A Tale of Two Cities:
Assessing the Local Impacts of the Great East Japan Earthquake and tsunami of
March 2011
Abstract
This article presents an overview of the disasters of 11 March 2011, focusing on their regional and local contexts, and an assessment of recovery plans. In doing so, it illuminates problems in the planning and reconstruction process, and develops out of these some tentative prognoses. The article shows that before the disaster the Tōhoku region was already ageing, depopulating, and declining in vitality. Via a case study of two shrinking communities that endured the full force of the tsunami the article shows that there were wide differentials in settlements’ experience of the events according to their physical and human geographies. The article then provides a brief analysis of post-disaster reconstruction plans. Although plans show commendable ambition in seeking to rebuild shattered communities, there is a danger of creating unrealistic expectations in settlements where ageing and depopulation appear to be accelerating.
Introduction
Ever since the earthquake and tsunami of 11 March 2011, the people of Japan have been coming to terms with the consequences of the most serious emergency to have occurred in their country’s postwar history. The Great East Japan Earthquake, tsunami and nuclear meltdown was not a single natural disaster but three interlocking disasters occurring in rapid succession, and developing into a national crisis of immense severity and complexity. Hence, despite Japan’s status as a rich and technologically advanced society, the post-disaster recovery has been hugely challenging. In this sense the severity of the disasters was due as much to the extraordinary amount of geophysical energy released by the earthquake itself as it was to some very human, and Japanese, circumstances and fallibilities that, aggregated together, created a ‘compound event’ and complicated its aftermath.
This article presents an overview of the disasters of 11 March 2011, focusing on the regional and local contexts in which they occurred, and an assessment of recovery plans.
1
In doing so,
I will illuminate problems in the planning and reconstruction process, and develop out of
1 See Author (2011) for a more detailed description of the 11 March 2011 disasters and their contexts.

these some tentative prognoses. To do this we need to look in detail at how communities have been affected and I have therefore developed two case studies of settlements directly impacted by the tsunami, and drawn out some analysis and conclusions from these. These are
Rikuzentakata and Ishinomaki Cities in Iwate and Miyagi Prefectures respectively (Map 1).
Map 1: North-eastern Honshu, with Rikuzenatakata and Ishinomaki Cities in yellow.
Japan and Tōhoku Prior to 11 March 2011
One of the most significant issues to come out of this crisis is how to reconstruct settlements and revive communities that, prior to the disasters, were already declining in size and vitality.
That is to say, Tōhoku – alongside all of Japan’s non-metropolitan regions – had been in the grip of a crisis of low fertility and out-migration for more than half a century already, which has left it ageing and depopulated to the extent that some communities have disappeared, and increasing numbers are in imminent danger of collapse. To make matters more difficult, the national population is also ageing and now, for the first time in the country's peacetime history, is declining in number. Under present trends, the country is projected to shrink from its 2010 peak of 128 million to around 87 million by 2060 (figure 1), when there may be just
50.9% working age, 9.1% children, and 39.9% older people.

Figure 1: Japan’s total population (in millions, right hand scale) and proportions by age group
(left hand scale), 1960-2060 (census figures 1960-2010; projected figures 2020-2060).
0-14 15-64 65+ Actual Pop.
Projected Pop.
140 100%
5,7 7,1 9,1 12,0 17,3 23,1 29,1 31,6 36,1 38,8 39,9
128
90%
120
80%
100 94
87
70%
80
60
64,1
68,9
67,3
60%
69,5
67,9
63,7
59,2
58,1
53,9
51,5 50,9
50%
40%
40
30%
20%
20
10%
30,2 24,0 23,5 18,2 14,6 13,2 11,7 10,3 10,0 9,7 9,1
0 0%
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060
Sources: Japan Statistical Yearbook (2012); NIPSSR (2012, medium variant projections).
Looking at those areas most severely affected by the tsunami, Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima
Prefectures’ populations shrank by 3.5% in the decade between 2000 and 2010, from 5.9 to
5.7 million people (Japan Statistical Yearbook, 2012). The Japanese government had forecast an acceleration of that trend, with a further 790,000 (13.9%) by 2030, marking a total projected 2000-30 decrease of 16.8% (NIPSSR, 2008). The impact of the disasters means that this figure will probably be exceeded, with a decline of 20% being possible. Population estimates for June 2012 show an accelerated reduction for the region of 112,000 (2%) on
2010, partly due to younger people and adults migrating in search of education, employment and stability elsewhere in the country.
Spatially, this process of demographic shrinkage is being experienced as a retreat from the peripheries of the archipelago, with the smallest and most remote hamlets collapsing first, and progressively larger and less distant settlements being drawn into a similar recursive spiral of depopulation and socio-economic decline (Author et al , 2011). Indeed, there are only a small number of settlements in Japan that are still growing in size. In the future, therefore, it is (almost) inconceivable that the more remote rural communities that were

