From protection of the immigrant, to protection from the immigrant
(and back?)
The attitudes of social-democratic1 parties in Western Europe towards immigration2 1990-2015
– The case of British Labour.
Orni Livny, Department of political science, Tel-Aviv University
In most contemporary election campaigns in Western democracies the competition for maximizing
voters’ support is accompanied by merchandise: parties have “Souvenir Shops” that offer the
potential voters vast variety of products - from scarves, hats, ties and shirts, to mugs and umbrellas –
all with the color, the logo and the main slogans that presents the political identity of the party.
During the general election campaign in UK in May 2015 voters were offered to buy, for 5£, a mug
with a slogan stamped on it: “controls on immigration”3. This mug was not a part of the extreme
right party UKIP campaign, nor a statement of the Conservatives. Rather, it was a red mug with the
traditional logo of the Labour party. The message of the Labour was cut and clear: restrictions on
immigration are our ‘cup of tea’.
Does this means that the Labour turn to be an anti-migration rightist party?
1
I use the definition of Kitschelt that refers to "Social-Democracy" (SD) as a "generic concept to cover a broad cohort of
parties that run under socialist, labor and social-democratic label". (Kitschelt, 1994, 1). In most west European countries
it's the major parties of the "center-left" bloc, or the "moderate left". (Mair, 1987). There is a large variety of different
versions of SD, from "orthodox" versions of socialism that is closer to Marcs and Engels, to "reformist" versions.
(Berman, 1998, 28)
2
I use the term "immigration" as a general title that includes a variety of different legal, social, and civil status, because
countries, as well as parties, also use a general term of "immigration policy". I refer basically to 3 decisions that policy
maker have to take: Who to let in, how many and what rights to give them.
3
1
The Labour Party Campaign Shop at the Labour Website https://shop.labour.org.uk/ 29/3/15
Introduction
In the common Left-Right political spectrum, left-wing "family of parties" is traditionally associated
with social values of tolerance, pluralism, solidarity, and with emphasizing equality in all spheres of
life. (Downs, 1957; Bobbio, 1996; Mair, 1998; 2007; Budge, 2001)
According to this approach, Social Democratic (SD) parties, as the main parties of the center-left
are expected to express protective and generous attitudes towards immigration: support of social
justice and multiculturalism, care for weak groups, and commitment to universal human rights and
equality. (Inglehart & Klingemann, 1976; Mair, 1998; 2007; Budge, 2001). This is their political
image in the public mind, and this is also a common approach in the study of SD4.
Is this approach relevant to immigration issues in the age of globalization in contemporary Europe?
Labour manifestos 1992-2015
Analyzing the attitudes of the British Labour towards migration, as presented in the party’s election
manifestos in the 90’s demonstrates this approach. the party emphasize the democratic obligation to
protect minorities: "… women and men from ethnic minority groups are full and equal members of the
community…We will not tolerate the present level of racial harassment and attacks, and will ensure that more
effective protection is given to vulnerable groups." (1992 election manifesto5). The Labuor also promotes
the vision of a multicultural society: "Britain is a multiracial and multicultural society. All its members
must have the protection of the law". (1997 election manifesto). "Labour believes Britain can be a model of
4
5
For example: Herbert Kitschelt (1994): "In my view, SD has no option to modify its position on the dimension of
citizenship rights where political conflict concern racism and tolerance for cultural diversity in contemporary
democracies. Within rather narrow bounds, SD is committed to a clear-cut universalist position accepting cultural
diversity and broad citizenship rights" (Kitschelt, 1994, 296). Sheri Berman (2006) emphasis the virtues of social
solidarity, egalitarianism and inclusiveness in SD ideological foundation, and "the commitment… to democracy and
aspects of liberalism" (Berman, 2006, 205-6). Giddens (2000) argues that SD must place itself left of center “because
social justice and freedom is in its core” (Giddens, 2000, 68). Bale et.al. (2010) talk about SD "ideological commitment
to tolerance on immigration and integration" (bale et. al. 2010, 414).
All the original texts of Labour manifestos are from the "manifesto project" database - https://manifestoproject.wzb.eu/parties/729
2
a multicultural, multiracial society" (2001 election manifesto). "There are too few black and Asian staff in
key public services". (2001 election manifesto).
In these manifestoes the attitudes of the Labour towards immigration are based on a liberal ethos
that emphasis human rights and liberties, and a commitment to democratic values.
