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Is Religion in Africa Today Simply a Destructive Throwback to “Tradition”
or the Promise of Positive Social and Political Transformation?
Religion in Africa, certainly throughout the last Century, has been under the constant
scrutiny of various agencies: the Western and African Media, governments, international
organisations and the public eye. This myriad of examinations has created some general
assumptions that ‘religion’ in Africa is backward, with an irrational devotion to out-dated
practices, or of interfering ‘alien’ religions and faith based NGOs which apply foreign and
unsuitable doctrine. All of which has contributed to some destructive force that has robbed
African communities of peace and prosperity.
In this essay, I will argue that this is an overly simplified view of religion, in fact there are
so many interpretations of religion in Africa there lacks any clear consensus on its
meaning; and as such, religion is best viewed on a case-by-case basis. In trying to answer
the question definitively one way or the other, the analysis of religion becomes
compromised; instead, by deconstructing the premise of the questions it may be possible
to understand the variable processes and outcomes of religion.
In order to do so, this essay will review the case studies of Uganda and Tanzania – both
of which share similar socio-economic conditions, albeit under different political
circumstances, and, importantly, diverse demographics of religious belief. The analysis
will first address the concept of ‘religion’ and break it down into typologies, such as
religious faith and practice, religious organisation, and individual agencies within its elite
leadership. The essay will then move on to analyse in turn, what the idea of “traditional
religion” may be, through a structural-functionalist view. It will then analyse religion as
destructive, and look at the political action, which runs along side the invocation of
religious reasons for conflict in order to show that religious identity is often manipulated
for political ends. Finally this essay will look at the unifying and progressive nature of
some religious organisations and highlight the positive role it can play through social
enterprise and community organisation.
In sum it will be shown that religion in Africa can be both destructive and transformative,
both positive and negative. But this is not necessarily a single fault of religion because it
does not operate exclusively, but within a realm of other forces, political, economic and
social.
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Understanding Religion in Africa
It is perhaps best to start off with a broad conceptualisation of religion, as Kastfelt (2005:
6) suggests, as an intellectual system which Africans use to make sense of their lives and
the world around them. This is possibly best as it allows for an understanding that
individual religions will not be viewed in any kind of uniformed way.
Looking at the two cases studies this essay is presenting; according to the CIA world
factbook 1 Mainland Tanzania is comprised of approximately thirty percept Christian,
Thirty-five percept Muslim and thirty-five percept, what they call, “Traditional religion.”
Uganda, is something very different: approximately forty-two percept Roman Catholic,
forty-two percept Protestant, twelve percept Muslim and three percept ‘Other’.
What these figures miss, however, is a very important observation which significantly
alters the way in which religious following operates. As Ellis and Ter Harr have argued,
‘In most countries plural religious allegiance is common at all levels of society, so that an
individual may be a member of several religious congregations simultaneously.’ (Ellis
and Ter Harr 1998: 177)
Binsbergen and Schofelleers define Pluralism as something which, ‘asserts the relative
autonomy or irreducibility of human culture in general and of different domains within
culture.’ (Binsbergen and Schofelleers 1985: 140) In this light, It is possible to review
the pluralism of religion in a different form, that of religions multiple functions. Ranger
and Kimambo (1972: 1) assert that ‘there is no satisfactory definition of religion which
allows us to separate it from political or economic or social life.’ Indeed, ‘Some authors
go as far as to consider religious thought as a vehicle for almost anything except religion.’
(Eliis and Ter Haar 1998: 181) This being said religion itself cannot ever be wholly
separated from other processes which play out in African societies, religion is both
revered and political, personal and social.
This being the case it is perhaps best, then, to break down religion into separate agencies,
namely those of: elite leadership, community organisation, and personal faith and
practice. This is not to suggest that they are mutually exclusive, of course there would be
intervening influences between these three realms. However, this distinction allows for a
1
http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/xx.html
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more nuanced understanding of the dynamics through which religion is asserted as a key
force in African life.
What this amounts to is an understanding that the motivations, decisions and actions
between agencies within the religious elite, its wider community and on a personal belief
level do not necessitate uniformity. What is often pronounced as “religious conflict”t or
dogma does not, in actuality, usually reflect that particular religion as a whole, but certain
aspects within that religion, because these groups each retain a degree of individual agency.
