Internalists DO Have
A New Evil Demon Problem
Presented at Dalhousie University
Philosophy Colloquium
1/17/2014
Purpose of Powerpoint
To give you the big picture dialectic in which my
paper takes place.
The Old Evil Demon Problem
The old evil demon problem, inspired by Rene
Descartes, is as follows:
The Old Evil Demon Problem
The old evil demon problem, inspired by Rene
Descartes, is as follows:
1) We could be fooled by an evil demon
2) If (2), then we can’t really know
anything.
3) Therefore, we can’t really know anything.
• The old evil demon problem was an argument
for skepticism.
• The old evil demon problem was an argument
for skepticism.
• It claimed that we don’t have certain
knowledge.
• The old evil demon problem was an argument
for skepticism.
• It claimed that we don’t have certain
knowledge.
• The new evil demon problem is about
justified/rational belief.
Reliabilism
In 1979, Goldman published his classic paper
“What is Justified Belief?”
Reliabilism
In 1979, Goldman published his classic paper
“What is Justified Belief?”
The view:
S’s belief is justified iff the belief is
formed by a reliable process.
Reliabilism
In 1979, Goldman published his classic paper
“What is Justified Belief?”
The view:
S’s belief is justified iff the belief is
formed by a reliable process.
Reliable processes: vision, memory, induction
Reliabilism
In 1979, Goldman published his classic paper
“What is Justified Belief?”
The view:
S’s belief is justified iff the belief is
formed by a reliable process.
Reliable processes: vision, memory, induction
Unreliable processes: wishful thinking, magic 8balls, astrology.
Two Theoretical Benefits of Reliabilism
Two Theoretical Benefits of Reliabilism
• It does not overintellectualize justified belief.
Two Theoretical Benefits of Reliabilism
• It does not overintellectualize justified belief.
Two Theoretical Benefits of Reliabilism
• It does not overintellectualize justified belief.
• It explains the connection between epistemic
justification and truth.
The New Evil Demon Problem
The New Evil Demon Problem
In 1984, Stewart Cohen published his paper,
“Justification and Truth”.
The New Evil Demon Problem
In 1984, Stewart Cohen published his paper,
“Justification and Truth”.
Consider your beguiled twin who
is fooled by a demon.
The New Evil Demon Problem
In 1984, Stewart Cohen published his paper,
“Justification and Truth”.
Consider your beguiled twin who
is fooled by a demon.
- Justified beliefs
The New Evil Demon Problem
In 1984, Stewart Cohen published his paper,
“Justification and Truth”.
Consider your beguiled twin who
is fooled by a demon.
- Justified beliefs
- Unreliably formed beliefs.
The New Evil Demon Problem
In 1984, Stewart Cohen published his paper,
“Justification and Truth”.
Consider your beguiled twin who
is fooled by a demon.
- Justified beliefs
- Unreliably formed beliefs.
- It seems that all that matters for a belief’s
justification are internal states.
Internalism and Externalism
Internalism – justificational properties
supervene on internal/mental properties.
Internalism and Externalism
Internalism – justificational properties
supervene on internal/mental properties.
Externalism – denial of internalism (i.e., some
external properties make a difference to
whether a belief is justified).
Internalism and Externalism
Internalism – justificational properties
supervene on internal/mental properties.
Externalism – denial of internalism (i.e., some
external properties make a difference to
whether a belief is justified).
Externalists think that a belief’s being formed by
a reliable process (Goldman)
Internalism and Externalism
Internalism – justificational properties
supervene on internal/mental properties.
Externalism – denial of internalism (i.e., some
external properties make a difference to
whether a belief is justified).
Externalists think that a belief’s being formed by
a reliable process (Goldman), a safe mechanism
(Sosa),
Internalism and Externalism
Internalism – justificational properties
supervene on internal/mental properties.
Externalism – denial of internalism (i.e., some
external properties make a difference to
whether a belief is justified).
Externalists think that a belief’s being formed by
a reliable process (Goldman), a safe mechanism
(Sosa), or properly functioning faculties
(Bergmann), is relevant to justification.
For years, since 1984, the new evil demon
problem has been considered to be one of the
most serious objections to externalism.
For years, since 1984, the new evil demon
problem has been considered to be one of the
most serious objections to externalism.
It has also been one of the main arguments in
favour of internalism.
The New Evil Demon Problem for
Internalism
The New Evil Demon Problem for
Internalism
In 2012, I publish a paper called
“Three Forms of Internalism and
the New Evil Demon Problem.”
The New Evil Demon Problem for
Internalism
In 2012, I publish a paper called
“Three Forms of Internalism and
the New Evil Demon Problem.”
I argue that the NEDP also
applies to all presently
endorsed versions of
internalism.
Reply to Me
In his forthcoming paper, “A
New Evil Demon? No Problem
For Moderate Internalists,” and
in his forthcoming book
Evidentialism and Epistemic
Justification, Kevin McCain
argues that I am wrong.
McCain’s paper will be published in Acta
Analytica and I have been invited to reply to his
paper.
McCain’s paper will be published in Acta
Analytica and I have been invited to reply to his
paper.
I am currently working on that reply, and that is
where I am looking for feedback today.