Policy paradoxes from scientific paternalism to agricultural
populism in the foot-and-mouth disease in South Korea
Lee Hae Young
Yeungnam University
e/mail: haylee@ynu.ac.kr
South Korean central and local governments decided massive slaughtering and compensation policy against
the outbreak of the foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) at Andong region in 2010-2011. Those policy actions,
however, featured a policy paradox by state scientific paternalism to framers’ decisions. Even this paternalism
itself was justified; the public criticized the extravagant budget expenditures for achieving the goal of FMD free
country status. Also environmental, religious, and civic organizations opposed the undiscriminating killings of
animals and its underground burying decisions. After all, the Korean government declared the end of the
Andong FMD disaster and publicly announced the policy termination of returning to the FMD clean country by
ignoring the heavy compensation costs and negative environmental and livestock farming effects. This policy
paradox was concreted by the Korean agricultural populist populism, in which it was economically initiated for
recovering the devastated livestock farming not by the united and/or organized farmers’ political movement and
revolt. This agrarian populism was originally captured by the Korean politician’s compassions to the undergone
economic hardship, and by Korean media’s and netizen’s emotional sympathy to the rural farmers. And it paved
the middle path or acquittal to the paradoxical scientific intervention. Eventually the slaughtering and
compensation policy were getting perplexed and self-contradictory.
Key words: policy paradox, paternalism, scientific paternalism, populism, populist populism, foot-and-mouth
disease (FMD)
Introduction
South Korean governments made a paradoxical decision to combat against the foot-andmouth disease (FMD) devastated to the southern farm villages during the winter season between
2010 and 2011. An autonomous rural city government, Andong had no choice but to kill and bury
the infected farm animals undoubtedly including non-infected living fresh livestock. And the
farmers just followed this slaughter decision with expecting enough governmental financial
compensations even having with some psychological anxieties by livestock market failures. The
central government, the Ministry for Food, Agriculture, Forest and Fisheries (MIFAFF) responded to
the Andong FMD case that the policy measure was the just slaughtering and burying of infected
and non-infected farm animals along with warning a nationwide alert for preventive actions of
sanitary cordons across nationally managed loads and highway gates. And in final, the Korean
farmers gave up their properties almost entirely with accepting public funds.
Facing agricultural populism for appeasing the angry resentments of the farmers, and pricing
the paternalistic intervention to the individual freedom of disposal grounded on the scientific
knowledge described in the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for FMD issued from the
1
MIFAFF for maintaining Al-free nation status in the livestock industry, the Korean governments
experienced policy paradoxes from scientific paternalism to agricultural populism.
After implementing the FMD decisions, the governments have been accused of missing the
policy timing for disinfection and vaccinations and of slaughtering living livestock for just
maintaining the Al-free nation. Polluting underground water by the decayed animals, the policy
was charged the costly compensations for appeasing farmers. After all, the same policy action was
decided and implemented for the same problem faced with the same public criticisms. South
Korean governments have experienced those policy paradoxes in the outbreaks of FMD not only
at Andong but also in other regions since the 2000s. Nevertheless, the national and regional FMD
policy has been quite simple of slaughtering and burying the infected and non-infected animals in
the outbreak regions including the protection zone.
And then, is it imperative and even true in both factually and scientifically that the
slaughtering policy was the best and only measure against the FMD? Why the Korean
governments adhere to the same policy to those frequent outbreaks of the national problem even
faced with far-reaching criticisms of budget extravagance, environmental damage, and massacre of
healthy animals? And even it simply admits that the source and the transmission routes of the
infection of FMD viruses are uncontrollable to domestic stock farmers, why the slaughtering and
compensation policy was justified by scientifically evidenced governmental intervention as much
as endorsed agricultural populism?
To answer these research questions experienced at the Andong FMD epidemics, this paper
hypothetically issued two theoretical lenses; the science-based state paternalism for intervening to
the individual farmers’ decisions for the solution of FMD and the politically appeased agricultural
populism as an indulgence to the paternalistic decisions.
With these two research paradigms for analyzing the 2010-2011 Andong FMD case 1 , this
article reviewed government documents issued from both the Andong City and the MIFAFF and
on- and off-lines news media reports and articles about on the FMD outbreak beginning from
November 2010 and eventually transmitted to the nationwide by March 2011. Secondly, I
personally interviewed with the Andong city and the MIFAFF officials, the president and the
general secretary of the Andong Peasants League, Andong City local council members, the
damaged rural farmers and owners, the president of the Korean Association of Swine Veterinarians,
and the director of Gyeongsangbuk-do Veterinary Service Laboratory, and the head officials in the
Animal, Plant and Fisheries Quarantine Inspection Agency.
Outbreak histories of FMD and policy actions
The first outbreak of FMD in the Korean peninsula was recorded in 1911 and sporadically
occurred until 1934 with a small scale during the Japanese colonial period. The total numbers of
1The
Andong FMD case in this paper is called by the fact of the epicenter to the FMD break in 2010-2011.
2
infected cattle were 54,354 including only 12 heads of pig (Ministry for Agriculture and Fishery 2,
2003: 3).
In the 1900s, however, the Korean native cattle had bound for agricultural farming and
burdening and an indispensable asset to the Korean farm household. In fact, the small scale of
the FMD infection damaged severely to the Korean agricultural industry. In that time, reporting,
controlling, and preventive systems to against agricultural diseases were so primitive that there
was no public mind against the livestock disease. The domestic animals were only to the private
care and breeding. Furthermore, the cattle farmers avoided informing their misfortunes to the
public and/or to the government and they did not have any thought and practice to blame the
public sector. They only accepted the FMD cases to their miseries.
In addition, the public government had no measures to prevent and/or control the livestock
epidemics, and to support financially to the damaged farms. Even the reported statistics was the
moiety. The numbers were collected by public officials in and around the most suburban and
metropolitan governments. The public government authority and management were limited to
rural and remote regions, the so-called farm village, in which almost all the Korean domestic
ruminants and pigs had been raised. Also Korean peasants were reluctant to report and/or to
participate to the public administration and affairs during the Japanese colonial era, particularly in
the bad enough case, such as the livestock disease.
With account of those facts and histories in the Korean livestock farming during the 1900s, the
outbreak record itself implied that the Korean livestock farmers suffered their irrecoverable
property losses. In particular, the sixty-seven percent of the total infected cattle in the same
period had occurred in 1918 (Ministry for Agriculture and Forest, 2003: 3). Even if statistical
evidence and/or public documents on governmental compensations did not exist, it can be easily
projected that this level of the FMD outbreak devastated Korean rural livestock farming. By the
way, after 1934, there were no records on the outbreak of FMD in the Korean peninsula.
After maintaining sixty-six years of no-FMD country, the first major FMD outbreak in Korea was
reported in March 2000. The years of 2000 and 2002 FMD epidemics, however, were limited to
fifteen and sixteen cases respectively, and controlled within a month, in which Korea recovered its
free country from the Office of International des Epizooties(OIE), World Organization for Animal
Health in November 2002 (Korea Rural Economic Institute, 2011: x).
The policy against to the 2000 and the 2002 FMD incidences was bounded to the slaughtering
2The
title of Korean agricultural department has been renamed by the regime change; with the founding of
the first Republic of Korea in 1948, the Ministry for Agriculture and Forest(MAF) was named. However, this
head was changed to the Ministry for Agriculture and Fishery(MAF) in 1973. In 1986, the missed ‘Forest’
came back to the title. After ten years, in 1996, the ‘Fishery’ was out. It traced that forest and fishery
industries have been included and sometimes excluded by policy priority in each presidential administration.
Finally the ruling government, Lee Myung-Bak’s administration reorganized the Ministry for Food, Agriculture,
Forest and Fisheries (MIFAFF) in 2008 for reforming the Korean central government organization
(www.mifaff.go.kr... access date: 02/02/2012). After Lee’s power, it can also easily expect that the name of
MIFAFF might be destined to change to somewhat by the Korean politics.
3
and burying the infected and healthy animals over 160 thousand heads. At the outbreak of 2002
case, firstly the pig was infected, in which the victimized species accounted for the 99.1% of total
slaughtered livestock (Ministry for Agriculture and Forest, 2003: 43). This FMD incident trend has
continued to the latest 2010-2011 Andong FMD case; over the ninety percent of the infected and
slaughtered animals belonged to pigs (Table 1).