What these three aspects do, however, is combine to create an identity. The main concern
of this essay is that it is, ‘a religious identity that is frequently mingled with other forms of
identity and may exceed the limits of strictly religious claims or concerns, particularly
when operating within the political system.’ (Constantin 1993: 37)
Tradition
Tradition, as a historical evolution of beliefs and practices, forms both a core component of
religious belief in many African countries, as was shown in mainland Tanzania, it shares
approximately the same proportion of followers as Christians and Muslims. However, it
often receives a disproportionately high amount of attention in academic investigation. This
may well be due to the nature of these beliefs in which the “invisible world” plays a
powerful role in the everyday lives of many peoples of African countries, even those whose
primary faith is Christianity or Islam. Much of this focus has been on the assumed
irrational practices of traditional religion such as witchcraft, sorcery and the occult.
This is again an overly simplified and narrow interpretation of the nature of these beliefs,
as Mudimbe said, ‘fundamentally, there are two main problems: one, of comprehending
cultures, the other concerning the significance of the interpretations offered.’ (Mudimbe
1998: 66) It is important, then, to consider how these traditional religions are not
necessarily backward or ‘savage’ but rather how they relate to a peoples within the current
socio-economic climate in which they operate.
Firstly, going back to the assumption that all religions form part of identity, Constantin
argued that,
At first glance, it would seem that the questions of religious identity is simply a
problem of god(s) and belief. But identity is also related to various social
processes, and believers, like everyone else, are confronted with issues of
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everyday life, including family affairs and job requirements, budget and food,
feelings and knowledge. (Constantin 1995: 36)
In order to understand how traditional religions sit at the very heart of modernising
societies it is important to note, as Turner did, that modernisation is not to be identified
with westernisation, because evolving culture will come out of traditional historical
sources, as well as Western and other influences. (1979: 309) In this way, it becomes
possible to view traditional practices not as irrational ritual but something which serves a
social function either contributing to, or more often critiquing, the present conditions in a
given society. As Berger explains,
Periphery cults as feminist subculture generally restricted to women…and
protected from male attack through its representation of being a therapy for illness.
Underlying this interpretation is the view that these movements stem from
threatening or oppressive conditions (Physical or social) that people can combat
only through heroic flights of ecstasy. (Berger 1976: 168)
Viewing sorcery and witchcraft as a social function may not entirely break down the
assumption that these practices are some how “uncivilized” yet it goes someway in
proving that they are not “un-modern.” This is not to say that for the people practicing
these rituals that they are not something very real for them, but it is possible for the action
to be both real and serve another function. A good example of this is possession cults on
the Swahili coast in Tanzania. Giles notes that, ‘the cult provides an avenue for female
prestige and public involvement which is almost ‘unattainable’ in this ‘male-dominated’
society through other means. (Giles 1987: 238) Beyond this, showing the very diverse
nature of such cults, Giles (1987: 238, 242, 243) adds there were also always
considerable numbers of men involved from all societal categories, including those from
highly respected, well-educated or economically well-off families. The rewards of cult
participation especially the very real power and wealth of the cult leaders can also be
viewed as sufficient inducements in themselves rather than a mere protest or reaction to
socio-religious exclusion.
Looking at which actors may be at play here, it seems to be a confluence of individual
belief, and also a community action which provides a form of social interaction not
available within current social norms. Returning to the idea of identity this may well be
characterized as “status”,
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Thus while “traditional” religious beliefs and practices such as ancestor worship
and witchcraft may form part of the urban setting, as religious expression they
may cluster around or accrete to particularistic relationships which conform to
“traditional” patterns anchored more in status than in individual contract. (Bond et
al 1979: 3)
I would turn this argument on its head to suggest that instead of conforming to so called
“traditional patterns of status”, witchcraft and cults challenge favoured status of political
and social elites. In this way, Turner argues that to ‘synthesize traditional forms and
values with modes of life and organization, and to do so within the new historical mode
of though, makes the independent churches important agents of modernization.’ (Turner
1979: 309) The key aspect of this, which will be investigated in the next section, is of
both Alice Lakwena and the LRA, where ‘in northern Uganda, established religious
traditions [were] applied to new social conditions resulting in religious innovations being
created on the basis of existing traditions.’ (Kastfelt 2005: 3, 4)
Traditional religions, should therefore not be seen as ahistorical or non-evolutionary.
