law enforcement
more readily than they do in ordinary times. The perception is that strong measures are
acceptable because the top priority must be to reduce the risk of attack. And strong
measures, whatever their drawbacks, at least seem to offer ways to reduce that risk. The
central lesson of smart law enforcement, however, is that there are no risk-free choices.
Strengthening the powers of the executive enhances some of our defenses
against terrorism, but it weakens others – many of which, including
community trust and cooperation, are absolutely essential to reducing the
dangers of terrorism.
Against this background, we must – for the sake of our democracy and even for the
sake of our physical security – find ways to dissipate the cloud of mistrust that
now hangs over NSA surveillance.
Mass surveillance causes information overload
Eddington, 15 - Patrick Eddington is a policy analyst in homeland security and civil
liberties at the Cato Institute. He was formerly a senior policy advisor to Rep. Rush Holt
(D-N.J.) and a military imagery analyst at the CIA’s National Photographic
Interpretation Center (“No, Mass Surveillance Won't Stop Terrorist Attacks” Reason,
1/27, http://reason.com/archives/2015/01/27/mass-surveillance-andterrorism#.ltrezi:U8Io
No, mass surveillance does not prevent terrorist attacks.
It’s worth remembering that the mass surveillance programs initiated by the U.S.
government after the 9/11 attacks—the legal ones and the constitutionally-dubious
ones—were premised on the belief that bin Laden’s hijacker-terrorists were
able to pull off the attacks because of a failure to collect enough data. Yet in
their subsequent reports on the attacks, the Congressional Joint Inquiry
(2002) and the 9/11 Commission found exactly the opposite. The data to
detect (and thus foil) the plots was in the U.S. government’s hands prior to the
attacks; the failures were ones of sharing, analysis, and dissemination. That
malady perfectly describes every intelligence failure from Pearl Harbor to
the present day.
The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (created by Congress in 2004) was
supposed to be the answer to the "failure-to-connect-the-dots" problem. Ten years on,
the problem remains, the IC bureaucracy is bigger than ever, and our
government is continuing to rely on mass surveillance programs that have
failed time and again to stop terrorists while simultaneously undermining the
civil liberties and personal privacy of every American. The quest to "collect it all," to
borrow a phrase from NSA Director Keith Alexander, only leads to the
accumulation of masses of useless information, making it harder to find
real threats and costing billions to store.
A recent Guardian editorial noted that such mass-surveillance myopia is spreading
among European political leaders as well, despite the fact that "terrorists, from 9/11 to
the Woolwich jihadists and the neo-Nazi Anders Breivik, have almost always come
to the authorities’ attention before murdering."
Mass surveillance is not only destructive of our liberties, its continued use is a
virtual guarantee of more lethal intelligence failures. And our continued will to
disbelieve those facts is a mental dodge we engage in at our peril.
Mass surveillance makes it less likely to detect terrorism –
overload,
Tufekci, 15 - Zeynep Tufekci is an assistant professor at the University of North
Carolina (“Terror and the limits of mass surveillance” Financial Times, 2/3,
http://blogs.ft.com/the-exchange/2015/02/03/zeynep-tufekci-terror-and-the-limits-ofmass-surveillance/
But the assertion that big data is “what it’s all about” when it comes to
predicting rare events is not supported by what we know about how these
methods work, and more importantly, don’t work. Analytics on massive datasets
can be powerful in analysing and identifying broad patterns, or events that occur
regularly and frequently, but are singularly unsuited to finding unpredictable,
erratic, and rare needles in huge haystacks. In fact, the bigger the haystack —
the more massive the scale and the wider the scope of the surveillance — the
less suited these methods are to finding such exceptional events, and the
more they may serve to direct resources and attention away from
appropriate tools and methods.
After Rigby was killed, GCHQ, Britain’s intelligence service, was criticised by many for
failing to stop his killers, Michael Adebolajo and Michael Adebowale. A lengthy
parliamentary inquiry was conducted, resulting in a 192-page report that lists all the
ways in which Adebolajo and Adebowale had brushes with data surveillance, but were
not flagged as two men who were about to kill a soldier on a London street. GCHQ
defended itself by saying that some of the crucial online exchanges had taken place on a
platform, believed to be Facebook, which had not alerted the agency about these men, or
the nature of their postings. The men apparently had numerous exchanges that were
extremist in nature, and their accounts were suspended repeatedly by the platform for
violating its terms of service.
“If only Facebook had turned over more data,” the thinking goes.
But that is misleading, and makes sense only with the benefit of hindsight. Seeking
larger volumes of data, such as asking Facebook to alert intelligence agencies every
time that it detects a post containing violence, would deluge the agencies with
multiple false leads that would lead to a data quagmire, rather than clues to
impending crimes.
For big data analytics to work, there needs to be a reliable connection
between the signal (posting of violent content) and the event (killing someone).
Otherwise, the signal is worse than useless. Millions of Facebook’s billionplus users post violent content every day, ranging from routinised movie violence
to atrocious violent rhetoric. Turning over the data from all such occurrences
would merely flood the agencies with “false positives” — erroneous indications
for events that actually will not happen. Such data overload is not without cost, as
it takes time and effort to sift through these millions of strands of hay to
confirm that they are, indeed, not needles — especially when we don’t even know
what needles look like. All that the investigators would have would be a lot of open leads
with no resolution, taking away resources from any real investigation. Besides, account
suspensions carried out by platforms like Facebook’s are haphazard, semi-automated
and unreliable indicators. The flagging system misses a lot more violent content
than it flags, and it often flags content as inappropriate even when it is not,
and suffers from many biases. Relying on such a haphazard system is not a
reasonable path at all.
So is all the hype around big data analytics unjustified? Yes and no. There are
appropriate use cases for which massive datasets are intensely useful, and perform
much better than any alternative we can imagine using conventional methods.
Successful examples include using Google searches to figure out drug interactions that
would be too complex and too numerous to analyse one clinical trial at a time, or using
social media to detect national-level swings in our mood (we are indeed happier on
Fridays than on Mondays).
In contrast, consider the “lone wolf” attacker who took hostages at, of all things, a “Lindt
Chocolat Café” in Sydney. Chocolate shops are not regular targets of political violence,
and random, crazed men attacking them is not a pattern on which we can base further
identification. Yes, the Sydney attacker claimed jihadi ideology and brought a black flag
with Islamic writing on it, but given the rarity of such events, it’s not always possible to
separate the jihadi rhetoric from issues of mental health — every era’s mentally ill are
affected by the cultural patterns around them. This isn’t a job for big data analytics. (The
fact that the gunman was on bail facing various charges and was known for sending hate
letters to the families of Australian soldiers killed overseas suggests it was a job for
traditional policing).
