Counterplans
Inuit Consult CP
1NC Shell
Text: The United States federal government should enter into binding consultation with
the Inuit Circumpolar Council over whether or not the United States federal government
should substantially increase its icebreaker fleet investment in the United States.
They’ll say yes but the Inuit have a central right in arctic policymaking – the plan denies
sovereignty
Norrell, 11 – Brenda, Publisher of Censored News, news reporter of Native American news, ‘Wikileaks: The Arctic belongs to the Inuit’,
http://narcosphere.narconews.com/notebook/brenda-norrell/2011/02/wikileaks-arctic-belongs-inuit/
While diplomats debated who owns the Arctic and what to do about melting ice, climate change,
shipping and the impending spread of oil and gas development, Inuit brought their own message to
the Arctic Ocean Conference in 2008. " Much of the Arctic belongs to the Inuit ," Aqqaluk Lynge, vice president of the
Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) and now chair of the ICC, told the diplomats from five countries in 2008. Wikileaks now provides a
new look at the closed door discussions at the inaugural Arctic Ocean Conference, held in Ilulissat, Greenland May 27 — May 29, 2008. At the
conference, Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia and the United States, discussed environmental regulation, maritime security, mineral exploration, polar
oil oversight, and transportation. The Ilulissat Declaration was the result. The Wikileaks cable provides the United States' perspective on the closed
door talks. The cable includes Inuit statements on sovereignty and the necessity for Inuit consultation in decision making. The cable also includes
Russia's statement on Russia's priority to Indigenous Peoples in policy making. The cable was written by US Ambassador James Cain in Copenhagen.
(Full names have been added in parenthesis.) The Cable: US Ambassador Cain states, "(Inuit Aqqaluk) Lynge emphasized colonial
errors of the past (including relocation of indigenous people from a community near Thule AFB) and
asserted that 'all Inuit own the Arctic .' "Asked by (Danish Foreign Minister Per Stig) Moeller whether he was afraid of new
opportunities in the Arctic, Lynge replied 'we are not afraid of anything when we are included in the response.' He
cited increased cooperation with U.S. researchers as positive and concluded that 'we need your assistance and you need our (traditional) knowledge,'"
the cable states. "Canadian minister (of natural resources Gary) Lunn lauded Inuit cultural respect for the environment and said that while
continental shelf territorial claims could only be handled by sovereign states, local and indigenous residents of
the Arctic should be involved in decision-making. "(Russian Foreign Minister Sergei) Lavrov asked Lynge whether existing Arctic institutions needed
to be modified. Lynge urged greater indigenous participation in all Arctic institutions," the cable states. Foreign
Minister Sergei Lavrov led the Russian delegation. Lavrov is quoted in the US cable. "On indigenous participation, Lavrov
claimed Russia
listened 'attentively' to concerns of indigenous residents of the Russian Arctic, saying that
protection of indigenous rights is 'integral' to Russian Arctic policy." The cable says the conference was a Danish
initiative, in response to the "Race for the Arctic." Inuit on Sovereignty and Climate Change Later, in November of 2008, Lynge, president of the
Greenland chapter of the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) in 2008, stressed the importance of including Inuit in any negotiations among governments
regarding sovereignty of the Arctic Ocean, according to an ICC press statement. Lynge, said that the new question of who owns the Arctic is an old
one for Inuit. “We debated this with our former colonizers and polar explorers who drew the maps and
named places," Lynge said. "The debate is reignited because of the anticipated acceleration of resource
development in the Arctic as a result of the global warming." The issue of geographic names and sovereignty was
mentioned as an issue for Lynge when he told the ministers that place names now known as Hans Island (Tartupaluk) and Ellesmere Island
(Umimmaat Nunaat) continue to have Inuit names and, in fact in the past the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, explorers, and others could not travel
in the Arctic without the assistance of Inuit. “The debate became most intense over the past few decades when we
negotiated various self government arrangements” with the respective countries now claiming the
Arctic. Lynge called upon the foreign ministers to respect the land claims and self-government
arrangements they have negotiated with Inuit. ICC announced that a pan-Inuit meeting would be held in Kuujjuaq, Canada in
November, 2008, in which Inuit leaders would determine how they should collectively respond to the increasing debate about who owns the Arctic,
whose ships will be allowed to traverse and benefit from it, and how to collectively protect its environment from potential disaster. ICC is the
organization that represents the 160,000 Inuit living in Russia, Alaska, Canada, and Greenland on
matters of international concern. After the Arctic Ocean Conference, in November of 2008, Inuit leaders from Greenland, Alaska, and
Canada met in Kuujjuaq and developed an "Inuit Declaration on Sovereignty in the Arctic." Inuit: Sovereignty and Climate Change There was a twoday Inuit Leader’s Summit on Arctic Sovereignty in Kuujjuaq. Patricia Cochran, Chair of Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) said, "Sovereignty is a
complex issue. It has a variety of overlapping elements, anchored in international law. But fundamentally it begins with the history and reality of Inuit
use and occupation of Arctic lands and waters; that use and occupation is at the heart of any informed discussion of
sovereignty in the Arctic. Arctic nation states must respect the rights and roles of Inuit in all
international discussions and commitments dealing with the Arctic ," according to ICC's Nov. 10th press statement
change has moved Arctic sovereignty to the front of the international agenda.
We have all seen the escalating speculation about how drastic reduction of ice coverage will open the
Arctic waterways to increased shipping traffic and expedited oil and gas development. "Leaders
agreed that the pursuit of resources through an agenda of Arctic sovereignty must involve
coordinated strategies to ensure the Arctic has viable and healthy communities, sound civil
administration, and responsible environmental management, not just ports, training facilities, and
military exercises. “One clear message from the convening of our meeting is that for all sorts of reasons - law, politics, and the very practical
reason that the world stands to learn the most about the Arctic from the people who know the Arctic best - Inuit have an essential role
in international discussions about arctic waters, marine transportation plans, environmental
initiatives and mechanisms, and the future of international Arctic institutions and relations
generally,” added Ms. Cochran.
from this gathering. "Climate
Denying sovereignty for resource exploitation enables colonial genocide
Endres 2009 – Danielle, Assistant Professor of Communication at the University of Utah, ‘The Rhetoric of Nuclear Colonialism: Rhetorical
Exclusion of American Indian Arguments in the Yucca Mountain Nuclear Waste Siting Decision,’
http://www.academia.edu/1750641/The_Rhetoric_of_Nuclear_Colonialism_Rhetorical_Exclusion_of_American_Indian_Arguments_in_the_Yucca_
Mountain_Nuclear_Waste_Siting_Decision
Nuclear Colonialism as a Discursive Phenomenon Although
the material implications of nuclear colonialism are
undeniable, it is important to turn to the discursive dynamics of the phenomenon. Nuclear colonialism
fundamentally depends on discourse because the policy decisions go through deliberation before being implemented. The decisions to site
parts of the nuclear production process on or adjacent to indigenous lands rely on complex
arguments and rhetorical strategies that invoke the interrelated discursive systems of colonialism
and nuclearism. Colonialism Post-colonialism attends to the legacies of colonial systems. Diasporic Indian
literary critic and theorist Gayatri Spivak has argued that attention must be paid to the identities of colonized peoples in
relation to race, gender, ethnicity, and nationality. 20 Raka Shome and Radha Hegde’s scholarship has pushed postcolonialism into critical-cultural communication scholarship. 21 Although post-colonialism is a crucial area of study, it unfortunately implies that
colonialism is over. For some countries (e.g., India, the Congo) the colonizers have left, leaving post-colonial
peoples to grapple with the legacies of colonialism. However, colonialism still exists for indigenous
people across the globe . Indigenous scholars such as Glenn Morris and the late Gail Valaskakis resist the notion of post-colonialism. 22
As stated by Linda Tuhiwai Smith, ‘‘ naming
the world as ‘post-colonial’ is, from indigenous perspectives, to
name colonialism as finished business . . . post-colonial can mean only one thing: the colonizers
have left. There is rather compelling evidence that in fact this has not happened.’’ 23 Despite the
surprisingly common contemporary belief that colonization of indigenous nations is a thing of the
past, we must not only recognize that colonialism still exists but also explore the communicative
practices that maintain colonialism. The present form of colonialism in the US is what Al Gedicks
has called resource colonialism , whereby ‘‘ native peoples are under assault on every continent because
their lands contain a wide variety of valuable resources needed for industrial development. ’’ 24 As
described by Marjene Ambler, the US government works in collusion with large national and multinational
corporations to facilitate leases and access to indigenous resources that benefit the government and
corporations to the detriment of indigenous communities. 25 Resource colonialism depends on
ignoring the land ownership rights of the colonized . As such, it also relies on the country’s legal and
political system to limit the rights of the colonized, specifically drawing on both the domestic dependent relationship and the
trust relationship that holds American Indian lands and monies in ‘‘trust’’ through the Bureau of Indian Affairs. 26 As American Indian Studies scholar
Sharon O’Brien states, ‘‘today’s ‘Indian wars’ are being fought in corporate boardrooms and law offices as
tribes endeavor to protect and control their remaining resources.’’ 27 Resource colonialism is a reality
for many tribes in the US, especially those with oil, gas, coal and uranium reserves. In the American West, the
Western Shoshone, Navajo, Southern Ute, Paiute and Laguna nations possess a wealth of natural resources including uranium ore and vast desert‘
‘wastelands’’ for nuclear waste storage. Historian Gabrielle Hecht noted that ‘‘the history of uranium mining . . . shows that colonial
practices
and structures were appropriated * not overthrown * by the nuclear age, and proved central to its technopolitical success.’’ 28
Nuclear colonialism is a tale of resource colonialism. Colonialism in all its forms is dependent on
the discursive apparatus that sustains it. Mary Stuckey and John Murphy point out that rhetorical colonialism
recognizes that the language used by colonizers is a crucial justification for the colonial project . 29
Caskey Russell argues that ‘‘vast justification systems have been set up to keep colonizers from feeling guilty.’’
30 Indian Law is an integral part of the discursive system of colonialism that is employed over an over
again to grant political sovereignty while simultaneously restricting it. Political sovereignty for
American Indians is a complex concept that reveals that US Indian Law views American Indian
nations as colonized peoples . It is not based on the inherent sovereignty of American Indian nations
but instead upon the laws of the US that grant political sovereignty to American Indians. Yet, when
sovereignty is granted, it is dependent upon acknowledgment by the grantor and is therefore
vulnerable to coercive restriction. Although the Constitution, hundreds of treaties, and US Supreme Court decisions affirm the
political sovereignty of American Indian nations, this form of political sovereignty is egregiously and unilaterally
limited by the US federal government through its laws and policies. 31 Three Supreme Court decisions under Chief
Justice John Marshall in the early 1800s solidified the assumption that Indian sovereignty is granted and introduced the concept of American Indian
nations as ‘‘domestic dependent nations.’’ 32 According to Wallace Coffey and Rebecca Tsosie of the Native American Rights Fund, ‘‘the concept of
Indian tribes as ‘domestic dependent nations’ means that tribal governmental authority is to some extend circumscribed
by federal authority.’’ 33 The domestic dependent status defined by Supreme Court decisions in the
1860s discursively relegates American Indian nations to a partial and contingent nationhood. The
term ‘‘domestic dependents’’ also calls forth paternalistic images of American Indians as child-like
dependents who need to be protected by the federal government . Given these restrictions, if American
Indian nations attempt to use Indian Law and its notion of political sovereignty for the improvement
of the nation or to assert sovereignty, the nations are stuck in a catch-22 where they have to accept
the limited notion of sovereignty granted through federal law in their quest for more rights within
Indian Law. Although political sovereignty may acknowledge that American Indians have distinct nations and governments, this sovereignty is
always defined as dependent on and subordinate to the US federal government. Indigenous resistance over the years has
created cracks in the system of resource colonialism, resulting in more control over resources and
more lucrative leases for many American Indian nations. 34 Recognizing the limitations of political sovereignty as defined
by US colonialist laws, Coffey and Tsosie and John Borrows have called for indigenous people to reject political sovereignty and to assert and live by
their inherent sovereignty. 35 Borrows calls for ‘‘an inherent, unextinguished, and continuing exercise of self-
government’’ that challenges the imposition of political sovereignty upon American Indian nations
by the federal government. 36 The concept of ‘‘inherent sovereignty’’ exemplifies the potential for resistance to colonization through a
constitutive redefinition of sovereignty that supersedes the political definition.
The concepts of cultural and physical genocide are impossible to separate; both include
social death which is the most catastrophic impact in the round
Card, 03 – Claudia, Ph. D in Philosophy from Harvard, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, ‘Genocide and Social
Death’, http://www.mit.edu/~shaslang/mprg/CardGSD.pdf
This essay develops the hypothesis that social
death is utterly central to the evil of genocide, not just when a
genocide is primarily cultural but even when it is homicidal on a massive scale. It is social death that
enables us to distinguish the peculiar evil of genocide from the evils of other mass murders. Even
genocidal murders can be viewed as extreme means to the primary end of social death. Social vitality exists
through relationships, contemporary and intergenerational, that create an identity that gives meaning to a life. Major loss of social vitality
is a loss of identity and consequently a serious loss of meaning for one's existence. Putting social
death at the center takes the focus off individual choice, individual goals, individual careers, and body counts, and puts it
on relationships that create community and set the context that gives meaning to choices and goals.
If my hypothesis is correct, the term "cultural genocide" is probably both redundant and misleading—redundant, if the social death present in all
genocide implies cultural death as well, and misleading, if "cultural genocide" suggests that some genocides do not include cultural death.
2NC Ev
Indigenous Regimes are particularly important --- including them in arctic governance and policy is
necessary
Ebinger et al, 14 (Charles, a senior fellow and director of the Energy Security Initiative at Brookings, “Offshore Oil and Gas Governance
in the Arctic A Leadership Role for the U.S.”, March 2014,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Reports/2014/03/offshore%20oil%20gas%20governance%20arctic/Offshore%20Oil%20and
%20Gas%20Governance%20web.pdf)
Climate change is contributing to unprecedented changes in the Arctic. As the ice melts further and hydrocarbon
exploration and development move into more ice-infested waters, new regulatory approaches will be needed, including the
adoption of Arctic-specific standards and the implementation of systems, infrastructure, and resource sharing arrangements to strengthen oil spill
prevention, containment, and response. Despite much debate over how this is best accomplished , there is broad consensus that the
prospect of much of the Arctic opening up for commercial development on a scale scarcely
recognized a few decades ago poses major challenges. Environmental challenges on the local,
regional, and international levels and associated risks, especially to indigenous communities, must
be managed through strengthening the existing offshore governance regime.
Alaska CP
1NC Shell
Text: The State of Alaska should invest in the United States construction of two new polar
icebreakers to be operated by the United States Coast Guard and implement a cigarette
tax to generate new revenue for the aforementioned investment. The United States
Federal Government should ensure that the POLAR SEA remains mission capable and that
the POLAR STAR remains available for reactivation.
Alaska solves the case
DeMarban, 2012 (Alex – staff writer for the Alaska Dispatch, Parnell: AIDEA could help finance icebreaker if Feds drop ball, Alaska
Dispatch, p. http://www.alaskadispatch.com/article/parnell-aidea-could-help-finance-icebreaker-if-feds-drop-ball)
Earlier this week, Alaska
Dispatch published a story shining light on an exchange of letters between Gov. Sean Parnell and Rep. Don Young
about how the state can help the US government beef up its Arctic icebreaking capacity. Icebreaker fans know the
federal government is hobbled in the Arctic as other countries boost their presence in the resource rich -- and increasingly accessible -- Far North. But
the nation's two heavy-duty icebreakers are out of commission, leaving just the medium-duty ship, Healy. Parnell's
March 15 reply to Young, who had tossed out ideas on how the state could help, was succinct. Parnell lamented the federal government's shirking of
its ice-breaking role in the Arctic, and said the state should not subsidize that US duty. However, he said Alaska could consider helping,
including financing. He didn't provide more detail on the financing idea, and the Dispatch did not receive an immediate reply to a request
seeking more detail. However Sharon Leighow, the governor’s spokeswoman, emailed a response the day after the story published on Thursday.
"Before looking to the state of Alaska to fund federal infrastructure, we would suggest the president revisit his FY 12 proposed budget for the US
Coast Guard, which contains $8.68 billion of discretionary funding. We think protecting the nation’s interests and the state’s
interests in the Alaska offshore area is critical. The president proposes funding six fast-response cutters, 40 response boat
medium-endurance cutters, and other vessels and air assets. While those are important, and we support the USCG, we think a new icebreaker
is critical and should be funded by the administration. It is clearly the administration’s job to make sure the Coast Guard
has the assets it needs, and an important asset is a new heavy icebreaker. "If the federal government fails to provide for this
need, there may be options for a state agency like Alaska Industrial Development and Export
Authority to participate in some sort of arrangement, but that will be up to the AIDEA board, and the Coast Guard would have to come to
AIDEA with a project proposal that met all due-diligence requirements. What exactly such an arrangement could look like would be up to the AIDEA
board."
2NC Solvency
The counterplan solves the case –
a. Sufficient vs. Optimal – their evidence defends the USFG as optimal, doesn’t indict
Alaska as insufficient – don’t vote AFF unless there’s a quantifiable impact to the solvency
deficit—net benefit would outweigh any risk of solving worse
b. Federal action on Icebreakers sucks - Alaska’s investment is key to the credibility and
signal of the plan
DeMarban 2012 (Alex – staff writer for the Alaska Dispatch, Parnell: AIDEA could help finance icebreaker if Feds drop ball, Alaska
Dispatch, p. http://www.alaskadispatch.com/article/parnell-aidea-could-help-finance-icebreaker-if-feds-drop-ball)
Gov. Sean Parnell says the
state might be interested in helping finance a new icebreaker so the U.S. can
make up lost ground in the race for Arctic dominance. That's the gist of the governor's response to a lengthy letter from
Rep. Don Young offering ideas on how Alaska can help the cash-strapped federal government put costly new
icebreakers off Alaska's increasingly busy northern coasts. With the nation's icebreaking fleet reduced to a single working
ship -- its two large icebreakers are undergoing repairs or being decommissioned -- the state and U.S. government should consider sharing costs to
make new icebreakers a reality, Young suggested in a Feb. 7 letter to Parnell. New or refurbished icebreakers will cost hundreds of millions of dollars.
More ships are plowing through the Bering Strait as sailing seasons lengthen in the warming but often ice-choked Arctic. The U.S. Coast Guard
predicts traffic will continue growing as shipping, resource development and tourism expands. But the Healy, a "medium duty" icebreaker that
escorted a Russian fuel tanker to Nome this winter, is the Coast Guard's lone functioning icebreaker. 'Creative financing' "Without access to heavy
icebreakers, we will be unable to adapt to historic changes in the Arctic," Young wrote. "Icebreakers are critical for ensuring safe
shipping and resource operations and providing for field research opportunities." He continues: "Given the
current fiscal climate in D.C., funding the acquisition of new vessels presents a significant challenge. It is clear that we must consider
creative financing and ownership options to move forward." In addition to helping bankroll the project, the state should
also think about owning an icebreaker with private firms. The state could refurbish the Polar Sea or the Polar Star. It
could then lease its icebreakers to the Coast Guard and National Science Foundation, wrote Young.
Alaska solves
Forgey ’10(Alaska's economy powers through recession Posted: Tuesday, August 24, 2010 By PAT FORGEY
http://juneauempire.com/stories/082410/sta_699586622.shtml. )
With the nation still struggling to pull itself out of recession, Alaska is in the welcome - but
decidedly unusual - position of having one of the nation's strongest economies. "We're a place of envy right
now," said Neal Fried, a state labor economist who has watched the state's economy for decades. The state's unemployment rate in July dropped to 7.7
percent, down from 7.9 percent in June and from 8.1 percent in July of 2009. The national unemployment rate is at 9.5 percent, where it has hovered
for more than a year. Alaska's boom-and-bust economy typically posts much higher unemployment rates than the national economy, Fried said. "This
is the first time we've ever seen a [year] of the unemployment rate coming in below the national average," he said. Many of Alaska's industries have
shown to be largely immune to the ongoing national recession, which has hit the manufacturing and construction sectors hardest. Fishing, oil,
government and mining are all important Alaska industries that are evading the impacts of the
recession.
"When you look at what makes our economy tick, its largely different than the national average," Fried said. Some parts of the
economy, such as manufacturing and real estate, faltered elsewhere but not in Alaska. Alaska's tiny manufacturing
sector is holding up well, mostly due to the thriving seafood industry, Fried said. The continued strength of seafood prices, even in the face of a
recession, is somewhat remarkable, said Eric Norman, vice-president and general manager at Taku Fisheries/Smokeries in Juneau. "It's a little bit of a
surprise to us the levels that fish prices have gone to, especially halibut and black cod," Norman said. Despite the higher prices, they can still move
what they can bring in, even with the recession. "We've gotten some comments out the market but they're still playing ball," he said. That's meant full
employment for a big crew, as many as 100 workers. A solid salmon season has helped, as well. is today, but while ours slowed, we haven't had the
balloon pop that others have had," Fried said. High oil prices have also benefited the state in a big way, providing strong employment in the industry,
though they are down. ANS West Coast crude enjoyed an average spot price of $133.78 a barrel in June 2008, according to information on the Alaska
Deartment of Revenue's website.
H1B Visas CP
1NC
Text: The United States federal government should increase the cap on H1-B visas.
Counterplan solves science diplomacy – bolsters scientific cooperation
Pickering and Agre 2010, ( Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering served as under secretary of State from
1997 to 2000 and chairs the advisory council of the Civilian Research and Development Foundation. Dr.
Peter Agre, director of the Johns Hopkins Malaria Research Institute and president of the American
Association for the Advancement of Science, won the 2003 Nobel Prize in chemistry. They are among the
signers of a bipartisan statement by the Partnership for a Secure America on the use of science in American
diplomacy, “More opportunities needed for U.S. researchers to work with foreign counterparts”, [
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2010-02-09/news/bal-op.northkorea0209_1_science-and-technologynorth-korea-scientists-and-engineers ] , //hss-RJ)
In 1979, a science and technology agreement between the United States and China paved the way for bilateral
scientific cooperation that continues to benefit American science and society more broadly. Now, science
diplomacy may help America open a door toward improved relations with Pyongyang, too. In December, six
Americans representing leading scientific organizations sat down with their North Korean counterparts. The
meeting took place on the heels of U.S. Special Envoy Stephen Bosworth's first official bilateral meeting with
North Korea. Science, an international enterprise that relies on a lively exchange of ideas and data,
can help build trust and expand understanding when government-to-government contacts may be
strained. The North Korea visit, plus the first-ever U.S. science envoys, represent a fine beginning to a new
era of international research cooperation. But the White House, the State Department and Congress
must do far more to bolster science diplomacy. In particular, the U.S. government should quickly
and significantly increase the number of H1-B visas being approved for specialized foreign workers
such as doctors, scientists and engineers. Their contributions are critical to improving human
welfare as well as our economy . Foreign scientists working or studying in U.S. universities also
become informal goodwill ambassadors for America globally -- an important benefit in the
developing world, where senior scientists and engineers often enter national politics. More broadly,
we urgently need to expand and deepen links between the U.S. and foreign scientific communities
to advance solutions to common challenges . Climate change, sustainable development, pandemic disease,
malnutrition, protection for oceans and wildlife, national security and innovative energy technologies all
demand solutions that draw on science and technology. Fortunately, U.S. technological leadership is admired
worldwide, suggesting a way to promote dialogue with countries where we otherwise lack access and leverage.
A June 2004 Zogby International poll commissioned by the Arab American Institute found that only 11
percent of Moroccans surveyed had a favorable overall view of the United States -- but 90 percent had a
positive view of U.S. science and technology. Only 15 percent of Jordanians had a positive overall view, but
83 percent registered admiration for U.S. science and technology. Similarly, Pew polling data from 43
countries show that favorable views of U.S. science and technology exceed overall views of the United States
by an average of 23 points. The recent mission to North Korea exemplified the vast potential of science for
U.S. diplomacy. Within the scientific community, after all, journals routinely publish articles co-written by
scientists from different nations, and scholars convene frequent conferences to extend those ties. Science
demands an intellectually honest atmosphere, peer review and a common language for professional
discourse. Basic values of transparency, vigorous inquiry and respectful debate are all inherent to
science. Nations that cooperate on science strengthen the same values that support peaceful conflict
resolution and improved public safety. U.S. and Soviet nongovernmental organizations contributed to a thaw
in the Cold War through scientific exchanges, with little government support other than travel visas. The U.S.
government is off to a good start in leveraging science diplomacy, with 43 bilateral umbrella science and
technology agreements now in force. The Obama administration further elevated science engagement,
beginning with the president's June speech in Cairo. Then, in November, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
appointed three science envoys to foster new partnerships and address common challenges, especially within
Muslim-majority countries. She also announced the Global Technology and Innovation Fund, through which
the Overseas Private Investment Corporation will spur private-sector investments in science and technology
industries abroad. These steps are commendable, but the White House and the State Department
need to exercise even greater leadership to build government capacity and partnerships that advance
U.S. science diplomacy globally. Congress should lead as well, with greater recognition of science
engagement and increased funding for science capacity-building. Both chambers must work
together to give the executive branch the resources it needs. In an era of complex global challenges,
science diplomacy is a critical tool for U.S. foreign policy. The opportunity to strengthen that tool
and advance our diplomatic goals should not be missed.
2NC Solvency
Counterplan solves science diplomacy – bolsters international cooperation and capitalizes
on global popularity of American science
Turekein and Lord 2009, (Vaughn Turekian is Chief International Officer and Director of the Center
For Science Diplomacy at the American Association for the Advancement of Science. Kristin Lord is a Vice
President at the Center for a New American Security and a Nonresident Fellow of the Brookings Institution,
“The Science of Diplomacy”, [
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/05/04/the_science_of_diplomacy ] , //hss-RJ)
Last week, U.S. President Barack Obama announced his 20-person Council of Advisors on Science and
Technology, a group including two Nobel laureates. He also proclaimed his intention to increase scientific
research spending to 3 percent of GDP, $70 billion more per year. The news prolonged Obama's honeymoon
with U.S. scientists, spurred by his senior-level appointments of highly respected specialists such as Dr. John
Holdren and Dr. Steven Chu as well as his re-legalization of stem cell research in his first days in office. As
he recommits resources to this most important field, Obama must remember that science and
technology have tremendous applications in and effects on the world of foreign policy as well. Given
the United States' predominance in technology, engineering, health, and innovation, other countries
want to engage with and benefit from the United States' ideas and products. Still, past U.S.
governments have not taken full advantage of the power and potential of science to improve foreign affairs
and make a safer, healthier world. To engage in science diplomacy -- defined here as scientific
cooperation and engagement with the explicit intent of building positive relationships with foreign
governments and societies -- Obama should do the following. Think strategically. Scientific cooperation
can be a fruitful and apolitical way to engage countries where diplomatic relations are strained. For example,
the U.S. National Academy of Sciences has sponsored scientific exchanges with Iran for the last several years.
As part of these exchanges, young Iranians enthusiastically welcome visits from U.S. thinkers like Nobel
laureate in physics Joseph Taylor. Scientists work together on issues of mutual interest such as public health
and earthquake preparedness. A nascent effort at science diplomacy is now underway in Syria, which recently
welcomed a high-level visit of U.S. scientists and educators. The delegation met for over an hour with
President Bashar al-Assad, himself a medical doctor, to discuss potential areas of cooperation outside the
realm of politics. Think offensively as well as defensively. Current policies regarding international
cooperation often restrict access to U.S. technologies -- keeping nuclear weapons out of the hands of
terrorists, for instance. But such defensive policies should be matched with better offensive policies:
bringing the world's best scientists and scientific businesses into the United States and sending
American scientists out to aid the world more often. To this end, the United States should provide
visas and scholarships to usher talented students into American universities and dramatically
increase the number of H-1B visas, which admit specialized workers such as doctors and physicists.
The United States should also send more professionals to aid in conducting disease surveillance, developing
clean energy technologies, facilitating environmental adaptation, and providing early warning of impending
natural disasters. Think about people -- not just governments. Foreign publics admire American
science and technology far more than they admire America. Indeed, an analysis of Pew polling data
from 43 countries shows that favorable views of American science and technology exceed overall views of
the United States by an average of 23 points. This presents the United States with a public diplomacy
opportunity: to remind foreign people of what they like about the United States and to highlight
constructive partnerships between Americans and foreign scientists, engineers, doctors, and
technology business leaders. As a first step, the U.S. government should publicize successful partnerships
with other countries and the relevant accomplishments of Americans. This means trumpeting Bill Gates as
much as government officials and naming Nobel laureates like Egyptian-American chemist Ahmed Zewail as
goodwill ambassadors. It means exposing the thousands of U.S.-government-sponsored scientific visitors to
American society and politics, not just science. Facing a complex set of foreign-policy challenges, the United
States can no longer afford to overlook such a useful instrument of statecraft. Regrettably, the U.S.
government is not well organized to take advantage of science diplomacy. The National Science Foundation
and technical departments (Energy, Agriculture, Health and Human Services, and Defense) apply their
resources to science -- but not to its diplomatic use. Thus, the Obama administration should appoint a seniorlevel ambassador for science and technology cooperation in the State Department. He or she could convene
an interagency group coordinating the strategic use of science diplomacy. But importantly, the Obama
administration must change current approaches. Foreign-policy leaders -- especially Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton -- must recognize the power of this means of engagement. The United States has emphasized in
past weeks its commitment to the globally shared goals of healthier populations, a cleaner
environment, safer societies, and a better life for all. Recognizing the potential of science diplomacy
will certainly help maximize the United States' realization of these goals.
Raising visas solve science diplomacy – bolsters innovation and communication
USHR Hearing 2013, (U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Science, Space, and Technology
Subcommittee on Oversight HEARING CHARTER, witnesses include Dr. Charles M. Vest, President,
National Academy of Engineering; Dr. Larry Wortzel, Commissioner, U.S.-China Economic and Security
Review Commission; Hon. Michelle Van Cleave, Senior Fellow, Homeland Security Policy Institute, George
Washington University; Mr. David G. Major, Founder and President, The Centre for Counterintelligence and
Security Studies, “Espionage Threats at Federal Laboratories: Balancing Scientific Cooperation while
Protecting Critical Information”, [ http://docs.house.gov/meetings/SY/SY21/20130516/100836/HHRG113-SY21-20130516-SD002.pdf ] , //hss-RJ)
Science is a worldwide endeavor. In 2008, American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS)
Chief Executive Officer Alan I. Leshner testified before this Committee that, “Science is by definition
global in scope and application - it knows no borders, is not constrained by geography, and no one
country has a monopoly on it.”4 In March 2011, Bo Cooper, former General Counsel to the thenImmigration and Naturalization Service (INS), testified before the House Judiciary Committee that,
“Throughout our history, our country has operated on the principle that the more brain power we can attract
from around the world, the more creativity, invention, and growth we can achieve here at home.” A Harvard
Business School study found that the number of inventions, as measured by patents, increased when
H-1B visa caps were higher due to “the direct contributions of immigrant inventors.”6 Though the
numbers have declined during the current economic downturn, immigrants with advanced degrees still
comprise a considerable percentage of U.S. workers in science and engineering occupations. At the doctoral
degree level, about half of U.S. workers in computer and mathematical sciences and in engineering
are foreign-born. 7 Aside from sparking innovation and entrepreneurship, foreign scholars make
significant contributions to the American economy. The Association of International Educators
estimates that international students and their dependents contributed approximately $21.8 billion to the
American economy during the 2011-2012 academic year. This figure is based on an analysis of tuition,
enrollment figures, living expenses and other associated costs.8 International scientific cooperation and
openness to international students also serves longstanding and important U.S. foreign policy goals
by fostering communication and cooperation among nations to promote greater global peace,
prosperity and stability.
AT: Wage Turn
Their wages arguments are based on poor studies – new evidence proves that increased
visas boost the US economy and don’t trade off with American jobs.
Sunil Mithas and Henry C. Lucas, Jr., assistant professor and Department Chair at the Robert H. Smith
School of Business at University of Maryland, May 2010, Management Science, p.762
Our findings have important policy and managerial implications. From a policy perspective, this study
suggests that, contrary to popular belief, non-U.S. citizen IT professionals are not paid less
compared to American IT professionals. More broadly, the evidence in this study provides indirect
evidence that visa and immigration policies so far have not had any adverse impact on the wages of
American IT professionals due to any relatively lower compensation of foreign IT professionals.
Comparisons of average salaries or those based on the compensation information in LCA petitions,
which do not adequately adjust for educational qualifications, work experience, or institutional factors
associated with American or foreign professionals, can lead to wrong conclusions. The current study,
using actual salary data from IT professionals, suggests that calls for making visa policies more
restrictive to protect American professionals and to prevent exploitation of foreign professionals need to
be examined more carefully. Although some instances of potential abuse can not be ruled out for any
policy, an appropriate and prudent policy response for any allegations of visa abuse should be commensurate
with the seriousness of the actual abuse . Setting visa caps higher is perhaps less damaging than setting
them too low because , if the economy does not need foreign professionals, then these visa caps will
remain underutilized, as happened from 2001–2003. On the other hand, policies that restrict the
supply of highly skilled professionals for U.S. firms may force U.S. companies to hire professionals
overseas, thus defeating the very rationale invoked for reactive policy responses (Lewin et al. 2009,
Thibodeau 2008). This phenomenon may already be occurring because the number of IT
professionals hired by companies like IBM and Accenture in India in recent times far exceeds the
number of IT professionals with H-1B or other work visas on their payroll.11 By the end of 2007, IBM
had more than 70,000 employees in India, and Accenture was slated to have more employees in India than in
the United States (Giridhardas 2007). More importantly, restrictive visa policies, to the extent they lead to
reverse migration and thus potential loss of skills, innovation, and entrepreneurship of foreign-born
IT professionals, particularly those who acquired higher education in U.S. universities (Wadhwa 2009), can
also hurt the long-term competitiveness of U.S. firms and the U.S. economy.
Title XI CP
1NC
Text: The United States federal government should increase Title XI loan guarantee
funding.
Counterplan solves shipbuilding – Title XI loan guarantees would stimulate the shipbuilding
industry
Goure, 11 [Lexington Institute, Obama Could Create Jobs And Support Defense, Daniel, PhD,
http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/obama-could-create-jobs-and-support-defense?a=1&c=1171]
Since the President probably is still working on the big economic proposal to be unveiled in September, I
would like to offer him a few thoughts. Over the past two and a half years the administration has put forward
one spending initiative after another. It is difficult to remember them all or to distinguish one idea from the
other. How many times can the White House advocate for more spending on infrastructure before the idea,
however plausible, loses credibility with Congress and the American people? President Obama could take a
leaf from President Roosevelt’s playbook during the last great economic downturn. During the Great
Depression the federal government spent funds from stimulus programs such as the Works Project
Administration (WPA) to support expansion of shipyard capacity and even to build warships. Pre-war
shipbuilding made a significant contribution to positioning the United States to become the Arsenal
of Democracy. It also helped win the battle of Midway; the aircraft carrier Yorktown was built with
Roosevelt-era stimulus funds. The administration likes to tout its stimulus plan as having halted the economic
downturn and prevented even more job losses. I would suggest that continuing high levels of defense
spending probably had a lot to do with this. In fact, on a dollar-for-dollar basis, defense spending
probably had a greater positive impact on the economy than infrastructure spending because the
money generally went for high value products and services. President Obama would be wise to consider
opportunities to invest in the defense sector as a way of both stimulating the economy and supporting
national security. Let me provide just one example. Both China and Russia have just demonstrated their first
entrant in the competition for a fifth-generation fighter, something the U.S. already has in the F-22. The fact
that the Russians and Chinese have entered the competition earlier than anticipated is a cause for alarm since
the U.S. halted the F-22 program at only 187 aircraft. Mr. President, how about providing the funds to restart
the F-22 line and build another 50 or 60 aircraft? That is a lot of high-tech jobs and a significant improvement
to national security. A less well recognized candidate for increased government investment that would
create jobs, improve infrastructure, remove impediments to economic growth and help national
security is the domestic shipbuilding industry. Simply put, the United States has always supported a
domestic shipbuilding industry and merchant marine on national security grounds. The centerpiece of this
policy is the Jones Act, passed in 1920, which requires that vessels engaged in trade between two U.S. ports
be American-built, owned and crewed. This is important for national security because the Navy both acquires
its support vessels — tankers and supply ships — from U.S. shipyards and uses that same industrial base for
overhaul and maintenance for its surface combatants. This industrial base could not be sustained on Navy
funding alone, hence the need to support commercial activities such as the construction of Jones Act ships.
The first thing that the President could do is provide continued funding for the Title XI Federal Ship
Financing Program. Title XI provides loan guarantees on contracts to build or overhaul commercial
vessels in U.S. shipyards. The guarantees can be employed to cover the production of any type of
commercial vessel including barges and offshore oil rigs. Title XI encourages the maintenance of
commercial facilities and a skilled workforce that can also be employed in constructing and
maintain Navy vessels. An even bigger boost to the nation’s economy and national security would
result from an administration decision to expand implementation of the Marine Highway Initiative.
The MHI is intended to accelerate development of waterborne shipping services thereby reducing
congestion on land as well as saving money since waterways shipping is extremely cost effective for
the movement of high volume and bulk freight. Because of the Jones Act, initiatives under the MHI that
involve funding support for the construction of carrier vessels would go to U.S. shipyards. The results
would be a double boost to the economy (ship construction and reduced freight costs), the creation
of jobs and support for national security. Mr. President, put more money behind the MHI.