But less than a decade later, in 2010, there is a “U turn”. Immigrants no longer framed as a
vulnerable group, but as a dangerous one. The title leaves no doubt what the party's position: "Crime
and Immigration: Strengthening our communities, securing our borders". Immigration is parallel
to crime. The compassionate approach replaced by threat perceptions and a separation to “us” and
“them”: "we will take the necessary measures to protect our country"… "There are people… who
want to attack our way of life". (2005 manifesto); “Strengthening our communities, securing our
borders" (2010 manifesto).
The terminology had also changed: from “discrimination”, “multicultural”, “multiracial”, to
“control” and “secure”; from "ethnic minorities", "refugees", "black and Asian" to "illegal" and
"unskilled" workers – terms that didn't appear in 1992-2001. The manifesto project finds that while
92’s-2002’s manifestos refer to multiculturalism only as a positive phenomenon, from 2005 it is also
seen as a negative one. 6
The liberal ethos of protecting democratic values replaced by a realistic ethos of restricting
immigration in order to protect democracy.
Not just the manifestos had changed, also the attitudes of the party leaders. In May 2014, after the
populist extreme right UKIP, got more votes than Labour and Conservatives in the European
Parliament elections7, the responds of two Labour leaders where opposite: While the former leader
Tony Blair described UKIP as a "pretty nasty and unpleasant" party, and called the Labour "to stand
up to them and take them on", the leader at the time Ed Miliband said that UKIP voters are "people
6
7
3
https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/parties/729
http://www.results-elections2014.eu/en/country-results-uk-2014.html#table02
who love our country" and that "it is not prejudice to worry about immigration. It is
understandable"8.
What explains this shift from opposing any anti-immigration expressions, to understanding it? Why
is there a change from emphasizing the commitment to multiculturalism to restrictions on
immigration?
The impact of immigration on political parties
The literature on immigration and political parties in the last decades has tended to focus on antiimmigration extreme-right parties, who have become notable political actors. (Betz, 1993; Kitschelt,
1995; Norris, 2005; Mudde, 2007)9. The main approach is the "contagion effect" of the extreme
right, which argues that the electoral success of anti-immigration parties cause governments and
other parties to adopt restrictive immigration policies (Schain, 1987; Norris, 2005; Van-Spanje, 2010
Bale et. al. 2010). According to this approach, the strategic response of mainstream parties to
immigration depends on the electoral threat of extreme right (Meguid, 2010, 92). This goes well with
the rational theory of Party competition that refer to parties as rational actors that aims for political
power and for maximizing voters support (Downs, 1957, 97). That means that if the majority of
voters hold anti-immigration attitudes parties will adopt it to. On the other hand, parties are
differentiated by their political image – the goals, symbols, and values they are linked to in the public
mind. (Stock, 1963).
There are various approaches to the question what shape immigration policies of governments and
parties. The leading historical explanations refers to economic interests, such as labor market.
(Hollifield, 1998, Freeman, 1995). This can also be affected by pressures of economic elites,
8
9
4
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/may/27/labour-divided-threat-posed-ukip
Between 2000-2015 In most European countries, extreme-right parties doubled and even tripled their electoral
support.(www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database)
employers, and interest groups, what is defined as Client politics (Freeman, 2002; Joppke, 1999;
Piore, 1979). This approach can explain why despite negative public opinion, governments’ supports
liberal and expanded immigration policies.
Public opinion can be a major factor that influences immigration policies. (Betz, 1993; Givens &
Luedtke, 2005, 7). This approach argue that negative public opinion towards immigration and the
increase in xenophobia leads parties to adopt restrictive attitudes. A related approach is that the
negative attitudes of the public intensifies by threat perceptions - when immigration is seen as a
threat – to the well-being of individuals as well as to the national identity and culture, the opposition
to it increases (Inglehart, 1997; Sniderman et. al. 2004; Meguid, 2010; Lahav & Courtemanche,
2012; Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014).
There is vast body of literature on the securitization of immigration, which refer to immigration as
a matter of national security. (Bigo, 2002; Bounfino, 2004; Lahav & Courtemanche, 2012). The 9.11
terror attack in the USA (2001) is seen as a turning point which represents a major change in the
attitudes of western industrial democracies towards Immigration in multi-level aspects (Fekete, 2004;
Karyotis, 2007; Bleich, 2009; Helbling, 2011).