After eight years of Al-free nation status, the second major disaster of FMD was occurred in
2010; the outbreak was developed in January and continued to April throughout in the seventeen
cases which were regionally limited in Gyeonggi-do and its vicinity (suburban Seoul) (Gyeonggi-do,
2011: 11). Over 55,000 infected and live animals were slaughtered and 77,400 million Korean won
(US$64.5 million) disbursed for the financial compensations to the Gyeonggi-do farmers. After
paying these expensive costs, the Korean livestock industry regained the FMD free country in
September 2010.
Quite shortly after this expeditious management, the calamitous outburst of FMD in the
Korean agricultural history turned out in November 2010 at Andong, the southeast region of
Korea. The Andong FMD began on the 28 th of November 2010 and prolonged to the 24 th of
March 2011, in which the FMD virus was transmitted to the entire regions of the Korean peninsula,
except Jeju Island and Jeolla-do, the southwestern region. The infected livestock animals covered
all species including Koran native cattle, beef and dairy cattle, cow, pig, goat, and even domestic
deer. The table 1 showed the Andong FMD disaster.
Table 1. Numbers of Infected Farms, Slaughtered Animals, and Underground Buried Sites, and
Compensation Expenditure by Region in 2010-2011, the Andong FMD Case
animals (in head)
compensations
Region
farms*
buried site
(US$, millions)
cattle**
Pig
others***
Sum
Gyeonggi-do
(Incheon)
2,503
72,962
1,711,060
51,079
1,835,101
2,266
690.6
Gangwon-do
661
19,941
399,167
782
419,890
470
189.3
Chungcheongdo
851
8,936
784,732
1,428
795,096
637
238.7
2
none
12,531
none
12,531
2
6.4
GyeongsangDo
2,251
52,901
429,016
3,620
485,537
1,208
312.8
Total
6,268
154,740
3,336,506
56,909
3,548,155
4,583
1437.7
Jeolla-do
*The numbers of farms (in household) are included farming reported infected FMD virus animals, preventive
slaughtering alive animals, and FMD epidemic-related.
**dairy cattle are included.
***goats and domestic deer are included.
Source: the unpublished statistics was provided by the Division of General Animal Health, the Ministry for
Food, Agriculture, Forest and Fisheries in March, 2012.
First of all, the sheer number of slaughtered animals itself verified that the Andong FMD case
4
as an apocalypse; over 3.5 million heads of livestock were infected and slaughtered, in which the
cruel victim fell under 3.3 million pigs. And over six thousand farms in household reported their
livestock infected FMD as well as their property losses. Even the traditionally safe species of goat,
deer, sheep, and dog were also infected to the FMD virus. The massacred animals were buried in
4,583 underground sites scattered in the Korean rural area. The Korean government paid 1.7
trillion won (US$ 1437.7 million) to livestock farmers for just compensations to the slaughtered
animals. The devastated statistics also revealed that the slaughtered animals in the Andong FMD
case amount to 23.2% of all Korean livestock farming in 2010. Specifically, 33.8% of pigs and 4.6%
of cattle were victimized (Ministry for Food, Agriculture, Forest and Fisheries, 2011: 126).
Secondly, even the Andong area, the epicenter of the 2010-2011 FMD took the criticisms on
the transmission of the epidemic virus to the nationwide, the Gyeonggi-do and its vicinity, the
outside Seoul was hit again by the Andong FMD. As FMD outbreaks of the 2000, 2002, and 2010
years were mostly limited to the Gyeonggi-do region (Ministry for Agriculture and Forest, 2003:
43; 62; 109), the 2010-2011 FMD virus also attacked intensively to this area as evidenced in the
table 1; over the half of the total slaughtered animals (51.7%) and in particular, about ninety
percent of goats, deer, and sheep (89.8%) appertained to the suburban Seoul region; and the half
of the compensations money (48.0%) was distributed to this area. This statistics depicted the
totally destroyed pig farming in the Gyeonggi-do area, in which 92.4% of all raised pigs were
slaughtered in this region compared to 15.9% of cattle.
As deservingly, the Andong region was ruined by the FMD virus; 100.0% of all the breeding
pigs and 68.7% of cattle were slaughtered; 57.8% of the farming household was damaged
(Andong City Government, 2010; 2011: 9); and slightly over the half (51.0%) of total
compensations for the loss of the livestock disbursed to the Gyeongsang-do3 was allocated to the
Andong’s livestock farmers. By following the FMD manuals described in the OIE and the
emergency SOPs prescribed by the MIFAFF to against the Andong FMD case, the Korean
governments paid the costs of total 1.7 trillion won for the compensation allowance only (table 2).
Table 2. Korean Government Budget Spending to the 2010-2011, the Andong FMD case by Paid
Items
budget spending
Items
(Korean won, US$)
nation
(millions)
slaughtering
area
(infected zone)
compensation allowance
living stability fund
1,725,272
(1437.7)
20,260
(16.9)
3
Andong City
(millions)
191,256
(159.4)
5,373
(4.8)
Andong City is affiliated to the Gyeongsang-do which is composed geographically and administratively of
‘buk-do’ (northern) and ‘nam-do’(southern local administrative division).
5
livestock repurchasing fund
migration limited
area (protection
zone)
livestock farming stability
fund
buying fund for living
animals
Total
4,480
(3.7)
4,574
(3.8)
142,983
(119.2)
20,955
(17.5)
1,897,569
(1,581.3)
233,330
(194.4)
12,887
(10.7)
2,859
(2.4)
Sources: the nationwide unpublished statistics were provided by the General Animal Health Division, the
Ministry for Food, Agriculture, Forest and Fisheries in March, 2012. And the Andong City's unpublished
statistics was provided by the Division of Livestock Management, Gyeongsangbuk-do in March, 2012.
The 9.1% of the total budget expenditure allocated to the government’s buying the living
animals for the preventive measures against FMD virus infections, paying the living costs, and
livestock farming stability and repurchasing to individual farmers in both slaughtering and
migration limited, i.e. protection zone. And the Andong local government also complied with this
expenditure system; 82.0% of total budgets compensations were paid for the loss of livestock
disclosed in the table 2.
In sum, as in the cases of the 2000, the 2002, and the 2010 FMD, the same policy was decided
and implemented in the 2010-2011 Andong FMD case; slaughtering the infected as well as the
living livestock in the FMD affected region and the protection zone being after the national
government’s compensating the loss of individual farmer’s property.
Scientific paternalism versus agricultural populism
Paternalism and populism in the Korean society as well as in the academic communities of
social sciences and philosophy are puzzled terminologies. Firstly, paternalism semantically has
been interchangeable into patronage, nepotism, favoritism, and patriarchic familism that superiors
and/or boss favor their members as family members in both public and private organizations
(Park, Chong-Min, 1996: 108; Choi, Sung Jai, 2009: 32; Chang, Soo Duck and Kang, Tae Heon,
2010: 65; Oh, Se Hyuk, 2010: 353). In addition, paternalism academically has been translated into
Korean and interpreted to the denotes of interventionism and protectionism (Cho, Seong Min and
Yang, Seung Mock, 2005; 92; Yoon, Hye Jin, 2009: 366; Ko, Kil Kon, 2009), few scholars accept it as
governmental interventions or interferences to individual freedom of decisions and/or behaviors
(Park, Hyo Chong, 1995: 437; Chung, Ho-Pyo, 2006: 128; Lee, Kyu Sang and Hong, Hoon, 2009:
172)4. Sometimes, quite negatively in both Korean and English vocabularies, paternalism broadly
4Korean
academic research activities on the paternalism have also limited. As evidenced by one of the major
academic research database, the Korea Education & Research Information Service, the Korean academic
journals have published 13 (searched by the Korean terminology) and 23 (by ‘paternalism’ in English) papers
(http://www.riss.kr; access date: 03/16/2012) .
6
has cited a cause or a breeding ground to social corruptions and dirty politics in practice (Kim,
Tae-Young,
et.al.,
2006:
92;
http://kr.dictionary.search.yahoo.com;
http://kr.dictionary.search.yahoo.com; http://100.naver.com; http://124.137.201.223; Encyclopedia of
Economics (in Korean), 1995: 1218).
Why Koreans understand and accept paternalism as a warm consideration to followers or
their members and as a cynical connotation to social decay not an intervention to individual free
will and decision is a bizarre question both academically and practically. In practically, the
terminology itself is the warmth and emotion and the public and the Korean media have used
conventionally and unconsciously paternalism as the pessimistic term.