impacted by the tsunami will be able to experience a ‘revival’ – if that is to be interpreted as a return to growth.
Significant in any reconstruction and recovery plan will be how the expected acceleration in processes of ageing and depopulation may affect the type of post-tsunami future that is possible for the region. This problem can be broken down into two issues; the first being how to take account of future seismic disturbances and an expected reduction in population in the reconstruction of the built environment and, second, how to revive community life in a shrinking and declining region after a tremendously destructive existential shock. Under such circumstances, then, what kind of community reconstruction is currently being planned, and what is possible, or even sensible? To begin to provide some analysis we need to know what happened on 11 March 2011, and then focus in detail on how particular communities were affected.
Japan’s ‘Triple Disaster’
At 14:46 local time on 11 March 2011 a magnitude 9.0 reverse fault megathrust earthquake struck 100km east of Miyagi Prefecture in Japan, along a 200km stretch of the subduction zone under the north-western Pacific Ocean where the Pacific and North American tectonic plates meet (JMA, 2011). It was the most powerful earthquake ever recorded to have hit the country and the fourth most powerful to have occurred anywhere on earth since 1900 (JMA,
2011; USGS, 2011). The resulting upthrust and subsidence generated a giant tsunami with a height, in places, of more than 30m that swept over the low-lying coastal areas of the northeastern seaboard of Honshū, flooding more than 507km2 of land and leaving 26.7 million tons of debris in its wake (Asahi Shimbunsha, 2011, p. 74-75). As of 11 July 2012 the
National Police Agency had registered 15,867 deaths, 2,909 missing, and 6,109 people injured across 20 prefectures, and 130,430 totally destroyed and 263,883 damaged buildings
(NPA, 2012). Miyagi, Iwate and Fukushima Prefectures were the worst hit, with 9,524, 4,671, and 1,606 deaths respectively (NPA, 2012). Aerial television footage showed entire towns being swept away and many residential areas, fishing ports, and industrial and commercial zones have been severely damaged or even completely destroyed.
The earthquake also disconnected the Fukushima Daichi nuclear power plant from the electricity grid, and the tsunami then overcame the plant’s 5.7m sea defences, flooding the facilities housing the back-up generators and causing the reactors’ cooling systems to fail.

Three reactors online at the time of the quake went into emergency shut-down but, without any electricity supply and with cooling systems disabled, their fuel rods began to melt.
Reactors 1, 3 and 4 then experienced hydrogen explosions that tore open the reactor buildings and reactors 1, 2 and 3 suffered ‘melt-throughs’ of nuclear fuel into their containment vessels and the release of radioactive materials into the environment. The government implemented an emergency evacuation within 20km radius of the plant, and advised those between 20 and
30km to stay indoors. This order was extended to include areas beyond the evacuation zone that had experienced radioactive contamination. On 11 April Japan’s Nuclear Industrial
Safety Agency (NISA) raised the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES) rating to 7, placing Fukushima alongside the catastrophe at Chernobyl in 1986 (Kushida, 2012).
A Tale of Two Cities: Rikuzentakata and Ishinomaki
Examining the tsunami’s impacts on two settlements that bore its full force, Rikuzentakata is a south facing town situated at the southern end of the picturesque Sanriku coastline, which is characterised by its many steep-sided rias. The main settlement lies on an alluvial fan at the head of one of these rias. Due to its proximity to the north-western Pacific subduction zone this region has experienced many destructive tsunami, notably in 869, 1611, 1896 and 1933, with the ria topography showing a tendency to ‘amplify’ the tsunami and its impacts on human settlements (Abe, 2005). Moreover, due to the steep-sided forested valleys and rural
Japan’s reliance on fishing and wet-rice agriculture, coastal settlements such as Rikuzentakata have tended to be squeezed onto the available flat coastal land at or near sea level, rendering them especially vulnerable to seismic disturbance. Hence, on 11 March 2011, as the tsunami advanced towards Rikuzentakata it appears to have been funnelled by both the ria, and the town’s tightly packed buildings, such that its height measured more than 20 metres over land.
Photo 1 depicts apartment blocks near the coast, with the shore side showing inundation to the fourth floor, while photo 2 shows that the majority of the town’s buildings and infrastructure were destroyed by the tsunami. Indeed, 3,159 buildings were totally destroyed in Rikuzentakata, and most that remained standing have either been demolished, or are scheduled for demolition.
Photo 1. Apartment blocks near the shore at Rikuzentakata (Photo: Author, August 2011).