2NC
The counterplan solves shipbuilding – lowers startup costs and ensures long term financial
sustainability
U.S. Department of Transportation Maritime Administration 11 (“America’s Marine
Highway Report to Congress” April 2011
http://www.marad.dot.gov/documents/MARAD_AMH_Report_to_Congress.pdf)
The Title XI Federal Ship Financing Program, administered by MARAD, enables owners of eligible
vessels and shipyards to obtain long-term capital financing with attractive terms by providing a full
faith and credit guarantee of eligible debt obligations. When credit markets are constrained, this
program has been particularly helpful to obtain long-term financing for vessels. Stakeholders have
suggested modifications to the Title XI program to help introduce more environmentally sustainable vessels
into the U.S. fleet and stimulate growth in U.S. shipyard jobs. Potential changes to the program could
prioritize Marine Highway vessels, allow Title XI to be used for directly-related shoreside facility
improvements, revise debt/equity and working capital requirements (responding to the needs of
startup operators), and include a mandate to conform to high environmental standards. Any such
changes, however, would need to be made in a manner that would not jeopardize the financial integrity of the
Title IX program. Direct beneficiaries of Title XI loan guarantees would be vessel owners and
operators and, potentially, shoreside infrastructure owners.
Counterplan solves ship building
Cook, 12 [H. Clayton Cook, Esq. has been involved with Jones Act issues for more than 40 years and
served as General Counsel of the Maritime Administration from 1970-1973. He is currently Counsel to
Seward & Kissel LLP in Washington, DC., “The Dual-Use Vessel Program and Americas Marine Highway
Next Steps”, [ http://www.maritime-executive.com/article/the-dual-use-vessel-program-and-america-smarine-highway-next-steps ] ,//hss-RJ)
A MarAd and Department of Transportation (DOT) “short sea shipping" program was announced
by Maritime Administrator William Schubert in 2002 and discussed at length in his FY 2003
authorization testimony. The program was rechristened "America's Marine Highways" by Maritime
Administrator Sean Connaughton. Congress addressed these short sea shipping issues in the Energy
Independence and Security Act of 2007, which contained provisions establishing a formal marine highway
program within the federal government and charged DOT with responsibility for implementation and
administration. DOT received a broad grant of authority for federal action and for federal and local
government collaboration in order to attract public and private sector projects to access the nation’s “ocean
highways,” including the authority for European-style Marco Polo and Motorways of the Sea programs. The
merits of these initiatives to “move traffic from our highways to our waterways” were obvious. The House
version of the 2007 Act addressed the need for U.S. government-assisted financing for the required vessels by
extending the CCF tax-deferral program to ro/ro and container services nationwide and authorizing $2 billion
for short sea transportation use from the Title XI loan guarantee program. As the 2007 Act was enacted, it
included the CCF program extension but not the $2 billion authorization for Title XI financing. Furthermore,
it did not remove the 1986 Treasury initiatives that had been designed to curtail CCF program use and
diminish its value. No initial funding was provided for implementation of the 2007 Act’s grants of authority,
and only limited funding has since been available. However, MarAd moved ahead in designating Marine
Corridors and Connectors and providing Marine Highway Grants and entering into Marine Highway
Cooperative Agreements. Most importantly, as funds have become available MarAd has worked with the
Navy to coordinate AMH and DUV program objectives. Prescription for Progress The principal issues of
shipyard construction are apparently agreed on the basis of the 2007 and 2008 Workshop
recommendations and the Design Report assumptions. The potential for Title XI and CCF
programs to reduce fully financed costs is apparently agreed as tabled during the 2008 Workshop,
subject to the removal of the 1986 tax barriers to CCF program use. With the Design Report in hand
and two additional corridor studies due in May, MarAd and the Navy appear well on their way to achieving
the Navy’s 2005 Senior Executive Sealift Forum objective of learning “what it will require to induce U.S.
shippers and ship operators to move cargo and operate U.S.-flag ships, respectively, that will have military
utility and be available for military use during a major contingency.” The next step will be to obtain Office of
Management and Budget approval for a series of legislative initiatives to include the following: 1. Repeal of
the Harbor Maintenance Tax as applied to AMH services; 2. Repeal of the Treasury’s 1986 CCF limitations
enactments (returning that program to the form in which it was originally enacted); 3. Modification of the
tonnage tax to allow its application on a strictly days-in-service foreign vs. domestic basis (returning the
tonnage tax to the form in which it was originally drafted); 4. Authorization of a multiyear federal financing
guarantee program that was a part of the House-passed version of the 2007 Act, backed by some form of
multiyear appropriations funding; and 5. Authorization for a specific European-style Marco Polo program to
mitigate start-up risks. With industry support, congressional approval of such legislation appears achievable.
And with these changes made it may be possible to initiate one or more AMH services with
relatively modest forms of government start-up assistance.
Icecamps CP
1NC
Text: The United States federal government should increase polar ice camps.
Counterplan solves arctic research
National Research Council 1995, (A joint report by the Committee on the Arctic Research Vessel,
Ocean Studies Board, Polar Research Board, National Research Council, “Arctic Ocean Research and
Supporting Facilities: National Needs and Goals”, //hss-RJ)
Ice camps are the most basic, simplest, and perhaps lowest cost “platforms” for some applications.
In general the locations are stable and they are not space-limited in the area surrounding the site.
The camps are usually put onsite, supported, and removed by aircraft or helicopters. There are two
types of camps, based on their projected duration. Long-duration camps are those that will be
operational for prolonged periods of time and tend to be occupied year-round. Ice islands, such as
the former T-3, are examples of this type of camp. Short-term camps are those occupied briefly,
usually for a specific purpose or mission. They are highly portable and are usually configured for
specific research missions. Often they are satellites of a long-duration camp. When they can be used,
ice camps are the platform of choice for many investigators. An ice camp has been used
successfully in a number of studies and will be used extensively in the Surface Heat Budget
(SHEBA) project planned for spring 1997. Ice camps can provide a long-term station for sampling
and an opportunity for coring sediments . They have limitations, however. They do not provide for work
in the open ocean or marginal ice zone. They are also unsuitable for horizontal sampling of the water with
trawls. Large camps move with the ice and cannot be relocated to specific areas of interest. Small camps
cannot support some important science facilities. The cost of ice-camp-based studies can range from $600 to
$4,000 per person per day, depending on such factors as the amount of support needed from ships and
aircraft for a given experiment.§ Helicopters Small helicopters can be carried aboard research vessels
and can be staged from ice camps . Used for both research tasks and logistic support, these vehicles
offer a high degree of mobility and operational flexibility. In relation to the machines of just 10 to 15
years ago, modern helicopters are reliable and reasonably easy to maintain in the field.
2NC
Ice camps are amazing and solves arctic research comparatively better than the aff
Gossett 2003, (Jeff Gossett is the Technical Director at the Arctic Submarine Laboratory and served as
the Test Coordinator at APLIS-03, “Life on an Eggshell”, [
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/n87/usw/issue_20/eggshell.htm ] , //hss-RJ)
In the gloom of the early polar spring, hundreds of miles north of Alaska, a group of Navy and
civilian personnel assembled a small village on the ice to help improve the performance of our
submarines in Arctic climates. Named after the research center at the University of Washington that
helped build it, this camp was called The Applied Physics Laboratory Ice Station, or APLIS. Nothing
about the installation was luxurious, but for five weeks this spring, it hosted a submarine tracking
range, a science laboratory , a small airport, and the only source of hot meals for 200 miles in any
direction. Why an Ice Camp? Over the past several decades, the Navy has fielded several ice camps in
support of submarine Arctic research and development. The last such camp – considerably smaller – was
built in support of Science Ice Exercise (SCICEX) 99 with USS Hawkbill (SSN-666). That 1999 expedition
was Hawkbill’s second cruise in support of a five-year, collaborative research and data-collection
program sponsored by the submarine community, the Office of Naval Research (ONR), and the
National Science Foundation (NSF). ICEX-03 provided USS Connecticut (SSN-22) her second
opportunity to visit the Arctic as a follow-up to earlier operations in the summer of 2001, when the under-ice
capabilities of the USS Seawolf (SSN-21) class were exercised for the first time. [Ed. Note: See “A New Era
in the Arctic,” in the Summer 2001 issue of UNDERSEA WARFARE.] The primary purpose for
Connecticut’s participation this year was to test Mk 48 ADCAP torpedoes in an Arctic environment, but they
couldn’t have done it without support on the surface. A key advantage of establishing a camp on the ice
itself is the stable venue it provides for deploying a tracking range and sensors for testing underwater
weapons under the ice cover. Such installations have been used frequently in the past to support the
recovery of exercise torpedoes during similar weapons evaluations. Establishing APLIS-03 To support
this year’s exercise, the Navy needed a large and very stable ice floe to install a tracking range, build
a runway, and support surface travel by personnel with relative safety over a radius of several miles.
Given all of the logistical alternatives – icebreakers, aircraft, and building on the ice – the last was
clearly the only option for this exercise . Just after Connecticut surfaced during ICEX-03, this young polar
bear was attracted by the tip of the ship’s rudder protruding through the ice. After investigating Connecticut
for approximately 40 minutes, the animal left the area, with no damage to the boat or the bear. These images
were seen through the ship’s periscope and captured by projecting them on a flat panel display. Photo by
Mark Barnoff Establishing an ice camp is as much art as science. APLIS-03 started out about 180
nautical miles north of Prudhoe Bay, Alaska, in the southern Beaufort Sea. To get that far from land
requires fixed-wing aircraft because of their greater range, carrying capacity, and speed in comparison to a
helicopter. To land an airplane on sea ice requires two things – a smooth surface thick enough to support the
weight of the aircraft, and daylight. These two constraints, along with the required longevity required of the
ice floe, limited the available timeframe for the ice camp to the months of March and April. Before March,
there is insufficient sunlight for pilot visibility. After the end of April, the ice pack becomes unstable,
increasing the risk to both aircraft operations and personnel living on the ice. Finding a suitable location
for an ice camp requires a fine understanding of the Arctic Ocean and sea ice. For this, we called
upon decades of experience at the Navy’s Arctic Submarine Laboratory (ASL) in San Diego and the
Applied Physics Laboratory at the University of Washington (APL/UW). Early in March, APL/UW’s
Fred Karig (the APLIS Camp Manager) and ASL’s Dan Steele (the APLIS Officer-in-Charge) visually
surveyed several candidate ice floes from the air. Together, they provided the expertise needed to recognize
stable ice, the conditions required for landing aircraft, and the kind of floe able to support ice camp
operations. In practice, having found a spot that appears suitable, the pilot first attempts a touch-and-go
landing to confirm the strength of the ice. If that proves sufficient, he makes a full landing to allow the others
on the aircraft to debark and confirm the suitability of the site for setting up a camp. Once this initial
investigation is complete and everyone is back onboard, the party continues the search and evaluation process
at other potential locations. After the best site was selected, support aircraft initiated several flights each day
to ferry the tons of equipment needed to construct a small encampment. First the living huts and the allimportant mess tent were constructed. Bit by bit, a small village appeared on the frozen sea ice,
emerging as a fully-functioning camp only three weeks after the first reconnaissance flight. Life at the
Camp APLIS-03 was the first large camp established by the Navy since 1993. During most of the tests with
Connecticut, it was home for 50 to 60 men and women, with the population peaking at 70 on one particularly
busy day. Keeping that many people fed that far from civilization was a real accomplishment; keeping them
fed each day with three delicious, high-calorie, hot meals was phenomenal Some of the camp’s features were
similar to those found in primitive villages anywhere. There were six-man bunkhouses – more affectionately
known as “hooches” – home to the shifting population of APLIS residents. There were unpaved streets
running through the village that became roads leading to outlying areas. There was a small electrical plant
with power lines supplying all of the buildings. There was a small doctor’s office. And, like all proper
villages, there was a vigorous social life centered around a small diner – the “mess hall” – where
residents could always pick up a meal or just a cup of coffee while meeting with their fellow
“townspeople.”
Arctic Containment DA
Top Level
Note
If the 1ac reads the arctic war advantage, just read the first 1NC header as a link turn to the advantage. If the aff doesn’t
read the advantage, read the Icebreakers link under the header “1NC Link – Icebreakers” as well.
1NC
Limited US presence enables Arctic cooperation and solves tensions – Russian
aggression is simply rhetoric and won’t escalate
Bernstein 14 – Leandra, reporter for Ria Novosti, citing Marlene Laruell, program director at the George
Washington Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies, Research Professor of International
Affairs, Ph.D. at the National Institute of Oriental Languages and Cultures, 2014 (“Arctic Cooperation May
Ease Russia-US Tensions – Analyst,” Ria Novosti, May 22nd,
http://en.ria.ru/world/20140522/190037278/Arctic-Cooperation-May-Ease-Russia-US-Tensions-Analyst.html | ADM)
Tense relations between Russia and the US and NATO could potentially be cooled through Arctic
cooperation , according to the program director at the George Washington Institute for European, Russian,
and Eurasian Studies.
“I think the Arctic is, today at least, one of the last places for cooperation with Russia following the
Ukrainian crisis,” Marlene Laruelle said.
“US-Russia [Arctic] cooperation will probably be less directed to cooperation on security issues
because of the Ukrainian crisis,” she specified, “but there are several other elements that are still open
for discussion.”
Since 2011 the US has increased its stake in Arctic security and development and currently holds the
chairmanship for the Arctic Council. The US is planning to invest $1.5 billion focusing on the Arctic,
according to former State Department official Heather Conley.
However, US assets in the region are limited and they rely on dated technology and borrowed
equipment from other Arctic nations. Russia is currently the only country employing nuclear-powered
icebreakers.
“The securitization trend we see in the Arctic from the Russian side is mostly not an issue of military
aggressiveness , but it is a business issue,” Laruelle said.
Concerning Russia’s delimitation of its continental shelf and control over the North Sea Pass, Laruelle said
“ Russia is playing by the rules .” The demarcation of national and international waterways is contested
within the Arctic Council, but the first voyage of a Chinese merchant ship, Hong Xing, through the North
Sea Pass last year set a precedent when the ship adhered to all Russian requirements for passage.
There are hopes that increased trade will take place through Arctic routes. The route is expected to see
between ten and twelve commercial trips this year.
Laruelle’s remarks were part of a panel discussion at the Wilson Center on the interests of the Arctic nations,
and the increasing participation in the region by non-Arctic players, particularly China, Japan, Korea, and
Singapore.
The aff’s containment strategy provokes Russia into brinksmanship and wrecks
relations – causes miscalculation and escalating aggression
Murray and Keating 14 – Robert W. Murray, Vice-President, Research at the Frontier Centre for
Public Policy and an Adjunct Professor of Political Science at the University of Alberta, holds a PhD, Political
Science, from the University of Alberta. Tom Keating, Professor of Political Science at the University of
Alberta, 4/25/14, (“Why Neo-Containment Should Not Extend to Arctic”,
http://opencanada.org/features/the-think-tank/comments/why-neo-containment-should-not-extend-toarctic/)//AW
As the situation in Ukraine continues to worsen, Canada is under increasing pressure to include the Arctic as
part of NATO’s strategy to counteract Russian aggression. In the following, we content that it should
continue to resist this pressure—even in the wake of events in Crimea and eastern Ukraine.
The efforts to increase NATO’s common interests in the Arctic began as far back as 2010 with Norway
broaching the subject at a NATO Summit. At that time, Canada requested that the Arctic be removed from
the Summit’s agenda as Canada felt that NATO had no place in Arctic affairs.
Recent events in Ukraine have evoked concern among NATO allies about Russia’s potential interest
in expanding its borders. In a recent meeting of the Russian Security Council, Russian President Putin
highlighted the “special” place of the Arctic in Russia’s sphere of influence . Referring directly to
Russia’s future Arctic strategy, Putin noted: “We need to take additional measures so as not to fall behind
our partners, to maintain Russian influence in the region and, maybe in some areas, to be ahead of our
partners.” Russia is in the process of continuing its militarization of the Arctic and this week’s comments
regarding Russia’s future Arctic interests is cause for concern.
Having mishandled the crisis in Ukraine for so long, NATO’s response can now be defined as “neocontainment” in which NATO bolsters its military presence in Poland and the Baltic states in an effort to
dissuade Putin from going any further with his quest for what he has called “New Russia.” However, it
would be incredibly unwise for NATO to include the Arctic as a component of the neocontainment strategy moving forward.
The idea of extending NATO to the Arctic theatre is not a new one. Canadian officials raised the possibility
of such an extended mandate in the 1950s when Soviet bombers posed a threat to North America through
Arctic airspace. Canada’s concerns at the time, however, were shaped as much by the relationship with its
southern neighbour as they were with the Soviet threat. Indeed, Ottawa was hoping to deflect living under an
exclusively bilateral (NORAD) umbrella by including our European allies in the plan. The Americans and
NATO’s European members took little interest in the Canadian request and the matter was dropped.
The situation today is completely different. Russian interests in the Arctic are not primarily about a
global competition for power through territorial expansion (despite the indirect implications of power
accumulation); it is about pressing territorial and resource claims to their most extreme limits. At the same
time, every other Arctic state is pressing similar claims. While military power is not insignificant in asserting
and defending such claims, it has not been the exclusive, nor even primary, means employed thus far.
Diplomatic and institutional measures are still a viable option for resolving these territorial disputes.
A NATO presence in the Arctic would severely undermine these non-military measures and would
likely provoke Russia into a game of brinkmanship .
To date, Arctic relations have been entirely diplomatic , with no genuine hint of armed conflict on the
immediate horizon. It is true that Arctic states have invested significant domestic resources into Arctic
scientific exploration, resource extraction technology and military assets but thus far relations in the
Arctic Region have been cooperative . For the first time since the crisis in Ukraine began, though, the
Arctic became a component of a broader strategic discussion when Canada withdrew from the meeting
of the Arctic Council’s task force on black carbon and methane held in Moscow. Even so, it is likely that
Canada’s withdrawal from the proceedings had more to do with the fact that the meeting was being held in
Moscow and not a sincere effort on Canada’s part to goad Russia on policy issues concerning the Arctic.
The disputes at play in the Arctic are also fundamentally different from those being played out in
Ukraine. Any attempt to link them would be counterproductive on many fronts. Much has been made
in the weeks since the implosion in Ukraine on the effects that NATO expansion has had on Russian foreign
policy. Regardless of how one interprets the effects of NATO’s expansion to the borders of Russia,
extending the alliance into the Arctic would only confirm the perception in Moscow that the alliance’s
primary objective has been to encircle Russia and deny what it views as legitimate security interests
on its borders. If Russians weren’t paranoid about being trapped before, such a move by NATO would
surely reinforce such a view .
‘
1NC Link – Icebreakers
The aff is perceived as a military demonstration of force. This spills over to broader
deterrence and containment apparatuses in the Arctic – causes war.
Pate 10 – Chad Pate, Major in the US Air Force, Thesis paper for an MA in Security Studies, 2010 (“Easing
the Arctic Tension: An Economic Solution,” Naval Postgraduate School, December,
http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=11038)
Currently, the United States does not possess any ice-hardened warships and its only three
icebreakers are approaching the end of their 30-year service lives. 12 Additionally, the icebreaker
mission was transferred to the Coast Guard in 1966 and is split between Coast Guard operations,
scientific and logistics-oriented tasks. These three Coast Guard vessels, coupled with the icebreaker
Nathaniel B. Palmer (owned by the National Science Foundation and used solely for scientific missions),
“constitute the entire fleet of U.S. ships equipped for polar operations .” 13 Contrast this situation with
that of Russia, which possesses 18 icebreakers, 10 of which are nuclear powered. 14 Allocating funds to
reinforce current naval vessels for Arctic missions or constructing new icebreakers during an economic
downturn could be problematic . Nonetheless, National Security Presidential Directive-66 (NSPD-66),
released in January 2009, calls for the development of “greater capabilities and capacity, as necessary, to
protect United States air, land, and sea borders in the Arctic region” as well as projecting “a sovereign
United States maritime presence in the Arctic in support of essential United States interests.” 15 These
interests, the directive further notes, are “ missile defense and early warning; deployment of sea and air
systems for strategic sealift, strategic deterrence, maritime presence, and maritime security operation;
and ensuring freedom of navigation and over flight.” 16 Fulfilling the president’s goal via military expansion
will be costly and time-consuming. 17 Although the need for increased law enforcement and search-andrescue capabilities are not in dispute for a region soon to experience increased human traffic, it is
necessary to scrutinize the need to maintain a robust military presence . The time requirement for
polar-capable ship construction is 10 years and each ship may cost as much as $1 billion. 18 It is important
that U.S. policymakers understand the validity of the threats posed to U.S. interests and what means are
available, other than a military show of force , to effectively neutralize these threats.
2NC Overview
The turn outweighs the aff’s internal link – status quo deterrence and cooperation mean
Russia will not initiate conflict in the Arctic, but strategic importance of resources means
the mere perception of American encroachment provides the external trigger for war.
Bailes 13 – Alyson Bailes, Visiting Professor, University of Iceland, member of the Advisory Council of
Independent Diplomat, visiting professor to the College of Europe teaching a course in New Security
Challenges and Security Governance, former English Diplomat who has served as Deputy Head of Mission
and Consul General at the British Embassy in Oslo, Head of the Security Policy Department at the Foreign
and Commonwealth Office, Vice President for the European Security Programme at the Institute for
EastWest Studies, and Political Director of the Western European Union, holds a Bachelor of Arts degree
(First Class Honors) in Modern History and a Master of Arts from Somerville College, Oxford University,
2013 (“Arctic: new conflict theatre between Russia and the West, or model of peace?” European Leadership
Network, December 16th, http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/arctic-new-conflict-theatre-betweenrussia-and-the-west-or-model-of-peace_1099.html | ADM)
To be sure, some commentators on the Arctic have other worries than just a disorderly 'race for oil'. They
note signs of increased military spending on assets designed for the polar seas, together with support facilities;
and they warn that an 'incident' could escalate into an international clash. What of these complications?
First, all Arctic states except Russia are cutting military expenditure generally and their Arctic plans
are modest, involving mainly higher-tech replacements for old assets and a small growth in numbers.
Russia's plans in the Arctic are not more grandiose than elsewhere and actual construction has
made a slow start. New bases like Denmark's in East Greenland, and Russia's being built in the New
Siberian Islands (far to the East), are designed mainly to get closer to the High Northern seas for purposes
of patrolling and policing, climate monitoring, and response to accidents. A study in 2012 by the
respected pro-peace institute SIPRI concluded: "Conventional military forces specially adapted to the harsh
Arctic environment are projected to remain small scale , especially given the size of the Arctic region,
and will remain in some cases considerably below cold war levels ."[i]
One must also remember that Russia and the West remain in a state of uneasy strategic balance overall,
despite all the progress made since the Cold War. Russia's northern coast is now its only real major
'break-out' area, and its forces there are also supposed to offset US and Western power in general. But
recalling this also highlights something many analysts miss. The nuclear and naval stand-off between the
USA and the Soviet Union or Russia has always taken place over the North Pole. Albeit by a deadly and
costly logic, it has kept the peace since the 1950s. Why should either side think they could use military
force against the other, in this very area, without the terrible dangers of escalation ? Can one really
imagine Russia fighting any of the other countries around the Arctic, all full NATO members, without
fear of NATO retaliation ? So long as Moscow's own Arctic assets are secure and the key sea route
firmly under its grip, why would it take that risk here more than anywhere else?
Arguably, in fact, the Arctic interaction of Russia and the West is less tense, less subject to out-of-control
incidents, than anywhere else their strategic peripheries touch. Since Cold-War times both sides have
cooperated on Arctic exploration and environmental management. Since 1996 the Arctic Council has
formalized and extended this cooperation, inter alia reaching two legally binding agreements (among the
five Nordics, Russia, USA and Canada) on cooperation in Search and Rescue, and major oil-spill response,
respectively. Under these agreements all sides have pledged to use their naval and air assets and other
security expertise to help each other when something goes wrong. Add the way that Russia has opened up
for Western investment in its own Arctic resource exploitation, and there seems rather less to worry about
here than in the Caucasus or even the Eastern Baltic.
Uniqueness
2NC Must Read – No Arctic War
**The status quo features low propensity for military expansion in the Arctic –
Russian belligerence is purely rhetoric aimed at the public. Containment efforts
cause conflict and deteriorate relations.
Gorenburg 14 – Dmitry, Senior research scientist, CNA, Senior Fellow of Harvard University’s Davis
Center for Russian and East European Studies, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Harvard University,
2014 (“How to understand Russia’s Arctic strategy,” Monkey Cage, Washington Post, February 12th,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/02/12/how-to-understand-russias-arcticstrategy)//AW
During most of the late 20th century, the Arctic region was primarily a zone of military interests, used by
both NATO and Soviet strategic forces as bases for their nuclear submarines and as testing grounds for
intercontinental ballistic missiles. With the end of the Cold War, the Arctic initially lost its strategic
significance. In the last decade, however, thanks to a combination of accelerating climate change and a rapid
increase in energy prices, it has become a key zone of strategic competition among a range of regional
actors and outside powers. Russia has become heavily involved in these fledgling efforts to develop the
Arctic. Russian leaders now primarily see the Arctic as a potential source of economic growth for the
country, both as a strategic resource base for the future and a potential maritime trade route.
Russian actions in the Arctic are governed by a combination of factors . The highest priority is
undoubtedly economic development of Russia’s Arctic region. Russia’s natural resources ministry has
stated that the parts of the Arctic Ocean claimed by Russia may hold more petroleum deposits than those
currently held by Saudi Arabia. Russia has already put in place plans to exploit resources in this region,
beginning with deposits on the Yamal Peninsula and adjacent offshore areas. The first offshore development
is the Prirazlomnoye oil field south of Novaia Zemlia, which started production in December 2013. Russian
companies face several challenges in developing these oil and gas resources. Because most of these deposits
are offshore in the Arctic Ocean, where extraction platforms will be subject to severe storms and the danger
of sea ice, the exploitation of these resources will require significant investment and in some cases the
development of new technology, and will only be economically feasible if prices for oil and natural gas remain
high.
The future economic potential of the region is not limited to the extraction of natural resources. In recent
decades, it has become clear that climate change is leading to the rapid melting of the polar ice cap,
which has already improved access to the Russian Arctic. Russian planners are banking on the relatively
rapid development of the Northern Sea Route (NSR), which they hope might compete with the Suez Canal
route for commercial maritime traffic. This will require a serious investment in icebreakers , new and
expanded port facilities, places of refuge and other services.
While much of the recent increase in attention paid to the region and investment in it is the result of
perceptions of the Arctic’s economic potential, Russian leaders also see the Arctic as a location where
they can assert Russia’s status as a major international power. This is done by claiming sovereignty over
Arctic territory and through steps to assure Russian security in the region. Many of the actions designed to
promote Russian sovereignty claims to the Arctic have been highly symbolic in nature. The planting of a
titanium flag on the sea floor at the North Pole in 2007 is typical of these types of actions, as are the highly
publicized occasional air patrols along the Norwegian, Canadian and Alaskan coastlines. The recent action
against Greenpeace protesters who sought to scale the Prirazlomnoye offshore oil rig is also highly symbolic
in nature. While an almost identical protest in 2012 resulted in nothing more than the protesters being
removed from the platform and their ship escorted out of Russian territory, the 2013 incident resulted in
Russia impounding the Greenpeace ship and highly charged statements by Russian officials accusing the
protesters of engaging in piracy. These actions are indicative of an effort by the country’s leadership to
ensure that the Russian public perceives Russian sovereignty over the Arctic as uncontested.
Russian policy is thus pursued on two divergent tracks. The first track seeks international cooperation
to ensure the development of the region’s resources. This includes efforts to settle maritime border
disputes and other conflicts of interest in the region . The second track uses bellicose rhetoric to
highlight Russia’s sovereignty over the largest portion of the Arctic. This is combined with declarations of a
coming military buildup in the region. This second track is primarily aimed at shoring up support among
a domestic audience . Managing the lack of alignment between these strategic and policy positions, and
their potential for counter-productiveness, is an important challenge for Russia’s leadership.
On the whole, Russia seeks cooperative international relationships in the Arctic . Although Russian
leaders’ rhetoric is at times confrontational, it is primarily targeted at maintaining their popularity
with their domestic base . Bellicose statements by President Putin and his subordinates about ensuring
Russian sovereignty in the Arctic should not be treated as indicators of an expansionist or militarist
agenda in the region. Although Russia is planning to improve its military and border patrol capabilities in
the Arctic, these improvements are primarily focused on areas such as protection of coastlines and
offshore energy extraction installations, search-and-rescue operations and icebreaker capabilities,
and should therefore not be viewed as inherently threatening to other Arctic states.
In observing Russian activities in the Arctic, the U.S. government needs to be careful to avoid assuming
that provocative statements intended primarily for a domestic audience are signals of belligerent intent
in the region. Instead, U.S. policymakers need to watch for more subtle signals of Russian intent. While
statements of Russian intent to build up military capacity should not cause much worry, actions such as
placing and deploying expeditionary forces would be far more provocative. Russian refusal to recognize the
decisions or authority of international organizations in the Arctic, or its withdrawal from such organizations,
should be considered a strong signal that Russia is truly shifting from a cooperative to a confrontational
posture in the Arctic.
Diplomacy
Peaceful Arctic diplomacy via multiple institutions prevents conflict. Russia still perceives
the region as a strategic priority that could require military protection if encroached upon.
CFR 14 – Council on Foreign Relations, 2014 (“The Emerging Arctic,” Council on Foreign Relations, March
25th, date acquired from “Emerging Arctic Explored in New CFR InfoGuide” available at
http://www.cfr.org/arctic/emerging-arctic-explored-new-cfr-infoguide/p32654, article available at
http://www.cfr.org/arctic/emerging-arctic/p32620#!/#Diplomacy%20and%20Security | ADM)
Less than a decade ago, many geopolitical analysts warned that the Arctic had all of the makings for
great-power rivalry reminiscent of the Cold War. However, the movement has gone quite the other
way . Despite a few remaining territorial disputes, the overwhelming majority of Arctic resources fall
within accepted national boundaries and all Arctic governments have committed to settling
disagreements peaceably . Notably, Russia and Norway resolved a decades-old maritime border
dispute in 2010, equally dividing some 67,600 square miles of water in the Barents Sea, and partnering in the
region on energy development. The historic deal is often cited as a model for future Arctic diplomacy .
The Arctic Council , the leading international forum for cooperation in the region, was established by
the eight Arctic states in 1996 with participation from indigenous peoples like the Inuit and Saami, and
all member states except the United States and Norway have appointed ambassador-level diplomats to
represent their interests in the region. With a secretariat in Tromsø, Norway, the council is a forum that
sponsors major assessments and studies, and develops policies and guidelines that focus on environmental
protection and sustainable development. Chairmanship of the council rotates every two years.
But Arctic cooperation takes place in a variety of other forums. Nordic nations—Denmark, Sweden,
Norway, Finland, and Iceland—also partner on sustainability and issues related to Arctic indigenous
peoples via the Nordic Council . Nineteen countries are party to the International Arctic Science
Committee , a nongovernmental organization dedicated to research. The nonprofit Arctic Circle , formed
in 2013 by Icelandic president Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson, aims to provide a setting for political and
business groups, as well as other organizations from around the world, to discuss Arctic issues.
Still, steady diplomacy has not precluded nations from maneuvering to protect their interests in the region.
Each of the eight Arctic nations has updated their strategy for the region in the last several years, including
the United States (see interactive diagram below). Russia, the only non-NATO littoral Arctic state, has
made a military buildup in the Arctic a strategic priority , restoring Soviet-era airfields and ports and
marshaling naval assets. In late 2013, President Vladimir Putin instructed his military leadership to pay
particular attention to the Arctic, saying Russia needed “every lever for the protection of its security
and national interests there.” He also ordered the creation of a new strategic military command in the Russian
Arctic by the end of 2014.
Economic powers further afield are also angling for a larger role in the Arctic . India, Italy, Japan,
Singapore, South Korea, and China became Arctic Council observer states in 2013. Analysts say Beijing is
particularly attracted to the region given its mounting energy demands and reliance on maritime trade.
Chinese officials now characterize their country as a “near-Arctic state,” and Beijing has recently increased its
investment in polar research, spending some $60 million annually, and ordered a second, $300 million icebreaking research ship. China strengthened its toehold in the Arctic by signing a free trade agreement with
Iceland, its first with a European country, and building an embassy that is Reykjavik’s largest.
Cooperation
No risk of Arctic War in the squo – cooperation and diplomacy
Bukkvoll 11
Tor Bukkvoll, Visiting fellow at The Leverhulme Program on the Changing Character of War, University of
Oxford, 9/22/11, (“Prospects for peace and cooperation in the Arctic”,
http://valdaiclub.com/russia_and_the_world/31960.html)//AW
On a related note, one must also keep in mind that while there is nothing inevitable about a
deterioration of relations in the Arctic , the fact that it can or will be avoided should also not be taken for
granted. The chances for building peaceful relations in the Arctic are good, but it will demand serious
focus, a great deal of dialogue and willingness to compromise from the states involved. Regional
cooperation arrangements such as the Arctic and Barents Councils can also play an important role in
this regard.
Despite the reasons for conflict discussed above, the conditions for conflict resolution through peaceful
means are probably more promising in the Arctic than in many other regions where similar conflicts exist.
First, all the states concerned, to varying degrees, are relatively economically developed and politically
stable . They are therefore likely to be more predictable in their policies than less economically
developed and politically stable states. Second, a comprehensive basis of agreements and normative
acts for regulating bilateral relations in the area already exists. Third, civilian cooperation among the
Arctic states is expanding on issues such as maritime search and rescue and environmental
monitoring, to mention just two. Such cooperation could also be expected to have a spillover effect
into the security realm.
Fourth, in military terms the most significant players in the Arctic – the USA and Russia – face much
greater security challenges elsewhere in the world. The USA is concerned by the rise of China’s
military capacity, their continued ability to be a significant military player if the Pacific, and the
defense of U.S. interests in a number of hot spots in the developing world. Russia is concerned by
the significant potential for political upheaval along its southern and eastern borders, in addition to
also keeping an eye on China’s rising military might. Thus, both countries could be expected to
work particularly hard to avoid the Arctic becoming yet another area of instability . Fifth, to some
extent the Arctic five share a common interest in limiting non-Arctic states’ access to the region. On
the one hand this could lead to greater cooperation among the Arctic five on limiting outside
influence , but on the other hand it could also lead to conflict between them should differences of opinion
arise about what the role of “outsiders” should be or whether some should be given priority over others.
No Escalation
No risk of war – empirics are conclusive
Hong 11
Nong, Postdoctoral fellow with the China Institute, University of Alberta, Deputy Director at the Research
Centre for Oceans Law and Policy, National Institute for the South China Sea Studies, ‘Arctic Energy:
Pathway to Conflict or Cooperation in the High North?’,
http://www.ensec.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=310:arctic-energy-pathway-toconflict-or-cooperation-in-the-high-north&catid=116:content0411&Itemid=375
While there are disagreements between the Arctic states on maritime boundaries, there are still
reasons to believe that these disagreements can be resolved amicably. The prospect for conflicts
relating to unresolved boundary disputes seems remote . The existing vehicles for dispute resolution
and cooperation in the region, UNCLOS and the Arctic Council, will also help to reduce tensions.
Joint management of resource fields is another option that might come into play as countries
involved in a dispute might see more advantage in approaching the disagreement this way rather
than losing a claim in an international tribunal. Cooperation between Norway and Iceland regarding
the development of the Dreki field could serve as a model for similar arrangements in the future.
Another example is the continental shelf dispute concerning an area rich in natural gas between
Russia and Norway in the Barents Sea. Both countries dispute the other's interpretation of where
their borders extend into the offshore EEZ. While it is possible that there could be a conflict between
the two countries over this area, it seems highly unlikely given the potential costs versus the potential
benefits. Geopolitical issues are not exclusively conflicts over interests, although such concerns tend to
dominate. They can also reflect cooperative, multilateral initiatives by which a state pursues its
interests vis-à-vis others. Such cooperative ventures are often considered desirable and even
unavoidable when a state is seeking a result that cannot be achieved unilaterally. At the same time,
cooperation frequently establishes a level of governance – in some cases formally, in others less formally
– by which mutual understanding can clarify intentions and help to build trust. Recognizing and
respecting each others rights constitutes the legal basis for cooperation between Arctic and nonArctic states. In accordance with UNCLOS and other relevant international laws, Arctic states have
sovereign rights and jurisdiction in their respective areas in the region, while non-Arctic states also
enjoy rights of scientific research and navigation. To develop a partnership of cooperation, Arctic and
non-Arctic states should, first and foremost, recognize and respect each other's rights under the international
law. Examples between Arctic and non-Arctic states are there. On 22 November 2010, the Sovcomflot
Group (SCF) and China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) signed a strategic long-term
cooperation agreement. The parties agreed to develop a long-term partnership in the sphere of
seaborne energy solutions, with the SCF fleet serving the continually growing Chinese imports of
hydrocarbons. Taking into account the significant experience gained by Sovcomflot in developing the
transportation of hydrocarbons in the Arctic seas, SCF and CNPC agreed upon the format for
coordination in utilizing the transportation potential of the Northern Sea Route along Russia’s
Arctic coast, both for delivering transit shipments of hydrocarbons and for the transportation of oil and gas
from Russia’s developing Arctic offshore fields to China. A new fleet of tankers designed to operate in ice
as well as additional heavy-duty ice breakers will be built to that end. South Korea´s Samsung
Industries is looking into filling the technological gap to make it possible to deliver Arctic natural
gas across the pacific ocean to East Asia. Russia is building massive duel-bowed oil tankers that are set to
come into use as soon as next year. While traveling forward, the ships move as they normally would through
open water. But when the vessels move backward, they can act as ice-breakers. Construction is underway on
two 70,000-tonne ships and two more 125,000 tonne ships and there are rumors that another five are on
order.
