Michael Funke
Department of Economic History
Uppsala University
michael.funke@ekhist.uu.se
Dear fellow participants of the session
This paper is mainly based on findings in my forthcoming doctoral thesis in Economic
History, which focuses on the policy process of advertising self-regulation in Sweden
during 1950-1971. At the moment I am finishing up a first final draft to be presented this
fall. The thesis departs from a theoretical combination of the strategic interests of
business interest associations (leaning on the logic of membership vs. logic of influence
model) and a stages heuristic theory modified to suit the self-regulatory policy process of
self-regulation. The main actors in the thesis are business associations. This paper tries to
take things bit further by looking at the actions of all actors relevant for the policy process
of advertising self-regulation. To do so it introduces a theoretical model that combines
Advocacy coalition framework theory with the two other approaches. Empirically the
paper leans on mainly four chapters of the thesis; the introductory chapter, first empirical
chapter covering the general positions on advertising among key actors in the Swedish
political economy at the time, the second empirical analyzing the strategies of the
business associations in the policy process of self-regulation and the third empirical
analyzing the organized business involvement in the policy process of the statutory
regulations of advertising. All these chapters have been presented at several conferences
and seminars. The general idea in this paper is to explore new possibilities of research,
either in the thesis or in further research.
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Advocacy coalitions, strategic interests and the policy
process of Swedish advertising self-regulation 1950–1971
Policy change and policy processes have received increased interest in recent decades.
This is evident not only in the number of empirical studies, but also in a dynamic
development of theory and method, with ensuing debates and discussions on the merits
and shortcomings of different approaches (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1993; Sabatier &
Jenkins-Smith 1993; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1999; Sabatier 2007). One theory that has
received significant attention is the advocacy coalition framework (ACF). The ACF has
been developed since the late 1980s in a number of theoretical contributions, with Paul A.
Sabatier and Hank C. Jenkins-Smith being particularly salient. The framework affords
special focus on the importance of actor coalitions in explaining policy change. These are
said to exist over prolonged periods of time and either struggle over or negotiate over
policy outcomes. Coalitions often incorporate broad groups of actors, such as interest
groups, government officials, experts, policy entrepreneurs and even journalists. The
ACF regards policy subsystems as the best level of analysis, and proposes that these
include actors from many levels of government. (Sabatier 1987; Sabatier & JenkinsSmith 1993; Sabatier 1998; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1999; Sabatier 2007; Weible &
Sabatier & McQueen 2009)
The ACF assumes that a coalition is bounds together by a shared hierarchical belief
system of its members, where deep core beliefs (ideology) and policy core (general policy
principles of the subsystem) are more immune to change than secondary beliefs
(instrumental and administrative issues). These beliefs are also seen as the main causal
mechanism driving the actions of the coalitions and leading to subsequent policy change.
This change can be minor, shifting secondary beliefs, or major, changing policy core
beliefs. Initially the ACF described two paths to major policy change: learning and
external subsystem events. In the first case the framework sees policy change as being
contingent on the internal learning of coalitions, a process where expertise and new
knowledge play crucial roles and the policy process take place in a setting with stable
external structures. In the second case major policy changes in a subsystem are associated
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with external chocks, leading to a significant redistribution of political resources and a
modification of the core of a policy beliefs. The external systems function as both
constraint and resource for the coalitions. Recently two more paths have been added to
the framework. The third path is internal subsystem events, usually based on realization
of failed current policies, and the fourth revolves around the possibility of a negotiated
settlement between two or more coalitions (Sabatier 1998; Weible & Sabatier &
McQueen 2009).
Advocacy Coalitions aim to transform their beliefs into policy by utilizing a number
of different strategies. Among these we find lobbying, research, mobilizing public
opinion, initiating research, taking part in state commissions, legal means, etc. The theory
has empirically been associated with policy subsystems dependent on the expertise of
natural science (energy, environment, forestry), but according to Sabatier et al, an
overview of over 80 case studies using the framework proves its usefulness in other
policy fields. The framework has also been used in conjunction with the stages heuristic,
which Sabatier et al think is feasible, given four conditions. Firstly, the stages heuristic
should be viewed as an organizing tool lacking inherent explanatory value. The stages are
therefore to be regarded as either linked to strategies or arenas. Second, it must be
understood that coalitions often have a multi-policy perspective. Third, the same can be
said of stages, where coalitions will be simultaneously active within many policy stages
at once. Fourth, the stages model lacks explanatory power regarding group formation or
group strategy, and here the ACF should instead be used (Sabatier 1998; Weible &
Sabatier & McQueen 2009).
The ACF has made key contributions to the discussion on the importance of actor
beliefs and actor agency within policy subsystems (Sabatier 1987; Sabatier 1998; Zafonte
& Sabatier 1998; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1993; Sabatier 1999; Sabatier 2007; Weible
& Sabatier & McQueen 2009). Still, other aspects of the theory have been criticized as
having weak or insufficient explanatory power. The emphasis on beliefs as the causal
drive of policy change has been described as one-sided and ignoring the importance of
strategic interests in the political power play that policy processes often are part of
(Schlager 1995; Schlager & Blomquist 1996; Hoberg 1996; Nohrstedt 2005). In a series
of papers exploring the change in Swedish nuclear policy after the Three Mile Island
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crisis in 1979, Daniel Nohrstedt suggests that core policy beliefs do not always come into
play when actors react upon what can be termed a crisis event, whether it is internal or
external to the subsystem in question. While the ACF posits that core policy beliefs
seldom change, but can do so when a subsystem is subject to crisis, Nohrstedts
conclusion from studying the actions and beliefs of the ruling Social democrats party at
the time of the Three Mile Island crisis is that the party retained its positive core policy
beliefs in nuclear power, but due to a sudden surge in negative public opinion on nuclear
power after the disaster decided to opt for a referendum and a more ambivalent public
stance on nuclear power. This decision, then, went against the core policy beliefs, but was
implemented to secure political power and avoid party infighting and loss at coming
elections, i.e. strategic interests were given primacy over policy beliefs when guiding
policy action. Accordingly neither minority coalition mobilization nor majority coalition
learning was a deciding factor in events. Instead strategic action of select leadership of
the incumbent elite shaped policy outcomes (Nohrstedt 2005; Nohrsted 2007; Nohrsted
2008). Concluding, Nohrstedt does not refute the applicability of the ACF in analysis of
policy change, but urges careful research design and process tracing to differentiate
between for example policy change due to learning and subsequent shifts in policy values
and policy change due to mainly strategic interest considerations. In his analysis,
Nohrsted combines the analytical model of the ACF with a rational choice inspired model
of political parties’ strategic interests that allows for analysis to differentiate between
these two causal explanations of actor agency and subsequent policy change.