Photo 2. The view across Rikuzentakata towards the south-east, showing the shape of the ria, and municipal gymnasium at centre (Photo: Author, August 2011).

In 2010 Rikuzentakata’s population was 23,302, which had shrunk by 5.7% in the five years since 2005, and was projected by 2030 to have declined by 22.8% to 17,989 (NIPSSR, 2008).
The confirmed death toll from the disaster was 1,691, with 41 people remaining missing, or
7.4% of the town’s 2010 population (Rikuzentakata City, 2012). On 1 May 2012 the estimated population of Rikuzentakata was 19,796 (Iwate Prefecture, 2012). Projecting over twenty years through to 2030, and including confirmed dead and missing but not including the potential long-term migration and fertility impacts of the disasters, shows an estimated population reduction of at least 30.2% to 16,257.
The heavy death toll and destruction in Rikuzentakata appears to have been caused by a combination of factors. As described, the town’s physical and built environment amplified the tsunami’s impacts such that nearly the whole town was submerged and destroyed. Second, with 65% of deaths across the region being people aged over 60, mainly due to mobility problems or being slow to vacate their homes in the cold weather, those towns with a larger population of older people appear to have suffered a disproportionately (Japan Times, 2011;
See figure 2). Third, due to the heavy damage to buildings, damage to connecting transportation, and Rikuzentakata’s remote location, it is likely that secondary casualties were higher in the hours following the disaster as people sought shelter and medical attention in the freezing weather. For example, the largest evacuation centre in the town, the municipal gymnasium, was itself overcome by the tsunami, killing many inside (photo 2).
2
10.7% of confirmed deaths from the disaster came from Rikuzentakata, whose population comprises
4% of the three affected prefectures.
Figure 2. Population structure by age group in Rikuzenatakata, Ishinomaki and Japan (2010).
Population in 2010
Rikuzentaka… 11,7
Ishinomaki 12,6
Japan 13,3
53,4
60,1
63,6
34,9
27,3
23,1
0-14
15-64
65+
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Sources: Japan Statistical Yearbook (2012), and Rikuzenatakata and Ishinomaki municipal websites.
2 This incident was related to me by a taxi driver in Rikuzentakata, in August 2011.

Located in northern Miyagi Prefecture to the south-west of Rikuzentakata and north-east of
Sendai, Ishinomaki is also a south facing coastal settlement. It too endured the full force of the tsunami, but with a different topography from Rikuzentakata, it appears to have suffered less. Prior to the tsunami its population was declining, by 3.9% between 2005 and 2010, from
167,324 to 160,826. As of June 2012 there were 3,236 dead and 493 missing in Ishinomaki
(Ishinomaki City, 2012) from the tsunami, representing 2.3% of the city’s 2010 population, as against 7.4% for Rikuzentakata. Projecting to 2030 shows an estimated population reduction for Ishinomaki of at least 25.5% to 118,576.
The main settlement of Ishinomaki is not bounded by a steep sided ria. Indeed, about a kilometre inland from the coast on the western side of the city there is an embankment which served both as an escape route for people fleeing the tsunami as well as a sea-defence for a large area of the city that lies behind (See photos 3 and 4). Due to this topography, and the fact that the city is larger and goes back further inland, a smaller proportion of the city’s buildings and infrastructure were destroyed and a smaller percentage of residents died than in
Rikuzentakata. Moreover, most survivors that had lost their homes were able to find emergency accommodation in evacuation centres and then longer term temporary accommodation which was set up nearby and within the city proper. In Rikuzentakata, however, nearly the entire settlement was swept away, and temporary housing had to be built some distance away on land in the surrounding hills. Consequently, many housed in
Ishinomaki have found their post-disaster circumstances a little less difficult. For example, one temporary housing centre I visited in Rikuzentakata (photo 5) was located deep in the hills behind the town on a green-field site, and lacked facilities such as children's play areas, shops, post office, bank, and public spaces. People had either to catch the infrequent local bus, pre-order a taxi, or drive to conduct their ordinary day-to-day business; things that many of the displaced in Ishinomaki could do on foot or by bicycle due to being located within the city environs.
Photo 3: The view inland from near the Ishinomaki shoreline towards Kadonowaki
Elementary School and the protective ridge behind (Photo: Author, August 2011).