Clearly, through the agency of leadership, organization and belief, these religions have
reinvented themselves to adapt to changes conditions. Hobsbawm argued that, ‘Inventing
traditions, it is assumed here, is essentially a process of formalization and ritualisation,
characterised by reference to the past, if only by imposing repetition.’ (Hobsbawm 1985:
4) A common form of this reinvention has been the integration of Christianity and Islam
in East African societies. As Becker (2008: Abstract, 227, 244) demonstrated in SouthEast Tanzania, Islamisation was more often a gradual, uneven and largely non-violent
process,
they learned from costal Muslim ritual rather than scripture, and African
religious precedents had been more concerned with actions than with definitions and rural
Muslims continued this pragmatic interest. Similarly of Christianity,
The African Christian churches are part of a dynamic and continuous historical
process of religious innovation involving both the education of internal factors and
the absorbing of external influences which are molded to fit the current realities of
a given social, cultural or political movement. (Bond et al 1979: 3)
Furthermore, according to Ranger, ‘Custom helped to maintain a sense of identity but it
also allowed for an adaptation so spontaneous and natural that it was often unperceived.’
(Ranger 1983: 247) And so this mix of continuingly evolving Christian, Muslim and
traditional religions, which have allowed both faith and religious organisations to remain
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relevant within current socio-economic conditions, renders the very idea of recourse to
traditional religion as backward useless. In considering the questions as to whether religion
represents a “destructive throwback to tradition”, it is clear, that the notion of it being a
throwback is impossible as traditional religions continue to evolve.
Religion as destructive or constructive
It has been shown that to understand religion in African societies, it must be broken down
into more nuanced categories which adequately distinguish the variant forces and social
functions. This being said, conflict or more precisely the study of conflict often reverses
this process:
Modern civil wars in Africa have revived or strengthened old stereotypes of
Africa and Africans. The continent is again portrayed as being steeped in
superstition and tribal warfare whose nature escapes the kind of rationality
usually applied in analysing warfare and social conflict. (Kastfelt 2005: 1)
One of the most infamous civil wars in Africa, labelled as “religious”, has been in northern
Uganda, both with Alice Lakwena’s Holy Spirit Movement, and the Lords Resistance
Army/Movement under Joseph Kony. Both are portrayed as being intimately religious in
nature, founded on millennial ideals and rooted in religious fundamentalism. As with all
conflicts, however, the reality is one of a series of dilemmas. (Van Acker 2004: 336)
Violence in Uganda, not just in Acholiland, but also elsewhere in the country has often
been fraught with dilemmas of identity and belonging. An example of this would be
Muslims in Uganda during the rule of Idi Amin,
The periodic riots against Asian shops (not to speak of the expulsion of Asians
by Idi Amin in Uganda) lead back to our problem, because Muslims are on both
sides of these events, among the rioters and among the victims…Muslim identity
may be submerged in the conflicts emerging from these mundane issues.
(Constantin 1993: 41)
In order to examine the dynamics of the conflict in northern Uganda it is necessary, once
again, to understand which agencies play the strongest driving force in this case, and also
to look at the wider social, political and economic contexts within which the conflict
operates.