This paper will depart from this suggestion of combining an ACF with an interest
oriented approach to better understand policy change. The subject of study is the policy
process of Swedish self-regulation of advertising during the time period 1950–1971. The
beginning of the period is chosen for two reasons. Firstly, the state initiated a number of
competitive and consumer oriented policies during this time, which directly or indirectly
affected advertising. Secondly, the sustained economic growth during this time
completely transformed lifestyles and consumption of Swedish society, giving an
unprecedented possibility of hedonistic consumption, hence also propelling advertising to
the fore of social, political and economic life. During this time, it was also a hotly debated
social issue, often within the context of consumer issues. Advertising was criticized for
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manipulating consumers, creating higher prices, wasting resources and creating
informational overload and ecological strains. Among critics counted both influential
interest groups such as trade unions, the cooperative movement and women’s associations
that had official state sanction as consumer representatives in corporatist power
structures, and influential individual critics from academia and intellectual circles. (Funke
2011; Funke 2012) At the same time, the business community considered advertising an
integral part of the free market, and vigorously defended it, usually through its business
associations or by business supported research. Reflecting these major events, advertising
regulations went through several changes at this time period. Particularly self-regulation
was reformed and transformed.
Given the historical context, the policy process of Swedish advertising self-regulation
exhibits many promising qualities for a policy process analysis in the context of an
ACF/interest group framework. Still, some revisions in theoretical make up are necessary.
Nohrstedt’s strategic interests are modeled on the behavior of political parties. These are
vote maximization (winning elections), office seeking (private gains from office), policy
seeking (maximizing effects of policy), representation (mediating public sentiments) and
party cohesion (party unity). They fit quite well with political actors. But as selfregulation usually is created, maintained and developed by market actors or their
associations, an interest model more attuned to this type of actor is needed.
Theoretical and empirical research on business associations has suggested that these
are run by two competing logics, the logic of membership and the logic of influence. The
logic of membership focuses on market internal factors, and represents the interaction
between the interests of members and the interests of the associational leadership. Here
members offer market compliance to the leadership who in turn supplies direct market
control in the form of competitive rules as cartels or self-regulation. The logic of
influence focuses on the exchange between associational leadership and external
envirnoment that the association has an interest in influencing, i.e. the state and other
interest groups (trade unions, consumer movements). Here the goal is to influence
regulations and actors that have a potential indirect control of the market, such as state
regulations. The associations main task has historically therefore been to handle and
reduce risks, both on the market and due to market external factors (Lundqvist 1995; van
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Waarden 1992; Schmitter & Streeck 1999). The literature on self-regulation also
emphasizes that business support for self-regulation can be deduced to the following
interests: 1) profitability 2) consumer sovereignty (fair competition and consumer rights)
2) influencing state policies 3) creating public good will. The first two interests
correspond to the direct market interests of members, while the other two correspond to
interests in market external factors. (Funke 2012).
Also, the study will utilize the stages heuristic (agenda setting, problem definition,
decision making, implementation, evaluation) as an ordering mechanism in analyzing the
policy process. This warrants a further modification, as the policy process of selfregulation displays some structural differences from state policy processes. Most selfregulatory systems co-exist, or even co-regulate, with state, supranational or international
regulations. This has led to the development of a modified stages heuristic approach in
studying the policy process (Gunningham 1995; Wotruba 1997; Jenkins 2001; Haufler
2001; Scott 2002; Porter & Ronit, 2006).
Porter & Ronit note that the structures and rules of the state enabling and constraining
policy formation is either lacking or not well known when it comes to internal rules being
set up by market actors. The development of self-regulatory policies is hidden from
public view, either intentionally or due to the indifference of the public. Instead this
process takes place in clandestine, with business associations and regulatory experts as
main actors. (Porter & Ronit, 2006)
Nevertheless, the authors assert that the basic model of the stages heuristic, is valid for
self-regulations too. What must be kept in mind, Porter & Ronit state, is that most selfregulatory practices evolve in interaction with state laws, and that the particular coregulation the two systems create in a given setting varies over time and in place,
affecting the policy process of self-regulation in unexpected ways. Here actors from the
business world interact with market outsiders as representatives of consumers and the
state. This can lead to the process “criss-crossing” or being terminated or interrupted in
unexpected manners, but still essentially be explainable within the framework of analysis.
Also to be considered is the power of public opinion and policy strategies aimed at
influencing it. Putting a self-regulatory issue on the agenda that attracts public attention
can pressure the self-regulatory process into opening up. This in, in turn, is close to the
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reasoning of both the ACF and the interest approach, where external or internal
subsystem crisis can affect policy beliefs and force actors to resort to strategic action.
(Porter & Ronit, 2006)
Advertising regulations in Sweden during 1950 –1971
Advertising in Sweden had few statutory regulations at the start of the period. The law of
1931 on disloyal competition forbade explicit lies in advertising, but awarded damages
only to producers, being primarily a law to regulate fair competition. Thus a number of
self-regulatory bodies started to appear in the 1930s, with two regimes functioning side
by side until a merger in 1957, creating one regime. As its precursors, the regime was
based on the international code of advertising practice, and transgressions, or accusations
thereof, were handled by a self-regulatory agency, of which a number of business
associations were both principals and stakeholders. The agency functioned in a judiciallike manner, although it lacked coercive powers. Self-regulation had initially been created
to look after producer interests, but relatively quickly representation of consumer interests
was officially made part of the operations of the regime. Still, very few consumers made
use of the institution (SOU 1972:7; Boddewyn 1985).
In 1963, consumer representatives were made part of the main self-regulatory body,
Näringslivets opinionsnämnd (NOp). The 1963 State Commission on disloyal advertising
suggested in its 1966 report introducing a general clause to strengthen marketing law, but
at the same time keeping a primary role for self-regulation. However, the Social
Democratic government decided to discard the report and instead proposed extensive
statutory consumer regulations, which were approved by parliament 1970. In 1971 the
new regime basically replaced the old self-regulatory system with a Consumer
Ombudsman acting as a consumer attorney in front of a special Market Court with
coercive statutory powers. Later a National Consumer Board was added in 1973, and in
1976 the Consumer ombudsman became its head (Funke 2011; Funke 2012). According
to (Boddewyn 1985), the replaced regime of self-regulation suffered from four major
drawbacks: the inability to highlight rising consumer concerns, not being well known
among consumers, a limited capacity to handle large number of complaints and
difficulties in getting non-compliers to adhere to self-regulation. Self-regulation, in turn,
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thus went through major reforms in 1968 to adapt to the new regulatory landscape. The
new self-regulatory regime was based on internal producer censorship to avoid
production of advertisements that would be in breach of the coming laws, and survives
more or less intact until this day (SOU 1972:7; Funke 2004).
The coalitions of the policy subsystem of advertising
During the chosen period of study, the policy subsystem of advertising consisted of two
competing advocacy coalitions. The first coalition, termed the producer oriented
coalition, was mainly comprised of business associations with interests in advertising and
advertising regulations, business oriented academics, politicians, journalists and public
intellectuals. The second coalition, named the consumer oriented coalition, was made up
of interest groups and individuals that claimed to represent the consumers. Among these
we find trade unions, the cooperative movement, state officials, academics, consumer
activists, journalists, artists and public intellectuals. Of these, the interest groups received
official legitimacy by being selected as consumer representatives in the new state
agencies created in the postwar era. Likewise, several of the business associations were
given similar positions on these agencies in the capacity of producer representatives
(Funke 2004; Funke 2011; Funke 2012; Jäfvert 1969; Pestoff 1984; Rothstein 1992;
Lundqvist 2003; Lundqvist 2007). This was in line with the corporatist policies of the
social democratic state, whereby interest groups were co-opted into subordinating or at
least adjusting their interests to that of the state. In consequence the coalitions each had a
central core supported by the corporatist structures, which incidentally also placed them
in the same policy structures, covering most of the stages heuristic model.