Although the practical-based knowledge between paternalism and negativism is immune to
empirical verification, the Korean academics might not be free from the blames for its negligence
of the rigorous and scientific studies of paternalism practically diffused patronage-private affection
rubric paternalism. Presumably, the answer to this misunderstanding and/or misinterpretation
might be the little research accumulations on paternalism (Lee, Hae Young, 2010: 32-38).
There is no agreement on the definition of paternalism. There were as many competing
concepts of paternalism as there were scholars (Garren, 2006: 340) 5 . By the terminological
diversifications surrounding the concept and the lack of consensus, one author put forward that
¡°the word is sometimes more trouble than it is worth and that we would be better off
philosophically doing without ‘paternalism’ in discussing some problems now often formulated by
using the word¡±(Sankowski, 1985: 2). Furthermore others requested that we need not
intransigently stick to the word of paternalism, alternatively we pick up the words of parens
patriae, patronage, and guidance rather than paternalism (Abercrombie and Hill, 1976: 413).
Be that as it may not the generally accepted concept on paternalism, it cannot deny the fact
that paternalism is all-pervading phenomena into practice (New, 1999: 63). Therefore, historically
and disciplinary, the studies on paternalism largely have rooted in both philosophical paternalism
and paternalistic policy. Firstly, many philosophers have inclined to observe that the individual
liberty and autonomy are the undeniable principle (Mill, 1859(2009): 19-23; Rostboll, 2005: 370;
Demenchonok, 2009: 273-264; Wall, 2009: 399), however, it is occasionally respectable if the state
intervention and engagement against those principles are morally justified and good (Archard,
1993: 341-342; Scoccia, 2000: 53-55; Garren, 2006: 334). For that practical ground, paternalism
poses a truly the individual liberty- or freedom-limiting theory and is burden significantly on the
personal autonomous self (Wolfe, 1994: 616-618; Karlsson and Nilholm, 2006: 1993). This being so
limited to the liberty and the autonomy, quite often paternalism conflicts and confronts with the
self-ownership and decisions (Goodin, 1993: 229; Wall, 2009: 400-401). In short, the philosophy
5 The
terminological inexactitude on paternalism cannot be an excuse to the Korean knowledge of propatronage to paternalism. Rather the diversified definitions commonly shared some key words on
paternalism such as governmental intervention, limit on individual free-will, and wellbeing to the public and
social justice and wisdom. No scholars and authors, however, admit and understand paternalism as
patronage or favoritism.
7
scholars espouse individual free-will and libertarianism against the paternalistic interventions and
interference or even paternalistic benevolence thus, there is no universal concept on paternalism
in the philosophical community. But there is little doubt that there are practically paternalistic
features and state policies (Feinberg, 1986: 25; Marneffe, 2006: 68-69; Garren, 2007: 59).
Meanwhile and secondly, paternalistic policy scholars approach and try to justify the
unavoidable paternalistic laws, policies, and regulations rather than arguing the paternalistic
morality and freedom in philosophy, in which some justifications for paternalistic interventions are
the main issue for the reasonable and acceptable decisionmaking in the public sector (VanDeVeer,
1986: 41-44; Rizzo and Whitman, 2009: 908).
Paternalistic policy interventions to individual decisions and power have not been always
justified. But the state legitimacy over self-government and self-determination can be justified and
accepted socio-politically and even individual’s own good. The principle bases were the
improvement of individual welfare and happiness and the protection of harms themselves so that
some conditions were justificatory accounts under limited abilities by poor information, weakness
of will, and indecisions particularly in a crisis or emergency (Dworkin, 1972: 79-80; Archard, 1993:
341-342; Leonard, Goldfarb, and Suranovic, 2000: 323-324). All of these rationales, the state
exercising power over individuals’ are good and perfect compared to those of people under the
premise that the state paternalistic grounds and ways must be accorded with socio-political
justice (Clarke, 2006: 111; Buchanan, 2008: 18-20; Gostin and Gostin, 2009: 217-218). The state
suppressed to personal autonomy and diversity need to approve through democratic politics and
social justice inasmuch as for the protection of majority’s best interests and a third party’s or other
regarding benefits in both potential and imminent (Buckley, 2009: 178-179; Boom and Ogus, 2011:
5-6). .
To focus on the paternalistic policy in the Andong FMD case with fully acknowledging the
diverse controversies on the concept and the justification of state paternalism both in philosophy
and policy, I proceeded to canvass situations that justify the Korean paternalistic policy; the
conceptual operationalization of paternalism in this paper is the state interventions over the
farmers’ individual decisions with their endorsement or at least consent (Lee, Hae Young, 2010:
32). The Korean government slaughtering decision has aimed originally to maintain the FMD free
country status, besides the policy has been approved by politically and justified by social
consensus. Although it is questionable that the slaughtering interference against Korean farmers’
disposition cared for the benefits of the infected farming and for the protection of the other
regarding of non-infected livestock industry, the domain of the justified state paternalism confined
to the financial compensations for the farmers’ material damages by the national government’s
budgets. This contextual metaphor refers to the farmers’ unavoidable consents to the government
decisions.
Especially where scientific and technical expertise and knowledge are the explicit advantage in
the case of FMD, the scientific paternalism to control preventive culling and emergency
8
vaccination and slaughtering is easily justified and accepted for instances of farmer’s selflimitation and -dubitation on the FMD epidemics. In those complex decisionmaking situations in
the farmer’s side, the standard operating procedures and manuals provisioned by the government,
namely the legal actions and implementation to combat the FMD (i.e. Livestock Infectious
Diseases Prevention Act) scientifically preserve the basic patterns of the Korean government as
well as farmers. Eventually this scientific paternalism is economically justified with the manner of
government compensations and farmer-dependence to the public funds. It can be called the selfjustified paternalism to both sides of government and farmers (Archard, 1993: 341)
As much as paternalism, populism in Korea is also a perplexed term to both practice and
academy. As the literatures on populism published by Korean scholars have also limited even in a
quantity6, the semantic disorientations and its practical understandings have been diversified. In
practices, populism has been widely accepted as popularized politics to meet with public needs
and protests (http://100.naver.com; www.kinds.or.kr, access date: 03/22/2012).
In academics, even though it strenuously insists that Korean scholars did not accommodate the
public understood populism into their studies of populism (Hong, Yun-Gi, 2006: 13), some
literatures translated into Korean and understood populism as a populist’s appeasement to the
public have been found (Han, Seung-Mi, 2004: 70; Park, Hyo Chong, 2005: 14; Lee, Han Gu, 2007:
6; Kim, Dong Keun, 2009: 187; Kang, Guk Jin and Kim, Sung Hae, 2011: 225). Besides, non-Korean
foreign scholars also understood and accepted the semantics of populism as ‘minjung’ or populist
movement (Thomas, 1996: 28)7 and as a nationalistic revisionism against the collapse of peoples’
trust to politics (Kimura, 2007: 277).
However, philosophical and political scholars sharply criticized that this understood populism
did not exist in the world and it is the Korean academic community’s schizophrenia against their
scientific responsibility to the mistranslation and misunderstanding (Hong, Yun-Gi, 2006: 8-10).
Also the Korean definition of populism is just an unknown terminology to the outside (Rhee, Sung,
Hyong, 2004: 54).
Historically, populism has been understood as a paradigm for explaining individual and unique
national characteristics of political movements. For examples, admitting that the terminology of
populism had no ¡°solid core of agreed meaning¡± in political science, Margaret Canovan, traced
the historical bizarre diversities of populism such as American farmers radicalism, Russian
revolutionary intellectual populism, Bulgarian peasant populism, Argentine Juan Peron’s populist
dictatorship, American progressive movement of populist democracy, George Wallace’s reactionary
6The
Korea Education & Research Information Service revealed that the first academic paper on the title of
‘populism’ in English appeared in 1975 and on the title of the Korean translated ‘populism’ did in 1988.
Furthermore, the limited research publications illustrated that 23 (in Korean, populism) and 43 (in English,
populism) papers appeared in Korean academic journals (http://www.riss.kr; access date: 03/16/2012).
7The Korean term, “minjung’ literally means mass and people’s popularity. The ‘minjung’ is an ideological and
pro-resistance connotation concept in Korea, in which it has been traditionally related to the populist
movement and resentment to ruling and power elites. For more information on ‘minjung,’ I recommend
James Thomas’s (1996: 28-30) study on the squatter renewal project in Seoul.
