Impartiality as a Democratic Value
CSMN Workshop, CSMN/Oslo, August 26, 2015
Democratic decision making is commonly considered as a matter of majority building and voting. This
procedure does not exclude partisanship. We shall explore the dangers of partisanship and the value of
impartiality within democratic societies.
Organizer: Christel Fricke
Abstracts (in order of presentation)
Yannis Tassopoulos (Athen):
The Liberal Power Structures of Practical Reason: Adam Smith's Impartial Spectator
and Pluralist Democracy
The paper discusses two parallel lines of argument, as developed in J. R. Weinstein, Adam
Smith's Pluralism, Yale UP, 2013, p. 341, and my last book on a pluralist reading of popular
sovereignty, on the basis of Smith's impartiality (I. A. Tassopoulos, Popular Sovereignty and
the Challenge of Impartiality, Athens 2014, Kritiki, p. 656). A core issue in the analysis is the
relation of sympathy with the prudential origins of impartiality (as expressed in the maxim
quod tibi fiery non vis, alteri ne feceris).
Lisa Hill (Adelaide):
Voter Turnout and Realising Impartiality as a Democratic Virtue
This paper explores one means by which to help realise impartiality as a democratic virtue. I
argue that elections can be opportunities for both the expression of impartiality as a moral
principle and the engendering of impartiality as a democratic virtue among governors.
I challenge the proceduralist assumption that only equality of electoral opportunity is
necessary to ensure impartiality and argue that when voter turnout is low, impartiality –as
both a procedural principle and political virtue -- is compromised. Specifically, high turnout
elections, where participation is always more socially-even, are better at delivering
impartiality than low turnout elections. Therefore proceduralists should tighten their criteria
for electoral legitimacy by demanding, not only that electoral participation be open to
everyone, but also that it should actually be performed by everyone within a given demos.
Kalle Moene (Oslo/ESOP):
Is it anything special about social democracy?
Social democracy is a variant of democratic rule enriched by strong social organizations and
routine consultations between government and these interest organizations on economic and
social issues. Social democracy also has a comprehensive welfare state and is based on
''redistribution twice''. Does it violate basic principles of impartiality? To address the question
I speculate of the political economy of Social Democracy.
Henrik Syse (Oslo/PRIO et al.):
Civility and Freedom
It is a stated aim of most democracies to preserve and protect a public sphere where the state
does not actively arbitrate between different views on the good life, and where there is ample
freedom of speech for all parties and viewpoints. However, this impartiality and neutrality of
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the state sometimes conflicts with a perceived need to keep public discourse civil, peaceful,
and safe, not least as extremist and violent views are spread under the protection of freedom
of speech. How do we maintain a wide and legally guaranteed freedom of speech without
ignoring legitimate ethical worries about hate speech and extremism? I will analyze some
elements of the Norwegian press-ethical code that can help us build an "ethics of speech",
which arguably does not collide with legally guaranteed free speech or the impartiality of the
state. In so doing, I will suggest, based on work done by Odin Lysaker and myself, a set of
"civility norms" for public discourse, yet also highlight the potential dangers of such norms.
Stefan Gosepath (Freie Universitaet Berlin):
Justice, Moral Rights and Impartiality
By way of justifying the equal right to political participation, I should like to explain the
principle of the sovereignty of the people (1) as well as its tense relationship with the primacy
of equal basic rights and freedoms (2). I shall then discuss the two main strategies of solution
for resolving this tension in political theory, either the primacy of democracy over morally
universal basic rights or, vice versa, the primacy of morally universal basic rights (3). I shall
argue that the morally motivated precedence of morally universal basic rights over democracy
is the only plausible strategy. However, it is a position which is fraught with problems for
which we must find a solution (4). The morally motivated precedence of universal basic rights
should secure (among other things) the necessary impartiality (5).
Konstantinos Papageorgiou (Athen):
Democracy as a normative source of equality
The idea of equality (next to being a legal and a moral idea) is a political idea with a great
history. Thinking about equality has become pertinent again, politicians and economists
rediscovered equality – for obvious and less obvious reasons. But equality seems to have lost
its foundation as a political idea turning more into an instrument of rhetorical use for political
purposes. Post-Rawlsian liberal theory, in particular the so-called luck egalitarian approach,
has not been helpful in re-establishing a workable and firm connection with the normative
foundations of the idea in a normative understanding of politics (cf. the seminal work of
Elisabeth Anderson). In my view one of the reasons for this failing can be attributed to the
neglect of the importance of democracy to equality. Equality is a building block of democracy
and we should not instrumentalize democracy as a supposedly independent value for the sake
of equality. Taking my cue from a rather inconspicuous remark in John Rawls’ Theory of
Justice (unearthed by Joshua Cohen) I will try to present some thoughts on how to re-establish
this connection without harming or neglecting either.
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