The core policy beliefs
Looking at the core policy beliefs of the coalitions during the start of the period, the
producer oriented coalition viewed advertising’s function as market information, giving
consumer the information they needed to make an informed buy according to their
preferences. This view was supported by economic theory that stated that this created
lower search costs, lower prices, better competition, enabled new market entries and
product innovation. The persuasive function was downplayed and seen as an exception or
a complement to the informative function. The consumer was regarded as capable and
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having heterogeneous needs, creating a demand driven consumer choice market.
Advertising was therefore a beneficial good for both producers and consumers, and the
coalition was united in faith in the market’s ability as a producer of societal goods, given
that market freedom, i.e. significant producer control of the market, was part of the
equation. Regarding problem definition, the main goal of policy was to safeguard
advertising maneuverability on the market to guarantee market freedom and
competitiveness. The social group whose welfare was crucial was that of the producers
while basic choice of policy instruments was self-regulation and communicating good
will. Desirability of participation of various segments of society was based on the belief
that producer controlled self-regulation represented both the interests of producers and
consumers. The ability of society to solve problems in this policy area was seen as best
served by self-regulation in combination with restricted and market accommodated state
policies.
The core policy beliefs of the consumer oriented coalition were based on advertising’s
main function as persuasion, trying to bend the consumer’s preferences into buying a
specific product. This was backed up by economic theories such as the market power
school that stated that advertising was used by large companies to build brand loyalty,
thereby creating barriers of entry, monopolistic competition, higher prices, higher search
costs and less innovation. The consumer was seen as capable but in need of consumer
information and product testing to balance the persuasive characteristics of advertising.
Also needs were regarded as normative, creating a discourse of rational consumption,
whereby thriftiness and the bare essentials of the household was to be prioritized, while
luxury goods and entertainment was seen as a threat to limited household budgets of
ordinary citizens. Persuasive advertising was consequently by default a risky and
potentially hazardous part of the market. Still, the coalition had faith in the market as
provider of societal goods, given that the market was subjugated to state control and
overall political goals. (Aléx 1994; Aléx 2003; Husz 2009)
Regarding problem definition, the main goal of policy was to guarantee consumer rights
by limiting, countering and improving advertising. The social group whose welfare was
crucial was that of the consumers while basic choice of policy instruments was statutory
regulations. Desirability of participation of various segments of society was based on the
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belief that strong consumer and state participation was necessary to safeguard that
consumer interests were met. The ability of society to solve problems in this policy area
was seen as best served by statutory regulations, as producers by default made selfregulation biased.
The progress of the policy beliefs of the two coalitions are described in more
analytical detail in the three tables accompanying this paper ( appendix 1–3)
The policy process – changing coalition policy beliefs and strategic action by key
elite majority actors
Looking at the development of self-regulation of advertising during this time period, three
extended policy phases are discernable. These occur between 1950-1963, 1963-1968 and
1968-1971. Each phase will first be shortly described, then analyzed using the theoretical
constructs presented.
1950-1963 – the first serious challenges to self-regulation
During the period 1950-1963, self-regulation is essentially still a producer oriented
regime, although going through a major reform in 1957, and beginning to discuss
increased consumer representation in the NOp at roughly the same time. The reforms of
1957, which merged the two regimes that had emerged in the 1930s into one, can be
explained by both advocacy coalitions learning and a strategic interest framework.
Business association representatives from both regimes entered talks of a merger in 1955.
Talks were held between the two camps, and the matter was also discussed on the board
of the Marketing association, at that time the principal of one of the regimes. An internal
report was produced by the commission handling negations on the merger, which gave a
number of reasons why a merger should be done. The conclusion was that slightly
different rules in the two regimes created a loophole for producers, as these could “chose”
which regime they wanted to handle a case, while consumers’ complaints were only
admitted in one of the regimes. This made for ineffective regulation and double standards.
A single regime would remedy this. Also, the possibility of the state stepping in and
taking over regulation increased if the current state of things were left intact. This risk
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was further aggravated by the fact that only about ten percent of the complaints originated
from consumers (in the regime that admitted them). This could also attract the attention of
the state and give it arguments to replace self-regulation with a statutory regime. The
decision was taken to merge the two regimes, which would include the previous
principals and also a number of new ones, all established business associations.
In the same year as the new regime was launched, a book critical of advertising as a
societal phenomena, Reklamen är livsfarlig (Advertising is lethal) by author Sven
Lindqvist, garnered a lot of public attention and sparked a critical debate on advertising
whose intensity that chocked the business community. The author claimed advertising
poisoned the minds of people, making them abandon civic values for false materialism.
He also blasted self-regulation as being ineffective and equivalent to “letting the thieves
being the judges of their own crimes” ( Lindqvist 1957, 2001; quote p. 67,69).
Lindqvist’s book was read by the author as a serial on public radio, and was also
published in Cooperative movement’s membership journal. Here, the response from the
producer oriented coalition varied. The Marketing Association organized a public debate
on advertising in Stockholm, but refrained to invite Lindqvist, whose views were
considered too extreme (Björklund 1967). However, the Association of Advertisers
decided to approach the peak trade union LO and newly formed state consumer agency
Statens Konsumentråd to hold tripartite talks on what could be done to better the public
standing on advertising. Possible revisions of self-regulatory rules, particularly aimed at
the ad agencies, and inclusion of consumer representatives were the topic of discussion.
Talks were held during 1957 and 1958, and resulted in a memo that stated that the current
rules of self-regulation were sufficient, but that the LO and Statens konsumentråd ought
to be invited to join the NOp as consumer representatives. However, nothing came of this
suggestion. Still, board meetings among the principals of the NOp show that the issue of
additional principals was brought up in the year reports of 1961 and 1962, with the need
for consume representatives explicitly being mentioned in 1962.
In 1962, a second major public debate on advertising was initiated, first in major Daily
Dagens nyheter, then by producer oriented coalition member Åke Ortmark, a journalist
with a background in producer oriented think tank SNS. Ortmark vehemently attacked
gasoline advertising in the press in 1962 and the released a book in 1963, Sveket mot
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konsumenterna (Betrayal of the consumers). Unlike Lindqvist, who attacked the
foundation of the newly created Affluent society as devoid of meaning, Ortmark had a
more classic consumerist approach, calling for the young and more socially oriented
business leadership to take the lead in reforming business practices and making sure
advertising became more informative and responsible. The new CEO of the Marketing
Association wrote an appreciating article on Ortmark’s book in major Stockholm daily,
and also took on a series of debates with Ortmark at various local Marketing societes all
over the country. The same year, LO and Statens konsumentråd, together with two other
peak trade union (SACO and TCO) and a national women’s’ association (Sveriges
Husmodersföreningars Riksförbund), were admitted as consumer representatives into the
NOp. A few years later the trade union representing employees in hotel and restaurants
(Sveriges hotel och restaurangförbund) was added as a consumer representative.
During this time period the consumer oriented coalition produced a number of books,
pamphlets and government commissions that clearly stated that advertising was a
problem for consumers. Self-regulation was also called into question. Powerful trade
union LO in 1955 stated in Konsumeten och reklamen (The consumer and advertising), a
pamphlet joint-released with the Cooperative Movement, that self-regulation needed
improvement or would otherwise have to be complemented with stringer statutory rules.