Another source of explanations refer to the EU. Such as regional regulations and immigration laws
of the EU10. A new approach in recent years is the Euro-skepticism approach which calls to abolish
the freedom of movement between EU members, and to minimize the EU authorities. This approach
intensified in 21st Century following the enlargement of the EU and the mass migration from Eastern
Europe.
All these explanations refers to external pressures that immigration poses on political parties.
10
The European Union's immigration policies are in two major categories: 1. immigrants within the EU, 2. Immigrants
from "third country" – a non EU country. Migration within the internal European borders is grounded in Schengen Treaty
from 1985, which abolish control between European countries, and in Maastricht Treaty (1992).
There are tens of laws and agreement that are not fully implemented. The ultimate decisions how to formulate
immigration policies remains at the national level.
5
I argue that in the case of SD parties we should also consider internal pressures, which are
significantly important because of these parties identity as worker’s parties.
The impact of immigration on SD parties
I follow previous studies that argue that immigration challenges SD more than other parties because
of their traditional electorate – the working class. Lower class tend to believe immigrants take their
jobs and abuse welfare systems (Freeman, 1978; Lahav, 2004; Givens, 2005) and tend to be more
racist and xenophobic than elites (Freeman, 1978, 28; Kitschelt, 1995, 10; Fetzer 2000). The unions,
which are a major source of support, demand restrictions on immigration, because it weakens their
control, reduces wages and erodes workers solidarity (Freeman, 1978; Johansson, 2014).
Immigration might also weaken another SD flag - the welfare state. (Glyn. 2006; Freeman, 1986;
Banting 2000, 22).
I argue that in the case of SD parties there is an inherent internal pressure: as moderate-left, they are
expected to favor generous and tolerant immigration policies, but as workers’ parties their preference
may be the opposite, because in order to protect these workers there is need for full employment and
for a strong national welfare system, and immigration might undermine it. These are principles
which fitted well into national societies before the age of globalization, but in order to protect them
in the age of mass migration, restrictions on immigration are essential.
To understand these internal pressures we should to go back to the history of SD, and to the core
concepts of this ideology. The roots of Social-Democratic Socialism lay on reformist ideas presented
by Karl Kautsky (1891), and the revisionism of Eduard Bernstein (1909), that argued that
parliamentary democracy is essential to the struggle. (Esping-Andersen, 1985, 20). “The
parliamentary road to socialism” (Berman, 1998, 5) emphasis that participation in electoral politics is
necessary if the movement for socialism is to find mass support (Przeworski, 1980, 28). Over the
years there was a shift from "proletarian cause" to “national interests" (Esping-Andersen, 1985, 8);
6
from “class solidarity” to “national solidarity” (Berman, 2006), and from "working class party" to
"people's party" or “peoples’ home” (Esping-Andersen, 1985, 8; Berman, 2006, 200).
The core values of SD are equality, distributive justice, and social welfare, but within the state
organization. National ideas are thus part of SD political identity, and in its history there are groups
and movements that focused on national ideas of protecting the national interests and national
identity, and opposed inclusion of foreigners. Such was the case of Austro-Marxist in Austria in the
first half of the 20th century (Bottomore & Goode, 1978); the British Fabianism in the late 19th
century - which laid the foundations for Labour, (Cole, 196o); and eugenics policies in Germany,
Sweden, Britain and France, which in some cases included sterilization of those who were
considered as not suitable for the nation.
Based on the historical and ideological roots of SD, I suggest that SD political identity is generally
composed of two sets of core values11: one that focuses on Universal norms (human-rights, equality,
pluralism, tolerance) – and one that focuses on National community principles (welfare state,
distributive justice, protecting national workers). The first set is based on Individualism, the other is
Communitarian. Usually these principles may go together, but when it comes to immigration there
is an inherent tension - The Universalist values leads to egalitarianism and inclusion, while the
nationalist principles may lead to exclusionary attitudes. Moreover: protecting the Universalist set of
core values might undermine the national-community principles, and at the same time, protecting the
national-community principles might violate the Universalist core values.
SD parties are conflicted about immigration: Their core values are protective and restrictive at the
same time. They are trapped between the multicultural claim and the necessity to protect the
organized national working class.
11
I base this argument on Michael Freeden's theory (1996), which in order to analyze political ideologies divides them to
"core values" and "peripheral" or "adjacent" concepts. The core concepts are long standing and are indispensable in
shaping the ideology's ideational content.