When confronted with their failures in predicting those rare acts of domestic terrorism,
here’s what GCHQ, and indeed the NSA, should have said instead of asking for
increased surveillance capabilities: stop asking us to collect more and more data to
perform an impossible task. This glut of data is making our job harder, not
easier, and the expectation that there will never be such incidents, ever, is not realistic.
Attention should instead be focused on the causal chain that led the Kouachi brothers
on their path. It seems that the French-born duo had an alienated, turbulent youth, and
then spent years in French prisons, where they were transformed from confused and
incompetent wannabe jihadis to hardliners who were both committed and a lot more
capable of carrying out complex violence acts than when they entered the prison.
Understanding such paths will almost certainly be more productive for preventing such
events, and will also spare all of us from another real danger: governments that know
too much about their citizens, and a misguided belief in what big data can do to find
needles in too-large haystacks.
Significant surveillance reform now disproves the link
Edgar, 4/13/15 - visiting fellow at the Institute and adjunct professor of law at the
Georgetown University Law Center (Timothy, “The Good News About Spying”
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2015-04-13/good-news-aboutspying
Despite high hopes for a fresh start on civil liberties, during his first term in office,
Obama ratified and even expanded the surveillance programs that began under former
President George W. Bush. After NSA contractor Edward Snowden began revealing
the agency’s spying programs to The Guardian in 2013, however, Obama responded
with a clear change of direction. Without great fanfare, his administration has made
changes that open up the practices of the United States intelligence
community and protect privacy in the United States and beyond. The last year
and a half has been the most significant period of reform for national
security surveillance since Senator Frank Church led the charge against domestic
spying in the late 1970s.
In 2013, at Obama’s direction, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)
established a website for the intelligence community, IC on the Record, where
previously secret documents are posted for all to see. These are not decades-old files
about Cold War spying, but recent slides used at recent NSA training sessions, accounts
of illegal wiretapping after the 9/11 attacks, and what had been highly classified
opinions issued by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court about ongoing
surveillance programs.
Although many assume that all public knowledge of NSA spying programs came from
Snowden’s leaks, many of the revelations in fact came from IC on the Record, including
mistakes that led to the unconstitutional collection of U.S. citizens’ emails. Documents
released though this portal total more than 4,500 pages—surpassing even the 3,710
pages collected and leaked by Snowden. The Obama administration has instituted other
mechanisms, such as an annual surveillance transparency report, that will continue to
provide fodder for journalists, privacy activists, and researchers.
The transparency reforms may seem trivial to some. From the perspective of
an intelligence community steeped in the need to protect sources and methods,
however, they are deeply unsettling. At a Brown University forum, ODNI Civil
Liberties Protection Officer Alexander Joel said, “The intelligence community is not
designed and built for transparency. Our culture is around finding our adversaries’
secrets and keeping our own secrets secret.” Accordingly, until only a few years ago, the
intelligence community resisted making even the most basic information public. The
number of FISA court opinions released to the public between 1978 and 2013 can be
counted on one hand.
Beyond more transparency, Obama has also changed the rules for
surveillance of foreigners. Until last year, privacy rules applied only to “U.S.
persons.” But in January 2014, Obama issued Presidential Policy Directive
28 (PPD-28), ordering intelligence agencies to write detailed rules assuring
that privacy protections would apply regardless of nationality. These rules,
which came out in January 2015, mark the first set of guidelines for
intelligence agencies ordered by a U.S. president—or any world leader—that
explicitly protect foreign citizens’ personal information in the course of
intelligence operations. Under the directive, the NSA can keep personal information in
its databases for no more than five years. It must delete personal information from the
intelligence reports it provides its customers unless that person’s identity is necessary to
understand foreign intelligence—a basic rule once reserved only for Americans.
The new rules also include restrictions on bulk collection of signals
intelligence worldwide—the practice critics call “mass surveillance.” The
NSA’s bulk collection programs may no longer be used for uncovering all types of
diplomatic secrets, but will now be limited to six specific categories of serious national
security threats. Finally, agencies are no longer allowed simply to “collect it all.” Under
PPD-28, the NSA and other agencies may collect signals intelligence only after weighing
the benefits against the risks to privacy or civil liberties, and they must now consider the
privacy of everyone, not just U.S. citizens. This is the first time any U.S. government
official will be able to cite a written presidential directive to object to an intelligence
program on the basis that the intelligence it produces is not worth the costs to privacy of
innocent foreign citizens.
No data proves surveillance reduces terrorism risks
Kehl, 14 – Policy Analyst at New America’s Open Technology Institute (Danielle,
“Surveillance Costs: The NSA’s Impact on the Economy, Internet Freedom &
Cybersecurity” July, https://www.newamerica.org/oti/surveillance-costs-the-nsasimpact-on-the-economy-internet-freedom-cybersecurity/
So far, the purported benefits of the programs remain unsubstantiated. While
intelligence officials and representatives of the Obama Administration have
defended the merits of the NSA programs,18 they have offered little hard evidence
to prove their value. To the contrary, initial analyses of the NSA’s bulk records
collection program suggest that its benefits are dubious at best, particularly compared to
the program’s vast breadth. A January 2014 study from the New America
Foundation’s International Security Program, for example, concluded that “the
government’s claims about the role that NSA ‘bulk’ surveillance of phone
and email communications records has had in keeping the United States safe from
terrorism… are overblown and even misleading.”19 Similarly, in its review of the
telephone records collection program under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, the
Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) could not identify a single
instance in which the telephone records program made a concrete
difference in the outcome of a counterterrorism investigation.20 The
President’s Review Group concurred, emphasizing that “there is always a
possibility that acquisition of more information—whether in the US or abroad—might
ultimately prove helpful. But that abstract possibility does not, by itself, provide
a sufficient justification for acquiring more information.”21 Although the
PCLOB did find in a separate report that “the information the [Section 702] program
collects has been valuable and effective in protecting the nation’s security and producing
useful foreign intelligence,”22 it provided no details and did not weigh those purported
benefits against the various costs of the surveillance. Furthermore, its conclusions were
undermined just days later when The Washington Post revealed that nine out of
ten of the Internet users swept up in the NSA’s Section 702 surveillance are
not legally targeted foreigners.23
Current counter-terrorism fails – lack of human intelligence
outweighs
Eddington, 15 - Patrick G. Eggerton worked as a military imagery analyst at the CIA.