The Social Democratic state had by this time launched a series of ambitions economic
policies whose interaction was crucial to the wider visions of the labor movement. The
Rhen-Meidner model, whose economic policies would keep inflation and wages in check,
was at the center but would interact with competitive and consumer policies to create an
ideal outcome for large groups of consumers. The goal was to create modest but real
wage increases that in turn would guarantee increased purchasing power among blue
collar workers as competitive polices lowered prices and consumer polices helped them
make the best buy possible. In this equation, advertising was perceived by the consumer
oriented coalition as a possible risk. Main labor movement economist Rudolf Meidner
lambasted it in Konsumeten och reklamen as a potential hazard, as the economic policies
of the state made full use of all resources, and did not need extra stimulation or
mechanisms that threatened diverting consumption into wrong directions.
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Analysis
The reforms of self-regulation in 1957 were the outcome of a clandestine policy process,
pricy only to the participating business associations. In this case agenda setting, problem
formulation, decision making and implementation took place inside the business
associations. However, the evaluation process was partly opened up to outsiders, as the
Association of Advertisers invited the LO and state consumer agency Statens
konsumentråd to evaluate the new regime. The Marketing association had similar
evaluation done, but kept these away from outside participation. The actions of the
associations are clearly tied to the Lindqvist debate, as internal documents explicitly
reveal that these actions were taken due to it. Still, this is a good example of how the
policy process of self-regulation due to sudden outside pressure started to exhibit a “crisscrossing” behavior.
Applying the ACF/strategies interest framework, it is apparent that the first reforms
were due to a combination of internal coalition learning and strategic interests. The
realization that two regimes worked worse than one was based on almost 20 years of
experience of having two regimes. The internal report done on the subject, together with
board discussions reveal that representatives of both camps wanted a better and more
stringent regulatory regime. So this would constitute a learning process based on a
cumulative experience, guided by the experts responsible for the report and also heading
the merger talks. Still, a number of arguments given for the merger were based on the fear
of market external factors thought to impact negatively on market relations. The market
internal control of self-regulation was threatened by the market external state unless
weaknesses, or what could be seen as such by the state, were addressed. As a main
interest of the actors in self-regulation was to uphold consumer sovereignty, it did not
bode well that the regime in practice only regulated fair competition while ignoring
consumer rights. Here strategic reasons are clear. Still, the experts behind the report stress
that the rights of the consumers have recently been implemented into the International
code of advertising practice which Swedish self-regulation adhered to, and done so on the
initiative of these Swedish experts. This would indicate that the consumer issue for the
experts was a matter of core policy beliefs, but that strategic arguments were used to
convince the more market active board members. Accordingly it is possible that tensions
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existed between these groups on core policy beliefs existed, as the market active members
more or less equated producers with the main group whose welfare was at stake, while
among experts active in self-regulation a view started to emerge that it was just as
important that the regime stood up for consumer welfare. (Funke 2012)
The sudden evaluation of the new regime in the wake of the Lindqvist debate, as well
as the invitation of the Advertisers to include the LO and Statens konsumentråd in the
self-regulatory regime appears to be more a case of strategy than learning or shift of core
policy values. The clue to this interpretation is the timing of events. The board of the
advertisers had in 1956 remarked that advertising had a low public standing, and asked
the CEO to contact the LO to discuss the situation. It must be understood that the LO at
this time was one of the most powerful interest groups in Sweden. As one of two
organizations making up the ruling labor movement (the Social Democratic Party, at this
time in power since 1932, being the other one), and also having recently acquired official
status as consumer representative on a number of new state agencies regulating both
consumer and competitive issues, the LO held considerable weight. Also, the pamphlet
Konsumenten och reklamen had demonstrated that the LO was critical of advertising and
wanted stronger state regulations. However, it took over a year until the CEO did initiate
those contacts, and when they were initiated it was shortly after the Lindqvist debate had
taken place. These contacts were also labeled by the board of the Marketing Association
as “informational gathering from the main enemies of advertising”. (Funke 2011; Funke
2012). It seems that the Lindqvist debate acted as “the final straw”, turning public opinion
towards the views of the LO, making it imperative to actually go ahead with contacting
the trade union.
When discussing the upcoming talks, the board of the Association of Advertisers also
stressed the importance of not allowing possible consumer representatives having a say in
fair competition matters, and that it was imperative that a politically neutral organization,
as the national housewives association, should be invited to break what the board
considered LO’s hold on the public discourse on the consumer issue. It was also
suggested that a CEO from a Cooperative company should be present at the talks. The
Cooperative KF had close and usually good relations with the labor movement, and
several of its key figures were also party members in the SAP. But as producers, they
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were also members of several business associations, such as the Advertiser Association.
This makes them potentially hard to place coalition-wise, but their ideological stance on
putting member welfare before profits at least disassociates them from one of the key
interests of market producers. (Funke 2012)
The time lag between the tripartite report in 1958 recommending the LO and Statens
konsumentråd and the actual induction in 1963 also point in the direction of strategy.
Although lack of sources makes it hard to definitely settle what happened, the inductive
evidence points to the Marketing association blocking this initiative of the Association of
Advertisers. The Marketing association, acting as a peak organization on marketing
matters for all other business associations, had a pivotal influence over self-regulations at
this time, holding four seats on the board of the NOp, instead of one or two, like the
remaining organizations. Also, the Marketing Association had on its own appointed two
consumer representatives, a consumer researcher and an mp from the liberal party on the
board of the NOp. The suggestion of the tripartite commission thus directly challenged
the legitimacy of these representatives, and indirectly the authority of the board of the
marketing association.
This interpretation is further strengthened by the fact that the board of the Marketing
Association blocked calls for reforms that appeared in internal reports in 1958 and in
1963. The first report was commissioned by the board after the Lindqvist debate took off,
and was written by the leadership of the NOp, while the second was drafted by the CEO
and the Chairman of the board of the Marketing Association. The first report
recommended more stringent monitoring of the market and maybe the introduction of a
pro-active attorney-like function inside the NOp. The second report put forward that
members inside the Marketing societies, the local chapters of the Marketing association,
could be activated to better monitor and report dubious advertising to the NOp. Increased
member action in monitoring would also active more consumers, as these would have
more venues to turn to with their complaints.
These suggestions were refuted by the
board as being against the spirit of self-regulation, which according to them emphasized a
discrete and flexible process of handling complaints. Here it must be stressed that
suggested in the internal commissions did not suggest inclusion of corporatist interest
groups in self-regulation. But none of these suggestions or the suggestion by the tripartite
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group resulted in any policy change. It is therefore likely that the board of the Marketing
Association not only blocked internal calls for reform, but for some time also thwarted
the ambitions of the Association of Advertisers.
The conclusion that the reasoning of the Association of Advertisers’ reveals strategic
interests as the main drive behind the tripartite initiative is also strengthened by looking at
the development of the wider regulatory context and the policy ideas behind it.
The initiative of the Association of Advertisers was made in a political setting where
consumer issues were increasingly targeted by state policies, and where advertising was
criticized as a potential hindrance to these policies. The initiative of the Advertisers was
thus more along the lines of damage control than a change of core policy beliefs. The
inclusion of corporatist consumer representatives in the NOp risked producer control of
the regime, as it was hard to know what agenda these actors would pursue once inside,
but the producer principals must have decided that potential gains outweighed the risks.