7
Restrictions on immigration, thus, should not be seen as "rightist" stand, but as a consequence of SD
core principles. It is common sense to expect SD, as parties that represent liberal norms and “leftist”
traditions, to hold inclusive and generous attitudes towards immigration. But it is also reasonable to
find that as workers’ parties they support restrictive attitudes.
How SD parties reconcile those contradicting values? When they give salience to the Universalist
core concepts and when on the nationalist ones? How they differentiate their exclusionary stand
from that of the extreme right?
I will answer these questions by text analysis of election manifestos of the British Labour.
The British case
Based on the historical and ideological roots of SD I suggest a theoretical model that analyze the
attitudes of SD parties towards immigration as two sets of core values. I argue that the impact of
immigration on SD parties should not be seen just as a matter of external pressures, but also as an
internal conflict within its core values.
I will start by analyzing the external pressures mentioned above and their weakness in explaining the
British case.
Indeed, public opinion towards immigration, including that of Labour voters, is negative. ESS
survey from 2012 shows that more than half of those who voted for Labour in previous election
support restrictions on immigration12. But the results from 2002 are not very different13. Namely, the
negative attitudes towards immigration were quite high in the beginning of 2000’s but Labour’s
attitudes than, as I showed before, were supportive and protective.
In ESS 6, 2012 16.8% of those who voted for Labour supported “allow none” people of different race/ethnicity enter
the country. 38.5% supports “allow only a few”. These responds are quiet similar to those of conservative voters.
www.europeansocialsurvey.org
13
In ESS 1, 2002 it was 13.1% “allow none”, and 32.1% “allow a few”.
12
8
Client politics as an explanation to immigration policies usually refer to pressures of employers
and economic interest groups. In the case of SD the most influential pressures are of the unions,
which are traditionally the major source of SD electorate. (Freeman, 1978; Johansson, 2014). The
weakness of this explanation is that as Freeman argues, the primordial response of trade unions has
been to oppose immigration (Freeman, 1979, 218). Thus it fail to explain protective and inclusive
attitudes of SD parties towards immigration. Other weaknesses are the decline in the status of the
unions (Glyn, 2006, 121)14 and changes in voters' behavior in contemporary liberal democracies: less
loyalties, more flexibility (Mair, 1998); less traditional voting and more rational voting. (Dalton,
2014) .
The arguments that immigration might undermine the welfare state model are basically economic,
and argue that restrictive immigration policy is essential to protect the economic benefits of the
welfare state (Freeman, 1986, 55; Banting 2000, 22). When more and more needy people get welfare
benefits it leads to more taxation (Glyn. 2006, 159), and erodes the solidarity and the willingness of
citizens to help foreigners. The claim that the welfare state model depends on national solidarity is
controversial (Korpi 1983; Esping-Andersen 1985, 1990; Stephens 1979). Moreover, as OECD data
shows, social expenditure as percentage of GDP in UK has not decrease in the age of mass migration
but increased - from 16.3% in 1990 to 22.8% in 2010.15
The contagion effect approach is less relevant in UK because due to the election system, the
extreme right UKIP is a minor threat in the national election level. At least for now. In the last
election in May 2015, although UKIP was strengthening dramatically, it got 12.6% of the votes.
14
In 2010 only 26% of the workers in UK were members of any trade-union. Source: OECD.
http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=UN_DEN
15
The average social expenditure in Western Europe in 80's was 22.6% of GDP. In 2010 – 26.4%. source:
http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=SOCX_AGG
9
These examples show the importance of the internal explanation to explain the changes in the
attitudes of British Labour towards immigration.
Now to the “when” and “how” questions.
I find that the best explanation to the “when” question would be party competition theories.
My hypothesis is that SD parties use different framing of immigration – More Universalist and
compassionate or more nationalist and restrictive – according to the role of immigration as an issue
in party competition: When opposing immigration is associated in the public mind – as well as in
party competition, with extremists’ non legitimate groups, SD political interest is to emphasis the
Universalist core values. But when opposing immigration has massive public support, and is a major
part of the political debate, it is a trigger to a shift from Universalist inclusive stand to a version of
nationalist exclusionist stand.
In UK in the 90’s the restrictive attitudes towards immigration were dictated by marginal non
parliamentaric groups like racist neo-Nazi or skin-headed gangs. In the mainstream politics, the
Labour and the Conservatives it was not an issue of debate. Expressing anti-immigration attitudes
considered by the public and in party competition as a racist inappropriate stand. The Labour thus
emphasizes the Universalist values of respect and Compassion to "the other".