He is policy analyst in homeland security and civil liberties at Cato Institute. (Patrick,
“US wants to hack your phone because it doesn’t have real spies it needs” Reuters,
http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2015/02/23/the-fbi-was-for-encryption-beforeit-was-against-it/
The best way to disrupt any organized criminal element is to get inside of it
physically. But the U.S. government’s counterterrorism policies have made
that next to impossible.
The FBI, for example, targets the very Arab-American and Muslim-American
communities it needs to work with if it hopes to find and neutralize homegrown violent extremists, including promulgating new rules on profiling that allow
for the potential mapping of Arab- or Muslim-American communities. The Justice
Department’s refusal to investigate the New York Police Department’s mass surveillance
and questionable informant-recruitment tactics among immigrants in the Arab- and
Muslim-American communities has only made matters worse.
Overseas, the Cold War style of spying — relying on U.S. embassies as bases from which
CIA and other U.S. government intelligence personnel operate — is increasingly difficult
in the areas of the Middle East and southwest Asia undergoing often violent political
change.
Steinbach testified about this before the House Homeland Security Committee earlier
this month. “The concern is in Syria,” he explained, “the lack of our footprint on the
ground in Syria — that the databases won’t have the information we need.”
Notice his reference to technology “databases” rather than the importance of the human
element. The U.S. intelligence community’s emphasis should be on the spy on
the ground who actually gathers critical information and makes any
penetration of a terrorist organization possible.
This problem is true for Yemen as well, as a recent Washington Post story highlighted:
The spy agency has pulled dozens of operatives, analysts and other staffers from Yemen
as part of a broader extraction of roughly 200 Americans who had been based at the
embassy in Sana, officials said. Among those removed were senior officers who worked
closely with Yemen’s intelligence and security services to target al-Qaeda operatives and
disrupt terrorism plots often aimed at the United States.
The CIA’s failure to field agents under nonofficial cover, or to recruit
enough reliable local informants on the ground who could communicate securely
with CIA handlers outside Yemen, is symptomatic of the agency’s failure to
break with its reliance on embassy-based operations throughout that part of
the world. Compromising encryption technology will do nothing to solve the
intelligence community’s human-intelligence deficit. This is a problem the
agency must address if it is ever going to be successful in finding and neutralizing
terrorist cells overseas.
It boils down to the fact that the FBI and the U.S. intelligence community have
failed to adapt their intelligence-collection practices and operations to meet the
challenges of the “new world disorder” in which we live. As former CIA officer Philip
Giraldi has noted:
[I]ntelligence agencies that were created to oppose and penetrate other nation-state
adversaries are not necessarily well equipped to go after terrorists, particularly when
those groups are ethnically cohesive or recruited through family and tribal vetting, and
able to operate in a low-tech fashion to negate the advantages that advanced
technologies provide.
The CIA has repeatedly attempted — occasionally at high cost — to penetrate militant
organizations like al Qaeda and Islamic State. Nonetheless, Washington’s overall
counterterrorism bias in funding and manpower has been toward using the
most sophisticated technology available as the key means of battling a
relatively low-tech enemy.
The FBI’s new anti-encryption campaign is just the latest phase in the government’s
attempt to deny Islamic State and related groups the ability to shield their
communications. If these militant groups were traditional nation-states with their own
dedicated communications channels, we’d all be cheering on the FBI’s efforts. But the
Internet has become the primary means for global, real-time communications for
individuals, nonprofits, businesses and governments. So it should not be treated as just
another intelligence target, which is certainly the FBI’s and Natural Security Agency’s
current mindset.
Using the legislative process to force companies to make defective electronic devices
with exploitable communications channels in the hope that they will catch a tiny
number of potential or actual terrorists is a self-defeating strategy. If implemented, the
FBI’s proposal would only make all Americans more vulnerable to
malicious actors online and do nothing to stop the next terrorist attack.
The government greatly exaggerates PRISM’s ability to stop
terrorism
Sanchez, 13 – senior fellow on technology, privacy and national security and
intelligence surveillance at Cato (Julian, “Epstein on NSA (Again) Part I: PRISM & the
FISA Amendments Act” 6/28, http://www.cato.org/blog/epstein-nsa-again-part-iprism-fisa-amendments-act
Finally, Epstein and Loyola rather uncritically repeat the claim that the
PRISM program surveillance pursuant to FAA authorities “is responsible for
foiling about 40 of the 50 terrorist plots which the administration recently
disclosed to Congress in classified briefings.” If we scrutinize the government’s claims a
bit more closely, we see that in fact NSA Director Keith Alexander claimed that PRISM
intercepts had “contributed” to the disruption of 40 of 50 terrorist “events,” mostly
overseas, and judged this contribution to have been “critical” in 50 percent of these
cases.
When we examine some of the specific “events” government officials have
discussed, however, it becomes clear that not all of these are “plots” at all—
many seem to have involved funding or other forms of “material support” for radical
groups, though in at least one such case the government appears to have claimed a
“plot” to bomb the New York Stock Exchange where none really existed. (FBI Deputy
Sean Joyce further told Congress that the “plot” must have been serious given that a jury
convicted the plotters. But federal prosecutors themselves emphasized that the men
“had not been involved in an active plot” and there was no jury trial: they were charged
with “material support” and pled guilty.)
Presumably at least some of these “events” did involve actual planned attacks, but
knowing that PRISM surveillance was “critical” to disrupting half of them
doesn’t in itself tell us much. The question is whether the same surveillance
could have been conducted in these cases using authorities that existed
before the FISA Amendments Act, or under narrower amendments to FISA. Since
the bulk of these “events” appear to have been overseas, the traditional
authority to intercept purely foreign communications without a warrant
would seem to have sufficed, or at most required a legal tweak to
accommodate stored data on U.S. servers used by foreigners to
communicate with other foreigners. There is no evidence to suggest that the
actually controversial part of the FAA—the revocation of the warrant
requirement for interception of U.S.-to-foreign wire communications—
made a necessary contribution in these cases. Indeed, as national security expert
Peter Bergen has documented, the public record in the overwhelming majority
of terror plots we know about shows that they were “uncovered by
traditional law enforcement methods, such as the use of informants, reliance on
community tips about suspicious activity and other standard policing practices.”
There is certainly such a thing as too much skepticism about government. But when
officials make vague allusions to vital, secret successes in an effort to justify their own
broad powers, there is also such a thing as too much credulity.
So much for PRISM and the FISA Amendments Act. I’ll discuss what Epstein and Loyola
say about the NSA’s metadata dragnet in a separate post.