The strategy would hopefully would dampen public criticism of advertising and
subsequently remove some external pressure by moving the issue away from the
unpredictability of the public arena into the closed off policy arena of corporatist
intermediation. Also, the fact that new consumer representatives were clearly
outnumbered by those of the producers, as the former consisted of five associations while
producer representatives numbered 20 associations, and that the regulatory regime had
been shaped by business interests meant that the producer oriented coalition could hope
for corporatism on business terms. (Funke 2012)
This interpretation of advocating corporatist inclusion as a interest strategic to move
away the issue of advertising from a confrontational setting in the public arena to a
corporatist policy arena of intermediation is strengthen by internal sources of the business
associations.
At a board meeting of the Marketing Association, The CEO of the
Association of Advertisers reacted with anger to the decision of the new reform friendly
CEO of the Marketing Association to take part in and encourage public debate on
advertising. This strategy would only result in giving critics of advertising more attention
and influence, he claimed, as producers according to him stood no chance when
advertising was debated in public. The second public debate on advertising in 1962-1963
probably tilted in favor of the Advertisers strategy, and thus contributed to a
16
corporatization of self-regulation of advertising. So while the core policy values on
regulation remained that producer controlled self-regulation was sufficient for the needs
of both producers and consumers, the outside pressure of the consumer oriented coalition
had forced the producer oriented coalition to relinquish complete control of selfregulation. The scheme of the Marketing Association to appoint consumer representatives
that lacked affiliation with particularly the LO had not been sufficient or effective in the
eyes of the Advertisers, given the heightened state of debate due to Lindqvist and later
Ortmark. That Ortmark in his book commended the business community for its recent
inclusion of corporatist consumer representatives in the NOp indicates that the some of
the sought effect was reached. (Funke 2012)
1963 -1968 corporatist self-regulation – a brief interlude
As the 1960s progressed, it appears that consumer issues were incorporated into the
producer view of an efficient market. As the consumer issue continued to grow in both
public debate and state policies, expert members and leadership figures in associations of
the producer oriented coalition started to exhibit views whereby the welfare of the
consumer was central to a healthy market. In a number of debate books, articles and
reform proposals, it was stressed that the market was essentially demand driven, and that
consumer information was an essential part of market information. However, this view of
the consumer differed from that of the consumer oriented coalition. While the latter view
emphasized advertising as a problematic market function and consumer information as
the solution, the former saw advertising as functional and consumer information as a
necessary complement to the information already given in advertising. According to these
segments of the producer oriented coalition, the concern was to educate and inform
consumers on how to best utilize both advertising and consumer information to maximize
their market exchange. (Funke 2011; Funke 2012)
Looking at policy processes on regulation, the second phase is characterized by the
problematic existence of the corporatist self-regulatory regime. While the inclusion of the
new consumer representatives had formalized the criss-crossing of the policy process of
self-regulation, it was seen as an improvement rather than a makeover by the producer
principals. The regime would also be both unstable and relatively short-lived, being side
17
stepped by the government bill of 1970 recommending the formation of a statutory
consumer regime, and ending with the termination of the NOp in 1971 in conjunction
with the launch of the new state consumer policies. (Funke 2012)
A study of the two coalitions also reveals that both sides were quite active in the
numerous state commissions that at this time investigated consumer and competitive
policies. In these commissions telltale signs are apparent that the corporatist solution did
not have the full support of the consumer oriented coalition. Particularly the LO kept
advancing ideas of larger role for the state in consumer policies. While the organization
had supported the state policies instituted in the 1950s that aimed at increasing
competition and educating consumers, it voiced its dissatisfaction with the outcome of
these policies. In a referral to a report from the state commission on consumer prices in
1965 the LO claimed that cartel-like behavior still existed, price competition was
insufficient and consumers did not appear to act more informed than before. Particularly
marketing was singled out as standing in the way of a more efficient consumer market,
and increased state efforts in consumer polices was recommended. (Lundqvist 2003;
Lundqvist 2007)
At the same time members of the producer oriented coalition that took part in state
commissions that actively sought to influence statutory policy as to give self-regulation
continued regulatory primacy members of the producer oriented coalition. In the 1966
report of the producer dominated Commission on disloyal competition, some additional
statutory rules were recommended. But at the same time the report stressed a continued
central role for self-regulation, as this mode of regulation best suited the dynamic and
ever changing demands of the market. In the 1968 the report of the Commission on
consumer information, also having a strong producer oriented presence, further reforms
inside self-regulation was suggested as to improve consumer information and regulation
of advertising. On the other hand, rival proposals were given by reports of commissions
where the consumer oriented coalition was dominant. These instead recommended
increased statutory involvement, and the creation of state agencies to handle both
information and regulation of consumer issues, including advertising. (Funke 2012)
The actual activities of the NOp also tell of a half-hearted involvement of the new
consumer representatives. The Archives of the LO that contain yearly reports of all the
18
corporatist boards the organization was a member of does not contain any mention of the
NOp. Documents from the mid 1960s also strengthens the interpretation that the LO were
unhappy with the NOp, and pursued other strategies closer to their core policy beliefs. In
an informal hearing held by the Marketing Associations PR-Commission at the end of
1964, a number of key players in consumer politics and self-regulation were interviewed
on their personal thoughts on the subject of advertising and advertising ethics. Present at
the hearing were Rudolf Meidner, perhaps the most influential economist inside Swedish
Social Democracy during the post-war years and at the time member of Statens
Konsumentråd and Eric Petterson, representative of LO in the NOp. At the hearing
Meidner revealed a very negative and distrustful opinion of advertising, stating that
unacceptable violations and transgressions of the consumer’s rights were common
occurrences in the world of advertising. (Funke 2012)
Meidner also had little faith in advertising being considered ethically sound just
because it was not convicted of a crime in a court. The best aid of the consumer in
confronting advertising, according to Meidner, was the insight that advertising was
always biased, always acting on the behalf of the producer, and never on that of the
consumer. Regarding self-regulation of advertising, Meidner gave ambiguous answers,
stating that he thought it was a good regime, especially since the consumers had become
represented, but that he didn’t think the trade unions would be interested in funding the
regime. He also said that it was a pity so few consumers reported cases to the NOp, and
that that he found other consumer based initiatives possible. He suggested a pro-active
consumer commission policing and reporting bad advertising, although it would refrain
from passing judgement, leaving this to the NOp. It is worthwhile to note that the so–
called Skoglund group, a commission on consumer issues formed by the SAP and the LO,
in 1966 suggested that the formation of local consumer commissions made up of trade
union representatives were necessary to make consumer information more efficient. This
proposal was also included in a government bill in 1967, where these commissions were
to be formed on a trial basis, funded by the state. The suggestion of Meidner bears a
potential affinity with the proposal made by the Skoglund group. Petterson also came out
as critical of the NOp, stating that it needed to be faster in processing complaints, and that
an animated body of consumers would demand an ever increasing capacity of the NOp.
