University of Warwick
Department of Economics
EC9B6 – Topics in Political Economy
Voting and Communication
Prof. Francesco Squintani
This mini-course in voting theory and applications of communication games to political
economy will take place over 10 lectures of 1 hour and 15 minutes, (15 hour blocks of
50 minutes). The aim of this course is twofold. First, we will provide the students with
the knowledge of fundamentals of voting theory and of applications of communication
games to political economy. Second, we will present in details some frontier research
topics. The frontier research topics may be the basis to develop PhD dissertation
proposals. The last lecture is devoted to open research ideas that can be addressed
using the knowledge built during the mini-course. Knowledge of PhD level mathematics
is required to attend.
Lecture 1.
Downsian Elections, Ideological Parties and Citizen Candidates
Lecture 2.
Probabilistic Voting and Ideological Parties
Lecture 3.
Electoral Pandering and Welfare
Lecture 4.
Activism and Polarization
Lecture 5.
Strategic Communication and Political Debate
Lecture 6.
Leadership and Advice
Lecture 7.
Optimal Governments
Lecture 8.
Party Debate and Factions, Engagement and Exit
Lecture 9.
Communication Hierarchies
Lecture 10.
Open Research Ideas
Readings
L1.
A. Downs (1957): An Economic Theory of Democracy, New York: Harper and Row.
M. Osborne and A. Slivinski (1996): “A Model of Political Competition with
Citizen-Candidates,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 111(1): 65-96.
T. Besley and S. Coate (1997), “An Economic Model of Representative
Democracy,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112: 85-114.
L2.
D. Wittman (1983): “Candidate Motivation: A Synthesis of Alternatives,”
American Political Science Review, 77: 142-157.
Calvert Randall (1985): “Robustness of the Multidimensional Voting Model:
Candidate Motivations, Uncertainty, and Convergence,” American Journal of
Political Science, 29:69-95.
D. Bernhardt, J. Duggan and F. Squintani (2009): “The Case for Responsible
Parties”, American Political Science Review, 103(4): 570-587.
L3.
N. Kartik, F. Squintani and K. Tinn (2012): “Information Revelation and
Pandering in Elections”, mimeo, Columbia University.
L4.
R. Venkatesh (2014): “A Model of Election Activism, Mobilization and
Polarization”, mimeo, University of Warwick.
L5.
Vincent P. Crawford and Joel Sobel (1982): “Strategic Information Transmission”,
Econometrica 50(6): 1431-1451.
A. Galeotti, C. Ghiglino, F. Squintani (2013): “Strategic Information Transmission
Networks”, Journal of Economic Theory, 148(5), 1751–1769.
L6.
T. Dewan and F. Squintani (2013): “Leadership, Judgment and Trustworthy
Associates”, mimeo, University of Warwick.
L7.
T. Dewan, A. Galeotti, C. Ghiglino and F. Squintani (2014): “Information
Aggregation and Optimal Selection of the Executive”, American Journal of Political
Science, forthcoming.
J. Patty (2014): “A Theory of Cabinet-Making: The Politics of Inclusion, Exclusion,
and Information,” mimeo, Washington University at St. Louis.
L8.
T. Dewan and F. Squintani (2015): “In Defence of Party Factions”, American
Journal of Political Science, forthcoming.
E.M. Penn (2015): “Engagement, Disengagement, or Exit: A Theory of Intergroup
Communication and Association,” American Journal of Political Science,
forthcoming.
L9.
D. Migrow (2015): “Designing Communication Hierarchies to Elicit Information”,
mimeo, University of Warwick.