Politics DA
Obama won’t push
Obama loves PRISM, would never use pc against it
Finn and Nakashima 13 ---Ellen Nakashima is a national security reporter for The Washington Post, Peter Finn
is
national security editor of The Washington Post (“Obama defends sweeping surveillance efforts,” 6/7/13,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/obama-defends-sweeping-surveillance-efforts/2013/06/07/2002290a-cf88-11e2-9f1a1a7cdee20287_story.html)//LE
President Obama on Friday defended the government’s collection of data on the phone
records of millions of Americans, saying that it was a modest encroachment on privacy
and one he thinks is both lawful and justified in order to identify terrorists plotting to
attack the United States.
Obama emphasized that the government does not collect information on individual callers or eavesdrop on Americans’
conversations without a warrant. He said he would welcome a debate on the classified surveillance effort as well as the previously
secret workings of a second program that gathers the e-mails and other digital content of targeted foreigners outside the United
States from major American Internet companies.
The programs “make a difference in our capacity to anticipate and prevent possible
terrorist activity,” Obama said.
Revelations about the programs in The Washington Post and the Guardian newspaper have opened up a debate that previously had
been limited to the cryptic warnings of some members of Congress who were briefed on but troubled by the surveillance efforts.
Some lawmakers who do not serve on the intelligence committees said they had no knowledge of the programs.
“Did I know about it? No, I didn’t,” said Rep. Gerald E. Connolly (D-Va.), who said he was unconvinced by the president’s assurances
that surveillance efforts are constrained by congressional oversight and the federal courts. “That’s the lawyer in him speaking. . . .
The way bureaucracies work, we stumble into invasions of privacy. We want information it’s unwise to seek or to possess.”
The National Security Agency acknowledges that Americans’ communications can be inadvertently collected, but U.S. intelligence
agencies have declined to provide Congress with an estimate on how often that has happened, despite repeated requests for that
information.
In his remarks, Obama said it was “healthy for our democracy” to have an open discussion about the balance between privacy and
security concerns but also said he rued the leaks of classified information that prompted the current debate.
“If every step that we’re taking to try to prevent a terrorist act is on the front page of the
newspapers or on television, then presumably the people who are trying to do us harm
are going to be able to get around our preventive measures,” Obama said during an
event in Northern California. “That’s why these things are classified. But that’s also why
we’ve set up congressional oversight. These are the folks you all vote for as your
representatives in Congress, and they’re being fully briefed on these programs.”
The Obama administration has aggressively pursued leak investigations. In one case, it swept up the phone records of Associated
Press journalists; in another, it identified a Fox News journalist as a “co-conspirator” for soliciting classified information.
The career intelligence officer who disclosed details of the online data-mining program to The Post said he acted out of a sense that
the NSA has exceeded the privacy expectations of Americans. The source thinks he is likely to be exposed and is prepared for that
possibility. One Justice official, speaking on the condition of anonymity, said that the department is at “the start of the process” of
determining if an investigation of the leaks is appropriate.
The Guardian also reported Friday that GCHQ, Britain’s equivalent of the NSA, has been secretly gathering intelligence from the
same Internet companies through an operation set up by the NSA.
According to documents obtained by the Guardian, the program would appear to allow GCHQ to circumvent the formal legal process
required in Britain to seek personal material such as -e-mails, photos and videos from an Internet company based outside of the
country.
Several companies contacted by The Post said they did not allow direct government access to their servers and said that they
responded only to court-sanctioned requests for information. Government officials also stressed that any information obtained is
targeted and backed by law and the courts. The program was authorized in 2008 when Congress passed the FISA Amendments Act.
On Friday, Obama emphasized that both of the newly disclosed surveillance programs
“have been authorized by broad, bipartisan majorities repeatedly since 2006. . . . It’s
important to understand that your duly elected representatives have been consistently
informed on exactly what we’re doing.”
Obama defends PRISM
BBC News 13--- operational business division of the British Broadcasting Corporation responsible for the gathering and
broadcasting of news and current affairs (“Barack Obama defends U.S. surveillance tactics,” 6/8/13,
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-22820711)//LE
President Barack Obama has defended newly revealed US government phone and
internet surveillance programmes, saying they are closely overseen by Congress and the
courts.
Mr Obama said his administration had struck "the right balance" between security and
privacy.
He also stressed US internet communications of US citizens and residents were not
targeted.
And he tried to reassure the US "nobody is listening to your phone calls".
Mr Obama was commenting on revelations this week in the Guardian and Washington Post newspapers that the US National
Security Agency (NSA) was collecting or tapping into vast amounts of telephone and internet communications data.
On Wednesday night, the UK's Guardian newspaper reported a secret court had ordered phone company Verizon to hand over to the
NSA millions of records on telephone call "metadata".
That report was followed by revelations in both the Washington Post and Guardian that the NSA tapped directly into the servers of
nine internet firms including Facebook, Google, Microsoft and Yahoo to track online communication in a programme known as
Prism.
Mark Zuckerberg, founder of Facebook, said the press reports were "outrageous" and denied Facebook's participation in the
programme.
His statement echoed those of other internet companies, who said they had not given the government direct access to their servers.
Mr Zuckerberg said: "We have never received a blanket request or court order from any government agency asking for information
or metadata in bulk, like the one Verizon reportedly received.
"And if we did, we would fight it aggressively. We hadn't even heard of Prism before yesterday."
And on Friday, the Guardian reported that the UK's electronic surveillance agency, GCHQ, had been able to see user
communications data from the American internet companies, because it had access to Prism.
The Guardian reported that GCHQ had access to the system since June 2010 and information from Prism had contributed to 197
British intelligence reports last year.
In California on Friday, Mr Obama noted both NSA programmes had been authorised
repeatedly by Congress and were subject to continual oversight by congressional
intelligence committees and by secret intelligence courts.
The president said he had come into office with a "healthy skepticism" of both
programmes, but after evaluating them and establishing further safeguards, he decided
"it was worth it".
"You can't have 100% security, and also then have 100% privacy and zero inconvenience," Mr Obama said.
Acknowledging "some trade-offs involved", he said, "We're going to have to make some choices."
Senior US Senator Dianne Feinstein confirmed on Thursday that the Verizon phone records order published by the Guardian was a
three-month extension of an ongoing request to Verizon. Intelligence analysts say there are likely similar orders for other major
communications firms.
The data requested includes telephone numbers, calling card numbers, the serial numbers of phones used and the time and duration
of calls. It does not include the content of a call or the callers' addresses or financial information.
'Assault on Constitution'
Prism was reportedly developed in 2007 out of a programme of domestic surveillance without warrants that was set up by President
George W Bush after the 9/11 attacks.
