1) Laudan wants to show why epistemic realism is not supported by historical evidence.
2) Realism makes variants of the following claims:
a) Scientific theories are typically approximately true and more recent theories are closer to
the truth.
b) Terms in scientific theory refer to things in the real world.
c) Successive theories will preserve theoretical relations and reference.
d) New theories will explain why old theories were successful.
e) (a)-(c) are empirical theses.
f) These theses refer to mature scientific theories. They are the best if not the only
explanation for the success of science.
i) Laudan’s critique: plenty of theories explain the phenomena, but are false.
3) Theses that a realist might hold about the relation between reference and success. (Success is
not defined by popularity, but success often leads to popularity. Success is defined by
explanatory and predictive power).
a) S1: The theories in the advanced or mature sciences are successful.
b) S2: A theory whose central terms genuinely refer will be a successful theory
(explains S1 along with S3, provides warrant for S4).
i) Criticism of S2: The theory of continental drift was referring and highly unsuccessful
(at least for a time).
ii) Another criticism of S2: Atomic theory (which has terms which did refer) was
rejected for the more popular affinity chemistry (which has terms which fail to refer).
(1) Laudan’s proposed (weakened) definition of S2: S2`: a theory whose terms refer
will usually (but not always) be successful.
(2) Problem: this is too weak. There are just too many theories available. It’s very
easy to come up with bad theories which have terms which refer, so equating
successful reference with success is not a good inference.
c) S3: If a theory is successful, we can reasonably infer that its central terms genuinely
refer. (explains S1 along with S2).
i) Criticism of S3: many theories used ether to explain phenomena; they were
empirically successful but did not refer.
(1) Possible response: only some main terms in the theory refer.
(2) Problem with this response: the realist typically wants to assert that science is
cumulative: the most theoretical parts of the theory are referring and
approximately true, and epistemic warrant flows up from observational terms. If
we accept that only some terms in a theory refer, we do not have grounds for
believing that the whole theory is approximately true, only parts of it.
d) S4: All the central terms in theories in the mature sciences do refer.
4) Mature sciences critique.
a) The concept is difficult to define. Putnam thinks that physics is supposed to be the
paradigm of a mature science. Yet many concepts in science have been quite wrong.
b) Epistemic criticism: you know that your science is a mature science when it undergoes a
revolution which drastically changes the concepts in the theory. It is worrisome that you
might never know that the science you’re working with is mature.
c) The later theory must explain the previous theory. Is this a criterion for science (for the
realist)? The realist often responds to the claim that certain sciences fail to explain their
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predecessors by claiming that mature sciences must explain their predecessors. Laudan:
this makes the realist’s claim unfalsifiable.
Abductive reasoning: if A then B, B, then (perhaps probably) A. This is reasoning to the best
conclusion.
a) The realist holds that our theories are approximately true because holding that our
theories are true simpliciter is easily falsified by any new theoretical development.
Reference and realism:
a) Realist’s account of reference: even if many claims that a theory makes about an entity
are false, the terms in the theory might still be genuinely referring.
i) Mendel’s gene refers.
ii) Phlogiston and ether do not.
b) Anton’s criticism: isn’t it always the case that what we see as successful reference is
always dependent on the time at which we examine a theory? Realist’s answer: one of
the theories refers time-independently. Reference itself is not time-dependent.
c) A standard intuition about reference: if a theory is really bad, its central terms do not
refer.
d) The problem is that the causal theory of reference does not allow this possibility. The
question then is whether we can provide good criteria for distinguishing non-referential
theories from referential theories.
Suppose we adopt a very liberal account of reference. What are the implications for the
standard realist argument against the idealist?
a) S1 becomes a vacuous thesis. It is not extraordinary that successful theories refer,
because all theories refer.
b) S2 will be patently false.
c) S3 is true but vacuous in the same way S1 is. We can reasonably infer that successful
theories refer, but all theories refer.
d) S4 is also true but vacuous.
e) Most importantly, the property of predictive power is not the same as the property of
truth. Truth allows cumulativity, predictive power does not. If we adopt a very liberal
account of reference, Putnam’s argument for the cumulativity of science does not work.
f) The realist needs a theory of reference which is more restrictive than a pure causal theory
of reference if he intends to make any of the arguments S1-S4.
Approximate truth:
a) A realist would not want to claim that a theory which included terms which did not refer
is approximately true.
b) Approximate truth can be improved. Subsequent theories are more approximately true.
c) Laudan: Approximate truth is not well-defined. The only view that’s obvious (the
Popperian view) holds that you can conclude more true claims than false claims from a
theory. Laudan thinks this view is not acceptable.
d) Two theories which are inconsistent are going to differ in their predictions and
explanations. There is no reason to believe that the latter theory will contain all the
predictions or theoretical structure that the first theory had.