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Van Acker (2004: 339, 340, 343) provides a working background of Acholi
marginalisation, to understand the root causes behind the conflict, which are not religious
in origin. This history of marginalisation has been driven by the selective composition and
use of the army, turning the military into a vehicle of domestic politics. In the Uganda
scenario, the State became the instrument of violent retaliation in the arena of domestic
politics. Driving this narrative of attack and counter-attack is an element of mistrust, or
more precisely a widespread feeling of betrayal. A belief that the government is actively
working to under develop the north by hitting at essential survival strategies based upon the
primary production factors of land, labour and capital. An example of this
underdevelopment plan is as follows:
The Gulu District Development Plan 2001 establishes that a total of 10, 301 sq.km
of arable land makes up 87.4 percept of the districts land area. Yet less than 10
percept is cultivated each year. (Van Acker 2004: 343)
The conflict in northern Uganda is profoundly political and yet it cannot be denied that
both the Holy Spirit Movement and the Lords Resistance Army have managed to attach a
degree of “religious value: to the conflict. Kastfelt argues that:
Wars are often extreme social situations in which religious phenomena occur in
more radical forms that in times of peace, and the breakdown of social relations is
often accompanied by religious change on a scale unseen under more peaceful
circumstances. (Kastfelt 2005: 30
This is analysis is most likely correct in that conflict creates social tensions whereby
religion or perhaps more correctly, religious identity can be become a rallying factor for
strength and reassurance. What it misses, however, is why religion does this; I suggest
that this apparent popularity comes from an authenticity and authority of religious
leadership. A religious leader is ‘endowed with power perceived as stemming directly
from the spiritual world, often reflecting a world view which is foreign to the norms of
government.’(Ellis and Ter Haar 1998: 191) To put this in the context of northern
Uganda, the deliberate failure of successive governments to provide for the Acholi not
only created popular resentment towards to central government, but also left a space for
leadership. Van Acker suggests that:
In this vacuum, Alice Lakwena and Joseph Kony, young people in their twenties,
emerged as leaders to offer holistic solutions, drawing on the Acholi cultural
archive to reinvent traditions of healing and cleansing. In so doing they mobilised
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a new social hierarchy that successfully mobilised the population during the late
1980s. (Van Acker 2004: 345)
What is important to note is that while, Lakwena and Kony’s leaderships was “religious” in
their characteristics of healing and eradicating witchcraft, and despite dressing up their
stated aims in religious discourse, the end goals of these movements are socio-political.
Van Acker, perhaps best explains this in the case of Alice Lakwena,
Lakwena established the HSMF for the purposes of war the purposes of war to
enable the spread of a cult that contained important emancipatory elements…an
attempt to reconstitute the moral order based on the formulation of an alternative
theory of social tensions and power relationships, which used the idiom of religion
and ritual. (Van Acker 2004: 346, 347)
This is not an attempt to deny that Lakwena and the Holy Spirit Movement are not
religious, but that in essence its aims are political and social. What Lakwena achieved,
albeit temporarily, was to provide leadership to a religious identity, rooted in cultural
history of the Acholi, and from this, was able to influence peoples beliefs into a taking
part into a :religious following” or cult. This is probably even more apparent in the case
of the LRA and Joseph Kony; Sverker Finnströmm quotes a news agency describing the
LRA as
A group whose beliefs are rooted in Christian fundamentalist doctrines and
traditional religions, has been fighting President Yoweri Museveni’s government
since 1987, with the aim of establishing its own rule based on the Biblical Ten
Commandments. (Finnströmm 2003: 149, 150)
However, Finnströmm (2003: 166, 167, 169) goes on to review the manifestos of the
LRA, which despite the groups violent military tactics in the ground, pinpoint the issues
relevant to most people in Acholiland. It promotes, first, the immediate restoration of
multi-party politics and, second the introduction of constitutional federalism. Another
manifesto containing a preamble by Kony himself claiming, “while a big percentage of
the Movements members are ordinary and practicing Christians. I would like to strongly
deny that these members are or in any way have the intention of becoming Christian
Fundamentalists.
It would be naïve indeed to assume that after any kind of success by the LRA that such
measures would definitely have been put in place, however that is not they key factor
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here. What is important to note is the overtly political aims in the manifesto and the
denial of fundamentalism which suggests that Kony’s religious movement is entirely
“religious” under stricter scrutiny, but again it functions as a useful way to rally people
through a common identity. Indeed, long held religious views are abandoned and
substituted by others seen to be better able to make sense of the wars and their evils.