Lobbyists
Tech and telecom companies spend millions influencing
Congress
Rosenberg 14 --- executive editor of The Fiscal Times, where he oversees coverage of business, the economy, technology
and Wall Street (“Google Spends More Than Any Other Tech Giant to Influence Congress,” Yuval,
http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/2014/10/23/Google-Spends-More-Any-Other-Tech-Giant-InfluenceCongress#sthash.reCAdJBf.dpuf)//LE
Silicon Valley keeps playing the D.C. game. Tech and telecom giants including Google
and Facebook spent millions on political lobbying in the three-month period from July
to September, according to data released Tuesday.
Google spent nearly $4 million on its efforts to win favor with lawmakers, up 17 percent
over the same period last year (but down from roughly $5.3 million last quarter).
Among major tech-related companies only Comcast spent more last quarter. The cable
giant, of course, is trying to win approval for its $45 billion mega merger with Time
Warner Cable.
Over the first nine months of 2014, though, Google has spent $13 million on lobbying,
more than any other tech company. Comcast, by comparison, has spent about $11.8
million, AT&T has doled out roughly $11 million, and Facebook has spent $7.35 million.
Google’s ramped up spending over the last quarter relative to the same period in 2013
makes it a bit of an outlier in the tech sector. Nine of the 15 tech companies monitored
by Consumer Watchdog, an advocacy group, dialed back their lobbying spending last
quarter compared to the third quarter of 2013. Facebook was among the six that
increased their lobbying efforts, upping third-quarter spending 70 percent, from $1.44
million last year to $2.45 million this year. Amazon’s lobbying bill, at $1.18 million,
reached seven figures in a quarter for just the second time, as the retailer upped thirdquarter lobbying by 51 percent over 2013.
What are the tech giants buying with that money? “Businesses don’t spend big bucks
unless they think that they’re going to get something for it,” says John M. Simpson of
Consumer Watchdog “Sometimes it’s as much about what isn’t being passed as what is
being passed.”
Google’s most recent filing indicates it has lobbied politicians on a host of issues, from
cybersecurity and privacy issues to intellectual property enforcement and patent law. It
has also lobbied lawmakers on trade agreements like the Trans-Pacific Partnership,
international tax reform, immigration policies, wind power, health IT and data policies,
and “unmanned aerial vehicle technology,” or drones.
Lobbyists love the plan---Freedom Act proves
Gibbs 14 ---
a technology reporter covering consumer electronics, security, privacy and all things tech (Samuel, “Facebook,
Google and Apple lobby for curb to NSA surveillance,” 11/17/14, http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/nov/17/facebookgoogle-apple-lobby-senate-nsa-surveillance)//LE
A coalition of technology and internet companies is lobbying to curb US National
Security Agency surveillance powers and for more transparency on government data
requests.
The Reform Government Surveillance coalition, including Facebook, Google, Twitter,
Microsoft and Apple, added its support for the race to pass a bill through the US Senate
before the end of the year, which would inhibit mass data collection from emails and
internet metadata.
“The Senate has an opportunity this week to vote on the bipartisan USA Freedom Act,” said the coalition in an open letter sent to the
Senate. “We urge you to pass the bill, which both protects national security and reaffirms America’s commitment to the freedoms we
all cherish.”
The bill would also allow technology companies to disclose the number and types of data demands from government as part of the
continued transparency push from the industry.
If the USA Freedom Act fails to pass through the Senate before the end of the year the process will have to restart in January, and
will be scrutinised by a new Congress controlled a Republican party more favourable to government surveillance.
The USA Freedom Act was passed through the House of Representatives in May with bipartisan support and is now set for a vote in
the Senate after Nevada Democrat and Senate majority leader Harry Reid filed a procedural motion to have the bill heard.
Privacy advocates and technology groups championed the bill originally but many revoked their support after compromises
expanded the definition of what data the government can collect.
The Senate vote on 18 November will allow debate on amendments to begin on the bill, although whether enough senators will vote
in favour is unknown.
Gary Shapiro, chief executive of the Consumer Electronics Association, which represents hundreds of technology companies globally
and hosts the largest electronics trade show in the world International CES, wrote an open letter urging support for the bill.
“American technology companies have been hurt by reaction to the revelation of the US
government’s bulk data collection,” wrote Shapiro. “Many companies have lost business,
or face laws designed to restrict data flows, due to foreign governments’ fear that the US
government can reach company-managed data at will.”
“Several companies, including members of CEA, have already lost contracts with foreign
governments worth millions of dollars. Further, several governments may now limit the
free flow of data across borders, damaging the utility and functionality of the internet,”
he wrote.
Technology companies, including Apple and Google, retaliated to the NSA revelations by
implementing end-to-end encryption and enhancing security on mobile devices,
protecting personal data as standard.
Pushback from technology companies, including Microsoft and Facebook, saw a limited
transparency deal struck with the US Justice Department in February, which the new
bill will enhance allowing companies greater freedom to disclose security requests for
user data.
The Reform Government Surveillance coalition also recommitted to reforms beyond the
USA Freedom Act, describing it only as a step in the right direction.
“We will continue to work with Congress, the Administration, civil liberties groups and
governments around the world to advance essential reforms that we set forth in a set of
principles last year,” wrote the coalition. “Such reforms include: preventing government
access to data without proper legal process; assuring that providers are not required to
locate infrastructure within a country’s border; promoting the free flow of data across
borders; and avoiding conflicts among nations through robust, principled, and
transparent frameworks that govern lawful requests for data across jurisdictions.”
Supreme court
Supreme court solves and avoids link to ptx---Metadata proves
De Vogue 5/7/15 ---CNN Supreme Court Reporter (“Court rules NSA program illegal,” Ariane,
http://www.cnn.com/2015/05/07/politics/nsa-telephone-metadata-illegal-court/)//LE
Washington (CNN)A federal appeals court ruled on Thursday that the telephone
metadata collection program, under which the National Security Agency gathers up
millions of phone records on an ongoing daily basis, is illegal under the Patriot Act.
The government has argued it has the power to carry forward with the program under a
section of the Patriot Act, which expires in June. Lawmakers are locked in a debate on
whether or how to renew the authority, which was first passed shortly after the Sept. 11,
2001 terror attacks on New York and Washington, but has been renewed by both
Presidents Bush and Obama in the intervening years.
Documents confirming the program's existence were first revealed in June of 2013 with
the leaks by former government contractor Edward Snowden.
