Madhyamka school of Philosophy:
The Madhyamaka school was a Buddhist philosophical school that came
out of India in the 5th Century. The main school of thought that preceeded it
was the Abhidharma.
In the Abhidharma, Dharmas (existent things) are characterized by their
defining traits or own-existence (svabhāva), whose ontological (way of
being) status is not dependent upon concepts.
The problem with the Abhidharma is not that things are 'independently
existent (a position that most Abhidharma schools would not accept), but
rather (from a Madhyamaka perspective) that they are independent from
notions about them (ideas, concepts elaborations).
For the Madhyamaka, dharmas are dependent, and furthermore, their
dependence entails a lack of ultimate, true existence.
It may be therefore important to understand that Madhyamaka constitutes
a continuation of the Abhidharma type of analysis, extending the range of
dependent arising to entail (and focus upon), dependence (the dependent
arising of concepts based on other concepts).
Madhyamaka uses language to make clear the limits of our concepts.
This creates a tension, since it does have to use concepts to convey
its teachings:
Concept 1: Svabhava – essence:
One of the main philosophers of Madhyamika was Nagarjuna. His critique
of the idea of ‘own-nature’ argues that anything which arises according to
conditions, (as all phenomena do) can have no inherent nature of it’s own.
For what it is depends on also, conditions it. Also, if there is nothing with
own-nature, there can be nothing with 'other-nature' i.e. something which is
dependent for its existence and nature on something else which has ownnature.
Furthermore, if there is neither own-nature nor other-nature, there cannot
be anything with a true, substantial existent nature. If there is no true
existent, then there can be no non-existent either.
In chapter 15 of the Mulamadhyamakakarika, "Nagarjuna plays on the
word 'thing'.
Nagarjuna had no objection to the Abhidhamma formulation of causal
relations so long as the objects are not regarded as having a unique nature
or substance (svabhava).
Most importantly the rejection of inherent existence does not imply that
there is no existence at all. What it does mean is that there is no "unique
nature or substance (svabhava) in the "things" we perceive.
What Nagarjuna is saying is that no being has a fixed and permanent
nature. What the abhidarmikas maintained was that every thing has
features that distinguish it from other things.
Essentialism and Nihilism:
What remains is the middle way between Eternalism and Nihilism.
The object of the critique is to show that the Eternalist (heaven, soul etc)
view does not hold up to investigation. Further, to show that the 'ownbeing' theory adopted by some Buddhists schools did not really differ,
when its implications were strictly worked out, from the eternalist theory of
Brahmanism (the theory of an eternal 'soul' and other eternal 'substances).
These two views are considered to be the two extreme views:
1.Essentialism or eternalism - a belief that things inherently exist and are
therefore effective objects of craving and clinging.
2.Nihilism or annihilationism - views that lead one to believe that there is
no need to be responsible for one's actions, because nothing exist
ultimately. Nagarjuna argues that we naively and innately perceive
things as substantial, and it is this predisposition that is the root
delusion that lies at the basis of all suffering.
Madhyamaka represents the middle way" between them.
The Two truths:
Madhyamaka discerns two levels of truth, absolute and relative, (to make it
clear, it does make sense to speak of existence). Absolutely seen, there
are no "things". Relatively seen, there do exist concrete objects that we are
aware of.
Insight into the emptiness of "things' is part of developing wisdom, seeing
things as they are. Conceiving of concrete and unchanging objects leads
to clinging and suffering. Buddhapalita says:
“What is the reality of a thing just as it is? It is the absence of essence.
Unskilled persons whose eye of intelligence is obscured by the darkness of
delusion conceive of an essence of things and then generate attachment
and hostility with regard to them.”
—Buddhapālita-mula-madhyamaka-vrtti .
The main school : The Prāsaṅgika:
One of the most famous Madhyamika Philosophers was Nagarjuna. In
Nagarjuna's own words, causality itself is not findable as existing
inherently. He uses the Four Diamond Slivers to show this:
"Neither from itself,
Nor from other,
Nor from both,
Nor without a cause
,
Does anything anywhere, ever arise."
Notice that each one of these statements is a non-affirming negation which
merely negates the subject (some type of inherent cause for the arising of
any given conventional phenomenon) and does not affirm some other
mode of arising in its place.
These four possibilities include all possible ways that a conventional
phenomenon could arise if, in fact, they arose through some type of
inherent arising process.
Each one of these modes is negated in sequence (from self, from other,
from both, from no cause) leaving you with a mere absence: the absence
of inherent modes of causality.
The causality of the Prasaṅgika is one of mere designation. For example,
in a flow chart of the process of a seed turning into a sprout: if we selected
5000 photographs of all the intermittent stages from seed to sprout and
independently asked 50 people, "Where does the seed become the
sprout?" There would probably be 50 different answers.
Nagarjuna's argument is that if the sprout arose (came into existence)
inherently in any of the four ways listed above, then all 50 people would
independently have no choice but to say, "Yes, on slide 2199 the sprout
arose. That is clearly and definitely the case." On the other hand, since the
arising of a sprout is something which is merely nominally designated by
the conceptual mind, when we independently question 50 people, we get
50 different answers. This is a strong indication that the sprout and all
other objects are not things that arise and exist objectively or inherently.
It indicates that human beings do not passively experience phenomena,
but that the content of our experiences is something which is validly
conceptually designated by our minds.
The mind aspect of reality provides the name, identity, function, and
conventional discreteness to phenomena, according to the Prasangkia. In
the flowchart example, the moment mind validly decides that the object
"seed" is no longer a valid basis for the term and concept "seed," it labels
the term-concept "sprout" and that object becomes a sprout.
When mind validly applies the term and concept "sprout" to its experience,
that experience becomes a sprout. The arising of the sprout is causally
linked to the valid designation of the term-concept "sprout," and not some
causal force that existed previously in the seed, nor some identity of
sproutness that existed somewhere prior to the arising of the sprout.
Designation is – (in the basic Madhyamika sense) - the application of a
conceptual (or in some cases non-conceptual) image and a term to a
selected object of experience. Once the object is labeled as a sprout, that
object of experience exists as a sprout. It is important to note that there are
also invalid ways to designate objects, which will be talked about in the
next section. The rules for valid vs invalid designation are clearly laid out.
A Prasaṅgika asserts that something exists conventionally if it meets all of
the following three conditions:
1. if it is known to a conventional consciousness
2. if no other conventional cognition contradicts its being as it is thus
known
3. if reason that accurately analyses reality (that is, analyses whether
something intrinsically exists) does not contradict it
Whatever fails to meet those criteria does not exist. Therefore Prasaṅgikas
cannot accept that intrinsic nature exists, even conventionally.