19
He also implied that increased funding by the government, something that to him would
be needed to make possible the responsibilities of the body, might discredit it in the eyes
of the business community, leading to a lessening will of the business community to
abide by its verdicts. (Funke 2012)
The question of financing was at this point becoming critical at the NOp. This was
due both to the burden of an increased workload and the cost of extra staff needed to cope
with it and several attempts at increasing the scope and activities of the NOp. For
example, a pro-active attorney like function, Anmälningsbyrån, was launched in 1968, but
was depended on state funding and would thus only run for an initial trial year. The
organisation had grown substantially since its inception. Only two years after its
foundation, in 1959, it had to hire an extra law expert to be able to keep up with the
amount of complaints it received. By the year of 1971, it housed a head, two vice-heads
and 39 regular members in three sections. Certain reforms were made in the organisation
to increase efficiency, and in 1966, acting CEO of the NOp Tengelin reported to the
board of the Marketing Association that these had been successful, as the pile of
complaints had been reduced. Still, in the following year the NOp wished to hire an
information secretary, but that lack of funds made it impossible. That LO at this point did
not show any interest in participating in funding was not positive, and the statements by
Meidner and Ericsson is supported by internal documents from the NOp, where LO and
the other trade unions are missing when individual contributions from principals are
listed. It is also evident that LO did not attend or participate in several internal reports
discussing reforms that were made at the NOp during this time, and at times even avoided
the yearly meeting of the principals. (Funke 2012)
Here it is also worth to note that Lillemor Erlander, LO spokesperson on consumer
matters and very critical of advertising, was also a LO representative of the NOp.
Erlander was a member of both the Consumer Commission launched in 1967 and the
Skoglund group (Skoglundgruppen), which both influenced the formulation of state
consumer policies in the early 1970:s. In the Consumer Commission, Erlander was an
outspoken supporter for minimizing business influence in the proposed Swedish
Consumer Agency, wanting fewer business representatives on the board than the proposal
suggested. The actions and statements of the LO vis-à-vis the NOp were, in conjunction
20
with the initiatives and the proposals given by some state commissions, an indication that
Social Democracy during the second half of the 1960s had developed other ideas about
regulations of marketing than just letting itself be a part of the corporatist arrangement of
self-regulation (Funke 2012).
Analysis
During this phase, the criss-crossing of the policy process had partly been formalized
with the inclusion of the corporatist consumer representatives. However, the policy
process of self-regulation appears to have been divided into two separate processes: one
taking part inside the NOp, with internal reports and reforms, one placed inside the state
policy process, whereby the two coalitions in a number of state commissions tried to
either defend self-regulation or push for more state relations. The developments during
the second phase of policy development shows that despite the formalization of the crisscrossing policy process of self-regulation through a corporatization, this did not lead to
the creation of a new coalition with shared core policy beliefs, nor a negotiated settlement
between two coalitions. The producer oriented coalition appears to partially have adopted
new policy beliefs by including consumer welfare and consumer information as part of
their core beliefs. However, this did not mean that they accepted the consumer oriented
coalitions’ view on consumer information, or their negative assessment of advertising.
Likewise, the consumer oriented coalition did not abandon their core view that consumer
and advertising regulations were to be handled by the state or directly by consumers.
Their participation in the NOp appears to have been purely strategic, gaining increasing
influence on regulation of advertising while at the same time pursuing the core policy
goal through referrals and participation in state commissions. This interpretation is
supported by the fact that producer oriented coalition members also actively in state
commissions in referrals tried to influence statutory development as to give continued
primacy to market accommodated self-regulation. This was an admission that the struggle
between the coalitions over policy influence definitely had moved into the sphere of state
policies.
At the same time, tensions existed inside the coalitions. In the producer oriented
coalition, experts and association leadership appears to have favored stricter reforms and
21
a more consumer inclusive policy, while producers active in the market were more
hesitant and blocked some of these reform initiatives. In the consumer oriented coalition,
the stronger pro-state beliefs developed inside the labor movement created friction with
the cooperative, whose double nature as both representing both consumers and producers
caused them to be excluded from the internal policy work of the trade unions in the
influential Skoglund group.
Third phase 1968 – 1971 external pressure and radical reforms
By the end of the 1960s, it was apparent that major policy changes were about in the area
of consumer and competitive policies. Public opinion had increasingly turned against
advertising, and the political radicalism of the late 1960s made advertising a key issue in
protests. Polls showed growing dissatisfaction or suspicion with advertising, particularly
among young people. The labor movement had mirrored these changes by adopting an
increasingly negative stance on advertising, and similar views were apparent in the
Cooperative movement and among consumer activists as well. Criticism of advertising
was now part of a context where the capacity of a market economy to deliver societal
goods was seriously questioned or even refuted. The leftist radical discourse on
advertising also received support from the media, as a number of journalists and public
intellectuals criticized advertising and the foundations of the affluent society itself. The
producer oriented coalition made a few attempt to launch a media counter-offensive, but
it was largely unsuccessful. Members of the producer oriented coalition complained about
what they perceived as a biased media, favoring the consumer oriented coalition, and a
concerted effort by the business associations never materialized as a number of
associations thought taking a public stand that risked severe the political repercussions.
Also, an overall radicalization of the labor movement by the end of the 1960s and early
1970s resulted in its partial abandonment of corporatist consensus policies. Adopting
slogans as “democratic socialism”, Social Democracy pushed for increased union
influence in the labor market and a larger public sector. These policies were also largely
turned into policy, although the most controversial, the creation of wage earner funds that
in effect would make trade unions major owners of private business, did not come into
effect until much later, and then in a watered down version. (Funke 2011; Funke 2012)
22
By this time, numerous commissions had also filed reports recommending various
reforms and policy changes. Now it was up to the Social Democratic government to
formulate a bill based on these various suggestions and probes. The report that explicitly
covered the issue of advertising was the 1966 report of the commission on disloyal
competition. As stated earlier, it had recommended some revisions in statutory
regulations, but stressed that self-regulation needed a central role, as it was the best way
of developing regulations in tandem with market demands.
However, the proposal of that commission did not turn into a bill. Instead, the
Ministries of Trade and Justice produced a memorandum in 1969 where the proposal of
the commission was criticized for not being in line with the governments view on the
protection of the consumer’s rights. In the memorandum, the head of the justice
department stated that the suggestions of the commission only went half- way in realizing
a proper consumer protection. The commission still wanted self-regulation to have a
wider function than the new law, letting self-regulation be one step ahead of the law, and
letting legislation remain as a second rate regime. This was not good enough, the ministry
stated. Consumer politics was not only based on sound competition, but also on the
deliberate policies of pressuring the producers into making the goods that the consumers
needed, with regard to type, quality, and prices. Consumer politics also had a duty to
make the consumer more aware of the rational aspects of a buy, and make sure that
irrational distractions did not cloud their judgments. The state was irreplaceable when it
came to fulfilling the needs of the consumer. “It is my principal standpoint that society
(meaning the state) should be responsible for the upholding of good ethic standards of
advertising and marketing. The legislation should be as advanced as needed to make sure
it is the basis for the creation of good ethical norms, and the creation of norms should be a
task assigned to public agencies. Sufficient coercive means and sanctions should be put to
their disposal.”, the head of the ministry of justice wrote. (Funke 2012; quote: Prop. 57:
1970 p.59, author’s translation)
The memorandum was sent off for referrals, and tellingly it was labeled as a
“memorandum concerning certain questions of organization in relation to a new law on
improper marketing”. This title bore a real significance, as those who were expected to
write the referral, were not allowed to comment on the revised suggestions of the new
23
law, but only on the suggestions of how its institutions and agencies should be
constructed. In the proposed law were explicit prohibition of combined offers and a
certain types of coupons. The Marketing Association commented on these restraints, and
gravely wrote that the inability to refer on the letters of the law went against the
principles of the whole system of referrals. Many of the associations also stressed that
they thought it was irresponsible of the memorandum to disregard the importance of
market efficiency and market competition in formulating the new legislation. (Funke
2012)
Other referrals were more pleased with the content of the memorandum. The central
trade union LO expressed satisfaction that its demand for prohibiting combined offers and
coupons had been provided for. The Consumer Commission also concluded that the
memorandum was very much in line with the reasoning of the commission. This was
perhaps no surprise, as the consumer commission in its referral stated that it had taken
part in writing a first draft of the PM, said that it was pleased that most of the original
content had remained in the finished version. Here it is worth noting that one of the two
who had signed the referral of the LO was Lillemor Erlander, also member of the
Consumer Commission. The Consumer Commission, launched in 1967, had in its in 1969
report and the final report in 1971 in various forms expounded the view that the consumer
was weak, and the producer strong. The solution lay in the state assuming stewardship of
consumer politics, guiding consumers into making rational purchases and using
legislation to pressuring the producer to satisfy the normative needs of the consumer.