Cross apply evidence saying PRISM violates 4th amendment from <<insert author name
here>>
Supreme court can rule that PRISM cannot collect domestic data and that it can only
collect foreign data through PPD28
AT: Implementation specification bad
Implementation specification good bc it means we are researching the topic more--good for education
Scenario two is TPP collapse
If the US wants to ink a trade deal, it needs to alleviate fears of NSA spying
Motherboard ’14. “The World's Next Major Trade Agreement Will Make NSA Spying
Even Easier” July 16, 2014. Justin Ling. http://motherboard.vice.com/read/the-transpacific-partnership-will-make-nsa-spying-easier //JJ
With paranoia over NSA surveillance reaching a fever pitch, foreign
governments are making a reasonable plea: bring our data home. But the
Americans are doing their best to ensure that the world’s Internet data
stays on U.S. soil, well within the reach of their spies. To do so, American
negotiators are leveraging trade deals with much of the developed world,
inserting language to ensure “cross-border data flows”—a euphemism that
actually means they want to inhibit foreign governments from keeping data hosted
domestically. The trade deals they’re influencing—the Trans-Atlantic
Partnership (TPP), the Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA), and the
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)—are all so
secretive that nobody but the governments themselves are privy to the
details. But thanks to the Australians and Wikileaks, both of whom have leaked details
on TPP, we have a pretty good idea of what’s going on in the latest Trans-Pacific
Partnership—a trade agreement that will act as a sort of NAFTA for Asia-Pacific region
nations. America is, essentially, the world’s data server. Since the dawn of
the internet itself, every database of import has been hosted in the grand US
of A. But now, foreign governments are starting to see the benefit of
patriating their citizens’ private information. Canada was an early adopter of the
idea. Federal procurement regulations often require government departments to insert
local data requirements, stating that businesses who wish to administer or host
Canadians’ information must keep the information within Canadian borders. Most
recently, the Canadian Government put out a tender for a company to merge and host
the email servers for all their departments. In doing so, they stuck in a national security
exemption, forbidding foreign contractors from applying. Nova Scotia and British
Columbia went a step further, flatly requiring any government-hosted personal data to
be physically located in Canada. Australia has taken similar steps, including setting up
firm requirements for how companies store offshore data. But the American
government is not having any of it and is using TPP negotiations to strongarm new provisions that favour American hosted data. “In today’s informationbased economy, particularly where a broad range of services are moving to ‘cloud’ based
delivery where U.S. firms are market leaders; this law hinders U.S. exports of
a wide array of products and services,” reads a report on Canada from the office of
the United States trade commissioner. The only reason the world is aware of the
provisions in TPP on data hosting, is because the Australian negotiators,
facing American insistence on the matter, leaked it to the press. Along with
the New Zealanders, the Aussies are proposing changes to the agreement to short-circuit
America’s proposal. The TPP negotiations are top-secret, and highly controversial. As
VICE reported earlier this month, provisions of the agreement could force American
anti-piracy provisions onto the signatory countries. “We know there is an ecommerce chapter and the general understanding is that the U.S. is
pressing for a provision that would bar the ability to require localization of
data,” says University of Ottawa professor Michael Geist, who is also the Canada
Research Chair in Internet and E-commerce Law. “That has big implications.” The
Americans aren’t even making secret their insistence on the matter. On the American
website for the trade deal, it clearly states there’s a priority for the TPP to
include: “requirements that support a single, global Internet, including
ensuring cross-border data flows, consistent with governments’ legitimate
interest in regulating for purposes of privacy protection.”
TPP and global trade agreements are key to the economy and
countering China
Frum – June 12, 2015. (David Frum former presidential speech writer and a
journalist for the Atlantic Magazine. “Why Americans Are Turning Against Free Trade”
The Atlantic. http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/06/-tpp-tpadefeated/395792/ //JJ
A decade and a half ago, I filled my days writing speeches urging Congress to grant
President George W. Bush fast-track trade authority. If memory serves, I wrote more
speeches on that one subject than on any other. Obviously, I didn’t earn my pay: Despite
Republican majorities in both Houses, Congress balked. This past year, President
Obama has worked as hard for fast-track authority as President Bush ever did. It now
seems that his efforts will prove as unavailing. This time, if anything, the loss is even
more heartbreaking, because the prize in reach is bigger than anything on offer in 20012002: a Trans-Pacific Partnership on trade. TPP matters both to the American
economy and to American security. China’s admission to the World Trade
Organization in 2001 was necessary and unavoidable. How can you sustain
a multilateral-trade regime without including the world’s largest exporter
and second-largest importer? But the price of China’s inclusion in the WTO
was the paralysis of the multilateral trade regime that had evolved since the
1940s: Trade-liberalization negotiations that included China just became too difficult.
The Trans-Pacific Partnership tries to work around China’s obstructionism
by limiting the next round of trade liberalization to 11 highly congenial
countries: Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New
Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States, and Vietnam. Not all are liberal
democracies, but all are committed to a more open global-trading regime. Even more
than the U.S.-Canada trade agreement of 1988, which was widened to include Mexico in
1994, TPP is intended to be an “open architecture” agreement, to which
other countries can adhere in future if they so wish. In other words, while the
door is open to China, the house is being built to non-Chinese specifications and without
China’s veto. Since the TPP states together represent not only 40 percent of the
world economy, but also many of China’s largest trade partners, the
agreement will constrain China’s future trade behavior. TPP thus asserts
Western and American will and power against an often-recalcitrant China.
TPP also will accelerate economic growth among the member nations. The importance
of trade to the U.S. economy can be oversold—in my speech writing days, I was surely
guilty of this to some degree—but by any definition, it’s significant and becoming more
so. The slowdown in developed world growth since the late 1990s has many causes
beyond the stall in trade liberalization. But the stall in trade liberalization has not
helped. The natural tendency of democratic societies is gradually to accumulate barriers
to international trade. The Bush administration itself exemplified this: At the same time
as it pleaded for fast-trade authority, it imposed restrictions on foreign steel. Relentless
international action on trade liberalization offsets equally relentless domestic pressure
for trade protection. Freer trade is always a tough vote. As long ago as the 1960s, Barry
Goldwater tried to make a campaign issue out of John F. Kennedy’s allegedly excessive
trade liberalization. Yet from the 1940s through the 1990s, freer trade benefited from
the almost unanimous elite consensus in its favor—and the strong public instinct to
defer to elites when unanimous. That deference has eroded. A recent Pew Research
poll found that although 58 percent of Americans felt that free trade
benefits the national economy, just 43 percent thought such deals benefited
their own families finances. And pluralities of Americans believe that free trade
slows economic growth, lowers wages, and leads to job losses. These are responses that
cause economists to roll their eyes. But most of us aren’t economists. We know what we
experience—and what most Americans have experienced are many more foreign
products on their shelves, a half-decade of weak job growth for Americans, and
stagnating or declining living standards for all but the wealthiest. Economic and
political leaders can argue that the nation’s economic troubles are not
traceable to free trade—that Americans would have been even worse off if
they reverted to protectionism. The trouble is that Americans no longer trust their
leaders. If polls can be relied upon, trust in leaders and institutions has plunged to the
lowest levels ever recorded, lower even than during the dismal days of the mid-1970s.