9
populism, and de Gaulle’s and Mao Zedong’s politician populism (Canovan, 1982: 550-551).
Also populism was to explain the opposite politics and ideologies. Some argued that populism
was to be a shadow cast of democracy (Canovan, 1999: 16; Hong, Yun-Gi, 2006: 20-31) and a
gauge by which we can measure the health of representative politics that occurs around liberal
democracy (Taggart, 2000: 109, 115), whilst Griffin saw that populism was a core concept of
fascism (Griffin, 1998: 13) and Maoism (MacRae, 1969: 154) . Furthermore, each scholar defined
populism on his/her paradigmatic perspectives based upon the different premises. Thus populism
was beyond the terminological definition as each scholar’s different definition for describing a
variety of political and social ideas and movements (Fieschi, 2004: 235). To moderate the two
opposite extremes, where national property remained highly concentrated in privates and where
politics chosen in mass election frustrates democracy by serving private moneyed interests rather
than the public good, Adrian Kuzminski suggested that populism was a genuine ¡°third way¡± in
politics, a middle path between corporate anarchy and collective authoritarianism (Kuzminski,
2008: 1-3).
In short, populism is a fractured and elusive concept in general terms, in which the worldwider scholars convened a conference at London School of Economics in 1967 for their common
original purpose of defining the populism and eventually failed. In lieu, they accepted the
diversified definitions and meanings on populism, in which it was rooted on some historicogeographical and ideological inclinations and political movements (Ionescu and Gellner, 1969: 2-4).
That granted the terminological diversifications, and more notoriously there is no coherent
keywords and themes on populism 8 , however, in this case, for explaining and observing the
Andong FMD’s populism, several core commonalities or unifying principles in the contextual
definitions of populism draw out as a working premise; first, populism basically characterized
opposition and resentment from economically frustrated people to seek redress for their
grievance and hurts (Goodwyn, 1978: viii; Hong, Yun-Gi, 2006: 32-35); second, populism regressed
to appeal to the people or mass (Fieschi, 2004: 237; Suh, Byung Hoon, 2006: 205); and third,
populism has widely understood as populist politics in Korea 9 and in Russian (Walicki, 1969: 93)
including other countries (Jansen, 2011: 82-85)..
This working concept of populism can accommodate the agricultural populism in the Andong
FMD case as such; the Korean livestock farmers had undergone severe economic losses in the
short period of FMD outbreak by the enforced governmental slaughtering policy for maintaining
the Al-free nation status. Even the Andong farmers did not unite or organize to redeem their
economic deteriorations, the Korean government responded wide and serious considerations to
melt down farmers’ resentments and to end regional economic extremes. Furthermore, the Korean
governmental actions did not shoot political populism, and regional and national politics could
8As
typical examples, Margaret Canovan summarized seven general categories of populism (Canovan, 1982:
550-551) and Paul Taggart explored six key themes that run through populism (Taggart, 2000: 2).
9 Populism in Korea has extensively understood as mass popularity in bitter criticisms (Hong, Yun-Gi, 2006;
Suh, Byung Hoon, 2006).
10
hardly go along with the populist politics, Korean media fuss and particularly Korean partisan
politicians endorsed the agrarian-foothold and -sympathetic policy. It might be called the Korean
populist populism characterized as popular sentiments and emotional appeasement to the public
and media (Thomas, 1996: 28; Cho, Hang-Je and Park, Hong-Won, 2010: 16).
Paradoxes from paternalism to populism
The Korean government has coercively intervened or interfered over the individual farmers’
decisions and preferences since the outbreak of FMD epidemics after 2000. The first alternative to
combat against those devastations was limited to slaughtering and burying the infected and alive
livestock. The other policy actions such as vaccinations for protecting all spheres of domestic
animals 10 , epidemiological investigations, and closing livestock markets were peripheral and
marginal countermeasures for the declaration of FMD-free status (Lee, Joo-Ho, et. al., 2006: 60-62).
The Korean government programmed decisions of removed infected and healthy animals by
preconditioned public compensations was scientifically justifiable, in which the policies were based
upon the SOPs and abided by policy chapters issued from the Office of International des
Epizooties, World Organization for Animal Health for FMD free country status. Based upon this
scientific judgment, the legal paternalism against to the nationwide FMD problem was easily
justified by depending upon the Livestock Infectious Diseases Prevention Act and its enforcement
decree, and FMD Emergency Standard Operating Procedures provisioned by the Korean central
government 11. Moreover, in the Andong FMD case, when the epidemic viruses diffused to the
nationwide, the Korean government declared the alert level of ‘national disaster’ so that the
paternalistic policy to the individual livestock farming was backed upon socially. Likewise, the
Korean decisions have been repeated since the major outbreaks of FMD without empirical
evaluations and self-examinations on the policy performance and its goal attainment 12.
This science-based policy intervention against to the farmers’ clearout itself was not blamed
and questioned. The policy objective of the regaining the Al-free nation had achieved and
subsequently the policy terminated. Then the Korean government announced policy success.
However, this paternalistic policy evoked state-wide outcries and criticism from environment,
It might be questionable that the emergency vaccination can be a measure to prevent of healthy animals in
the mid-FMD outbreak. And epidemiological experts recommended Korean animal health authorities to
carefully judge vaccinations as for preventing FMD virus transmission and diffusion (Sur, et.al., 2000: 725-726;
Garner, Mackereth, and Wainwright, 2002: 3;; Traulsen, Rave, Teuffert, and Krieter, 2011: 219)
11 The legal paternalism in the Korean FMD policy can be the other side of policy paradox between
paternalism and populism.
12Even though the policy implementation problems as such specious SOPs and Manuals on the infected FMD
regions, inopportune vaccinations and control of moving livestock and facilities, shortage of experts, and
non-scientific criteria in slaughtering have reported since 2000, the same policies against the FMD outbreaks
were decided and implemented (Sur, Jee Young, 2011: 436-442; Korea Times, January 6, 2011). For more
critical and evaluative analysis on the Korean FMD policies, particularly, the implementation stage of the
Korean decision might be a disputable subject to policy makers and academic circles.
10
11
religion, animal protection, and citizen participation.
Firstly, it was socially admitted that the grounding justification of the massive cull policy was
the economic compensations to farmers (Kim, Dong-Kwang, 2011: 30), however, the public
criticized the extravagant budget expenditures for achieving the goal of FMD free country. As
disclosed in the table 2, the Korean government spent $1,437.7 million for just compensation in
addition to $143.6 million for farmers’ living stability and other financial support programs; i.e.,
over ninety percent (90.9%) of total budgets (82.0% in the Andong city) distributed to the
reimbursement for the culling animals without any economic analysis between the public costs
and the benefits to the framers and Korean livestock farming.
The timing and cash-amount of compensations to the economically damaged farmers have
been decided by the law, the presidential decree, and the policy directions issued from the Korean
agricultural department not by the economic benefit-cost analysis. Specifically, under the code 48
of the Livestock Infectious Diseases Prevention Act, the Korean presidential decree ruled the
compensation procedures. With this legitimacy, the Korean Ministry for Food, Agriculture, Forest
and Fisheries issued the administrative directions and guidelines as to the timing and amount of
compensations. Then the public officials who charged the livestock affairs in regional and
provincial governments actually decided the money with the consents of farmers.
However, the main issue in this compensation decision was the allowance, in which the both
side of farmer and public official must agree to the sum. The farmers asked the market price and
the lump-sum payment, but the law ruled that the fifty percents of the estimated and agreed
compensations dispended in provisional as the spot payment followed by slaughtering. The
remaining moneys pay to the farmers if the final negotiations between farmer and public, the ad
hoc team for compensation assessment reach. Frequently, the so called, the pro-farmer’s
emergency planning committee which was composed of representatives of damaged livestock
households, regional peasant organizations, Hanwoo (Korean native cattle) Association, and Korea
Swine Association participated to the allowance procedures and usually made it difficult and timeconsuming processes of compensations (.Gyeonggi-do, 2011: 186-191).