Photo 4: View of Ishinomaki inland and up-river from atop the protective ridge. Note the area in the background and to the left which was sheltered by the ridge and suffered less damage, while the river island’s buildings (centre-right) were nearly all destroyed by the tsunami’s advance (Photo: Author, August 2011).

Photo 5: Temporary accommodation in the forested hills behind Rikuzentakata. The main settlement can be seen in the distance (Photo: Author, August 2011).
In addition to these differences, other longer-term issues have appeared. More than in
Ishinomaki, Rikuzentakata’s municipal capacity and infrastructure was destroyed in the tsunami, with the death of approximately one third of the municipal government’s employees, and the loss of documentation, buildings, and equipment such as telephones and computers.
The town, therefore, began its recovery from a lower base and this has been made more difficult by its remoteness. Unlike in Ishinomaki, the train line connecting Rikuzentakata into the region has not yet been restored, making debris clearance and delivery of supplies and construction materials – vital initial components of reconstruction – slow and difficult. It has also been difficult for workers and volunteers to get to the settlement to assist with debris clearance, installation of basic infrastructure, and provision of services. There is, for example, little accommodation for non-residents near the town, so volunteers and temporary workers often have to find accommodation as far away as Sendai and organise daily buses for the two hour ride to the town, reducing the time available to contribute to recovery. Consequently, the speed of reconstruction and recovery planning and their achievement has been considerably complicated in Rikuzentakata due to the more severe impacts and its remoteness; indeed, little seems to have been achieved as yet other than debris clearance and stabilisation of essential services (See, Economist, 2012).

Planning for the Recovery
On 11 April 2011 Prime Minister Naoto Kan delivered a message to the people of Japan that established three principles for recovery;
1.
to create a regional society that is highly resistant to natural disasters,
2.
to establish a social system that allows people to live in harmony with the global environment, and
3.
to build a compassionate society that cares about people, in particular, the vulnerable (Kan, 2011).
Although the initial government response was rapid and well co-ordinated, and a large number of volunteers and personnel from overseas made vital contributions to stabilising the affected locales, subsequent government efforts get recovery under way were mired in political in-fighting over management of the nuclear crisis, the intentions and status of PM
Kan, and continue to this day over how to pay the immense cost of reconstruction and nuclear decommissioning. The government has come under harsh criticism for this loss of momentum and for its management of the multiple crises that have ensued since the tsunami.
For example, the Reconstruction Agency was established on 10 February 2012, taking seven months longer than the equivalent agency after the Great Hanshin Earthquake in 1995.
Moreover, community planning is being stalled throughout Tōhoku due to questions over building regulations, availability of finance, and consensus among participants over the way forward and, as described, there are appearing wide differentials between municipalities in achieving reconstruction (Economist, 2012).
Many of the problems encountered have been a result of complications arising out of the
Fukushima nuclear disaster. Much government time and resources have gone into developing and implementing a plan to stabilise the plant’s reactors. Housing and caring for nuclear evacuees, securing the evacuation zone, and planning for the future of these communities require considerable efforts to coordinate and is ongoing; as yet there is no decision as to whether, where or how these communities will remain together. Then there are the issues of cleanup of contaminated areas outside the evacuation zones, location and identification of human remains, clearance and disposal of contaminated debris, and the enormous challenges involved in beginning the decades long decommissioning process. At all stages of the recovery and reconstruction process throughout Tōhoku, and indeed Japan, the problem of
Fukushima raises its head to complicate and slow the process of achieving the reconstruction