(Funke 2012)
The final bill of the government contained most of the revised suggestions of the
memorandum, and in 1970, it was passed by the Swedish parliament, and took effect in
1971 as the Market Practices Act, introducing new laws and two new state agencies, the
Consumer ombudsman and the Market Court. The new statutory regime was corporatist
in structure, with business associations being producer representatives on the boards of
the new consumer bodies, together with consumer representatives and representatives of
political parties. The change of setting gave business a much smaller percentage of board
seats, being around a third of the seats in the Market Court and the Consumer
ombudsman. An additional third of the seats were taken by trade unions and the
24
cooperative movements in the capacity of consumer representatives, and the final third
reserved for state officials and MPs from parliament. (Pestoff 1984; Rothstein 1992;
Funke 2012)
These development were not entirely unanticipated by the producer oriented coalition.
At the end of 1968 a major reform of the whole self-regulatory took place that completely
changed the regime. The old regime had been based on the policy beliefs that selfregulation was best handled by post-production control of existing market advertising,
and judge according to a common set of formalized ethical rules. Transgression would be
reported and handled by a court-like agency lacking coercive powers, relying solely on
the moral standing of market actors. The new regime instead abandoned this mode of
operation, instead favoring setting up a wholly new regime based on pre-production
censorship, whereby every company and ad agency would have someone formally
responsible and acting as gate keeper stopping questionable advertising from ever
reaching the market. To aid in this endeavor, producer funded agencies staffed with legal
personnel would for a fee assist in cases that were too difficult to settle at company or ad
agency level. Initially a series of experimental and proactive market monitoring
commissions were also formed, probably to quickly jump start and complement the new
regime. These were however short-lived, and all discontinued by the time the statutory
regime was in place in 1971. (Funke 2012)
The regime change had been the initiative of the Advertising Association
(representing the ad agencies) and quickly also won the approval of the Association of
Advertisers. These associations would fund and organize the new regime, particularly
setting up certified training for members that would act as gate keepers on ad agencies
and in company marketing departments. The origins of the new regime can be traced to
recurring complaints from the Association of Advertisers that ad agencies produced too
much advertising that was below standard and caused good will issues for the whole
business community. These arguments had been voiced in connection with the tripartite
initiative in the late 1950s, and resurfaced when the architects of the 1968 reforms in
1965 inside the Advertising Association (representing the ad agencies) started to discuss
what to do about self-regulation. Those behind were the same as in previous suggestions
of reform inside the producer oriented coalition; legal experts, marketing academics and
25
producers active inside NOp. A report was produced in 1965 that argued that a larger part
of the ethical responsibility of advertising ought to be placed upon the ad agencies, and
more pro-active self-regulatory agencies were needed to monitor the market and receive
complaints. However, nothing came of the suggested reforms until the end of 1968.
(Funke 2012)
The idea behind the new regime of 1968 was reform self-regulation as to fit in with
the expected statutory regime, where transgressions risked leading to judicial processes
risking both bad will and hefty fines. To avoid such outcomes was imperative for the
producer oriented coalition. Thus the corporatist post-production monitoring was replaced
by a producer-only pre-production internal censorship regime. This accomplished three
things. First, it made sure that self-regulation accommodated itself to the new regulatory
conditions. Second, it made the regime again a pure business operation, devoid of the
political entanglements and conflicting beliefs and strategies that had plagued the NOp in
its corporatist phase. It would thus be easier to get support for reforms and actual
participation on company level. Third it shifted the ultimate responsibility on the ad
agencies, which now had to manage a system of pre-production censorship. (Funke 2012)
Analysis
The third phase of policy development is characterized by extreme external pressure on
the producer oriented coalition. The subsystem of advertising was subjected pressure
from public opinion increasingly negative towards advertising. Inside the subsystem, the
consumer oriented coalition dominated a number of government reports that took
opposition to the support for self-regulation from producer dominated commissions.
When it came time for the government to formulate a bill for a new consumer policy, the
suggestions of the producer coalition dominated reports were discarded in favor of those
of the consumer coalition. The close contacts between the trade union LO and the Social
Democratic government appear to have been instrumental in this turn of events, as the LO
were consulted in formulation of a ministry PM that in 1969 initially formulated what
was to become the bill of 1970, subsequently being enacted by the parliament creating a
new regulatory regime in 1971.
By launching a new state regime to monitor transgressions and use state coercive
powers if necessary, the self-regulatory regime based on the corporatist NOp was made
26
redundant. Still, the transfer of regimes kept the corporatist principles, but in a state
context. In this setting business influence was made much smaller while that of the
consumer representatives and the state increased, giving the consumer oriented coalition
the upper hand. This transition of regimes confirms the evidence presented in the section
covering the previous phase of policy development, in that the consumer oriented
coalition was unconvinced of the merits of corporatist self-regulation as long as it
remained a business dominated regime. It also confirms that the business oriented
coalition’s strategy to devote resources to state policy processes in order to protect the
independence of self-regulation was a necessary but in the end insufficient approach, due
to the increasing influence of the consumer oriented coalition in this policy arena.
The regulatory switch from self-regulatory corporatism to state corporatism seems
to have been the outcome of a long-term strategy of the consumer oriented coalition, and
based on their core policy beliefs. Still, the often harsh anti-market rhetoric that was
voiced by the labor movement and the launch of polices under the aegis of “democratic
socialism” during this period indicates a shift in core beliefs of the consumer oriented
coalition. Gone was faith in the market as a provider of societal goods. Instead, the
market was viewed as flawed, and the cause of resources being diverted away from the
production of public goods to a waste in private consumption. The ideas of “democratic
socialism” are apparent in SAP:s consumer policy programme of 1972 and the consumer
policy document of trade unions LO and TCO from the same year. In the documents, the
market’s ability to satisfy consumer needs is described as a failure. A high private
consumption rate is described as standing in the way of public consumption, the only way
to realizing social, educational and economic equality. Advertising is described as
something that is used by the producers to divert the consumer’s attention away from the
essential factors that should decide a buy. The producers are portrayed as actors
consciously working against the satisfaction of the consumer’s need. Therefore, active
state consumer politics is necessary to achieve the goals of social democracy – spiritual
growth and active citizenship. The creation of a Swedish Consumer Agency
(Konsumentverket) is described as a tool to reach this goal. Thus core policy beliefs of
the consumer oriented coalition now saw larger potential in the state as producer of
societal goods than the market driven private sector (Funke 2012).