Those arguments can be funneled that Korean public administrations against to the FMD
epidemics have chosen the slaughtering and compensation alternative without hesitations. Even
though economic analyses and policy reports on the experienced FMD have continuously
cautioned the negative and somewhat destructive effects 13 , the Korean FMD policy did not
changed. FMD policy analysts and public officials have underestimated those economic and
13 As
for the economic studies and policy reports on the aftermaths of Korean FMD outbreaks, selective
examples were listed; economic comparisons between slaughtering and vaccination alternatives (Choi, Jung
Sup, et.al., 2002: 34-40); household economic losses followed by the fallen meat prices swifted to the
consumers’ diminished demands of pork and beef (Sur, Jong Hyuk, et.al., 2000: 13-18; Hur, Duk, et.al., 2011:
9-11), in which the downside price was happened by the Korean purchaser’s psychological frustrations not by
the meat prices (Ha, Suk Yang, 2011); unexpected financial costs in livestock-related industries (Yang, Byung
Woo, 2011: 70); economic impact analysis on all sorts of livestock diseases (Song, Ju Ho, 2006: 9-19); and the
shifts of Korean consumer behavior to imported meats by the FMD aftermath (Kim, Young Gyu, 2011).
12
scientific studies on the FMD rather than the just followed the policy directions and rules
described in FMD-SOPs, MIFAFFF and Terrestrial Animal Health Code, OIE because they believed it
science, in which their science-deserved policy interventions were to be justified.
Even in the Andong FMD case, the Korean policymakers simply complied with the FMD laws,
decrees, and policy directions issued from the central government, the MIFAFF by seizing with the
panic of swift diffusions of the viruses into the Korean peninsula. Actually at the policy
implementing stage, regional public officials managed to administer the slaughtering program, in
which they got laboriously and barely the farmers’ consents by soliciting and coaxing with only
measures of cash-enough compensations. After the stage, they finished up the given amounts of
slaughtering and burying the animals, the government declared the closing emergency of the
FMD outbreak, and publicly announced the policy termination, in which the public governments
intended to ignore the heavy costs and negative sides. It was called the policy paradox.
Secondly, the environmental activists voiced the hazard of the buried sites scattered around in
the infected and protected zones. As shown in the table 1, over 4,500 land-filling sites inearth the
slaughtered animals. About halfies (49.4%) concentrated at Gyoeonggi-do and Incheon regions,
the surrounding vicinities of Seoul, the most vulnerable regions to flooding (Kim, Sung Gyun,
2011: 63).
The environmental groups and scholars argued that the policy failures on the disaster
management in the case of the FMD catastrophe resulted in contamination of underground water
and soil and river pollutions (Kim, Jeong-Soo, 2011: 104-114; Lee, Kang Kun, 2011: 8-12). Those
environmental problems were complicated by the fact that the policy implementers failed to
conform the burying manuals and SOPs. The MIFAFF and the Ministry of Environment (MOE)
regulated the environmental-safe burying sites and construction, in which the sites should be
placed out thirty-meter distance from river, underground water facilities, catchment basin, and
communal households. Also the scales and methods of the site construction were specifically
illustrated as shown by the mimetic diagram (MOE, 2010). However, the street-level public officials
and construction workers did not follow those policy manuals because of pressed burden of their
jobs. The most hardship was to find the safe-sites because the public-owned lands were so
limited so they negotiated with livestock farmers’ farmland to find the burying places.
Furthermore, with facing their time squeezing efforts for no-more diffusion of the FMD viruses
into neighborhoods areas, field workers had no choice to finish up their missions without
environmental struggles. Also the military troops usually dispatched for the slaughtering and land
filling duties and most of the soldiers ignored the policy directions and manuals rather they
obeyed their field overseer’s decisions (Kim, Jong Su, 2003: 61-64). One regional government
official confessed that environmental justice or safe was the next, my first priority was the finished
up killing and burying, quite frequently burying alive animals to calm down the spreads of the
viruses. This was my undeniable assignment (Telephone interviewed with an Andong city official,
03/20/2012). The Korean central as well as regional administrations neglected their disaster policy
13
learning from the recurrent outbreaks of the FMD (Ju, Hyo Jin and Rho, Ji Young, 2011: 363-364).
Thus whenever the unexpected calamity of FMD had broken, they recycled the precedent policy
such as firstly, slaughtering, secondly, land filling, and finally compensation.
Thirdly, Korean religious groups accompanying with animal protection organizations opposed
the undiscriminating killing of infected and alive livestock. They criticized that the massacre policy
was deeply oriented by human economic greed and by the restoration of the FMD free country
status. Animal life must be equal as humans. The science-backing but indiscreet or blind
government intervention belittled the values of animal life and welfare (Kim, Sung Gyun, 2011: 59;
Kim, Seon Kyung, et. al., 2011: 167-168).
Korean religious societies argued that the reduced meat demands by returning to the
vegetarian diet culture can alter the Korean style of livestock farming as plantation, in which the
high density of livestock breeding was prone to animal influenza and other epidemic diseases.
(Five Religions and Thirty-Tree Organizations, 2011). The veterinarian and its associations also
underwrote the problems and sensitivity of diseases in the animal plantation. And optimal size of
livestock farming and natural pasturing can guarantee biosphere, in which natural and Korean
styled small scale of farming can be more effective to the disease controls for the FMD and other
epidemics. The breeding costs of this production method might be higher than those of the
competing countries, USA, Australia, and in Europe, in a longer term, however, the natural small
scale livestock can save sizeable production costs because this farming was more cost-saving to
the disease controls than the plantation. Otherwise, the Korean government and farmers cannot
afford to cut their astronomical monies for combating against FMD and other diseases (Cho, Hun,
2011: 86-87; Woo, Hee Jong, 2011: 35-36).
From opposite angles, however, the minister and top policymakers in the MIFAFF were
suspicious to the small size livestock because the Korean plantation breeding affected to foreignmeat import substitution and because the down-sized livestock density jeopardized more than
half million workers’ job market and year-seventeen trillion Korean won animal farm industry
(Joongang Ilbo, 03/10/2011).
This policy paradox manifested by the scientific intervention came again by the Korean
agricultural populist populism. The oppressive state power with the epidemics science to the
intervention of the farmers’ decisions was itself paradoxical, however, this contradictory policy
decision was justified by the political supports from politicians, the members of National
Assembly who were pros to the agricultural and rural political powerhouses. And Korean top
policymakers
including
the
South
Korean
president,
Lee
Myung-Bak
emotionally
and
psychologically pulled for the farmer’s side, in which their families have rooted to the agrarian
society espoused by that agriculture has been the basic national wealth. They did decided
compensations and other financial supporting policies to the farmer’s wishes not the scientifically
manipulated cost-benefit analysis. This was the politically occupied or captured to FMD policy at
the Andong FMD case.
14
The regional livestock-related organizations such as Andong City Peasant Organization and
Catholic Peasant Society of Andong, National Association of Korean Cattle Farming of Andong City,
Korea Swine Association of Andong City united for their goal achievements of satisfactory
compensations, after-FMD livestock industry support programs, and for the popular supports from
Korean peoples. However, the Andong-based grassroots societies were not turn to political actions
by forming local alliances to seek economic redress. Rather they delivered their voices to the
regional mass-media and sometimes national communication networks. Also the Korean netizen
in their cyberspaces swiftly diffused their pros to agricultural industries citing with farmer’s
grievances. Especially, the Korean media’s flippant reports and coverage to the Andong FMD
case14 triggered to the nationwide popular sympathies to the FMD-damaged farmers and farming.
Then the Korean decisions merely followed, the so-called the agricultural populist populism. It
was perplexed the scientific programs to intervene against the Andong FMD epidemics. Even the
science-grounded paternalistic intervention was critically called as the policy paradox, the public
sympathy or propensity swiftly slanted to the pathetic farmers seized the Korean policymakers’
impartial and neutral decisions, in turn, it arrested and blocked the policymakers’ opportunities for
judging and evaluating implementation feasibilities and economic effectiveness of diverse
alternatives to dealing with the national catastrophe of the FMD outbreak. It was another policy
paradox illustrated by the Andong FMD case15.
It was quite predictable in the Korean politics that the Korean peoples and region-based
politicians were not serious to reevaluate major slaughtering policy and financial compensations
to the framers’ economic losses, deservingly the Korean policymakers did not seek to formulate
other alternatives rather than choosing the easy-going and recurrent massacre policy. Also Korean
top policymakers wished to circumvent or did not embroil themselves into Korean national
political whirlpools. A variety of policy formation can provoke tedious and demanding political
bargaining with politicians and advocacy groups 16 which have argued their pros and cons on the
government intervention and its interfering timing to overcome the FMD virus and its
transmission into the protection zones.
