Exam 1: Platonic and Chinese Buddhist Discourses
Chuying Liang
02/27/2015
Similarity
Both Plato’s Phaedrus and Chinese Buddhism indicate language is inadequate when it
comes to substantiate the real divine truth. Language has been considered as a greatest product of
human development, which enables us to make sense of the earthly world and to learn and digest
knowledge. However, both East and West imply language fails to perform its role of carrier,
carrying and transmitting the ultimate truth. I am not saying that they deny language. Instead, I
am saying they encourage us to think beyond the dimension of language in order to arrive in
realm of absolute knowledge.
In Phaedrus, Plato resorts to use an allegory to symbolize what truth meant. The winged
chariot represents the immortal soul. The soul is driving by a good horse and a bad horse. The
good horse is the ability to memorize the soul for ascending to the realm of truth, and the bad
horse is the earthly temptation. The two horses head to the opposite direction. Plato’s allegory
doesn’t tell us what truth is because truth itself is indescribable and unanswerable. Language
can’t substantiate the truth because language is born after the soul. Soul is the beginning of every
beginning and is ungenerated and formless. Yet, Plato provides a path for us to get to know the
absolute knowledge. “The fragments of this eternal truth, or love, exist within the memory all
humanity”. The more we memorize, the higher we can reach to the realm of ultimate knowledge.
We must remain communicating with memory. Here, the path is enabled through language.
Memory can be written down and share. In this way, the truth has been accumulated bit by bit,
then passing down. Yet, language here must be free from the social, emotional, discursive
discourse limitation. The contradiction is that if language is independent from words, how could
language exist as an agent?
Similar to Plato’s truth, Chinese Buddhism also thinks that truth is universal, eternal and
objective. According to Gethin, truths are “we are not dealing here with propositional truths with
which we must either agree or disagree, but with four ‘true things’ or ‘realities’ whose nature, as
we told, the Budda finally understood on the night of his awakening” (60). Here, Gethin opens a
new possibility of truth for us. The world we live, the truth we perceive, the language we use so
far might turn to be inadequate and singular. Language might play its role only within one
dimension. It can’t be used to justify something out of this perceived dimension. Gethin
emphasizes the Buddhist teaching relies on “training in conduct, mediation, and wisdom” (64).
Buddhsim teaching is only able to guide them to go through the suffering step by step. Buddhsim
teaching opens the possibility of ambiguity and uncertainty for people to interpret and discover
and doesn’t want us to be constricted by a fixed and dead judgment. “Discourse on Actions”
states: “Therefore all dharmas are inconceivable and inexpressible, their own nature is phantom
like”. Language exists within a discursive discourse. It is not an entity, but a signifier/phantom
like for people to interpret. Yet, something that can be interpreted differently is not the real
divine truth. Due to the figurative essence of language, the absolute truth is “inconceivable and
inexpressible” in regard to language. Hence, Chinese Buddhism also resorts to use allegory to
tell people what truth looks like.
The similarity that both East and West have is that “knowledge is not properly
communicated through the written word” (37). And the similarity leads to different solutions on
how to get into the realm of absolute knowledge. Plato says it is through memorizing the soul
whereas Gethin says it is through suffering and practicing. Even though the two paths seem
different, they have something in common. Memorizing the soul means looking inwardly and
creating new connections beyond the “sanity” of human. Suffering and practicing also means
freeing from the earthly attachment and forging new connections with the truth.
Difference
Plato’s rhetoric teaching in Phaedrus and Chinese Buddhism both indicate that
Philosophers and Buddas are rare. However, because of the understanding of truth in Chinese
Buddhist teaching and that in the West is culturally different, Chinese Buddhism further says that
even though it is so hard to become a Budda, everyone has the potential to become a Budda.
Plato thinks that real divine truth is wholly rational, eternal and universal. It comes from the
mind, and the mind is led by the soul. The soul is the source of every beginning. Plato says:
“This is a recollection of those things which our soul once beheld, when it journeyed with God
and, lifting its vision above the things which we now say exist, rose up into real being” (150).
Specifically, Plato is saying that the only way for people to get in touch with truth is through
memory. As long as we are “good” or “insane” enough, we can memorize or recollect as much
as possible and thus born to be a philosopher. He also states that insanity is not a negative
condition that we, as common people, always think. Rather, insane condition means that the
person is getting closer and closer to the truth. Put another way, being insane is freeing from the
conventional emotions and the corrupted body. He memorizes more than everyone else, hence he
is divine “sane.” The reason for us to think “insanity” is bad is that we have not reached to a
point where we are accessible to the ultimate truth. Plato says because the majority of people are
trapped by the trivial things in the earthly world, thus “few then are left which retain an adequate
recollection of them” (151). Here, Plato demonstrates that not so many people can become a
philosopher because most people are blind to the conventional dimension of the earthly world
such as body desires and human emotions. They are weighed down by the bad horse and are
forgetting their divine soul.
After reviewing Plato’s divine truth in relation to people, we can better understand how
Chinese Buddhist teaching is different from Plato’s rhetoric. Gethin states: “the appearance of
such a being in the world may not be unique, but is nevertheless a rare and special circumstance”
(18). Here, Gethin reveals a fact that Buddas are rare. Later, Hershock says Chinese view of
Buddhism is different from Gethin’s Indian view of Buddhism after a long course of
development.
Hershock points out the new insight of Chinese Buddhism is that “the interdependence of
all things” (47). Chinese culture roots in collectivism especially the bond with family. The Budda
in China doesn’t mean a person or individual, rather it implies that the ultimate Buddhism is that
all people can be saved and become Buddas. As “Discourse on Action” states, “This will then
enable you to cut off all evil forever, to bring the wholesome dharmas to completion and to be
constantly near all the Buddas, Bodhisattvas, and other holy communities” (3). Budda itself
means “enlightened and knower”. Enlightenment doesn’t only mean “self-enlightenment”, but
also mean “helping others become enlightened”. Within Chinese context, everyone has the
potential to become Budda, to see the divine truth. The consciousness of “potential” rooted in the
philosophy of collectivism influences every Chinese. Bodhisattva serves as an agent to connect
“sentient beings” with the divine truth. Common people can take Bodhisattva vow and wish
Bodhisattva could help them enlightened one day. Chinese Buddhism is more complex to some
extent. It is not as dichotomized as Plato’s truth. The measure unit of Plato’s philosopher is
individual. Yet, Buddhist lies on the integrity of individual effort and communal effort. The
enlightenment as a whole can achieve the ultimately purpose for being a Budda.
The contrast raises a question: why East and West have different understandings upon the
real divine truth? If the truth is such universal, absolute and eternal, culture, as a social, earthly
determinant, should have no influence at all.
Works Cited
The Discourse on the Ten Wholesome Ways of Action. Trans. Tripitakacarya Sikshananda to
Chinese and Saddhaloka Bhikkhu to English. Web. 25 Feb. 2015.
<http://wenku.baidu.com/view/b310bc0e7cd184254b35350d.html>.
Gethin, Rupert. The Foundations of Buddhism. New York: Oxford UP, 1998. Print.
Hershock, Peter D. Chan Buddhism: Dimensions of Asian Spirituality. Honolulu, HI: U of
Hawaii P, 2005. Print.
Plato. “Phaedrus/On the Beautiful; Ethical.” Trans. H. N. Fowler. The Rhetorical Tradition:
Readings from Classical Times to the Present. Ed. Patricia Bizzell and Bruce Herzberg. 2nd
ed. Boston: Bedford/St Martin’s, 2001. 138-68. Print.