Assignment 2 of “Theory of Knowledge”
March 30, 2015
Kenzo Fujisue
(Approximately 1530 words).
Q. What is the epistemic externalism/internalism distinction? Which view is preferable,
do you think? Defend your answer.
1.
Epistemic Externalism and Internalism Distinction
In terms of epistemological knowledge, Plato proposed that knowledge needs
justification for true belief. Justification is possession of good reasons for thinking that
what one believes is true. This Justified True Belief (JTB) is the classical account of
knowledge in epistemology.
Then, Gettier pointed out the problem on this JTB proposition and made the definition
of JTB be developed. This means that there is possibility of knowledge overcoming JTB.
According to Gettier problem, two theories, internalism and externalism, occured, The
justification performed only in one’s epistemic standing is internalism and the
justification performed in one’s epistemic standing depending on factors outside one’s
control. In addition, distinction between internalism and externalism has conception of
deontic or non-deontic. The deontic conception is a form of epistemic internalism and the
non-deontic conception is a form of epistemic externalism.
In terms of internalism, one’s epistemic standing could be one’s bodily states, one’s brain
states, one’s mental states or one’s reflectively accessible states1. Taking internal states
as either reflectively accessible states is known as accessibility internalism and taking
internal states as mental states is known as mentalist internalism2.
In terms of externalism, whether one recognizes justification grounds of belief or not has
no relationship with the propriety of justification of the belief. Reliabilism is one type of
externalism. When the justification process reliability and the probability of processing
to the truth is high, the belief can be justified. Reliabilism emphasizes the truthconduciveness of a belief-forming process, method, or other epistemologically relevant
factor3. According to reliabilism, whether process of belief forming can be reliable or not
Poston, T. “Internalism and Externalism in Epistemology” Internet Encyclopedia of
Philosophy. http://www.iep.utm.edu/int-ext/#SH1c
2 “Epistemology” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, First published Wed Dec 14,
2005. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology/
3 Goldman, Alvin, “Reliabilism” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, First published
Mon Apr 21, 2008. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reliabilism/
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is criterion and whether perceiver recognize one’s belief true or not is not criterion.
Externalism is formed in a causal requirement to justification. One’s belief that p is
produced by a reliable method4.
Epistemic justification of internalism is deontic. Deontic process is internal and
internalism needs closer connection between epistemic rationality and epistemic
responsibility for justification. Internalism deny justification that is externally true but
has no rationality or responsibility.
2.
Externalism and Internalism Debate (I-E Debate)
In this context, I-E debate leads to deeper thinking on epistemic rationality,
responsibility, justification and knowledge. I understand that the I-E debate especially
focused on the rule of justification on knowledge5.
To deal with Gettier problem, Alvin Goldman 6 (1976) offered the causal theory of
knowing. This means “S knows that p, if and only if the fact p is causally connected in
an “appropriate” way with S‘s believing p.”7 According to the casual theory of knowing,
justification of true belief needs appropriate causal connection fact and belief. This
casual connection exists out of one’s epistemic standing and cannot always be recognized
by one’s epistemic standing. True belief must be justified, externally objective
justification is sufficient for knowledge and employing one’s epistemic virtue is not
necessary as the chicken-sexer case.
Internalisim criticizes externalism from two viewpoints; 1) Externalism overlooks core
of justification concept. Even we are able to explain the institution and perception in the
causal theory, it is not possible to explain the propositional knowledge by the causal
theory (I naturally think “from the fact ‘P’, there perception ‘p’ occurs causally and
proposition knowledge of "s" occurs causally from the perception ‘p’.) and as a result, 2)
Justification becomes irresponsible. According to internalism, "Justification is
deontological: it is a matter of duty-fulfillment. But duty-fulfillment is internal.
Therefore, justification is internal."8 For examples, in the movie of Matrix (the brain-in-
“Epistemology” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, First published Wed Dec 14,
2005. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology/
5 Pappas, G. “Internalist vs. Externalist Conceptions of Epistemic Justification”,
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, First published Mon Jan 24, 2005; substantive
revision Fri Aug 8, 2014
6 Goldman, Alvin, “Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge’’, The Journal of
Philosophy, 1976, p.773.
7 http://www.iep.utm.edu/epi-luck/
8 “Epistemology” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, First published Wed Dec 14,
2005. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology/
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the-vat), Thomas Anderson believed that he is living in the world justified by the way
that Thomas justified. Thomas is living internally the same world as Thomas percept
but his external world is quite different from his internal world. In this case, Thomas
can never justified his belief externally and just internal world can justify his beliefs.
Externalisim criticizes internalism from four viewpoints; 1) Internalism needs one’s
deontic process for justification and one should be able to control belief internally.