This agricultural populism has ensnared Korean politicians, media communications, and netizen
14 As
of instances, the Korean daily newspapers wrote under the headline, “the Korean government and
Korean peoples cannot deny the agricultural populism followed by the reports that the Andong FMD case
was the national apocalypse, that was the typical national failure” (Joongang Ilbo, 03/09/2011); and
“livestock houses are burning, disinfection-smoking are in thick clouds looks like the battleground” (Moon,
Chul Soo, 2000: 71).
15As of a comparative study, David Hundt(2005) termed a legitimate paradox in his analysis on the reform of
the chaebols, the Korean conglomerates during the Kim Dae-jung’s administration, in which populist
populism for reforming chaebols combining with his neo-liberalism policy philosophy reinstated the power of
Korean state as well as Korean big businesses rather than nurture the chaebols.
16In fact, without any policy alternative substituting the slaughtering policy at the Andong FMD epidemics,
the major Korean advocacy groups (for examples, Korean Livestock Farming Association, Hanwoo (Korean
native cattle) Association, Korean peasant and livestock related newspapers and internet networks, Korean
Veterinary Medical Association, Korea Swine Association, and Korean Animal Protection Society) must be hard
to define their policy positions against the national policy choices of slaughtering and compensation.
15
for affective to the rural framers who were undergone their economic hardships and psychological
anxiety to the future livestock markets. Also the Korean peoples reacted like the prime movers to
populist populism whenever they watched the media reports and coverage on the farmers’ crying,
the animal slaughtering scene, and vacant Bulgogi restaurants at the showy windows and slowed
boucheries at major shopping malls coming from the sharp meat demand-decreases by
consumers’ safe anxiety (Ha, Suk Yang, 2011).
As populism served the third way between the extremes of American corporate anarchy and
collective authoritarianism as one of the systematic alternatives to today’s political and economic
system (Kuzminski, 2008: 116-154), the Korean experienced the audience-captured populist policy
was a middle way to escape from excessive pressures between political compassion and
scienticism.
The government intervention to private decisions and property in Korea has been a long
tradition of practice as well as philosophy. The Korean society and people have been ruled by the
authoritarian monarchy until the representative democracy founded in the mid 20th century. Those
government histories and experiences undisputedly granted the public interferences to the private
sector. At the Andong FMD case, the science-armed government decision was also justified by
this historical empiricism.
However, the democratic decisonmaking and the grassroots society have been reevaluated by
the current Korean generations, the government scientific actions to the FMD intervention were
no longer automatically justified. The political support and recognition were necessary to the
policy that the Korean policymakers put to use the agricultural populism aroused from the
Andong region as well as the national media and the public sympathies. Then the populist
populism was the middle path or indulgence to the scientific espousers of government
intervention, in which the science-proved FMD policy as well as the OIE endorsed slaughtering
policy to get the Al-free nation status were finally accepted to even the environmental, religious,
and budget-economic criticisms on the slaughtering and compensation policies. Arguably the
Korean agricultural populism casted the paradoxical scientific interventions to the Andong FMD
case, in which the policy actions were getting perplexed and self-contradictory.
And agricultural populist populism was not a movement of economically damaged framers
and workers whom did not pushed for political and economic change in the Korean society. The
Andong’s farmers and national livestock workers did not seek organizations as a solution to their
economic devastations. Also the individual farmers did not actively involve in politics. Rather the
agricultural populism made swift decisions for the livestock farming even though the scientific
knowledge-rooted policy interventions faced the policy paradox. Also even the agrarian-founded
Korean society and its emotional compassion to the farming complicated the government
interference decisions, the agricultural populism reinforced the Korean policymakers’ choices in
the Andong FMD case because of the Koreans’ deep rooted to the agricultural society, so called
the place-in their-heart and of the long historical traditions of government patronage and
16
interventions to neighbors’ plight.
This populist populism differed from the genuine democracy. Rather it was called a political
patronage or nepotism because the public supports to the Andong FMD policies were mostly
based upon the political compassion and public sympathy emerged from the media productions
and the historical traditions to the agrarian family. This Korean populism might be a shadow cast
to the grassroots democracy.
Conclusions
By observing the outbreak of the Andong FMD in 2010-2011, reviewing the documents on the
statistics of the slaughtering livestock and compensations to the farmers’ reliefs and plights
revealed by the Korean central and local autonomous governments, and interviewing the livestock
farmers and local government officials who decided and implemented the national government
FMD policy programs, the policy paradoxes were featured; firstly, state paternalistic interventions
against the farmers’ freedom of choices were justified by solely the farmers’ economic interests at
the expenses of taxpayers’ money. Also the killings of over 3.5 million animals included noninfected alive livestock were justified with its conformity to the FMD management manuals for
regaining the Al-free nation status, the so-called national interests.
While this scientific paternalism for the governmental decisions frequently ignored the local
knowledge and farmers’ needs; the livestock farmers’ knowledge and experiences to against to
the livestock disease cannot infuse into the policy decisions formatted by scientific knowledge and
programmed manuals.
Secondly, the agricultural populist populism in the Andong FMD case confined to the
desperate economic crisis in the livestock farming not by united and/or organized farmers’
political movement and revolt; this populism was the economically initiated for resolving out their
economic disaster incurred by the FMD not by the political ideologies and philosophical conflicts
to popularizing the local farmers and its support groups.
The political power recognition was necessary to the policy that the Korean policymakers put
to use the agricultural populism aroused from the Andong region as well as the national media
and the public sympathies. Then the agricultural populism was the middle path or acquittal to the
scientific knowledge of government intervention, in which the science-based FMD policy as well
as the OIE endorsed slaughtering policy to get the FMD free country status were finally accepted
even to the environmental, religious, and budget-economic criticisms on the slaughtering and
compensation policies. This Korean agricultural populism casted the paradoxical scientific
interventions to the Andong FMD case, in which the policy actions were getting perplexed and
self-contradictory.
Eventually, the agrarian politics endorsed by populism made stronger the scientifically proved
paternalism. In the results, the FMD outbreak caused the extravagant expenditures of the
taxpayers’ budget for compensations, whilst the government financial supports and funds have
17
always been shortage to the farmers who have suffered from severe economic losses. And the
increasing governmental power of the cash nexus undermined the Korean livestock market
competitiveness in a global economy and pushed Korean farmers into public money’s beneficiary
or dependent.
If the FMD epidemics were took place in somewhere else, the same policy in the government
sector and the same reactions in the farmers’ counterpart might be repeated. The huge public
funds were to be compensated to the local farmers. And yet, the local livestock industry was to
be undergone for a long hard time to recover the Al-free FMD nation status. Even the large
amount of budget inputs were destined to the FMD resolution, the policy learning was so poor
that the policy outcome can be easily followed to just slaughtering and compensations. It was the
never-ending policy paradoxes in the Korean FMD policy.
References
Abercrombie, Nicholas and Stephen Hill. (1976). “Paternalism and Patronage.” British Journal of Sociology,
27(4): 413-429.
Andong
City
Government.
(2010).
Annual
Statistics,
2010.
(www.andong.go.kr/open.content/ko/administration/administration.data/statics.a…access date: 03/13/2012)
(in Korean).
Andong City Government. (2011). Reports of the Andong FMD of 2011. (in Korean).
Archard, David. (1993). "Self-justifying Paternalism." Journal of Value Inquiry, 27(3/4): 341-352.
Ben-Ishai, Elizabeth. (2012). “The New Paternalism: An Analysis of Power, State Intervention, and Autonomy.”
Political Research Quarterly, 65(1): 151-165.
Boom, Willem H van and Anthony Ogus. (2011). “Introducing, Defining and Balancing ‘Autonomy and
Paternalism’.” Edited by Ogus and Boom. Juxtaposing Autonomy and Paternalism in Private Law. 1-8.
Oxford, England: Hart Publishing Ltd.
Buchanan, David R. (2008). “Autonomy, Paternalsim, and Justice: Ethical Priorities in Public Health.” Health
Policy and Ethics, 98(1): 15-21.
Buckley, Francis H. (2009). Fair Governance: Paternalism and Perfectionism. Oxford, New York: Oxford
University Press.
Canovan, Margaret. (1999). “Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy.” Political Studies,
47(1): 2-16.
Canovan, Margaret. (1981). Populism. Boston, Massachusetts: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publisher.
Canovan, Margaret. (1982). “Two Strategies for the Study of Populism.” Political Studies, 30(4): 544-552.