(Kastfelt 2005: 12)
Returning to the idea of religion as helping people to make sense of their surroundings;
religious communities can play a very positive healing and unifying role as Turner states:
One of the striking features of independent religious movements is the extent to
which so many have succeeded in transcending the limitations of language, tribe and
region and have achieved a wider community. (Turner: 1979 300)
A prime example of this is ‘The East African Muslim Welfare Society which was created
by the Aga Khan and today by the funding of Muslim schools and hospitals which are
open to all without discrimination. (Constantin 1993:46) And as Becker and Wenzle have
shown on HIV in Uganda and Tanzania (2007: 2, 5) the role of religious organisations in
providing care and support for sufferers is well known (e.g., Islamic Medical Association
of Uganda.) Far from paralysing religious thought, the AIDS crisis has stimulated it.
From witchcraft to Judeo-Christian demonology, notions of every derivation are
employed, developed and combined to make sense of AIDS and those who live in its
presence.
In fact, the remarkable role of religious organisations, most especially in Uganda, points
to a current situation where the churches are an invaluable asset in maintaining social
order by providing such services. ‘Religion is a powerful weapon in promoting moral
values and enhancing humane conditions within a political society.’ (Van den Vyver and
Green 2008: 349) A criticism here might be that consideration should be given to exactly
whose values are being placed onto a society and whether religions, especially western
religions promote some form of neo-liberal imperialism. However, Buckley-Zistel, who
studies social change in Uganda, summarises a point made by Giddens, saying that:
For Giddens, all social life is generated in a thorough social praxis; where social
praxis is defined to include the nature, conditions and consequences of historically
and spatio-temporally situated interactions produced through the agency of social
actors. (Buckley-Zistel 2008: 31)
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Religious actors do not operate exclusively, but within the wider social and political
arena. In this way, it could be argued that religion has contributed to the “social praxis”
but is in turn influenced by the environment in which is exists and as such does not
necessarily ‘dominate’ social life with imposed values, for example, the Vatican edict that
condoms may be used in the prevention of HIV/AIDS.
Nonetheless, ‘It has been stated in general that in Africa, the mainline churches cannot
boast a sound human rights record.’ (Van Den Vyver and Green 2008: 349) This is a key
dilemma in many African societies, as ‘Islam and Christianity strongly oppose
homosexuality and have consequently resisted legal reform measures prohibiting
discriminations on sexual orientation.’ (Van Den Vyver and Green 2008: 349) In Uganda,
the recent legislative attempts to make homosexuality punishable by death sparked outcry
in the international community and may have been one cause as to why the British Prime
Minister, as reported by the BBC, declared that the UK would withhold aid from
countries which fail to remove legislation banning homosexuality2.
As has been stated, arguably the Christian churches in Uganda are key in maintaining
stability yet Uganda is also reliant on development aid, and the outcome of this dilemma
could have potentially very serious consequences for Ugandan societies. In the sense, one
could construe religion as playing a destructive role, perhaps not in the form of all-out
conflict, but in small scale violence and a rupturing of the social fabric caused by this
dilemma of religion versus rights. This being said, one must question whether it is the
West, in this instance the British Government who should be accused of neo-liberal
imperialism, and placing a far too high expectation on societies to reform in such a short
spans of time since their independence, when Western societies took far longer in
achieving these goals.
Conclusion
This essay has argued that religion in Africa today, within the cases of Tanzania and
Uganda represents a highly dynamic, evolving and sometimes necessary force which has
the ability to play both a harmonising and destructive role in societies. But to assume that
these religions, including those labeled as “traditional” are backward, irrational but most
2
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-1511081 (accessed 28 December 2011)
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importantly uniformed in their approach, is to significantly misunderstand and
compromise an understanding on Religion.
In breaking down religion into typologies of faith and also the various actors which
operate within it, reveals an intricate system in which it becomes possible to see the vital
roles of identity politics, socio-economic conditions and leadership. These circumstances
point to an evaluation that religion is not uniformed, recourse to its organization is not a
throwback or “de-evolutionising” of society due to its progressive and pluralist nature,
and that religion is only one of a number of factors which contribute to conflict in which
leadership tends to be a key factor. And yet the juxtaposition of the positive and negative
outcomes of religious community action, highlights some dilemmas of religion in
development which could cause potentially destructive outcomes.
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