No Miscalculation
The Arctic is safe – no miscalc, intentions are benign
Rybachenkov 13
(Vladimir, Counselor for nuclear affairs at the Russian embassy in Washington, Lecturere at CarnagiePlowshare, “The Arctic: region of multilateral cooperation or platform for military tension?”,
http://english.ruvr.ru/2013_04_03/The-Arctic-region-of-multilateral-cooperation-or-platform-for-militarytension/)
Some western media have recently been highlighting the view that military conflicts in the struggle
to secure the Arctic's natural resources are inevitable. Russia is carefully monitoring developments in
polar region and considers the general situation in the area to be positive, stable and, on the whole,
predictable, based on the assumption that there are no immediate issues that might call for a military
solution. This assessment has recently been confirmed in a report by the Stockholm Institute for
Peace Research (SIPRI), which refuted recent conjecture about a polar arms race.¶ It is commonly
recognised that there are currently three major factors determining the Arctic situation; Firstly, the end to
military and political confrontation from the Cold War when the Arctic was almost exclusively seen in the
context of flight trajectories for strategic nuclear weapons as well a route for nuclear submarine patrols. Now
the threat of a global nuclear war is substantially reduced, with US–Russian arms control treaties
being a key element in the gradual movement towards a world without nuclear weapons.
Impartial assessment of the arms control proces s shows that both countries' nuclear potentials have
steadily diminished over the last 20 years. The START 1 treaty resulted in the removal of about 40% of
the nuclear weapons deployed in Russia and the USA while the 2010 New START treaty provided for their
further fourfold reduction. Substantial efforts have also been made by both countries to reduce the
likelihood of accidental nuclear launches due to unauthorised actions or misunderstandings: strategic
nuclear bombers were taken off full time alert and “Open ocean targeting" was mutually agreed,
meaning that in the event of an accidental launch, the missile would be diverted to land in the open
ocean.
Two other factors were contributing to the opening up of new opportunities in the Arctic: the emergence of
new technologies and rapid thawing of the Arctic ice, both rendering natural resources and shipping routes
more accessible. It should also be noted that the ice-cap depletion also has a military dimension, namely the
gradual increase of US multipurpose nuclear submarines and the deployment of missile defence AEGIS
warships in the Northern Seas may be considered by Russia as a threat to its national security.
Russia was the first Arctic state to adopt, in 2008, a long term policy report in response to the new
realities, it pointed to the Arctic region as a, “strategic resource base for the country" which would
require the development of a new social and economic infrastructure as well as an upgrading of military
presence in the region to safeguard the Arctic territory. The document however underlined that there
was no question of militarising the Arctic and expressed the importance of sub-regional and
international cooperation to form a favourable social, cultural and economic space.¶ All other Arctic
states have adopted similar strategies with the key common point being a statement that the
national interests of each Arctic state can only be met through multilateral cooperation.¶ A “race" for
territory, energy and seafood has been curtailed by historical decisions taken at the 2008 Ilulissat (Greenland)
meeting when five Arctic coastal states declared that their basic framework for future cooperation, territorial
delimitation, resolution of disputes and competing claims would be the UN Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS ).
AT: “Ukraine Undermines Cooperation”
The Arctic is largely insulated from the Ukraine crisis – Arctic cooperation over a host of
issues is still likely and resolves any tensions
Gudev 14 – Pavel, Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations
of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Center for North American Studies, holds a Ph.D., interviewed by
Eleonora Milazzo, Arctic Climate Change Emerging Leaders Fellow for the Ecologic Institute in Berlin, 2014
(“Prospects of cooperation in U.S.-Russia relations in the Arctic,” Russian International Affairs Council, March
19th, http://russiancouncil.ru/en/blogs/arctic-cooperation/?id_4=1053 | ADM)
In the current situation, bilateral relations between the U.S. and Russia run the risk of becoming increasingly
problematic. Do you think this will affect Arctic cooperation?
In the last years, we have witnessed a deep evolution in the understanding of the Arctic issues among
both American and Russian experts. We have understood that we are allies rather than enemies and that
we have shared interests in the Arctic.
At the time being, all countries are willing to cooperate in the Arctic. This willingness remains in
spite of the crisis in Ukraine or in any other sphere. The Arctic has been and will be a very fruitful
field of cooperation between Russia and the U.S., Norway, and Canada. I don’t think there will be
any problems . I believe that what we need is to more openly discuss all the issues. In 2013, the U.S. signed
the new Arctic Strategy. It refers to the American national interest all the time, but the American experts did
not tell us what this national interest is. We need clarity and openness in discussing our goals.
The U.S. is going to chair the Arctic Council in 2015. Both American and Russian authorities consider Arctic
cooperation as one of the most fruitful. What will the U.S. agenda be? What do you expect from the
American chairmanship of the Council?
What we expect is enhanced cooperation on a number of issues. First of all, we expect to strengthen
coast guard and naval cooperation. In the Arctic, there is no such possibility for military conflict .
Still, we need to regulate all maritime activities, especially those conducted by non-Arctic states like China
or South Korea. All activities, from fisheries to scientific research, must be conducted in accordance with
the law. To ensure this, we need to enhance cooperation between the coast guards. When the Canadian
Minister Stephen Harper states that they are strengthening their navy or their coast guards, this does not
mean that we are witnessing an arm race in the Arctic. It just shows the tendency to regulate unregulated
activities[1]. Also, enhanced coast guard cooperation with the U.S. and with the other Arctic states will help in
tackling the new threats of the globalized world. Security concerns such as terrorism, piracy, and drug and
human trafficking are shared by both Russia and the U.S. Tackling these challenges effectively is in
everyone’s interest.
Ukraine doesn’t change Russian presence in the Arctic – militarization is too expensive of a
strategy
Canadian Press 14 – The Canadian Press, citing Michael Byers, a professor of international law at the
University of British Columbia, holds a Ph.D. from Cambridge University, 2014 (“Canada continues talks
with Russia as part of Arctic Council,” Canadian Broadcasting Corporation News, March 26th,
http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-continues-talks-with-russia-as-part-of-arctic-council-1.2587566 |
ADM)
NATO keeping close eye on Russia
International politicians expressed concerns earlier this month about how Russia's actions in
Ukraine may affect Arctic relations .
Former U.S. secretary of state Hillary Clinton said Russia's reopening of old Soviet military bases in the
Arctic could be seen in a different light given its actions in Ukraine. Icelandic Prime Minister Sigmundur
Gunnlaugsson made similar comments.
Observers say NATO hasn't seen any moves yet in the Russian Arctic that alarm them.
"NATO countries keep a close eye on Russian military activities and nothing in the Arctic , so far,
has caused them any concern," said Michael Byers, a professor of international law at the University of
British Columbia and author of several books on the Arctic.
"That said, NATO countries will certainly be keeping an even closer eye on Russia from now on.
"The Russians have been quite co-operative in the Arctic during the past decade, probably because
they realize how expensive it would be to take another approach, especially one involving
militarization."
Ukraine crisis doesn’t affect NATO presence or Russian military activity in the Arctic – at
worst, it merely increases vigilance on both sides, which magnifies the link
Fouche 14 – Gwladys, Oslo, Reporting for Reuters, citing Ine Eriksen Soereide, Norwegian Defense
Minister, 2014 (“Wary of Russia, Norway urges NATO vigilance in Arctic,” Reuters, May 20th,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/20/us-norway-defence-russia-idUSBREA4J0HE20140520 |
ADM)
(Reuters) - NATO needs to become more watchful about defending its members' security, including in
the Arctic, because of the 'completely new' situation created by Russia's behavior towards Ukraine ,
Norway's defense minister said in an interview.
Until now, NATO's response to Russia's annexation of Crimea has chiefly focused on reassuring
anxious members in Central and Eastern Europe that until a generation ago were dominated - or, in
the case of the Baltic states, directly ruled - by Moscow.
But Norway's Ine Eriksen Soereide told Reuters that Russia's actions raised broader questions about
NATO's collective defense - significant comments from a country that borders Russia and is as keen as
Moscow to tap Arctic minerals, oil and gas.
"Ukraine has permanently changed relations between Russia and the international community, including
between Russia and NATO," Soereide said.
"We are in a completely new security situation where Russia shows both the ability and the will to use military
means to achieve political goals."
She said Norway has long pushed for NATO not only to intervene in crises such as Afghanistan, but to
strengthen the collective defense of its members - an idea central to NATO's founding treaty, which declares
that an attack on any one member country will be treated as an attack against all.
"We see this issue comes more to the fore in the discussions in NATO now than before. It is clear the
Ukraine crisis has given the issue a push in the past weeks," Soereide said.
'CORE AREAS'
Western governments have declared Russia's annexation of Crimea from Ukraine illegal, and accused
Moscow of destabilizing parts of eastern Ukraine where pro-Russian separatists have taken over public
buildings and declared a breakaway state.
Moscow blames the tensions on the pro-Western Ukrainian government. The Kremlin said on Monday
President Vladimir Putin had ordered Russian forces near Ukraine back to their bases, but NATO and the
United States said they saw no sign that tens of thousands of Russian troops there had pulled back.
Soereide stopped short of saying that the crisis had increased the threat level in the Arctic, from where Russia
shipped its first oil last month.
"But it demands of us that we be more watchful of the activities that are taking place in our core areas," the
minister said. "We need a NATO that has a good understanding of its regional areas."
Since the Ukraine crisis broke out, Norway has not registered any new increase in Russian military
activity in the Arctic , Soereide said. "But we see that there has been an increase in activity over time."
Link
Containment Link
Status quo cooperative drilling solves Arctic relations – the plan’s military containment
strategy escalates tensions and causes violence.
Pate 10 – Chad Pate, Major in the US Air Force, Thesis paper for an MA in Security Studies, 2010 (“Easing
the Arctic Tension: An Economic Solution,” Naval Postgraduate School, December,
http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=11038)
Yet Russian technology is incapable of extracting the oil and natural gas from its newly uncovered
Arctic territory. Conversely, Western corporations are in need of new oil reserves and possess the
technology to begin extraction almost immediately. The capitalist peace is based on the establishment
of economic relationships , which serve to override the potential for increases in hostilities. The
hydrocarbon industry may be where these relationships are forged. Achieving a capitalist peace is by no
means a foregone conclusion. Political obstacles, such as the Russian law mentioned above, as well as
counterarguments posed by realist critics will inhibit the transition from the region’s tense present state to
one more pacific. 243
Facilitating the capitalist peace will require Russian leaders to reevaluate the costs and benefits of its barriers
to FDI in the hydrocarbon industry. Considering its maturing wells and its dependence on oil and gas
revenue as well as its use of gas for strategic leverage, Russia should comprehend the folly of fostering a
business climate unattractive to investors. Unfortunately, Russia’s recent behavior has given little indication
that it will soon reevaluate its policies. Its 2008 law as well as the examples set in Kovykta and Sakhalin may
be indications that Russia would rather keep its resources in the ground rather than risk losing them in the
competitive atmosphere that is capitalism.
For its part, the United States should maintain its “reset” policy designed to create more peaceful
American- Russian relations . Though the Obama Administration still adheres to NSPD-66, it has shown
a willingness to depart from realist principles and adopt more conciliatory policies. 244 Continuing to
do so may make Russia more receptive toward U.S. industry becoming involved in its strategic resources.
There are at least two possibilities for how the situation in the Arctic will evolve. One resembles a
realist solution with large increases in military capabilities and states posturing for regional
dominance. This solution involves enormous expenditures and a future characterized by tension
and possibly violence . The other solution appears to be more universally beneficial. With Western
oil and natural gas corporations joined with those of Russia, the expectation is that such high levels
of FDI would bring a kind of peace to the region. It is important to note that the prospect of a capitalist
peace does not equate to a lack of rivalry. The resultant atmosphere will involve fierce competition over
markets as both sides vie for greater profits and larger shares of resources. However, an atmosphere
characterized by competition is much preferred over the realist vision of an atmosphere
characterized by military conflict .
This strategy specifically fails with Russia – escalates conflict
People’s Daily Online, 5/8
(People’s Daily Online, “Will U.S. containment of Russia be effective?,” May 8, 2014,
http://english.people.com.cn/98649/8620824.html, Accessed: 7/24/14, RH)
This all shows that Obama is adopting a “containment” policy to undermine Putin economically and
politically in the coming years, thus weakening his influence over Russia.
Practically speaking, Obama’s containment policy may not be as effective in practice as is seemed
when first proposed. The international economy is more interdependent and political power is more
widely dispersed.
Obama has not yet convinced his European allies to give active support to his policy of containment.
For many European countries it seems an overreaction to impose harsh sanctions on Russia unless
Russian troops are dispatched to the east of Ukraine.
This attitude was particularly obvious during the visit of the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, to the
United States. Germany has 6000 companies in Russia and nearly 30 percent of its natural gas and
petroleum come from Russia. While showing its solidarity with the U.S., Merkel emphasized that a
comprehensive solution was needed when the U.S. and the EU discuss sanctions on Russia if
damage to the interests of some EU countries is to be avoided.
Politically, the U.S. has encountered bigger obstacles in isolating Russia. In the United Nations vote on
Ukraine many key countries were unwilling to side with America. India and South Africa abstained and
America’s firm ally Israel was absent from the vote.
The Ukraine has already split. Even without Russian intervention, the country is still faced with a major task:
to rebuild Ukraine, establish its national consensus and revive its economy.
Rather than trying to contain Russia, what the U.S. needs to do is cooperate and look for solutions based on
negotiations. Otherwise, the situation is likely to deteriorate.
Perception Link
Containment turns the case – based on perception
Troitsky 10
Mikhail Troitsky is an associate professor at the Department of International Relations and Russia’s Foreign
Policy of the MGIMO University. He holds a Doctorate in Political Science, 12/25/10, (“Containment Must
Be Overcome”, http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/Containment-Must-Be-Overcome-15078)//AW
Containment , especially when based on nuclear deterrence, was the main link in the vicious circle that
emerged in Russian-U.S. relations after World War II . The situation has changed dramatically since
then, but people’s mindsets have not – you can’t trust the one you seek to deter. The lack of mutual
trust makes it highly difficult to resolve conflicts.
COSTS OF CONTAINMENT
The containment strategy can freeze a conflict, but it cannot pave the way to its solution . Nuclear
deterrence represents existential confrontation. Realizing this, economically developed nations seek to
avoid a situation of containment (especially one involving nuclear weapons) in relations with any
significant economic partner. Potential commercial costs would be too high.
By containing each other, the U.S. and Russia strongly impede mutually advantageous bilateral
cooperation. The saga of Russia’s accession to the WTO, which has broken all records for the process’s
duration, is hard to explain by anything other than the West’s psychology of containing Moscow. The
refusal to sell the Opel car company to a Russian investor has shown that NATO member-countries are
reluctant to share their latest industrial technologies (and not only military ones) with countries that are their
opponents (at least potentially) in the military-political sphere. Mutual containment feeds mistrust,
prevents interaction in the field of modernization and impedes efforts to find effective solutions to
climate change, to work out a mutually advantageous regime for using transportation routes and natural
resources in the Arctic, etc.
History knows examples of states making large-scale economic exchanges between themselves without establishing socio-economic or political rapprochement (for example, the Soviet Union and
Finland during the Cold War). However, there have never been full-fledged economic relations between major powers containing each other. Strategic containment and overemphasis on the
maintenance of the nuclear balance is against the logic of interstate relations within the economically developed part of the international community and against the imperative of multilateral
cooperation in addressing the increasingly challenging global problems.
Today, this is well understood by China, for example. Beijing and Washington do not trust official declarations of mutual intentions in the military-political sphere. At the level of military planning, they
probably proceed from the assumption that in case of exacerbation of the Taiwan problem, for example, the parties will have to resort to the rhetoric of nuclear deterrence. However, now that the U.S.
accounts for about 15 percent of China’s trade, both Beijing and Washington are seeking to downplay the significance of potential nuclear deterrence.
Otherwise, economic cooperation with the United States, which is vital for China’s development, would directly depend on the parties’ perception of each other. In the event of a bitter confrontation
between the two countries, in which they would contain each other in the security sphere, the employment by U.S. companies of even civilian advanced technologies for the production of goods and the
provision of services in China would become a politicized issue. This would bury China’s hopes to maintain its economic growth rates and, consequently, social stability in the country.
Interstate relations within military-political alliances are the only sphere that guarantees against containment.
Yet the psychology of the zero-sum game between Moscow and Washington is not a direct
consequence of the fact that Russia is not a NATO member. The United States maintains close
partner relations with states that are not in a formal alliance with it and that often oppose
Washington on the international scene. These states include a wide range of different actors, from
European “neutrals,” China and India to some Middle East countries. Russia also has experience of long and
trustful interaction with countries that do not have formal allied relations with it. These include, for example,
large states in the Middle East, some European countries and Russia’s neighbors that are not parties to the
Collective Security Treaty Organization and that do not fully share Moscow’s position on military-political
issues.
A revision of the situation of mutual nuclear deterrence between Russia and the United States would not
necessarily mean that Moscow and Washington will reach full agreement on the dynamics of further arms
reductions. The renunciation of deterrence is not directly linked with the controversial “nuclear-free world”
project and does not require an immediate recognition that nuclear weapons are rather a threat to
international security than a factor of stability. As long as the parties are confident that the possession of
nuclear weapons is an indicator of prestige and a factor of influence in the contemporary world, nothing
prevents them from maintaining their nuclear arsenals at a level that they deem necessary and that they can
justify to the public from a financial point of view.
The deterrence problem is not technical but political and psychological. It is not even the number of
warheads and delivery vehicles the parties have that really matters, or the response time available to the
leaders of Russia or the United States to an impending nuclear attack. These issues are only secondary to the
perception by Moscow and Washington of each other as strategic rivals in the nuclear field. American
diplomat and disarmament expert James Goodby wrote in his book Europe Undivided: The New Logic of
Peace in U.S.-Russian Relations back in 2000 that it is desirable to exclude any nuclear conflict between
Russia and the United States from possible development scenarios for sub-rational reasons. The
parties must be kept from aggressive actions not by the awareness of huge material costs but shared
values.
Counterbalancing Link
Russian Arctic doctrine proves counterbalancing only causes war
Nilsen 13
Thomas Nilsen, Former Senior Fellow of Bellona Foundation’s Russian study group, editor of
BarentsObserver, 2/27/13, (“Danger of militarization of the Arctic exists”,
http://barentsobserver.com/en/security/2013/02/danger-militarization-arctic-exists-27-02)//AW
Putin made his speech at the expanded meeting of the Defense Ministry Board in Moscow, reviewing the
ministry’s work last year and examined plans for the Armed Forces’ continued development.
“ Methodical attempts are made to rock the strategic balance in one way or another . The US has
practically started the second stage of its plan to set up a global missile defense system and there are
probes into the possibility of NATO’s further eastward expansion. The danger of militarization of
the Arctic exists ,” Vladimir Putin said according to the transcripts posted at the presidential portal.
Russia has earlier communicated that the Arctic is an area with no military tension.
In his hardliner speech on Wednesday Putin urged Russia’s armed forces to continue reforms and
radical rearmament.
“Our task - to create a mobile, well-equipped armed forces ready to respond promptly and
adequately to any potential threats to peace, to protect our citizens, our allies, the future of our
nation and state,” Vladimir Putin said.
Russia is currently increasing its spending on military hardware.
“By 2015, the proportion of the new generation of weapons should be 30 percent, and by 2020 to reach 70100 percent,” Putin said.
Naval Deterrence Link
The plan results in naval deterrence strategies – that forces Russian retaliation and
American attacks
Pate 10 – Chad Pate, Major in the US Air Force, Thesis paper for an MA in Security Studies, 2010 (“Easing
the Arctic Tension: An Economic Solution,” Naval Postgraduate School, December,
http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=11038)
NSPD-66 and the Arctic Roadmap’s proposed assessment of the Navy’s strategic deterrence capability
in the Arctic region is equivalent to an investigation of its ability to strike with nuclear weapons,
something with very little relevance when confronting non-state actor threats in the Northwest Passage.
Further, the Roadmap highlights a need to “Initiate a Capabilities Based Assessment for Naval Arctic
capabilities.” 67
The purpose of the Capabilities Based Assessment is to examine the Navy’s “current and required capability
to execute undersea warfare, expeditionary warfare, strike warfare [and] strategic sealift.” 68 The acquisition
of platforms specifically designed for these roles, such as aircraft carriers and destroyers, may also prove
adequate for deterring terrorist infiltration, but based on Russia’s actions and its projected military presence in
the North it is more logical that the capabilities based assessment is specifically designed to counter
Russia . Yet the Navy is not the only branch of the U.S. military using Russian actions in the North
to justify contemporary policy decisions.
On 8 August 2007, Elmendorf Air Force Base (AFB) in Anchorage, Alaska, welcomed its first of a projected
forty F-22 Raptor aircraft. 69 Only the second operational military installation to receive the state-of-the-art
fighters and the first Pacific-based fighter wing to accept them, the decision to station “America’s most
prominent air-superiority fighter” 70 so close to Russia’s border may be an attempt by Washington to
ensure the region’s balance of power remains in favor of the United States. In 2000, when the Air
Force was considering locations to base the second wing of F-22s after Langley AFB, Virginia, fielded the
initial delivery; the locations under consideration were Eglin and Tyndall AFBs in Northwest Florida,
Mountain Home AFB, Idaho, and Elmendorf. 71 Though political and infrastructure considerations likely
influenced the final outcome, the security of having a multi-role, stealth fighter in close proximity to
Russia just as likely added weight to the final decision. For its part, the Russian military has not
proved the decision to expand the U.S. presence in the North to be a poor one. 72 The examples below
illustrate recent events where Russia has worked against the other Arctic states . The intent is to illustrate
why realists believe there is potential for a military confrontation with Russia in the North and why
they are proposing a buildup in their nations’ military capabilities. The remainder of this section details
some of these actions.
Topicality
Neg T Non-military
Asset = Mil
All icebreakers are Coast Guard and for military presence
NRC 7
(National Research Council. Polar Icebreakers in a Changing World: An Assessment
of U.S. Needs. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2007.
http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=11753&page=R1//sd)
As one of the five U.S. armed services, the U.S. Coast Guard helps to defend the nation and supports
the National Security Strategy. The U.S. Coast Guard has served alongside the Navy in all wars and most
armed conflicts since 1798, and has maintained weapon systems, training programs, and operating procedures that facilitate readiness and interoperability with the Navy and the other services. Many
U.S. Coast Guard capabilities have military applications as well as domestic civilian purposes. Current agreements with the Department of Defense assign the U.S. Coast Guard five specific defense
missions in support of U.S. combatant commanders: (1) creating a visible presence and thereby maritime interception operations; (2) military environmental response operations; (3) port operations,
security and defense; (4) peacetime military engagement; and (5) coastal sea control operations. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the United States employed U.S. Coast Guard capabilities, which
the U.S. Coast Guard operates the nation’s
only multimission polar icebreakers, projecting U.S. presence and protecting national interests in the Arctic
region.
currently remain a key component of maritime security in the Persian Gulf. As part of its national defense role,
Icebreakers are used to bolster military power – best-case scenario the Aff is extra-topical
GPO 8 (U.S. Government Printing Office, “House Hearing, 110 Congress, HEARING BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION OF THE
COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION,”
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110hhrg43754/html/CHRG-110hhrg43754.htm, accessed 7/3/14)
Today, our nation is at a crossroads with Coast Guard ¶ domestic and international icebreaking capabilities. We have ¶ important decisions to make.
And I believe we must address our ¶ icebreaking needs now, to ensure we will continue to prosper in ¶ the years and decades to come, whether on the
Great Lakes, the ¶ critical waterways of the East Coast or the harsh operating ¶ environments of the polar region.¶ The Coast Guard's
icebreaker fleet provides a significant ¶ service for the American public by facilitating the nation's ¶ ability to navigate
U.S. waters, project military-economic ¶ power, and presence on the high seas.
Even if the Coast Guard performs science missions, the vessel is military
NIMMICH 6
REAR ADMIRAL JOSEPH L. NIMMICH, ASSISTANT COMMANDANT OF
THE COAST GUARD FOR POLICY & PLANNING, “U.S. REPRESENTATIVE
FRANK LOBIONDO (R-NJ) HOLDS A HEARING ON THE NATIONAL
ACADEMY OF SCIENCE ICEBREAKER REPORT” pg online proquest//sd)
The Coast Guard will continue to partner closely with the National Science Foundation to support
future scientific activities to the fullest extent possible, while simultaneously affording the nation our
full and considerable range of capabilities, as well as sovereign value of a military vessel of the United
States. Like you, we have just received the report of the National Research Council and we look forward to
discussing their recommendations and working towards important national outcomes.
Coast Guard is military and is interoperable with the Navy
NRC 7
(National Research Council. Polar Icebreakers in a Changing World: An Assessment
of U.S. Needs. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2007.
http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=11753&page=R1//sd)
As one of the five U.S. armed services, the U.S. Coast Guard helps to defend the nation and supports
the National Security Strategy. The U.S. Coast Guard has served alongside the Navy in all wars and most
armed conflicts since 1798, and has maintained weapon systems, training programs, and operating procedures that facilitate
readiness and interoperability with the Navy and the other services. Many U.S. Coast Guard capabilities have military applications as well as domestic civilian purposes. Current
agreements with the Department of Defense assign the U.S. Coast Guard five specific defense missions in support of U.S. combatant commanders: (1) creating a visible presence and thereby maritime interception operations; (2) military
environmental response operations; (3) port operations, security and defense; (4) peacetime military engagement; and (5) coastal sea control operations. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the United States employed U.S. Coast Guard
capabilities, which currently remain a key component of maritime security in the Persian Gulf. As part of its national defense role, the U.S. Coast Guard operates the nation’s only multimission polar icebreakers, projecting U.S. presence and
protecting national interests in the Arctic region.
Coast Guard = Mil
Coast guard is legally military
U.S. Code ‘02
(U.S. Code, Title 14, Part 1, Chapter 1, Section 1 pg online at
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/14/1//sd)
The Coast Guard, established January 28, 1915, shall be a military service and a branch of the armed
forces of the United States at all times.
Military activity is determine by structures---they’re military development in a non-combat
role
Brown 12 – Sylvia Brown, DPhil from the University of London, “Youths in Non-Military Roles in an
Armed Opposition Group on the Burmese-Thai Border”, Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy in the
Department of Development Studies, School of Oriental and
African Studies, University of London, http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/15634/1/Brown_3434.pdf
a) Definition of key terms
The term ‘youth’ is understood in this study to be a socially constructed emic term which, like all social
constructions, is not static, but continually re-defined by society based on the social context of the time. The
term ‘non-military’ is used here to refer to roles which are not located within army or militia
structures . Since roles within military structures involve both combat and non-combat roles (army
cooks, porters, signallers and engineers, for example), the term ‘non-combat’ can be used to refer to
ancillary roles within a military, which are not the focus of this study . This study is concerned with
participants outside the armed wing of an armed opposition group entirely, for instance, within its
administrative apparatus or mass organisations.
Coast Guard icebreaking is explicitly connected to the military role by statute
ABS Consulting, 10 – study commissioned by the Coast Guard (“United States Coast Guard High Latitude
Region Mission Analysis Capstone Summary”
assets.fiercemarkets.com/public/sites/govit/hlssummarycapstone.pdf)
The Coast Guard is assigned a wide range of responsibilities that apply to the high latitude regions through
legislation and executive orders, or are transferred to the Coast Guard by agree-ments with other agencies.
The
Coast Guard shall develop, and operate, with regard to the requirements of national defense, aids to
maritime navigation, ice-breaking facilities, and rescue facilities, and shall maintain a state of readiness to
func-tion as a specialized service in the Navy in time of war
rules and regulations for maintenance, and operation of lights and other signals on fixed and floating structures to protect marine navigation (14 USC
-mental interests in developing and maintaining a fleet of
icebreaking vessels capable of operating effectively in the heavy ice regions of
Secretary] shall develop capabilities to protect borders, preserve the global mobility of U.S. vessels and project a sovereign U.S. maritime presence in
the Arctic in support of U.S. int
required by a Federal Onmanning
requested by
the NSF to allow the U.S. Antarctic Program to maintain an active and influential presence in Antarctica (Presidenti
The Coast Guard will maintain and operate all U.S. icebreakers, participate in peacetime operations
in polar regions for environmental and readiness training, and provide mobilization capability to
support military operations in high latitudes (Department of Navy and Department of Treasury Agreement on the Operation of
interference with native birds, mammals or plants (16 USC 2401-2413).
hibited waste, harmful
The Coast Guard is ALWAYS a military service
Stubbs, 94, Captain in the US Coast Guard
(B.B., “The US Coast Guard A unique instrument of US national security”, Marine Policy, Volume 18, Issue
6, November 1994, Pages 506–520, Science Direct)//GZ
The Coast Guard has a lengthy list of statutory authorities that oblige the service to conduct diverse duties. It derives
many of its functions from Title 14 USC. Under this Title the Coast Guard is a military service and a
branch of the Armed Forces of the US at all times , not just in wartime or when the President directs.
According to 14 USC 2 the Coast Guard on the high seas and waters subject to US jurisdiction shall:
The Aff uses the Coast Guard, which is a military organization
USCG 12 (United States Coast Guard, “About Us,” http://www.uscg.mil/top/about/, accessed
7/1/14)//GZ
The U.S. Coast Guard is one of the five armed forces of the United States and the only military
organization within the Department of Homeland Security. Since 1790 the Coast Guard has safeguarded our Nation's maritime
interests and environment around the world. The Coast Guard is an adaptable, responsive military force of maritime
professionals whose broad legal authorities, capable assets, geographic diversity and expansive partnerships provide a persistent presence along our
rivers, in the ports, littoral regions and on the high seas. Coast Guard presence and impact is local, regional, national and international. These attributes
make the Coast Guard a unique instrument of maritime safety, security and environmental stewardship.
The Coast Guard is a part of the military – prefer our evidence, it is in the context of nonmilitary spending and concludes neg
Snowe ‘10– US Senator for Maine
(Olympia J., “HEARING before the COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND
TRANSPORTATION, UNITED STATES SENATE,” MARCH 18, 2010,
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg63798/html/CHRG-111shrg63798.htm)//GZ
The Coast Guard fills innumerable roles in the maritime domain and does so with tremendous skill, precision, and speed, despite often operating in the
most treacherous of conditions. When other vessels head for safe harbors in the face of a rising storm, it is the Coast Guard's duty to sail full steam
ahead into the teeth of the tempest to assist those in need. From dramatic helicopter rescues hundreds of miles from shore to its role as first
responders in the face of humanitarian crises like the tragic earthquake in Haiti, the Coast Guard perpetually lives up to its motto, ``Always ready.''So
the Coast Guard today faces countless challenges, which we will pursue through various questions to the Admiral. But certainly, in the execution of
their missions--and frankly, it is the budget that concerns me the most. President Obama has chosen in this Fiscal Year to impose a
freeze on nonmilitary discretionary spending. And frankly, the Coast Guard is a branch of the
military . So I am surprised that it wasn't recognized as such in terms of now imposing a reduction of more than $340 million in the Fiscal Year
2010 enacted level. So those are some of the issues that I certainly will be pursuing in the line of questioning. But I certainly want to welcome Admiral
Papp to this position and to this committee so that we have a chance to explore these and examine these key issues.
The Coast Guard is ALWAYS a military service
Stubbs, 94, Captain in the US Coast Guard
(B.B., “The US Coast Guard A unique instrument of US national security”, Marine Policy, Volume 18, Issue
6, November 1994, Pages 506–520, Science Direct)
The Coast Guard has a lengthy list of statutory authorities that oblige the service to conduct diverse duties. It derives
many of its functions from Title 14 USC. Under this Title the Coast Guard is a military service and a
branch of the Armed Forces of the US at all times , not just in wartime or when the President directs.
According to 14 USC 2 the Coast Guard on the high seas and waters subject to US jurisdiction shall:
Coast Guard operations have no clear distinction between them
Stubbs, 94, Captain in the US Coast Guard
(B.B., “The US Coast Guard A unique instrument of US national security”, Marine Policy, Volume 18, Issue
6, November 1994, Pages 506–520, Science Direct)
This combination of different organizational functions gives the Coast Guard a unique nature with
strong contrasts. The Coast Guard is: (1) a humanitarian and law enforcement service, (2) a
regulatory and operational agency, (3) an armed force and federal agency, and (4) a domestic and
international agency. Each of the four roles depicted in Figure 1 is composed of several missions and
functions. These roles do not have sharp, clear-cut separations. Some of the missions and functions
benefit more than one role, such as the port safety and security function. This function supports three
roles - safety, environ- mental protection, and national defence. As a result Coast Guard resources
cannot be designed for only one function; they must be capable of multiple functions. This multifunctional capability is an en- during Coast Guard quality. Versatile, multi-mission resources represent
the essence of the Coast Guard as an organization.
Allowing Coast Guard affirmatives explodes limits
Stubbs, 94, Captain in the US Coast Guard
(B.B., “The US Coast Guard A unique instrument of US national security”, Marine Policy, Volume 18, Issue
6, November 1994, Pages 506–520, Science Direct)
Today the Coast Guard conducts a wide variety of functions to promote a safe, viable national
marine transportation system (Figure 3). The principal functions of this mission area are: aids to
navigation; recreational boating safety; commercial vessel safety; search and rescue; waterways
management; domestic ice operations; and port safety and security.
The Coast Guard is the enforcement agent of any regulatory AFF
Stubbs, 94, Captain in the US Coast Guard
(B.B., “The US Coast Guard A unique instrument of US national security”, Marine Policy, Volume 18, Issue
6, November 1994, Pages 506–520, Science Direct)
The Coast Guard’s maritime law enforcement mission¶ area traces its roots to the Coast Guard’s¶ inception as
the Revenue Marine in 1790, The Coast¶ Guard has the authority to board any vessel subject¶ to US
jurisdiction to make inspections, searches,¶ inquiries, and arrests. This is an extremely powerful¶ police
authority that the Coast Guard employs with¶ prudence. Protection of marine resources comes¶ primarily from
the Magnuson Fishery Conservation¶ and Management Act of 1976. Additionally, the Coast Guard enforces
many international fisheries agreements involving the US, such as the International Convention for
the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific. Today, the Coast Guard’s maritime¶ interdiction of illegal
drugs and aliens is a significant¶ national security task (Figure 4).¶ As the primary US maritime law
enforcement agency, the Coast Guard enforces or assists in the enforcement of applicable federal laws
and treaties and other international agreements. The Coast Guard enforces all federal laws on the
high seas and waters under US jurisdiction. The principal functions of this mission area are to:
interdict smugglers moving drugs, illegal aliens, and contraband into the US; enforce Exclusive
Economic Zone laws relating to fisheries and other resources; inspect domestic and foreign fishing
vessels to ensure compliance with US laws; assist other law enforcement agencies and enforce all
other US laws associated with marine matters; and combat maritime terrorism.
The US Coast Guard is always military and operates with military intent.
DoD 08 (9/22,
“Visit to Deployed Cutter Underscores Coast Guard’s Global Reach”, DoD News,
http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=51273, accessed 8/1/14)//GZ
In addition to its historic role protecting U.S. coastlines from external threats while promoting safe
navigation, the Coast Guard has had a little-known or -understood role supporting U.S. combatant
commanders overseas for the past 15 years, Wagner told the group.
“We are an armed force of the military at all times, and our missions are global,” he said. “U.S.
interests don’t stop at our borders, so the Coast Guard pretty much hits all seven continents.”
Since leaving its home port of Charleston, S.C., this summer, the 378-foot USCGC Dallas has
demonstrated the broad scope of the Coast Guard mission and the way it works cooperatively with
the U.S. military to advance U.S. interests.
The 170-member crew, most half the age of the 41-year-old vessel that saw duty in Vietnam, first traveled to
West and Central Africa to support U.S. Naval Forces Europe’s Africa Partnership Station, Wagner said.
This initiative aims to build partnerships with regional militaries to help them build capacity to
improve maritime safety and security in the region.
The US Coast Guard is military at all times
USCG 3/20- also references the United States Legal Code (3/20/14, “Missions”, The United States Coast
Guard, http://www.uscg.mil/top/missions/, accessed 8/1/14)//GZ
The legal basis for the Coast Guard is Title 14 of the United States Code, which states: "The Coast
Guard as established January 28, 1915, shall be a military service and a branch of the armed forces of
the United States at all times." Upon the declaration of war or when the President directs, the Coast
Guard operates under the authority of the Department of the Navy.
As members of a military service, Guardians on active duty and in the Reserve are subject to the
Uniform Code of Military Justice and receive the same pay and allowances as members of the same pay
grades in the other four armed services.
Polar Ocean Fleet = Mil
The polar ocean fleet includes military missions
Augustine 12
(Norman Ralph Augustine is a U.S. aerospace businessman who served as Under
Secretary of the Army from 1975 to 1977. Augustine currently serves as chairman of
the Review of United States Human Space Flight Plans Committee. Testimony of
Norman R. Augustine Before the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology
United States House of Representatives. “The U.S. Antarctic Program: Achieving
Fiscal and Logistical Efficiency While Supporting Sound Science” pg online at
https://science.house.gov/sites/republicans.science.house.gov/files/documents/H
HRG-112-%20SY-WState-NAugustine-20121115.pdf//sd)
Polar Ocean Fleet . Restore the U.S. polar ocean fleet (icebreakers, polar research vessels, midsized and smaller
vessels) to support science, logistics, and national security in both polar regions over the long term. Follow through
on pending action in the President’s FY 2013 Budget Request for the USCG to initiate the design of a new icebreaker. (It is noted that current practice for supplying
McMurdo and the South Pole is to charter Russian icebreakers when they are available.
National Sec = Mil
National security is a government term of art that refers to military advantages
Gortney 10
(William e. Gortney vice admiral, usn director, joint staff, “Department of Defense
Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms” pg online at
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf//sd)
national security — A collective term encompassing both national defense and foreign relations of the United States
with the purpose of gaining: a. A military or defense advantage over any foreign nation or group of nations; b. A favorable
foreign relations position; or c. A defense posture capable of successfully resisting hostile or destructive action from within or
without, overt or covert. See also security. (JP 1)
AT Military Operations Other than War
Military Operations Other than War still involve combat, no bright line under their
interpretation.