Chang, Soo Duck and Kang, Tae Heon. (2010). “The Effects of Environmental Uncertainty, Organizational
Slack, and Paternalism on Corporate Entrepreneurship and Firm Performance: An Empirical Study on SMEs
in Korea.” Korean Small Business Review, 32(3): 65-87 (in Korean).
Cho, Hang-Je and Park, Hong-Won. (2010). “A Typology of Media-Public Sphere Relationships.” Journal of
Communication & Information, 50: 5-28 (in Korean).
Chung, Ho-Pyo. (2006). “Paternalistic Intervention and Liberty in Education.” Philosophy of Education, 29:
119-135 (in Korean).
Cho, Hun. (2011). “Ethics in the Foot-and-Mouth Disease.” Philosophy and Practice, 89: 81-88 (in Korean).
Cho, Seong Min and Yang, Seung Mock. (2005). “The Press Law and Paternalism: The Logic and Limit of
Government Intervention.” Journal of Communication Research, 42(1): 91-125 (in Korean).
Choi, Jung Sup, Jung, Min Guk, Jun, Sang Gon, Sung, Dong Hyun, and Hur, Duk. (2002). “The Outbreak of
FMD in 2002 and Its Impact Analysis.” Policy Research Report, number P56, Korean Rural Economic
Institute (in Korean).
Choi, Sung Jai. (2009). “Global Standard and Overcoming the Paternalism.” Journal of Business
Administration and Law, 20(1): 29-70 (in Korean).
Clarke, Simon. (2006). "Debate: State Paternalism, Neutrality and Perfectionism." Journal of Political
Philosophy. 14(1): 111-121.
18
Demenchonok, Edward. (2009). “The Universal Concept of Human Rights as a Regulative Principle: Freedom
versus Paternalism.” American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 68(1): 273-301.
Dworkin, Gerald. (1972). "Paternalism." The Monist. 56: 64-84 (reprinted in Philosophy, Politics and Society.
fifth series. edited by Peter Laslett and James Fishkin. (1979). 78-96. New Haven, New Jersey: Yale
University Press.
Feinberg, Joel. (1986). Harm To Self. New York, New York: Oxford University Press.
Fieschi, Catherine. (2004). “Introduction.” Journal of Political Ideologies, 9(3): 235-240.
Five Religions and Thirty-Three Organizations. (2011). “Interreligious Believers’ Positions on the FMD
Outbreaks.” Good News in the Divided Era, 966: 4-6 (in Korean)
Garner, Graeme, Graham Mackereth, and Sherrilyn Wainwright. (2002). “Report of the International
Assessment Team on the Epidemiology and Control of the 2002 Foot and Mouth Outbreak in the
Republic of Korea.” In White Paper on the Foot-and-Mouth Disease. (2003). 1-29. Ministry for Agriculture
and Forest.
Garren, David J. (2006). “Recent Work: Paternalism, Part I.” Philosophical Books, 47(4): 334-341.
Garren, David J. (2007). "Paternalism. Part II." Philosophical Books, 48(1): 50-59.
Goodin, Robert E. (1993). "Democracy, Preference and Paternalism." Policy Sciences, 26(3): 229-247.
Goodwyn, Lawrence. (1978). The Populist Revolt: A Short History of the Agrarian Revolt in America . Oxford,
New York: Oxford University Press.
Gostin, L.O. and K.G. Gostin. (2009). "Special Issue: A Broader Liberty: J.S. Mill, Paternalism and the Public's
Health." Public Health. 123(3): 214-221.
Griffin, Roger. (1998). International Fascism: Theories, Causes, and the New Consensus . Edited. London:
Hodder Education Publishers.
Gyeonggi-do. (2011). 2011 White Paper on the Foot-and-Mouth Disease (in Korean).
Ha, Suk Yang. (2011). “Economic Analysis on Animal Disease (FMD and AI) and the Licensing System of
Livestock Farming in Korea.” Ph.D. dissertation at Konkuk University (in Korean).
Han, Seung-Mi. (2004). “The New Community Movement: Park Chung Hee and the Making of State Populism
in Korea.” Pacific Affairs, 77(1): 69-93.
Harmon, Michael M. (1995). Responsibility as Paradox: A Critique of Rational Discourse on Government .
Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications.
Hicks, John D. (1931). Populist Revolt: A History of the Farmers’ Alliance and the People’s Party. Minneapolis,
Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.
Hofstadter, Richard. (1955). The Age of Reform. New York, New York: Vintage Books.
Hong, Yun-Gi. (2006). “A Philosophical Examination of the Discourse of Populism in Korea.” Civil Society &
NGO, 4(1): 7-41 (in Korean).
Hundt, Davis. (2005). “A Legitimate paradox: Neo-liberal Reform and the Return of the State in Korea.”
Journal of Development Studies, 41(2): 242-260.
Hur, Guk, Jung, Min Guk, Woo, Byung Jun, Lee, Myung Gi., Lee, Hyung Gi, Kim, Won Tae, Kim, Hyun Jung,
and Kim, Hyung Jin. (2011). “Cattle and Pork Price Estimations in 2011 after the Outbreak of FMD.”
Journal of Rural Development, vol.68: 1-31. Korean Rural Economic Institute (in Korean).
Ionescu, Ghita, and Ernest Gellner. (1969). “Introduction.” Edited by Ionescu and Gellner. Populism: Its
Meaning and National Characteristics. 1-5. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.
Jansen, Robert S. (2011). “Populist Mobilization: A New Theoretical Approach to Populism.” Sociological
Theory, 29(2): 75-96.
Ju, Hyo Jin and Rho, Ji Young. (2011). “Case Analysis of Foot-and-Mouth Disease from the View of Each
Disater Management Steps.” Journal of Korean Policy Studies, 11(3): 347-366 (in Korean).
Kang, Guk Jin and Kim, Sung Hae. (2011). “The Politicized Policy and Policy Discourse: A Case Study of Media
Discourse about ‘Tax-Relief for the Rich’.” Korean Public Administration Review, 45(2): 215-240 (in
Korean).
Karlsson, Kristina and Claes Nilholm. (2006). "Democracy and Dilemmas of Self-determination." Disabilty &
Society, 21(2): 193-207.
Kim, Dong Keun. (2009). “A Plan for Good Use of Populism in Korean Politics.” Journal of Ethics and
Education Studies, 20: 185-206 (in Korean).
Kim, Dong-Kwang. (2011). “What Is the Korean 2010-2011 Foot and Mouth Disease(FMD) Epidemic?
Focusing on the Nationalistic Slaughter Policy and It’s Implication.” Democratic Society & Policy Studies,
20: 13-40 (in Korean).
Kim, Jeong-Soo. (2011). “Environmental Problem and Citizens Science owing to the Failure of Foot-andMouth Disease Policy.” ECO, 15(1): 85-119 (in Korean).
19
Kim, Jong Su. (2003). “Seventy Days Vivid and Miserable Memories in the Field Work against FMD.” Local
Administration, 52: 57-77 (in Korean).
Kim, Seon Kyung, Kim, Ji Eun, and Paek, Do Myung. (2011). “The Cultural Analysis of 2010-2011 Foot and
Mouth Disease Massacre in Korea.” Journal of Environmental Health Science, 37(2): 165-169 (in Korean).
Kim, Sung Gyun. (2011). “FMD, Environmental Justice, and Public Policy Orientations.” Presented paper in
spring conference for the Korean Association for Environmental Sociology (in Korean).
Kim, Tae-Young, et. al., (2006). “A Study on the Characteristics of Ingroup Favoritism∙Paternalism of
Corruption in Korea.” Public Policy Review, 20(2): 91-126 (in Korean).
Kim, Young Gyu. (2012). “Imapct Analysis of FMD on the Consumer’s Behavior in market of Korea.” Ph.D.
dissertation at Kangwon National University (in Korean).
Kimura, Kan. (2007). “Nationalistic Populism in Democratic Countries in East Asia.” Journal of Korean Politics,
16(2): 277-299.
Ko, Kil Kon. (2009). “Liberal Paternalism.” (www.kapa21.or.kr/epadic/, access date: 02/10/2012) (in Korean).
Korea Rural Economic Institute. (2011). White Paper on the 2010-2011 Foot-and-Mouth Disease (in
Korean).
Korea Times. (2011). ¡°Massive Cull Planned as Foot-and-Mouth Disease Spreads.¡± January 6, 2011
(www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/include... access date: 04/28/2012).