27
The radical reforms of self-regulation in 1968 appear to have been the result of a
combination of external and internal pressure on the producer oriented coalition and
internal learning. The internal learning was connected to the realization that the current
system of self-regulation was insufficient given the growth of market in recent years.
Also, a new type of system was needed if the regime was to become more effective, and
the key position of the ad agencies in keeping up standards had been discussed at least
among advertisers for over a decade. A small shift in core policy beliefs is also evident,
as the persuasive component of advertising had changed from being an exception during
the other phase, but now more or less was termed as problem that needed addressing by
proper reforms. It is also noteworthy that the actual reforms of 1968 were much more
pervasive and elaborate than those suggested in the 1965 report, indicating that the want
for reforms was not just symbolic politics, but actual need of instrumental changes that
would in effect make self-regulation more effective and complement the new state
regulations.
But it seems that external pressure in the shape of increasing bad will in public, the
general radicalization of the incumbent labor movement and the imminent threat of new
statutory regulations were needed to convince the boards of the Advertising Association
and the Association of advertisers to actually go through with reforms.
Conclusion – Two or three coalitions?
The policy process of advertising self-regulation in Sweden during the time period 19501971 can be deduced to the actions of two main coalitions active in the subsystem
regulating advertising. On the one hand a producer oriented coalition, that had created
and maintained a self-regulatory regime since the mid 1930s, and on the other, a
consumer oriented coalition that very much mirrored the increased interest in consumer
issues present in the public, the state and in key interest groups that successfully had
gained legitimacy as consumer representatives.
With the state taking an increased interest in consumer policies in the 1950s, the
policy process of self-regulation became increasingly complex. While the different stages
previously had taken place inside the business associations acting as regime principals,
the pressure from both the consumer oriented coalition and the state initiated a
28
”crisscrossing” policy process. In effect, business and non-business actors interacted
directly inside the NOp after the reforms of 1963. But at the same time both coalitions
were also active inside the state policy process as members of various state commissions,
directly trying to influence agenda setting and problem definition. Reforms inside the
NOp in the 1960s together with activity in state commission reports can be seen as a twopronged attempt by the producer oriented coalition to preserve and strengthen the
independence of self-regulation. The consumer oriented coalition’s lack of interest in
taking part of the policy process inside the NOp and its strong activity in agenda setting
and problem inside the state policy process indicate the opposite goal – to weaken
business dominated self-regulation and create a stronger position for state regulations.
The logic behind these parallel policy processes is to be found in the fact that the
producer oriented coalition even after the reforms of 1963 without doubt was the majority
coalition inside the policy arena of self-regulation, while the newcomers representing the
consumer oriented coalition were the minority. However, on the public arena and in the
state policy arena power was not distributed in the same manner. The consumer coalition
appears to have dominated the public discourse in advertising, which was one reason for
the producer coalition to try to kill off the agenda setting taking place there and move the
issue in the NOp. Inside the state policy arena the close allegiance between the Social
Democratic state and the trade unions and the propensity of the Cooperative movement to
support them also finally tipped the balance of power in favor of the consumer oriented
coalition. That the labor movement had a stable majority in parliament also made it likely
that the problem definition favored by the consumer oriented coalition would survive
decision making. The producer coalition was thus faced with the difficult position of
being a majority coalition in one arena (self-regulation), but a minority one in arenas that
held both potential (public arena) and formal power (state policy arena) over selfregulation.
The core policy beliefs of the coalitions remained largely unaffected during the
studied period, but key changes among them were important in how the coalitions over
time pushed for policy reforms. A gradual learning inside the producer oriented coalition
created a bigger awareness that self-regulation also had to cater to consumer needs and
incorporate consumer information, and that the persuasive aspects of advertising could
29
constitute a real problem. Still, it seems that this learning was somewhat isolated to
segments inside the coalition that was actively involved in self-regulation. Board
members of the business associations that dominated as principals of the main selfregulatory agency NOp appear to have been less keen on this, blocking policy reforms
that had this aim at the decision making stage until external pressure forced them to let
them pass. The admittance of consumer representatives inside the NOp appears to have
been largely a strategic move in a situation of external pressure.
It is possible that the producer oriented coalition in reality consisted of two factions
fighting for control of the policy arena of self-regulation, which in reality equated the
boards of the NOp and the boards of the stakeholder associations that were principals of
the NOp. According Schmitter & Streeck (Schmitter & Streeck 1985), associations inside
corporatist systems often exhibit internal tension between leadership keen on running
self-regulation with the approval of the state, and members who often have market based
interests that can be contrary to or challenge regulatory design. Depending on the
regulatory outcome of these internal tensions, this in can lead to tension between state and
association and association and other associations not covered by the agreement between
the association and the state. Another possible interpretation would be to analytically split
the coalition into two: a pro-active reform-friendly producer coalition and a re-active
reform-skeptic producer coalition. Still, active reformers did not question or abandon the
associations they were member of, and ultimately supported self-regulation over state
regulations. This conflict might therefore also be explicable as an internal fight in a single
coalition over which secondary strategy to use to best safeguard the continued existence
of a core policy producer dominated self-regulatory regime.
The policy actions of the producer oriented coalition can consequently be seen as a
combination of learning in certain quarters and the increasing internal as well as external
subsystem pressure leading to actions based on protecting strategic interests, such as
power over market regulations.
The consumer coalition seems more cohesive, although tension between for example
the trade union LO and the Cooperative movement in the end of the 1960s indicate that
this coalition wasn’t so stable either. Still, the radicalism of the labor movement wasn’t
challenged by the Cooperative. It even had staunch supporters inside its own ranks. Here
30
the core policy beliefs appear to be pretty solid over time (see tables in appendix), with
the important exception of the faith in the market’s ability to deliver societal goods. The
faith in this function, given state control over market regulations, was diminished by the
end of the period and replaced with a larger faith in the state as provider of societal
goods. Barring the membership in the NOp, the actions of the consumer oriented coalition
seems more based on beliefs than on strategic action. One reason for this is of course the
long term incumbency of the SAP. Having been in power since 1932, and with
corporatism co-opting key collective actors in supporting Social democratic policies,
many of the strategic interests were manageable enough to allow for more long term
ideological goals, such as state dominated market. Still, the strong leftist tilt of the party
in the end of the 1960s can also be interpreted as a strategic way of responding to
pressure from trade unions and the political radicalism of students, i.e. protecting party
cohesion, appearing representative of public sentiments and safeguarding vote
maximization. (Esping-Andersen 1990; Åmark 1993; Andersson 2003; Henrekson &
Jakobsson 2002) Still, the number of policies enacted at the time suggests that there really
was a shift in policy core beliefs regarding faith in the market as producer of societal
goods, and that the changes in advertising regulations 1971 was one of many expressions
of this change.
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Appendix 1.
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Appendix 2.
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Appendix 3.
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