Air Force Doctrine 96- (October 5, 1996, Air Force Doctrine, p.5-6)//GZ
There are 16 representative types of MOOTW as listed in
Joint Publication (Pub) 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War. Four typically
involve combat, six do not, and six can overlap (they may be either combat or noncombat) depending on
the particular situation. Because each type of MOOTW has its own unique characteristics, the appropriate
response for one may not be appropriate for another.
Typical combat operations use or threaten to use force to deter war and help resolve conflict when a
country or region is unstable.
Because air and space forces train to meet demanding wartime requirements, basic mission training also
qualifies these personnel to conduct MOOTW which may involve combat.6
Typical
Noncombat Operations
However, basic mission training does not necessarily qualify air and space forces to meet the very demanding
requirements of typical noncombat operations which normally do not involve the use or threat of force. As
such, typical noncombat operations try to keep day-to-day tensions below the threshold of armed conflict.
They also promote peace, maintain US influence in foreign lands, and provide capabilities to help
enforce policies benefiting US national interests. Personnel involved in typical noncombat MOOTW may
need additional training in foreign language skills, cross-cultural communications, area orientation, security
assistance law, and human rights considerations.
Military Operations Other than War
Military Operations other than war don’t preclude combat. Their interpretation lacks a
brightline.
Shalikashvili 95- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (John, June 16, 1995, Joint Doctrine for Military
Operations Other Than War, Joint Publications Volume 3 Issue 7, p. I5-I6)//GZ
MOOTW focus on deterring war, resolving conflict, supporting civil authorities, and promoting
peace (see
Figure I-1). These operations provide the
National Command Authorities (NCA) with a wide range of possible response options, ranging from
other instruments of national power are unable to influence a deteriorating or potentially hostile situation,
military force or threat of its use may be required to demonstrate US resolve and capability, support
the other instruments of national power, or terminate the situation on favorable terms. The focus of
US military operations during such periods is to support national objectives—to deter war and return to a
sustainable state of peace. Such operations involve a risk that US forces could become involved in
combat.
• Combatant commanders, at the direction of the NCA, may employ US forces to deter an adversary’s
action.
The physical presence of these forces, coupled with their potential employment, can serve as a deterrent and
facilitate achieving strategic aims.
Should this deterrence fail, force may be required to compel compliance, for example, in the form of
strikes, raids, and other contingency operations. Other such operations include peace enforcement,
counterterrorism, some foreign internal defense (FID), enforcement of sanctions, support to
insurgency and counterinsurgency, and evacuation of noncombatants.
Non-military is distinct from non-aggressive or non-combat operations – it implies a
prohibition of military activities
Benkeo et al. 85- Professor of Astronomical Space Research at Utrecht University Observatory,
(Marrietta, “Space Law in the United Nations”)//RJ
4.3.1.1 The Terms 'Peaceful', 'Non-Military' and 'Non-Aggressive' The vast literature on the subject
shows, in space law, two major interpretations of' peaceful': that of non-military and that of nonaggressive53. In international law ‘non-military’ is defined as the prohibition to use outer space for
military activities in times of peace, whereas 'non-aggressiveness' refers to the permission to use at
least partial military precautions. The term 'non-aggressiveness' includes the possibility to apply
military activities in outer space law-fully as long as those activities do not aim at direct attack in the
sense of the United Nations definition of 'aggression'. The concept of non-aggressiveness is, from
the political point of view, therefore a much broader one than the non-military one: it permits among
other things almost all present activities in outer space such as those of 'spy' satellites, interceptor satellites,
remote sensing satellites of a certain type as well as laser beam experiments and the use of nuclear power in
outer space. At this point it begins to be difficult for those among us who are in favour of peace on Earth as
well as in the rest of outer space, because many outer space activities, scientific or not, have up to now been
executed by military personnel*; so that, if we had to get rid of the 'non-military', this would mean that space
research as it stands would become impossible. But it would be difficult, if not impossible, to discontinue
space research, the more so since international law, and, to a smaller degree space law, do not forbid the use
of outer space for military purposes.
‘Peaceful Purposes’ is too vague – any connection to the military opens Pandora’s box
Skaridov, 05- Professor of Law at St Petersburg Humanitarian University (Alexander S., “Naval activity in
the foreign EEZ—the role of terminology in law regime”, Marine Policy Volume 29, Issue 2, Science Direct)
Terminology is of fundamental importance in the application of the Law of the Sea. During the Tokyo
meeting most participants were of the opinion that the 1982 UNCLOS in establishing the EEZ left many terms undefined, and thus the regime
ambiguous, particularly regarding military uses of foreign EEZs. This ambiguity is in turn reflected in national laws. ¶ In Russian law, it is generally
assumed that the definition of a term can be determined from its generic characteristics (genus proximum) and specific differences (differentia
specifica) of the phenomenon being defined [1]. In this context, a generic feature distinguishing military activity from other activities is its purpose of
ensuring the security of the flag State, and a specific difference is the use of weapons for such purposes. 1. Peaceful uses Awell-known Eastern saying
goes ‘you may repeat a countless number of times the word halva, but it won’t become sweeter in your mouth’. Imagine yourself as a
captain of an antisubmarine cruiser instructing your crew to sail with ‘peaceful purposes,’ and that
the activities on the cruise must be innocent and ‘not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security
of the coastal state’ [2]. Every cruise of a naval vessel is related to training the crew in warfare. And
any military vessel or aircraft can inflict damage on its opponents. If that possibility is taken at face
value, then it would be necessary to ban all military activity outside the territory of the flag State.¶
Although the term ‘peaceful uses’ appears in official government statements and multilateral treaties
before the 1982 UNCLOS [3], examination of State practice leads to the conclusion that this term still
lacks an authoritative definition. However, ‘peaceful’ does not necessarily mean ‘non-military’. Let us
look at one of its early uses, in the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. The UN General Assembly resolution 1148
(XII) first introduced the phrase ‘exclusively for peaceful purposes,’ at the end of the 13th UN General Assembly
meeting in 1958. In the debate, nearly all States used the term ‘peaceful’ as opposed to ‘military’. Therefore, the
common under- standing was to avoid any military uses whatsoever. But at the time of the debate, both the United States
and the Soviet Union were developing satellites to serve military objectives. When this became evident, the
legal meaning of the phrase ‘peaceful uses’ changed from non-military to ‘non-aggressive.’ Accordingly,
all military uses of outer space were permitted and lawful as long as they remained ‘non-aggressive.’¶
Neg T Ocean Dev
1NC T Ocean Dev
Ocean “development” is utilization as a resource
Owen 3 – Daniel Owen, Consultant to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, “Legal And
Institutional Aspects Of Management Arrangements For Shared Stocks With Reference To Small Pelagics In
Northwest Africa”, FAO Fisheries Circular No. 988,
http://www.fao.org/docrep/006/y4698b/y4698b04.htm
1.2 The legal regime for management of shared stocks
For a stock shared between two or more neighbouring coastal States and not ranging onto the high seas, the
regime of Art 63(1) LOSC is appropriate. It states that:
Where the same stock or stocks of associated species occur within the exclusive economic zones of two or
more coastal States, these States shall seek, either directly or through appropriate subregional or regional
organizations, to agree upon the measures necessary to coordinate and ensure the conservation and
development of such stocks without prejudice to the other provisions of this Part.
Regarding the term “development”, Nandan, Rosenne and Grandy[4] state that:
The reference to “development”... relates to the development of those stocks as fishery resources .
This includes increased exploitation of little-used stocks, as well as improvements in the
management of heavily-fished stocks for more effective exploitation. Combined with the requirement in
article 61 of not endangering a given stock by overexploitation, this envisages a long-term strategy of
maintaining the stock as a viable resource.
Violation---the plan doesn’t develop ocean resources
Voting issue--Ground---resource-focus provides a stable and predictable direction for the topic and
creates a balanced set of arguments for each side---depth of literature on oil, gas, and
renewables is strong and creates high-quality debates
Limits---other interpretations make all ocean activity topical---explodes research burdens
and makes preparation impossible
Neg T Ocean Exp
1NC Ocean Exploration
“Exploration” is discovery through observation and recording
NAS 00 – National Academy of Science Study, “Ocean Exploration”, http://dels.nas.edu/resources/staticassets/osb/miscellaneous/exploration_final.pdf
What Is Ocean Exploration?
As defined by the President’s Panel on Ocean Exploration (National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, 2000), ocean exploration is discovery through disciplined, diverse observations and
recordings of findings . It includes rigorous, systematic observations and documentation of
biological, chemical, physical, geological, and archeological aspects of the ocean in the three dimensions of
space and in time.
Activity after discovery isn’t “exploration”
Hertzman 13 – Len Hertzman, Partner at Ashurst Australia, “Exploration Expenditure – No Bright Line
Test”, 5-29, www.ashurst.com/doc.aspx?id_Content=9175
What is "exploration"?
One of the key issues in the proceedings concerned the meaning of the word "exploration" as used in
section 37 of the Act.
While it is clear that "exploration" extends to activities involved in searching for and drilling
exploration wells to discover petroleum reserves, prior to the Tribunal’s decision, it was not clear whether
the word "exploration" extended beyond the immediate discovery of petroleum. For example, if a
taxpayer drilled an exploration well and discovered petroleum, does expenditure incurred subsequent to
that point in time cease to have the character of exploration expenditure (even though the extent and
quality of the reserve may be unknown)?
Further, it was unclear whether the term "exploration" extended to circumstances where a taxpayer did not
yet know whether an identified reserve was commercially or technically viable to allow for the development
and later production of a petroleum project (ie where the reserve is not a proven reserve). If activities of this
nature were in connection with "exploration" then the costs of assessing the commercial or the technical
feasibility of exploiting a reserve are likely to be referrable to "exploration" and therefore within section 37 of
the Act.
A further step along the continuum is whether "exploration" continues until a final investment decision is
made to proceed with a project in relation to a proven reserve. Again, it was not clear whether expenditure
incurred on activities prior to a final investment decision being made are referrable to "exploration" and
therefore within section 37 of the Act.
In its decision the Tribunal concluded, after considering the legislative history of the Act, that there is nothing
in the legislative history or in the extensive case law referred to by either party to suggest that the term
"exploration" should be read as meaning other than its ordinary everyday meaning understood in the context
in which it appears. The Tribunal found it useful to borrow from the language of a research report prepared
by the Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics in 1996 (ABARE report) in considering
the nature of the activities which naturally fall within the meaning of the word "exploration", as the word
would be understood by a user of ordinary English familiar with oil and gas mining.
The ABARE report refers to:
… oil and gas companies using a range of survey techniques to identify prospective fields. These may be
geological, gravity, magnetic, seismic (2D and 3D) or geometrical surveys. In prospective areas, new field
wildcat wells are drilled to discover the location of accumulations. In the event of a discovery, appraisal wells
may also be drilled to provide a more accurate indication of the potential size and quality of the oil and gas
resources.
The ABARE report then stated "[if] the discovery is significant, a feasibility study of the field for future
development and production is undertaken". The Tribunal took the view that although activities in the nature
of feasibility studies were included by the ABARE report as falling within the "exploration phase" as
opposed to the "production phase", activity of that kind is of a distinctly different nature to that
included within the ordinary meaning of the term "exploration". Accordingly, the Tribunal found at
[322]:
… as a matter of fact, that in the context of section 37(1) of the PRRTA Act, the ordinary meaning of the
word 'exploration' contemplates the use of any range of survey techniques to identify prospective oil or
gas fields. Those survey techniques would include, but not be limited to, geological, gravity and magnetic,
seismic (2D and 3D) and a geometric surveys together with any scientific or technical analysis necessarily
associated with evaluating their results. 'Exploration' also includes the drilling of appraisal wells to provide a
more accurate indication of the potential size and quality of the oil and gas reserves. However, the ordinary
meaning of the word 'exploration' does not, in the Tribunal's view, extend to include feasibility studies
of the field for future development and production . [emphasis added]
Voting issue--Limits---they include any activity that potentially gains knowledge, which makes research
impossible---the mechanism of “exploration” is the only hope for limits because action in
any part of the ocean is topical---limits are key to preparation and clash
Ground---action beyond discovery artificially inflates advantage ground and opens up
unique production Affs that change the link direction to generics---ground is key to fairness
Case
Shipbulding
AT Shipbuilding K2 Navy
Investment in commercial shipbuilding is not necessary for readiness and is not costefficient
Slattery et al 14
(Brian, Research Assistant, Defense Studies, Bryan Riley: Jay Van Andel Senior
Policy Analyst in Trade Policy, Nicolas Loris: Herbert and Joyce Morgan at the
Heritage Institute, “Sink the Jones Act: Restoring America’s Competitive Advantage
in Maritime-Related Industries” pg online at
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2014/05/sink-the-jones-act-restoringamericas-competitive-advantage-in-maritime-related-industries//sd)
Jones Act proponents also argue that America must keep its shipyards in operation in case that
capacity and capability is required in times of military buildup. Yet only one of the shipyards that
build the Navy’s primary vessels (e.g., carriers, destroyers, amphibious vessels, and submarines) also produces large commercial
shipping vessels.[13] The idea that the Jones Act preserves and sustains America’s naval superiority is antiquated. Furthermore, proponents disingenuously argue that it helps to “avoid
complete dependence on ships controlled by foreign nations.”[14] Yet the military maintains its capacity to build highly sensitive
weapons systems—including naval ships—regardless of the existence or health of comparable
commercial sectors in the U.S. Allowing America to use foreign-built ships for noncombative systems makes economic sense when those ships can be
built less expensively abroad. The Jones Act directly threatens national security in disaster response. The President can waive the Jones Act during a national emergency
and often does. President George W. Bush signed a waiver during the response to Hurricane Katrina to ensure that all maritime assets could aid in restoration and stabilization. More recently, President
Obama waived the Jones Act during the response to Hurricane Sandy “to immediately allow additional oil tankers coming from the Gulf of Mexico to enter Northeastern ports, to provide additional
fuel resources to the region.”[15] During disasters, recovery efforts should not be slowed by unnecessary legal roadblocks. If during disasters the Jones Act only causes hesitation before engaging in a
U.S.-built, U.S.owned, and U.S.-crewed vessels have dramatically higher operating costs than other options
available to shippers. U.S.-flagged container ships and tankers spend over four times as much as foreign vessels on crewing expenditures.[16] Jones Act ships also have higher
response effort, it provides no benefit. Harmful to U.S. Economy The Jones Act undermines U.S. economic competitiveness in a number of ways. For example,
maintenance costs, and it is more costly to repair and maintain vessels in domestic shipyards compared to foreign ones. Repair and routine work on U.S. tankers costs almost 70 percent more than
comparable work on foreign tankers.[17] Foreign vessels have longer trade routes and can spread their costs over a larger amount of cargo, making operating costs cheaper. As indicated by a March
2013 Government Accountability Office (GAO) study, foreign vessels that operate in a global marketplace have the flexibility to adjust their capacity to meet changing markets.[18]
Econ High
Economic trends are positive – consensus of business leaders
Desert Sun 7/14/14
(Morris Beschloss, TDS, “Majority of Financial Officers Turn Positive on US
Economy” pg online at
http://www.desertsun.com/story/money/industries/morrisbeschlosseconomics/20
14/07/14/majority-of-financial-officers-turn-positive-on-useconomy/12645737///sd)
For the first time since the end of the recession, a majority of business/industry top financial
management officers have become positive about U.S. economic growth throughout this year and
beyond. This conclusion was reported by the American Institute of CPA’s, as part of their second quarter
AICPA outlook. What makes this group’s comments especially significant is due to the “hard-boiled”
financial nature of this group, which views economic growth through the lens of expanding financial
viability. The 51% that registered positive were in stark contrast to the lowly 5% optimism in the eye of the
2009 financial storm, and up 2% over last year. Views expressed by participants included “forward
growth, steady hiring, and investment.” Although still tentative as to the intensity of the economy’s
anticipated forward motion, most agreed that the corner from deep recession to a solid platform of a longer
term recovery had been turned. As these conservative financial managers view the future, the major
disagreement lies in the scope of a brighter economic future. This disparity tended to reflect the segment of
business and industry sector that each survey participant represented. Most ebullient were from those
involved with the energy development, and ancillary businesses, allied with companies participating
in the multi-billions of project dollars already committed to the awesome growth awaiting the positive
impact of growth dynamics already underway.
Growth resilient—consumer spending indicates firm footing
Star 7/16/14
(“US retail sales, manufacturing data point at firming economy” pg online at
http://www.thestar.com.my/Business/Business-News/2014/07/16/US-retail-salesmanufacturing-data-point-at-firming-economy///sd)
US consumer spending rose solidly in June, in the latest indication that the economy ended the second
on a stronger footing. That momentum appeared to have carried into the third quarter, with another report on Tuesday showing factory activity in New York state expanded
sharply in July. "This is not a fragile economy," said Chris Rupkey, chief financial economist at Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ in New York. "The consumer continues to
WASHINGTON: A gauge of
quarter
play their part in moving the economy forward." Core sales, which strip out automobiles, gasoline, building materials and food services, increased 0.6% last month after rising an upwardly revised 0.2%
in May, the Commerce Department said. Core sales, which correspond most closely with the consumer spending component of gross domestic product, were previously reported as being flat in May.
The report added to signs of the economy's strengthening fundamentals
Economists had expected them to rise 0.5% in June.
,
which could buoy optimism the recovery is on a self-sustaining path, after output contracted sharply in the first quarter. Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen told lawmakers the economy continued to
improve, but noted that the recovery was not yet complete because of still-high unemployment. Yellen, however, cautioned the US central bank could raise interest rates sooner and more rapidly than
currently envisioned if the labor market continued to improve faster than anticipated by policymakers. Labour market conditions are firming, with the unemployment rate falling to a near six year-low
of 6.1% in June and job growth exceeding 200,000 for a fifth straight month. Prices for US Treasury debt fell on the economic data and Yellen's interest rate comments, while the dollar gained against a
basket of currencies. US stocks traded lower. June's gains and May's upward revision to core retail sales suggested a pickup in consumer spending in the second quarter after growing at its slowest pace
in more than four years in the first quarter because of weak healthcare consumption. Forecasting firm Macroeconomic Advisers raised its second-quarter GDP growth forecast by three-tenths of a
percentage point to a 3% annual pace. Goldman Sachs upped its estimate for the quarter by two-tenths to a 3.4% rate. UPBEAT OUTLOOK A surprise drop in receipts for automobiles, however,
Consumers will
gain more confidence
held overall retail sales to a 0.2% increase in June after advancing 0.5 percent the prior month. "
likely
to spend as the job
market improves and summer travel season hits full swing," said Randy Hopper, credit cards vice president at Navy Federal Credit Union in Vienna, Virginia. "We are optimistic that the second half of
the year will deliver stronger sales growth." From employment to manufacturing, the economy appears to be firing on nearly all cylinders, with even housing regaining its footing after slumping in late
2013 following a run-up in mortgage rates. Growth estimates for the second quarter top a 3%annual rate. In another report, the New York Fed said its Empire State general business conditions index
New orders edged up, while factory employment and
shipments surged. There were also signs of inflation pressures, with measures of both prices received and paid by manufacturers rising in July. Overall retail sales in June were
jumped to 25.60 this month, the highest since April 2010, from 19.28 in June.
restrained by a 0.3% fall in receipts at auto dealerships. The decline is surprising given automakers reported a surge in motor vehicle sales in June. Auto sales had increased 0.8% in May. Excluding
autos, sales grew 0.4% after rising by the same margin in May. There were increases in sales at non-store retailers, which include online sales, as sales at clothing retailers. Receipts at sporting goods
shops rose as did those at electronics and appliances stores. But sales at building materials and garden equipment suppliers fell 1%.- Reuters
US Economy is resilient – 5 reasons
Wiseman 7/5/14
(PAUL WISEMAN, AP Economics Writer “What's making US economy a world
beater? 5 factors” pg online at http://www.chron.com/news/us/article/What-smaking-US-economy-a-world-beater-5-factors-5601092.php//sd)
Europe is floundering. China faces slower growth. Japan is struggling to sustain tentative gains. Yet the U.S. job market is
humming, and the pace of economic growth is steadily rising. Five full years after a devastating recession officially ended, the economy is finally
showing the vigor that Americans have long awaited. Last month, employers added 288,000 jobs and helped reduce the unemployment rate to 6.1 percent, the lowest
since September 2008. June capped a five-month stretch of 200,000-plus job gains — the first in nearly 15 years. After having shrunk at a 2.9 percent annual rate from January through March — largely because of a brutal winter — the
U.S. economy is expected to grow at a healthy 3 percent pace the rest of the year. Here are five reasons the
United States is outpacing other major economies: AN AGGRESSIVE CENTRAL BANK "The Federal Reserve acted sooner and more
aggressively than other central banks in keeping rates low," says Bernard Baumohl, chief global economist at the Economic Outlook Group. In December 2008, the Fed slashed short-term interest rates to near zero and has kept them there.
Ultra-low loan rates have made it easier for individuals and businesses to borrow and spend. The Fed also launched three bond-buying programs meant to reduce long-term rates. By contrast, the European Central Bank has been slower to
respond to signs of economic distress among the 18 nations that share the euro currency. The ECB actually raised rates in 2011 — the same year the eurozone sank back into recession. It's worth keeping in mind that the Fed has two
mandates: To keep prices stable and to maximize employment. The ECB has just one mandate: To guard against high inflation. The Fed was led during and after the Great Recession by Ben Bernanke, a student of the Great Depression who
was determined to avoid a repeat of the 1930s' economic collapse. Janet Yellen, who succeeded Bernanke as Fed chair this year, has continued his emphasis on nursing the U.S. economy back to health after the recession of 2007-2009 with the
STRONGER BANKS
help of historically low rates.
The United States moved faster than Europe to restore its banks' health after the financial crisis of 2008-2009. The U.S. government bailed out the financial
system and subjected big banks to stress tests in 2009 to reveal their financial strength. By showing the banks to be surprisingly healthy, the stress tests helped restore confidence in the U.S. financial system. Banks gradually started lending
again. European banks are only now undergoing stress tests, and the results won't be out until fall. In the meantime, Europe's banks lack confidence. They fear that other banks are holding too many bad loans and that Europe is vulnerable to
another crisis. So they aren't lending much. In the United States, overall bank lending is up nearly 4 percent in the past year. Lending to business has jumped 10 percent. In the eurozone, lending has dropped 3.7 percent overall, according to
A MORE FLEXIBLE
ECONOMY Economists say Japan and Europe need to undertake reforms to make their economies more flexible — more, in other words, like America's. Europe needs to lift wage restrictions that prevent employers from
figures from the Institute of International Finance. Lending to business is off 2.5 percent. (The U.S. figures are for the year ending in mid-June; the European figures are from May.)
cutting pay (rather than eliminating jobs) when times are bad. It could also rethink welfare and retirement programs that discourage people from working and dismantle policies that protect favored businesses and block innovative newcomers,
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development has argued. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has proposed reforms meant to make the Japanese economy more competitive. He wants to expand child care so more women can work,
replace small inefficient farms with more large-scale commercial farms and allow more foreign migrant workers to fill labor shortages in areas such as nursing and construction. Yet his proposals face fierce opposition. "Europe and Japan
remain less well-positioned for durable long-term growth, as they have only recently begun to tackle their deep-rooted structural problems, and a lot remains to be done," says Eswar Prasad, a professor of trade policy at Cornell University.
LESS
BUDGET-CUTTING Weighed down by debt, many European countries took an ax to swelling budget deficits. They slashed pension benefits, raised taxes and cut civil servants' wages. The cuts devastated
China is struggling to manage a transition from an economy based on exports and often wasteful investment in real estate and factories to a sturdier but likely slower-growing economy based on more consumer spending.
several European economies. They led to 27 percent unemployment in Greece, 14 percent in Portugal and 25 percent in Spain. The United States has done some budget cutting, too, and raised taxes. But U.S. austerity hasn't been anywhere
A ROARING STOCK MARKET
near as harsh.
The Fed's easy-money policies ignited a world-beating U.S. stock market rally. Over the past five years, U.S. stocks have easily outpaced shares in
Europe, Japan and Hong Kong. That was one of Bernanke's goals in lowering rates. He figured that miserly fixed-income rates would nudge investors into stocks in search of higher returns. Higher stock prices would then make Americans
feel more confident and more willing to spend — the so-called wealth effect.
Manufacturing High
All data shows economy and manufacturing share accelerated growth and sustainability
Independent 7/16/14
(“US economy powers ahead in June as consumer spending advances” in
http://www.independent.ie/business/world/us-economy-powers-ahead-in-june-asconsumer-spending-advances-30433964.html#sthash.iEx3a3nz.dpuf//sd)
US consumer spending rose solidly in June, in the latest sign that the economy ended the second quarter on a
firmer footing. SHARE That momentum appeared to have carried into the third quarter, with other new data
showing factory activity in New York state expanded sharply so far this month. The commerce department said core sales, which strip out cars,
petrol, building materials and food services, increased 0.6pc last month after rising by an upwardly-revised 0.2pc in May. Core sales correspond most closely with the
consumer spending component of gross domestic product. They were previously reported as being flat in May and economists had expected them to rise 0.5pc in June.
June's gains and May's upward revision suggested an acceleration in consumer spending in the second quarter after it was held back by
weak healthcare spending in the first three months of the year. A surprise drop in receipts for cars, however, saw overall retail sales rise only 0.2pc in June after a 0.5pc
June's report added to signs of the
economy's strengthening fundamentals, which could buoy optimism the recovery is on a selfsustaining path. The economy contracted sharply in the first quarter, but that was probably a temporary setback. From employment to
manufacturing, the economy appears to be firing on nearly all cylinders, with even housing regaining its footing after
advance in May. While the rise in retail sales lagged economists' expectations for a 0.6pc increase,
slumping in late 2013 following a run-up in mortgage rates. Growth estimates for the second-quarter top a 3pc annual rate. The steady run of fairly upbeat data, as well as
slightly higher inflation readings, prompted Goldman Sachs to move forward its expectations for the first interest rate increase by the Federal Reserve to the third quarter
of next year from the first quarter of 2016. The US central bank, Janet Yellen, which is winding down its monthly bond purchasing programme, has kept its benchmark
interest rate near zero since December 2008. In another report, the New York Fed said its Empire State general business conditions index jumped to 25.60 this month, the
highest reading since April 2010, from 19.28 in June. New orders edged up, while factory employment
The survey of manufacturing plants in the state is one of the earliest monthly guideposts to US factory conditions.
and shipments surged.
Manufacturing is increasing and is sufficient to wean off of stimulus
Bloomberg 7/16/14
“Gain in Factory Output Provides Boost to U.S. Growth: Economy” pg online at
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-07-16/industrial-production-in-u-sincreased-0-2-in-june-fed-says.html//sd)
Industrial production climbed in June to cap the strongest quarter in almost four years as manufacturers
provided a bigger spark for the U.S. economy. A 0.2 percent increase in output at factories, mines and utilities last month followed a revised 0.5 percent
advance in May, figures from the Federal Reserve showed today in Washington. While the June gain fell short of expectations, production rose at a 5.5 percent annualized rate from April through June,
The fastest pace of car sales in eight years and a recent pickup in bookings for business
equipment point to further output gains. Improving overseas markets, underscored by a report showing faster growth in China, would also keep assembly lines
busy and propel the economy after a first-quarter slump. “The industrial sector of the U.S. economy has been doing well,” said Neil Dutta,
head of U.S. economics at Renaissance Macro Research LLC in New York. “It’s indicative of an improving economy.” The housing
industry is also starting to show signs of progress. Confidence among the nation’s homebuilders climbed in July
to the highest level in six months. The National Association of Home Builders/Wells Fargo’s sentiment measure rose to 53 this month from 49 in June. Readings above
50 mean more respondents said conditions were “good.” Housing Market A strengthening labor market, combined with wage growth and rising consumer
sentiment, will probably support further gains as the Fed winds down its unprecedented stimulus
program.
the most since the third quarter of 2010.
Manufacturing is on a positive feedback loop and the fastest US sector
Schaub and West 7/14/14
(Hillary Schaub, Director of Center for Technology Innovation, Darrell West is an
American author, political scientist, and political commentator. West is the vice
president and director of governance studies and director of the center for technology
innovation at the Brookings Institution. Why American Manufacturing is Vital to
Future Prosperity pg online
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/techtank/posts/2014/07/14-manufacturinghubs-innovation//sd)
The Obama administration has
enacted policies to spur economic growth and diverse groups of Americans reap the benefits of those
changes. Manufacturing supports the economies of local communities in ways that do not show up in national reports. It
accounts for a large percentage of R&D spending and American patents. Innovators require manufacturing facilities to create new processes and develop new prototypes.
A new wave of “makers” have built new sectors and companies, like 3-D printing and digital manufacturing. This has in effect
democratized manufacturing. The positive feedback loop between manufacturing and innovation supports a
larger entrepreneurial ecosystem. If America loses the ability to make things it creates a vicious circle that makes it harder to create jobs in the future.
Manufacturing is Growing Quickly The manufacturing sector is growing faster than the rest of the
economy. Over the past decade, manufacturing lost nearly a third of its workforce due to a lack of demand for American goods, the trade deficit, and general
stagnation. However, since 2010 it has grown steadily in terms of the number of workers. Sixteen thousand direct manufacturing jobs
were added to the economy this month and over 668 thousand since 2010. This represents the first period of sustained manufacturing job
growth since the 1990s. The US share of exports has grown faster than other modern countries. Manufacturing
plays a broader role in the economy and creates innovation benefits as well.
Shipbuilding High
Oil booms stimulate commercial shipbuilding—aff can’t solve Navy because of
sequestration
Roll Call 7/11/14
(“Domestic Oil Boom Helps U.S. Shipyards Rebound” pg online at
http://blogs.rollcall.com/the-container/domestic-oil-boom-helps-u-s-shipyardsrebound/?dcz=//sd)
The oil boom that has sparked controversy over rail shipments of Bakken crude from North Dakota has also been a boon for U.S. shipyards. This week
we interviewed Matthew Paxton, the president of the Shipbuilders Council of America, on the health of the U.S. shipbuilding industry. His organization represents small shipyards that build fishing
What’s the state
of the U.S. shipbuilding industry? Quite vibrant on the commercial side. We are seeing a surge in large vessel
construction; some of that has to do with the boom we seeing taking place with the shale finds and that oil and
gas moving around domestically; some of it has to do with the fact that we are re-capitalizing our fleets right now…. On top of that, we are very
robust in the building and repairing of offshore supply vessels that service the offshore oil land gas patch in the Gulf of Mexico. And we
build all sorts of barges, tugs and other vessels. … We deliver thousands of vessels every year: a little over 1,200 vessels delivered in 2012 alone. Where it gets tricky is on the
defense side, because there are budget constraints, there’s this nasty thing called sequestration. And
vessels as well as large companies such as Huntington Ingalls and General Dynamics which turn out aircraft carriers and submarines. (Responses edited a bit for brevity.)
while our shipbuilders that are building Navy assets and Coast Guard assets are doing wonderfully, and are building the most advanced and state-of-the art Navy and Coast Guard in the world,
those budget constraints do create some uncertainty on the defense shipbuilding side. But overall
we’ve weathered it.
Navy Resilient
Naval power is strong and resilient – even with a net decrease in fleet size, the US Navy has
only gotten stronger
Farley 07, Dr. Robert Farley is an Assistant Professor at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce. He specializes in
National Security Policy, Defense Statecraft, History of Strategy, Airpower, Asian Security, Seapower, Military Diffusion, and Maritime Affairs, (“The
False Decline of the U.S. Navy”, http://prospect.org/article/false-decline-us-navy, 11/23/2007) Kerwin
We live in strange times. While the United States is responsible for close to 50 percent of aggregate world
military expenditure, and maintains close alliances with almost all of the other major military
powers, a community of defense analysts continues to insist that we need to spend more. In the November issue of The Atlantic, Robert Kaplan
asserts that United States hegemony is under the threat of “elegant decline,” and points to what conventional analysts might suggest is
the most secure element of American power; the United States Navy. Despite the fact that the U.S. Navy remains several orders
of magnitude more powerful than its nearest rival, Kaplan says that we must beware; if we allow the size of our Navy to
further decline, we risk repeating the experience of the United Kingdom in the years before World War I. Unfortunately, since no actual
evidence of U.S. naval decline exists, Kaplan is forced to rely on obfuscation, distortion, and tendentious historical analogies to make
his case. The centerpiece of Kaplan’s argument is a comparison of the current U.S. Navy to the British Royal Navy at the end of the 19th century. The
decline of the Royal Navy heralded the collapse of British hegemony, and the decline of the U.S. Navy threatens a similar fate for the United States.
The only problem with this argument is that similarities between the 21st century United States and the 19th century United Kingdom are more
imagined than real. It’s true that the relative strength of the Royal Navy declined at the end of the 19th century, but this was due entirely the rise of the
United States and Germany. But the absolute strength of the Royal Navy increased in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, as the United Kingdom
strove to maintain naval dominance over two countries that possessed larger economies and larger industrial bases than that of Great Britain. In other
words, the position of the Royal Navy declined because the position of the United Kingdom declined; in spite of this decline, the Royal Navy
continued to dominate the seas against all comers until 1941. Britain’s relative economic decline preceded its naval decline, although the efforts to keep
up with Germany, the United States, and later Japan did serious damage to the British economy. The United States faces a situation which is in no way
similar. Returning to the present, Kaplan takes note of the growth of several foreign navies, including the Indian, Chinese, and Japanese. He points out
that the Japanese Navy has a large number of destroyers and a growing number of submarines. He warns that India “may soon have the world’s third
largest navy” without giving any indication of why that matters. Most serious of all, he describes the threat of a growing Chinese Navy and claims that,
just as the Battle of Wounded Knee opened a new age for American imperialism, the conquest of Taiwan could transform China into an expansionist,
imperial power. The curious historical analogies aside, Kaplan is careful to make no direct comparisons between the growing navies of foreign
countries and the actual strength of the United States Navy. There’s a good reason for this oversight; there is no comparison between
the U.S. Navy and any navy afloat today. The United States Navy currently operates eleven aircraft
carriers. The oldest and least capable is faster, one third larger, and carries three times the aircraft of
Admiral Kuznetsov, the largest carrier in the Russian Navy. Unlike China’s only aircraft carrier, the
former Russian Varyag, American carriers have engines and are capable of self-propulsion. The only
carrier in Indian service is fifty years old and a quarter the size of its American counterparts. No
navy besides the United States' has more than one aircraft carrier capable of flying modern fixed
wing aircraft. The United States enjoys similar dominance in surface combat vessels and
submarines, operating twenty-two cruisers, fifty destroyers, fifty-five nuclear attack submarines, and
ten amphibious assault ships (vessels roughly equivalent to most foreign aircraft carriers). In every
category the U.S. Navy combines presumptive numerical superiority with a significant ship-to-ship
advantage over any foreign navy. This situation is unlikely to change anytime soon. The French
Navy and the Royal Navy will each expand to two aircraft carriers over the next decade. The most
ambitious plans ascribed to the People’s Liberation Army Navy call for no more than three aircraft
carriers by 2020, and even that strains credulity, given China’s inexperience with carrier operations
and the construction of large military vessels. While a crash construction program might conceivably give the Chinese the ability
to achieve local dominance (at great cost and for a short time), the United States Navy will continue to dominate the
world’s oceans and littorals for at least the next fifty years. In order to try to show that the U.S. Navy is insufficient in the
face of future threats, Kaplan argues that we on are our way to “a 150 ship navy” that will be overwhelmed by the demands of warfighting and global
economic maintenance. He suggests that the “1,000 Ship Navy” proposal, an international plan to streamline cooperation between the world’s navies
on maritime maintenance issues such as piracy, interdiction of drug and human smuggling, and disaster relief, is an effort at “elegant decline,” and
declares that the dominance of the United States Navy cannot be maintained through collaboration with others. It’s true that a 600 ship navy can do
more than the current 250-plus ship force of the current U.S. Navy, but Kaplan’s playing a game of bait and switch. The Navy has fewer
ships than it did two decades ago, but the ships it has are far more capable than those of the 1980s.
Because of the collapse of its competitors, the Navy is relatively more capable of fighting and
winning wars now than it was during the Reagan administration. Broadly speaking, navies have two
missions; warfighting, and maritime maintenance. Kaplan wants to confuse the maritime maintenance mission (which can be
done in collaboration with others) with the warfighting mission (which need not be). A navy can require the cooperation of others for the maintenance
mission, while still possessing utter military superiority over any one navy or any plausible combination of navies on the high seas. Indeed, this is the
situation that the United States Navy currently enjoys. It cannot be everywhere all at once, and does require the cooperation of regional navies for
fighting piracy and smuggling. At the same time, the U.S. Navy can destroy any (and probably all, at the same time)
naval challengers. To conflate these two missions is equal parts silly and dishonest. The Navy has arrived at an ideal
compromise between the two, keeping its fighting supremacy while leading and facilitating
cooperation around the world on maritime issues. This compromise has allowed the Navy to build
positive relationships with the navies of the world, a fact that Kaplan ignores. While asserting the dangers posed by a variety of
foreign navies, Kaplan makes a distortion depressingly common to those who warn of the decline of American hegemony; he forgets that the
United States has allies. While Kaplan can plausibly argue that growth in Russian or Chinese naval
strength threatens the United States, the same cannot reasonably be said of Japan, India, France, or
the United Kingdom. With the exception of China and Russia, all of the most powerful navies in the
world belong to American allies. United States cooperation with the navies of NATO, India, and
Japan has tightened, rather than waned in the last ten years, and the United States also retains warm
relations with third tier navies such as those of South Korea, Australia, and Malaysia. In any
conceivable naval confrontation the United States will have friends, just as the Royal Navy had
friends in 1914 and 1941. Robert Kaplan wants to warn the American people of the dangers of impending naval decline. Unfortunately, he’s
almost entirely wrong on the facts. While the reach of the United States Navy may have declined in an absolute
sense, its capacity to fight and win naval wars has, if anything, increased since the end of the Cold
War. That the United States continues to embed itself in a deep set of cooperative arrangements
with other naval powers only reinforces the dominance of the U.S. Navy on the high seas. Analysts
who want to argue for greater U.S. military spending are best advised to concentrate on the fiascos
in Iraq and Afghanistan.