The belief that the economic system is rigged in favor of the wealthy and that ordinary
people can no longer get ahead run is especially intense. Americans increasingly
perceive the rich getting richer, the poor getting poorer. Their view of business
corporations has turned especially hostile, very nearly as hostile as their view of
government. Trade is a pro-growth policy. But when the proceeds of growth are not
widely shared, and not perceived as widely shared, it becomes difficult to sustain the
consensus in favor of pro-growth measures—especially when those measures seem to
impose costs on American workers. That’s the warning in today’s congressional action.
[Insert impact Sequence]
Loss of US economic leadership causes extinction
Lieberthal and O’Hanlon 12 - *Director of the John L. Thornton China Center at Brookings AND Director of
Research and Senior Fellow Foreign Policy (Kenneth and Michael, “The Real National Security Threat: America's Debt”, The
Brookings Institute, 7/10,http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/07/10-economy-foreign-policy-lieberthal-ohanlon)
EL
Lastly, American
economic weakness undercuts U.S. leadership abroad. Other countries
sense our weakness and wonder about our purported decline. If this perception becomes
more widespread, and the case that we are in decline becomes more persuasive, countries
will begin to take actions that reflect their skepticism about America's future. Allies and friends will
doubt our commitment and may pursue nuclear weapons for their own security, for example;
adversaries will sense opportunity and be less restrained in throwing around their weight in their
own neighborhoods. The crucial Persian Gulf and Western Pacific regions will likely become
less stable. Major war will become more likely.
US China war means extinction
Wittner, 11 – professor of history emeritus at SUNY Albany(Lawrence, “Is A Nuclear
War with China Possible?”, Huffington Post, 11/30,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lawrence-wittner/nuclear-warchina_b_1116556.html)//VP
Surely the United States would "win" any nuclear
war with China. But what would that "victory" entail? An attack
with these Chinese nuclear weapons would immediately slaughter at least 10 million Americans in a great
storm of blast and fire, while leaving many more dying horribly of sickness and radiation poisoning. The Chinese death toll in a
nuclear war would be far higher. Both nations would be reduced to smoldering, radioactive wastelands.
Also, radioactive debris sent aloft by the nuclear explosions would blot out the sun and bring on a "nuclear
winter" around the globe -- destroying agriculture, creating worldwide famine, and generating chaos and destruction.
Reform bipart
NSA reform bipart---Freedom Act proves
Lewis and Roberts 13--- Paul Lewis is Washington correspondent for the Guardian. He was previously special
projects editor, Dan Roberts is the Guardian's Washington Bureau chief, covering politics and US national affairs (“NSA reform bill
to trim back US surveillance unveiled in Congress,” 9/25/13, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/25/nsa-reform-billsurveillance-congress)//LE
Four senators at the vanguard of bipartisan efforts to rein in US government spying
programs announced the most comprehensive package of surveillance reforms so far
presented on Capitol Hill on Wednesday.
The draft bill represented the first sign that key Republican and Democratic figures in
the Senate are beginning to coalesce around a raft of proposals to roll back the powers of
the National Security Agency in the wake of top-secret disclosures made by
whistleblower Edward Snowden.
"The disclosures over the last 100 days have caused a sea change in the way the public
views the surveillance system," said Democratic senator Ron Wyden, unveiling the bill
at a press conference alongside Republican Rand Paul.
"We are introducing legislation that is the most comprehensive bipartisan intelligence
reform proposal since the disclosures of last June," he said.
Wyden said the bill would set a high bar for "not cosmetic" intelligence reform, on the
eve of a series of congressional hearings into the NSA's surveillance powers that will
begin on Thursday.
The two other senators supporting the bill were Democrats Mark Udall, a long-time ally
of Wyden, and Richard Blumenthal, who has been at the forefront of efforts to reform
the secretive court process that grants surveillance warrants.
Their bill, the Intelligence Oversight and Surveillance Reform Act, merges competing
legislative proposals announced by the senators before the summer recess, and cherrypicks from ideas contained in about twelve other draft bills.
It would prohibit the NSA's bulk collection phone records of Americans under section
215 of the Patriot Act, the most controversial aspect of US surveillance revealed by
documents supplied by Snowden to the Guardian.
The bill would also prevent a similar data trawl of internet communication records,
which was stopped in 2011, and definitively close a so-called "backdoor" that potentially
enables the NSA to intercept the internet communications of Americans swept up in a
program protected by Section 702 of the of the Fisa Amendments Act.
<<pretty sure we have a card saying the only reason people were against Freedom Act
was b/c it was not big enough, if someone could copy paste that here, that would be
great b/c idk where it is>>
Legitimacy k
US Legitimacy can be rebuilt and key to global diplomacy
Lagon and Grebo’ Mar/Apr 2015
National Interest, Inc (Mark P. Lagon is Global Politics and Security Chair at the Master of
Science in Foreign Service (MSFS) Program at Georgetown University. He teaches MSFS
courses on Ethics and Decision-Making, and on the UN and Global Institutions. He is also
Adjunct Senior Fellow for Human Rights at the Council on Foreign Relations. SARAH
GREBOWSKI is a graduate student in the Master of Science in Foreign Service program at
Georgetown University and a member of the 2013–14 Future Leaders Program at the Foreign
Policy Initiative)
(Time for Societal Diplomacy Lagon, Mark P; Grebowski, Sarah
http://search.proquest.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/docview/1657575483/C02D2DB32F994291PQ/
6?accountid=14667)
The first major goal of societal diplomacy is to carve out space for civil society worldwide,
especially in countries where illiberal governments are seeking to monitor and shrink the space
for civil society to dissent, resist and rally for reform. Openness and free expression facilitate
reform and innovation, which, in turn, spur economic development and prosperity. An
empowered citizenry may also be more likely to question going to war, which incentivizes more
peaceful and cooperative behavior among states. Second, societal diplomacy would serve to further U.S. interests by
hedging its bets on who will wield power in the future in a given country and enhancing its legitimacy by matching rhetoric about democracy
with deeds. The United States can gain flexibility in responding to unpredictable outcomes in countries where current power arrangements may
not hold. America should expand its notion of what defines a foreign partner to include liberal opposition actors in order to build relationships
that will outlast brittle autocracies. By nurturing relationships with democratic activists and community leaders, the United States can position
itself on the "right side of history," the term Obama so hesitantly used in reference to Egyptians calling for democratic change in 2011.