However, belief is beyond one’s epistemic standing (one’s will) and the deontic
justification cannot exist. 2) Internalism’s justification depends just on one’s internal
epistemic standing and false belief can be justified as knowledge. For example, in the
movie of The Trueman Show, Trueman’s environment/world is controlled by a TV
producer and Trueman can have internally true knowledge but externally/really false
knowledge. 3) When true belief should be justified by one’s epistemic standing internally,
justification should be justified infinitely as Agrippa trilemma, 4) Children and
especially animals can have some perceive knowledge without internal justification. In
conclusion, internal justification of true belief has possibility of an infinite chain of
justification, untrue belief and meaningless justification9.
Furthermore, reliabilists deny the justification of one's internal beliefs depending on
mental states but accept those on memorial and perceptual faculties, as reliable beliefforming process. If one's belief sources are reliable, justification cannot always be
recognized on reflection. Therefore, reliabilists reject access internalism.
As a result of above I-E debate, in terms of justification, there is clear conceptual
difference between internalism and externalism but I think that either of internalsim or
externalism cannot definite justification completely. This is because the justification
conditions of both internalism and externalism are not stable and various types.
Therefore both became to have many types of theories (reliablism, evidentialism,
mentalism, accessiblism, and so on). For example, concept reliability of externalism is
related to those of rationality and evidence of internalism. Therefore, in my opinion,
internalism and externalism does not seem to be completely different.
3.
Conclusion
I think that we should classify knowledge with scientific knowledge, moral knowledge
and religious knowledge when we debate internalism and externalism.
And I believe that scientific knowledge including mathematical knowledge is guided by
Pappas, G. “Internalist vs. Externalist Conceptions of Epistemic Justification”,
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, First published Mon Jan 24, 2005; substantive
revision Fri Aug 8, 2014
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natural law, basis of other types of knowledge and very important for economic and
industrial progress.
In terms of scientific knowledge, externalism seems to be suitable. Reasons are
followings,
1) For sceintifc knowledge, sharing knowledge with others is very important becaue
scientific knowledge must be proved by other out standings (scientists) and will be
used for industry and economy in cooperation with others. Law of gravitation and
law of quantum mechanics are useful and workable without one’s internal
justification. This concept is suitable to animals’ knowledge. Animals cannot justify
their perceptual knowledge but can use their knowledge for their living.
2) Scientific justification is different from those of religious knowledge and moral
knowledge. Scientific knowledge must be objective and is not necessary to be deontic,
prudent or moral. Therefore, scientific knowledge does not always need mental
internalism and accessible internalism to ensure the objectivity. For example, the
fact of the sun rising from west is justified both internally and externally but external
justification of gravity law justified externally is generic and more useful for us.
3) The chicken sexers can distinguish between male and female correctly without
understanding of reasons. In this case, belief is justified by just externally not
internally. In addition, in the case of the good thermometer, the good thermometer
can measure reliably correct temperature and measured temperature is justified
externally not internally. Also, internal justification is not necessary
On the other hand, religious knowledge seems to more depend on internalism than
scientific knowledge, in my opinion. Religious knowledge’s arguments are focusing on
the existence of God and the central theme of religious knowledge is evidentialist
challenge. According to evidentialists, knowledge requires adequate evidence. However,
externally, we cannot have any adequate evidence of God's existence (not everyone
accepts the evidentialist challenge to religious belief 10 ). However, in the reformed
epistemology, religious belief is akin to perceptual belief as sensus divinitatis 11. This
concept seems to be closer to externalism.
In terms of moral knowledge, the moral knowledge is based on moral statement such as
right and wrong. Moral facts don’t seem to be objective in a way that real fact like
scientific fact. Therefore, moral disagreement are often completely intractable12. Moral
knowledge seems to have closer relationship with internalism. Moral knowledge can be
10
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12
Textbook, pp .
Ibid.
Textbook, pp .
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acquired via intuition and a priori reasoning. 13 The textbook proposed classical
foundationalism, coherentism and virtue epistemology. Classical foundationalism and
coherentism are some types of internalism, and virtue epistemology is understood as
earlier externalism14. I think that moral knowledge is mainly closer to internalism than
scientific knowledge.
(Afterthought)
After reading the textbook and several essays, I think two points.
1) Wide scope of I-E debate. I-E debate covers not only epistemology but also ethics, law,
medicine and physics.
2) Various definitions of externalism and internalism. This is mentioned above. Even
when I read just several essays, I was confused with the definition of I-E. Bergmann15
pointed out that “the internalism-externalism debate in epistemology remains mired in
serious confusion” and “this debate fits well with entrenched views on the I-E distinction.”
I agreed with Bergmann
This is a very well researched essay, Kenzo. You explore the topic at depth and cover a
wide range of views that go beyond what was discussed in the course. Very good! You
also make a strong argument for the position that you favour. Well-written! Ilhaam
“A Priori Justification and Knowledge” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, First
published Sun Dec 9, 2007; substantive revision Mon May 19, 2014.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/apriori/
14 “Virtue Epistemology” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, First published Fri Jul
9, 1999; substantive revision Wed Jan 12, 2011.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology-virtue/
15 Bergmann, Michael, ”INTERNALISM, EXTERNALISM AND THE NO-DEFEATER
CONDITION”, Volume 110, Issue 3, pp 399-417 March 1997.
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