AT Econ Impact
No impact to economic decline
Thirlwell ‘10
—MPhil in economics from Oxford U, postgraduate qualifications in applied finance from Macquarie U, program director in International Economy for the Lowy Institute for International Policy
(Mark, September 2010, “The Return of Geo-economics: Globalisation and National Security”, Lowy Institute for International Policy, google scholar,)
Summing up the evidence, then, I would judge that while empirical support for the Pax Mercatoria is not conclusive, nevertheless it’s still
strongly supportive of the general idea that international integration is good for peace, all else equal. Since there is also even stronger evidence that
peace is good for trade, this raises the possibility of a nice virtuous circle: globalisation (trade) promotes peace, which in
turn promotes more globalisation.
In this kind of world, we should not worry too much about the big power
shifts described in the previous section, since they are taking place against a backdrop of greater economic integration which should help smooth
the whole process. Instead of ending this section on that optimistic note, however, it’s worth thinking about some reasons why the Pax
Mercatoria might nevertheless turn out to be a poor, or at least overly optimistic, guide to our future. The first is captured
by that all important get-out-of-gaol-free card, ‘all else equal’. It’s quite possible that the peace-promoting effects of international commerce will end
up being swamped by other factors, just as they were in 1914. Second, perhaps the theory itself is wrong. Certainly, a realist like John Mearsheimer
would seem to have little time for the optimistic consequences of the rise of new powers implied by the theory. Here’s Mearsheimer on how the US
should view China’s economic progress, for example: ‘ . . . the United States has a profound interest in seeing Chinese economic growth slow
considerably in the years ahead . . . A wealthy China would not be a status quo power but an aggressive state determined to achieve regional
hegemony.’ 62 Such pessimistic (or are they tragic?) views of the world would also seem to run the risk of being self-fulfilling prophecies if they end
up guiding actual policy. Finally, there is the risk that the shift to a multipolar world might indirectly undermine some of the
supports needed to deliver globalisation. Here I am thinking about some simple variant on the idea of hegemonic stability theory
(HST) – the proposition that the global economy needs a leader (or ‘hegemon’) that is both able and willing to provide
the sorts of international public goods that are required for its smooth functioning: open markets (liberal or ‘free’ trade),
a smoothly functioning monetary regime, liberal capital flows, and a lender of last resort function. 63 Charles Kindleberger
argued that ‘the 1929 depression was so wide, so deep, and so long because the international economic system was
rendered unstable by British inability and US unwillingness to assume responsibility for stabilizing it’, drawing on the
failures of the Great Depression to make the original case for HST: ‘ . . . the international economic and monetary system needs
leadership, a country that is prepared . . . to set standards of conduct for other countries and to seek to get
others to follow them, to take on an undue share of the burdens of the system, and in particular to take on its support in adversity...’ 64
Kindleberger’s assessment appears to capture a rough empirical regularity: As Findlay and O’Rourke remind us, ‘periods of sustained
expansion in world trade have tended to coincided with the infrastructure of law and order necessary to keep trade routes open being
provided by a dominant “hegemon” or imperial power’. 65 Thus periods of globalisation have typically been
associated with periods of hegemonic or imperial power, such as the Pax Mongolica, the Pax Britannica and, most recently, the
Pax Americana (Figure 9). The risk, then, is that by reducing the economic clout of the United States, it is possible that the
shift to a multipolar world economy might undermine either the willingness or the ability (or both) of
Washington to continue to supply the international public goods needed to sustain a (relatively) smoothly
functioning world economy. 66 That in turn could undermine the potential virtuous circle identified above.
Diversionary war theory is false
Boehmer ‘7
(Charles, political science professor at the University of Texas, Politics & Policy, 35:4, “The Effects of Economic Crisis, Domestic Discord, and State
Efficacy on the Decision to Initiate Interstate Conflict”)
This article examines the contemporaneous effect of low economic growth and domestic instability on the threat of regime change and/ or
involvement in external militarized conflicts. Many studies of diversionary conflict argue that lower rates of economic
growth should heighten the risk of international conflict. Yet we know that militarized interstate conflicts, and especially
wars, are generally rare events whereas lower rates of growth are not. Additionally, a growing body of literature shows that regime changes are also
associated with lower rates of economic growth. The question then becomes which event, militarized interstate conflict or regime change, is the most
likely to occur with domestic discord and lower rates of economic growth? Diversionary theory claims that leaders seek to
divert attention away from domestic problems such as a bad economy or political scandals, or to garner increased
support prior to elections. Leaders then supposedly externalize discontented domestic sentiments onto other nations, sometimes as scapegoats based
on the similar in-group/out-group dynamic found in the research of Coser (1956) and Simmel (1955), where foreign countries are blamed for domestic
problems. This process is said to involve a “rally-round-the-flag” effect, where a leader can expect a short-term boost in popularity with the threat or
use of force (Blechman, Kaplan, and Hall 1978; Mueller 1973). Scholarship on diversionary conflict has focused most often on the American case1 but
recent studies have sought to identify this possible behavior in other countries.2 The Falklands War is often a popular example of diversionary conflict
(Levy and Vakili 1992). Argentina was reeling from hyperinflation and rampant unemployment associated with the Latin American debt crisis. It is
plausible that a success in the Falklands War may have helped to rally support for the governing Galtieri regime, although Argentina lost the war and
the ruling regime lost power. How many other attempts to use diversionary tactics, if they indeed occur, can be seen to generate a similar outcome?
The goal of this article is to provide an assessment of the extent to which diversionary strategy is a threat to peace. Is this a colorful theory
kept alive by academics that has little bearing upon real events, or is this a real problem that policy makers should be
concerned with? If it is a strategy readily available to leaders, then it is important to know what domestic factors trigger this gambit. Moreover, to know
that requires an understanding of the context in external conflict, which occurs relative to regime changes. Theories of diversionary
conflict usually emphasize the potential benefits of diversionary tactics, although few pay equal
attention to the prospective costs associated with such behavior. It is not contentious to claim that leaders typically seek to remain in
office. However, whether they can successfully manipulate public opinion regularly during periods of domestic
unpopularity through their states’ participation in foreign militarized conflicts—especially outside of the American case—is a question
open for debate. Furthermore, there appears to be a logical disconnect between diversionary theories and extant studies of domestic conflict
and regime change. Lower rates of economic growth are purported to increase the risk of both militarized interstate conflicts (and internal conflicts) as
well as regime changes (Bloomberg and Hess 2002). This implies that if leaders do, in fact, undertake diversionary conflicts,
many may still be thrown from the seat of power—especially if the outcome is defeat to a foreign enemy.
Diversionary conflict would thus seem to be a risky gambit (Smith 1996). Scholars such as MacFie (1938) and Blainey (1988) have nevertheless
questioned the validity of the diversionary thesis. As noted by Levy (1989), this perspective is rarely formulated as a
cohesive and comprehensive theory, and there has been little or no knowledge cumulation. Later analyses do not necessarily build on past
studies and the discrepancies between inquiries are often difficult to unravel. “Studies have used a variety of research designs,
different dependent variables (uses of force, major uses of force, militarized disputes), different estimation techniques, and different data
sets covering different time periods and different states” (Bennett and Nordstrom 2000, 39). To these problems, we should add a lack of theoretical
precision and incomplete model specification. By a lack of theoretical precision, I am referring to the linkages between economic conditions and
domestic strife that remain unclear in some studies (Miller 1995; Russett 1990). Consequently, extant studies are to a degree incommensurate; they
offer a step in the right direction but do not provide robust cross-national explanations and tests of economic growth and interstate conflict. Yet a few
studies have attempted to provide deductive explanations about when and how diversionary tactics might be employed. Using a Bayesian updating
game, Richards and others (1993) theorize that while the use of force would appear to offer leaders a means to boost their popularity, a poorly
performing economy acts as a signal to a leader’s constituents about his or her competence. Hence, attempts to use diversion are
likely to fail either because incompetent leaders will likewise fail in foreign policy or people will
recognize the gambit for what it is. Instead, these two models conclude that diversion is likely to be undertaken particularly by risk-
acceptant leaders. This stress on a heightened risk of removal from office is also apparent in the work of Bueno de Mesquita and others (1999), and
Downs and Rocke (1994), where leaders may “gamble for resurrection,” although the diversionary scenario in the former study is only a partial
extension of their theory on selectorates, winning coalitions, and leader survival. Again, how often do leaders fail in the process or are removed from
positions of power before they can even initiate diversionary tactics? A few studies focusing on leader tenure have examined the removal of leaders
following war, although almost no study in the diversionary literature has looked at the effects of domestic problems on the relative risks of regime
change, interstate conflict, or both events occurring in the same year.3
Low growth makes politicians cautious—they don’t want to risk war because it makes them
vulnerable
Boehmer ‘7
(Charles, political science professor at the University of Texas, Politics & Policy, 35:4, “The Effects of Economic Crisis, Domestic Discord, and State
Efficacy on the Decision to Initiate Interstate Conflict”)
Economic Growth and Fatal MIDs The theory presented earlier predicts that lower rates of growth suppress participation in
foreign conflicts, particularly concerning conflict initiation and escalation to combat. To sustain
combat, states need to be militarily prepared and not open up a second front when they are already
fighting, or may fear, domestic opposition. A good example would be when the various Afghani resistance fighters expelled the Soviet Union from
their territory, but the Taliban crumbled when it had to face the combined forces of the United States and Northern Alliance insurrection. Yet the
coefficient for GDP growth and MID initiations was negative but insignificant. However, considering that there are many reasons
why states fight, the logic presented earlier should hold especially in regard to the risk of
participating in more severe conflicts. Threats to use military force may be safe to make and may be
made with both external and internal actors in mind, but in the end may remain mere cheap talk that
does not risk escalation if there is a chance to back down. Chiozza and Goemans (2004b) found that secure leaders were more likely to
become involved in war than insecure leaders, supporting the theory and evidence presented here. We should find that leaders who
face domestic opposition and a poorly performing economy shy away from situations that could
escalate to combat if doing so would compromise their ability to retain power.
Arctic Research
1NC Sci Dip Fails
Science diplomacy fails, scientists and policy makers can’t work together
Marlow 12 (Jeffery, Writer for wired.com, “The Promise and Pitfalls of Democracy”, Wired.com, 12/11/12,
http://www.wired.com/2012/12/the-promise-and-pitfalls-of-science-diplomacy/, CTC)
On July 17th, 1975, Alexei Leonov and Tom Stafford did something extraordinary: they shared a meal of canned beef tongue and black bread. It may
not have been the most delicious culinary experience the men had ever had, but the setting of the meal was slightly more noteworthy: outer space,
where two spacecraft had docked and were orbiting the earth at nearly 18,000 miles per hour. The two men and their crews conducted scientific
observations, exchanged gifts, and spoke intermittently in English, Russian, and “Oklahomski,” the Soviet commander’s description of Stafford’s
drawl. Far below Leonov and Stafford, their political leaders – Leonid Brezhnev and Gerald Ford, respectively – were embroiled in the maneuverings
of the Cold War. Diplomatic tensions ran deep, but with the Space Race to the Moon in the rearview mirror, joint missions seemed to operate above
the fray of political discourse. The Apollo-Soyuz episode was a unique moment in American space exploration history, a pivot from antagonism and
competition to measured cooperation that previewed a similar move toward engagement in the political arena over a decade later. Indeed, crosstalk
between members of supposedly clashing countries is a common feature of the scientific enterprise. These sorts of collaborations may not directly
solve the issues at the heart of tense diplomatic situations, but they do get parties on either side talking. The very neutrality of the subject matter – the
pursuit of “truth” – may actually help the process, allowing mistrust to thaw and preconceptions to crumble while engaging in a shared aim. This
notion of science as a diplomatic tool – its use as an entry point to a recalcitrant society that simultaneously breaks down politically
steeped preconceptions and offers tangible benefits – is a promising mode of development and a constructive brand of international
relations. The Obama Administration understands the value of science diplomacy; last month, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced the
expansion of the Science Envoy program, appointing Barbara Schaal of Washington University in St. Louis, Bernard Amadei of the University of
Colorado, and Susan Hockfield of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology to the position. These prominent scientists represent the third class of
envoys – the program began in 2009 and has sponsored visits to nearly 20 countries. The philosophy behind the envoy program is
noble, but its current directive is a bit vague. As noted in the State Department’s official release, “the science envoys travel in their capacity as
private citizens and advise the White House, the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. scientific community about the insights they gain from their
travels and interactions.” A recent assessment of the program by envoy Elias Zerhouni noted the challenge of following
through on initiatives predicated on the personal credibility and contacts of the individual envoys. Leveraging the
networks of world-renowned scientists within the framework of a coherent policy of international
relations is difficult, particularly when funding for longer-term projects is uncertain. The trust of international partners
requires a predictable political and financial environment. When President Obama launched the program during a speech
in Cairo, he said that the envoys would “collaborate on programs that develop new sources of energy, create green jobs, digitize records, clean water,
and grow new crops.” Whether these programs are mandated by the executive branch or are the responsibility of the envoys is unclear. A more explicit
structure could allow science diplomats to be more effective, building on the strong record of science as an invaluable tool in the soft power arsenal.
Alt-Cause: Science leadership is impossible as long as fracking is prevalent in the U.S.
Magill 13 (Bobby Magill is an award-winning science, environment and energy journalist who is currently
the senior science writer covering energy and climate change for Climate Central in New York City. My work
has appeared in Popular Mechanics, Scientific American, Bloomberg News, the Guardian, Huffington Post,
Salon, USA Today, High Country News, New West.net, and daily newspapers throughout Colorado,
“Fracking hurts US climate change credibility, say scientists”, The Guardian via Climate Central,
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/oct/11/fracking-us-climate-credibility-shale-gas, N.O.)
“As we produce more, we burn more, and we send more CO2 per person into the atmosphere than
almost any other country,” said Susan Brantley, geosciences professor and director of the Earth and
Environmental Systems Institute at Pennsylvania State University. “We are blanketing our world with
greenhouse gas, warming the planet.”
Several years ago in Pennsylvania, scientists were talking about carbon sequestration in shale formations deep
underground, she said.
“However, since 2005, we have been fracking shales and have drilled 6,000 shale gas wells ,” she said.
“ This extraordinary rate of development is good for our country in terms of jobs and energy prices ,
but bad in that we are not worrying as much about the greenhouse gas problem as we are about
exploiting gas with hydrofracking.
“It is hard for us to have credibility in global discussions of greenhouse gas unless we can use this
new source of gas a transitional fuel that bridges us from hydrocarbons to renewable, non-carbon
fuels,” she said.
Even among advocates for greenhouse gas emissions reductions, there is disagreement about what the U.S.
role as chief oil and gas producer means for America’s credibility on climate change.
“Those who already see the U.S. as a major bad actor will continue to do so, and cite this
hydrocarbon boom as further evidence ,” said Armond Cohen, executive director of the Boston-based
Clean Air Task Force. “By contrast , if the U.S. took a more progressive global stance on overall
emissions control, increased domestic production would be probably irrelevant; the world would be
relieved to see U.S. leadership.”
2NC Sci Dip Fails
Science diplomacy isn’t a substitution for regular diplomacy
Dickson 10 (David, Director of SciDev.net, “Science in diplomacy: ‘On tap but not on top’ ”, SciDev.net,
28/6/2010, http://scidevnet.wordpress.com/2010/06/28/the-place-of-science-in-diplomacy%E2%80%9Con-tap-but-not-on-top%E2%80%9D/, CTC)
There’s a general consensus in both the scientific and political worlds that the principle of science diplomacy, at least in the
somewhat restricted sense of the need to get more and better science into international negotiations, is a desirable objective. There is
less agreement, however, on how far the concept can – or indeed should – be extended to embrace broader goals and
objectives, in particular attempts to use science to achieve political or diplomatic goals at the international level.
Science, despite its international characteristics, is no substitute for effective diplomacy . Any more than
diplomatic initiatives necessarily lead to good science. These seem to have been the broad conclusions to emerge from a three-day meeting at Wilton
Park in Sussex, UK, organised by the British Foreign Office and the Royal Society, and attended by scientists, government officials and politicians
from 17 countries around the world. The definition of science diplomacy varied widely among participants. Some saw it as a subcategory of “public
diplomacy”, or what US diplomats have recently been promoting as “soft power” (“the carrot rather than the stick approach”, as a participant
described it). Others preferred to see it as a core element of the broader concept of “innovation diplomacy”, covering the politics of engagement in the
familiar fields of international scientific exchange and technology transfer, but raising these to a higher level as a diplomatic objective. Whatever
definition is used, three particular aspects of the debate became the focus of attention during the Wilton Park meeting: how science can inform the
diplomatic process; how diplomacy can assist science in achieving its objectives; and, finally, how science can provide a channel for quasi-diplomatic
exchanges by forming an apparently neutral bridge between countries. There was little disagreement on the first of these. Indeed for many, given the
increasing number of international issues with a scientific dimension that politicians have to deal with, this is essentially what the core of science
diplomacy should be about. Chris Whitty, for example, chief scientist at the UK’s Department for International Development, described how
knowledge about the threat raised by the spread of the highly damaging plant disease stem rust had been an important input by researchers into
discussions by politicians and diplomats over strategies for persuading Afghan farmers to shift from the production of opium to wheat. Others pointed
out that the scientific community had played a major role in drawing attention to issues such as the links between chlorofluorocarbons in the
atmosphere and the growth of the ozone hole, or between carbon dioxide emissions and climate change. Each has made essential contributions to
policy decisions. Acknowledging this role for science has some important implications. No-one dissented when Rohinton Medhora, from Canada’s
International Development Research Centre, complained of the lack of adequate scientific expertise in the embassies of many countries of the
developed and developing world alike. Nor – perhaps predictably – was there any major disagreement that diplomatic initiatives can both help and
occasionally hinder the process of science. On the positive side, such diplomacy can play a significant role in facilitating science exchange and the
launch of international science projects, both essential for the development of modern science. Europe’s framework programme of research
programmes was quoted as a successful advantage of the first of these. Examples of the second range from the establishment of the European
Organisation of Nuclear Research (usually known as CERN) in Switzerland after the Second World War, to current efforts to build a large new nuclear
fusion facility (ITER). Less positively, increasing restrictions on entry to certain countries, and in particular the United States after the 9/11 attacks in
New York and elsewhere, have significantly impeded scientific exchange programmes. Here the challenge for diplomats was seen as helping to find
ways to ease the burdens of such restrictions. The broadest gaps in understanding the potential of scientific diplomacy
lay in the third category, namely the use of science as a channel of international diplomacy, either as a way of helping to
forge consensus on contentious issues, or as a catalyst for peace in situations of conflict. On the first of these, some pointed to recent climate
change negotiations, and in particular the work of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, as a good example, of the way that the scientific
community can provide a strong rationale for joint international action. But others referred to the failure of the Copenhagen
climate summit last December to come up with a meaningful agreement on action as a demonstration of the limitations of this way of
thinking. It was argued that this failure had been partly due to a misplaced belief that scientific
consensus would be sufficient to generate a commitment to collective action, without taking into account the
political impact that scientific ideas would have. Another example that received considerable attention was the current construction of a synchrotron
facility SESAME in Jordan, a project that is already is bringing together researchers in a range of scientific disciplines from various countries in the
Middle East (including Israel, Egypt and Palestine, as well as both Greece and Turkey). The promoters of SESAME hope that – as with the building of
CERN 60 years ago, and its operation as a research centre involving, for example, physicists from both Russia and the United States – SESAME will
become a symbol of what regional collaboration can achieve. In that sense, it would become what one participant described as a “beacon of hope” for
the region. But others cautioned that, however successful SESAME may turn out to be in purely scientific terms, its potential impact on the Middle
East peace process should not be exaggerated. Political conflicts have deep roots that cannot easily be papered over, however open-minded scientists
may be to professional colleagues coming from other political contexts. Indeed, there was even a warning that in the developing world, high profile
scientific projects, particular those with explicit political backing, could end up doing damage by inadvertently favouring one social group over another.
Scientists should be wary of having their prestige used in this way; those who did so could come over as patronising, appearing unaware of political
realities. Similarly, those who hold science in esteem as a practice committed to promoting the causes of peace and development were reminded of the
need to take into account how advances in science – whether nuclear physics or genetic technology – have also led to new types of weaponry. Nor did
science automatically lead to the reduction of global inequalities. “Science for diplomacy” therefore ended up with a highly
mixed review. The consensus seemed to be that science can prepare the ground for diplomatic initiatives – and benefit
from diplomatic agreements – but cannot provide the solutions to either. “On tap but not on top” seems as relevant
in international settings as it does in purely national ones. With all the caution that even this
formulation still requires.
Turn – science diplomacy empirically causes conflict – poor cooperation mechanisms – anthrax
accident proves
Smith the 3rd 6/17 | Dr. Frank L Smith III is a lecturer in the Centre for International Security Studies at the
University of Sydney with a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago, Advancing science
diplomacy: Indonesia and the US Naval Medical Research Unit published in Social Studies of Science,
http://sss.sagepub.com/content/early/2014/06/16/0306312714535864.full.pdf, 6/17/14, Accessed
6/27/14, CCHS-AY
Just as the goals or ends of science diplomacy can vary, so too might its actual effect. The
conventional wisdom is that science diplomacy creates positive externalities or spill- over effects that facilitate
greater cooperation. The possibility that it might cause conflict is rarely considered, even by potential
critics. Tim Flink and Ulrich Schreiterer argue that science diplomacy is ‘no panacea’, and they conclude that
‘exploiting science for politi- cal purposes ... makes little or no sense’ (Flink and Schreiterer, 2010).1 Similarly,
David Dickson claims that science and politics ‘occupy different universes’, and so there is ‘only so much
science can do’ (Dickson, 2009). Dickson acknowledges that innovation can cause upheaval, while Flink and
Schreiterer note that there are tensions or tradeoffs between scientific cooperation and competitive
advantage. However, they all stop short of saying that science diplomacy itself may heighten conflict or
reduce trust and transparency.¶ Therefore science diplomacy is assumed to be at worst ineffective but
never harmful. Yet this assumption is doubtful because the effects of science diplomacy are variable.
Again, the anthrax accident at Sverdlovsk is illustrative: one consequence of Soviet deception
through science diplomacy was to reduce trust and transparency, thereby threatening peace talks with
the United States (Hoffman, 2009: 350). More troubling is the long and complex history of scientific,
technical, and medical exchanges as instru- ments of imperialism and justifications for colonialism (e.g.
Headrick, 1988; MacLeod, 2000; Vaughan, 1991). What we now call science diplomacy is not new, nor has its
impact always been benign.¶ Unfortunately, even when the intent is benign, the outcome may still be harmful
or interpreted as such. For instance, Iran once detained an American scientific delegate in order to suggest
that ‘science exchanges are not a good thing’ (Badger, 2009). How could this happen if everyone benefits
from science diplomacy? Though not diplomacy per se, similar questions arise when science and
technology are applied to aid global health. In 1994, ‘effort by humanitarian actors to restore health to at least
one million Rwandan refugees’ in Zaire ‘had the unfortunate effect of helping to restore the capacity of Hutu
militias to fight’, according to Sara Davies, ‘precipitating the escalation of the war’ (Davies, 2010: 94). The
positive or neutral effects of medical, scientific, or technical assistance and exchange cannot be taken for
granted.¶ Finally, the mechanisms through which science diplomacy creates international cooperation
are underspecified, providing little confidence that it will not backfire. Science diplomacy is related to
public diplomacy, but merely citing public opinion polls about the popularity of science and technology does
not explain how this attraction is leveraged to build goodwill abroad. While their products might be popular,
are scientists and tech- nicians typically movers and shakers of mass public opinion? Maybe, but this seems
unlikely when they are compared with celebrities or other public figures, especially if we consider variation in
the public understanding of science and efficacy of science com- munication. In addition, like propaganda,
public diplomacy that aims to improve mass public opinion can have the opposite effect and
inadvertently undermine trust (Goldsmith
No impact to science diplomacy – cooperation is limited to science
Dickson 9 | David Dickson was the founding director of SciDev.Net and spent many years at Nature, as its
Washington correspondent and later as news editor. He also worked on the staffs of Science and New
Scientist, specializing in reporting on science policy. He started a career in journalism as a sub-editor,
following a degree in mathematics, The limits of science diplomacy, 6/27/14,
http://www.scidev.net/global/capacity-building/editorials/the-limits-of-science-diplomacy.html, Accessed
6/27/14, CCHS-AY
Using science for diplomatic purposes has obvious attractions and several benefits. But there are limits
to what it can achieve.¶ The scientific community has a deserved reputation for its international perspective
— scientists often ignore national boundaries and interests when it comes to exchanging ideas or
collaborating on global problems.¶ So it is not surprising that science attracts the interest of politicians
keen to open channels of communication with other states. Signing agreements on scientific and
technological cooperation is often the first step for countries wanting to forge closer working relationships.¶
More significantly, scientists have formed key links behind-the-scenes when more overt dialogue
has been impossible. At the height of the Cold War, for example, scientific organisations provided a
conduit for discussing nuclear weapons control.¶ Only so much science can do¶ Recently, the Obama
administration has given this field a new push, in its desire to pursue "soft diplomacy" in regions such as the
Middle East. Scientific agreements have been at the forefront of the administration's activities in countries
such as Iraq and Pakistan.¶ But — as emerged from a meeting entitled New Frontiers in Science Diplomacy,
held in London this week (1–2 June) — using science for diplomatic purposes is not as straightforward as it
seems.¶ Some scientific collaboration clearly demonstrates what countries can achieve by working
together. For example, a new synchrotron under construction in Jordan is rapidly becoming a symbol of the
potential for teamwork in the Middle East.¶ But whether scientific cooperation can become a precursor
for political collaboration is less evident. For example, despite hopes that the Middle East synchrotron
would help bring peace to the region, several countries have been reluctant to support it until the Palestine
problem is resolved.¶ Indeed, one speaker at the London meeting (organised by the UK's Royal Society and
the American Association for the Advancement of Science) even suggested that the changes scientific
innovations bring inevitably lead to turbulence and upheaval. In such a context, viewing science as a driver
for peace may be wishful thinking.¶ Conflicting ethos¶ Perhaps the most contentious area discussed at the
meeting was how science diplomacy can frame developed countries' efforts to help build scientific capacity in
the developing world.¶ There is little to quarrel with in collaborative efforts that are put forward with a
genuine desire for partnership. Indeed, partnership — whether between individuals, institutions or
countries — is the new buzzword in the "science for development" community.¶ But true partnership
requires transparent relations between partners who are prepared to meet as equals. And that goes
against diplomats' implicit role: to promote and defend their own countries' interests.¶ John Beddington, the
British government's chief scientific adviser, may have been a bit harsh when he told the meeting that a
diplomat is someone who is "sent abroad to lie for his country". But he touched a raw nerve.¶ Worlds apart
yet co-dependent¶ The truth is that science and politics make an uneasy alliance. Both need the other.
Politicians need science to achieve their goals, whether social, economic or — unfortunately — military;
scientists need political support to fund their research.¶ But they also occupy different universes. Politics is,
at root, about exercising power by one means or another. Science is — or should be — about
pursuing robust knowledge that can be put to useful purposes.¶ A strategy for promoting science
diplomacy that respects these differences deserves support. Particularly so if it focuses on ways to leverage
political and financial backing for science's more humanitarian goals, such as tackling climate change or
reducing world poverty.¶ But a commitment to science diplomacy that ignores the differences —
acting for example as if science can substitute politics (or perhaps more worryingly, vice versa), is
dangerous. ¶ The Obama administration's commitment to "soft power" is already faltering. It faces
challenges ranging from North Korea's nuclear weapons test to domestic opposition to limits on oil
consumption. A taste of reality may be no bad thing.¶ David Dickson¶ Director, SciDev.Net
The positive effects of scientific diplomacy are contestable; the potential to backlash is
always present, results are unpredictable, and scientists have limited ability to influence
politics
Smith 14 (Frank, Professor at the Centre of International Security Studies at the University
of Sydney, “Advancing science diplomacy: Indonesia and the US Naval Medical Research
Unit”, Sage Journals , June 17, 2014,
http://sss.sagepub.com/content/early/2014/06/16/0306312714535864.full N.O.)
Finally, the mechanisms through which science diplomacy creates international cooperation are
underspecified, providing little confidence that it will not backfire . Science diplomacy is related to
public diplomacy, but merely citing public opinion polls about the popularity of science and technology does
not explain how this attraction is leveraged to build goodwill abroad. While their products might be
popular, are scientists and technicians typically movers and shakers of mass public opinion?
Maybe, but this seems unlikely when they are compared with celebrities or other public figures,
especially if we consider variation in the public understanding of science and efficacy of science
communication. In addition, like propaganda, public diplomacy that aims to improve mass public
opinion can have the opposite effect and inadvertently undermine trust (Goldsmith and Horiuchi,
2009).
No Solvency: Sci Dip
The USA is incapable of projecting leadership beyond its own hemisphere
Mearsheimer 10 (John, Professor of Political Science at University of Chicago, “The Gathering Storm:
China’s Challenge to US Power in Asia”, 2010, http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/content/3/4/381.full, N.O)
When people talk about hegemony these days, they are usually referring to the United States, which
they describe as a global hegemon . I do not like this terminology, however, because it is virtually
impossible for any stat e—including the United States— to achieve global hegemony. The main
obstacle to world domination is the difficulty of projecting power over huge distances, especially
across enormous bodies of water like the Atlantic and Pacific Ocean s.
The best outcome that a great power can hope for is to achieve regional hegemony, and possibly
control another region that is close by and easily accessible over land. The United States, which
dominates the Western Hemisphere, is the only regional hegemon in modern history . Five other
great powers have tried to dominate their region—Napoleonic France, Imperial Germany, Imperial Japan,
Nazi Germany, and the Soviet Union—but none have succeeded.
AT Medicine
Ocean exploration for medical use non-unique
Palmer 14 [Brian, writer for the Washington Post, “Deep sea creatures shed light on the future of medical imaging” –April 1, 2014,
http://www.theguardian.com/science/2014/apr/01/neurobiology-atlantic-ocean-bioluminescent-medical-imaging, LS]
In July, a team of scientists organised by the American Museum of Natural History will dive 300 metres below the Atlantic Ocean's
surface about 160km off the coast of New England. Among their goals: to find
bioluminescent creatures – such as the
dinoflagellates that make their own light, causing the ocean to glow – that they hope will offer clues for creating the next
generation of medical imaging. The right combination of molecules – a protein that can make light and another compound to
serve as the light's fuel – may allow us to map brain activity to a new level of detail. This advance may someday give
quadriplegics new ways to interact with the world. Though it seems futuristic, the back story for this line of research began 50 years
ago. In the early 1960s, a Japanese marine biologist named Osamu Shimomura isolated a protein from the crystal jellyfish. When blue light is shined on
the creature, this protein absorbs it, changes its wavelength and emits a green light. It is called green fluorescent protein, or GFP. "That single protein
literally changed the course of biology," says Vincent Pieribone, a neurobiologist at Yale. It also won Shimomura a share of the2008 Nobel Prize in
biochemistry. Most of the structures inside a cell are clear, which makes observation a challenge. Biologists eventually realized that they could attach
GFP to virtually anything inside a cell, then shine a blue light on it to observe its movements and activities. In the 1990s, geneticists spliced the
jellyfish's GFP gene into mice and other lab creatures, essentially turning their bodies into living museums. They could express the protein
in their muscle cells, brain cells or other organs. By shining the right wavelength of light on to the animal,
scientists could watch cancer spread or the immune system fight viruses. For all its incredible applications, GFP has a major
shortcoming: it needs an external light source. Blue light doesn't penetrate far, so we have trouble seeing deep into a complex organ. The inner
workings of a mammalian brain, for example, are nearly impossible to observe using GFP, because it's too difficult to shine a light in there. In addition,
hemoglobin, the oxygen-carrying protein in red blood cells, absorbs blue light differently depending on how much oxygen is present. This complicates
the delivery of the blue light and the detection of green light from the cells. We need a method that enables us to work in darkness. If only there were
creatures that emitted their own light. You've probably seen one such creature in your own backyard, as night begins to fall in summer: the firefly.
Lampyridae is, indeed, one of the few terrestrial creatures capable of producing its own light. As with fluorescent animals, bioluminescent creatures
rely on a protein to shine their lights, so it's appealing to think that we could just extract the protein and attach it to proteins in mammalian cells. But
there's an extra piece involved in bioluminescence that makes it a more complex process. "The chemical reaction has two parts," Pieribone explains.
"The protein is the engine. But it requires fuel – a small molecule that is produced by the animal and burned." It's easy enough to insert the firefly's
protein into other animal cells, or even to force other animals to manufacture it, but researchers haven't been able to get the fuel source in place. None
of the fuel molecules used in known bioluminescent creatures can be produced in the cells of a mouse, dog or primate. What we need instead is a
bioluminescent creature that relies on a fuel that's already present in mammalian cells. Glucose and adenosine triphosphate, for example, are highenergy molecules in ample supply in mammals. The medical applications of a bioluminescent compound are potentially enormous. With them we may
see, for example, how electrical impulses translate into muscular actions. Using a machine that can interface with those signals, a quadriplegic could
merely think about picking up a fork, and a robotic arm would execute the command. That's where July's deep-diving expedition comes in. A team of
scientists will each don diving gear called an exosuit, which looks something like a costume piece from a superhero movie. Its pressure-resistant body
and finely tuned joints permit a person to descend to 300 meters and still move smoothly. It is equipped with thrusters on the feet and specialized
hand attachments that can grasp interesting objects or collect specimens with a vacuum device. Researchers on the surface can see what the diver sees
through the four cameras mounted on the suit. Do they have any reason to believe that they'll find a glucose-powered bioluminescent creature lurking
off the Atlantic coast? Not exactly, says Pieribone, but that's exploration. "It's a bit of a fishing expedition, but we have our hooks in a really rich pool,"
he notes. "Let's get into a genetically rich environment and observe with our eyes."
AT Disease Impact
Diseases won’t cause extinction – burnout, vaccines, quarantine
York ‘14
Ian, head of the Influenza Molecular Virology and Vaccines team in the Immunology and Pathogenesis Branch, Influenza Division at
the CDC, former assistant professor in immunology/virology/molecular biology (MSU), former RA Professor in antiviral and
antitumor immunity (UMass Medical School), Research Fellow (Harvard), Ph.D., Virology (McMaster), M.Sc., Immunology (Guelph),
“Why Don't Diseases Completely Wipe Out Species?” 6/4, http://www.quora.com/Why-dont-diseases-completely-wipe-outspecies#THUR
But mostly
diseases don't drive species extinct . There are several reasons for that. For one, the most dangerous
diseases are those that spread from one individual to another. If the disease is highly lethal, then the
population drops, and it becomes less likely that individuals will contact each other during the infectious phase.
Highly contagious diseases tend to burn themselves out that way. Probably the main reason is variation.
Within the host and the pathogen population there will be a wide range of variants. Some hosts may be naturally
resistant. Some pathogens will be less virulent. And either alone or in combination, you end up with
infected individuals who survive . We see this in HIV, for example. There is a small fraction of humans who are
naturally resistant or altogether immune to HIV, either because of their CCR5 allele or their MHC Class I type. And there are a
handful of people who were infected with defective versions of HIV that didn't progress to disease. We can see
indications of this sort of thing happening in
the past, because our genomes contain many instances of pathogen
resistance genes that have spread through the whole population. Those all started off as rare mutations that conferred a
strong selection advantage to the carriers, meaning that the specific infectious diseases were serious threats to the species.
No global pandemics – international actors will contain spread
Wayne ‘14
Alex, syndicated columnist on US health policy, “Global Effort Signed to Halt Spread of Infectious Disease,” Bloomber, 2/13,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-02-13/global-effort-signed-to-halt-spread-of-infectious-disease.html#THUR
The
U.S. won commitments from 25 countries and the W orld H ealth O rganization to work together on
systems to better detect and combat outbreaks of infectious diseases such as H7N9 avian flu and Ebola
virus. The
Obama administration plans to spend $40 million in 10 countries
this year
to upgrade laboratories and
communications networks so outbreaks can be controlled more quickly , Thomas Frieden, director of the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, said today in an interview. President Barack Obama will seek another $45 million next year to expand the program. Infectious
diseases account for about 1 in 4 deaths worldwide, according to the U.S. National Institutes of Health. While diseases such as Ebola and Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome haven’t posed a threat to
We’re all only as
safe as the weakest link out there. This is an effort to essentially make the U.S. safer and make the world
the U.S., lapses in other countries may allow an outbreak to spread rapidly, Frieden said. “No country can protect itself solely within its borders,” Frieden said. “
safer , to improve countries’ capacity to better find, stop and prevent health threats .” Frieden and Kathleen Sebelius,
all the nations at
the conference including China, Russia, France and the U.K. agreed to “ accelerate progress and
the U.S. health secretary, held a videoconference today with the partners in the effort. While no other country made a specific financial commitment today, Frieden said,
address not just the health sector but include security in health in new ways .” First Consensus “ For the first
time , really, we have a consensus on not only what are the threats, but what do we have to do to address
them,” he said. As an example, Frieden said Turkey’s government agreed to host a WHO office to respond to
outbreaks in its region. The agreement will also target emerging infections such as M iddle E ast R espiratory
S yndrome. The 10 countries in line for the U.S. investment, which will be funded by the CDC and the Department of Defense, weren’t identified. The CDC plans to build
on test projects last year in Uganda and Vietnam, where the agency helped the two nations’ health officials improve
systems to detect and combat outbreaks of dangerous pathogens that include drug-resistant tuberculosis, Ebola virus and exotic flu
strains. In Uganda, CDC officials helped the country’s Ministry of Health upgrade laboratories where tissue samples would be
tested in the event of an outbreak, and developed a system for local doctors to report cases of illness by text message, according to an
article published in the CDC’s journal Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report. Uganda now is able to quickly transport tissue samples
from rural outbreaks to a high-security lab in the capital, Kampala, by motorcycle courier and overnight mail, Frieden said. A mobile phone networkconnected printer then texts lab results back to rural hospitals, he said. “Ultimately every country in the world should have this kind of
system,” Frieden said. The $40 million, he said, “is certainly enough to make a good start.”