Finally, societal diplomacy would have positive ramifications for the United States' legitimacy as
a global leader. Popular acceptance of American global leadership has declined over the last
decade. According to the Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes Project, foreign countries'
confidence in the ability of the American president to "do the right thing regarding global affairs"
was dismal during the George W. Bush presidency (in 2005 and 2006, there was not a single
nation in which over 75 percent of its population expressed confidence), and has declined
throughout the course of the Obama presidency after an initial spike. In acting unilaterally to
invade Iraq on a false pretext, violating international human-rights standards at Guantánamo
Bay, and instituting a legally and ethically dubious targeted- killing program against suspected
terrorists, the United States has lost some of the moral authority that it once claimed as the leader
of the free world. Rebuilding a positive image on the world stage requires winning back the trust
of not only allied governments but also people around the world. Supporting liberal activists or
ngos in the Middle East now, for example, can help counter the damage done by decades of U.S.
support for authoritarian leaders in Egypt, Tunisia and elsewhere. Supporting civil society
throughout East Asia is equally important- from Hong Kong residents demanding direct
democracy, to repressed dissenters and worshippers elsewhere in China, to those jailed after the
coup in Thailand, to ngos still marginalized in Myanmar. By lending soft-power resources to
strengthen civil society around the world (for example, expertise and training, monetary support,
and the time and attention of its diplomats), the United States can chip away at the false idea that
its goal is to spread democracy by force-and the well-founded suspicion that its support for
democratization is selfservingly selective in practice.
Only tangible restrictions on the NSA will fix legitimacy
TF ’14 [Tech Freedom, April 1, 2014, TF, CDT, and 40 others tell Congress what real
NSA reform should look like, http://techfreedom.org/post/81391689035/tf-cdt-and40-others-tell-congress-what-real-nsa] //JJ
The White House has expressed support for reining in the NSA’s bulk
collection of Americans’ phone records, but with multiple bills in Congress it’s uncertain which specific reforms will be
included in the debate moving forward. To ensure whichever NSA reform bill advances is as
strong as possible, TechFreedom and 41 other nonprofits and businesses have sent a
joint letter to key policymakers outlining what any bill aiming to reform
bulk surveillance should include. Read the text below, and see the full letter for the list of signatories and
recipients: We the undersigned are writing to express support for ending the government’s bulk collection of data about individuals.
We strongly urge swift markup and passage of the USA FREEDOM Act (H.R.3361), which would enact appropriate surveillance
reforms without sacrificing national security. This
letter focuses on bulk collection, but
overbroad NSA surveillance raises many more privacy and security issues
that Congress and the Administration should address. We appreciate that Congress and the
Administration are converging on consensus that the National Security Agency’s (NSA) bulk *collection of telephone records must
end. Among
other things, legislation on bulk collection should: Prohibit bulk
collection for all types of data, not just phone records. Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act
applies broadly to business records, and the Department of Justice has claimed authority for bulk collection of any records that
reveal relationships between individuals. Legislation that focuses only on phone records may still allow for the bulk collection of, for
example, Internet metadata, location information, financial records, library records, and numerous other records that may help
“identify unknown relationships among individuals.” Prohibit
bulk collection under Section 214 as
well as Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act, or under any other authority. While the
NSA’s bulk collection of telephone records under the purported authority of Section 215 has received considerable attention, the
NSA engaged in the bulk collection of Internet metadata using the Pen/Trap
authority under Section 214 until 2011. Legislation that focuses solely on
Section 215 would still fail to prohibit the bulk collection of phone and Internet metadata
using Section 214, the National Security Letter (NSL) statutes, or another authority. Require prior court
approval for each record request. Under current law, the government must obtain
approval from the FISA court before it can force private entities to turn
over records (in bulk or otherwise) under Sections 215 and 214 of the PATRIOT Act. In addition, President Obama, in his
January 17th policy announcement, established that a judicial finding is required before the government can query the phone
records that the NSA collected in bulk. Congress
should leave this key safeguard in place. If
there is concern that the FISA Court would move too slowly to authorize
domestic surveillance beforehand, then the solution should be to provide
the FISA Court with sufficient resources.
Soft Power is portrayed and created through culture
Nye’ 3 Joseph S. Nye, Jr. is the University Distinguished Service Professor at Harvard.
Education - Nye attended Morristown Prep (now the Morristown-Beard School) in Morristown,
New Jersey and graduated in 1954. He went on to Princeton University, where he graduated
summa cum laude, Phi Beta Kappa, and won the Myron T. Herrick Thesis Prize. During his time
at Princeton, Nye was vice president of the Colonial Club, a columnist for The Daily
Princetonian, and a member of the American Whig–Cliosophic Society's Debate Panel.[10] After
studying Philosophy, Politics and Economics (PPE) as a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford University's
Exeter College, he obtained his Ph.D. in political science from Harvard University in 1964.
(Nye, Joseph. "Propaganda Isn't the Way: Soft Power." International Herald Tribune, January
10, 2003. http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/publication/1240/propaganda_isnt_the_way.html)
Soft power is the ability to get what you want by attracting and persuading others to adopt your
goals. It differs from hard power, the ability to use the carrots and sticks of economic and
military might to make others follow your will. Both hard and soft power are important in the
war on terrorism, but attraction is much cheaper than coercion, and an asset that needs to be
nourished. Attraction depends on credibility, something a Pentagon propaganda campaign would clearly lack. On the
contrary, by arousing broad suspicions about the credibility of what the American government says, such a program would squander soft power.
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld is reported to be deeply frustrated that the U.S.
government has no coherent plan for molding public opinion worldwide. He is right to be
concerned. Recent polls by the Pew Charitable Trust show that the attractiveness of the United States declined significantly in the past two
years in 19 of 27 countries sampled. What can the government do? Soft power grows out of both U.S. culture and U.S.
policies. From Hollywood to higher education, civil society does far more to present the United
States to other peoples than the government does. Hollywood often portrays consumerism, sex
and violence, but it also promotes values of individualism, upward mobility and freedom
(including for women). These values make America attractive to many people overseas, but
some fundamentalists see them as a threat.