of settlements and, as far as possible within the circumstances outlined herein, community revival.
On 25 June 2011 the Reconstruction Design Council published its report, establishing seven principles as a framework for reconstruction and ‘disaster reduction’, and which boil down to
(RDC, 2011: 2);
1.
a focus on local communities and human linkages,
2.
accepting that disasters occur, and basing survival on ‘self-aid’, and
3.
developing the conditions for mutual aid and public aid.
The report is divided into four chapters that, broadly, make 15 recommendations for
‘rebuilding the region’, ‘restoring life and livelihood’, ‘working towards reconstruction after the nuclear accident’, and ‘open reconstruction’.
3
These recommendations have then been filtered through the relevant ministries, and prefectural and local governments, to inform specific regional and local planning objectives. Since then, each prefecture and municipality has begun to compile planning documents for achieving their own versions of reconstruction and recovery, though there has as yet been a heavier emphasis on the ‘hard’ reconstruction of the built environment, and perhaps less on the ‘softer’ aspects of maintaining citizen health and well-being. Ishinomaki City, for example, published in December 2011 its 126 page plan to be completed within ten years (Ishinomaki, 2011), broken down into three periods of:
1.
3 years (to 2014): Restoration – of housing, infrastructure, industrial base, and prepare for further development.
2.
4 years (to 2018): Regeneration – of city and community vitality and increase the value of the region.
3.
3 years (to 2021): Further Development – as a new, attractive and vibrant area in which people will want to live.
Rikuzentakata municipal government, meanwhile, and with the assistance of officials from other municipalities such as Nagoya and nearby Hachimantai City, has restored its basic systems and functions and produced a 57 page plan (Rikuzenatakata, 2011), also published in
December 2011, which identifies a two stage process towards recovery as follows:
1.
3 years (to 2014) – Infrastructure reconstruction.
3 The full report in English can be found at the Cabinet Secretariat website here: http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/fukkou/english/pdf/report20110625.pdf
.

2.
5 years (to 2019) – Reconstruction development.
Rikuzentakata identifies six objectives, with these being to (1) collaboratively create a city that is (2) resistant to disasters, (3) comfortable and attractive, (4) vibrant, (5) environmentally friendly, and (6) where citizens’ lives are stable. The report produces attractive designs for the settlement’s layout including a narrow pine woodland at the shoreline, behind which is a 12.5 metre levee for tsunami protection. Immediately inside the levee will be a park, with industrial zones behind and downtown, and residential areas behind these on an area raised by about 5 metres at the foot of the surrounding hillsides. A railway will pass through the centre of the new town connecting various districts. The plans assume a base population of 25,000 people, with some moving in from nearby smaller communities and hamlets to create a more compact settlement.
Conclusion: Looking to the Future of Tōhoku and Japan
Since 11 March 2011 national politics has appeared fractious and delivered less than expected by many ordinary people. Nevertheless, information about the impacts of the earthquake and tsunami is being collected and analysed, and planning documents produced at every layer of the administrative machinery to try to deliver regional reconstruction and community revival.
The plans at present are full of beautiful ideals and ambitious objectives; but there is a danger of creating unrealistic expectations among affected communities, and of over-capacity appearing in infrastructure and housing due to optimistic assumptions about population trends. Rikuzentakata is planning on rebuilding for a vibrant town of 25,000 inhabitants in
2021 (Rikuzentakata City, 2011). My rough and conservative estimates show a population shrinking below 16,257 nine years later.
Already, some individuals and families are deciding for themselves where they will live and under what circumstances, because they are eager to move on with the rest of their lives and the planning process appears slow. Others have moved elsewhere in Japan to find work or schooling for children, are establishing new lives and relationships, and may never return.
New structures are already appearing where old ones have been cleared away, and this is complicating the planning and reconstruction process. Thousands of concrete plinths – the original foundations of destroyed buildings – stand ready to bear new structures (see photo
2); inevitably some will remain empty and serve as memorials to what was there before.
Some communities will be built on raised land, or moved to surrounding hillsides, with huge

sea-walls built to protect against future events. The cost of such measures will be huge and, mired in public debts passing 230% of GDP, the Japanese government will almost certainly have to face down a compromise between the need to rebuild Tōhoku and decommission
Fukushima Daiichi, and to maintain a the national economy in an era of ageing, depopulation and climate change. Few are daring to suggest, for example, that municipal governments should plan for shrinkage by acknowledging that some communities will, in the fullness of time, disappear altogether, or that current sea-defence plans will be rendered unworkable in the event of dramatic rises in sea-level.
It is almost inevitable that communities in Tōhoku will be smaller, older, and perhaps less crowded. Spaces where buildings and neighbourhoods once stood will become empty and overgrown, or be redeveloped as, for example, car parks or children’s playgrounds. Tōhoku will rebuild itself, after a fashion, and it will not disappear; but it will remain an ageing, shrinking, and declining region. Indeed, these processes look set to accelerate. The planning and implementation of the reconstruction and recovery will need to take account of this if it is to be meaningful and effective for the region's future.
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