Kuzminski, Adrian. (2008). Fixing the System: A History of Populism, Ancient and Modern. New York, New
York: Continuum.
Lee, Hae Young. (2010). ¡°Understanding Paternalsim in Policymaking and Its Mis-knowledge.¡± Korea Policy
Journal, 10: 23-42 (in Korean).
Lee, Han Gu. (2007). ¡°Populism is Mobocracy.¡± Philosophy and Practice, 74: 6-12 (in Korean).
Lee, Joo-Ho, Kim, Tae-Jong, Nam, Hwang-Mi, Yoon, Ha-Chung, Park, Choi-Kyu, Park, Jee-Yong, An, Soo-Hwan,
Kim, Chang-Sub, and Wee, Sung-Hwan. (2006). ¡°Changes in Policies of Animal Disease Control Measures
according to the Outbreak of Foot-and-Mouth Disease in Korea.¡± Korean Journal of Veterinary Public
Health, 30(1): 57-68 (in Korean).
Lee, Kang Kun. (2011). ¡°FMD, Leachat, and Underground Water Pollution.¡± Geoenvironmental Engineering,
12(2): 6-17 (in Korean).
Lee, Kyu Sang and Hong, Hoon. (2009). ¡°Liberalian Paternalism and Laissez-faire.¡± Economic Study, 57(3):
171-193 (in Korean).
Leonard, Thomas C., Robert S. Goldfarb, and Steven M. Suranovic. (2000). "New on Paternalism and Public
Policy." Economics and Philosophy. 16(2): 323-331.
Livestock Infectious Diseases Prevention Act, 2011 Amendment, (National Law Number, 10930) (in Korean).
MacRae, Donald. (1969). “Populism as an Ideology.” Edited by Ionescu, Ghita, and Ernest Gellner. Populism:
Its Meaning and National Characteristics. 153-165. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.
Marneffe, Peter De. (2006). "Avoiding Paternalism." Philosophy & Public Affairs, 34(1): 68-92.
McMath, Jr., Robert C. (1995). ¡°Populism in Two Countries: Agrarian Protest in the Great Plains and Prairie
Provinces.¡± Agricultural History, 69(4): 517-546.
Mill, John Stuart. (1859(2009). "On the Liberty of Thought and Discussion." in The Basic Writings of John
Stuart Mill. 19-61. New York, New York: Classic Books America.
Ministry for Agriculture and Forest. (2003). White Paper on the Foot-and-Mouth Disease (in Korean).
Ministry for Food, Agriculture, Forest and Fisheries. (2011). FMD Emergency Standard Operating Procedures
(SOP) (in Korean).
Ministry for Food, Agriculture, Forest and Fisheries. (2011). Food, Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Statistical
Yearbook. (www.mifaff.go.kr) (in Korean and in English).
Ministry of Environment. (2010). Environmental Management Directions to Livestock Burying Sites .
(www.me.go.kr) (in Korean).
Moon, Chul Soo. (2000). ¡°Journalism: Newspaper Reports Evaluation in the Case of FMD.¡± Newspaper and
Broadcasting, 354: 71-75 (in Korean).
New, Bill. (1999). ¡°Paternalism and Public Policy.¡± Economics and Public Policy, 15(1): 63-83.
Office of International des Epizooties(OIE), World Organization for Animal Health. “Terrestrial Animal Health
Code.”
Chapter
8.5:
Foot
and
Mouth
Disease
(www.oie.int/fileadmin/Home/eng/Health_standards/tahc/2010/en_chapitre_1.8 access date: 03/05/2012).
Oh, Se Hyuk. (2010). “The Justification of Suicide.” Jung-Ang Law Review, 12(4): 351-386 (in Korean).
Park, Chong-Min. (1996). ¡°Political Paternalism and Authoritarian Legitimacy.¡± Korean Political Science
Review, 30(3): 105-122 (in Korean).
Park, Hyo Chong. (1995). ¡°Liberty and Coercion.¡± Korean Political Science Review, 29(1): 425-455 (in
20
Korean).
Park, Hyo Chong. (2005). ¡°A Critical Examination of Korean Populism.¡± Journal of Humanities and Social
Sciences, 13: 13-41 (in Korean).
Pirotta, Godfrey A. (2001). ¡°A Farewell to Paternalism through Public Enterprise? Privatization in the Small
Island State of Malta.¡± International Review of Public Administration, 6(1): 39-48.
Rhee, Sung Hyong. (2004). ¡°Populism: The Interpretation into Popular Opportunism Is An Unknown
Nationality Usage.¡± Sindong-a (Monthly Magazine), Appendix in January edition: 50-55 (in Korean).
Risso, Mario J. and Douglas Glen Whitman. (2009). "The Knowledge Problem of New Paternalism." Brigham
Young University Law Review. 2009(4): 905-968.
Rostboll, Christian F. (2005). "Preferences and paternalism on Freedom and Deliberative Democracy." Political
Theory, 33(3): 370-396.
Sankowski, Edward. (1985). ¡°’Paternalism’ and ‘Social Policy’.¡± American Philosophical Quarterly, 22(1): 1-12.
Scoccia, Danny. (2000). "Moral Paternalism, Virtue, and Autonomy." Australian Journal of Philosophy, 78(1):
53-71.
Song, Ju Ho, Woo, Byung Jun, Hur, Duk, and Park, Sun Il. (2006). “Economic Impact Analysis on the Livestock
Diseases.” Research Report, R19, Korean Rural Economic Institute (in Korean).
Suh, Byung, Hoon. (2006). ¡°How to Define Populism.¡± Philosophical Studies, 72: 203-223 (in Korean).
Sur, Jee Young. (2011). ¡°National Policy Alternatives against Infectious Animal Diseases.¡± Paper delivered in
the summer conference of Korean Association for Policy Studies: 433-449 (in Korean).
Sur, Jong Hyuk, Kim, Jung Ho, Hur, Duk, Kim, Kyung Duk, Jung, Jung Gil, Jung Min Guk, and Lim, Jung Bin.
(2000). “The Impacts of FMD and Policy Agenda.” Policy Research Report, number P37, Korean Rural
Economic Institute (in Korean).
Sur, Jung-hyang and other twenty-one authors. (2000). ¡°In Vivo Characterization and Transmission of Korean
Foot-and-Mouth Disease Virus(FMDV).¡± Korean Journal of Veterinary Research, 40(4): 719-727 (in Korean).
Taggart, Paul. (2000). Populism. Buckingham, MK: Open University Press.
Thomas, James P. (1996). ¡°Populism, Social Representation and the Limits of Squatter Resistance: A Korean
Case.¡± Asia Journal, 3(2): 23-45.
Traulsen, Imke, Gerhard Rave, Jurgen Teuffert, and Joachim Krieter. (2011). ¡°Consideration of Different
Outbreak Conditions in the Evaluation of Preventive Culling and Emergency Vaccination to Control Foot
and Mouth Disease Epidemics.¡± Research in Veterinary Science, 91: 219-224.
Yang, Byung Woo. (2011). ¡°Market Trends of Domestic Livestock Industry and Policy Tasks.¡± Presented
paper in the Korean Food Marketing Association (in Korean).
Yoon, Hye Jin. (2009). ¡°On ¡°Attorney’s Lying¡± in Profession.¡± Studies in Philosophy East-West, 52: 365-387
(in Korean).
VanDeVeer, Donald. (1986). Paternalistic Intervention: The Moral Bounds on Benevolence . Princeton, New
Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Walicki, Andrzej. (1969). “Russia.” Edited by Ionescu, Ghita, and Ernest Gellner. Populism: Its Meaning and
National Characteristics. 62-96. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.
Wall, Steven. (2009). "Self-ownership and Paternalism." Journal of Political Philosophy, 17(4): 399-417.
Wolfe, Christopher. (1994). "Liberalism and Paternalism: A Critique of Ronald Dworkin." Review of Politics,
56(4): 615-639.
Woo, Hee Jong. (2011). ¡°Biosphere in the Foot-and-Mouth Disease: The Neo-liberalism in the Disease
Control Policy.¡± Paper presented at the Korean Ecosociety (in Korean).
http://kr.dictionary.search.yahoo.com, access date: 10/23/2010.
http://100.naver.com, access date: 10/23/2010.
http://124.137.201.223, access date: 10/23/2010.
Encyclopedia of Economics (in Korean). (1995). Seoul: Seum Publishing Co.
Joongang Ilbo, 03/09/2011; 03/10/2011.
21