Arctic Resources
1NC Plan Doesn’t Solve Methane
We should leave the arctic alone – even with new infrastructure there methane leaks are
too dangerous and will persist
Llanos, 2012 - Miguel, NBC News, ‘US claims 'unprecedented' success in test for new fuel source’,
http://usnews.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2012/05/05/11522433-us-claims-unprecedented-success-in-test-for-new-fuel-source?lite
Cummings also worries about inadvertent releases of methane, which is even more powerful as a
warming gas than CO2. Alaska's Arctic is the U.S. area "most under stress from warming," he added.
" Even
if we could safely develop and install infrastructure there, we're still industrializing an area
that essentially should be left alone."
1NC No Methane Impact
Consensus of scientists agree that arctic methane release has been happening for years
and isn’t caused by anything we do – ur evidence is written by hippies and unqualified
journalists – our evidence was written by scientists who actually went to the arctic and
studied methane emissions
Page, 2012 – Lewis, Regular contributor to the Register and Prospect magazine, Former officer in the Royal Navy, Author and authority on
military matters, ‘DON'T PANIC: Arctic methane emissions have been going on for ages’,
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2012/09/25/dont_panic_arctic_mission_finds_methane_emissions_old_news/
Scientists returning from a seaborne expedition to the Arctic say that the ongoing panic in some
quarters regarding runaway emissions of methane from the chilly polar seas - and associated
imminent global-warming disaster - appears to be unjustified. For those unacquainted with this particular panic, the
idea is that rising Arctic sea temperatures caused by humans in recent times are causing methane locked up as hydrates on the chilly seabed to be
emitted into the atmosphere as gas – as methane hydrates are only stable at very low temperatures and high pressures. Methane, as any fule kno, is a
hugely more powerful greenhouse gas than CO2, so this would cause more warming which would then release more methane from the seabed until
once again planet Earth becomes a baking lifeless hell. As ever with scenarios leading to baking lifeless hell, the hippies* at Greenpeace
and similar activists are very keen on this idea. Various scientists have detected methane emissions from Arctic waters by
various means, too. Anyway, this seemed worth looking into, so an international team of scientists set out this past
summer aboard a German research vessel for the freezing seas off Spitzbergen, to look into Arctic
seabed methane emissions and try to figure out what might be causing them. In short, whatever it is, it
doesn't seem to be anything human beings have done . The Arctic seems to have been emitting
methane for a very long time . The Helmholtz-Zentrum für Ozeanforschung (Centre for Ocean Research, aka GEOMAR)
in Kiel tells
us so, in an announcement revealing the "surprising result" that methane emissions from
the Arctic seabed are "no new thing ". “Details will only be known in a few months when the data has been analysed; however the
observed gas emanations are probably not caused by human influence," says Professor Doktor Christian Berndt,
the expedition leader. Berndt and his colleagues believe this because their examinations of the seabed - conducted in part with the help of
an undersea lab positioned in the area previously by a British research ship, and also with their own remotely operated submersible - show that
the methane sources there have been in action for centuries. They have not suddenly appeared in
response to the warming seen in recent decades, generally thought to have been driven by
humanity's carbon emissions. The GEOMAR statement says bluntly: Above all the fear that the gas emanation is a
consequence of the current rising sea temperature does not seem to apply . “At numerous
emergences we found deposits that might already be hundreds of years old. This estimation is indeed only based
on the size of the samples and empirical values as to how fast such deposits grow. On any account, the methane sources must be older," adds Berndt.
This picture was also confirmed by the presence of large numbers of methane-gobbling microbes. “Methane consuming microbes
grow only slowly in the seabed, thus their high activity indicates that the methane has not just
recently begun effervescing," explains Professor Doktor Tina Treude, another of the expedition scientists. The GEOMAR statement can
be read in PDF here. Comment The expedition's findings obviously won't put an end to people's fears of climate catastrophe. Theorists (and
occasionally untrained activists or journalists) keep coming up with new proposed positive-feedback
runaway disaster mechanisms faster than experiments and expeditions can disprove them : it's like
playing global warming whack-a-mole
to worry about. ®
(see Related Stories below for a few examples). But at least this week there's one less thing
2NC No Methane Impact
No methane bubbles and no impact if there are—prefer science over scared journalists
Archer, 2012 - David Archer - PHD computational ocean chemist at the University of Chicago. (“Much ado about methane” Real Climate 4
January 2012 http://www.realclimate.org/index.php/archives/2012/01/much-ado-about-methane/)
Methane is a powerful greenhouse gas, but it also has an awesome power to really get people worked up, compared to
other equally frightening pieces of the climate story. What methane are we talking about? The largest methane pools that people are talking about are
in sediments of the ocean, frozen into hydrate or clathrate deposits (Archer, 2007). The total amount of methane as ocean hydrates is poorly
constrained but could rival the rest of the fossil fuels combined. Most of this is unattractive to extract for fuel, and mostly so deep in the sediment
column that it would take thousands of years for anthropogenic warming to reach them. The Arctic is special in that the water column is colder than
the global average, and so hydrate can be found as shallow as 200 meters water depth. On land, there is lots of methane in the
thawing Arctic, exploding lakes and what not. This methane is probably produced by decomposition of thawing organic matter.
Methane could only freeze into hydrate at depths below a few hundred meters in the soil, and then only at “lithostatic pressure” rather than
“hydrostatic”, meaning that the hydrate would have to be sealed from the atmosphere by some impermeable layer. The great gas reservoirs in Siberia
are thought to be in part frozen, but evidence for hydrate within the permafrost soils is pretty thin (Dallimore and Collett,1995) Is methane
escaping due to global warming? There have been observations of bubbles emanating from the sea
floor in the Arctic (Shakhova, 2010; Shakhova et al., 2005) and off Norway (Westbrook, 2009). The Norwegian bubble plume coincides with
the edge of the hydrate stability zone, where a bit of warming could push the surface sediments from stable to unstable. A model of the
hydrates (Reagan, 2009) produces a bubble plume similar to what’s observed, in response to the
observed rate of ocean water warming over the past 30 years, but with this warming rate extrapolated further back in
time over the past 100 years. The response time of their model is several centuries, so pre-loading the early warming like they did makes it difficult to
even guess how much of the response they model could be attributed to human-induced climate change, even if we knew how much of the last 30
years of ocean warming in that location came from human activity. Lakes provide an escape path for the methane by
creating “thaw bulbs” in the underlying soil, and lakes are everywhere appearing and disappearing
in the Arctic as the permafrost melts. (Whether you get CO2 or a mixture of CO2 plus methane depends critically on water, so lakes
are important for that reason also.) Methane bubbles captured in freezing lake ice in Alaska So far there hasn’t been strong evidence presented for
detection enhanced methane fluxes due to anthropogenic warming yet. Yet it is certainly believable for the coming century however, which brings us
to the next question: What effect would a methane release have on climate? The climate impact of releasing
methane depends on whether it is released all at once, faster than its lifetime in the atmosphere (about a decade) or in an
ongoing, sustained release that lasts for longer than that. When methane is released chronically, over decades, the concentration
in the atmosphere will rise to a new equilibrium value. It won’t keep rising indefinitely, like CO2
would, because methane degrades while CO2 essentially just accumulates. Methane degrades into
CO2, in fact, so in simulations I did (Archer and Buffett, 2005) the radiative forcing from the elevated methane concentration throughout a long
release was about matched by the radiative forcing from the extra CO2 accumulating in the atmosphere from the methane as a carbon source. In the
figure below, the dashed lines are from a simulation of a fossil fuel CO2 release, and the solid lines are the same model but with an added methane
hydrate feedback. The radiative forcing from the methane combines the CH4 itself which only persists during the time of the methane release, plus the
added CO2 in the atmosphere, which persists throughout the simulation of 100,000 years. The possibility of a catastrophic release
is of course what gives methane its power over the imagination (of journalists in particular it seems).
A submarine landslide might release a Gigaton of carbon as methane (Archer, 2007), but the
radiative effect of that would be small, about equal in magnitude (but opposite in sign) to the
radiative forcing from a volcanic eruption. Detectable perhaps but probably not the end of
humankind as a species. What could happen to methane in the Arctic? The methane bubbles coming
from the Siberian shelf are part of a system that takes centuries to respond to changes in
temperature. The methane from the Arctic lakes is also potentially part of a new, enhanced, chronic
methane release to the atmosphere. Neither of them could release a catastrophic amount of methane
(hundreds of Gtons) within a short time frame (a few years or less). There isn’t some huge bubble of methane waiting to
erupt as soon as its roof melts. And so far, the sources of methane from high latitudes are small,
relative to the big player, which is wetlands in warmer climes. It is very difficult to know whether the bubbles are a
brand-new methane source caused by global warming, or a response to warming that has happened over the past 100 years, or whether plumes like this
happen all the time. In any event, it doesn’t matter very much unless they get 10 or 100 times larger, because high-latitude sources are small compared
to the tropics. Methane as past killing agent? Mass extinctions like the end-Permean and the PETM do
typically leave tantalizing spikes in the carbon isotopic records preserved in limestones and organic
carbon. Methane has an isotopic signature, so any methane hijinks would be recorded in the carbon isotopic
record, but so would changes in the size of the living biosphere, soil carbon pools such as peat, and dissolved organic carbon in the ocean. The endPermean extinction is particularly mysterious, and my impression is that the killing mechanism for that is still up for grabs. Methane is also
one of the usual suspects for the PETM, which consisted of about 100,000 years of isotopically light carbon, which is thought to be
due to release of some biologically-produced carbon source, similar to the way that fossil fuel CO2 is lightening the carbon isotopes of the atmosphere
today, in concert with really warm temperatures. I personally believe that the combination of the carbon isotopes
and the paleotemperatures pretty much rules out methane as the original carbon source (Pagani et al.,
2006), although Gavin draws an opposite conclusion, which we may hash out in some future post. In any case, the 100,000-year duration
of the warming means that the greenhouse agent through most of the event was CO2, not methane.
Could there be a methane runaway feedback?. The “runaway greenhouse effect” that planetary scientists and climatologists
usually call by that name involves water vapor. A runaway greenhouse effect involving methane release (such as
invoked here) is conceptually possible, but to get a spike of methane concentration in the air it
would have to released more quickly than the 10-year lifetime of methane in the atmosphere.
Otherwise what you’re talking about is elevated methane concentrations, reflecting the increased
source, plus the radiative forcing of that accumulating CO2. It wouldn’t be a methane runaway
greenhouse effect, it would be more akin to any other carbon release as CO2 to the atmosphere. This
sounds like semantics, but it puts the methane system into the context of the CO2 system, where it belongs and where we can scale it. So maybe
by the end of the century in some reasonable scenario, perhaps 2000 Gton C could be released by
human activity under some sort of business-as-usual scenario, and another 1000 Gton C could come
from soil and methane hydrate release, as a worst case. We set up a model of the methane runaway
greenhouse effect scenario, in which the methane hydrate inventory in the ocean responds to changing ocean temperature on some time
scale, and the temperature responds to greenhouse gas concentrations in the air with another time scale (of about a millennium) (Archer and Buffett,
2005). If the hydrates released too much carbon, say two carbons from hydrates for every one carbon from fossil fuels, on a time
scale that was too fast (say 1000 years instead of 10,000 years), the
system could run away in the CO2 greenhouse mode
described above. It wouldn’t matter too much if the carbon reached the atmosphere as methane or if it just oxidized to CO2 in the ocean and
then partially degassed into the atmosphere a few centuries later. The fact that the ice core records do not seem full of
methane spikes due to high-latitude sources makes it seem like the real world is not as sensitive as
we were able to set the model up to be. This is where my guess about a worst-case 1000 Gton from hydrates after 2000 Gton C
from fossil fuels in the last paragraph comes from. On the other hand , the deep ocean could ultimately (after a thousand
years or so) warm up by several degrees in a business-as-usual scenario, which would make it
warmer than it has been in millions of years. Since it takes millions of years to grow the hydrates, they have had time to grow in
response to Earth’s relative cold of the past 10 million years or so. Also, the climate forcing from CO2 release is stronger now than it was millions of
years ago when CO2 levels were higher, because of the band saturation effect of CO2 as a greenhouse gas. In short, if there was ever a
good time to provoke a hydrate meltdown it would be now. But “now” in a geological sense, over thousands of years in
the future, not really “now” in a human sense. The methane hydrates in the ocean, in cahoots with permafrost peats (which never get enough respect),
could be a significant multiplier of the long tail of the CO2, but will probably not be a huge player in climate change in the coming century. Could
methane be a point of no return? Actually, releasing CO2 is a point of no return if anything is. The
only way back to a natural climate in anything like our lifetimes would be to anthropogenically
extract CO2 from the atmosphere. The CO2 that has been absorbed into the oceans would degas back to the atmosphere to some
extent, so we’d have to clean that up too. And if hydrates or peats contributed some extra carbon into the mix, that would also have to be part of the
bargain, like paying interest on a loan. Conclusion It’s the CO2, friend.
This ev has a bunch of complicated math that proves you wrong
Archer, 2012 - David Archer - PHD computational ocean chemist at the University of Chicago. (“Much ado about methane” Real Climate 4
January 2012 http://www.realclimate.org/index.php/archives/2012/01/much-ado-about-methane/)
Let’s suppose that the Arctic started to degas methane 100 times faster than it is today. I just made
that number up trying to come up with a blow-the-doors-off surprise, something like the ozone hole. We ran
the numbers to get an idea of how the climate impact of an Arctic Methane Nasty Surprise would
stack up to that from Business-as-Usual rising CO2 Walter et al (2007) says that Arctic lakes are 10% of natural global
emissions, or about 5% of total emissions. I believe that was considered to be remarkably high at the time but let’s take it as a given, and
representing the Arctic as a whole. If the number of lakes or their bubbling intensity suddenly increased by a
factor of 100, and it persisted this way for 100 years, it would come to about 200 Gton of carbon
emission, which is on the same scale as our entire fossil fuel emission so far (300 Gton C), or roughly the amount of traditional reserves of natural
gas (although I’m not sure where estimates are since fracking) or petroleum. It would be a whopper of a surprise. Scaling Walter’s
Arctic lake emission rates up by a factor of 100 would increase the overall emission rate, natural and anthropogenic, by about a factor of 5 from where
it is today. The weak leverage is because the high latitudes are a small source today relative to tropical wetlands and
anthropogenic sources, so they have to grow a lot before they make much difference to the sum of all sources. The steady-state
methane concentration in the air scales nearly linearly with the emission rate. Actually, the concentration goes
up somewhat faster than a constant times the emission rate, because the lifetime in the atmosphere gets longer (IPCC TAR). Let’s err on the
side of flamboyance (great word in this context) and say the concentration of methane in the air goes
up by a factor of 10 for the duration of the extra methane emission (meaning that the lifetime
doubles). Using the modtran model on line I get a radiative forcing from 10 * atmospheric methane
of 3.4 Watts/m2 (the difference in the instantaneous IR flux out, labeled Iout, between cases with
and without 10x methane). Using the TAR estimates of radiative forcing gives 2.7 Watts/m2. But
methane is a reactive gas and its presence leads to other greenhouse forcings, like the water vapor it
decomposes into. Hansen estimates the “efficacy” of methane radiative forcing to be 1.4 (Hansen et
al, 2005, Shindell et al, 2009), so that puts us to 4 or even 5 Watts/m2. This is about twice the radiative
forcing today from all anthropogenic greenhouse gases today, or (again according to Modtran) it
would translate to an equivalent CO2 at today’s methane concentration of about 750 ppm. That seems
significant, for sure. Or, trying to “correct” for the different lifetimes of the gases using Global Warming Potentials, over a 100-year time horizon
(which still way under-represents the lifetime of the CO2), you get that the methane would be equivalent to increasing
CO2 to about 500 ppm, lower than 750 because the CO2 forcing lasts longer than the methane,
which the GWP calculation tries in its own myopic way to account for. But the methane worst case
does not suddenly spell the extinction of human life on Earth. It does not lead to a runaway
greenhouse. The worst-case methane scenario stands comparable to what CO2 can do. What CO2
will do, under business-as-usual, not in a wild blow-the-doors-off unpleasant surprise, but just in the
absence of any pleasant surprises (like emission controls). At worst comparable to CO2 except that
CO2 lasts essentially forever.
AT: Oil Dependence
US dependence is greatly reduced now
Salhani, 12/18/2013 (Claude, journalist, author and political analyst based in Beirut, specializing in the Middle East, politicized Islam and
terrorism and the former editor of the Middle East Times and United Press International, “US to Become Less Dependent on Foreign Oil -- be
Careful What you Wish for”, OilPrice, http://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/US-to-Become-Less-Dependent-on-Foreign-Oil-but-CarefulWhat-you-Wish-for.html)
The US Energy Information Administration released on Tuesday an early version of its Annual
Energy Outlook for 2014. The main item being that the United States will continue to develop its own oil and
to press for more efficient cars in order to reduce demand on oil . The report from the federal
government forecasts a rise in US oil production of another 800,000 barrels per day for the coming two years,
but sees a rise by 2016 with the US reaching about 9.5 million barrels per day. The previous high was attained in
1970 when production had reached 9.6 million bpd. Predictions are that the oil boom is temporary and is expected to
level off around 2020, but by then there should be a lot more fuel efficient cars on the roads that the
drop in production will not be felt . Another major change is that the federal government report expects that as
oil production begins to decrease natural gas will rise, according to the EIA by as much as 56 percent by 2040 reaching 37.6
trillion cubic feet per year. This news should please the environmentalists as well as politicians who want to see the
United States turn away from the Middle East, its oil and its problems. For the first group, the good news is that the
total reading of U.S. energy-related emissions of carbon dioxide by 2040 will be 7 percent under 2005 levels in 2040. The reduction in
consumption will come about as the result of greater importance being given to focus on more
energy efficiency in every aspect of our lives; from automobiles to buildings that require less heating to street lighting. While this new
development will no doubt be welcomed by most Americans it will bring additional joy to those who are fed up with the
stagnation and violence that is perpetuated in the Middle East and will welcome this news amid
hopes that the US will be less dependent on that turbulent part of the world for its fuel, thus less
prone to the region’s unstable politics .
US oil dependence is waning now --- fracking boom proves
Spencer, 12/13/2013 (Richard, Middle East Correspondent for the Telegraph, “Fracking boom frees the US from old oil alliances”, The
Telegraph, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/earth/energy/oil/10476647/Fracking-boom-frees-the-US-from-old-oil-alliances.html)
Last year, he made another striking prediction: he forecast the eclipse of an unchallenged energy giant.
Saudi Arabia
would shortly be overtaken as the world's biggest producer of crude oil by its most important client,
the United States, he said. In a world consumed with fears over financial crisis, joblessness, war in Syria, and international jihad, the academic
predictions of people like Mr Birol tend to get overlooked. Yet as chief economist of the International Energy Agency (and,
like a surprising number of the world's most important men, a Turk) he is closer to the action on all those issues than many care to realise. The
belief that the world's economy, security and geopolitics are subordinate to America's need for oil is
a truism so universally acknowledged that it is regurgitated on every concerned news site the web over. Yet this is what he said in his
annual outlook on the important trends of the moment: "By around 2020, the United States is projected to become the
largest global oil producer ," he wrote. " The result is a continued fall in US oil imports, to the extent
that North America becomes a net oil exporter around 2030 . "The United States, which currently imports
around 20 per cent of its total energy needs, becomes
all but self-sufficient in net terms – a dramatic reversal of the
trend seen in most other energy-importing countries." Far from sending its armies round the world to secure oil, in other
words, before long it will be sending marketing consultants to sell it. A dramatic reversal indeed: it seems like only yesterday that
every commentator was talking about Peak Oil, the theory that the world's biggest reserves had all been discovered and that the
planet's booming population would all soon be scrapping over the dribbles that still came out of the pipelines that remained. Now, with fracking
technology revolutionising output in the United States - soon to be followed by other countries - that
talk has dried up rather quicker than the pipelines ever did.
Dependence waning and we’re insulated from the impact --- prefer most recent evidence
West, 6/19/2014 (James, senior producer for the Climate Desk and a contributing producer for Mother Jones, “Here's What the Battle
Over Iraqi Oil Means for America”, Mother Jones, http://www.motherjones.com/environment/2014/06/iraq-obama-baiji-oil-fracking)
4. America imports much less Iraqi oil than it used to. When Barack Obama ran for president in 2008, he said that America's
dependence on the "tyranny of oil" helped fund terrorism in both Iraq and around the world. "One of the most dangerous weapons in the world today
is the price of oil," he said. "We ship nearly $700 million a day to unstable or hostile nations for their oil. It pays for terrorist bombs going off from
Baghdad to Beirut." His opponent that year, John McCain, said at a town hall that his plan to "eliminate our dependence on oil from the Middle East"
would "prevent us from having ever to send our young men and women into conflict again in the Middle East." As president, Obama has continued to
emphasize independence from foreign oil. "Today, America is closer to energy independence than we have been
in decades," he told an audience at Walmart in Mountain View, California, last month. "And for the first time in nearly 20
years, America produces more oil here at home than we buy from other countries ." Indeed, in October,
domestic crude oil production surpassed imports for the first time since 1995 . More specifically, even though
Iraq's oil production has increased, the US now imports far less Iraqi oil than it did around the time of the 2003 invasion.
That's not just the
story in Iraq . America is now importing less oil overall—20 percent less, in fact—than in 2003.
"We're getting more of that oil domestically," Rapier said, pointing to increased local production
facilitated by the fracking boom, especially in Texas and North Dakota. And America's own neighbors are also
chipping in to help, says Rapier, pointing to Canadian crude. "We've got lower cost production in our
neighborhood here." This means the United States is now somewhat insulated from big shocks to the
market like the 1970s oil crisis , in which oil-producing Arab states imposed a crippling embargo against the US. "The increase
of unconventional oil supplies from new emerging assets in the US, all of this has created some sort
of a comfort zone ," said Khatteeb from the Brookings Doha Center. John Duffield, who authored a 2008 book called Over a Barrel: The
Costs of US Foreign Oil Dependence agrees: " I
would say we are not as much over the barrel ."
1NC Methane Turn
Turn – aff triggers the methane gun – drilling causes landslides and earthquakes that
disturb fragile methane crystals – only scenario for massive methane pulse
Koronowski 13 (Ryan, Think Progress, July 29, 2013, “‘Fire Ice’: Buried Under The Sea Floor, This New
Fossil Fuel Source Could Be Disastrous For The Planet,”
http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2013/07/29/2370661/methane-hydrates-potentially-massive-greenhousegas-on-the-sea-floor-faces-earthquakes-and-drilling/, alp)
Earlier this year, Japanese researchers successfully tested a new process that extracted methane hydrate
from the ocean floor for the first time. The director of Japan’s Agency for Natural Resources compared
this to the way shale gas was viewed a decade ago — too expensive for commercialization — but concluded
“now it’s commercialized.” This process does have similarities to fracking, but instead of pumping
fracking fluid into the earth and exploding the rock, it drills down to the seabed, relieves pressure on the
hydrates, and dissolves the crystals into gas and water for collection. However, harvesting methane
hydrates poses the same risks faced by offshore oil drillers — pressure, drilling at depth, and the
catastrophic ramifications of failure. If the drilling causes an underwater landslide, the methane
could erupt to the surface all at once, a scenario called the “methane gun hypothesis.” This could
release massive amounts of methane into the atmosphere, dealing a serious blow to cutting carbon
emissions.
2NC Methane Turn
Drilling melts hydrates underwater – accelerates methane release
Friedemann 4/28 (Alice, author of energyskeptic.com, in this article, she internally cites qualified
sources, April 28, 2014, “Why we aren’t mining methane hydrates now. Or ever.,”
http://energyskeptic.com/2014/methane-hydrate-not-gonna-happen/ , alp)
Eastman states that normally, the pressure of hundreds of meters of water above keeps the frozen
methane stable. But heat flowing from oil drilling and pipelines has the potential to slowly
destabilize it, with possibly disastrous results: melting hydrate might trigger underwater landslides as it
decomposes and the substrate becomes lubricated… 5) Which can Trigger Tsunamis Landslides can
create tsunamis that might result in fatalities, long term health effects, and destruction of property
and infrastructure.
Drilling accidents turn the advantage
Lefebvre 13 (Ben, Wall Street Journal, July 28, 2013, “Scientists Envision Fracking in Arctic and on Ocean
Floor,” http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324694904578600073042194096, alp)
Commercial production of methane hydrate is expected to take at least a decade—if it comes at all.
Different technologies to harvest the gas are being tested, but so far no single approach has been
perfected, and it remains prohibitively expensive. But booming energy demand in Asia, which is spurring
gigantic projects to liquefy natural gas in Australia, Canada and Africa, is also giving momentum to efforts to
mine the frozen clumps of methane hydrate mixed deep in seafloor sediment. The biggest concern is that
the sediment that contains methane hydrate is inherently unstable, meaning a drilling accident
could set off a landslide that sends massive amounts of methane—a potent greenhouse gas—
bubbling up through the ocean and into the atmosphere. Oil and gas companies establishing deepwater drilling rigs normally look at avoiding methane-hydrate clusters, said Richard Charter, senior
member of environmental group the Ocean Foundation, who has long studied methane hydrates.
Oil Dependence Good
Absent dependence, US rentrenchment from the region decimates Middle Eastern Stability
and US leadership
Salhani, 12/18/2013 (Claude, journalist, author and political analyst based in Beirut, specializing in the Middle East, politicized Islam and
terrorism and the former editor of the Middle East Times and United Press International, “US to Become Less Dependent on Foreign Oil -- be
Careful What you Wish for”, OilPrice, http://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/US-to-Become-Less-Dependent-on-Foreign-Oil-but-CarefulWhat-you-Wish-for.html)
But here
there is the need for a word of caution . Being less dependent on Middle Eastern oil does not
mean the United States should become a political recluse, retrench inside fortress America and damn the rest
of the world and their problems. In the region of the Gulf, for example, the US counts many allies who are becoming
extremely nervous at a USA hoping to step back from the region while across the waters they face a
more powerful Iran with ever-growing political/religious ambitions. Up until now countries in the region felt somewhat
protected largely because of their oil. Case in point was when Kuwait was invaded by Saddam Hussein in 1990 the US raised a
powerful multinational coalition to throw him out of the oil producing state. But recent events, such as the distancing of once
extremely close US-Saudi relation have started to cast doubts in the minds of the oil rich sheiks of
the Gulf who are truly questioning America’s resolve in the region. The added danger for the US is
the resurgence of Russia as a power to be reckoned with and now China, too . The United States
could be fooled into a false sense of security inside Fortress America and start to lose more and more of its
influence . Indeed, the exploitation of American oil for American consumption may well bring about
much wished for independence from foreign oil and foreign intrigue. But one should be careful what one wishes
for .
Oil independence bad --- causes war, terrorism, civil unrest, and drug trafficking
Miller, 2010 (Gregory D., assistant professor of political science at the University of Oklahoma, “The Security Costs of Energy
Independence”, The Washington Quarterly, April 2010, http://www.asiaresearch.ir/files/10apr_Miller.pdf)
As a result, policy debates focus exclusively on how the United States should reduce its dependence on oil, with suggestions ranging from conservation
(supported by the environmentalists) to greater domestic production (made by those who focus on security) to aggressively pursuing alternate sources
of energy (emphasized by those making an economic argument, as well as environmentalists). A critical oversight in all of this, however,
is that any dramatic reduction in U.S. dependence on oil will create major security concerns , not
only for current oil-exporting countries and their neighbors, but also for the West. Three particular threats
will grow with a dramatic reduction in U.S. consumption of foreign oil . First, international conflicts
would increase between states that currently export oil and states that are their customers. Second,
violence would increase within oil-exporting states themselves including civil wars, genocide, and
terrorism, all of which are likely to spill into neighboring states. Third, in attempts to avoid the first
two threats, states dependent on oil revenues will increasingly turn to illicit sources of income, such
as narcotics trafficking or the arms trade , to replace their diminishing wealth.
1NC Oil Spills Turn
Status quo Arctic drilling has only a small risk of a spill --- increased exploration or drilling
drastically increase the probability --- prefer Arctic specific evidence
O.N.U.S., 2010 (Oceans North US, US Arctic Program sponsored by the Pew Charitable Trusts, “Exploration and Development Risks”,
http://oceansnorth.org/exploration-development-risks)
EXPLORATION & DEVELOPMENT RISKS What Causes Spills? Where there are people, there
are mistakes. The causes of BP’s Deepwater Horizon blowout in the Gulf of Mexico have not yet been determined. But the Exxon Valdez oil
spill was caused by human error. The Montara well blowout and spill in the Timor Sea in 2009 was very
likely caused by human error in setting the cement casing. Eighty percent of spills and accidents in all
industries, including oil and gas, are estimated to be caused by human error . Additionally, the Arctic
Ocean presents an array of hazardous operating conditions . The difficulty of responding to BP’s
Deepwater Horizon spill in the Gulf of Mexico was exacerbated by the difficult conditions of
extreme water depth . In the Arctic, dangerous conditions could include gale force winds, extreme
fog, prolonged periods of darkness, shifting sea ice and sub-zero temperatures . When multiple risk
factors combine, accidents are even more likely to occur. For instance, the aging oil infrastructure at Prudhoe Bay is succumbing to
corrosion and inadequate monitoring of that problem has led to a spate of recent spills on the North Slope. An increase in oil exploration and
production will create oil spill risks from offshore platforms, associated pipelines, storage tanks and
shipping activities . At the same time, changing sea ice conditions are opening new shipping routes and
extending the season for existing routes . Increasing vessel traffic will only add to the potential risk
of oil spills beyond the oil and gas industry . Not If, But When How likely is a spill in U.S. Arctic waters?
The federal government’s Minerals Management Service estimates the chances of a major spill are 26 percent in the
Beaufort Sea and 40 percent in the Chukchi Sea over the life of oil development. The risk of small spills is nearly 100 percent. The
government’s statistics are based on an assumption of only 2 billion barrels of production
lease areas out of an estimated 19 billion barrels of economically recoverable oil.
between the two
If Arctic oil development proves profitable and
activity increases, the risks could be much higher, amplifying over time . Aging oil infrastructure on Prudhoe Bay spilled
660,000 gallons of oil, natural gas and water in only three years – from 2006 to 2009. Recent spills on the North Slope in Alaska include: In November 2009, an estimated
46,000 gallons of crude oil, high-salinity water and natural gas leaked from a pipeline rupture caused by ice plugs. In February 2009, corrosion of a pipeline resulted in a spill
estimated at 1,900 gallons of crude oil, high-salinity water and natural gas. January, 2009, an estimated 24,000 gallons of crude oil and water spilled after a failure in the
automated flow control system The oil industry plans on an exploration, development and production timeline of 50 years in the Beaufort and Chukchi seas. Recent Spills
Spills happen . Even with modern equipment and modern safety
measures, spills are a part of the offshore oil and gas industry. The Deepwater Horizon blowout in
April 2010 caused a massive oil spill that foiled all modern technological safeguards designed to prevent such an
from Offshore Exploration and Development
accident. Other spills in recent years include: In 2001, a sinking oil platform released about 9,500 barrels of oil and killed several people in Brazil. In 2004, a spill from an
offshore platform released about 1,000 barrels of oil off the coast of Newfoundland, Canada. In 2007, 25,000 barrels of oil spilled from a platform off the coast of Norway.
In 2009, a 10-week blowout at the Montara oil field off the coast of Australia released between 29,600 and 222,000 barrels of oil into the Timor Sea. How
big is a
spill likely to be? The “large” spills considered in the government’s environmental impact statement
for the Chukchi and Beaufort seas are only 1,500 bbl and 4,600 bbl. BP’s Deepwater Horizon spill
has been a grim lesson in how vastly that underestimated the potential of a major spill. During the first five
weeks alone, the Gulf blowout spewed an estimated 440,000 to 700,000 barrels of oil. Other Major Spills from Offshore Oil As BP’s Deepwater Horizon disaster has
illustrated, blowouts of offshore oil wells can be some of the most difficult spills to control . A federal Minerals
Management Service report recorded 117 failures of blowout preventers in a two year period in the 1990s, while another report noted 39 actual blowouts between 1992 and
2006. Though
blowouts are the most dramatic and devastating spills, every piece of the offshore oil and
gas industry, from pipelines to boats, causes spills. Much of the offshore oil industry was shut down before hurricanes Katrina and Rita
in 2005, but at least 741,000 gallons were spilled from broken pipelines and other sources. In addition to the recent offshore disasters mentioned above, this list shows some
of the major blowouts in the history of the offshore oil and gas industry: In 1969, Santa Barbara was polluted with 80,000 barrels of oil from an 11-day blowout that
continued leaking oil for months. In 1977, more than 200,000 barrels were released from Phillips Petroleum Ekofisk B platform In 1979, a blowout at the Ixtoc I well in the
Gulf of Mexico took nine months to control, spilling 3.5 million barrels of oil, and creating the second largest oil spill in history. In 1980, a two-week blowout sent 200,000
barrels into the Niger Delta. In 1980, 100,000 barrels was spilled after an exploratory well exploded in the Persian Gulf and killed 19 workers. Risks from Exploration
Even exploring for oil is risky . The Minerals Management Service’s 2009 environmental impact
statement for Royal Dutch Shell’s proposed exploration drilling in the Chukchi Sea discounted the
risk of a spill as improbable. But BP’s Deepwater Horizon blowout occurred as the rig completed
exploration drilling. The 1979 Ixtoc I spill in the Gulf of Mexico also happened during exploration drilling as did the Persian Gulf spill. Additionally, there
were 11 documented well-control incidents from 1977 to 2000 in which natural gas and/or drilling muds (a mixture of clays, chemicals and water) were released into the
environment. The
lack of data on drilling in Arctic offshore environments means that most information is
based on the U.S. industry’s experience in the Gulf of Mexico, a much different operating environment.
Despite industry assurances that drilling in shallow water versus deep water is less risky, the Timor
Sea’s Montara blowout was a vivid example of a recent shallow water disaster using a relatively new
drilling rig. See our recommendation for an oil spill risk assessment. Human Error No matter how technologically
advanced exploration and development equipment becomes, there is still a chance that it will not be
operated correctly. Mistakes happen . In the summer of 2009, a blowout in the East Timor Sea spewed oil for months while crews and experts
tried to stop the spill. Even though the platform was almost new – delivered in 2008 – reports suggest that the procedure to cap the well was not followed accurately,
leading to the blowout.
Arctic oil spills wreak havoc on global biodiversity—it’s the keystone ecosystem of the
planet
WWF 10 (World Wildlife Fund, “Drilling for Oil in the Arctic: Too Soon, Too Risky” 12/1/10,
http://assets.worldwildlife.org/publications/393/files/original/Drilling_for_Oil_in_the_Arctic_Too_Soon_Too_Risky.pdf?1345753131)//WL
The Arctic and the subarctic regions surrounding it are important for many reasons. One is their
enormous biological diversity: a kaleidoscopic array of land and seascapes supporting millions of
migrating birds and charismatic species such as polar bears, walruses, narwhals and sea otters. Economics is
another: Alaskan fisheries are among the richest in the world. Their $2.2 billion in annual catch fills
the frozen food sections and seafood counters of supermarkets across the nation. However, there is another
reason why the Arctic is not just important, but among the most important places on the face of the Earth. A keystone species is
generally defined as one whose removal from an ecosystem triggers a cascade of changes affecting
other species in that ecosystem. The same can be said of the Arctic in relation to the rest of the
world. With feedback mechanisms that affect ocean currents and influence climate patterns, the Arctic functions like a global
thermostat . Heat balance, ocean circulation patterns and the carbon cycle are all related to its
regulatory and carbon storage functions. Disrupt these functions and we effect far-reaching changes
in the conditions under which life has existed on Earth for thousands of years. In the context of climate change,
the Arctic is a keystone ecosystem for the entire planet Unfortunately, some of these disruptions are
happening already as climate change melts sea ice and thaws the Arctic tundra. The Arctic’s sea ice cover
reflects sunlight and therefore heat. As the ice melts, that heat is absorbed by the salt water, whose temperature, salinity and density all begin to change
in ways that impact global ocean circulation patterns. On land, beneath the Arctic tundra, are immense pools of frozen methane—a greenhouse gas far
more potent than carbon dioxide. As the tundra thaws, the risk of this methane escaping increases.4 Were this to happen, the consequences would be
dire and global in scope. As we continue not just to spill but to burn the fossil fuels that cause climate change, we are nudging the
Arctic toward a meltdown that will make sea levels and temperatures rise even faster, with potentially catastrophic
consequences for all life on Earth—no matter where one lives it. For the sake of the planet, losing the Arctic
is not an option. Mitigating the impact of climate change there ultimately depends upon our getting serious about replacing fossil fuels with
non-carbon-based renewable energies. Until we demonstrate the will and good sense to do that, however, the Arctic needs to be
protected from other environmental threats that, compounded by the stress of climate change, undermine its
resiliency and hasten its demise. Chief among those threats is offshore drilling—especially in the
absence of any credible and tested means of responding effectively to a major spill. Future technological
advances may give us those means, but this report argues that we do not have them yet and that we should not drill in the Arctic until we do.
