Davidson, Deception and Division.
138
1. Not clear there is any irrationality unless we can find irrationality,
inconsistency, within the agent.
2. But, when we find this, we explain it away, and so it is not irrationality.
Note: This is the dilemma mentioned at the end of 'Paradoxes.'
If we find
real inconsistency, then people are not rational, and we cannot attribute
anything.
If, we find inconsistency, we tend to explain it away to avoid this.
3. Self-deception often requires us to say:
a. somone believes x and not x.
b. and, one supports the other.
4. People believe things like 'I am bald' and 'I am not bald' and one belief
supports the other, but people do not put them together.
139
1. Usually, there is evidence on either side, so conflict; x is probable, and not x
is less probable.
2. We are inclined toward one side.
3. So, we ignore the other.
4. Notice, this is like akrasia (but not it)
Akrasia is forming an intention on
less than all the reasons 'you recognize' as relevant:
a. reasons for and against doing x
b. judges x better
c. does not x intentionally.
5. He goes against own better judgement.
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Note: Davidson notes that what must be explained is why he goes against
better judgement.
6. Weakness of Will (akrasia) sins against 'do always what you judge best to
do,' the Principle of Continence.
7. This principle is a fundamental principle of personal consistency.
rationality too.
Of
We all use it.
140
1. Now, Weakness and Self Deception are not the same.
a. Outcome of weakness, intention or act; outcome of self- deception,
is a belief.
2. Now weakness of will like weakness of warrant.
3. Warrant:
a. person has evidence for and against x.
b. says x is more probable.
c. believes not x.
4. Sins against Principle of total evidence.
5. That is, believe hypothesis best supported by total evidence.
6. Weakness of warrant, then says x is more probable, via total evidence, but
believes not x.
7. Hence the sin.
8. Now, though weakness of will and weakness of warrant have the same
logical structure, will is a conflict between values, and warrant is a conflict
between beliefs.
9. Will product, an irrational intention.
belief.
2
Warrant product, an irrational
141
1. Now, for weakness of the warrant to occur, the evidence of totality, must
be taken to be evidence.
2. Now of course people do follow the total evidence principle without being
able to articulate it.
3. Criterion for this, is just that we follow it habitually, and so to deviate is
odd.
Note. Or, I assume the same for Will.
x.
Then do not x.
judgements.
We must truly judge x better than not
That is, we must have taken the judgements to be
And, to follow this principle, is just to do it all the time.
142
1. It is harder to interpret inner inconsistency.
2. For, the more different we are, the less basis there is for interpretation.
We need a background of norms for interpret.
3. Beliefs and Desires of other understood iff:
a. one person can assign beliefs and desires to other.
b. but beliefs proceed holistically.
c. so, a belief stands in relation to thousands of others.
d. so, when one person attributes beliefs, he must be able,
in
attributing, to attribute thousands of others.
e. but, this means: he must be able to replicate the
outlines
of
his beliefs, as a background in the other.
4. In other words, this must go: establish background first, then attribution of
individuals.
5. This all means that the norms are there first.
They must be.
don't want to use term 'inner,' for it is misleading.
3
So, we
Much of the inner is
already set.
6. No question of accepting the norms.
Note: This means that inner inconsistency will not occur at a radical inner
level.
It will occur at a level we can understand.
7. Self deception includes weakness of warrent.
8. But goes beyond it.
a. must have a 'reason' for weakness of warrent.
b. must be active, do it himself.
143
1. Example: Wishful thinking.
Believing x because you wish x were true.
2. It is irrational iff: we know there are reasons for the belief, but the only
reason we hold the belief is because of the wish.
3. If someone wants x true, we assume they would enjoy x being true.
4. But, a reason to believe, a motive, is not a reason for thinking x is true.
5. So, irrational iff, there are reasons for x, which are required for the belief
in x, and you know that this is the case, but you believe in x anyway, only on
a wish.
Note: Little section here on how wishful thinking need not be irrational.
144
1. Only self deception requires intervention by agent.
2. Though, in both wish think. and self dec., there is an evaluative element.
3. Still, wish thinking often passive; only self deception active.
4. Wishful thinking, on the one hand, always ends up where it wants: with a
positive belief, that it set out to.
5. Self deception, is often painful.
Jealously, etc.
4
Pessimism.
Note:
So
there
are
two
differences
here.
Active/Passive.
And
Positive/Negative.
145
1. Definition, then of self deception.
a. x more likely true, than not.
b. he, deceiver, has evidence of this.
c. the thought that x is true (perhaps unpleasant) is a
motive
for
believing not x is true.
d. perhaps he just misdirects attention from x.
e. or, looks to refute x.
f. or, looks to support not x.
1. so, motive comes from belief x is true.
2. acts to negate x.
3. act is done 'with intention to produce belief that not x.'
g. state that motivates the self deception, x, and that which produces
self deception, not x, coexist.
h. usually, that which motivates, x, actually causes and sustains, the not
x.
i. so, self deception is 'self induced' weakness of warrant.
j. this often is motivate by wishes, so self deception is often wishful
thinking.
Note: So, there is warrant, in that, self deception is self induced weakness of
warrant.
It is a strong case of warrant then.
There is wishful thinking, in
that, often (but not always) self deception just is a strong case of wishful
thinking.
E.g. I self deceive myself into thinking I am a genius.
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2. But how to explain a belief in x, sustaining a belief in not x?
3. Say the belief that I am fat, sustaining the belief that not fat?
4. We must find a point in the series of mental states, where there is a cause
that is not a reason.
146
1. Carlos driving.
Carlos is going to fail, most likely.
There is a glimmer of
hope.
2. Thoughts of failure painful.
3. So, he pushes them into background.
4. But, they motivate thoughts that he will pass.
5. Irrationality, here, a process.
6. Belief that failure, is, continually supporting success.
7. It holds success in place.
8. Now, Carlos can believe failure and success, x and not x, but not when the
contradiction is obvious.
9. Agents keep propositions apart, in mind.
10. There are, thus, boundaries, which are but conceptual, in the mind.
11. There are overlapping territories.
Like Venn diagrams perhaps.
12. The contradictory beliefs do not belong to the same territory.
13. Agents cannot 'survey whole' to see all; we cannot erase our boundaries.
14. So irrationality enters at the irrational step.
That step is where
something, of course is a motive but not a reason for belief.
15. At this time, I assume, we wall off the requirement of total evidence, and
bypass it.
14. And, this step draws a boundary.
Which is thereafter set in stone.
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