After 9.11 terror attack in the USA, and even more after the terror attacks in central London in 2005,
negative attitudes towards immigration became part of the legitimate discourse of the mainstream. In
2005 it became a major issue of criticism against Labour government, and against Tony Blair’s
vision of multiculturalism.16 From 2005 election campaign the salient of immigration as an issue in
party competition increased. We can see it also in the scope of the issue in Labour manifestos: From
a few sections and minor paragraphs in the manifestos of 92, 97, 01, the reference to immigration
expanded to wider sections in 2005 and a whole chapter in 2010, 2015.
16
The 3 main issues in the negative campaign of the conservatives in 2005 were Iraq, Taxes and Immigration.
10
The Labour adjust to the new reality by a shift of its core values: the welfare and well-being of the
national community comes first.
I have found 3 major points what characterize the shift in Labour attitudes towards migration, as
reflected in the party election manifestos: 1. a shift from discussing immigrants’ integration to
discuss immigration control. 2. Framing immigration as a threat. 3. A model of conditioned inclusion
of the foreigner.
From Immigrants’ integration to immigration control
The literature separate immigration policy into two different sets of policies that has different
political logics: Hammar (1985) defines it as immigration policies (at borders, before entering the
country) and immigrants' policies (in country, after they got in). Money (1999) termed it as
Immigration control vs. immigrants' Integration, Avinery et. al. (2009) as “outside” and “inside”.
The main focus in the 92, 97, 01's Labour manifestos is the "inside": the integration of immigrants
and the commitment to protect them. In the manifestos of 05, 10, 15 the focus is on the "outside" –
restrict border control, increase limitations. These manifestos presents all the technological measures
and the legislation the party will operate in order to control immigration, and minimizes the
references to the issue of integrating those who are already in.
Framing immigration as a threat
The securitization of immigration led to a consensus among parties as well as in the public debate in
the UK on the need to restrict immigration. If immigration is a threat – it is legitimate to oppose it.
While in the early manifestos the attitude was to integrate immigrants ant protect their rights, in 2005
and more intense in 2010 and 2015 manifestos there is clear distinction between "us" and "them"'
and a commitment to protect "us" against "them". The manifestos refers to immigration as a threat to
"our way of life" (05) and to "British values" (10) and promise to “reduce net migration” and “tackle
illegal immigration” (15)
11
A model of conditioned inclusion
Another interesting finding is that even in those manifestos that presents a firm stance against
immigrants, there are also some positive phrases. “For centuries Britain has been a home for people
from the rest of Europe and further afield. Immigration has been good for Britain.” (2005); “Britain
has benefited over many centuries from immigration.” (2015).
The exclusionary stand the Labour presents is not “Zero immigration” but rather a moderate version
of it: a conditioned inclusion of the foreigner. “Our philosophy is simple: if you are ready to work
hard and there is work for you to do, then you are welcome here. We need controls that work and a
crackdown on abuse to ensure that we have a robust and fair immigration system fit for the 21st
century that is in the interests of Britain”. (2005)
Restrictions thus do not depend on ethnic background, religion or culture, but on accommodation
into culture of production characterized by organized work.
Conclusions
The puzzle this paper examines is wither the Labour turn to be an anti-migration rightist party. The
answer, as presented here, is that restriction on immigration should not be seen as "rightist" stand,
but as a part of SD core principles.
To explain the shift of British Labour from promoting multiculturalism to restrictions on
immigration, we should consider not only the external pressures, but also the internal contradictions
within its core values, that rooted in the historical and ideological roots of SD.
The British Labour case, as reflected in elections manifestos, shows a connection between the
changes in the role of immigration as an issue in party competition and changes in the attitudes of the
party towards migration. These changings are very strongly influenced by threat perceptions and by
the securitization of immigration approach.
12
The negative attitudes of the Labour towards immigration are not extremist like those of the far
right, but a moderate selective–restrictive version of a conditioned inclusion: no restriction on basis
of race, restrictions on basis of productivity and adaptation.
Epilog – from September 2001 to September 2015
This paper refer to 9/11 2001 as a turning point that triggered a shift from a liberal ethos that
inspired SD parties attitudes towards immigration, to a realistic on: From framing immigrants as
vulnerable group to framing immigration as a threat.
It is very interesting to see wither the Syrians refugees crises of September 2015 in Europe, and
especially the photo of the body of the Syrian baby, Aylan Kurdi, will cause SD parties to return
back to the Liberal ethos.
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