(insert environment impact)
2NC Ext. Arctic IMpact
Arctic ecosystems are key biodiversity hotspots
Gill ’09 (Michael, is the Chair of the Circumpolar Biodiversity Monitoring Program, “Climate Change and
Artic Sustainable Development: scientific, social, cultural and educational challenges”, 3-6 March 2009,
http://www.unesco.org/csi/LINKS/monaco-abstracts/Gill_abstract_MonacoUNESCOarctic.pdf,
Accessed: 7/10, SD)
Arctic ecosystems and the biodiversity they support are experiencing growing pressure from ¶
climate change and resource development while established research and monitoring ¶ programs remain largely uncoordinated, lacking the ability to effectively monitor, understand ¶
and report on biodiversity trends at the circumpolar scale. The maintenance of healthy Arctic ¶ ecosystems is a global imperative as the Arctic plays a
critical role in the Earth’s physical, ¶ chemical and biological balance. A coordinated and comprehensive effort for monitoring
¶ Arctic ecosystems is needed to facilitate effective and timely conservation and adaptation ¶ actions. ¶
The Arctic’s size and complexity represents a significant challenge towards ¶ detecting and
attributing important biodiversity trends. This demands a scaled, pan-Arctic, ¶ ecosystem-based approach that not only identifies trends in biodiversity, but also identifies ¶ underlying
causes. It is critical that this information be made available to generate effective ¶ strategies for adapting to changes
now taking place in the Arctic - a process that ultimately ¶ depends on rigorous, integrated, and
efficient monitoring programmes that have the power ¶ to detect change within a ‘management’ time
frame. ¶ To meet these challenges and in response to the Arctic Climate Impact ¶ Assessment’s recommendation to expand and enhance Arctic biodiversity monitoring, the ¶ Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF) Working
Group of the Arctic Council ¶ launched the Circumpolar Biodiversity Monitoring Program (CBMP). The CBMP is working ¶ with over 60 global partners to expand, integrate and enhance existing Arctic
biodiversity ¶ monitoring efforts to facilitate more rapid detection, communication and response to ¶ significant trends and pressures. ¶ Towards this end, the CBMP is establishing five Expert Monitoring Groups ¶
representing major Arctic themes (Marine, Coastal, Freshwater, Terrestrial Vegetation & ¶ Terrestrial Fauna). Each group, representing a diversity of expertise including both ¶ community-based and scientific-based monitoring capabilities, is
tasked with developing ¶ pan-Arctic, comprehensive and integrated biodiversity monitoring plans for the Arctic’s biomes. ¶ To facilitate effective reporting, the CBMP is developing a suite of indices and ¶ indicators and a web-based data
portal that will be used to report on
the current state of ¶ Arctic biodiversity at various scales and levels of detail to suit a wide range of audiences. ¶ The current and planned CBMP
biodiversity monitoring underpins these indices and ¶ indicators.
Biodiversity key to Earth's life-support functions in a changing world
2NC Link
Drilling causes spills
Kollewe & Terry 2012 (cites report from Lyods, Julia, Macalister The Guardian, Wednesday 11 April 2012 “Arctic oil rush will ruin
ecosystem, warns Lloyd's of London” http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/apr/12/lloyds-london-warns-risks-arctic-oil-drilling)
But the new report from Lloyd's, written by Charles Emmerson and Glada Lahn of Chatham House, says
it is "highly likely" that
future economic activity in the Arctic will further disturb ecosystems already stressed by the
consequences of climate change."Migration patterns of caribou and whales in offshore areas may be
affected. Other than the direct release of pollutants into the Arctic environment, there are multiple
ways in which ecosystems could be disturbed, such as the construction of pipelines and roads, noise
pollution from offshore drilling, seismic survey activity or additional maritime traffic as well as through
the break-up of sea ice. The authors point out that the Arctic is not one but several ecosystems, and is
"highly sensitive to damage" that would have a long-term impact. They are calling for "baseline knowledge about the
natural environment and consistent environmental monitoring". Pollution sources include mines, oil and gas installations, industrial sites and, in the
Russian Arctic, nuclear waste from civilian and military installations, and from nuclear weapons testing on Novaya Zemlya. The report singles
out a potential oil spill as the "greatest risk in terms of environmental damage, potential cost and insurance" –
but says there are significant knowledge gaps in this area.
2NC AT: Cleanup
Zero risk of clean up—lack of infrastructure and planning takes out their defense
Dlouhy 4/23 (Jennifer A., Energy Reporter at the Houston Chronicle, citing NRC report on Oil drilling in the Arctic -
http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=18625, “U.S. could be caught cold by Arctic oil spill, report says”, 4/23/14,
http://www.houstonchronicle.com/business/energy/article/U-S-could-be-caught-cold-by-Arctic-oil-spill-5425524.php)//WL)
WASHINGTON - The United States is ill prepared to tackle oil spills in the Arctic, whether from drilling or from
cargo and cruise ships traveling through newly passable waterways once clogged with ice, the
National Research Council reported
Wednesday. Extreme weather conditions and sparse infrastructure in the Chukchi and Beaufort seas - more than
1,000 miles from the nearest deep-water port - would complicate any broad emergency response. Ice in those
remote oceans can trap pockets of oil, locking it beyond the reach of conventional cleanup
equipment and preventing it from naturally breaking down over time. "The lack of infrastructure in
the Arctic would be a significant liability in the event of a large oil spill," scientists said in a 198-page National
Research Council report requested by the American Petroleum Institute, the Coast Guard, the federal Bureau of Safety and Environmental
Enforcement and five other entities. "It is unlikely that responders could quickly react to an oil spill unless
there
were improved port and air access, stronger supply chains and increased capacity to handle
equipment, supplies and personnel." The report offers more than a dozen recommendations for what regulators, the oil industry and
other stakeholders need to do to boost their ability to tackle a crude oil or fuel spill at the top of the globe, as retreating sea ice spurs new energy
development and ship traffic there. A chief recommendation: More research across the board, from meteorological studies to investigations of how oil
spill cleanup methods would work in the Arctic. The National Research Council - an arm of the National Academy of Sciences and the National
Academy of Engineering - insisted the United States needs "a comprehensive, collaborative, long-term Arctic oil spill research and development
program." The council encouraged controlled releases of oil in Arctic waters - a practice generally barred under U.S. environmental laws - to evaluate
response strategies. Although the federal government and oil industry are conducting lab studies that attempt to replicate Arctic conditions, the report
suggests there is no substitute for the real thing and said the studies could be done without environmental harm. Warmer waters Most information on
responding to oil spills has been developed in temperate conditions, such as in the Gulf of Mexico, so it may not translate to the Arctic, where cold
water and sea ice may limit the amount of oil that naturally disperses and evaporates. Workers practice deploying an inflatable oil containment boom
before Royal Dutch Shell began drilling in Alaskan Arctic seas in 2012. Jennifer A. Dlouhy Workers practice deploying an inflatable oil containment
boom before Royal Dutch Shell began drilling in Alaskan Arctic seas in 2012. Because no response methods are completely effective or risk-free, the
industry and government need a broad "oil spill response toolbox," the report said. Pre-tested and pre-positioned equipment - along with plans for
using it - would be critical to ensuring a swift response in an oil spill, the group said. When Shell was drilling for oil in the Chukchi Sea and Beaufort
seas in 2012, it stashed containment booms and other equipment along Alaska's northern coast and had a fleet of spill response vessels floating nearby.
Shell since has suspended operations there following a series of marine mishaps before and after the drilling projects. Cold-weather effects Arctic
cleanup options include chemical dispersants that can break down oil, either applied at the surface or near a wellhead, but the researchers said more
work is needed to understand their effectiveness and long-term effects in the Arctic. While burning thick patches of floating oil is a viable spill
countermeasure in the Arctic - potentially aided by ice that helps corral the crude - that approach fails when ice drifts apart and oil spreads too thin to
ignite. Using booms, vessels and skimmers to concentrate oil slicks also may be difficult in the region,
where there are few disposal sites for the contaminated equipment, sparse port facilities for the
vessels and limited airlift capabilities. The National Research Council says this kind of mechanical recovery is probably best for
small spills in pack ice, but it would likely be inefficient for a large offshore spill in the U.S. Arctic. Coast Guard presence The group also
suggested the U.S. Coast Guard's relatively small presence in the U.S. Arctic is not sufficient, and
that it needs icebreaking capability, more vessels for responding to emergency situations, and eventually
aircraft support facilities that can work year-round. The report cited other resources now lacking in the Arctic,
including equipment to detect, monitor and model the flow of oil on and under ice, and real-time
monitoring of vessel traffic in the U.S. Arctic. A politically tricky recommendation is for the Coast Guard to expand an existing
bilateral pact with Russia to allow joint Arctic spill exercises. Chris Krenz, a Juneau, Alaska-based senior scientist with the conservation group Oceana,
said the report offers "a sobering look at our lack of preparedness" and suggests that the U.S. should reconsider whether to allow offshore drilling in
the region. But oil industry representatives said the council rightly calls for more research and resources to combat spills there. The American
Petroleum Institute was "encouraged by the report's emphasis on the need for a full toolbox of spill response technologies," spokesman Carlton
Carroll said. The report was the product of a 14-member committee of the National Research Council, organized by the National Academy of
Sciences, with representatives drawn from academia, the oil industry and Alaska.
Arctic War
T double bind
Either they are military or they can’t solve forward arctic power projection
Jones 6
(ANITA K. JONES, CHAIR, POLAR RESEARCH BOARD, NATIONAL
ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, “U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FRANK LOBIONDO (RNJ) HOLDS A HEARING ON THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCE
ICEBREAKER REPORT” pg online at proquest//sd)
multi-mission ships operated by the Coast Guard. And
conduct of science as well as the missions of the Coast Guard, homeland
security, maritime safety, national security, protection of natural resources. In addition, the National Science Foundation
Over the past couple of decades, the government has deployed a fleet of four icebreakers, three
by multi-mission, I mean that they support the
operates a single mission ship that's solely dedicated to scientific research. Today, two of the multi-mission ships, the Polar Star and the Polar Sea, are at the end of their service life, 30 years. Deferred
maintenance, absence of an upgrade program to extend their lifetime, and lack of replacement has left the U.S. with a multi-mission fleet of one ship. And the U.S. is at risk of being unable to meet
these interests in the polar regions, particularly in the Arctic. In the Arctic, the icepack has thinned and retreated dramatically. This committee anticipates greater human presence in the Arctic with
increased economic activity, as you alluded to. Oil companies have purchased a large number of leases in the sea and on the land of the Alaskan North Slope. Adventure travel to the North increases.
The number of ice-strength and tankers in the world will shortly double, incurring new traffic across the north of Russia and through the Bering Strait, we expect. Mining will be more cost effective in
northern Alaska as ice retreat allows longer periods to load or ship. Greater human activity will increase the need for the Coast Guard to assert a more active and influential presence in the Arctic to
protect the nation's economic, scientific, environmental and foreign policy interests. This requires the use of icebreakers. The retreat of the sea margin is not uniform or predictable. Conditions may
become more or less difficult. And in our conversations with the Coast Guard, they have told us that they consider this their mission and actually look forward to it. The money needs that are
documented in our report lead the committee to conclude that the nation requires a multi-mission fleet. From a national point of view, from a national-policy point of view, the Coast Guard's missions
transcend the support of science. The science missions are quite complementary and this has been demonstrated admirably both with science missions on the Healy and McMurdo break-ins using the
Polar Sea and the Polar Star. While McMurdo break-in does not have to be preformed by a military service, the break-in does require a reliably controlled ship. And this committee concluded that that
means U.S. owned, U.S. operated and U.S. flagged. However, performing McMurdo break-in is compatible with the other demands on the multi-mission Coast Guard fleet. And the committee notes
a Coast Guard ship asserts the tangible U.S. presence, a leased ship does not. So from the total fleet perspective, the
believes that the Coast Guard should operate this multi-mission, that it should be provided sufficient resources and maintenance
budget to support an increased, regular and influential presence in the Arctic.
that
committee
China Energy Security
1nc – us-china co-op
Status quo cooperation solves – mutual dialogue
Dexing 14
Qin Dexing, China Daily, 7/11/14, (“China, US will enhance energy cooperation”,
http://www.ecns.cn/business/2014/07-11/123685.shtml)//AW
**Quotes: Wu Xinxiong – head of National Energy Administration, Ernest Moniz – US Secretary of Energy,
and Wang Haohao – analysit with energy consultancy Shandong Longzhong Information Technology Co.**
China's National Energy Administration and the US Department of Energy inked an agreement on
Thursday that will see the two sides work together to bolster China's strategic crude reserves.
Wu Xinxiong, head of the NEA, and Ernest Moniz, US secretary of energy, signed the memorandum of
understanding and discussed cooperation opportunities in sectors like shale gas, liquefied natural
gas trading, nuclear projects and non-fossil energy.
"China and the United States have many cooperation opportunities in the energy sector, which is
significant for both countries," Wu said. He said the two sides should further expand energy cooperation.
Moniz said efforts should be made to strengthen cooperation and find solutions for existing
problems through China-US strategic and economic dialogues.
As China's economy grows, the country's crude oil demand has been increasing rapidly with an estimated
annual growth of 6.7 percent during the last 10 years.
In 2013, China used 487 million metric tons of crude, up 2.8 percent year-on-year. Up to 58.1 percent of the
supply came from imports, according to the CNPC Economics and Technology Research Institute.
According to experts, creating an oil storage system is crucial for China's energy security, especially
when weighed against the growing demand and rising dependency on foreign supplies.
According to the institute, by the end of 2013, China had established 24 crude oil storage bases with total
capacity of 46.23 million cubic meters for commercial use.
Earlier reports indicated that the US was keen to be a part of China's crude reserve system
development as it felt it would help stabilize the international crude market.
The agreement gave further evidence that the two nations were keen on stepping up energy
cooperation .
According to a report released on April 10 by the US Energy Information Administration, crude oil reserves
in the US reached their highest level since 1976 in 2013. Proven crude reserves in the US rose for the fourth
consecutive year in 2012 to 33 billion barrels, a 15 percent year-on-year growth.
"The cooperation between China and the US on crude reserves will help balance the energy output
and consumption to some extent," said Wang Haohao, an analyst with energy consultancy Shandong
Longzhong Information Technology Co.
1nc – china-arab co-op
China-Arab cooperation is growing – recent summit proves
Martel 14
Frances Martel, Currently attending Fordham University School of Law, BA in Government from Harvard
University, 6/3/14, (“CHINA SEEKS ENHANCED COOPERATION WITH ARAB WORLD ON
NUCLEAR ENERGY, SPACE ISSUES”, http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Peace/2014/06/03/China-SeeksEnhanced-Cooperation-With-Arab-World-on-Nuclear-Energy-Space-Issues)//AW
The China-Arab Cooperative forum is celebrating its tenth anniversary, and Chinese Foreign Minister
Wang Yi noted in a statement that the Chinese government is increasingly interested in expanding
trade and economic ties with the region, particularly in developing industries like nuclear energy.
In statements provided to Chinese news agency Xinhua, Wang said the forum's meeting, scheduled for this
Thursday, would focus on expanding cooperation in sectors that have yet to be fully developed in
relationships between Arab countries and China. " China wants to reinforce cooperation with Arab
states in both traditional sectors like energy, trade and infrastructure and emerging sectors like nuclear
energy, space and new energy with a view to sharing development benefits and promoting common
prosperity," Wang noted, highlighting the Silk Road ties between China and the Arab world.
Arab countries – which will include in this summit Bahrain, Jordan, Yemen, and others – are "natural and
important cooperation partners for China, " according to Wang. Xinhua makes note of highlighting
China's support for Palestine's "right to be an independent state." In addition to political support, China
has greatly expanded its economic reach in the region. According to a statement from the Chinese
government, trade between China and the region has expanded to $239 billion, and China has become the
largest trading partner of nine Arab countries.
The summit will extend talks between Arab countries and China, both sides of which have expressed an
interest in expanding trade. Wang went on a tour of various Middle Eastern countries in December, including
Saudi Arabia, and met with several members of the Gulf Cooperation Council. At the time, the Agence
France-Presse reported that Gulf Countries appeared open to stronger ties with China that would allow them
to rely less on economic relations with the United States. Saudi Arabian authorities expressed optimism at the
time towards opening further trade with China.
While China has expressed interest in expanding trade into other sectors, the oil market has also
increased with many Middle Eastern countries. OPEC announced in May that much of its increased
demand for oil is coming from China. "Almost half of annual oil demand growth is seen coming from
China and the Middle East," a report released by the organization explained.
In addition to expanding trade with Arab countries and the greater Middle East, China has extended its
global offensive to become more involved in world economies. In February, the Chinese government
announced its intentions to found a China-Latin America trade forum this year that would work
similarly to the Arab arrangement. China has also made inroads in trade with a number of African
nations.
1nc – diversification solve
Diversification now – energy revolution
Cai 14
Peter Cai, China Analyst for Business Spectator, 6/16/14, (“China readies for an energy revolution”,
http://www.businessspectator.com.au/article/2014/6/16/china/china-readies-energy-revolution)//AW
China is the world’s largest consumer and producer of energy and emitter of carbon. The country’s
voracious appetite for oil, coal, gas and renewable energy is fundamentally re-shaping the global
energy landscape.
China’s slowing economy and the transformational structural change will have a profound impact on
the ways it produces and consumes energy. The growth rate for the country’s energy demand is set
to decelerate from about 8.4 per cent to between 4 and 5 per cent, according to the Development and
Research Centre of the State Council, the Chinese cabinet. However, the absolute size of demand will
continue to rise.
In light of the country’s economic structural shift, worsening environmental problems, and advances
in new technology, Chinese President Xi Jinping has called for an energy revolution in China.
Speaking on Friday night at a meeting of the Central Leading Group on Financial and Economic Affairs, the
country’s highest decision-making body on economic issues, Xi said China must work to safeguard its
energy security.
“To ensure national energy security, China needs to take steps to rein in irrational energy use and
control the country’s energy consumption by fully implementing energy-saving policies ,” he said.
Xi, who arguably has greater power vested in him than any Chinese leader since Deng Xiaoping, made five
important points about China’s energy industry that could have lasting consequences for the global energy
sector.
The one that will have the most impact on Australia is the push to diversify China’s energy sources .
Xi emphasised the importance of having a diverse range of energy suppliers and sources to ensure
the country’s energy demand and security. Chinese authorities will place new prominence on clean coal
technology and upgrade polluting coal fired power stations.
In addition, China will explore and develop new sources of energy beyond coal and petroleum
including natural gas, renewable energy such as solar, and wind and nuclear power. Evidence from
past years is already showing strong signs of change.
For example, China’s coal consumption only increased 1.85 per cent between 2012 and 2013, compared to an
annualised growth rate of 8.3 per cent between 2002 and 2011. On the other hand, the country’s demand for
natural gas increased 15.4 per cent in 2012 and 13.9 per cent last year.
Meanwhile, the country has experienced explosive growth in renewable energy p3roduction, with wind and
solar power increasing 35.3 per cent and 122 per cent respectively in 2013. At the moment, nearly two thirds
of China’s energy consumption is powered by coal. Beijing wants to reduce that reliance to 52.4 per cent by
2023.
Xi also called for more international cooperation in energy production, exploring further
opportunities in Central Asia, Middle East, Americas and Africa. Beijing clearly wants to diversify its
sources of energy supply to ensure better energy security. China recently sealed the $400 billion natural gas
supply contract with Russia, securing China a major source of cleaner fuel from its neighbour.
State-owned giants dominate the country’s energy sector from petroleum exploration to electricity generation.
The cosy monopoly is a source of corruption as well as inefficiency. Xi promised more market-oriented
pricing reform to build a competitive energy market.
There have been calls to open up the country’s closed exploration sector to private capital and especially for
unconventional gas industry.
The Chinese president also emphasised the need to invest more in renewable energy sector as part of
the broader strategy to upgrade the country’s industrial structure. The country is already the world’s largest
builder of wind turbines and the largest producer of solar photovoltaic cells.
Chinese authorities see the development of renewable energy not only as a solution to address its energy
demand and worsening environmental problem but also part of the plan to overtake Western competitors in
emerging sectors.
This scenario is non-unique—China has already joined the Arctic council—this resolves all
energy security issues and trade benefits—also proves Russian deal solves—this card
obliterates their whole advantage
Blank, Research Professor of National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute, 2014
(Stephen, 6/20/2014, “China's Arctic Strategy: Since gaining Arctic Council observer status, China has been
quick to move on its interests.” http://thediplomat.com/2013/06/chinas-arctic-strategy/?allpages=yes DA:
8/1/2014, dobp)
China has certainly been busy since it won observer status at the May Arctic Council summit in Kiruna, Sweden. First,
Yu Zhengasheng, Chairman of China’s Political Consultative Conference, visited Finland, Sweden
and Denmark with an eye to boosting general trade and cooperation, particularly in the Arctic. China then announced an
expanded research and scientific polar institute that will collaborate with Nordic research centers to study climate change, its impact and desired Arctic policies and legislation. With this, Beijing
made clear it did not intend to be a passive member of the Council; it planned to have a real say in
its future proceedings. China National Offshore Oil Corporation meanwhile announced a deal with
Iceland’s Eykon Energy firm to explore off Iceland’s Southeast coast. State-owned mining firm Sichan Xinue Mining has also agreed
to finance a major international mining project at Greenland’s Isua iron-ore field*. If this venture succeeds, other Chinese state-owned mining companies, such
as Jiangxi Zhongrun Mining and Jiangxi Union Mining, which have prospected in Greenland but have not yet started production, would then join it to explore for gold
and copper. And other projects like aluminum smelting are already taking shape or will begin, espeically if the Isua project is successful. These moves come on top
of recently announced deals with Rosneft and Gazprom to explore Arctic fields for oil and gas. At the recent
Sino-Russian summit, China concluded a contract with Rosneft to triple the size of current oil deliveries to China to 900,000 BPD, putting it on a par with Saudi deliveries to China, according to a
recent report in the Financial Times print edition. But Rosneft won that contract only by accepting further huge Chinese loans of $25-30 billion as cash infusions and agreeing to facilitate the acquisition
as part of its huge energy deals in the Arctic and the Russian Far
East (RFE), China has added to Rosneft’s already sizable indebtedness to China , going back to the 2009 deal for the East
of oil and gas assets in Russia by Sinopec, an oil and gas company. In other words,
Siberia Pacific Ocean pipeline. This indebtedness and the size of the planned oil deliveries from Rosneft will give China substantial leverage in the region. Rosneft will consequently consider Sinopec’s
participation in its large-scale project in the RFE, namely the Eastern Petrochemical Refinery jointly established in 2007 by Rosneft and Sinopec’s rival CNPC, China National Petrochemical
Corporation. While China will loan Rosneft $2 billion backed by 25 years of oil supply, Rosneft will boost oil exports to China by 800,000 metric tons this year. Annual exports may reach 31 million
tons annually or 620,000 barrels a day, more than doubling present volumes. Igor Sechin, Rosneft’s boss and Putin’s right-hand man, even hinted at going to 50 million tons per annum. Rosneft’s other
deal deal with CNPC to drill in the Pechora and Barents Seas in the Arctic similarly highlights CNPC’s growing clout in global markets. Gazprom also announced its intention to conclude a longawaited gas deal with China in 2013 by signing a Memorandum of Understanding to that effect. That deal, too, might involve advance payments from China to an increasingly vulnerable Gazprom.
Given Russia’s equally strenuous efforts to explore and exploit the Arctic’s hydrocarbon and mineral resources, it is understandably unnerving for it and possibly other governments to see this flood of
vigorous Chinese activity, which comes on top of the opening up of the Northern Sea Route to intercontinental trade from Europe to Asia. Certainly, it seems Moscow is concerned, even though it is
Beijing’s “strategic partner.”
China
is clearly after more than simply investment and trade opportunities as it
continues to display its obsession with
securing energy and other supplies where the U.S. Navy cannot or will not go . Beijing Review claimed that other actors
were trying to exclude China, but by dint of enormous exertions and large outlays to finance energy infrastructure in Russia and Canada, as well as its own scientific program of Arctic research,
China has ultimately managed to reshuffle the Arctic balance of power in record time.” More crassly, we might say
China will not only gain real access
to state-of-the-art Icelandic clean energy technologies, it will also acquire leverage and influence in
Iceland itself and that influence, once Iceland joins the Council, will redound to China’s benefit. But
beyond even these considerable commercial and energy, investment and trade access benefits,
China gains strategically in Northern Europe and Russia, if not Canada. It now possesses a venue where it can fully participate in addressing
issues of climate change that could, if unchecked, affect China’s climate to extent of eroding its agricultural capacity or rendering it vulnerable to flooding because of its low-lying coast. In
addition, as the Northern Sea Route opens up as a cheaper alternative for transcontinental shipping
and trade, Russia will almost certainly seek to establish an advantageous tariff regime; China can
now make certain that Russia heeds its voice in setting those tariff rates. China will also now have a
“
that China has paid dearly for its newfound status. Still, it will achieve some tangible goals. For instance, in its deal with Iceland,
secure footing from which it can defend what it will claim to be its “legitimate rights” in the Arctic .
China will now use that foothold to demand as well a voice in the resolution of Arctic
territorial boundaries that are up for decision. In 2009-10 it had claimed that no state had sovereignty in the Arctic, a clear slap at Russian claims. Now, to
It is quite conceivable that
join the Council, it had to repudiate that earlier position and state that it respected the sovereignty of
all the states claiming territory in the Arctic but accept that the decision will be made in the future, a
sharp contrast to its rigid insistence on its “core interests” and sovereignty in the Senkakus and the
South China Sea. Indeed, given those claims on the seas adjacent to China, it had no choice but to recognize existing exclusive economic zones and boundaries if it wanted to be a
member of the Council. Nonetheless, it now calls itself a “near-Arctic state” and an “Arctic stakeholder.” Probably this is what is
unnerving for Moscow. According to Interfax, Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, with no apparent cause, told an interviewer in Norway on June 4 that “China is trusted. But it is you and us who draw
up the rules of the game, that is to say the Arctic states.” Medvedev went on to claim that while Moscow wants productive cooperation with all Council members, including China, and has purely
“peaceful and pragmatic goals” there, only Arctic Council members should determine the rules on these questions because, “This is natural, this is our region, we live here. This is our native land.”
Unfortunately for Moscow, not only China but also the other new Asian members will seek to maximize their influence in the Council for many of the same reasons. The Arctic may be Russia’s home,
but it can no longer be its castle.
2nc – diversification solve
Trends are set to continue – renewables are growing
EAN 14
Euro Asia News, 3/27/14, (“China moves towards renewables to diversify energy resources”,
http://euroasianews.com/china-moves-towards-renewables-to-diversify-energy-resources/)//AW
China the largest consumer of coal in the world is attempting to diversify its energy sources to
move towards renewable energy in particular, wind and nuclear power.
It currently gets 68 percent of its energy supply needs from coal. However in 2013, electricity generation
from wind power increased by 35 percent to reach 135 terawatt-hours. Also 110 terawatt-hours
electricity was generated by nuclear power plants in 2013, according to International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA).
China, the leading country in wind energy, surpassed four continents in producing electricity from wind
power in 2013 generating 91.4 gigawatts (GWs) capacity surpassing that of North America, South
America, Australia and Africa continents. The three leading countries, China, U.S and Germany have
around 60 percent of the total world wind energy power in 2013.
China’s nuclear power generation should increase over the next few years, according to Energy expert
Michael Davidson, from Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT).
“ This is part of a concerted effort to introduce renewable and other non-fossil fuel energies into the
electricity mix to reduce China’s reliance on coal ,” he said adding that “wind benefited from a stable
feed-in-tariff”. It appears that there will be an increase in reliance on both wind and nuclear energy
in the country over the next few years.
Davidson anticipates that electricity generated through nuclear energy could overtake that generated
from wind energy by the end of 2015,” said Davidson, who works on the China Energy and Climate
Project in MIT, adding that China is committed to expanding nuclear power as well, however, the
nuclear industry grew slower than wind due to its lengthy construction and time-consuming approval
processes.
Davidson confirmed that the current nuclear power generation should increase over the next few years as
there are 14 nuclear power units in operation in China with 8 plants under construction and in preliminary
preparation with approval, according to China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC).
Wind energy has become China’s third-largest energy source, behind coal and hydropower and it aims to get
15 percent of its primary energy from non-fossil sources by 2020.
1nc – russia solves
Russia deal solves – supply is set to increase – circumvents insecure routes
[also proves SOI disad turns energy insecurity]
Juan 14
Du Juan, Writer for The China Daily, 5/22/14, (“Gas deal supplies energy diversification”,
http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/europe/2014-05/22/content_17532949.htm)//AW
Energy specialists see China's new deal to import natural gas from Russia as a costly but necessary
step toward energy diversification.
On Wednesday, President Xi Jinping and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin oversaw the conclusion
of the decade-long negotiations over Russia's gas supply to China.
Under the roughly $400 billion pact, Gazprom will supply China with 38 billion cubic meters of gas
annually for 30 years, starting in 2018, through the planned "eastern pipeline", which will connect
Russia to China's northeastern Heilongjiang province, and from there connect with the
industrialized cities along China's eastern coast.
Sun Yongxiang, a professor at the Euro-Asian Social Development Research Institute of the State
Council's Development Research Center, said the strategic partnership between China and Russia has
to be based on big-ticket deals.
The signing of the gas deal shows Russia's strong interest in diversifying its energy buyers outside
Europe and China's interest in diversifying its energy supply structure , Sun said.
Russia, which exported around 160 billion cubic meters of gas to Europe last year, is under pressure
to seek new energy buyers due to its growing friction with the West over Ukraine.
Wang Xiaokun, an analyst at the domestic commodities consultancy Sublime China Information,
said the new supply from Russia will increase the share of natural gas in China's energy
consumption mix from the current less than 6 percent to 8 percent.
Industry specialists speculate that the price could be about $300 per 1,000 cubic meters, close to Russia's
export price to Europe but higher than China's gas imports from Central Asia.
Under the pact, Gazprom will be responsible for upstream exploration, gas processing and pipeline
construction inside Russia, and its Chinese partner CNPC will build pipelines inside China and all
supporting and storage facilities.
2nc – russia solves
Solves diversification – experts
Chengxi 14
Yang Chengxi, Reporter for CCTV, 5/27/14, (“China-Russia gas agreement provides diversification”,
http://english.cntv.cn/2014/05/27/VIDE1401182043205126.shtml)//Aw
Has the long-awaited agreement that China signed with Russia last week completed China’s strategy
of diversifying its gas imports ? Some Chinese experts think that’s the case.
Russian gas giant Gazprom will start supplying China with 38 billion cubic meters of natural gas
annually for 30 years under the deal estimated to be worth 400 billion U.S. dollars. The gas will be
transported through a 5,000 kilometer long pipeline project that links China with two gas fields in eastern
Siberia. And an estimated 3,000 kilometers of new pipeline will be built in China.
"Last year China’s natural gas consumption reached 167.6 billion cubic meters, and it is growing by
30 billion every year. The gas deal could help support this growth rate," said Professor Liu Yijun from
China University of Petrolem.
Natural gas accounts for only four percent of China’s energy consumption. That’s much lower than the
international average of 24 percent. China has launched multiple projects to import gas from neighbouring
countries in order to reduce its reliance on oil and coal and reduce pollution.
"According to China’s planning, the proportion of natural gas in the country’s energy consumption
will be moved up to 15 percent by 2020. Importing gas from Russia will help ensure China diversify
its energy portfolio," said Dong Xiucheng, director of China Oil and Gas Center.
China became the third largest natural gas consuming country in 2013 and the government has decided to
improve the country’s gas supply capacity to 330 billion cubic meters by 2017.
Solves the internal link to a sufficient threshold
Buchanan 14
Elizabeth Buchanan, PhD candidate at the ANU Centre for European Studies, manager of the Rio Tinto
China Economy Program at the Crawford School of Public Policy, 6/19/14, (“Consumers, not strategists, are
the winners in China-Russia gas deal”, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2014/06/19/consumers-notstrategists-are-the-winners-in-china-russia-gas-deal/)//AW
China and Russia have signed a 30-year natural gas contract . Come 2018 China will import 38 billion
cubic metres of Russian gas per annum. Seemingly, the international community is alarmed and on
guard. But is this warranted?
For strategists, the deal ushers in an apparent shift in global power and the end of China as a viable
destination for Western energy exports. The deal has certainly placed energy security back on the
international political agenda. The reality that global competition for energy is heating up fuels this
doomsayer sentiment. International demand is rising for the known traditional energy reserves, which
are depleting.
So does the ‘mega deal’ reflect Putin’s sudden pivot to the East? Not necessarily.
Firstly, the deal had been on the table for a decade, and in 2009 the Kremlin officially stated its planned push
to the Asian market in the ‘Energy Strategy of Russia to 2030’. Russia has the world’s largest natural gas
reserves and China is the world’s biggest gas consumer. Sheer geography pits the two powerhouses as
neighbours; the deal is simple economics. Despite the deal pointing to better working Sino-Russian relations,
tensions are very much still a hallmark and the bilateral relationship is set to remain coloured by mutual
suspicion.
Rather, the deal is a pragmatic application of Russian foreign energy strategy -- a strategy that has
remained unchanged and entirely predictable since Putin came to power in 2000. The primary goal of
this strategy is to establish Russia as an energy superpower. So energy is wielded as a foreign policy
tool .
Nowhere is this more devastatingly effective than in the states of the former Soviet Union. The
strategic manipulation of the former Soviet Union's overreliance upon Russian gas is a well-known
occurrence. The intricate web of pipelines across the former Soviet Union states wed them to Russian
supplies -- those who actively seek an exit from Russia’s orbit are punished by sudden supply cuts or price
hikes.
Putin can use this strategy because Europe is set to remain Russia’s most important customer.
China’s 38bcm pales in comparison to the 160bcm delivered to Europe annually. More so, the bulk of
Russia’s Western European customers are locked in with long-term supply contracts. In some cases, their
domestic gas infrastructure is owned and operated by Russian state-owned behemoth Gazprom. There are no
short-term alternatives to Russian gas for Europe.
So, ultimately, this deal was all about diversification -- the diversification of Russia’s customer base
and the diversification of sources for China’s insatiable energy thirst. Russia effectively has the FSU
under its thumb with the sustained selective application of its energy ‘weapon’. It has Western Europe locked
into long-term contracts and starved of any viable short-term alternatives. Naturally, it was only a matter of
time before Russia cast its eye to the East.
Sure, China may have secured a reduced price given the Kremlin’s current isolation stemming from the
events on the Crimean Peninsula. But who was the real winner here?
Simple: the rest of us.
Indeed, ‘end of oil’ pundits and consumers should rejoice in the deal. Russia has the largest gas deposits
on earth (most located in the Far East) which have remained unexplored and undeveloped as a direct
result of the lack of cash to access, develop and export the reserves. This deal paves the way for this entire
region to be explored and turned to production. Not only are new fields set to come online providing more
gas to the international market, the deal provides the precedent of international partnerships when it comes to
exploration. It also imparts a healthy injection of competition into the international energy market that will
ultimately serve to push prices down in the long term.
Perhaps more significantly, this recent deal allows for the delay in Sino–Russian exploration of
offshore Arctic energy reserves -- a challenging and environmentally hazardous endeavour, which
will require more time to develop the necessary technology.
The China-Russia gas deal is nothing unexpected. It is merely smart business and another step for
the two powerhouses towards conquering the challenges of energy security. Those with insecurities
must simply grin and bear it.
Russia Arctic Mil
1nc – containment turn
No risk of Arctic War in the squo – cooperation and diplomacy
Bukkvoll 11
Tor Bukkvoll, Visiting fellow at The Leverhulme Program on the Changing Character of War, University of
Oxford, 9/22/11, (“Prospects for peace and cooperation in the Arctic”,
http://valdaiclub.com/russia_and_the_world/31960.html)//AW
On a related note, one must also keep in mind that while there is nothing inevitable about a
deterioration of relations in the Arctic , the fact that it can or will be avoided should also not be taken for
granted. The chances for building peaceful relations in the Arctic are good, but it will demand serious
focus, a great deal of dialogue and willingness to compromise from the states involved. Regional
cooperation arrangements such as the Arctic and Barents Councils can also play an important role in
this regard.
Despite the reasons for conflict discussed above, the conditions for conflict resolution through peaceful
means are probably more promising in the Arctic than in many other regions where similar conflicts exist.
First, all the states concerned, to varying degrees, are relatively economically developed and politically
stable . They are therefore likely to be more predictable in their policies than less economically
developed and politically stable states. Second, a comprehensive basis of agreements and normative
acts for regulating bilateral relations in the area already exists. Third, civilian cooperation among the
Arctic states is expanding on issues such as maritime search and rescue and environmental
monitoring, to mention just two. Such cooperation could also be expected to have a spillover effect
into the security realm.
Fourth, in military terms the most significant players in the Arctic – the USA and Russia – face much
greater security challenges elsewhere in the world. The USA is concerned by the rise of China’s
military capacity, their continued ability to be a significant military player if the Pacific, and the
defense of U.S. interests in a number of hot spots in the developing world. Russia is concerned by
the significant potential for political upheaval along its southern and eastern borders, in addition to
also keeping an eye on China’s rising military might. Thus, both countries could be expected to
work particularly hard to avoid the Arctic becoming yet another area of instability . Fifth, to some
extent the Arctic five share a common interest in limiting non-Arctic states’ access to the region. On
the one hand this could lead to greater cooperation among the Arctic five on limiting outside
influence , but on the other hand it could also lead to conflict between them should differences of opinion
arise about what the role of “outsiders” should be or whether some should be given priority over others.
Arctic neo-containment fails – eviscerates cooperation and sparks military brinksmanship –
causes war
Murray and Keating 14
Robert W. Murray is the Vice-President, Research at the Frontier Centre for Public Policy and an Adjunct
Professor of Political Science at the University of Alberta. Tom Keating is a Professor of Political Science at
the University of Alberta, 4/25/14, (“Why Neo-Containment Should Not Extend to Arctic”,
http://opencanada.org/features/the-think-tank/comments/why-neo-containment-should-not-extend-toarctic/)//AW
As the situation in Ukraine continues to worsen, Canada is under increasing pressure to include the
Arctic as part of NATO’s strategy to counteract Russian aggression. In the following, we content that
it should continue to resist this pressure—even in the wake of events in Crimea and eastern Ukraine.
The efforts to increase NATO’s common interests in the Arctic began as far back as 2010 with
Norway broaching the subject at a NATO Summit. At that time, Canada requested that the Arctic be
removed from the Summit’s agenda as Canada felt that NATO had no place in Arctic affairs.
Recent events in Ukraine have evoked concern among NATO allies about Russia’s potential interest
in expanding its borders. In a recent meeting of the Russian Security Council, Russian President Putin
highlighted the “special” place of the Arctic in Russia’s sphere of influence . Referring directly to
Russia’s future Arctic strategy, Putin noted: “We need to take additional measures so as not to fall
behind our partners, to maintain Russian influence in the region and, maybe in some areas, to be
ahead of our partners.” Russia is in the process of continuing its militarization of the Arctic and this
week’s comments regarding Russia’s future Arctic interests is cause for concern.
Having mishandled the crisis in Ukraine for so long, NATO’s response can now be defined as “neocontainment” in which NATO bolsters its military presence in Poland and the Baltic states in an effort
to dissuade Putin from going any further with his quest for what he has called “New Russia.” However, it
would be incredibly unwise for NATO to include the Arctic as a component of the neo-containment
strategy moving forward.
The idea of extending NATO to the Arctic theatre is not a new one. Canadian officials raised the possibility
of such an extended mandate in the 1950s when Soviet bombers posed a threat to North America through
Arctic airspace. Canada’s concerns at the time, however, were shaped as much by the relationship with its
southern neighbour as they were with the Soviet threat. Indeed, Ottawa was hoping to deflect living under an
exclusively bilateral (NORAD) umbrella by including our European allies in the plan. The Americans and
NATO’s European members took little interest in the Canadian request and the matter was dropped.
The situation today is completely different. Russian interests in the Arctic are not primarily about a
global competition for power through territorial expansion (despite the indirect implications of power
accumulation); it is about pressing territorial and resource claims to their most extreme limits . At the
same time, every other Arctic state is pressing similar claims. While military power is not insignificant
in asserting and defending such claims, it has not been the exclusive, nor even primary, means
employed thus far. Diplomatic and institutional measures are still a viable option for resolving these
territorial disputes. A NATO presence in the Arctic would severely undermine these non-military
measures and would likely provoke Russia into a game of brinkmanship .
To date, Arctic relations have been entirely diplomatic, with no genuine hint of armed conflict on
the immediate horizon. It is true that Arctic states have invested significant domestic resources into
Arctic scientific exploration, resource extraction technology and military assets but thus far relations
in the Arctic Region have been cooperative. For the first time since the crisis in Ukraine began, though,
the Arctic became a component of a broader strategic discussion when Canada withdrew from the
meeting of the Arctic Council’s task force on black carbon and methane held in Moscow. Even so, it is likely
that Canada’s withdrawal from the proceedings had more to do with the fact that the meeting was being held
in Moscow and not a sincere effort on Canada’s part to goad Russia on policy issues concerning the Arctic.
The disputes at play in the Arctic are also fundamentally different from those being played out in Ukraine.
Any attempt to link them would be counterproductive on many fronts. Much has been made in the weeks
since the implosion in Ukraine on the effects that NATO expansion has had on Russian foreign
policy. Regardless of how one interprets the effects of NATO’s expansion to the borders of Russia,
extending the alliance into the Arctic would only confirm the perception in Moscow that the
alliance’s primary objective has been to encircle Russia and deny what it views as legitimate security
interests on its borders. If Russians weren’t paranoid about being trapped before, such a move by
NATO would surely reinforce such a view.
‘
2nc – no arctic war
The Arctic is safe – no miscalc, intentions are benign
Rybachenkov 13
(Vladimir, Counselor for nuclear affairs at the Russian embassy in Washington, Lecturere at CarnagiePlowshare, “The Arctic: region of multilateral cooperation or platform for military tension?”,
http://english.ruvr.ru/2013_04_03/The-Arctic-region-of-multilateral-cooperation-or-platform-for-militarytension/)
Some western media have recently been highlighting the view that military conflicts in the struggle
to secure the Arctic's natural resources are inevitable. Russia is carefully monitoring developments in
polar region and considers the general situation in the area to be positive, stable and, on the whole,
predictable, based on the assumption that there are no immediate issues that might call for a military
solution. This assessment has recently been confirmed in a report by the Stockholm Institute for
Peace Research (SIPRI), which refuted recent conjecture about a polar arms race.¶ It is commonly
recognised that there are currently three major factors determining the Arctic situation; Firstly, the end to
military and political confrontation from the Cold War when the Arctic was almost exclusively seen in the
context of flight trajectories for strategic nuclear weapons as well a route for nuclear submarine patrols. Now
the threat of a global nuclear war is substantially reduced, with US–Russian arms control treaties
being a key element in the gradual movement towards a world without nuclear weapons.
Impartial assessment of the arms control proces s shows that both countries' nuclear potentials have
steadily diminished over the last 20 years. The START 1 treaty resulted in the removal of about 40% of
the nuclear weapons deployed in Russia and the USA while the 2010 New START treaty provided for their
further fourfold reduction. Substantial efforts have also been made by both countries to reduce the
likelihood of accidental nuclear launches due to unauthorised actions or misunderstandings: strategic
nuclear bombers were taken off full time alert and “Open ocean targeting" was mutually agreed,
meaning that in the event of an accidental launch, the missile would be diverted to land in the open
ocean.
Two other factors were contributing to the opening up of new opportunities in the Arctic: the emergence of
new technologies and rapid thawing of the Arctic ice, both rendering natural resources and shipping routes
more accessible. It should also be noted that the ice-cap depletion also has a military dimension, namely the
gradual increase of US multipurpose nuclear submarines and the deployment of missile defence AEGIS
warships in the Northern Seas may be considered by Russia as a threat to its national security.
Russia was the first Arctic state to adopt, in 2008, a long term policy report in response to the new
realities, it pointed to the Arctic region as a, “strategic resource base for the country" which would
require the development of a new social and economic infrastructure as well as an upgrading of military
presence in the region to safeguard the Arctic territory. The document however underlined that there
was no question of militarising the Arctic and expressed the importance of sub-regional and
international cooperation to form a favourable social, cultural and economic space.¶ All other Arctic
states have adopted similar strategies with the key common point being a statement that the
national interests of each Arctic state can only be met through multilateral cooperation.¶ A “race" for
territory, energy and seafood has been curtailed by historical decisions taken at the 2008 Ilulissat (Greenland)
meeting when five Arctic coastal states declared that their basic framework for future cooperation, territorial
delimitation, resolution of disputes and competing claims would be the UN Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS ).
No risk of war – empirics are conclusive
Hong 11
Nong, Postdoctoral fellow with the China Institute, University of Alberta, Deputy Director at the Research
Centre for Oceans Law and Policy, National Institute for the South China Sea Studies, ‘Arctic Energy:
Pathway to Conflict or Cooperation in the High North?’,
http://www.ensec.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=310:arctic-energy-pathway-toconflict-or-cooperation-in-the-high-north&catid=116:content0411&Itemid=375
While there are disagreements between the Arctic states on maritime boundaries, there are still
reasons to believe that these disagreements can be resolved amicably. The prospect for conflicts
relating to unresolved boundary disputes seems remote . The existing vehicles for dispute resolution
and cooperation in the region, UNCLOS and the Arctic Council, will also help to reduce tensions.
Joint management of resource fields is another option that might come into play as countries
involved in a dispute might see more advantage in approaching the disagreement this way rather
than losing a claim in an international tribunal. Cooperation between Norway and Iceland regarding
the development of the Dreki field could serve as a model for similar arrangements in the future.
Another example is the continental shelf dispute concerning an area rich in natural gas between
Russia and Norway in the Barents Sea. Both countries dispute the other's interpretation of where
their borders extend into the offshore EEZ. While it is possible that there could be a conflict between
the two countries over this area, it seems highly unlikely given the potential costs versus the potential
benefits. Geopolitical issues are not exclusively conflicts over interests, although such concerns tend to
dominate. They can also reflect cooperative, multilateral initiatives by which a state pursues its
interests vis-à-vis others. Such cooperative ventures are often considered desirable and even
unavoidable when a state is seeking a result that cannot be achieved unilaterally. At the same time,
cooperation frequently establishes a level of governance – in some cases formally, in others less formally
– by which mutual understanding can clarify intentions and help to build trust. Recognizing and
respecting each others rights constitutes the legal basis for cooperation between Arctic and nonArctic states. In accordance with UNCLOS and other relevant international laws, Arctic states have
sovereign rights and jurisdiction in their respective areas in the region, while non-Arctic states also
enjoy rights of scientific research and navigation. To develop a partnership of cooperation, Arctic and
non-Arctic states should, first and foremost, recognize and respect each other's rights under the international
law. Examples between Arctic and non-Arctic states are there. On 22 November 2010, the Sovcomflot
Group (SCF) and China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) signed a strategic long-term
cooperation agreement. The parties agreed to develop a long-term partnership in the sphere of
seaborne energy solutions, with the SCF fleet serving the continually growing Chinese imports of
hydrocarbons. Taking into account the significant experience gained by Sovcomflot in developing the
transportation of hydrocarbons in the Arctic seas, SCF and CNPC agreed upon the format for
coordination in utilizing the transportation potential of the Northern Sea Route along Russia’s
Arctic coast, both for delivering transit shipments of hydrocarbons and for the transportation of oil and gas
from Russia’s developing Arctic offshore fields to China. A new fleet of tankers designed to operate in ice
as well as additional heavy-duty ice breakers will be built to that end. South Korea´s Samsung
Industries is looking into filling the technological gap to make it possible to deliver Arctic natural
gas across the pacific ocean to East Asia. Russia is building massive duel-bowed oil tankers that are set to
come into use as soon as next year. While traveling forward, the ships move as they normally would through
open water. But when the vessels move backward, they can act as ice-breakers. Construction is underway on
two 70,000-tonne ships and two more 125,000 tonne ships and there are rumors that another five are on
order.
2nc – containment
Containment turns the case – based on perception
Troitsky 10
Mikhail Troitsky is an associate professor at the Department of International Relations and Russia’s Foreign
Policy of the MGIMO University. He holds a Doctorate in Political Science, 12/25/10, (“Containment Must
Be Overcome”, http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/Containment-Must-Be-Overcome-15078)//AW
Containment , especially when based on nuclear deterrence, was the main link in the vicious circle that
emerged in Russian-U.S. relations after World War II . The situation has changed dramatically since
then, but people’s mindsets have not – you can’t trust the one you seek to deter. The lack of mutual
trust makes it highly difficult to resolve conflicts.
COSTS OF CONTAINMENT
The containment strategy can freeze a conflict, but it cannot pave the way to its solution . Nuclear
deterrence represents existential confrontation. Realizing this, economically developed nations seek to
avoid a situation of containment (especially one involving nuclear weapons) in relations with any
significant economic partner. Potential commercial costs would be too high.
By containing each other, the U.S. and Russia strongly impede mutually advantageous bilateral
cooperation. The saga of Russia’s accession to the WTO, which has broken all records for the process’s
duration, is hard to explain by anything other than the West’s psychology of containing Moscow. The
refusal to sell the Opel car company to a Russian investor has shown that NATO member-countries are
reluctant to share their latest industrial technologies (and not only military ones) with countries that are their
opponents (at least potentially) in the military-political sphere. Mutual containment feeds mistrust,
prevents interaction in the field of modernization and impedes efforts to find effective solutions to
climate change, to work out a mutually advantageous regime for using transportation routes and natural
resources in the Arctic, etc.
History knows examples of states making large-scale economic exchanges between themselves without establishing socio-economic or political rapprochement (for example, the Soviet Union and
Finland during the Cold War). However, there have never been full-fledged economic relations between major powers containing each other. Strategic containment and overemphasis on the
maintenance of the nuclear balance is against the logic of interstate relations within the economically developed part of the international community and against the imperative of multilateral
cooperation in addressing the increasingly challenging global problems.
Today, this is well understood by China, for example. Beijing and Washington do not trust official declarations of mutual intentions in the military-political sphere. At the level of military planning, they
probably proceed from the assumption that in case of exacerbation of the Taiwan problem, for example, the parties will have to resort to the rhetoric of nuclear deterrence. However, now that the U.S.
accounts for about 15 percent of China’s trade, both Beijing and Washington are seeking to downplay the significance of potential nuclear deterrence.
Otherwise, economic cooperation with the United States, which is vital for China’s development, would directly depend on the parties’ perception of each other. In the event of a bitter confrontation
between the two countries, in which they would contain each other in the security sphere, the employment by U.S. companies of even civilian advanced technologies for the production of goods and the
provision of services in China would become a politicized issue. This would bury China’s hopes to maintain its economic growth rates and, consequently, social stability in the country.
Interstate relations within military-political alliances are the only sphere that guarantees against containment.
Yet the psychology of the zero-sum game between Moscow and Washington is not a direct
consequence of the fact that Russia is not a NATO member. The United States maintains close
partner relations with states that are not in a formal alliance with it and that often oppose
Washington on the international scene. These states include a wide range of different actors, from
European “neutrals,” China and India to some Middle East countries. Russia also has experience of long and
trustful interaction with countries that do not have formal allied relations with it. These include, for example,
large states in the Middle East, some European countries and Russia’s neighbors that are not parties to the
Collective Security Treaty Organization and that do not fully share Moscow’s position on military-political
issues.
A revision of the situation of mutual nuclear deterrence between Russia and the United States would not
necessarily mean that Moscow and Washington will reach full agreement on the dynamics of further arms
reductions. The renunciation of deterrence is not directly linked with the controversial “nuclear-free world”
project and does not require an immediate recognition that nuclear weapons are rather a threat to
international security than a factor of stability. As long as the parties are confident that the possession of
nuclear weapons is an indicator of prestige and a factor of influence in the contemporary world, nothing
prevents them from maintaining their nuclear arsenals at a level that they deem necessary and that they can
justify to the public from a financial point of view.
The deterrence problem is not technical but political and psychological. It is not even the number of
warheads and delivery vehicles the parties have that really matters, or the response time available to the
leaders of Russia or the United States to an impending nuclear attack. These issues are only secondary to the
perception by Moscow and Washington of each other as strategic rivals in the nuclear field. American
diplomat and disarmament expert James Goodby wrote in his book Europe Undivided: The New Logic of
Peace in U.S.-Russian Relations back in 2000 that it is desirable to exclude any nuclear conflict between
Russia and the United States from possible development scenarios for sub-rational reasons. The
parties must be kept from aggressive actions not by the awareness of huge material costs but shared
values.
Russian Arctic doctrine proves counterbalancing only causes war
Nilsen 13
Thomas Nilsen, Former Senior Fellow of Bellona Foundation’s Russian study group, editor of
BarentsObserver, 2/27/13, (“Danger of militarization of the Arctic exists”,
http://barentsobserver.com/en/security/2013/02/danger-militarization-arctic-exists-27-02)//AW
Putin made his speech at the expanded meeting of the Defense Ministry Board in Moscow, reviewing the
ministry’s work last year and examined plans for the Armed Forces’ continued development.
“ Methodical attempts are made to rock the strategic balance in one way or another . The US has
practically started the second stage of its plan to set up a global missile defense system and there are
probes into the possibility of NATO’s further eastward expansion. The danger of militarization of
the Arctic exists ,” Vladimir Putin said according to the transcripts posted at the presidential portal.
Russia has earlier communicated that the Arctic is an area with no military tension.
In his hardliner speech on Wednesday Putin urged Russia’s armed forces to continue reforms and
radical rearmament.
“Our task - to create a mobile, well-equipped armed forces ready to respond promptly and
adequately to any potential threats to peace, to protect our citizens, our allies, the future of our
nation and state,” Vladimir Putin said.
Russia is currently increasing its spending on military hardware.
“By 2015, the proportion of the new generation of weapons should be 30 percent, and by 2020 to reach 70100 percent,” Putin said.
Antarctic Bioresearch
1NC — Bio-Research
Bioprospecting regulations are illegal and lack of an enforcement mechanism tanks
solvency
Davis 2011, (Jason Davis has a ph.D in philosophy from Ohio State University, “Reconsidering Antarctic
Bioprospecting through Territorialities of Science, Property, and Governance”, [
https://etd.ohiolink.edu/ap/10?0::NO:10:P10_ETD_SUBID:73399 ] , //hss-RJ)
The question of whether or not bioprospecting activities in Antarctica violate the principles behind
the third article of the Antarctic Treaty is not a simple one to answer. In deconstructing the question, it
seems to assume that bioprospecting is an inherently scientific activity, which has not yet been established
solidly. If bioprospecting is to be considered a scientific activity, then scientists should take
responsibility for explaining and/or defending it as such. Scientists seem unable to fully commit to
this project, however, because bioprospecting is a hybrid activity that involves science, commerce,
and politics. Bioprospecting may be considered either exploitation-driven or technology-driven science in
the Jabour and Nicol typology mentioned earlier. As such, Antarctic scientists are seemingly faced with a
choice to either call for this form of science to be accepted, as part of the diverse postmodern typology of
sciences is accepted, or reformed to match more Mertonian expectations of science in Antarctica. These two
choices need not be considered mutually exclusive, however. Scientists could both accept bioprospecting
activities as a type of Antarctic science while at the same time engaging in efforts to tweak it to make it more
acceptable. Beyond the consideration of whether or not bioprospecting is science, there is the
complication that arises from the territorial focus that arises from Article Three's declaration that
observations and results from Antarctica should be shared. If bioprospecting research is conducted
on data derived from a sample library which includes Antarctic biota (such as the Census of
Antarctic Marine Life), but not conducted by scientists who have ever been to Antarctica, are the
observations and results of their research still considered to be from Antarctica? The ability for the
ATS or SCAR to control scientific research that is conducted outside of the territorial confines of
Antarctica is questionable. Whereas such organizations might find success excluding scientists from
returning to Antarctica if they violate expectations of scientific exchange, imposing penalties on
parties that might not even be under the jurisdiction of ATS member states presents a seemingly
insurmountable challenge.
Turn: the plan increases competition for extremophiles — that undermines Antarctic
cooperation and disincentivizes future research
Kirby 2004, (Alex Kirby is a BBC News Online environment correspondent, “Antarctica's resources 'at
risk'”,[ http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/3444753.stm] , //hss-RJ)
The UN University says "extremophiles", creatures adapted to life in the polar wastes, are being
relentlessly hunted in what is virtually a new gold rush. A successful search could uncover new drugs,
industrial compounds and some commercial applications, the UN says. It says the existing Antarctic Treaty
System cannot adequately regulate the possible consequences to Antarctica. The UN University's report, The
International Regime For Bioprospecting: Existing Policies And Emerging Issues For Antarctica, is published
by its Institute of Advanced Studies, based in Tokyo, Japan. Survival mysteries The publication comes a week
before the start of a meeting on 9 February of the UN's Convention on Biological Diversity in Kuala
Lumpur, Malaysia. Extremophiles comprise principally bacteria, which have the remarkable ability to
thrive in conditions that would be hazardous to other lifeforms - extremes of temperature, radiation,
salinity, and metal toxicity. These organisms, which have fundamentally different metabolisms to normal
microbes, are found in hydrothermal vents on the deep-ocean floor and in rocks and springs hundreds of
metres below the surface of the Earth. Understanding their biology may lead scientists to tap new energy
sources and make novel drugs. But it is the race to find and exploit the microbes that can survive in the
very cold, dry or salty conditions of Antarctica that is raising particular concern for the UN
University. Its report says the search to unlock the secrets of these lifeforms' success could be a
repeat of the 19th Century's gold rush, a free-for-all to find and patent new cancer treatments,
antibiotics and industrial products. Dr A H Zakri, the institute's director, said: "Biological prospecting
for extremophiles is already occurring and is certain to accelerate in Antarctica and the Southern
Ocean. "This report suggests that efforts to exploit this new frontier are now threatening to outpace the
capacity of national and international law to regulate... ownership of genetic materials, the issuing of patents...
and the potential environmental consequences of harvesting these resources." However, it is not just
bacteria that are being targeted. Higher lifeforms are being investigated, too. One promising
discovery is a glycoprotein which prevents Antarctic fish from freezing. It could help fish farmers,
extend the shelf life of frozen food, improve surgery and tissue transplants, and make plants more tolerant of
freezing. Other Antarctic discoveries include an extract from green algae for use in cosmetic skin treatment,
and anti-tumour properties in a strain of yeast. New era of competition The report says Antarctic
bioprospecting so far has usually been the work of consortia of public and private bodies, like
universities and pharmaceutical companies. It says: "This has made it difficult to draw a clear line
between scientific research and commercial activities." Sam Johnston, the report's co-author, says
the Antarctic Treaty System, the main international agreement governing activity on the continent,
does not specifically regulate bioprospecting. He told BBC News Online: " The search for
extremophiles threatens the hallmarks of Antarctic scientific research, its transparency and
cooperation . "We're not saying there's much danger of environmental damage, but it does pose a challenge.
"It's likely to inhibit scientists in the future, and companies will be less interested in working in the
Antarctic because there won't be any clarity over who owns what."
Turn — bioprospecting wrecks Antarctic biodiversity — that turns the case
Slobodian et al. 2010, (*Lydia Slobodian is an emerging legal professional in the field of international
environmental law. In 2012 she graduated magna cum laude from Georgetown University Law Center,
where she focused on international law, environmental law, trade law, the supreme court and the federal
system, and legal philosophy. She is currently working as a visiting attorney at the Environmental Law
Institute, **Rémy Kinna was a researcher in the Global Governance of International Watercourses at
UNESCO Centre for Water Law, Policy and Science and is currently Humanitarian Program Management
Coordinator (East Asia) at Oxfam Australia, ***Alphonse Kambu holds a doctorate in law with specific
emphasis on environmental law and policy from Chiba University in Japan. Prior to joining UNEPs Division
of Environmental Law and Conventions (DELC) as a Legal Officer, he was Director of Ishikawa
International Cooperation Research Center, a Special Programme of the United Nations University Institute
of Advanced Studies (UNU-IAS), which is now the International Operating Unit of UNU-IAS that he was
instrumental in establishing. Before that he worked with IUCN-The World Conservation Union as an IUCNFord Foundation Fellow and taught at the Tokyo Management College and various other universities in
Japan. ****Lara Ognibene is a legal officer at the United Nations Environmental Programme,
“Bioprospecting In The Global Commons: Legal Issues Brief”, [
http://www.unep.org/delc/Portals/119/Biosprecting-Issuepaper.pdf ] , //hss-RJ)
Bioprospecting has the added potential to cause negative impacts on delicate ecosystems of the
deep seabed and Antarctica. In situ experiments in and around the Deep Seabed can introduce light
and noise or change water temperature, which, in-turn, can affect pro-creation and the survival of
organisms in these areas. Bioprospecting activities can also produce pollution in the form of debris
or discharge from vessels and equipment. Additionally, inadvertent movement of organisms through
disrupting currents or discarding of scientific samples can lead to biological contamination. Finally,
there is the usual possibility of over-exploitation in harvesting organisms in these regions and the
flow on environmental impacts. Yet, this aspect is unclear due to the lack of information about ecosystems
in these marine habitats. In this respect, the precautionary principle7 would seemingly apply to any future
environmental regulations developed to govern bioprospecting activities in the High Seas and Antarctica. The
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (‘the Assessment’) est- mates that the current and projected future impact
of bioprospecting on ecosystems is low, because the amount of material that needs to be harvested is
normally small.8 The Assessment also states that there is a strong synergy between biodiversity preservation
and bioprospecting, since the latter benefits from preserving the former. However, it warns that great
uncertainty remains about the potential impact of bioprospecting activities. As the projected impact is
minimal, although uncertain, bioprospecting does not presently implicate provisions of international
agree¬ments which regulate actions likely to have serious adverse environmental impacts in the commons.
The legal implications of any potential environmental impacts from bioprospecting are not explored in detail
through this issue brief, but must be a consideration for decision-makers in drafting future laws and policies
to regulate this activity. materials between States, particularly for developing nations. Additionally, there are
no clear guidelines on the environmental standards bioprospecting expeditions must meet. The
content and interplay between the existing laws governing bioprospecting in the High Seas and Antarctica are
examined below, along with the legal gaps and uncertainties this exposes in the current framework.
Status quo solves — massive Antarctic bioprospecting research happening now
UNU-IAS 2007, (The United Nations University - Institute of Advanced Studies (UNU-IAS) is amongst
the newest in the network of research and training centres within the UNU system. The UNU-IAS mission is
to undertake research and postgraduate education on issues at the forefront of knowledge, policy
development and learning, “Biological Prospecting in Antarctica: Review, Update and Proposed Tool to
Support a Way Forward”, [ http://www.unep.org/dewa/Portals/67/pdf/Atcm30_ip067_e.pdf ] , //HSS-RJ)
Molecules derived from nature, particularly those produced by plants and microorganisms, have an excellent
record of providing novel chemical structures for development as new pharmaceuticals. The screening of
microbes, such as bacteria and fungi, continues to represent an important route to the discovery of novel
bioactive and therapeutic chemicals. Of increasing interest is the evaluation of the potential of lesser-known
and/or new microbial taxa. Microorganisms represent the largest reservoir of undescribed biodiversity, and
hence possess the greatest potential for the discovery of new products of commercial interest. Although
much still remains to be known about Antarctic microbes, an increasing number of new Antarctic
microorganisms are being described, particularly from marine environments (sea ice seawater), but
also from the lakes, terrestrial biotopes and the cryosphere4 5 6 . New species and genera from
diverse bacterial phyla are being found. More recently, the diversity of fungal taxa, as well as
microalgae and small invertebrates, have started to be investigated and new strains are being
isolated. Antarctic terrestrial environments have also been found to be a rich source of both novel
species and rare genera of Actinobacteria. Many of the novel Antarctic bacterial species belong to genera
with very strong track records for producing pharmaceutically active compounds (e.g. Streptomyces,
Nocardia, and Micromonospora).7 At present, genomic information on Antarctic species is limited mainly to
a number of fish species and microbes. However, an increasing number of Antarctic genomics projects
are being funded and will significantly increase the amount of molecular information available on a
much wider range of species in the near future. For example, genome information exists for
psychrophilic organisms isolated from Antarctica. Recent discoveries of note include, for example,
the demonstrated ability of two microbes of the type Archae to form a chemically linked unit called a
biofilm, enabling them to survive and multiply in cold conditions. A basic examination of published
research relating to extremophiles in the Antarctic reveals that a wide variety of research activities
have been carried out. The journal Extremophiles, and international journal edited by Springer10,
has published 21 articles relating to novel discoveries from Antarctic extremophiles between 1999
and 2007. Much of this research relates to the characterization of cold-adapted bacteria, genes, proteins and
enzymes from Antarctica. Specimens have been collected from a variety of Antarctic environments, including
Antarctic seawater, marine sediments, sea ice, mineral soils and inland waters. In addition, Antarctic fish and
plants have been a focus of genetic research. Other examples include a screening for antimicrobial activities in
723 bacteria from 24 lineages (alpha, beta and gamma Proteobacteria, Cytophaga-Flavobacterium-Bacteroides
branch, and the high and low percentage G+C Gram-positives), as well as in 158 fungal strains from
Antarctic lakes’ microbial mats11. The Antarctic Bibliography component of the Cold Regions
Bibliography project12 provides a comprehensive source of literature relating to Antarctica. A quick
search of this database turned up 9 articles relating to research on Antarctic microbes, 200 related to
the genes of Antarctic organisms, and over a thousand relating to bacteria. This basic literature
search demonstrates the volume of scientific research being carried out. This point is also underscored
by the formation, in 2002, of the International Society for Extremophiles (ISE), which aims to exchange
information and experience between scientists in the rapidly growing field of research on extremophiles13. In
addition, a number of universities have research programmes carrying out research in Antarctic
extremophiles14. Of interest is also the work of the Institute for Genomic Research (TIGR), which reports
that the establishment of an Antarctic Microbial Observatory is in progress. The considerable amount of
extremophile research discussed above may demonstrate a growing interest in the novel genetic
resources of extremophiles, and in the potential commercial applications of those genetic resources.
Previous documents considered by the ATCM pointed out the difficulty in distinguishing between purely
scientific research and commercial ventures. Much of the basic scientific research relating to extremophiles
may produce commercial applications in the future, even though the purpose of that research may have been
primarily scientific. In the past, many companies have cited the lack of baseline information about Antarctic
biodiversity, and in particular on Antarctic genetic resources, as an impediment to investing resources in
commercially-oriented research in Antarctica. This knowledge base is now growing, though is yet far from
complete. The volume of increase in research may, however, soon result in lessening some of the
cited knowledge-related impediments to bioprospecting in Antarctica.
2NC Solvency
No solvency — US involvement prevents international consensus and commercial interests
block regulations.
Warner 2008, (Dr. Robin Warner is an Associate Professor at the Australian National Centre for Ocean
Resources and Security. She was formerly the Assistant Secretary of the International Crime Branch of the
Criminal Justice Division in the Commonwealth Attorney General’s Department from 2002 to 2006. During
that period Dr. Warner led twelve Australian delegations to bilateral and multilateral delegations on
transnational crime and criminal justice cooperation issues. Previously she served with the Royal Australian
Navy as a legal officer. During her Defence Force legal career, Captain Warner occupied a wide range of
positions including Director of International Law for the ADF and Deputy Director of Naval Legal Services.
From 1996 to 2001, she was a member of several Australian delegations to multilateral and bilateral
negotiations on Indonesia’s archipelagic sea lanes proposal and to the UN Informal Consultative Process on
the Oceans. Dr. Warner holds a Bachelor of Arts (Honours) and LLB from the University of Sydney and a
Master of International Law degree from the Australian National University. She graduated as a PhD from
the University of Sydney in November 2006. Her PhD research concerned the international law framework
for protection of the marine environment and conservation of marine biodiversity beyond national
jurisdiction. She is the author of Protecting the Oceans Beyond National Jurisdiction: Strengthening the
International Law Framework (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 2009), editor (with Simon Marsden) of
Transboundary Environmental Governance: Inland, Marine and Coastal Perspectives (Ashgate Publishers,
Farnham, Surrey, 2012), editor (with Clive Schofield) of Climate Change and the Oceans: Gauging the Legal
and Policy Currents in the Asia Pacific and Beyond (Edward Elgar Publishers, Cheltenham, UK, 2012) and
has published numerous articles in international peer reviewed journals and chapters in books on
international law and policy. Dr. Warner is a member of some key professional bodies including the IUCN
Commission of Environmental Law (Oceans, Coasts and Coral Reefs Group), the Scientific Advisory Board
of the Institute of Marine and Antarctic Studies, University of Tasmania, Australian and New Zealand Society
of International Law and the Asian Society of International Law. She is the Australian Vice President of the
NZ and Australian Armed Forces Law Association, “Protecting the diversity of the depths: environmental
regulation of bioprospecting and marine scientific research beyond national jurisdiction”, [
http://ro.uow.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1178&context=lawpapers ] , * ISA = International
Seabed Authority //hss-RJ)
Notwithstanding these benefits, the proposal to expand the ISA’s mandate would have some significant legal
and political hurdles to overcome. Under the current provisions of the LOSC and customary
international law, resources of the high seas water column and those resources of the deep seabed
which are not mineral resources are subject to an open access regime. Political agreement to include
these resources in the common heritage of mankind and to regulate their access through a global
body such as the ISA would be difficult to obtain particularly as there are already substantial
commercial interests involved in their exploitation.72 The political obstacles to obtaining international
agreement on expansion of the Part XI regime may be even more intractable now, in an international climate
where ideologies of free trade and non intervention in market forces are predominant motifs.73 The
involvement of the United States in bioprospecting activities and its acknowledged reservations to
the Part XI regime do not augur well for the achievement of international consensus on an
expanded mandate for the ISA. Another complication adverted to by Leary is the difficulty of
distinguishing bioprospecting activities from marine scientific research and the categorisation of
marine scientific research as a freedom of the high seas under the LOSC. 74 While the ISA has the
right to carry out marine scientific research concerning the Area and its resources, States Parties and their
research institutions have equal freedom to carry out marine scientific research in the Area provided that it is
carried out for peaceful purposes and that they cooperate with the ISA in developing research programmes,
training the personnel of developing countries and effectively disseminating the results of their research and
analysis through the ISA or other international channels.75 In the absence of appropriate amendments to
Parts XI and XIII of the LOSC, the ISA would have no regulatory powers in relation to marine scientific
research activities which were also bioprospecting activities.76 In addition, Leary notes that recent statements
from member States of the ISA and the Secretary General of the ISA indicate a lack of support for extension
of its mandate to bioprospecting activities.77
2NC Enviro Turn
Bioprospecting wrecks deep-sea biodiversity — disrupts local ecosystems
Warner 2008, (Dr. Robin Warner is an Associate Professor at the Australian National Centre for Ocean
Resources and Security. She was formerly the Assistant Secretary of the International Crime Branch of the
Criminal Justice Division in the Commonwealth Attorney General’s Department from 2002 to 2006. During
that period Dr. Warner led twelve Australian delegations to bilateral and multilateral delegations on
transnational crime and criminal justice cooperation issues. Previously she served with the Royal Australian
Navy as a legal officer. During her Defence Force legal career, Captain Warner occupied a wide range of
positions including Director of International Law for the ADF and Deputy Director of Naval Legal Services.
From 1996 to 2001, she was a member of several Australian delegations to multilateral and bilateral
negotiations on Indonesia’s archipelagic sea lanes proposal and to the UN Informal Consultative Process on
the Oceans. Dr. Warner holds a Bachelor of Arts (Honours) and LLB from the University of Sydney and a
Master of International Law degree from the Australian National University. She graduated as a PhD from
the University of Sydney in November 2006. Her PhD research concerned the international law framework
for protection of the marine environment and conservation of marine biodiversity beyond national
jurisdiction. She is the author of Protecting the Oceans Beyond National Jurisdiction: Strengthening the
International Law Framework (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 2009), editor (with Simon Marsden) of
Transboundary Environmental Governance: Inland, Marine and Coastal Perspectives (Ashgate Publishers,
Farnham, Surrey, 2012), editor (with Clive Schofield) of Climate Change and the Oceans: Gauging the Legal
and Policy Currents in the Asia Pacific and Beyond (Edward Elgar Publishers, Cheltenham, UK, 2012) and
has published numerous articles in international peer reviewed journals and chapters in books on
international law and policy. Dr. Warner is a member of some key professional bodies including the IUCN
Commission of Environmental Law (Oceans, Coasts and Coral Reefs Group), the Scientific Advisory Board
of the Institute of Marine and Antarctic Studies, University of Tasmania, Australian and New Zealand Society
of International Law and the Asian Society of International Law. She is the Australian Vice President of the
NZ and Australian Armed Forces Law Association, “Protecting the diversity of the depths: environmental
regulation of bioprospecting and marine scientific research beyond national jurisdiction”, [
http://ro.uow.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1178&context=lawpapers ] , //hss-RJ)
Exploration activities related to deep seabed ecosystems are described in a 2005 United Nations
University/Institute of Advanced Studies (UNU/IAS) report on “Bioprospecting of Genetic Resources in the
Deep Seabed: Scientific, Legal and Policy Aspects” as “scattered, small scale, independent research activities
and programmes ongoing in many universities and research institutions in the world” which while not directly
commercially oriented represent the backbone of any commercial application of deep seabed genetic
resources as they generate the necessary scientific information for bioprospecting. 27 The report contains
several examples of joint public and private ventures involved in deep seabed exploration which operate at
the interface of research and development, linking research activities with the development of products and
processes.28 The majority of research cruises to the deep sea are conducted by state sponsored
operators but there are now numerous examples of the results of such cruises being shared by state
research institutions with commercial enterprises under joint venture agreements.29 The list of
patents involving genetic resources from the deep seabed is steadily growing and reveals increasing
potential for sustained commercial interest and investment in this use of the deep seabed which has
already eclipsed current commercial interest in mining for deep seabed minerals.30 Bioprospecting,
while not as invasive as deep seabed mineral exploration, does entail physical disturbance, alteration
and introduction of alien elements to deep sea habitats.31 Current deep sea research projects,
principally on hydrothermal vent sites, have progressed beyond simple observation of the benthic
fauna from manned or remotely controlled submersible vessels to actual sampling of the fauna and
faunal infrastructure and installation of scientific instruments in the deep seabed environment to
record experimental observations on a regular basis.32 As well as disturbing the physical habitat,
research vessels and scientific equipment also introduce light and different noise patterns into the
fragile deep sea environment and may discharge marine pollutants and alien biological material into
the previously pristine environment of the deep seabed.33 The negative impact of frequent research
expeditions on particular deep seabed sites and the potential for conflicting or incompatible research
activities which duplicate adverse effects on fragile deep sea sites has also been noted by scientists
and other commentators.34 The absence of compulsory environmental protection measures such as
environmental baseline data collection, ongoing environmental impact assessment of sampling sites
and impact reference zones could result in substantial loss of deep seabed biodiversity over time .35
Scientists involved in deep sea research have developed some voluntary protocols to reduce the negative
impacts of their research on the deep seabed environment including requests to the global scientific
community to consider certain deep seabed sites as scientific reserves and voluntary codes of conduct which
seek to minimise adverse effects on the environment and to coordinate deep seabed research to reduce the
occurrence of simultaneous expeditions to deep seabed sites and conflicting use of these sites.36 As
bioprospecting activities are currently intermingled with marine scientific research, these initiatives have the
dual purpose of reducing the adverse effects of both bioprospecting and marine scientific research activities
on the deep sea environment.